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CHAPTER ONE
1.0 Introduction
Most problems related to land in third world countries are those associated
with planning, use and management of land. Over the years, developing
nations have tended to change their policies from those left by colonialists
to the ones best suited to their socio-economic conditions (Kambenja,
1997).
Land reform has long been at the heart of efforts to promote rural
development. It has been argued that customary Tenure in Africa is a
recipe for underdevelopment, and thus a major cause of the regions untold
levels of rural poverty (Ngombe et al, 2006).
In recent years, market reforms have been carried out in countries as
diverse as Brazil, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia (Brown,
2002). The quest for land reform involves raising the living standards of
huge proportions of the world’s population, currently estimated at 6
billion, of which many are in developing countries (UN Habitat, 2003).
The great majority live in rural areas thus it is a matter of necessity that
overall development must include rural development (Ngombe et al,
2006).
It has been argued that Africa can only develop if the traditional tenure
consisting of about 90% of African land resources is integrated into
leasehold tenure system founded on principles of individualization (Quan,
1998)).
In urban areas, land or real property that is acquired for public interest is
compensated by value. Although the owners may experience worsenment
by moving from their premises, they still get the value for their properties
and manage to settle elsewhere. But decades after the construction of the
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Kariba dam, the Gwembe valley Tonga still bear the consequences of the
mass construction. Apart from being displaced from their land, they
experienced a loss of livelihood and have never been fully able to recover
from these consequences (Colson, 1979).
1.1 Background of study
Zambia has a total landmass of approximately 752,000km². This land is
divided into two tenure systems namely customary land and state land.
Customary land covers about 94% of these areas while the remaining 6%
is state land. (GRZ, 1996). In the customary system, chiefs regulate the
allocation of land.
Figure 1.1: Land Tenure distribution
Source: Adams(2003)
With an exponentially rising population of about 11million, the country
has experienced artificial shortages of land in major towns due to poor
planning of urban land. The demand for land has increased considerably
and in its current state the land delivery system is unable to meet this
demand especially in urban areas. This calls for the conversion of
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customary land to state land to meet future land requirements (Republic of
Zambia 2000)
Further, it is believed that promoting market-based activities in customary
areas will bring about economic development in the rural areas.
In Zambia as well as in many African countries, the call for market based
land reform has been overwhelming. Urbanization, rural-urban migration,
commercialization in farming, tourism and monetary economy bring about
a demand for customary land to be converted to state land (Kambenja
1997). After the end of the second republic under the UNIP government,
the new government under the MMD found it necessary to reform land
laws in the country to make land delivery more efficient (Brown 2002). In
their manifesto it was outlined among other things that:
The MMD shall institutionalize a modern, coherent, simplified and relevant land
Law code intended to ensure the fundamental right to private ownership of land as
well as to be an integrated part of a more efficient land delivery system. To this end,
the MMD government will address itself to […] fundamental land issues […] in
order to bring a more efficient and equitable system of tenure conversion and land
allocation in customary land; land adjudication legislation will be enacted and
coordinated in such a way that confidence shall be restored in land investors […] the
MMD shall attach economic value to undeveloped land [and] promote regular
issuance of title deeds to productive land owners in both rural and urban areas
(MMD Manifesto, 1991)
One of the specific objectives of the current land policy is to address the
pressures and need for land by urban populations and foreigners. Among
other things, the Land Act provides for the alienation of land by the
president, statutory recognition and continuation of customary tenure and
also the conversion of customary tenure into leasehold (state land). The
aim was to enact legislation that would restore investor confidence in the
land market, attach economic value to undeveloped land and encourage
customary communities to engage in market activities.
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1.2 Problem statement
In recent times, tracts of customary land have been converted into state
land as private land, game reserves or district expansion. Conversion of
title has taken place throughout Zambia and these have been concentrated
in peri-urban areas and in those parts where agriculture and tourism have
the most potential (Brown, 2002).
While we appreciate this, in areas where the issuance of leasehold title is
widespread, long standing economic, social and political relations are
being transformed (Brown, 2002). The l995 Land Act (Part 11 section 4(c)
provides that land should not be alienated ‘without consulting any other
person or body whose interest might be affected by the grant’ (Republic of
Zambia, 1995). This proviso offers legal protection to sitting tenants on
customary land; however, it is seldom adhered to (Brown, 2002).
Following the implementation of the Land Act, the government failed to
pass any statutory instruments- the rules and procedures that govern the
administration of land (Adams. 2003).
It has been observed in areas converted for tourism purposes, under the
premise of market based land reform that local people have lost full access
common pool resources upon which they have depended for their
livelihood (Southern Guardian, 2005). Also, after transformation, it is
uncertain whether the leaseholds on customary land remain subject to
local customs and traditions (Mulolwa, 1998).
In the absence of equitable and democratic administrative system, market
reforms can lead to social and economic exclusion (Brown, 2002).
Majority of the investors in these areas prefer that the land they desire
should be converted from customary land to state land. Under the current
act, there is no provision for land that is converted to state land to be
reconverted to customary land (Zambia land alliance 2005).
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However, there are some customary areas which have seen the
introduction of investors as a positive contribution to their livelihood,
making the debate on tenure conversion dependant on particular areas of
implementation (Quan, 2000).
Given this background, an important question arises:
Bearing in mind that customary communities depend on land for their
livelihood, can Market based land reform in be carried out without leaving
negative consequences on customary communities in Zambia?
1.3 Research questions
The primary questions to be answered by this research are:
1.Are village communities aware of the market based approach to land
reform in their areas?
2.Have customary communities benefited from market based land
reform in their areas?
3.Is the market based approach the best method for appropriating land
in customary areas?
1.4 Research objectives
The aim of the research is to assess the inherent problems of the current
land reform as regards customary land. To achieve this aim, the objectives
are to investigate:
1.Administrative procedures followed in implementing market based
activities in customary land
2.What economic benefits have been channeled to the local people
through market reform?
3.The social effects of conversion of tenure on the livelihood of the
local people.
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1.5 Relevance of research
Land policy lies at the heart of economic development. This means that
the focus is on the landed professionals to come up with policies that will
be viable enough to sustain development.
The current land disputes in Zambia justify this research. As the focus
now turns to customary land to meet future land requirements, procedures
of this allocation need to be made clear. However this can only be done if
the real effects of this conversion are brought to light.
The research thus generates information as to whether the current
approach to customary land appropriation is the best approach for
Zambia’s economic development.
1.6 Justification of study area
The research focuses on Chief Chiwala’s area in Ndola Rural as a case
study area. The proximity of the area to the Ndola urban area has resulted
to high demand of the area by urban dwellers. The area is also endowed
with rich forests and fertile soils making it a prime area for investors.
The area also proved to be convenient as it can easily be accessed from the
University.
1.7 Research Methodology
Primary data was obtained by way of field survey through interviews with
the residents in the research area and with relevant authorities like the
ministry of lands, Masaiti District Council and non-governmental
organizations, the chief and village elders.
Secondary data was obtained by desk research through reviewing of
published and unpublished literature.
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1.7.1 Data Collection Methods
Focus Group Discussions
Focus groups are a tool for collecting qualitative data from group
discussions. This process follows a predetermined interview guide to
direct a discussion among 5 to 12 people with the purpose of collecting in-
depth qualitative information about a group's perceptions, attitudes, and
experiences on a defined topic. Participants should be typical of the
intended population.
This research will follow a “funnel structure." The beginning section is
broad and less structured. This is achieved by focusing first on a larger
group of people who will be randomly selected.
The middle section is more structured. Through Judgement Sampling a
smaller group will be selected and the goal is to lead into, or begin to
cover, the research questions.
The ending section is narrow and the most structured. The goal is to
obtain answers to the specific needs assessment questions. www.sampling
/focusgroups
Questionnaires
Structured questionnaires were given to the Masaiti District Council. This
questionnaire was intended to achieve the following:
1. Investigate the relationship between the chiefdom and local authority in
terms of land allocation
2. Investigate the extent of conversion of customary land in the chiefdom
3. To generate data on the social geography of the area
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Interview Schedules
Interviews were conducted with the investors or farmers and heads of
households in the area.
The advantage of an interview is that certain conclusions can be made
through personal observations. It is also cost-effective in terms of time.
1.7.2 Details of units of inquiry
In order to investigate the socio-economic impacts of conversion of tenure
in Chief Chiwala’s area, the following units were used in this research:
Employment
Through encouraging investors to settle in customary areas, it is hoped
that employment can be created for the local people. The research
investigated the number of people that have gained employment from the
investors in the area.
Infrastructure
This was assessed in terms of recent infrastructure built by investors such
as schools, health centers. It was assumed in the research that access to
basic infrastructure improves livelihoods of people thus a social benefit.
Productivity
In order to assess the economic impact, the research investigated the
levels of productivity of the local people and sought to establish as to
whether it has been affected by the reform process.
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Security of tenure
Tenure security is an important aspect of livelihood in customary land. An
assessment was carried out to determine how secure the villagers are with
the introduction of market reforms.
Access to common pool resources
Villagers consider certain areas of great importance to their livelihood.
This is because those areas possess vital resources such as wild fruits
which act as safety nets during non-farming seasons. In view of this
importance, the research investigated access to these resources as a
measure of livelihood.
