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'S.O' 014 .283*.

McLain, Douglas, Jr. .

United States Security and Salt Two. kekrt of,a r".Wingspread Conference (Racine; W4*sconsin, February 9,1979).Department of State, WasAington,- D.O.; JohnsonFoundation; Inc., Racine, Wis.; Wiscqnsin UniR.,IMilwaukee. Inst. of World Affairs.May 7925p. .

Johnson Foundation, 33 East Four. Mile Road, Racine,WI 53401 (free).Viewpoints (120) Collected Works ConferenceProceedings (021)

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*Disarmament; Foreign Policy; InternationalRelations; *National Defense; Peace; War; WorldAffairs*Strategic Arms Limitation.Talks; AISSR

ABSTRACT _-Eugene Rostow (Yale University) and David Tarr

(University of Wisconsin) present their views concerning the wisdomand tOidity of U.S. security policies, including SALT, and theadequacy of the country's political/military planning. Rostow,representing the vievth of the dommittee on the Present Danger,belieiies that America is losing the capabIlity of m9unting a lethalsecond strike.because.it has perMitted the nuclear balance to tiltagacnst us. Jinless the balance is restored, the,United States'will teunable to Oach equitable or safe agreements with the Soviets. Tarr,invited by'the Institute of World Affairs, stresses ,the profoundeffect of the U.S. desdent from nuetear superiority to balance. Inhis.view this parity has weakened the deterrent value of nuclearweapons for protection of our allies. The issue of SALT TWO hasbecome Less releN?ant compared to the juxtaposition of-conventionalarms and other areas of.competition between the superpowers,. Both,

, speakers agreed that the Soviet Union does not want nuClear war..Rather, the USSR mould prefer to have its,adversary concede. (RM)

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, U S. DEWARTMENT OF EDUCATIONNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

f DUC'ATIONAt RESOURCES INFORMATIONLENTER tERIC,

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UVIED STATES SECURITYAND SALT TWO

RepOrtQf ".

A Wingspread CanfereAceconvened by the

'Corninitteb on the Present Dxiger: /and the

InStitute of WoHd Affairso

The University :of Wisbonsin-Milwaukea. in cooperatiodwith.The Johnson' Foundtilon'

Racine, Wiscon-SinFebruary 9,,1979'

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"PERMISSION"CO WRODUCE THISMATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

-H-enr -Ha /571-ecL,

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TO THE'EDUCANONAt. RESOURCESINFORMATIO CENTER (ERIC)."

R,eport prepared byDouglas McLain, Jr.

Mr. McLain, a retired Foreign Service Officer,is Assistant Professor, Internationa1 RelationsMajor, and Assistant Director, Instituteof World-Affairs-of Tbe University of Wisconsin-

A

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

INTRODUCTION

FROM THE COLD WARTO THE SALT TALKS:THE EMERGINGSTRATEGIC EQUATION

SALT TWO'- CATCH 22 -14i

DISCUSSION

3

,-."

'

In June, 1978 The University ofWisconSin-Milwaukee's Institute ofWorld Affairs and the United StatesDepartment of State, with the co-operation of The Johnson Founda-tion, convened a conference on"United States Security and theSoviet Challenge." Because thismeeting concentrated on the statusOf the proposed SALT TWO treaty,speakers included representativesfrom the Unieed States Departmentof Defense and the United StatesLlepartment of State, as well asPaul Warnke, then the nation'schief negotiaIor for the ALT TWOtalks.

In order to present a differinganalysis of the issue tq essentiallythe same audience, an invitationwas extended to the Committee onthe Present Danger to present thatorgarLization's, point of view. Thiswas done in a spirit cohsistent withthe principle of balanced dialogueat Wingspread ?Irgetings. The edu-Cational miAion of The Universitypf Wisconsin-Milwaukee's Instituteof World Affairg 4 e9ually dedicatedto presenting diff ring.points ofview on issues of t s,diverse points of vi w are best pre-sented at the Aame` eeting, but forreasons of logistics it is not alwayspossible, and a folloW-up meeting isarranged in ordento achieve balance.

Amondpersons invited to bothmeetings by The University ofWisconsin-Milwaukee's Institute ofWorld Affairs were members of theWisconsin Citizens' catif.inet, a groupof opinion leaders organized throughthe work Of the Institute of WorldAffairs and The Johnson Fouhda-tion for the purpose of keepingcitizens informed on foreign policyissues. -"-

When the meeti ith the Com-mittee on the P ent Danger washeld in February, 1979, its timelinessoccurred to all those present, giventhe dien-recent visit to the UnitedStas of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping.of tIlp people's Republic Ithina.

FOREWORD

We were aware of the imphcationswhich the visit might have forUnited States-Soviet detente. How-ever, it can be said that in anyperiod, it is important to offer opinionleaders balanced presentations of atimely topic, because we live in aclimate of constant political, eco-nomic and social change.

Of all the foreign policy issues withwhich the United States' citizenry,must be familiar .and expless itsviews4or the consideration ofgovernment representatives, noneis moreimportant to the security of.the nation than being sufficientlyknowledgeable, complex as the issueis, to think through ways to preventthe unthinkable holocaust of anuclear war.

In, my welcome to participants atthe Wingspread meeting referencewas made to some of the conferencesin which The Johnson Foundation .has recently cooperated. The scope

oofthese included: *

Alt

cooperation with the President'sCoMmission on Mental Health,reducing urban youth unem-ployment,coping with changes in Americanfamily life,improving education in basicskills,prevention of child abuse,long-tetnicdre and the aging ofAmerica,wilderness preservation,formation of a National Coalition'for Jail Reform,a planning meeting on theUnited Nations' Year of theChild.

It is tippr4riate for The JohnsonFoundation to assist in conveningspecialists to discuss these subjects,

.but we must never forget that pro-grams conducted to improve thehuman condition will count fornothing if we live under a cloud offear that millions of lives may 'belost and the physical environmentbecome unlivahle thrgugh nuclear

0

destruction and contamination.

To think through and, work outways of preventing the unthinkable,while assuring United States secu-rity, is why two Wingspread meet-ings were held. We are indebted tothe Committee on- the PresentDanger and the Institute of WorldAffairs of The University of Wis-consin-Milkaukee, including Pro-fess r Carol Baumann who'was

rCh person for this presentation.

Tne Johnson Foundation, acting onpolicy set by the Trustees, willcontinue its role of advan.cing publicunderstanding`df this overridingissue through open and balanceddialogue, alwayg hdpeful that theseendeavors ma.y help, howevermodestly, to prevent the disasterwhich would result from the use ofnuclear weapons.

Les lie PaffrathA Pregident

The JohnsoTh-Foundation

A

J"... Unless we take urgent measures at onceto reverse current :trends, the Russwns in afew years' time will have the capacay tofight a nuclear war and to win such a warin the mihtary s'ense of ending up in undis-puted command of the battlefield and beingin a posaion to dictate the peace."

Nun! Naze. former DeputySecretary of Refense 'and memberof the United States SA LT dekgationfrom l96g:l974May 7, 1478

In June, 1978 a group of WiscOnsincivic le4ders !net for a briefing onthe SALT TWO negotiations ,bychief United States $ALT negotiatorPaul C. Warnke and other UnitedStates*government officials. Theprincipal elements of ,the treatyexpeicted to etnerge from the tailswere'described, The Acizinistrationspokesmen argued that astablestrategic nuclear balance Sexiststoday and that the SALT TWOtreaty, as proposed, was a sound,fair, verifiable agreement that wouldenhance United States s'ecurity and %place limits on the buildup of nuMear

., weapons. .

Many thoughtWand concernedpersons 'disagree. The other side ofthe coin in the developing nationaldebate on SALT is the position thatthe Sovit Union is developing ,astriategic advantage that imperilsthesecond strike" capability of theUnited States; that this could lead4,to successful Russian nuclear black-mail or victOry in an, atomic wal.;that no treaty, including SAWTWO, could be sucbessfully negoti-ated with the Soviets from such aposition of 'weakness. In addition, ,opponents of SALT TWO believethe treaty Would ratify a statu&-ofUnited States strategic disadvan-tage wherein the'credibility, of ournuclear deterrent would be reduced

Nid

INTRODUCTION

to the point where Soviet conven-tional .military adventurism could .be checked only with great difficulty.

With this in mind, the Committeeon the Presemt Danger and theInstitute of World Affairs of TheUniversity, of Wisconsin in coopera-tioh with The Johnson Foundationconvened a meeting at Wingspreadincluding those same Wisconsincvic leaders to hear the views ofthose who. seriously 'question the,,wisdolm and validity .of currenfMilted States security policiesincluding SALT and the adequacyof the Administration's' political/military planning.

The University of Wisconsin's Dr.Dal&id Tarr, nationally knownscholar of security policy and experton strategic issues, appeared at theinvitation qf the Institute of WorldAffairs. Dr. 'Eugene Rostow of YaleUniversitysrepresented the Com-mittee on the Present Danger.

In her opening remarks, Dr. CarolEctler Baumanp,-Director of the.Institute of World Affairs, stressedthe crucial nAthre of the SALT

%debate in terms of national securityand the need for the contribution bfinftormed citizens to the fesolutionof that debate.-

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A

A

FigureSTRATEGIC RATIOS A-ND STRATEGIC DOCTRINES

Strategic Ratio

Superio'rit

Advantage

Offsetting Ad-I,vantages and Parity

'InferioritY

United States.

Cooperation

gomPetition,..

j

.

Strategic Doctrine

Offensive Superiority

Qualitative Superiority

Essential Eq\ivalenceand ,

Assurgd aestiuction

Minimuni Deterrence

. Figure 2:STRATEWC PARITY. MODEL

ooperation

Jr

U.S.S.R.

Comp.etition

1

,40'

,

, ,----.N Arms Control U.S.Sjt. Advantage

, United Siates Advaintage..

Arms Race..4,

flow to use the matrix aboveI f the United States opts for cooperation and the U S S.R for competition. the results would beU.S.S.R. advantage, if the United States and the 1.1 S S.R. both opt for competitaln. an arms race-would result, and so, forth.

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3.-

The task assigned to mctoday isimpossible.'I have been given fortyminutes. I cannot speak on thistopic fur less than fifty minutes aday over an entire semester, but.Iwill try. Tu facilitate this atty<it Ihave designed twu Charts that mayappear mysterious at first. Theymay remain a mystery1 after mycom'ments, but I hope they will'guide you through a conceptualanal,ysis of our subject. The chartsare. igur 1, Strategic Ratios andStra etic Doctrines, and Figure 2,The Strategic Parity Model.

Since what I really would like to dois present a backdrop for a discus-

., sion of SALT TWO rather than totalk specifically about SALT ONE,SALT TWO and the technplogy andthe politics involved, I have toengage in techniqueS of simplifica-

{tion a'nd analysis in developing aconceptualcscheme It is the kind ofscheme that miiht drive historiansup the wall, but political scientistsenjoy an ignoranok of history suf-ficient to permit them to make suchgeneralizations with confidence

I wiofi attempt to cover the periodfrOm 1945 to the present in terms ofthe evolving strategic equdtion. Iwould like to say something sub-stantive about this, but there reallyis not time. So what I have done isto icle#tify four possible power ratios,that might obtain between theUntted States and the Soviet Union(See Figure 1): (a) superiority, (h)advantage, (c) offsetting advantage3--and/ panty,' and (d) infenority., From1945 to the present we have experi-enced all of these ratios except that,in my judgment, the UnitedStates

David W. Tarr, ProfeSZ of Political Scienceat yhe Uniterbst) Wiatunsin Mad satinengages in research and teaching in areas ofunited States foreign policy, strategic issues,and security studies. He received a Rock«.feller Grant in 1977 for a project on armscontrol and disarMament carried out aj,,theHarrard University Center for Science a,ndInternational Affairs Dr Tarr is the authorof American Strategy in the Nuclear Ageand co.editor of Modules io Security Studies.

C.

FROM THE COLD- WATO THE SALT TALKS7L,

THE EMERGINGSTRATEGIC EQUATION

David W. Tarr

has not been in the position ufinferiorityyet. This is tu say, webegan the period of the Cold Warwith delr military superiority, atleast in terms of strategic puwer,lung-range nuclear weapons andthe capacity to,inflict serious harmupon the homeland uf the SuNietUnion. We have tried tu maintainthat superiority over a- substantialperiod of time. However, over timethe power-ratio changed to ach antage and, more recently, tu parity.

At the/outset, of course, the UnitedStes had a monopoly of atomicpower. It had a virtual monopoly uf'delivery systems\because it had alohg-range air reach, and it hadoverseas bases from which it couldsaike gne Soviet Union in a way theSoviet Union oould not match.,Thatatomic monopoly ceas-ed in 1919when the Soviet Union exploded itsfirst atomic device. Then a phasewhich is largely characterized by"American nuclear superiority began.In the 1960s there began to be anerosion of what almostany malystwould regard as strategic superior-ity. This w.as largely a result ofAmerican decisiorrs not to add to itsstrategic arsenal, but is also due tothe Soviet thrust to catch up withthe United States in nuclear weap-onry. By the late 1960's, the powerratio is thus better characterized as"str4egic advantage" for the UnitedStates rather than strategic supgri-ority. Now Lcould give you a nom-inal definition of "superiority" thatmight satisfy Henry Kissinger (whoof course has asked "what,in God'sname is superiority?"), and I couldyive you a nominal definition of"advantage." Howevei.,, the realnub of the issue here is the opera-tionfil definition. In specific militarycapabilities, and posture, what con-stitutes "superiority" and ",advan-tage"?