1.7.3 Analysis of Data
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used in the analysis of
data. For open ended questions, the analysis was physical. Data obtained
from Focus Groups was analyzed and presented using simple
descriptive/reporting method.
1.8 Scope and limitation of study
The research focuses on activities of private land owners in customary
areas, with specific interest to Chiwala chiefdom. The chiefdom covers
quite a large area thus it was necessary to further limit the area of study by
selecting a particular area within the chiefdom.
It is limited to one study area hence the information may not be a
representation of all chiefdoms.
The time given for the research is also limited, as the study requires
considerable time to familiarize with the research community.
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Being a customary area, sampling frames could not be easily accessed for
farmers in the area. This meant using snowball sampling which was quite
hectic because of the differing locations.
Finances also limited the research because hiring vans to get to the farms
was expensive. This meant that only a few farmers could be reached.
Villagers were quite skeptical in giving information for fear of being
reported to the chief. They risked losing their land if certain information
reached the headmen.
The land question in Zambia is quite a sensitive matter hence some
investors and farmers in the research area were not willing to provide the
necessary information.
1.9 Chapter Layout
Chapter one introduces the study, outlines the problem statement, scope
and limitation of the study, justification and relevance of the study
Chapter two is divided into theoretical and conceptual framework. It
reviews literature on land reforms and give experiences of land reforms
and outcomes in other countries. The conceptual framework contains the
model of the research.
Chapter three: This chapter gives the background of land reform in
Zambia. It is meant to give an insight of the reform process in Zambia
before narrowing to the selected case study in chapter four.
Chapter Four: The chapter is a presentation of research findings and
analysis with particular reference to the case study area. It presents the
findings of the research in line with the Research questions and objectives
outlined in section 1.4 and 1.5 respectively.
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Chapter Five: The final chapter summarizes the study and gives a
recommendation on the best approach to land reform in Zambia.
Recommendations for further study are also given.
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CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.0 Introduction
Land in Africa is a subject that can be traced to as far back as the 1950s
and 1960s and yet it is still one of the topical issues and a top agenda item
at many a global forum especially those hinging on development in sub
Sahara Africa (Ngombe et al, 2006). Current concern with the land
question derives from the accumulated experience of economic
development. Land is believed to be a prerequisite to economic growth as
most people depend primarily on the land and agriculture for their
existence. Land is directly linked with both their economic and social
interests (Quan, 2000).
Most African countries have embarked on reform programs intended to
regain macro-economic balance, improve resource allocation and restore
growth. Reforms in Africa have been substantial in three important areas
namely Macro economic balance, Market forces and private initiative or
privatization (World Bank, 2004). Among the critical areas of reform, land
has stood as the focal point of reform as many African economies hinge
on Agriculture.
After decades of neglect and disinvestments in agriculture and rural
development land reform has returned to national policy agendas as a
result of increasing landlessness on the one hand, and on the other
pressure from the World Bank and donor agencies to develop land
markets. The objectives of the world’s body land reform programs have
been equity and efficient distribution of secure land tenure. Nevertheless,
Africa has emerged from reforms with a difficult legacy; the performance
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of Africa’s developing countries still falls short of the needed levels
needed to reduce poverty and offset decades of stagnation (Plateau, 1992).
2.1 Understanding market based land reform
In the last two decades, land reforms have taken place throughout the
world in one guise or another. The aims have been to promote economic
growth, encourage sustainable management and reduce poverty.
Land market reforms have been carried out in countries as diverse as
Brazil, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia (Brown, 2002). The
quest for land reform involves raising the living standards of huge
proportions of the world’s population, currently estimated at 6 billion, of
which many are in developing countries (UN Habitat, 2003). The great
majority live in rural areas thus it is a matter of necessity that overall
development must include rural development (Ngombe et al, 2006).
Land remains an asset of great importance to economies especially in
Africa where land and the biological resources it supports are principle to
livelihood.
Economic development issues concerning land tenure are often related to
the concept of land reform (Chileshe, 2005).
Adams et al in 1999 defined land reform as a planned change in terms and
conditions on which land is held, used and transacted. Further, Bruce
(1993) defined land reform, as a government measure undertaken to
redistribute land holdings. From the above definitions, it is clear that the
reformation in land is meant to change existing structures and practices
related to land.
In an effort to redress past inequalities to land and stimulate self-
sufficiency, many developing countries sought to redistribute land from
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big landowners to poorer peasants and the landless. However from the
1980s, market based approaches to land reform have been dominant
(Brown, 2002). The rationale is that this would lead to rural economic
growth through sustainable individual use of land resources, good
governance and promotion of rural land markets .Proponents of the market
approach further argue that the recognition of property rights will reduce
poverty and reduce the problems of capital accumulation in developing
countries (Pilipinas, 2000).
The hope that rural people will be able to loan, rent or even sell their land
in terms of hardship and have financial security is the basis of market-
based land reform (Plateau, 1992). Deininger (1997) has observed that in
times of economic growth through reforms, the income of the poorest
sections of society also tends to improve. Even where the growth does not
directly affect the poor, it can do so indirectly, for instance through-
improved provision of rural services, employment or safety nets
(Quan,2000).
According to Kambenja (1997) there exist many factors that bring about
the need for land reform:
i. Economic reform.
ii. Employment creation
iii. Better income distribution
iv. Social requirements
v. Education
Agrarian reform, a construct of the Cold War to counter 'communist' land
reform, embraces improvements in both land tenure and agricultural
organization. Its policy prescriptions urged governments to go beyond
redistribution: they should also support other rural development measures,
such as the improvement of farm credit, cooperatives for farm-input
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supply and marketing, and extension services to facilitate the productive
use of the land reallocated. Economic arguments favoring land
redistribution focus on the diseconomies of large-scale enterprises and on
the need to increase returns to land (Adams, 2001).
2.2 Land Tenure conversion in market based land reforms
Land tenure has been broadly defined as the set of legal rules and
procedures that govern the use of land (Dorner, 1970). Many of the
challenges arising from land reform in sub-Sahara Africa stem from the
plurality of tenure systems of authority related to land (Quan, 1996). He
further asserts that the plurality of land tenure systems in Africa has had
lots of challenges in terms of land administration, land delivery and
general economic advancement.
Tenure in Africa follows a mosaic pattern although the duality of statutory
and customary is the most dominant. The background of this mosaic
tenure is as a result of the colonization of Africa in the 19th century, which
saw the introduction of the western capitalist models of tenure
administration (Ngombe et al, 2006). This saw the birth of unjust divide of
land between the colonial masters and the natives; with the colonialists
getting the best of African fertile land. The western tenure system was
more capitalist as compared to the African perception that land is a free
gift from God.
After independence, many countries hastily sought to change this
prevailing tenure and turned to their own socialist systems founded on
principles of customary rights. Tenure under customary practices is
predominantly communally held. Natives have individual rights of use but
do not have exclusive rights to the land (Chileshe, 2005). Up to date, many
African countries hold land under customary tenure as the majority, while
private land is held in minimum. However, reforms that were undertaken
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after independence by African governments, aiming at correcting the
historical injustices in land distribution, have had their own share in the
stagnation of economic development (Brown, 2002).
Many countries of the world, especially developing countries in Africa
have experienced severe problems related land administrations under their
current tenure systems. The most prevalent ones include environmental
degradation, landlessness, squatting, inadequate public revenue and rural
poverty (Kambenja, 1997).
Many African governments and international donors have attributed the
problems of rural poverty, poor agricultural output and low levels of
economic development to the persistence of farming systems based on
customary tenure (Quan, 2000). There is widespread argument that Africa
can only develop if the traditional tenure, consisting of about 90% of
Africa’s land resources, is integrated into the leasehold tenure system,
which is founded on principles of individualization. The World Bank in
particular has made frantic efforts to encourage modernization of tenure in
many developing countries. (Ngombe et al, 2006). But why have
traditional tenure systems attracted so much global attention?
2.2.1 The World Bank view on Market based land reform
Up to the 1990s, the role of the World Bank and other international
organizations in promoting and supporting land reforms was rather
marginal and contradictory. Although they formally endorsed land reform
in conference declarations, researches and policy statements, their actual
support for it was ambivalent (FAO, 1992)
When the World Bank published its 1975 “Land Reform Policy Paper,”
basically, its major recommendations wanted to do away with customary
communal tenure systems that are deemed to be backward. Moreover,
these common lands are traditionally used for the production of food crops
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and are thus incompatible with the World Bank’s model of export-oriented
agriculture to service the needs of the industrialized countries (Pilipinas,
2000). Privatization of land ownership would provide a more favorable
environment for cash crop production. It likewise serves the objective of
debt servicing since the proceeds of public land sales are used to generate
state revenues which are channeled to the international creditors (World
Bank, 1980).
During the 1990s, the World Bank reviewed its Land Reform Policy Paper
and started pushing market-assisted land reform as a concrete alternative
to redistributive land reform (FAO, 2006).
The World Bank (2003) argues that customary tenure encumbers
commercialization; it is insecure, lacks certainty and frustrates rural land
markets. This has led to the call for land tenure reform, attempting to
replace customary tenure with a modern secure tenure. Land tenure
security is often associated with Land titling and land registration.
The next section explores land titling in relation to land tenure and also the
role it plays in market based land reform.
2.2.2 Land titling and Registration in market based land reform
Secure individual tenure, and a free land market, has been promoted in the
belief that they will lead to higher levels of agriculture investment and
productivity and thus provide a firm basis for national growth and
development (Quan, 2000). Smith (1999) defines title as the degree of
control, use and enjoyment that are recognized and protected by law. It has
been argued that lack of title in customary lands brings about insecurity
because rights are not recognized and protected by law. Olawore et al
(2006) state that, over 80% of lands in developing countries have no
documentary evidence or confirmed tenure, making insecure land in
Africa the majority.
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Acquare (1984) defines land registration as the making and keeping of
records relating to land transactions. He further states that these records
include not only the information about the transactions affecting land, but
any relevant data about its physical and abstract attributes depending on
the purpose for which it is intended to use the register. It can be seen from
the definitions that land registration and titling go together. What role do
they play in market-based land reform?
Land titling and registration make parcels of land known, definable and
identifiable (Olawore et al, 2006). This substantiation of parcels makes a
prospective purchaser ascertain the right vendors to convey the land to
them. This forms the basis of the land market. Following this line of
argument, customary tenure it is believed, hinders the development of the
land market and agricultural growth. Quan (2000) thus concludes that
growth requires the conversion of customary tenure systems in which land
is not a saleable commodity, to formal, individual land titles, which can be
traded.
But Mololwa (1998) and other scholars like Brown(2002) oppose this
conclusion in that without registration, customary rights are secure and do
not need to undergo market reforms. At a time when customary tenure is
labeled backward because of the inherent uncertainties, ambiguity in
parcels of land (and hence the justification of its reform), it is also being
argued that customary tenure does not encumber financial markets.
2.2.3 The effects of market based reforms on Common Pool Resources
The debate on registration and titling also brings an important question on
common property resources. Ostrom(1990) defined common property
resources(CPR’s) as “ public goods which are used simultaneously or
sequentially by different users because of difficulties in claiming or
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enforcing exclusive rights, or because they are so sparse that it is not
worth doing so”.
Most tenure systems are communal in character hence common property
resources form part of their livelihood. Their contribution can be viewed
in terms of water for domestic use, grazing land for mixed herds, habitats
for wildlife, providing food, cash and medicine; building materials; fuel;
edible plants; raw materials for tools, products and handicrafts for use and
sale(Cousins,1999; Quan,2000).
The significant contributions that CPRs make to rural livelihoods are
under threat with the introduction of reform policies on land. Rapid socio-
economic change partly as a result of new modes of interaction between
the local and market economy is fundamentally altering the context of
CPRs making the economic livelihood of rural people very uncertain
(Quan, 2000).
Opposing views of researchers on the commercialization of customary
rights makes the question of land reform more critical. Some countries
have, in the quest for economic growth, undertaken considerable steps in
modernization of their tenure and it would be interesting to see how and
draw lessons from them.
2.3 Market Land reforms in East Africa: Lessons from Kenya
Kenya is said to be the first African country south of the Sahara to have
adopted a clear policy on land access, management and control
(Swynnerton report, 1955). While settlers in Zambia came for mineral
exploitation, the explorers in Kenya were attracted by the beauty of the
country and decided to permanently settle there. Agriculture became the
basis of the land policy.
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The policy first introduced by the colonial administration is based on
implementation of a comprehensive program of registration and titling
throughout the country. Individualization in Kenya was implemented
following the Swynnerton report of the royal land commission on East
Africa in 1955(Ngombe et al, 2006). This process was on the basis that
individualization stimulates farm investment, agriculture growth and the
emergence of land markets (Kanji et al, 2001). Kenyan nationals were
granted individual titles to portions of former colonial settlers’ estates and
these were registered with the hope that market transactions would be
consolidated, and administrative benefits would be derived from the
creation of organized records (Quan, 2000). The arguments advanced in
the swynnerton report which were the basis of the individualization of the
tenure in Kenya are:
Security of Tenure: It was and it is still hoped that individualization of
tenure will bring about the pride of ownership thus foster individual
investment on land. The collective result would result in economic
development especially in rural areas. Communal tenure is thought to
discourage long term planning and investment in land.
Facilitation of credit: It is argued that land titles give farmers and other
rural people the opportunity to mortgage their plots and thus access loans.
Dispute reduction: It was thought that individual titles would reduce
disputes especially in densely populated areas.
Since the 1970s, individualization has taken place all over Kenya. In their
research, Ngombe et al (2006) argue that land has been privatized to
outsiders against the wishes of and without consultations with the local
community. Quan (2000) asserts that the expected free market from titling
and registration, have not materialized nor has agricultural credit been
increased. He concludes by stating that although land titling has provided
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secure tenure rights, the process of registration has been costly and the
titling has tended to generate damaging impacts on the position of the
poor. According to Bruce et al (1986) some of the impacts that Market
based approaches have had in Kenya are summarized as follows:
i. Increased concentration of land ownership, especially in the hands of
the recipients of former settler land, and those influential enough to
manipulate the registration process in their own interests;
ii. Weakening of customary rights, within households and between
different social groups, resulting in diminished security of tenure
for non-title holders especially women, children and landless
farmers who can no longer rely on secondary claims or kinship ties
to guarantee access to resources.
iii. Heightened inequalities in land ownership and agricultural incomes,
leading to increased landlessness through land sales, and growing
rural-urban migration.
iv. Rising unemployment, caused by reduced opportunities for share
cropping and tenancy opportunities
v. Diminished food security and increased vulnerability to drought
amongst groups whose access to land has been diminished by the
titling process;
vi. Increased level of disputes resulting from individual rights being
imposed on pre-existing systems of multiple rights
vii. The inability of poor farmers to acquire title since the costs is often
greater than the benefits.
Kenya, where the post-independence government somewhat unexpectedly
embraced the colonial government's Mau-Mau-era individualization
programme, has been the major test case for the individualization of
indigenous tenure. The programme was carefully studied and generated an
extensive critical literature in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently, other
important studies have been carried out of both the development of
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indigenous tenure systems where there are no major interventions, and the
economic impacts of tenure individualization in several smaller pilot
tenure reform exercises (Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994).
Two conclusions have emerged. First, indigenous tenure systems tend to
evolve under the influence of such factors as new market forces and
population growth. They are not static and can often be reformed without
the need of state interventions. Second, where individualization was
forced by State-sponsored reforms, it usually did not have the desired
impacts on small farmers' behaviour. New investment did not materialize,
and land was not used as collateral to secure credit (FAO, 1992). Other
important economic or technological preconditions for the anticipated
behaviour apparently did not exist, and farmers' behaviour with regard to
land still reflected their adherence to the values of family and lineage.
These findings have weakened the case for forcing individualization.
Existing tenure systems are less often described as "bottlenecks" and
discussion concentrates more on strategies for adapting such systems,
rather than replacing them(Quan,2000).
2.4.0 Market Land reforms in Central Africa: Lessons from Malawi
The colonial policy was to appropriate all land in Malawi to the British
sovereign, place the administration of such land in the sovereign’s local
representative, facilitate access by white settlers on the basis of private
title, preserve native rights strictly as occupation rights and ensure
availability of cheap labor for settler agriculture (Kandodo, 2001). The
results of such a policy were that indigenous people lost ownership and
control over their own land. By independence in 1964, land was
categorized as public land, private land and customary land.
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Malawi’s land policy after independence evolved in a different approach
from Zambia. From the onset, post-colonial policies were aimed at getting
rid of the customary approach. The countries first president Dr Kamuzu
Banda carried the colonial accusations leveled against customary tenure
and also proclaimed that customary tenure was a hindrance against
economic growth (Ngombe et al 2006). In 1965, the Government of
Malawi passed the land act (cap.57.01) but it did not change the existing
policies. The government embarked on an aggressive process of expansion
of large scale or estate agriculture through alienation of land under
customary land tenure, which up to date has seen land being concentrated
into the hands of fewer individuals (Kandodo, 2001).
The results of this process are high rates of underutilization of large estates
or absenteeism of landlords while 55% of peasant households own
smallholdings of less than a hectare each. The underutilization reflected
among other things, the ease with which land was acquired and prevalence
of low taxes. (Mkandawire, 1999; Ngombe et al, 2006).
What economic benefits have been reaped from this market-based
approach to land ownership? Kandodo answers this question by stating
that:
It is not a secret to say that not less than 80% of the Malawian
population is poor; there are black Malawian citizens, who, if they
have any property, it is the land where they have built their hut or
have their small garden. Chances of being tempted to sell that piece
of land are therefore very high. Whatever will be realized from the
sell will straight away go to the mouth. What will be seen later will
be 80% of the population being poor and landless, while 20% of the
population (foreigners and multinational companies) taking over
(Kandodo, 2001)
24
Malawi has since introduced a draft new land policy that seeks to reverse
the injustices in land ownership. This reversal in the policy is enshrined in
the Control of lands order of 1990, which has discontinued the conversion
of customary land to estate leasehold. The goal of this policy is to ensure
security of tenure and equitable access to land, and to facilitate the
attainment of broad based social and economic development through
optimum and ecologically balanced use of land and land based resources.
It is however interesting that the fundamental principle is to elevate
customary tenure to full ownership status through comprehensive
registration and titling of customary interests.