Unfortunately, I w1l have to glossover that:because-fin fact, it involvesa very complex argument involv,ing

s '6

I

.4)

interpretations of the signjficancea specific weapons systems un bothsides. Suffice it to say that.theUnited States once enjoyed strategic"superiority" in a meaninUfulmilitary sense uf that word. Presi-dent Nixon, uf all people, was thefirst president-K.) abandon the use ofthe term, instead adupting a policyof ''sufficiency." In short, by 1969-19701 we appear tu have arrived-atnuclear parity. I think it is better tothink ip terms of "offsetting advan-tages" rather than "parity," becausewe are dealing with an asymmetri-cal relationship and the asym-metries in the strategic equation are

, important, although they make the,debate .difficult to comprehend. Ineffect, we are comparing Sovitroranges with American apples andtrying to came up with so-called"rough equivalence" of strategicforces. There are those Who have

- said that we have slipped into aposition of strategic inferiority. Iwill not address that question atthis moment, I simply indicate thatI have put it on the list because it isnot only possibility, but becausethe other party in the strategicequation (the Soviet Union) wasonce, in fact, in such a Lposition.Also, there is a paint of view and astrategic doctrine inthe United,States which justifies and advocatesstrategic 'inferiority for us.

In Figure 1 in the column to theright there are doctrines whichmatch the strategic ratios. Thesedoctrines are descriptions of par-ticular strategic relationships. Thereare,more doctrines than I have,listed and there are some I do notknow where to locate. For example,I do nOt know Kliere to place,"limitedcounterforce"which was a doctrineintroduced formally in 1974 bySecretaxy of Defense Schlesinger. Ido not know whether.it is'moreappropriatesto "strategic advantage"or to "offsettitag advantages andparity." At an rate, it seemeduseful to this presentation to try to

match up these Vito columns

AS I have indicated, the pnitedStates has gone through stagesfrom "strategic suOrionty" through"strategic advantage" down to"parity" of strategic power. inreviewing these phases we need toanalyze the underlying policies thatreflected the shifts in the strategicequarion within which we wereassured both then and now thatnuclear deterrence cpntinued to beeffective and stable.

To analyze the logic of these policies,I have constructed two "models" ofdeterrence, if you willtwo differentconceptions ordeterrence which arequite distinct. The first one is simple.I call it the Cold War, or supremacy,model. In general, 'deterrence in-cludes two ideas: one is a rational

-calculation that war is unprofitable;the other is the more emotionalfactorfear of punitive attack. In"other words, deterrence disconrageswar by military threat that eitherconvinces an adversary that theconsequences would be unacceptable,4 more basically, simply frightensthe adversary. In the Cold Warmodel, the interesting thingbothin the public sector and to a largedegree amsog.many analysts inuniversitiesis that the question ofintentions of the two strategiccompetitors cv as not regarded as a .

serious problem. The orthodoxdetcription of the Cold War satiationVvab that the United States was thedefender of peace; fredom and thestatus quo, and that the SovietUnion was an aggressorexpansiveand dangerous. Therefore, thedefending, or status quo power, hadthe role in international relations ofmaintaining stability and peacethrough deterrence, The.aggressiveintentions .of the Soviets were clear,rather than open to question theconclusions were obvious. Strategicsupremacy was necessary. That is,the greater the strategic athantagethe United States had over rhe$oviet Union, the better deterrencewas asstimed to work. The reversewas also the case, for example,people became concerned whenAmerican strategic power wasbelieve to be slippihg under thealleged tuip1n cy of Eisenhower,when the socalle missile gap arose.

As the Soviet Union began to catchup, a second conception of strategic'deterrence was needed-to justifySoviett gains in terms of the strategic,position of the United States. Tbiaresulted in a very substantial debatein the 1960's. I am sorry that debateis -43;cer, hecause.most of the inierest-ing options then under considerationhave disappeared or gone beyondthe fringe of strategic debate oftoday. The, resulting consensusmakes me uncomfortable.

Unlike the Cold War modpl, whichis simifie, the second deterrentmodel is complex. I 'call it the "Stra-tegic Parity Model" (Figure 2). Thisis repreisented by a matrix thatshows tile strategic interdependenceof weapons and armaments deci-sions on the part of theUnitedStates and the Soviet Union. Itsimplifies these decisions by reduc-ing the strategic choices of eachnation to two options: "cooperationm."and 'competition." We could pursue,and we have pursued policies ofcooperation with the Soviet UniOn.Some of these policies have been, infact, unilateral. For example, Secre-tary of Defense McNamara decidednot to increase strategic missilelaunchers beyond the numbersdeployed in 1967.. He made thisdecision and also generally opposeddeployment of strategic defenses,auch as the anti ballistic missilesystem, on the grouiids that sucactions might proVoke'Soyi re-sponses that were counterOrcluctive.Indeed the assured destiuctiondoctrine with which Secro,toryMcNamara is identified is, infact, aunilateral American effort to enlistcooperation by inducing the SovietUnion to 'engage in this madnesswith us, thus making it MutualAssured Destruction (MAD). Thatis, both sides "cooperate" by notdefending their own cities and bynot targeting thtir opponent's strategic forcesthus producing abizarre form of strategic stkahilitybased on the mutual vulnerabiliirof their populations.

,As my matrix indicated (Figure 2),if, we both simultaneously choosecooperative policies, the most likelyresult would be "arms control"anagreed reduction of strategic weapons. On the other hand, we both

7

mi5ht choose to compete. Strategiccompetition is characterized byweapons decisions and deploymentsthat seek to gain advantages overthe other side. Here, there arckin-teresting incentives for each side,whetlir we assume,aggressiveintent or not.-That is, there arestrong incentives for.both to choosecompetition and ad .ntage, overcooperation. Fo e , there is adefensive incentivewe fear the '.other- side may deploy wpaponssystems that give them significantadvantage in military and politicalcapability, resulting in grave stra-tegic disadvantage to our side. Tooffset those possib-lities, our Pe-search and developn1nt programspursue qualitative impr vements inweapons to prevent this result. Asimilar incentive exists on theothersitleias well. This is further compli-cated by the fact that a decision todevelo% a weapbn and deploy itrequires a long `9ead time," forcingus and the Soviets to enga'ge ip vanticipatory competitiveidecisionswith respect to each othel.

The matrix (Figure 2) shows four ,

possible outcomes o£ decision. Ifboth sides choose to cooperate, pre-sumably.we coUld have arms controlsor even disarmament. If both sideschoose to comizete, the result is an,arms race. But the most interestingset of Variables is when one sidehouses one option ATI the pth er

si e the other. If we weft to co-op rateand it appears that ourpol cy.preference since thdbeginningof ALT has been in this directionand the Soviet Union were to com- .-

pete by means of a crash "Manhat-tan Prjject" to develop a new typeof strategic weapon, we could findourselves confronted with a Sovietadvantage. On th,e other hand, ifthe Soviet Union were to cooperatein the strategic realm and the UnitedStates were to push hard to gain anadvantage (i.e. "comPete"), theSonet Union might find itself backin a position of strategic inferiority.In short, while 'eheh sicfe hasonlytwo chofces (cooperation ancr-com-petition), there are at least threeincentives. Defensive incentivesexist on both sides to preven't theother side from +achievingtages. Secondly there are o fensiveincentives for each has good reason

,

, .

to feel more secure i f the other side'smilitary capabilities are infecior.4Finally there are cooperativeincentives, because the presentstrategic situation is extremelydangerous. It .is alto a costly §itu-ation. There are those in bothsocieties who would like to reallocate'resources to programs other thanthose of defense. Moreover com-petitive relations)-iip-s usually in-crease tensions, there are manywho want to reduce tensions betweenthe two sides. Su cooperation is, animportant incentive fur both govern-ments.

,, . .

In actual practicelwe find a mixtureof, incentives and,choices. What Isuggest is going on today, in termsof my conceptilal scherne, is that.both sides are orchestrating strate-giescooperation and competition.Therefore, one of the more difficultproblems for our policy makers is toidentify the other side's cooperatMeand competitive intentions andactions. I will try to analyze that in'the few minutes we have le t. I willAlso trY to do something vhich isprobably a little uncomfor able torsome of usthat is, to use my matrix

..,- to:Identify positions in the currentstrategic debate. For examplej amgoing to tyfy to show where theCommittee on the Present Dangerfits on the matrix.

If we go back to the four ratiosstrategic superiority (or supremacy)strategic advantage, parity,4ndinferiority, we see that tkey can boeintrinsically confusing. For example,could the Russians recognize a-dis-tinction between the "cold war'supremacy" model and the newmodel of strategic parity, representedby the matrix, in which we seekonly "strategic dvantage" throughqualitative sup6riority? How couldthe Russians distinguish betweenthese two objectives? On the other,hand, how can the' United,Statesknow whether the Soviet Union fissimply seeking to maintain parityor whether it really has adopted anaggressive posture as is suggeste.dby the cold war model? There arethose in our society ,who still advo-cate supremacy. They argue thatthe Soviet Union'is an inherentthreat to the West militarily, politi-cally, 'and ideologically.

.Let us turn to the ne)ict category. Apush for "stretegic advantage" isprobably a basic objectiye of peoplelike Senator Htnry Jackton and TheCdmmittee on the Present .Danger.That is to say, what really concernssome analysts is the possibility %atthe Soviet Union will gain signiii-ctg.strategic war-fighting adven-tages, which will lead to bolderSoviet policies and contribute to theerosion of the Western alliance. Inthis event should war occur, theSoviefs might' have 4i significantmilitary advantage on the -battle-field. Such advantage might leavethe United States incapable orunwilling to act (deterred), or actu-ally defeated.

Do those on the ,C ommittee,on thePresent Danger and other's, includ-'ing Senator Jackson,' pally wantan Americon advanta0? .1 am sure

erhey would accept it It is morecomfortable. Moreover, since we arethe deterring and status quo power,we have no interek in territorial orother acquisitions, so an Americanadvantage would mit endanger

'others, it would reinTorce'deterrenceInt it does, of coutse,, suggest thesame underlying logic as the coldwar.rnodel of strategic supremacy

-The next calegoryjs nuclear'parity.,Parity has become a popular con-

cept. According to the spokesmen in,. the Arms Control arid Disarmament." Agencyand the-State Department,

,is the best AratIgic outcome. Ininterviews with members of the

Attrs Control and Disarmament.4.4*.-.Agency, I have been impressed by

the -degree to which they appear' tob-e-toncerned more about the fuelingOf The arms race from our domesticprocess than'from the internationalcoompetitiop which I am addressingheq,,Arms control to them appearsto. involve dapening the enthusi-asm and spit'a for new armamentsin the United States. They wouldlike to retard ti4 production of newweapons systeks, while l'iolding theoverall letrels of strategic weaponsfairly high\in oilier to maintain astable baralice based on mutualassured destruction. This', as I haveexplained, is regarded as essentiallya cooperative strategy.

And now the fourth category. Whetabout "inferiority?': Are there any

people in our sodetN who advocatestrategic inferiority? WQ, such abtlief has persisted in some, sectorsthrough must periods of strategiccompetition between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union. Manyfeel that there is-no place to hide,"and that at a certain level of nuclear

' conflict,..it is all over. In this 'view,,stratwic thinking stops when deter-rence fails. From this perspectivethe basic requirement is simple.have "enoiigh" strategic weaponst( harm your adversaryQat a certainlevel. It use to be called "finitedeterrence." For examp)e, accordingto this doctrine, All you would needto deter the Soviet Union is a fleetof, say, ten strbmarines, with 16missiles each. Such a finite forcewould be sufficient to destroy an'ivcceptable' number of Sovietcitiesthus, the Russians would bedeterred even though they have amudif larger strategic *force of theirown.' . .

Before closing, I would like to raisesome que'stions about perceptions. Ihave indicated that it is difficult foradversarie,s to trust each other..Neither side can easily determinewhether the other is just seeking tooffset potential advantages it seesdown the road, or whether it isconfronted with a significant at-tempt.to gain supremacy. We do notknow, for example, whether theRussians, having surpassed us inimportant categori s of strategicpower in the early 19 s, ere goingto stop. or level offi more signifi-cant ways that SAI:l"MO-providesThe "worst case" analyst is goingto say, "Well, let's take a look atwhat they could do to us if till'strend continues." That picture canbe very sObering. If, as some believe,the Soviets are seelikrig superiority,

. what does that niean to us? WHat isthe real.significance of supremacywhen we already have such largenumbers of nuclear weapons? Theanswer, at least for a number ofanalysts, appears to be that even ifit doesn't matter militarily that wefall slightly behind the Soviet Union,politically it is very significant.This argument suggests that themost imOortant element in military

Ppower is political influence, and ifyour military status in the worldshifts from superiority to eq.uality

or to slight disadvantage, allies andOthers will begin to get the message,and begin to make accommodationsto the other powers of the world.Thus, American influence in theworld would diminish in ddtectableways. There are those who say thatthis has been happenink. The SovietUnion explains this in terms of a"correlqtion of forces" movingagainst us, and believes it is aninevitable historitl pi%cess. Thereare those in this 'country- syho saywe have contributed to th'is processby not making the right decisionsin the strategic, political, and eco-nomic realms. So perceptions ofpower and status can be important.

-attack againit civilians that woulddoubtless result ina Sovie t reply inkind. Military defense r uires"counterforce" responses. This d eshot necegsarily mean striking Sovietmissile silos, but it does suggest,countering ,th e. military forces ofthe attacker, To 4.ipproach the prob-lem fn theset terms is to extendstrategic thought beyond deterrence.In the Soviet Union it is fairly clear

' that-such thinking is taking placein a very professional way. Thefunctional view in the Soviet Unionis that tl!ie Soviet foreign ministryseeks to deter the "imperialists"from launching a war. But, if a waroccurs, it is then up to Soviet militaryforces to bring about a favorableoutcome. Thus, Soviet nuclear strat-egy includes concePts of lightingand winnirlig. There is much leSs ofthis in the Willed States: Instead,in our view, one deterrence fails weare inclined to ko "all out.".We haveadopted a posture which reinfigrcesthis conceptual broadjump. "Assureddestruction" guarantees the highestlevel of cataclysm fhat we can con-struct in Order to prevent war fromoccurring. It is an unhappy paradoxthat makes nuclear, war unthinkablebut not impossible. Certainly if Iwere pi-esident, that is the ldst buttonI would push, and I probably wouldnot push it because it would beirrevelant in that stage of themilitary process.

Finall, there is the questjon ofwhat to do when deterrence failsand why we should be seriouslyconcerned alcrout that: I haven'treally made up .my mind about thedirections of the Carter Administra-tion in strategic Weaponry andand policy. I am impressed in anonpartisan sense with the inade-quacy of American strategic thought.Basically, while most strateg,icthinking and analysis goes a littlebit beyond deterrence, it does not govery far. Deterrence theory itself. isa series of revolving paradoxes thatare embedded in American-strategicpolicy. Unfor,tunately, our aeclara-.

; tory statemen about the use ormilita powj. the event of thebreakd n o eace are, not very--,,.credible because we claim we willdo th as --,:aasonable thing. Wepuzkle our ackersaries and perhapssometimes jSur- friends by the state-ments we fmake. For example, wesay we will commit nuclear suicidein kfense of Europe. That is, weclaim we will strike Soviet cities,knowing full wellthat the Russians'will respond by destroyig ours.But why should we retaliate againstSoviets citcies in a response to an4ttack on NATO? We can all under-stand in terms of deterrence, that ifthe Rüssians fear the loss of theirindustrial and populations centers,such a threat willgive-them pause.But if xd6u take the next sterslandask why the Unitpd States would dothat if deterrence fails, attackingcities does.not make sense. It doesnot make sen§e;becaue the logical fresponse to the military attack ismilitary defense, not a. punitive

To sum up, we need to take muchmore into account the problem ofdeterrence failure. On this issuerthe adequacy bf the American stra-tegic poStiirethe critics of SALTTWO are in a strong position. Theyhave found an important weaknessin the American strategic position,and thty-have attacked it. I do notfind the response of the proponentsof SALT TWO to have a very effec-tie answer.I hope these Temarks have set thestage for Dean Rostow's presenta-tion.

-71- --if

9

40%

a

First, I should like to thank theInstitute of World Affairs of TheUniversity of Wisconsin-Milwaukeeand The Johnson Foundation forthe honor of theif invl\tation toWingspread, It is my first visit tothis famous and beautiful place.

Before beginning my prepared li"e-marks, I should like to comment onthe terme"cold war" and "detente"which all three .previou& speakershave used in a familiak way Theyare terms in common usage But Ibelieve their ordinary meaning is

' misleading. The cold war is notover; it cOntinues, indeed, it iswarmer than ever The Soviet-American relation has not changedin character since 1917 nor has anyappreciable detente been achieved.There was no relaxatio;kof tensionwhen President Nixon announcedin 1972 that the cold war was overand that confrontation had beenreplaced by hegotiation. Since 1972,the cold, war has been very muchworse than ever'before. Recentconfrontations in the Far East, theMiddle East, a d now in PersianGulf find in A rica make th Berlincrisis 4nd th thrusts and,thratsagainst Gre e and Iran oI the lateforties loo ike play But wepersist in telling ourselves and,worse still, in believing that thecold war is over, and has been re-placed by something more benigncalled "detente!:

My former colleague Po.ul Warnkespoke here, last June in defense ofthe SALT TWO Treaty. He saidthat the Treaty, which has beenanticipated nearly every week sinceOctober, 1977, should be judgedonly in terms of its contribution tothe security of the United States. Iagree with that premise, although

Eugem. v Rogrou., St7:rling Professor of Lawat the Yak Untverstty Law School, is Chairman of the Executive Committee of theCommittee on the Prest nt IMnger Ih. is thefurnier Dean of the Yale Lau School Anationally kmm n spokesman on strategicissues, Dr kostoic served as Under Secretaryof State of political Affairs from 1966 to 1969in the Johnson adinuluaratom

SALT TWO CATCH 22

Eugene V. Rostnw

v

both the President and the Secretaryof State do not. They contend thatthe SALT agreement will improveour overall political relationshipwith the Soviet Union. And theyclaim also that SALT TWO* willsave us money, by m,aking it possibleto reduce our defense budget. Indeed,Mr. Warnke himself sometimesspeaks Of the SALT Treaty as acontribution to "detente," p4iys-terious and undefined term which

'has been tormenting the Americanmind ever since it was proclaimedin 19%2. And he ha occasionallysaid that SALT TW would save usmoney, although e has also saidthat the finan ia consequence ofSALT could n t b quantified.

But let me stat Iith Mr. Warnke'sposition in his le ture here that theSALT TWO Treaty, as it is nowprojected, would enhance the secu-tity of the United States.- 4

For the benefit of those of you whodid not hear Mr. Warnke last Julie,lee' tile summarize his argument. Ishall deal with four of his fivepoints in the course of my talk. OneI shall discuss at this stage.

Mr. Wa'rnke's case for SALT restedon four theses. (1) that thw is astable strategic balance today, inthat neither side could initiate anuclear war without facing thecertainty of devastating retaliation.Assuming for the moment that thereis a stable strategic balance today -and I do not agree with Mr. Warnkeon this would it be better to preservethe balance by unrestricted com-petition in the ,development ofnuclear arms, or through an agree-ment that,would -limit and thenreyerse the)miclear\ arms build-up,providing the same kind of securityat lower cost? On these assumptions,no one could disagree with Mr.Warnke's choice of the second option.Certainly I do not. The question iswhether SALT TWO could accom-plish his goal. (2) Mr. Warnke'ssecond contention is that it would.Mr. Warnke says that the Treatywould establish equal.ceilings for

Nib

both sides, and reductions in nuclearpower hereafter. Thus, he says, itwould presens the balance, andmake it impossible for either side tocontemplate a first nuclear strike.(3) Third, he contends, the terms ofthe Treaty can be verified by na-tional means; compliance would notdepend on trust of the Soviet Union.(4) And foarth, the. Treaty wouldpreserve the military options webelieve are necessary to maintainthe balance. With these three pointsI disagree, for reasons I shall try toexplain hereafter. Mr. Warnke'sfif k. and final point is a rathertoining one -'that our negotiati.pgppsition*-in the bargaining havebeen determined not by him alone,but by an interagency coordinatingcommitte representing all the con-cerned departments in Washington.I have had a good *deal of experiencewith interdepartmental coordinationin Washington. All I can say is thatI cannot share his faith in the pro-cess as a method for achieyingwi§dom.

While Mr. Walmke and I agree thatthe SALT TWO Treaty should bejudged on security grounds, I definethe term "national security" morebroadly than Mr. Warnke does. Fjespoke here as if the only problem ofour security in the field of nuclearweapons is to guarantee us againstthe risk of a possible nuclear attackon the United States itself. He madesome passing reference to NATO,but he did not really analyze theimplications of Soviet nuclear policyfor the defense of Europe. And hedid not mention the bearing ofSoviet nuclear strength on the prob-lem of defending our interests inother parts of the world, whether byconventional or nuclear mean's. Ifyou think of the headlines of thepast few weeks, you will see at oncethe importance of the point I amtrying to make. The United Statesand many other countries arealarmed about the fate 4,,,I4aell andthe possibility that the whole areafrom Pakistan and Afghanistan tothe states of the...Persian gulf and

the Horn of Afrii a ould fall unaerSoviet control. The President hasjust announced uur concern abuutthe threat tu Thailand, and hasreminded the world that Thailaendis protected by the SEATO Treaty,the Treaty uf Manila*. Those wordshave an ominous echo. And thebrilliant Chinese Vice Premier,Tung fIsiao ping, has been speakinghere wfth great force about thenature and weight of Soviet foreignpolicy, and the arrn, which sustainit.

These are the real elements of "link-age" between the SALT TWO Treatyand other aspects af our foreignpolicy By "linkage" I do not meanconnecting our considerati6n of theSALT TWQ Treaty to the way theSoviet Union treats its own citizensI should not link the SALT Treatyto the human rights question, deep?),as I feel about violations of humanrights. But SALT cannot be treatedin isolation from the problerh ofproxy wars, and Soviet campaignsto enlarge its empire by other means.Even if SALT.TWO provided for asmuch nuclear stability and verifi-dbility as Mr Warnke believes,even if it allowed us all the militaryoptions we shall rieed to restore thenuclear balance, it would be of n6use to us if it were a license forSoviet expansion at will throughthe use of conventional militaryforce, proxy wars, subversion, ornuclear threa44

In short, we cannot answer thequestion Mr. Warnke posed withoutfirst deciding what our militaryestablishment is for. Does it existonly, to repel invasions of the UnitedStates? To keep the United States,Western Euope, and perhaps Japanas safe enclaves while the rest of theworld sinks into anarchy? That isthe qUestion we linust face, I believe,before we can reach a prudent con-clusion about SALT TWO!

. The SALT TWO Treaty is intelligibleonly in its setting uf Americanforeign and security policy as awhole. Soviet-Mmerican relatiunsare the mcnn problem uf d1 fureignand defense policy, and the nuclearbalance between the Soviet Unionand the United States is the mostimportant structural element inthat relationship. The Soviet Uniun

is engaged, in a program of indefiniteexpansion, based ()man arms buildup without precedent in this century.Unless we retain our nuclear secondstrike capability, which is une of thefew self evident phrases in Olearcane vocabulary uf- the nuclearprublem, we shall be unable tu con.-tain-, deter, ur defeat Soviet expan-siun °when it threatens uur nationalinterests. For present purposes, Ishould define that term as thepresenation uf the balance of poweron which our national securityultimately depends. Obviously, thebalance of power reqN,ires us toprotect the independence of thestates of Western Europe and Japan.But the concept,cannot be sharplylimited. Many other states will be ofgreat importance to our seciurity,depending upun their contextnn theSoviet drive fur power. Facing Sovietnuclear superiority, the threat touse uur theatre or indeed our strate-gic nuclear forces in defense of ourinterestvwould lose all credibility.If we allow such a situation todevelop, we should be in the positionthe Soviet Union ,occupied duringthe Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962,and we should face the grim choicebetween accommodation or destruc-tion. No American President shouldbe put in such a position. The ratifi-cation of the SALT TWO Treatytherefore requires the Senate andthe nation at long last to face thetask of redefining our nationalinterests in the aftermath of Wiet-nam, and adopting a foreign pnlicyand a military posture capable ofprotecting them.

, .Between .President Truman's timeimmedia y after World War II andthe revu

Ation against Vietnam

during the last° decade, We had areasonably coherent foreign policy,which was supported by a strongbipartisan majority of the Americanpeople. Its main features are famil-iar: First, there was the network ofprograms, starting with the Mar-shall Plan, through which we helpedto restore the industrialized demo-cracies and knit themilltu a dy-namic worldwide capitalistiecunumy.Between 1947 and the early 'seven-ties, when the international mone-tary system collapsed, these policieswere eminently successful, helpingthe entire free wurkl tu achieve

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high rates uf growth and socialprogress under reasonably_ stableconditions. Secondly, we suppurteddecolonization, and initiated, pro-grams o( economic and technicalassistance to the deyeloping nations,must of them newly liberated fromimperial rule. Here the requrd ofsuccess has been uneven, but manydeveluping nations, from TaiwanilMalaysia, and South Korea toMexico Brazil and until recently,Iran have made tri mg advancesas integral parts .4 t economy ofthe industrialize. : ocracies.Third, we developed bilateral andmultilateral policies of internationalcooperation to encourage social andpolitical deveLopment, educationand cultural improvement, and theself-determination of peoples. Andfinally, we conducted a long, patient,and thus far unsuccessful campaignto bring nuclear weapons and nu-clear technology under internationalcontrol. That campaign was-launched in 1947 with our offer ofthe Baruch Plan, which the SovietUnion rejected. SALT TWO is themost recent stage of the Americaneffort to eliminate nuclear weaponsfrom world politics, and to develocrnuclear energy for peaceful uses.