2.5.0 Market Land reforms in Southern Africa: Lessons from
Mozambique
Mozambique, a country with around 17 million people has a total
landmass of 800 000km². Like Zambia, Mozambique took up the socialist
approach to land through the enactment of the Land Act 1970 (Suca,
2003). However, unlike Zambia where all land was vested in the president,
all land in Mozambique was placed into the hands of the state and it
became state property. Socialism disappeared with the coming in of the
political and economic liberalization of the 1980’s, which resulted into
mass privatization, grounded in the usual expectation of economic growth
(Ngombe et al, 2006). White farmers from South Africa and Zimbabwe
expressed the most interest in land acquisition, resulting in a strong
concessionaire culture whereby lands were leased by the government to
foreigners for certain productive uses (Quan, 2001). During the 1980’s up
until 1992, the country suffered a lot of civil wars, which led to mass drifts
into neighboring countries like Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Malawi and South
Africa. An estimate of 1/3 of the population fled to other countries. The
civil strife led to the classification of Mozambique as the poorest country
in the world in the 1990’s (Suca, 2003). The road to recovery meant that
25
policies had to change to address socio-economic needs. Consultations on
land policy began under structural adjustment programs (SAP). Civil
society rejected the continuation of privatization of land rights, which
were among the principles of the land policy (Kandodo, 2001). As a
result, when the bill went for debate at the 1996 national land conference,
any clauses aimed at rural land reform were excluded (Ngombe et al,
2006). The new land law was passed in 1997 and among its various
aspects is that state land cannot be sold. Kloeck-Jensen (Cited in Quan,
2000) observes that the law has neither met the ambitions of most citizens
nor met the keenest of the donor community to create a clear legal
environment for the development of private property and a free market in
land.
However, the land issue in Mozambique seems not to have been fully
settled. The Minister of Agriculture is reported as having stated that:
The land law we have today in Mozambique, that protects the
peasants, was conceived by the peasants. It was thought that it was
the best way to protect the peasants, but I think time has come to
start selling land (Kanji et al, 2002).
The above case studies have shown how some countries in Africa have
performed in attempt to privatize their land. When Kenya and Malawi are
considering reversing the individualization program under the auspices of
market reform, Mozambique is thinking of introducing it.
Experiences in Kenya have shown that market approaches to land can
result in increased landlessness through land sales and weaken social
bonds in customary areas. The weakening of customary rights indicates a
change in societies, a scenario so familiar to the coming of the colonialist
in Africa.
26
Malawi too has shown the results of unclear policies in introducing market
activities. Poor people have a higher chance of becoming landless by
selling their parcels of land with the hope of getting money.
From the literature reviewed, the call of market based activities in
customary areas as a way of promoting rural development in itself is a
good idea but the approach of implementation is what has caused land
disputes. The conversion of title from customary to leasehold has
benefited the wealthy people leaving the target communities with negative
consequences such as landlessness.
Therefore, in the continuing search for tenure security and poverty
reduction in rural areas, what policy changes or synergies are required to
confer social security and equity, and permit economic efficiency?
The next section discusses some of the models in land reform that are able
to achieve economic growth.
2.6.0 Economic theory of Private Enterprise
The argument that individuality of tenure or privatization of land rights
would yield economic growth is derived from the economic theory of
private enterprise. According to Ngombe et al (2006), the economic theory
of private enterprise, two keys theoretical approaches have been used in
pursuing private enterprise and these are:
2.6.1 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP’s)
Private enterprise is achieved by making adjustments to the economy.
Creating an enabling environment for the market forces of supply and
demand to interact freely mainly achieves this. By allowing the market to
interact freely i.e. willing buyer and willing seller, an enabling
environment is created for rural land markets. An enabling environment is
27
defined by universal inducements towards individualization of land rights
and universal constraints against the form of tenure are targeted to reform.
This theory is supported by Turner (1997) in his book “an approach to
land values”. He describes three (3) criteria that must be satisfied for land
to have value for market reform.
1) Utility
Land must be capable of being utilized. This is looked at in terms of
productivity and its ability to create goods and services. Without utility,
the value of land can not be expressed as value is often determined by the
output it produces.
2) Ownership
It must be capable of being owned. Individual ownership can only be
established on a known, definable and identifiable basis. Communal
ownership in this case inhibits the value of land because parcels of land
cannot easily be identifiable and linked to an owner.
3) Limited Supply
It must be limited in supply to instill competition. From an economic
standpoint, the more limited or scarce a good is on the market, the more
likely that its value will be high. In the case of land, the total extent of an
area cannot be changed, thus land at any point is limited in supply.
However, economic land can be increased with the opening up of new
roads.
The above factors can be summarized in figure 2.2 as follows:
28
Figure 2.2: Basic elements of land value
Formulated by author
The satisfaction of land as an economic good makes it a tradable
commodity on the market. However, while customary land satisfies the
aspect of utility, individual ownership does not exist. Land is held as a
communal good and not an individual good. To understand rural land
markets it is helpful to shift the analytical focus from the physical
ownership of to the prevailing system of property rights. Hoff states that:
Little economic activity would occur in the absence of rights, or powers, to
consume, obtain income from, and transfer assets. The level of economic
development of a region will therefore depend on its system of property rights
(Hoff, 1993).
It is thus the aim of the Government to put up mechanisms that will create
a sense of ownership of customary land and also create demand for it. The
theoretical supply curve for land is vertical, meaning that there is no way
to (materially) increase the supply, as the price people are willing to pay
climbs. Since the supply of land is "inelastic" it means that limitedness of
supply will be achieved by inducing demand (Hoff, 1993). As prices for
land are increasing, there is a "tendency" for those who control land to
hold it off the market in anticipation of further increases. Thus, the supply
OWNERSHIP
UTILITY LIMITED SUPPLY
LAND VALUE
29
curve for land actually leans to the left rather than being vertical. This is
what land hoarding and speculation causes. With this artificial scarcity
created, prices for the land that is either developed or underdeveloped will
tend to increase even more (Turner, 1997).
This theory was heavily supported by the World Bank before 1975. In
1975, changing priorities in economic development meant a direct change
in land reform (FAO, 1992)
2.6.2 Direct central control
Unlike the enabling approach, which merely facilitates market interaction,
this approach directs reforms on assumptions that left alone, the market
can fail to transfer enough land to meet the demand (World Bank, 2004).
The government is able to introduce redistribute policies such as Fast track
policies in Zimbabwe aimed at distributing land equally.
2.7 The replacement theory
Customary land allocation rules provide every resident with as much land
as it needs for subsistence but not for more. In other words, households are
prevented from producing a surplus. And even when they succeed in
producing a surplus, they are subject to strong pressure to redistribute to
the village (Plateau, 1992).
The implication of this argument is that any more of land tenure ought to
be encouraged on the grounds that it would provide much stronger
incentives to hard work and investment than customary land arrangements
and traditional social organization.
The cornerstone of this theory rests on the premise that if a large number
of people are free to use the same piece of land, each for their own
purpose, each has an incentive to use the same piece of land without
putting anything back to it (FAO, 2006). However, under the replacement
30
theory, flexibility in land tenure will encourage households to adjust their
holdings and production to meet new needs, thus encouraging investments
and development of sustainable means of using land and natural
resources(Plateau,2000).
It is further argued that communal tenure worked well in Africa so long as
populations were small in relation to land; but population pressure
everywhere causes such tenure to destroy the land. Investment apart,
communal tenure is a handicap to innovation (Lewis, 1995).
Under the replacement theory, the legitimization of access to land and
natural resources by individuals is likely to reflect power structures and
may not be equitable (FAO, 2006)
2.8 Towards the theory of adaptation
From the discussions in the previous sections, it can be concluded that
land tenure reforms in most African countries are based on replacement of
customary tenure with statutory tenure. The approach supports the
replacement of customary tenure by statutory tenure provided by the state
because customary tenure is conceived as inefficient in allocation of
resources.
However, different concepts of customary tenure are emerging. One such
theory is that of Adaptation. The basic concept of this approach is that
indigenous tenure arrangements are dynamic and evolve in response to
factor price changes (Chileshe, 2005). Individualization of land rights, in
which farm households acquire full transfer rights over their land comes
about as a result of population pressure and agricultural
commercialization, proceed. The evolution of land rights is said to have a
common tendency. With increasing population density, specific land rights
develop and generally replace general land rights. Therefore customary
systems are often able to evolve to meet new needs (Brown, 2004).
31
Traditional village communities can therefore be viewed as an
organizational response to the challenges arising as a result of externalities
and are able to stipulate and enforce rules, behavioral norms and
regulations to coordinate and reduce conflicts over the use of scarce
resources. Opening up new and varied avenues for social and economic
mobility, the growth of the markets tends to encourage the overt
expression of individual propensities among the people and has the effect
of loosening the web of traditional social relations towards individual
efforts to achieve economic growth (Plateau, 1992)
The picture that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that customary
tenure systems are capable of conforming to prevailing market conditions
and should be allowed to evolve. Customary tenure systems operating in
village settings provide vital livelihood security functions for households
and are able to meet new social and economic needs of communities
(Chileshe, 2005).
Bruce (1993) has also observed that state intervention may work against
land security and economic opportunity of vulnerable groups and further
break the link between traditional social organization and land tenure.