The possibility of success in thesefour sec s of our foreign policydepended ippn the achievement 'ofa state o general peace, based onreciprocal acceptance of the rules ofwOrld public order codified in theCharter of the United Nations. Forthe men and women of Iliame firstpost-war generation, who had livedthrough the failure of the League ofNations to stop aggression in the'Thirties, it was self-evident thatpeace was indivisible, in MaximLitvinov's phrase. They believedthat the way to prevent the scourgeof large-scale war,on this small,i \nterdependent, and infinitelydangerous planet was to outlaW allwar, and to insist on the enforce-ment of .the rules of the Charter,,either through the institutions ofthe United Nations,' or, if they di'dnot work, through arrangernents ofcollective self defense ltke NATOand uur other regional securitytreaties.

The development uf dris policy, thepredite for every other aspect of

it)

-our foreign policy, started with theTruman Doctrine immediately afterWorld War II, when it became clearthat the Soviet Union was marching

< to a different drummer when itPursued expansionist goals in East-ern Europe, Iran, Greece,. andTiirkey, and rejected the MarshallPlan, the Baruch Plan, and pro-posals td develop the SecurityCouncil as an effective peace-keepinginstitut4. We sought the goal of,general Oeace in this sense withconsiderable success in the succes-sive post-wai crises over Iraii, Berlin,Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey,Korea, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,maintaining a balance of power inworld politick, and - except forEasterp Europe - a considerabledegree of respect for the rules of theCharter.

The commitment of the Westernnations to the ideas of the TrumanDoctrine began to weaken after theKorean War, and weakened a greatdeal dunng und after the war inIndo-China. A new generation hadgrown up, a generation which hadnot known Pharoah. And peoPlebegan to say there must be a betterWay to lc. the peace than throughsuch bitter and expens5ie wars asKorea and Vietnam. But no newpolicies emerged to replace thosewhich had become so unpopular.And so, at the moment, we remaincommitted to the did policies, butwithout conviction or enthusiasm,adrift and uncertain while aggres-sions increase in number and im-portoace throughout the wor1d. TheUnited States react b oingnothing, saying "We are not theworld's policeman," and asking"How does it affect us if war occursin some distant place we hardlyknow?" As a result, the fearfulspecter of anarchy has become moreand mors powerful as a factor ofinternational life and as a force inmen's minds. It is a striking com-ment on the trend of the times thata number of new books and articleshave begun again to address theproblem of world public order.

One can chart the disintegration ofand the relationship

betwtiuclear and conventionalmilitdry power and politics, by re-calling some of the key elements of

kt

our experience since 1945.

Despite the Soviet rejection of theBaruch Plah, the goal of our nuclearpolicy was, and has remained, toprevent nuclear weapons from beingused or brandished in world. politics.It is a sound goal which,I for onestrongly suppoit The implicationof that goal is that:_developmentsshould pr'verit either side fromachievin a position in which-itcould gai a great advantage 1:13afirst nue ,ar strike World politthshould not be exposed to such temp-tations.eBut the neutralization ofnuclearwea nsin that limitedsense cannot become an excuseauthorizing t e Soviet Union toexpand at will through the use ofconventional weapons*: subversion,or nuclear threats, When such eventsoccur, the second objective of ournuclear policy comes into play. It isto supplement our political influenceand cqnventional arms in deterringor stopping Soviet-sponsored ag-

ion directed against our inter-ests. This is why retaining a crediblesecond-strike capability is neces-sarily an essential goal of oursecurity policy. ..

'This second purpose of.our nucleararsenal has become steadily moreobvious as the Soviet Union becamea nuclear power, and then a strongnuclear Plower. The mission of ournuclear forces goes beyond makingit too expensive for theSoviet Unionto consi er launching a nuclearattack ag nst the United States.They must lso provide a nuclearguaranty for our interests in many`parts of -the world, and make itpossible for us to defend those inter-ests by diplomacy or by the use oftheatre military forces wheneversuch action becomes necessary. -

The Soviet doctrine with regard tothe use of nuclear weapons is quitedifferent. As we are finally begin-ning to realize, the Soviet Union isnot interested in mutual deterrenceand niiclear stalemate. The SovietUnion never accepted our Quixoticview of the problem of nuclear amp.And they never joined us in cuttifigback 'on nuclear arms development.We pften talk of an arms race. AsProfessor Albert Wohlstetter hasshown, there has been no armsrace. It takes two to race. The Soviet

12,_ I

Union has been racing. We havenot. Secretary of Defense Brownuses the metaphor of the tortoisear&the hare. It is apt. We wereahead. We decided to sit under atree. But they have kept on racing.To the Soviets, clear nuclear superi-ority is the 'ultimate weapon ofcoercive diplomacy - the Queen of .their chess set, through which they.Think thgy could achieve checkmatewithoutilraving to fight either anuclear' or a conventional war. Andif'accidentor miscalculation should'lead to full scale nuclear war, theSoviets believe they are prepared tofight and win.

It became obvious even before theend of World War II that the Ameri-can nuclear monopoly could not beused to prevent inarq forms ofSoviet expansion. 'In the hope ofachieving Soviet-American cooper-ation, we deferred to the SovietUnion's strategic interest in havinga buffer zone of client statesiin.Eastern Europe. We did nothingwhen the Soviet Union took overPoland, Czechoalavia, Rumania,East Germany, Bulgaria, andHungary immediately after the war,and crushed rebellions againstSoviet control in 1948, 1953, 1956,and 1968. Nor could Americannuclear superiority alone preventthe Soviet Union from, using con-ventional forces, at least againsttargets they think we regard assecondary, like Korea, Vietnam, orEthiopia. In most such situations,except for massive attacks on ourmost vital interests, like WesternEurope or Japan, defense has to beprovided by conventional forces inthe first instance. But the absenceof effective American nuclear deter-rence - that is, the erosion or neu-tralization of our second-strikecapacity - would deny all credibilityto our conventional force deter-rent. The nuclear balance has beenthe decisive factor in all the crisesof confrontation between the SovietUnion and the United States be-tween 1945 and the present day.

In the early post-war years, whenwe, had a nuclear monopoly, andthen overwhelming nuclear superi-,ority, we were able to deal satis-factorily, although at steadily in-creasing cost, with a long series of

Soviet managed thrusts, from theearly moves against Iran, Greece,and Turkey to the Berlin Airlift, thethreat to Yugoslavia, the war inKorea, the Cuban Missile Crisis,and 'recurrent Soviet efforts in theMiddle East and,Africa.

which determined the outcome ofthe Berlin airlift the Korean War,and Cuban Missile Cri5is.

The first result ot4that'buildup wasevident in Vietnam. In the late 60'sand early 70's, our nuclear superior-ity was no longeresO evident as it

In the Bertin Airlift, for example, had been at the time of the Cubanthe shadow of our nuclear monopoly . missile crisis, indeed,-superioritykept the soviets from firing on the had given way to stalemtte. The're-allied planes and thin persuaded fore, the hints which brought thethem to give up the blockade. The Korean war to an end could nueZercise becarne too risky wh n we longer determine the course of eventsdemonstrated bur willingne s to Nin: Indo-China. We tried to repeatinsist on our rights. In Korea, d pite the Korean scenario for Vietnam.our nuclear, monopoly at that tme, But it didn't work. The, nuclearwe used only conventional foikces. balance had changed too mpch.But veiled nuclear threats, alto-gether credible after the long and This is the ultimate moral of Viet-bitter Avar, persuaded the North rram. The deterioration of ourKoreans to iume to Panmunjojn in nuclear advantaga led to the erosionthe first place, and then broughts' of our position and profoundlythose fantastic negotiations at 'least affecteg the final stages of theto the point of an armistice which conflict.has held for more than twenty years.

The essence of the problem is illus-trated by.the Cuban Missile Crisis

..of 1962. There, the Soviet Unionsecretly undertook to introduce land-based nuclear missiles into Cuba, inviolation of their assurances to us,

. and in the face of pri ate and publicwarnings from the President of theUnited States. Such action wouldhae altered the basic ovation ofnuclear deterrence, and gravelyaffected the credibility and effec-tiveness of American diplomaticwarnings to the Soviet Union,: Atthat time, we had unchallengeablenuclear superiority. If there hadbeen a nuclear ekchange, the SovietUnion would have suffered about100 million casualties and theUnited States, 10 million. We hadequally obvious cnnventional-forcesuperiority in the area. If we hadinvaded Cuba, the Soviet Unioncould not hee opposed the invasioneffectively with either conventionalor nuclear forces. By mobilizing aninvasion force in Florida and in-stituting a limited naval blockadeof Cuba, we convinced the Sovietsthat the nsks were too great, andthey withdrew their Missiles.

Since the late 50s, the Soviet Unionhas been engaged in a massivemilitary buildup, both in nuclearand conventional forces, designedto reverse the nuclear relationship

At the moment,. our policy is' in-hibited nearly paralyzed by thesechanges in the balance of nucletirand conventional power. In 1958,we and the British moved fOrcesinto Lebanon.and Jordan, and endeda Soviet-backed threat to take oerboth countries without firing a sh t.When the same kind of threat asmounted against Lebanon in 19 7,we did ribt seriously consider usingeven a parade of force to saveLebanon from destruction.

There can be no question that sinceVietnam our nuclear position hasslipped from stalemate to the bordersof inferiority. While the expertsargue about whether we are already'inferior to the Soviet Union in over-all nuclear power, they are agreedthat if present trends continue weshall be significantly inferior andsoon. Some careful studies contendthat the strategic force relation-ships which dominated the Cubanmissile crisis will soon be reversedunless we undertake a crash pro-.gram immediately that in theevent of a nuclear exchange weshould risk 100 million casualtiesand the Soviet Union 10 million.Even if the figure were 100 to 20 or30, as the C.I.A. has estimated, it isnot difficult to anticipate whatwould happen if we ,were to allowsuch a situation to develop. A perceptive student of the problem has

remarked that, confronting such ascenario, even General CurtisLeMay would advise "a,ccommo-dation." Our foreign policy and ourconventional forces would be im-potent, ancilow should acquiesce.

It is.the first objective of SovietPolicy to-achieve such a situationwith its implications for nuclearcoercion. This not nuclear waritself is hat our nuclear-weaponsprogram and the SALT negotiationsare. about.

For the last six yeais or sO, myconversations with those respon-sible for the policy', of governmentsall over the world have been con-cerned with one question above allothers "What has happened toAmerican foreign policy?" Withanxiety now approaching panic,these men and women are preoc-cupied with a series of question theyconsider the key to the future: "Willit take another Pearl Harbor toinduce the United States to restorea realistics and affirmative forewnpolicy? Have Americans lost theirnational pride, and even their in-stinct for self-preservation? Don'tthey uuderstand the Soviet rush forpower? Or,have they decided tosu.rrender, and make the best ofFinLandization, as the prime Sovietsupplier of ;food and high technologyon credit? Could it possibly be true,

as some have said, that the Amen-tan people have become decadent;that the United States has 'passedits, historic high point like so manyearlier civilizations, and cannot beroused by political challenge,'; andthatthe task of the Americangovernment is therefore to persuadethe Russians to give it the bestavailable deal?"

Those who discuss these questionsamong themselves, or put them totrusted visitors, are not interestedin the answers as spectators orstudents of history'. They know thatthe fate of their countries and theirown careers, perhaps their lives areat stake. When they reach conclu-sions about whether the winner ofthe struggle will be the Soviet Unionor the United States, they act.Pakistan, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia,among other states, are visiblydisengaging from the United States,

apc1 moving towards accommodation with the Soviet Union. Theyrisk nothing from such a posture ifwe :should in the end prevail. Andthey do not want their people to gothrough the experience of Ethiopia,Yemen, Afghanistan, Lebanon, andIran if our retreat to isolation shouldcoreinue. ,At the moment, we necessarilyoccupy the perch of the eagle, but.we'are rying to indulge in thepos e of the Ostrich. While theUhit States hides its. head insand', still,caught up in the un-resolved contradictions cif its post-Vietnam mood, the Soviet Union ismethodically seizing one strategicposition after another, frbm Vietnamto a long list (If forinerFrench, and Portugese colonies inAfrica and the Middle East, in apattern Admiral Mahan would haveadmired Since 1974, the SovietUnion has dreatly enlarged itsspheres of influence

The pattern of Soviet imperial ex-'pension is not ambiguOus. It canmean only the Soviet envelopmentof Europe, the detachment ofJapanand China from the American orbit,and the achievement of a status ofdomination from which the SovietUnion could isolate and coerce theWnited States itself. As high Sovietleaders saw, their goal is a positionof "visible military superiority,"which will permit- them to determine"the future course of world politics."Nothing could bring"out the impli-cations of this developMent morevividly th'an the fact that on Decem-ber 7, 1978, President Carter

. yielded to a public Soviet warningnot to help Iran in its agony. ThePresident's stlitement was a start-ling, nearly unbelievable event.Coupled with our uncertain and in-effective behavior dining the Iranianconvulsion, it means that the UnitedStates has given up the advantageof uncertainty, one of the mostpowerful deterrent ceices in inter-national politics. And it implies thepossible abandonment of an ally ofexceptional geo-political importance,whose destiny will determine thatof Saudi Arabia and the smallerstates of the Peesian Gulf, andtherefore of many other states aswell. Soviet control of the oil re-sources of the area, its space, and

the near by seas is not a prospectwe can accept. Among many otherconsequences, it would doom thehigh hopes we hae placed in theCamp David Agreements.

While the Soviet Union moves aheadwith stunning speed, backed bymilitary power which is nolv su-perior to our own in most categories,and growing more than twicekasfast, the United States remainsparalyzed by doubts about how todefine its national interests in worldpolitics, and what. it must do toprotect them.rA variety of factors impedes clarityof 'thought.

1- _In the media, the issues are debatedin terms of slogans and shibboleths-4,which bear no relation to reality.For the moment, "No more Viet-nams" is a battle-cry as potent as"No more Koreas" was in the 50's.The perennial American yearningfor our nineteenth century postureof isolation and neutrality has beengiven new life by the catastrophe ofVietnam. Well meaning Americanscontend that we should help onlydemocratic nations which respecthuman rights a small and dimin-ishing group; they forget our alliancewith Stalin against Hitler, ourrapprov1rrnent With Alina to balancethe Soviet Union, and many otherpractical policies made necessaryby reality. The hardy faith of paci-fism continues to flourish, in themidst of a ;nilitarized world. Genu-ine Communists and their fellowtravellers still rally the innocents,their influence apparently undi-minished by the repeated betrayalsof the God who IT1d.

flut most Americ n opinion remainspractical, level- eaded, and intense-ly loy'al 'to t nation. It is deeplyconfused, however, by one funda-mental elemdrit of the situation:with a few notable exceptions, ourleaders are not leading. Are theyfulfilling Kissinger'spolicy that thefacts about Soviet power and policyof expansion must be "concealed"from the American people while thegovernment negotiates "the bestdeal it can get"?.

President Carter has said we shouldnot base our foreign policy on "an

I

inordinate fear"' of Soviet power',but he does not explain how todistinguish reasonable from "in-ordinate': concern with the problem.Last spring, he told the NorthAtlantic Council in London that theSoviet military position is "aggres-sive" in nature, and could not beexplained by considerations ofdefense. He repeated that commentin a number of later speeches. Butduring the fall he told a much larger

L audience on American televisionthat Soviet policy is defensive incharacter, and that it representsonly an exaggerated and hyper-sensitive concern about Sovietsecurity. He added that thg UnitedStates is and will remain strongerthan,the Soviet Union; 'and that theSoviet Union is not seeking militarysuperiority, or the power to threatenthe United States or its allies withdestruction we could not match. Inthis'judgment, the President rejectsthe conclusion of the 1978 NationalIntelligence Estimate, which for thefirst time acknowledged that theSoviet Union is heading for sdperi-ority,Anot parity, i).1 the militaryarena.

The President's claim of Americanmilitary superiority is contradictedby his own Secretary of DePense,and by the publicly available statio-tics about Soviet military 'strengtE,and the rate at which they arebuilding tanks, ships, planes, mis-siles, and almost every other cat-egory of weapons. His painfuljustification for Soviet policy as"defensive" is even mbre disturbing.It recalls a comment by President.Johnson about a leading Senator ofhis time in office. "That fellow;" thePresident said, "would find anexcuse for the Russians if theylanded in Mexico."

This dissonance is reflected at manyother levelssiInside the governmentand out, people make it clear thatwhile they do not want to be "alarm-ist" or "extreme" about the meaningof Soviet policy, they wonder never-theless, whether "detente" hasperhaps been oversold, and whethertrade with the, Soviet Union, orrestraint Qn our part in Our militaryprograms, or cultural relations, orAmerican silence about humanrights, might persuade the. Soviet

°

leaders to pursue a more peacetulcourse in Africa, the Middle East, orelsewhere.

In short, we are in the mood We idthe British shared during the `Thii-'ties. We do not believe emotionallyin the reality of what wejinowintellectually, I must leave it to thepsycholokists to explain the phe-nomenon. Here, I Can do mow thannote its existence.

goAt the mdment, out favQrie andmost desperate denial device is ourtouching faith that Ole pendingSALT TWO agreement on- strategicarms limitations ,could estalylishpeaceful relations With the SovietUnion,.save moneA, and prevent.apolitical disaster of major propor-tions. The issue presented bY SALT,Senator Geoge NIcGoverh has said,is that "tfie alternative to armscontrol and detente is' the bank-ruptcy and death crfNovember, 1978, Mr. Brezhnev.tolda group of visiting.United StatesSenators that a vote' ler the SALTTWO Treaty in the Senatewould be"a vote for peace." And Mr. Kosygin'made it clear to theSenators that ifthey voted against tlie Treaty, their"peace-loving" constituents wouldvote them out of office at the nextelection. In somewhat less ferventlanguage, this is the main theme ofSeceetary of State Vance's com-ments on the problem. In a speechin London on December p, 1,978, theSecretary said that,"without anagreement, our technblogical andeconomic strength;would enable usto match any Atragetic'buildup, but ka good agreement dan provide moresecurity with lower risk and cost.And we recognize that withoutSALT, the strategic competitioncould infect the whole east-westpolitical relationship','damaging

the effort to create &Jess dapgerousworld which is at the heart of West-ern foreign policies."

It was altogether reasonable for usto approve the SALT ONE agree-ments in 1972, in the belief thatthey would be stabilizinifbothpolitically and militanly, andiwOuldin any event save money by restrain-ing Soviet and American armsexpenditures.

Applying the same criteria for

.

judgment, it is not reasonable toreach the same, conclusion aboutSALT TWO Technological develop-ments since 1972, coupled with rapidSoviet advances while we markedtime, have made the methods of the1972 agreements inadequate toachievestability in the Soviet-American nuclear balance. But inbehalf of SALT TWO, the Adminis-tration_ is repeating all the argu-ments vanced seven years agofor SAL - ONE. Sowietand the-Soviet arms buildup since1972 make such contentions intel-lectually impossible. The estimatesand expectations on the basis ofwhich we appzoVed SALT ONE in1972 have fumed out to be in error.SALT TWO would not be stabilizingmilitaiily or politically, and it wouldpdt redur the oost of American

-secu'rity: -On the contrary, it Wouldlock us into a position of militaryinferiority which would lead theSoviet Union to increase its pres-sures on us, and therefore increasethe risk of war.

The two SALT ONE agreements -the ABM Treaty limiting anti--ballistic missiles ,and the InterimAgreement on Offensive,StrategicArms establishing numerical limitsfor ICBM and ballistic missilesubmarine launchers came up forapproval in the summer and fall of1972, the ABM Treaty through avote oiothe Senate, the InterimAgreement through a Joint Resolu-tion,passed by both houses.

It is wortlf recalling the atmosphereof thaVemote time. It was legitimatethen to hope that the tensions of theriew Sino-Soviet-American triangle,coupled with the steady success ofour forces in Vietnam, would pre-vent a Soviet attack on China, andpersuade the, Soviet Union not toobstrUct a satisfactory peace inIndo-China and the Middle East.The Soviet leadership had promisedPresident Nixon full cooperation inMay, 1972 an early warning system,working together to solve difficultproblems all over the world peace-fully, specific collaboration inachieving peace in Indo-China andthe Middle East, "detente," "peace-ful coexistence," "peace."

Following. President Nixon's tripsto China and the Sovikt Union, a

promising agreement for peace inIndo-China was signed in January,1973, and guaranteed by the greatpowers in March. We would nothave withdrawn our troops withoutthose agreements. Once we hadjeftthe area, of course, the North Viet-namese and the Soviet Union toreup the agreements, and.threw themin (Air face. They were confidentthat the United States, absorbed inthe- Watergate drama, would donothing to insist on; the fulfillmentof the guaranties. But .when theSALT ONE agreements were signed,the Indo-Chinese "peace" was for

rile future. As Congress and thecountry debated SALT ONE, peace-ful rumors arose from the Indo-Chinese negotiations, and therewas even a revival of hope .aboutthe possibilities of peace in theMiddle East.

In the Middle East, too, disillusionwas far in the future when SALTONE was approi,ed. The massivewar of October, 1973, shattered theoptimism of the preceding year. Farfrom warning us of that war, andcooperating with us to stop it inaccordance with their promises toPresident Nixon of May, .1972, theSoviet leaders actively conspiredwith Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and othercountries of the area to prepa1e,plan, equip, and conduct the war.They incited distant states to fight,and to maintain the oil embargoinstituted as a weapon of war. Wenow know that the Soviet Unionhad promised Egypt full cooperationin the War a month before PresidentNixon came to Mdqcow in May,1972.-They carned out that promise,in spades.

In the military sphere, we were well,ahead of the Soviet Union in 1972in MIRVing nuclear weapons, inaccuracy, and in the number ofwarheads. Our bomber force wassuperior, and we were ahead, wethought, in ABM technology and inour navy.

The foundation of all our hopes forSALT ONE with regard to thestrategic balance turned on Sovietacceptance of the McNamara Doc-trine the notion that' if the people,cities, and industries of each sidewere undefended and open to attack,

,there wouldd, be mutual deterrence,

and stability. Witnesses testifyingin behalf of the SALT ONE agree-ments said that both agreements,and particularly the ABM Treaty,proved, that the Sovtet Union sharedour view of mutual deterrence: Thepeople of both countries were hos-tages, a fact which guaranteed thatneither side could use or brandishnuclear weapons in world politicS.

, We have followed the McNamaraDistrine ever since, but the SovietUnion has not done so The Soviet,liniy_n has vigorously 'continued itsresearch and development on ABMsIt is reported that they could quicklydeploy more ABM systeins if theychoose to do "so We could not. We

'dismantled our single deployed ABMsystem, and'(Ut. back on our re'search We.have no significant airdefense dyployments in the UnitedStates. The Soviet Union bristleswith them, placing a serious ques-,tion mark over, the possible effectiveness of our bombers and futurecruise missiles, and indeed of ourland based and sea based missilesas well. There-is the 'Same asym-metry with regard to civil defensemeasures, whose existence is init'self a rejection of the McNamaraDoctrine. The Soviet Union hasspent billions on civil defense, onthe relocation of industries, and onevacuation plans. We have a tokencivil defense program in which thegovernment obviously does notbelieve.

In 1972, Congress and the countryyere assured that the SALT ONEagreements would lead to a stabili:.zatioAor reduction of Soviet ex,penditure on nuclear weapons andindqd on other arms. The Sovietsare seeking nuclear parity, we weretold, and agreements assuring paritywould ntisfy their ambitions andtheir pride.

Developments since 1972 make it apoignant exercise to reread thesemelancholy statements in 'the of-ficial reports of Congressionalhearings and debates. In anticipa-tion of the SALT agreements, we.,had reduced our expenditures onstrategic nuclear weapons by 1972to a rate, measured in constantdollars, one-third of what we hadaveraged during the six years frum

1956 tu 1962. Our spending in realterms Has fallen since that date,-and we have introduced no newstratégic weapons systems since1970. The Soviet Union has intro-duced five or six. According to theC.I.A., the Soviet Union is nowspending more than two and a halftimes as much as we are on strategi(weapons alone. The Carter Admin-istration ;has cancelled or sloweddown a nucnber of new weaponssystems supported ,by the Nixonand Ford Administrations whichwould have helped significantly tomaintain the nuclear balance during'the early 1980s aRd thereafter theTomahawk sea-launched cruisemissile, the B-1 bomber, the develop-ment of die MX missile as a mobileincreased throw-weight weaponcarrYing 10 warheads, and theTrident submarine. Instead of (om-pleting those promising and care-fully considered programs on anurgpnt basis, the Carter Administra-tion has permittAl only limitedprojects to improve existing systems.It has even closed down the prodm-turn line for the manufacture ofMinuteman III missiles.

The Soviet buildjng program wassignificantly larger than ours in1972, and it has been expandingever sinte at a cumulative rate of atleast 8% a year. Thvombination ofour slav-clown and die Soviet build-ing program has had extraordinaryresults. All the significant indicesof nuclear power will rise drancati-cally, even if SALT TWO is finallyapproved and ratified. The numberof Soviet warheads will increase300% by 1985, ours by 50%; the areadestructive capabilities of Sovietweapons will increase ii.0%; ours by25%; the capability of their weaponsto destroy hardened targets, likemissile silos, will increase 1000%; ifour cruise missiles, stip 'underdevelopment, fulfill preserCt 'expec-tations, ours will,increase 400%. Byevery measure o'f nuclear power,except the number of warheads, theSoviet Union will be far ahead of usby 1985, if we cdntinue to drift.

But even our slight anAsliminishingadvantage i9 th(: niimber of yuirheads,If ottr ,elitirnates are'accwate,would heliseless, because t;f.theasymmetry of the Soviet and AmeTh

can nuclear programs'. The Soviet.and American nuc4.ar forcesi1/4 aremit alikein i. omposition. In theVast, at l,eaM, we placed heavyreliance on our bomber, then on ourmissiles and then on our submarines, Less that 20'':; of our capac4is in ICBMs. The Soviet Union hdserriphasized the ICBM componentof theie mal,ear arsenal. Theirweapons have much heavier thrustor throw-weight than ours. Theyhave developed a number of newsystems, some extremely heavy,capable of a massive interconti-nental attack on our military forces,others versatile, mobile, and carry-ing many small warheads., speciallydesigned for hitting smaller targetsin Europe. So far, the Russianshave put more than half their nucle-ar force in ICBMs, perhaps two-third's by the_early 1980s. Mr.Warnke used the figure of 7O in histalk. ICBMs are now more aceuratethan submarine launched miSsiles,and are therefore more.appropriatefor use against military installationsthan cities and people. The prospec-tive imbalance between Soviet andAmerican nuclear forties during thenext few years derives from thisbasic fact; Soviet superiority in,land bated tvitercontinental andinterme te range missiles tonsti-tutes a missile gap."