The Adaptation approach to land tenure reform recognizes that land tenure
rights under customary tenure are embedded in socio-cultural systems that
cannot be bypassed. Instead of imposing state governed systems of reform,
local or community-based solutions to land tenure security should be
explored (Plateau, 1992). Chileshe (2005) further suggests the
strengthening of village community capacity for management, information
and dispute settlement rather than imposing a statutory land tenure system.
32
In the 1970s, the "tragedy of the commons" was almost conventional
wisdom in discourses about natural resource management. The tragedy
asserted was that, as population and pressure on resources grew, the users
of resources that were held in common would eventually, and inevitably,
overexploit and degrade those resources, because they had no individual
incentive to use them carefully (Hardin, 1968).
Today there is renewed optimism about the prospects for effective
community management of natural resources, based to a significant extent
on the growing perception that communities with the opportunity to
manage resources as common property have a reasonable chance of doing
so sustainably(Munshifwa,2003).
The arguments of economic development and land management tend to
underestimate the importance of customary land tenure systems, which are
an integral part of the social, political and economic framework. They
overlook the unintended effects of undermining land tenure systems,
which protect poor and vulnerable members. They also tend to disregard
the empirical evidence that traditional tenure systems can be flexible and
responsive to changing economic circumstances. With population pressure
and commercialization, individualization has occurred autonomously
(Migot-Adholla et al., 1994).
2.9 Conceptual Framework
This section presents the conceptual model for the research. The model
suggests the process of reform and will act as a guide in analyzing field
data.
The model has been developed on the concept that society is able to
evolve and meet required challenges without undue influence. The model
is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
33
The figure is represented by two main descriptive rectangles which
represent Land and the Community itself. Both components have their
own characteristics that may come up with a tenure system. However the
components are interlinked and therefore exert a dependency relationship.
Land is a resource base upon which the community depends for its
production and livelihood (Chileshe, 2005), but on the other hand, “a
resource is not, it becomes”(Zimmerman, undated).
The framework suggests that the tenure situation in a community should
be determined by mapping and describing the characteristics of the
community and the land which is the resource base. The identification of
these characteristics will lead to the identification of the uniqueness of that
community and the rules that govern the allocation of resources. Once this
is done, the tenure system can easily be identified.
The dependency of these components suggests that even the
characteristics will be interrelated as depicted by the inner solid lines in
diagram. The interaction of these characteristics determines the tenure
system. Any change in the any of the characteristics leads to change in the
other characteristics leading to change in the tenure system.
For example, a change in the fertility of the land could lead to a decrease
in its demand. The decrease in demand could also lead to flexibility in the
regulations governing ownership and use.
The core of this model is therefore summarized as follows.
Change in land tenure = Change in characteristics of land/change in the
characteristic of the community.
34
Figure 3: The community, land and tenure adaptation model
Source: Formulated by Author
Freudenberger(2004) in his analytical schema asks four important
questions that are of interest to the model
1.How do the characteristics of the community determine the nature of
the tenure system?
2.What incentives or disincentives does the tenure system create for
sustainable, equitable, efficient use of natural resources?
3.How do the rules affect the socio-economic life of the community?
Economic -Productivity -other non-farm activities
Administration -Land allocation -Inheritance -leadership
COMMUNITY
Social -Demographics -Culture -Equity
LAND
Legal/Political -Statutory regulations
Economic -Scarcity/abundance -Demand/supply
Quality -Fertility -Other by products
TENURE Local/Formal rules
35
4.How do the characteristics of the resource base affect the nature of
the rules that are promulgated and/or enforced?
2.9.1 Characteristics of the community
The community has several unique characteristics which will define its
social structures. These can be in form of leadership, inheritance trends
and other social norms and values. Different tribes have different cultures
which also lead to a difference in the perception of land.
2.9.2 Characteristics of the Land
Communities can be defined in terms of their land and its resources. High
qualities of land such as fertile soils could define the community as a
farming community or vise-versa.
Therefore land plays a vital role in determining land tenure for any
society.
2.9.3 Characteristics of the Tenure
Land tenure defines the relationship between people and their land and
other natural resources. It determines who has access to land and who can
be excluded from it; the terms and conditions of that access; the rights and
obligations that such access gives rise to; how land can be used and
controlled; and the means and circumstances by which the rights and the
obligations which can be transferred to others(FAO,2006)
The characteristics of the tenure will be interplay of the characteristics of
the community and the characteristics of the land. The community can
determine its own rules towards their own land and will mainly draw their
socio-economic livelihood from it.
36
Therefore, Land tenure is essentially a social phenomenon, comprising
rules invented by society to regulate behaviour (Quan, 2000))
The focus of the argument can then be outlined that change of tenure has
to be internal i.e. a communities ‘ response to change and not imposing
rules on the community. This is because the linkage between the
community and the land is a solid linkage which cannot be broken without
affecting either/ both of them.
Cousins (1999) has drawn a table to illustrate the relationship between the
resource and the community. In his table Critical livelihood questions, he
examines several questions that will critically affect livelihoods.
Box 1. Critical tenure-related livelihood questions
Given the inherent complexity of land tenure systems, the limited capacity of the
State and the costs of tenure reform, is reform necessary for reducing poverty
and securing sustainable livelihoods? What kinds of reform are appropriate?
How should tenure reform be phased?
Political: Is land ownership distinct from jurisdiction, i.e. is the tenant in a
feudal relationship with the landowner? How is tenure reform linked to land
reform in the wider sense? Do political conditions favour tenure reform? How
effective is the administration of land tenure at national, regional and local
levels?
Economic: How do tenure systems affect agrarian and other sources of
production and income? What economic use is made of common property
resources? How does the land tenure system intersect with markets for land,
capital, labour, inputs and outputs? Does lack of clarity about land rights
discourage investment?
Social and cultural: How are rights to land embedded within wider social and
37
cultural relationships? What is the impact of the structure of land rights on
gender inequality? Are tenure systems associated with class, racial ethnic and/or
other forms of inequality? Are rights to land an important source of asset-based
security for the poor? How have indigenous tenure forms been affected by
colonial and post-colonial laws? How do reform policies interact with informal
evolutionary processes?
Legal: Do constitutional and legal frameworks affect tenure? Are there
appropriate and legally secure options for rural and urban situations? What is the
legal basis of common property arrangements? When and where are titling and
registration programmes appropriate? Do group forms of ownership require
titling and registration?
(Ben Cousins,1999)
2.10 Conclusion
It is now clear that most countries in Africa will move with some sectors
under individual ownership and other sectors where indigenous tenure
systems prevail. Recent decades have seen dramatic attempts at land-
grabbing by the urban-based government and local elites and private
investors through the process of shifting land out of the indigenous tenure
category into statutory tenure systems. This has been done whether by
government-granted concessions of indigenously held land over which a
State title is asserted, or through registration of land purchased by the
elites from those who held it under indigenous tenure systems. Land
reforms will be of little significance if such processes cannot be
controlled, and this implies broad political mobilization of rural people to
put an end to land-grabbing.
38
CHAPTER 3 Market land reforms in Zambia
3.1 Introduction
The preceding sections defined and explained land reform in general and
have formed the basis of this section. This section applies all these issues
to the situation in Zambia. Zambia’s prelude to reform has been no less
different from the countries explored above. The myriad of problems
related to land all point to the development of the tenure arrangement.
3.2 Evolution of land tenure systems in Zambia
Before the coming of the white settler community, holding of land by the
indigenous community was largely through families, jointly or by a chief
or chieftainess on behalf of the community in accordance with the
community’s respective customary laws (Republic of Zambia, 2000)
Traditional rulers administered Land in pre -colonial days. With the
coming of the white settlers in Zambia in about 1890, the system of
ownership changed significantly (Mvunga, 1980).
In 1924, when Northern Rhodesia came under British rule, the settlers
wanted to know exactly what they owned thus the first imperial governor
Stanley appointed a Native reserve commission to investigate the land
extent, examine natural resources with special regard to agriculture. The
commission demarcated land reserves for exclusive habitation of Africans
and allocated the best fertile lands for the settlers. All lands with mineral
sites were put under settler land or otherwise called crown lands. This was
the beginning of the dual system of land tenure (Mvunga, 1980). The land
held by the white settlers was generally held under leasehold or freehold
title and as such enabled the title holders to use title deeds in borrowing
money from lending institutions so as to develop their land (Republic of
39
Zambia, 2000). This system of land tenure was completely alien to the
African way of life. The exclusive properties of private ownership were at
variance with and destructive of communal and family life as it existed in
the colonies. In fact, the only way in which this land grabbing could be
enforced was through the introduction of "pass" laws in various forms
(Mvunga, 1980). They prohibited the access to traditional lands by the
birthright owners and condemned the indigenous people to live in
overcrowded "squatter reserves" to which the private land tenure system
did not extend. The colonialists used private titles to benefit only
themselves; it was never intended to benefit the owners of the land for
development or any other purpose (Sichone, 1997).
With the attainment of independence in 1964, the Zambian government
took over management of crown lands and these became known as state
land. Trust and reserve lands continued under the authority of the
customary rulers. The dual type of land holding continues to
date(Republic of Zambia,2000).