It obvious in every context thatby 1985, taking into account: thecurrent programs of both sides andthe provisions of SALT TWO, our

prompt capability to destroy hard-ened military targets (silos, com-mand,-control and communicationscenters, nuclear weapons storagedepots, and shelters for leadershippersonnel) will be less than aneighth that of the Soviet Union. Theimplications 'of this grim statisticwould be compounded by the factthat they will have at leasttwice asmany hard targets as we, eachbeing twire as hard as ours. Whenhe was here Mr. Warnke referred toa study by ACDA purporting toprove that tur nuclear forces wereat least as strong as those ,of theSoviet Union. The chief weaknessof that study is that it compared thetwo forces not against real targetsin the two countries, bui against anhypothetical set of hart and softtargets, assutried to be the same for

-9

eaJI (ountry's fu ( es This is nutthe ase The S( iet Union hasmany,. more hard targets than theUnited States This means that theSoiet t'nion will be in a positionery soon to destroy a major portionof our ICBM missiles sites andother key militav targets with afraction of their missile force if weshould ratify the SALT TWO. Treatynow projeced, holding,enoughnuclear power in reserve to make anAmerican counterstrike againsteither military or civilian targetsalmost inconceivable. We shouldthem face the dilemma the SovietUnion faced during.the CubanMissile Cnsis, and we should givein, just as the Soviets did then. Yetin his recent State of the Unionmessage, President Carter assuredus that we have nothing to Tear inthis realm, because our submarines

.. at sea could alWays blow up Sovietcities in the event of a Sciviet firststrike against our miasile sites andother military.. targets.. diven theSoviet-American, nuclear relationnow projected for91(985 and theterms of the SALT TWO lireaty,this is ao empty threat as empty asJohn Foster Dulles' doctrine of"massive retaliation." It wou4d beirrational for the President to givethe order to blo,up Moscow if h,eknew that the Soviet Union hadenough nuclear power in hand toblow up New 'York, Chicago anilWashington. Such/ a threat hadultimate credibility during the Fif-ties and early Sixties, if the SovietUnion pushed us too.far It wouldhave almost none by 1985, if we failto redress the nuclear balance

This is the most important weaknessof the argument Mr Warnke presented here last June Equality inthe number of launchers cannotguarantee either equality or stabilityof real nuclear power if a superiorSoviet ICBM force can neutralizeour submarines tinder such circumstances, the Soviet Uniori wouldhave the capacity to inflict a firstnuclear strike against Americanmilitary targets', an'd indeed toimprove its nuclear position bydoing so, even if we should strikeback blindly at Soviet cities andpopulations

.

The Committee on the Present

I .

Danger has reached these harsih' judgments about SALT TWO be-

cause in pur judgment our studies ofthe sUbject, directed by Paul H.Nitze, former Deputyl Secrelary ofDefense and SALT negotiator,permit no other conclusian,

In July, 1977, the Committee issueda statement whi'ch stated that eventhe proposal we Aide to the SovietUnion in March, 1977, which theSoviet Union rejected out of hand,was "potentially unfavorable forthe United States. Agreement onthe basis of this proPosal would notassure crisis stability and mutualdeterrence; and its terms woulddisproportionotley favor the USSRas against the United States.".SinceMarch, 1977, our government, hasmoved closer and closer. to the Soviet'position, further reducing the pos-sibility that we could preserve acredible second-strike capability asour ultimate deterrent. The Com-mittee therefore concluded:

In the short run, it is unlikely I.hata comprehensive and safe SALTagreement can be negOtiated. Inthelonger run, our March, proposal,'adjuisted to remove its mere obviousinequities to- the VS.,- miait.corivstatute a framework for 'mutuallyproductive negotiations - proyidedthat we meanwhile demonstrate inaction our determination, -agree-ment or 'no agreement, to maintainforces fully adequate to deter attackagainst the U. and our allies.This course would require us tomove forward promptly on severalpending and projected strategicsystems to restore the credibility ofour second-strike deterrent. ,

We must demonstrate that we arefirmly committed to a course ofaction designed to safeguard ourstrategic tnterests. Therein lies ouronly hope of persuading the Sovietsthat it is in their interest to nego-tiate withinthe general provisionsof a modified U,S. comprehensiveapproach.

Unfortunately, the Administrationhas not followed the line recom-mended in that statement, eitherwith regard to the negotiations or tothe development of the MX-mobilemissile and other weapon systems.needed to redress the balance.

The Iterirn Agreement on OffensiveStrategic Alto's of 1972 providedthat the United States could have1054 ICBM launchers and 656-70subtnarine based missile launchersand that the U.S.S.R. could have upto 1618 ICBM launchers and 740-950 submarine-based launchers.The higher ceilings for SLBMs ispermitted if equivalent numbers ofpre1964 type ICBM launchers aredismantled. The disparity in the,number of launchers allowed wagexplained on the ground that wewere well ahead- in MIR.Ving andaccuracy, and therefore that ourreal nuclear pow.er was still fargreater than that of the SovietUniqp,We added that the Reno/.Agreement only covered a five yearpenod; that we could not as a prac-

tical matter increase out arsenalbefore 1977; and that with the B-1bOmber, the MX-missile, and the

/Tndent submarine we would main-tain our lead even if the SovietUnion caught up- to.us in the art ofMIRVing and in accuracy. Unfor-

'llinately, our advanced we.aponsprograms halie been cancelled or;-.sloWed down, and the Interim"A gre erpen t. ha§ bepn "extencied byexecutive agreement with the SovietUnion long past its expiration slateof 3 October, 1977, despite the pro-,vision in the ACDA-statute Which'declares that the United Statdscannot accept limitations on itsn'uclear arsenal other than those

/ specified in treaties or statutes.

In approving the SALT ONE IterimAgreement, the United States alsorelied on a series of unilateral inter-pretations of the agreement whichthe Administration put befortOeCbngreks when the agreement wasapproved. They covered importantpoints on which the Soviets hadrefused to agree forinally. the de-velopment of land-based mobileICBMs, the definition of a heavy,missile, and methods,for determin-ing the ceilinit,for submarinelaunched missile,. Although wethreatened to abrogate the agree.ments if these unilateral interpreta-tions were violated, we did not doSO.

The Soviet Union, for example,routinely makes and deploys theformidable SS-20 "yariable-range"

.t,

mobile ballistic missile which iscausing deep alarm in Europe. It isMIRVed and ha's multiple refirecapability. It is considered an inter-s -mediaterange missileand thus nuttechnically within the 1972 InterimAgreement. But it can'be convertedinto an intemuntinental SS-16 byadding a third stage, or by makingless dramatic chariges in its con-figuration.

The United States had a comparableexperience with Article II of the

.11 .Interim Agreement, which purportsto restrain both sides from substi-tuting heavy-rnissiles,for light oneg

a major concern for,tis, in view ofthe Soviet lead in this area. The'Soviet Union refused to agree to aciefinition of heAvy missiles. TheUnited States,offered rts definitionof heavy missiles as a unilateralinterpietation of the Treaty. TheSoviet Union then deployed theirSS-19, which violated our definitionof a heavy missile, and which musthave been at least in advanced'development while the agreementwas being negotiated. We wereforced lamely to explain that. theSoviet Union was not bound by ourinterpretation of the Agreement.

T,he SALT TWO agreement hasthen in negotiation.since early 1973,under three Administrations. InOctober, 1974, President Pord andMr. Brehznev agre'ed at Vladivostokon a formula for the SAI.,T TWOtalks. While the Vladivostok "ac-ord" was withdrawn, and has neverreappeared, it,clearly ippuenced theprocess of negotiatioi. Under theVladivostok formula, the newagreement woulcrset a limit for thetotal number of offensive deliveryveh.iclei, including ICBMs, sub-marine launched vehicles, andheavy bombers and sublimit on thenumber.of missiles which could beMIRVed Negotiations were stalledfor two years after VIadiVostok,primarily because we pressed toinclude the Soviet Backfire bomberwithin the limits set by the Treaty,and the Soviets pressed to includethe American cruise missile pro-gram, The Backfiie bomber - slightlysmaller than our B-1 bomber -versatile modern weapons, systemcapable of attacking targets any-where in the United Sta'tes without

refueling if it landed in Cuba ursoine other third country. It can, ufcourse, bezefueled.

The Carter Administration can-called dr cut back the weaponsdevelopment programs approvedduring the,Nixon and Ford Admini-strations, and broke thruugh thestalemate in the SALT TWO talksby accepting the Soviet position on.'

, the Backfire and the cruise missiles.At the present time, BaCkfires areexcluded and cruise missiles areincluded.

The initial proposals of the CarterAdministration shOwed great prom-,ise, although they wQre in them-selves inadequate fully to proteNthe American interest. In March,1977, the -United States suggestedrules which would go beyond count-ing launchers-, and limit moreimportant aspects of riuclear power

throw-weight, warheads, and theprocess pf MIRVing. The SovietUnion srornfully and publicly re-jected the American proposal. Wepromptly abandoned it, and cameback with a series of,coffers, eachcloser than its predecessors to the$oviett position. The Soviet Unionmade no Proposals at all\ntil a fewweeks befdre the 1972 Aareementwas due to expire. They naturallyexploited what they sensed was theAdminic ration's eagerness toobtai ac agr 'ent. Since October,197- the nominal expiration date ofthe Interim Agreement, we hkvemade our own bargaining situat/nworse by constantly stressing howdisastrous it would be not to have aSAM TWO agreement, and howrea0.we are to make concessions.

According to statements by-Admin-istration spokesmen and uncon-tradicted leaks, the SALT TWOTreaty will consist of a Treaty, aProtocol, and a Statement of Prin-ciples. The Treaty would expire onDecember 31, 1985, the Ptocol ona date not yet agreed in 1g81, eitherJune 30 or December 31. The State-ment of Principles concerns theagenda for_the negotiktions of SALTTHREE and has no terminal date.

The key provisioriof th8 SALTTWO treaty is that each side wouldbe permitted to have the samenumber of strategic nuclear launch

/.?,

tif

.g--

vehicles 2,400 until a date in 1982,and then 2,250. Within this limit,there is a sublimit of 1,320 on thenumb'er of launchers carryingmultiple indepenaently-targetedreentry vehicles (MIRV's) ICBM's,SLBM's, and aircraft equipped tocarry -air launched cruise missiles(ALCM's) with a range greater than600 icilumeters. At this writing,there is still reported to be a disputelietween,the Arnrican and Sovietnegotiators as to 'whether all armedcruise missiles should be coered, oronly cruise missiles armed with

,e--'nuclear weapons.

There are two further sublimit,swithin the category of 1,320 MIRVedlaunchers: (1) a limit of 1,200 on thenumber of MIRVed ICLIM launchers

- plus MIRVed SLIV1 launchers; and(2) a sublirnit of 820 on t number ofMIRVed ICBM launch rs. Withinthat limit of 820, the S wiet Unionwould be allowed to hase a numberof fixed modern larg ballistic-missile launchers (MLBM) equal totheir present force in this category,eithei4308 or 326. This force includesthe formidable Soviet SS-18's, whichwe believe now car,ry up to 10 sep-ahate megaton-range warheads.The SS-18 and SS-19 are capable ofdestroying protected missile hous-ings and command centers. Whenfully deployed, the Somiets SS-18-force by itself could destroy morethan 90 per cent of our land-basedmissile force, which consists of 54Titans, 450 Minuteman II's, and550 Minuteman III's, at ;tone blow.The United States now has no suchweapons, and the treaty wctuld denythe United States the rightlo buildany fisting the treaty period.

The treaty contains a number oflimits on the modificqion of existingICBM's, primarily the-rule that anytest of an ICBM with more reentryvehicles (RV's) than had previouslybeen tested will cause it to be classi-fied as a "new type".

Limited modifications of existingtypes of ICBMs are permitted.However, any test of.an ICBM with

, inure RVs than has been previouslytested on that type of ICBM willcause it to be classified as a "newtype." The U.S. has tested 7 RVs onthe MINUTEMAN III on two oc-

casions, altli.ough it is deploy('dwith only' 3 RVs. It has recerItlybeen reported thAt the Soviet Unionhas accepted our position withrespect to preserving the option fordeph-iyment of 7 Me:s on MINNLTE-MAN III without, such a variantcounting as a "new type." Thereare, however, no plans Co )- oceedwith the deploy,ment of uch avariant. In any caEe, the deploymentof 7 substantially lower yield RVson MINUTEMAN IP would notinciease the aggregate I-lard targetkill capability of MINUTEMANIkls so equipped over MINUTEMANIlls each equipped withN3 Mark-12Awarheads The Soviet Uniori hastestedirltVs on the SS-17, 6 RVsionthe SS-19, and 10 RVs on the SS-18.Testing of certain other types ofmodifications will alsocause anICBM to be classed as a "new type."The sides have agreed that eachside will be permitted to flight testand deploy one' "new type" ICBM(MIRVed or unMIRVO) during theTreaty period. There is no limit tothe number of "new type" SLBMswhich the sides are permitted to testand deploy during the life of theTreaty Jlt has recently been reportedthat the Soviet sido has requested afurther exemption' from the "newtype- rule f'or missiles smaller thanthe missiles-they would replate.

ii3ecause of the delays iii, our MXprogram, however, there is no pos-sibility thtet the Mited States candeplou "new type" TCRM prior tothe expiration of the Treaty

The Soviet Union has Made greatprogress in fractionating its war-heads, including those targetedagainst Europe which do not comeunder the treaty. There is agreementthat the treaty should establish alimit of 14 RV's per mis:tile forsubmanne-launched missiles. Thereis-no agreement as yet for the num-ber of cruise missiles on a singleaircra ft. IFVnited Staks B 52's in( luding thosein storage and our I 13 1 test aircraftand Soviet Bisons and Bears are tobe «,unted as heavy bombers forpurposes of the treaty. The SovietBackfire bomber, much discussed inthe negotiations, will not be counted,although it is (-apable of reachingtargets throughout the United

States, an'd is being producedsteadily,

The treaty does not attempt to limitnumber of missiles or warheads

ay.be produced and storedductions" in the Soviet-

eployed. nuclear force required bythe treaty need.not result in thedestruction of the weapons, butonly their transference to a ware-house.

Both sides have agreed that neitherside will take any action-owhichwould circumvent the purposes ofthe agreement. This proviswn raisesserious problems with regard to thepossible transfer of cruise missilesor cruise-missile teclinplogy to ourallies. Whether this question hasbeen satisfactorily rcsolvednegotiations is mit now clear.\irnilarly, there is agreement thateach side would refrain frOm inter-fering with the other side's nationalmeans of verification. Here, toodamaging controversies have al-rAdy developed, particularly withregard to Soviet encoding of "tele-metry," which would enable themto circumvent. our monitoringdevices.

The--Kotocol- would ban the flightte-sting or deployment of mobileICMB's and the deploymen't ofground- and sea-launched cruisemissiles with a greater range than600 kilometers during a three-ye&period. At this time, the provisionswith respect to ground-and 'sea-launched cruise missiles, of special

- concern to our NATO allies, arereported to be still under-negotiation.

From the layman's, point of view,there are two basic 4.13jections to theTreaty now in prospect, one techni-cal and the other political. Thetechnical objection is that the-Treatywould lqck us into a position ofinferiority in the nuclear balance,and deny us the only av.ailablemeans to restore that balancequickly, during the tense and dif

I ficult period between now and 1985,when the credibilfty of our nucleardeterrent is in doubt. The politicalobjection is that the effect of aSALT TWO Treaty would be toreassure the Administration andpublic opinion about our immunityfrom Soviet coercion, aNk make it

19

.

more difficult to obtain the aptTro-priatirs necessary to restore and'Maintain our nuclear and conven-tional deterrent forces.

As Mr. Warnke made clear to -yoqlast June, the Administration casefor SALT TWO rests on the piloposi-tion ttiat the emerging -Soviietcapacity to destroy our hardenedICBM silos is not really a.matter 6f.concern becaiise notould respondby destroying theiepeople and theircities from our submarines. I havealready discussed this argument.The possibility of our using sukmarine launched missiles to attackSoviet cities, always dubious, isnow rapidly close to the mamin offutility.

In addition, SALT TWO wouldinhibit us from reestablishing oursecond-strike capability againsthardened military targets - in the.

current state of the muclear balance,the Fetalia r y possibility whichhas the most credibility as a deter-rent, and as an .option for action ifdeterrence fails.

To deal with the threat of a Sovietfirst-strike capacity, and to restoreThe strategic. balance generally bythe early 1980's, will not be easy or

'cheap. The President's decisions tocancel or delay the B-1 bomber, theMX missile, and the Trident sub-marine make it nearly impossiblefor those weapons to be availablebefore the late 1980's, even assumingthat the decisions against them arrev.ersed. It probably would tanearly as long, and cost nearly asmuch, to deal with the problem inthe short run by reviving the pro-duction of Minuteman .III's (or B-52's). The Minqternan HI productionline has been closed recentlY. Arid acrash program along these lines, orits equivalent, would be preventedby the numerical ceilings establishedin SALT TWO.

At this time, it seems probable that\ the Treaty would also prevent the

United States from adopting.theonly feasible "quick fix- for dealingwith the problem, the promisingplan for deploying missiles using amultiple aim-point system (MAPS),the so-called "shell game.- It hasrecently been named the MultipleVertical Protective Shelter (MVPS)

System. Under this bropo. al-r-theUnited States wutild cum ct alarge number of vertical pr eetiveshelters, each capable of holding anICBM and its laurn. her. Some wouldbe empty. The missiles would bemoved periodically, to maketa first-strike 'against them highly prob-lematical. According to reports, theSoviet Unionhas rejected an Amer-ican inquiry about the compatibilityof this idea with the treaty.

These are the basic iteasons whycritics have said that SALT TWO..would freeze us in a position ofinferiOrity, and deny us an oppor-tunity to redress the balance beforethe critical period of the early 1980's,when all the indices w(zuld'haVeturned againstl5s.

I remarked earlier that the milrtaryctssumptions un the basis of whichwe ratified the SALT QJE agree-ments have no4,4 turned out tu be inerror. L t me recapitulate thosepuint.s, to, nderline their importance:First, and most basic, we havecontinued to live by the McNamaraDoctrine of mutual assured destruc-tion; the:Soviets have not. This factpermeates every aspect of theproblem, and completely alters thenature of deterrence.

Secondly, the Soviet Union hasmoved ahead rapidly in MIRVingtheir missiles, and improving theiraccuracy. These two changes bringout the increasing irrelevance of the..measures of nuclear equality usedin SALT TWO. The Treaty regulatesthe number of deployed launchers'-which, by the way, are not thus fardefiMd in the Treaty, becau theyare difficult to distinguish romboosters. The real measures ofeffective nuclear power must dealalso with the number of warheads;the throw-weight of missiles, andtheir destructive power for varioususes. The Soviet Union now regu-larly deploys land-based intercon-tinental Missiles, with as many as8-1() warheads, although ours areequipped with no niore than 3. Weknow also that the host warheadsin the Soviet arsenal have morethan 20 times the destructive powerof Poseidon warheads, our mostnumerous type. -

Third, our earlier

bombers is rapidly disappearing,due to the development dale SovietBacklire, the cancellation of uur B-1bomber, and the'deyelupment ufSoyiet passive and activ! defenses.

Fourth, there are disquieting reportsof Soviek progress both in anti-submarikie warfare and In thedeVeloprrient of anti-satellite weap-ons. The signiAcance of these reportsrequires no emphasis. The cancella-tion of .B-1 production and theapproaching vulnerability of ourland-based)CUMs puts more andmore responsibility on our sub-marine fleet. And uur satellites arecritical both to-the possibility ofverifying compliance wiith SALTTWO, and to many other functiasof our military-, intelligence.

Firth, the.dev elopment of Sov ietmissile and cOnventional forceprograms has increased thc threattu.Western Europe astronomically.It -brings within reach the Sovietstiategic goal qf separating Europefrom the Unitetl States, and achiev-ing the neutralizatip of Europe,Pie liquidation of NATO, and thewithdrawal 'of the United States

from Euwpe and the Mediterranean.Such a catastrophe would leadJapan and China to draw the neces-sary conclusions, and result in thecomRlete ii4olation uf the UnitedStates. .

Finally, the past few years havewitnessed the development of Sovietcapacity to fire missiles from fac-tories, warehoUses, or other "soft"launchers The Soviet Union is nowdeploying between 100 to 200 mis-siles a year ks ,replacements forolder systems-. 4-

What these developments ean, inthe context of the SALT TW prob-lem, is that technological de elop-ments have made the SALTapproach obsolete. Restrictions onthe. number of deployed launc erscan no longer serve as a roug andready index of real nucle ower.SALT TWO is measuring the wrongthings. Its rules could not asSurestability and equality or "parity" inthe nuclear relation between theSoviet Union and the United States.No situation can be Consideredstable if it can be changed in hours

ad v antage iii ,. by the movement uf missiles from

(warehouses to launchers, by t1.10'firing of missiles.Trorn.ware u .esor factories, ur, indeed, by the tra -formation of an iniermediate rangeSoviet missile into an interconti-nental missile byvilding a booster.At thrs stage of nuclear technology,national means of verification can-not monitor most of the importantvariables of nuclear power. Accept-ing the SALT TWO approach wouldserve only to delay our recognitionof the real situation during theshortperiod we have left to restoreour basic defenses.

In short, all the cards in the nucleardeck are now jokers.

In 1972, it was urged th rt the agreedceilings for some laun hers in theInterim Agreement c d no greatharm. Our second strike capability

(")was still credible t a- some threatsbecause we were ah .ad in MIRVingand accuracy., and in bombers, and ,...".therefore in real nuclear power,

,

despite the Soviet advantage-4c thenumbeik of launthers and in throw-weight. This is not the case in 1979.The Soviet Union has at least nar-rowed our lead, and perhaps caughtup with us in MIRVing and inaccuracy, and translated its ad-van-tage in throw weight into an om-inous threat to our military targets.The Soviet Union is far strongertoday and will be even further ahead .tomorrow, in accurate, MIRVed,hea.vy throw weight ICBMs ofenormous destructive power. Asmall fraction- of that force coulddestroy our ICBMs arid other vitalmilitary targets. Our'advantage inbombers is. fading fast because ofour cancellation of the B-1, thedevelopment of the Soviet Backfire,And the strength of Soviet active,and passive air defense measures.

The net result is to put an enormousquestipn mark over our second strikecapability, which should always beclear and credible beyond perad-venture of doubt. Could the strengthof the Soviet ICBM f.orce neutralizeour submarines and perhaps ourbombers as well? That is a keyquestion.

Paul Nitze remarked recently thatthe "the SALT experience reflects abasic antithesis. A colleague Iikensthe transactional relatio to court-

J.

ship between a rich.badulor and anacquisitiN.e beauty each aspiring towedloLk, but he for matrimony andshe with alimony in mind. Bothsides in SALT want a pact but fordistrepant aims our side to neu-

*tralize the nuclear strategic factoroverhanging international politics,-the'other side to narl down stratagicprimacy so as to be in position todirect the course of internationalpolitics.

"To be sure, SALT is not the sourceof all our troubles. The B1 bombercancellation, slippage in our TRI-DENT and MX 'programs, andvC,affling on neutron technology - toname three instances - are notattributable to the SALT connection.Yet a tendency exemplified in themis coinmon to our SALT approach -a tendency to subordinate securitypolicies to hopes for advancingarms control rather than s'hapingarms control policies to our securityneeds."

In the light of what has happenedsince SALT ONE, I conclude thatwe should judge SALT TWO ein theterms of President Kennedy's wrycomment. "If you are cheated once,it is their fault. But if you are cheatedtwice,.it is yours."

The Administration's ultimate ar-gument in favor of obtaining aSALT Treaty is an argument un-worthy of Americans. It is anargument of fear that even a badSALT Treaty is better than noTreaty at all. We are told that if wereject the Treaty now in prospectthe Soviet Union would accelerateits present military building pro-grams, and behave even moreaggressively in international poli-tics. SALT, Administration spokes-men say, is the only "positive"element in the Soviet-Americanrelationship, and the rejection ofSALA' would set back the possibili-ties of a more stable relationshipwith the Soviet Union for years tocome.

If the SALT negotiations are theonly "positive" element in theSoviet-American relationship,should that fact give rise to thesuspicion that the Soviet Union isusing the SALT negotiation as adevice to lull us while.they proceed

to achieve a position of irreN.ersiblesuperiority, and consolidate anempire on an unchallengeable scale?

But the whole idea is a profoundillusion. The Soviet Union's driveforiominion has been proceedingat an accelerating pace for years,limited mit by SALT but by itscalculation of what the American

, response would be to each of itssuccessive moves on the chess boardof world politics. The leaders of theSovi6t Union stop when they con-front ulacceptable risk. Only wecling to he'myth that the "detente"we proclaimed in 1972 has anysubstance. The Soviet's openly talkof it as a tdctie, a strategem. "Nego-tiation" has not been substittitedfor "confrontation", the Cold Waris not over, but worse than ever. Ofcourse the Soviet Union could deploymany missilesoow housed in ware-houses, and put more war-heads onthe heavy-throw weight missiles itpossesses in such abundance. Bat,such actions woula only force. us toconfront the reality now concealedby the limitaticoS and uncertaintiesof our intelligence, and by ourunwillingness to face the worldas it.is. Can the Soviet Union increaseits nuclear arsenal more rapidlythan its present rate of 8% a year? Itis doubtful that it could do muchbetter, without reducing other com-ponents of its military program, Inany eventwe have the economicpower ,to meet the Soviet challenge,once we acknowledge it for what itis.

If the Senate rejctsjie SA4T TWOagreements, itQiffd mean that wehave finally reached a nalionalconsensus on the nature and impli-cations of the Soviet policy ofexpansion and of the military build-up which is its motor. On that basis,and only on that basis, we couldrapidly develop the political andmilitary programs ,required to dealwith, the problem..

fjowo.rer passive and bemusedAmerican opinion may seem.today,the ultiynate political reality is quitedifferent. The American people willrise to the task with passion whenthey realize what the Soviet Unionis doing and trying to do. We shallnever submit to Soviet domination

2,C

in the pattern Ftriland and Polandmust accept. If our moment ofawakening comes too late, there^will be nothing left to do but fight,no matter what the odds may be.That is the psychological truth theSoviet leaders should never ignore.