3.2.1 Watershed Speech- Land Reforms 1975
The watershed speech marked a significant change in Zambia’s land
tenure. From the capitalist approach, the president Dr Kenneth Kaunda
introduced socialist practices to land ownership. In his view, land was a
free gift from God and thus did not need the market to determine
ownership of land. Thus the market approach to land was banned and
replaced by the socialist principles. All land was vested in the hands of the
president to be a custodian on behalf of the people. Thus freehold was
banned and replaced with statutory leaseholds. Large tracts of idle lands
owned by absentee landlords were confiscated by the state and these were
incorporated into state land. It became more difficult for foreigners to buy
and own land. In fact, the emphasis of the watershed speech was on the
40
point that Land had no value, thus land sales became prohibited unless by
government control. This was a big blow to the land market in Zambia.
3.2.2 The Land (Conversion of titles) Act CAP 289, 1975
The Watershed speech on land reforms was then backed by legislation.
This was through the passing of the land (conversion of title act) in 1975.
The significance of this Act was to provide for the vesting of all land in
Zambia absolutely in the hands of the president and for the conversion of
titles to land. It further imposed restrictions on the extent of Agricultural
holdings, the abolition of sale, transfer and other matters incidental to the
ownership and alienation of land (Mushinge, 2004).
The land reform brought about unforeseen constraints: significant
restriction of the publics access to land resulted in:
i. An artificial land shortage;
ii. The introduction of the requirement for state consent brought
complications in the procedures of land acquisitions, causing
administrative delays;
iii. Less land was brought to productive use as those who had no
capacity to develop were inhibited from selling off undeveloped
land. (Chinene et al, 1998)
3.2.2 Land Circular no 1 –1985
This document was drawn to lay down procedures of the administration
and alienation of land. The circular set out procedures for the conversion
of customary land to leasehold tenure. It further restricted the alienation of
land to foreigners, with the exception of certified investors and charitable
organizations (Land circular, 1985). According to the circular, approved
investors could acquire land as long as they had consent from the local
chief or council who had to physically inspect the land and ensure that no
41
persons rights or interests were affected (Republic of Zambia, 2000).A
person wishing to obtain land in a customary area must first secure the
approval of the local council and then apply to the local council enclosing
the chief’s letter of approval. It is up to the commissioner of lands to
decide whether or not to approve the application.
This goes to show that conversion of tenure is not an MMD policy but
started way back into the Kaunda era.
An important question thus arises; why has it received more attention
during the MMD regime?
3.2.3 Lands Act CAP 189-1995
Zambia’s third republic, which began in 1991, saw the ushering in of
privatization of the economy following the Structural Adjustment
Programs. There was a rapid change of the economic policy from
nationalization (from Kaunda’s socialist to a liberalized economy) to
instigate wide market reforms in order to promote mining, agriculture and
tourism. The land issue was not to be left out under this liberalized
economy. The thriving of these three sectors required an enabling land
policy that would accommodate investors (PRSP, 2002).
Like other African countries, Zambia’s resort to reform was externally
influenced by the World Bank and IMF who set it as a condition that the
government was required to meet in order to restructure its international
debt (Ngombe, 2006). The provisions of the proposed act were to re-
establish a market for land and to streamline the issuance of titles and to
promote foreign and domestic investment, to stimulate agricultural
productivity and to generate tax revenue. Value to land was restored.
The process of reform began in 1993 when the government convened a
National Conference on Land Policy and legal reform to spearhead the
42
formulation of a new land policy. As in Mozambique, the consultations
carried out sparked protests against the proposals of the bill and thus when
it was extended to parliament, the bill was withdrawn. However the bill
was reintroduced in September 1995 and passed. (Chinene et al, 1999).
The provision of the Act among other things saw the lifting of the
restriction of ownership of land by foreigners and makes it clear for
Zambia citizens to convert their customary land holdings to statutory
leasehold (Republic of Zambia, 2000).
3.2.4 The Zambian experience of market reforms
The MMD new deal government has not reversed it’s the market policy to
land. The republican president stated that:
It is my hope that traditional rulers will make land available
expeditiously….This will be an opportunity to transform these areas
into industrial and commercial cities with world class physical and
social infrastructure (www.statehouse.gov.zm/)
The impacts of the market reforms in Zambia have been felt. Brown
(2002) states that market based reforms in Zambia have been inequitable,
contentious and confused. Issuance has been skewed towards foreign
investors and prosperous well-connected locals. Few rural villagers are
dimly aware of the land act and the conversion and its technicalities.
Under the provisions of the act, Investors are able to access land in
customary lands through written consent from the chief to hold land under
leasehold system. Planning authorities are required to draw site plans for
the areas and the committee interviews the applicant. Upon success, the
council secretary recommends the allocation of the unnumbered plot to the
ministry of lands. Once the procedure is complete, the plot immediately
43
changes from customary to state land. It is worth noting at this point that
under the current land tenure system, there is no provision for land that has
been converted to state land to be reconverted to customary land. (GRZ,
Land policy document 1996).
Although the act explicitly recognizes and protects customary land rights,
an unstated but crucial assumption underlying the act is that overtime the
conversion of customary to leasehold tenure will open up more land for
investment and diminish the amount of land held under customary tenure.
At present, no land audit has been carried out to determine how much of
customary land has been converted to statutory land (Muchima, 2006).
Most Zambians are also at a disadvantage when it comes to protecting
their land rights because their territorial boundaries are in abstract form.
For example, some villagers in rural areas have found themselves
squatters overnight after their land was converted to private land by
investors.
Case 1
The Times of Zambia on 22nd August 2002 carried a story headlined
“Displaced in my own country?” It is the story of the people of Kasembele
village who woke up one morning and found themselves as squatters.
From 1920, the people of Kasembele village have lived on this land,
planted over 320 mango and guava trees, which they used as a medium of
exchange with people who cultivate their maize. This had been their
livelihood until Thomas Edward Roberts came and ordered the villagers to
vacate, claiming he had bought the farm.
46 Native families were given marching orders claiming they were illegal
squatters. Out of desperation, some families left the village after being
compensated with K 1 Million each (approximately US$340) to begin new
44
livelihood. The results were women and children sleeping at the nearest
graveyard.
Case 2
The post newspaper dated November 14, 2006 had a story of Mayana farm
in chief Mpenzeni’s area. The case involves Sara Towers who bought land
from the ministry of lands in chief Mpenzeni’s area without the consent of
the chief.
Sara Towers issued an eviction notice to the villagers who she framed as
squatting on her land and destroying her land. The chief vowed that he
would rather commit suicide than see his people evicted from the land.
The people in the area have stated that this case is a matter of life and
death and are ready to fire guns than let a white lady evict them from their
land.
Land conflicts such as those in Kasembele Village and Mayana are
occurring all over Zambia, highlighting increasing tensions between
customary and private land rights. These conflicts have been sharpened by
the process of economic reform, including the liberalization of land
markets, which has seen wealthy Zambians and foreign investors buying
up land previously held under customary tenancy by the rural poor
(Brown, 2002).
Common pool resources contribute to the livelihood of most rural
Zambians. Villagers draw their water from rivers or village wells, graze
their livestock on communal pasture, cut their firewood and building
materials from forests and catch fish on shared rivers and lakes (Brown,
2002). Besides this, certain social-cultural aspects such as marriage,
45
inheritance, power, equity and social security are also embodied (Platteau,
2000).
According to Brown (2002), Land conversions have caused a great deal of
conflicts in customary communities and are transforming social and
political relations between chiefs and villagers, between villagers and one
another and between locals and outsiders.
3.3 Legal implementation of market reforms in customary land
The disputes in customary areas pose one important question. Are
customary rights fully recognized by the law?
The following pieces of legislation give recognition of customary tenure.
Chapter 184 section 3(4) of the laws of Zambia states that:
i. The President shall not alienate any land situated in a district or
chiefdom;
ii. The person acquiring land shall consult the chief and the local
authorities in the area in which the land to be allocated
iii. The person acquiring land shall consult any other person or body
whose interest might be affected by the grant and customary rights
to the land recognized under section 7(2) of the lands Act.
Section 7 (2) states that the rights and privileges of any person to hold land
under customary tenure shall be recognized and any such holding under
the customary law applicable to the area in which a person has settled or
intends to settle shall not be construed as an infringement of any provision
of this Act or any other law except for a right or obligation which may
arise under any law.
Section 8 (1) states: Any person who holds land under customary tenure
may convert it into a leasehold tenure not exceeding ninety-nine (99) years
46
on application in the manner prescribed by way of a grant of leasehold by
the President.
Section 8 (2) states: the conversion of rights from a customary tenure shall
have effect only after the approval of the chief and the local authorities in
whose area the land to be converted is situated and in the case of a game
management area and the director of National Parks and Wildlife Services,
the land to be converted shall have been identified by a plan showing the
extent of the land to convert
.
Section 8(3) states that: Except for a right which may arise under any
other law in Zambia, no title other than a right to the use and occupation of
any land under customary tenure claimed by a person, shall be valid unless
it has been confirmed by the chief and a lease granted by the President.
Despite the above legislation to over customary land, customary land
rights have continued to be in conflict with local authorities over land
allocation (Laws of Zambia, volume 12)
3.4 The place of Chiefs in Market based land reforms
In order to successfully implement land reform, the MMD Government
called on traditional rulers to support the reform by releasing more of their
land to the investors and local people that would want to convert title
(Mushinge, 2004). In so doing, investment would be brought to their
areas.
However, many chiefs feel betrayed by outsiders who acquire titles
because they often promise to bring schools, clinics and other benefits to
the local people but seldom fulfill these promises once in possession of
title(Brown,2002;Chileshe,2005).
47
Concerning authorization of title, chiefs have differed over the issuance of
title deeds on customary land. In a Times of Zambia article “Chiefs differ
over land authority”, the house of chiefs disagreed with the motion raised
by the president on who should issue title deeds. One faction suggested
that the chiefs should take over the issuance of title deeds so that they
could be respected as custodians of such land. The other faction however
opposed this suggestion, stating that the chiefs did not have capacity and
could end up giving all their land to investors (Times of Zambia, 2006).
It can be seen from the above argument that the future of customary land
is quite uncertain. The chiefs who are custodians of the land cannot agree
on how reform should be carried out their areas and this has led to disputes
in customary areas.
3.5 The basis for market based land reforms in customary land in Zambia
The major argument on customary tenure has been security in land
holding. The World Bank (2003) argues that customary tenure encumbers
commercialization; it is insecure, lacks certainty and frustrates rural land
markets. This has led to the call for land tenure reform, attempting to
replace customary tenure with a modern secure tenure. Land tenure
security is often associated with Land titling and land registration.
Secure individual tenure, and a free land market, has been promoted in the
belief that they will lead to higher levels of agriculture investment and
productivity and thus provide a firm basis for national growth and
development (Quan, 2000).
Smith (1999) defines title as the degree of control, use and enjoyment that
are recognized and protected by law. It has been argued that lack of title in
customary lands brings about insecurity because rights are not recognized
and protected by law. It is such arguments that led to the implementation
48
of the 1995 Land Act in Zambia. The chiefs and the local people however
object to this notion because for them, communal resources act as an
important social safety net and people have equal access to the resources
that nature has provided (Chinene et al, 1998).
3.6 Conclusion
The debate on security of tenure in customary land has continued to date
without conclusive evidence that customary areas hinder the development
of markets and lessen the ability of rural development to take place
(Brown, 2002). Despite this uncertainty, conversion of customary land
tenure has continued to take place.
The experiences of the reform process have been felt differently in the
various chiefdoms. While others have appreciated the market approach as
the best reform measure, other chiefdoms have had bitter experiences.
The next chapter will now investigate the effects of the reform process in
Chief Chiwala’s area.
49
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
4.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the data analysis and findings. It is divided into the
following sections
Section 4.1 is a profile of the case study area.
Section 4.2 presents a restatement of objectives
Section 4.3 presents the survey method including computation of sample
size.
Section 4.5 gives the analytical tools to be used in the data analysis.
Section 4.6 discusses the analysis of processed data.
Section 4.7 is an overview or summary of major findings of the research.
4.1 CASE STUDY PROFILE
4.1.1 Demographic characteristics
Chief Chiwala’s area lies in the peri-urban areas of the Copperbelt Province. The
chiefdom falls under Kafulafuta constituency, in Masaiti District, Ndola rural
(Masaiti District Situational Analysis, 2005).
50
Figure 4.1: Map of study Area
Table 4.1: Population distribution in the survey area
Source: CSO, 2000
4.1.2 Economic Activities
The economic situation of Chief Chiwala’s area depends solely on
subsistence farming and charcoal burning. Major livelihood sources are
farming and gardening as an off-farm activity. Other livelihood sources
include forest activities like beekeeping, pit sawing, furniture making, fruit
collection, caterpillar collecting and mushroom collection. These activities
are done either in the forest reserve areas or in the open land. It is an
Ward Number of
males
Number of
females
Total Total
Households
Chondwe 1,682 1,642 3,324 632
Majaliwa 3,780 3,471 7,251 1,629
Mutaba 6,119 5,740 11,859 2,492
TOTAL 11 581 10,853 22 434 3,753
Source: CSO 2000
51
underdeveloped rural area where people live in small mud, grass-thatched
houses and form homesteads that are scattered near the forest reserve or
along the main road.
The people in these villages rarely carry out economic activities as a
community. Although they get together to discuss their problems and
possible solutions, they are not organized to improve their economic
situation for themselves (Masaiti District situational Analysis, 2005)
4.1.3 Social Organization
The people of chiwala chiefdom are a Lamba speaking ethnic group under
the leadership of senior Chief Chiwala.
Families are usually grouped in homesteads of between 3 to 10
households. These villages are further grouped into villages and are
headed by village headmen.
Plate 4.1: His Royal highness, Senior Chief Chiwala with the Author
Source: Field survey, October 2006
The chiefdom has approximately 600 villages under the guidance of
headmen or ba salutani in lamba. These report to the 25 traditional
counselors located in different areas.They are mainly matrilineal and rules
52
of inheritance favour men as against women. Thus many homesteads are
headed by men coming from the woman’s side of the family.
Figure 4.5: Hierarchy of leadership in the chiefdom
Source: Field survey, 2006
4.2 Objectives restated
The purpose of this research was to carry out a socio-economic assessment
of the Market based land reform process in Zambia.
The primary objective was to determine whether using the market based
approach was the best method of appropriating land in customary areas
with the aid of Chief Chiwala’s area as a case study.
The secondary objectives were therefore to investigate:
1) Administrative procedures followed in implementing market based
activities in customary land and whether they are followed
2) What economic benefits have trickled to the local people as a
result of allowing outsiders to buy land in chiefdoms?
3) The social effects of conversion of tenure on the livelihood of the
local people.
Senior Chief Chiwala
25 Traditional councilors
Headmen
Villagers
53
4.3 Survey method
The sample size that was used was 100. To arrive at 100, a series of
calculations were done using the formula as follows:
Source: scheaffer, 1979
Therefore with a total population of 3753 households:
N=3753 B=0.098 π=0.5
Sample n= 3753 (0.5) (1-0.5)
(3753-1) (0.098)²/4 + (0.5) (0.5)
Sample n=938.25/9.25 =101.43≈100
Because the area in question is a village area with scattered homesteads, it
was resolved instead that a village consisting of about 100 households be
adopted to make the collection of data easier. Therefore a village zone
with an estimate of 102 households and 3 main villages was selected.
These households are grouped into 30 homesteads. It was further
resolved that heads of homesteads be used, thus 30 heads of homesteads
were a representative of the 100 households.
Sample size required to estimate p with a bound on the error estimation, B: n= Npq (N-1)D + pq Where q=1-p and D=B²/4 n=sample size p=π N=Population B=Error bound
54
4.4 Problems encountered during the research
4.4.1 Households
Households were quite suspicious about the study because of the ongoing
disputes over land in the area
The research was carried out at the onset of the farming season thus some
house owners could not be interviewed as they had left for their fields.
Permission from the chief to carry out the survey could not easily be
obtained because the chief does not reside at the palace.
4.4.2 Farm owners
Farms are located far away from the transport points making it very
difficult to access them.
Some farm owners are absentee landlords thus it was difficult to obtain the
information needed.
4.4.3 Local Authority
Masaiti District Council is a rural council that faces lots of challenges
including information management. It was difficult to obtain sampling
frames and maps for the research.
4.5 Methodology of Analysis
The statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for the
analysis. SPSS was able to offer the analysis required in terms of each
variable being investigated and cross-tabulations showing relationships of
certain variables. The package was mainly used for the village or
household questionnaire.
55
The other data sets were analyzed and presented using simple description
and report method.
4.6 Research findings
The following were the analysis and findings following the collection of
data. The three respondent types i.e. Villagers, Farmers and the local
Authority are dealt with differently.
4.6.1 Local Authority findings
4.6.1.1 Procedure of land allocation in customary areas for outsiders
The Local Authority clearly stated that the Legislation concerning land
allocation (Land Act 1995) did not discriminate land ownership. Every
citizen has the right to settle wherever they wished provided that all
requirements were met.
The procedure that is used when a non villager seeks land is as follows:
Figure 4.6: Land Allocation procedure
Source: Field Survey, 2006
The land seeker obtains written consent from the chief
Ministry of Agriculture maps out the boundaries and submits to local Authority
Local Authority approves plans and recommends for title to lands commissioner
Settles in the area without title
56
In the procedure of land allocation whether with title or without title, the
chief has no authority to sell land but merely receives tokens of
appreciation from the applicants.
4.6.1.2 Benefits to the chiefdom
Once title has been granted by the Local Authority, the new farm owner
has no obligations to the chiefdom except out of courtesy to the chief.
However, the benefit is supposed to be derived from the Land
Development fund which provides for consideration fee to be paid to the
chiefdom and to the local authority. Currently, there is no procedure to
determine this fee thus a standard fee of only K10, 000.00(Ten thousand
Kwacha) is paid to the local authority.
Furthermore, the local authority does not have direct implementation of
the land development fund for customary areas. This means that there’s no
economic consideration for customary areas in the land conversion
process.
4.6.1.2 Has the market reform achieved its aim?
Final conclusions from the local authority are that the market land reform
has not achieved its intended purpose of fair redistribution of land while
developing customary areas.
4.6.2 Findings from Focus Group discussions
Two major focus group discussions were conducted during the research.
The aim was to identify potential respondents and also to draw out certain
aspects that would be necessary to include in the interview schedule. It
was noted that the villagers were freer to discuss in groups than as
individuals.