The course of wisdom in our policyis to confroni the unpleasant realitynow, while it is still feasible toprotect our national interests inpeace by effective military deter-rence and pdlitical programs ofalliance solidarity. The debate overthe ratification of6ALT TWO offersus the best possible opportunity forachieving this decisive turn inAmerican opinion and 'policy. Wecannot afford to delay, and hesitateand wonder any longer. irreversiblechanges jn the, structure of worldpolitics are takirig place. If we allowthem, to 'happen, we shall face atime of 'Thloo0sweat, and tears."

The irony is,that there is no need forus to be defeatist about the Sovietbid for dominance as the wave of

, the future. The Soviet Union is aweak and vulnerable society, despiteits formidable military machine:,Together, we, the Europeans, theJapanese, the Chinese, and a num-.ber of smaller hations around theworld have more than enough powerto restore' the peace without war,through concerted alliance diplo-ma6y hacked by adequate deterrentmilitary force, both strategic 'andconventional. What is lacking is thepolitical will.to fOrge a policy for thewo'rld of the 1980s as energetic,confideni, and calm as the policyPresident Truman and Secretary ofState Acheson established a gener-ation ago. Only such a policy couldarrest the slide towprds anarchyancrstabilize world politics again.

SALT TWO could not contribute tothe revival of such a policy. Itsrejection, however, should be avigorous first step in that direction.

7

Followmg the presentations by Dr.Davul Tarr and Dr. Eugene Rostowpresentations fundamentally atodds with present United StatesGovernment stVegic arms policies.--questions from the floor indicatedthree principal areas of concern. Abasic issue revolved around Saietattitudes toward the possibility offighting and winning a nuclearwar. This included uncertaintiesregarding the actual extent ofdevastation that might result froma puclear conflict and the actualcredibility of strategic .nuclea'rdeterrence. A most'importirspectof this was the political-militarysignificahce of America's transitionfrom superiority to parity, or per-haps, something less than parity inthis sphere.

This discussion pxoduced a parallelline of inquiry involving "nuts andbolts" problems. These involved theextent of Ruasia's conventionalarms buildup, the potential benefitof deployn3ent of United Statescruise missiles, and the cost of anincreased American strategic in-vestment advocated by critics ofpresent levels.

Finally, a degree of fruAration wasexpressed over the seeming paradoxof proposed alternatives or additionsto a SALT TWO agreement. With orwithout SALT, would not the nu-clear arms race continue? Even ifsecond strike capability could bemaintained without an arms spiral,would not this fuel a weapons racein conventional weapons? With thisconstant escalation, was there anyultimate possibility for world peace?

Responses by Dr. Rostow and Dr.Tarr, while not at variance in theirmain thrust, indicated differingpoints of emphasis. The basicpremise of Dr. Rostow and the Com-mittee on the Present Danger isthat America is losing the capabilityof mounting a lethal second strikebecause we have permitted thenuclear balance to tilt against us.Thus, they believe that unless and

DISCUSSION

until the balance is restored we war, the soviet Union would prefershall be unable to illach equitable or to have its adversary concede Hesafe agreements ith the Soviets. stated that the Soviet Union'sDr. Tarr places less emphasis on intention is to accumulate nuclearthe exact state 'of comparative strength sufficiently intimidatingnugear power, stressing instead the and overwhelming to enable it toprofqund effect of the United States *achieve all policy goals by negotia-descent from nude& superiority tok tion, ultimatum, or the use of con-billançe (6 i. something close to it). ventional force. The problem weIn his view this parity has weakened face was described long ago bythe deterrent value of nuclear Thucydides who said, "In humaweapons for protection of our allies. disputations, justice is only 3gfdOne result has been that the issue Of on when the necessity is equarSALT TWQ has become less rele- Whereas, they filet have the odds ofvant compared to the juxtaposition power exact as much as they can,of conventional arms and othei and the weak yield to such condi-areas of competition between the-` tions as they can get."superpowers.

Both speakers agreed that the SovietUnion does not want nuclear war.Both, however, emphasized that theSoviet Union is pursuing pkogramsof eixpansion which threaten UnitedStates interests, and that Sovietperceptions regarding nuclearweapons are dangerously differentfrom those of the United States.

Dr. Tarr believes Soviet statementsabouVighting and winning anuclear war should be taken at facevalue. Unlike the United States, theSoviet Uni6IN4s riot concede firststrike to the other side. If war comes,the Soviets hope to fight with tacti-cal nuclear weapons or perhapsonly With conventional forces.However, if strategic nuclear armsare introduced, Soviet militaryplanning accepts and includes thfsand has prepared routinized tacticsto fight such a war. Dr. Tarr dis-counted suggestions that Moscowshares W,ashington's view that;nuclear ar is necessarily an un-acceptab cataclysm.. Statementsof this nature from Russian solirces,for example, might be sincere butalso could be directed toward Amer-ican prejudices and could be con-cocted to undermine the willingnessof the Unfted States to counterSoviet threats.

Dr. Rostow endorsed Dr. Tarr'sview that rather than fight a nuclear

.Discussion of nuclear war casualtyestimates involved macabre totalsrunning from 5 to 100 million,depending on whether 'weaponsinstallatiOns or cities were thetarget. At issue was the credibilityof the threat of massive retaliation.Simply put, is a threat to incineratean adversary.'s cities and kill. 100million people over a dispute inAsia or Africa (or even WesternEurope) really believeable? Is itcredible even in a direct confronta-tion between Washington and Mos-cow on a vital issue? Is the threat ofone side more credible than that ofthe other?

Dr. Rostow developed the &Ensthat when lane side (the UnitedStates) enjoyed nuclear monopolyor superiority, that capacity tokrestrain or threaten imposed terribleuncertainty and risk upon an adver-saryeven when it did not carryabsolute credibility. Such uncer-tainty clearly played role in theCuban missile crisis and earliercrises of the Cold War. Contrariwise,with the loss of American superi-ority, deterrence has weakenedunder a parity-induced "certainty"thait each side could retaliate mas-sively and mortally. Orte apparentresult of this development was4merican inability to inhibit deci-sively Soviet and ChineSe involve-ment in Vietnam. Dr. Rostowconcluded that the loss-of American

nuclear superiority meant thy lossofl our ability to dictate thc lev0 ofviolence that a confrontation withMoscow would take. According toDr Tarr, the achieement of nuclear

'paraty by the Russians has.profoundpolitical-military significante. Tothe extent that stalemate cancelsout each ide's strategic nuclearweapons, the issue of SALT TWOcould becoine less relevant thenissues of the balance of-conventionaland tactiial nuclear forces deployedin areas of vital interest to thesuperpowers.

Moving to the area of arms capabil-ities and costs, Di-. Rostow statedthat the Soviet arms buildup hasrepresented an annual increase ofbetween 5 and 8 percent in realterms for more than a decade and ahalf. He pointed out that this Sovietactivity was especially ominous inview of the large size Orthe initialarmament base and the compound-ing effect of this increase over asubstantial time span.

The Committee on the PresentI)anger states that" America's secondstriR'e capabilityour ability toretaliate devastatingly after ab-sorbing a Soviet attackis endan-gereib It opposes SALT TWO as,cwimpounding this deterioration ofour strategic position. Dr. Rostowdoes not believe that the.deploy-ment of cruise missiles in B-52swould counter this threat. He pointedout that the cruise missile is still alns,w and experimental weaponwhose vulnerability to antimissilefire has not yet been determined. Ifthis systern .. proves vulnerable, sotoo would United States secondstrike capability

them. However, the same percentagedid not believe the Soviets could betrusted to_keep agreements and waswilling toiAy more taxes to keep upwith the Russians. In the event theSenate refuses approval of SALTTWO, Dr. Rostow was confidentCongress would augrrivri\t thoseincreased defense appropr'ations1

cked by the President an Con-gr ssjonal leadership. He n tedmounti_ng public concern o rernational security which could emobilized to augmeont traditiom lCongressional willingness to sup-,,port any defense appropriations

*which the Preysident demonstratedwere necessary.

Would not a Senhte rejection ofSALT TWO simply continue thenuclear arms race?. With or withoutSALT-, neither speaker was opti-mistic. Dr. Rostow favored continu-ing SALT negotiations but felt thatthe United States must.,restore itsstrategic position during the processto avoid the dangers of bargainingfroen a position of weakness. Hesaw no alternative to continuing tomatch Soviet weapons advanceswith our own as long as the Sovietsyersisted in an aggressive strategyof seizing opportunities and exploit-ing areas of weakness on a globalscale. Dr. 'pares response was evenmore somber. He differentiatedbetween arms control, which wepursue, and disarmament, whichwe have not seriously attempted,and pointed out that an arms con-trol policy stiill meant high levels ofarmaments on both sides. At best,those arsenals would be stable andoffsetting. He concltuled that evenmore.than Soviet expansion, theinherent nature of nuclear tech-

installed, there is no final solutionto the onward march of technology.As lung as the naipn-state systemprevails, the n elear weapon withspiraling addi ions to its capabilityand versatil seems unlikely to beeliminated.

In a valedictory comment on wheth-er constant escalation ultimatelymade world conflagration inevi-.table, Dr. Rostow argued for stnctadherence to the rules of the UnitedNations Charter regarding theinternational use of force. To ac-complish this, we should abjurethecondition wherein the United Statesand its allies respect the Charter,but the other side does not. Weshould announce an "eye for aneye" policy calling for the Russiansand all other countries to adhere tothe Charter or see the West abandonit. Since the rules of the Charter arein the mutual interest of all coui -tries, Dr. ,Rostow believed such apolicy by the United States stoadsome chance of, success. The altV-native, he suggested, could be a.-worsening of present conditions ofanarchy and chaos, and a dangerousslide, toward general war.

The Committee on the Present Dangeris a non profit. non partisoc educationalorganization of citizens founded inI976. The basic purpose of-the Com-mittee is to "facilitate a national dis-cussion of the foreign and nationalsecurity pulw:es of the United Statesdirected toward a secure peace and

nology was at the root of the dis- freedom." Its membership is limited tieIf the scales of nuclear balance armament problem. Today's offen- t/..pse prn ate life and doemwt include

o thave, in fact, tilted against the sive weapons technology requires" electal r appointed full ime federal oroUnited States, are post-Proposition both sides to rely on deterrence. state officials r active candidates for

Thirteen Americans willing to pay Only if technology/ could be chan- public office

the cost's of regaining our s_econd_ neled into delensi-ve_w_eapons !\ strike capability? Estimating the

costs of "restoring the balance asquickly as possible" at $5 billion ayear, Dr. Rostow supported his beliefthat Americans would accept addi-tional taxes for this purpose by arecently conducted Wisconsin poll.This iridicated about 70 percentfavored negotiating with the Sovietsand reaching agreements with

competition could we conceive-Of an.environment in which disarmamentof offensive-weapons could be con-templated. Ironically, at this stage,deployment of defensive weaponscould, by withdrawing one's citiesas hostages to the opponents' secondstrike, be seen as a signal of offen-sive intuit And draw a preemptivestrike. Even if defenses could be

71u, Institute of World Affairs of TheUniversity of Wisconsin Milwaukeeengage.s in a wide range of public educa-tion programg designed to broaden the'knowledge and understanding of the.students. &cult). and the ewnmunity inthe fidd of world affair.s.

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WINGSPREAD

The budding Frank Lloyd Wnght calledWingspread, situated on a roiling prairie site justnorth of Racine, Wisconsin, was designed on1938 as a residence for the Johnson family. In1%0, through the gift of Mr. and Mrs. H. F.Johnson, it became the headquarters of TheJohnson Foundation and began its career asan educational conferenc4 center.

In the years since, it has been the setting formany conferences and, meetings deahng withsubjects of regival, national, and international

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ermitia.

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interest It is the hope of the Ftundation's o

trustees that Wingspread will take its placeincreasingly as a national institution devoted tothe free exchahge of ideas among people.

The rolling expanse of the Midwestern prairieswas considered a natural setting for Wingspread'.in the limitless earth the architect envisioned afreedom and movement. The name Wingspre4Iwas an expression of the nature of the house,reflecting aspiration through spread wings a

symbol of soaring inspiration

THE JOHNSON FOUNDATIONH. F. Johnson

Founder

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BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Samuel C. JohnsonChairman r

Melvin BrorbyVice.President

James L. AllenCatherine B. ClearyJerome H. Holland

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The Jkin son Foundation encoura es theexamination of a variety of problems, fcfcing the

IcTialuest, the Nation, and mankmd. In the beliefthat responsible analyses and proposals shbuklreach a substantial audience, The JohnsonFoundation assists in the publication of variouspapers and reports. Publication, of course,does not imply approval.

r- United States Secunt , Sower Challenge,report of a Fyingsprea ne U9 onuenea in w ,1978 by the Institute of Wor fAYfairs of the

"University of Wisconsin Mi Nkee and the..United States Department of pte in cooperationwith The Johnson Found. . i presents positionsother than those reported in this publicationCopies of both reports may be obtained from TheJohnson Foundation, Racine, Wisconsin 53401

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\Editor for this Report, Rita Goodman, Vice President Area Programs, The Johnson Foundition,Pubhsged, May, 1979 25 "