57
Group one
The first group consisted of 10 members i.e. 8 women and 2 men. This
particular group comprised villagers bordering Zambezi Portland Cement
PLC. The following were the issues raised:
Shortage of farming land
The villagers complained that the new company bought large tracts of land
including land which they had been cultivating on for years. This meant
that they had little land to cultivate more food for their families and also
for sale.
Plate 4.2: Prohibitions by Private land owners
Source: Field survey, 2006
Besides Zambezi Portland Cement, they were also aware that their chief
was allocating land to abamapension( urban dwellers), causing more
insecurity about their land.
Title to land
Because of the current influx of urban dwellers seeking land in the area,
the villagers were no longer comfortable with their kind of tenure.
58
However majority of them could not afford to acquire statutory land title
as they lacked finances to do so.
Relationship with the chief
The group unanimously agreed that their relationship with the chief and
headmen was getting bad because of the increase in land grabbing. The
group disclosed that the chief rarely consulted them about giving land to
outsiders and thus they felt betrayed. The law provides that chiefs consult
their subjects who are likely to be affected by the allocation of land to
outsiders.
Relationship with new farmers
It was expressed that the new farmers worsened the situation by not
fulfilling their promises of accelerating development in the area.
When seeking for land, the seekers promise to employ people with good
pay, improve roads, and help the community to access fertilizers, build
clinics and schools for the children. When land is given to them, they do
not fulfill their promises but end up fencing their farms so that no one can
reach them.
It was highlighted for example that farmers made the villagers walk long
distances because they no longer allow them to use their usual paths
through the farms.
Views on the market based reform in the area
The villagers expressed concern about the current urban land deficit but
stated that they should not suffer the consequences of urban land
shortages.
59
It was also stated that the market approach to land distribution was unfair
on the poor who could not afford to buy land. The approach could lead to
the poor being landless, while the rich accumulated more land. The people
wondered where their grand children would live if more people bought
land in their area
The final remarks were that money transactions on land were not
acceptable in customary land and were against the traditions of villagers.
This is because it is making the people lose trust and respect for their chief
and increasing tension in the village.
Focus group 2
The group comprised 6 women from saidimujala area near the new farms
The aim of the discussion was to get views of women on the land reform
process.
The major issues raised were similar to focus group 1. However an
important aspect of enclosure of common pool resources was raised.
Focus group 2 named their major shared resources as forests with mango
trees, mushrooms and other wild fruits.
It was observed in the group that since people started buying land; these
important resources can not be easily accessed because the land no longer
belongs to the community.
Their opinion on the market reform was similar to group one. The market
reform was increasing insecurity of tenure and failed to fulfill the aim of
developing customary area. However, the group suggested that if it was
the only way of distributing land, then the villagers should have the power
to demand for certain things from the urban seekers before they occupy
their area.
60
It was also suggested that farmers should not apply for areas where
villagers obtained common resources but should settle in areas outside the
reach of villagers.
4.6.3 Findings from the homesteads
4.6.3.1 Sex of homestead owner
From the total of 30 homesteads, the respondents were distributed as
follows:
Table 4.2: Sex of respondent
Sex Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Male 16 53.3 53.3 53.3
Female 14 46.7 46.7 100.0
Total 30 100.0 100.0
Source: Field Survey, 2006
There was an almost equal balance in the gender of respondents giving a
balanced view of the response from both sexes. However, in terms of the
ownership of the land, the results showed biasness to men.
Upon cross tabulation of marital status and head of homestead, the survey
showed the following results.
Table 4.3: Marital status of heads of homesteads
Status Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Married 19 63.3 63.3
Widowed 8 26.7 90.0
Single 3 10.0 100.0
Total 30 100.0
Source: Field survey, 2006
61
4.6.3.2 Method of land acquisition
The type of land acquisition is one of the key aspects of any tenure
system. Therefore, it was important to investigate how people acquire land
in the chiefdom. Survey results showed that only two methods exist in the
chiefdom i.e. directly through the chief or through inheritance. The table
below summarizes the mode of acquisition from the 30 respondents.
Table 4.4: Methods of land acquisition
Source: Field survey, 2006
From the survey results, it can be noted that although the villagers perform
their economic activities as individual families or homesteads, none of
them have individualized ownership of land. The common method of land
acquisition is through inheritance while others obtain it directly from the
chief.
The most probable reason could have been that the villagers are not aware
that they can convert the customary title of their land with the permission
of the chief. It was therefore necessary to also investigate the level of
awareness of tenure conversion among the villagers. From the survey, the
following results were obtained:
Table 4.5: Tenure conversion awareness
Source: Field survey,2006
Method Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Inherited from parents 17 53.3 56.7 56.7
Given by chief 13 46.7 43.3 100.0
Total 30 100.0 100.0
Awareness Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Aware 26 86.7 86.7 86.7
Not aware 4 13.3 13.3 100.0
Total 30 100.0 100.0
62
From Table 4.5 above, it can be deduced that 86.7% of the villagers are
aware that land can be converted to individualized parcels. About 13.3%
still maintained that at were not aware that land can be converted to
statutory land in the chiefdom.
The 26 who showed awareness of the conversion process has varying
reasons for not converting their land. The reasons were summarized as:
i. Lack of finances to convert their land.
ii. Land was a gift from the chief thus it would be impolite to
convert it.
iii. It would be against the social norms of the village.
iv. Converting the land would require paying of ground rent to the
Government and they were not willing and able to do so.
4.6.3.3 Productivity of villagers
It is essentially the objective of Market based land reform to increase
productivity among rural farmers, thereby boosting the economic
livelihood of the village. Farm productivity was therefore a priority in
assessing the economic impact of reform in the chiefdom.
From the survey conducted, most homesteads engage in maize cultivation
as a source of food. Other homesteads also have gardens for vegetables
and tomatoes.
However, although labour and farm inputs are an issue in the chiefdom;
the size of the land determines how much food will be cultivated.
A survey of the size of land parcels per homestead was carried out.
The sizes of land parcels varied as follow Table 4.6.
63
Table 4.6: Sizes of land parcels among village households
Size Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Large 3 10.0 10.0 10.0
Medium 6 20.0 20.0 30.0
Small 13 43.3 43.3 73.3
very
small 8 26.7 26.7 100.0
Total 30 100.0 100.0
Land in the chiefdom is often measured in lima, a local terminology.
1 lima=50m × 50m Categories of size of land
Size Category
Below 3 lima Very small
Between 3 lima to 5 lima Small
Between 5 lima to 8 lima Medium
Above 8 lima Large
Source: Data Compiled from field survey,2006
From Table 4.6 above, it was found that about 43% of the homesteads
have small-sized parcels representing the majority. 20% of the homesteads
were considered to have medium tracts of land. 26.7% of homesteads are
considered to have very small parcels of land and only 10% have large
tracts of land.
Having determined the sizes of land, it was imperative to also determine
how many of the village homesteads have surplus food for sell. The
following results were obtained:
64
Table 4.7: Sell of produce among homesteads
Sell of produce Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Sell 8 26.7 26.7 26.7
Don’t sell 17 56.7 56.7 83.3
Sell occasionally 5 16.7 16.7 100.0
Total 30 100.0 100.0
Source: Field survey,2006
The market reform process is supposed to improve the productivity among
the village communities. However, the results of this particular village,
indicate that about half of the homesteads have do not have surplus food
for sell while only 26.7% confidently agree that they have surplus to sell.
Other homesteads sell their produce occasionally when their harvest allow.
The reasons for low productivity are varied.
A cross tabulation of size of land and the selling of produce gave the
following results:
Table 4.8: Size of land and selling of produce Cross tabulation
sell of produce Total
sell don’t sell occasionally
Large 2 1 0 3
Medium 2 2 2 6
Small 4 7 2 13
Very small 0 7 1 8
Total 8 17 5 30
Source; Field survey, 2006
It can be noted that size of land is a reason for not selling of produce by
majority of homesteads. Land allocation in the chiefdom has been affected
by the reform process. The villagers complained that since buying of land
began, priority is usually given to those with money. Those without
65
money are given smaller parcels of land. This allegation was also
investigated upon and the results obtained were as follows:
Table 4.9: Size of land and Method of acquisition Cross tabulation
method of acquisition Total
Size of land inherited given by the chief
Large 1 2 3
Medium 5 1 6
Small 10 3 13
very small 1 7 8
Total 17 13 30
Source: Field data, 2006
The other reason given by respondents was the lack of Agriculture inputs
such as fertilizers and seeds. Not all the farmers can afford to buy fertilizer
for their crops; therefore, their yields are too low to sell their produce.
4.6.3.4 Renting of land
The hope that villagers will be able to rent their land is yet another
objective of land reform. Renting of land can become an important source
of income for village communities. It was therefore paramount to establish
this important aspect of the village community. The following were the
findings:
Table 4.10: Number of people renting out land
Rent Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 11 36.7 36.7 36.7
No 16 53.3 53.3 90.0
Sometimes 3 10.0 10.0 100.0
Total 30 100.0 100.0
Souce: Data compiled from field survey, 2006
66
It was observed again that size of land was the determining factor in
renting of land. This was proved by correlation of variables i.e size of land
and renting of land.
Table 4.11: size of land and renting of land Cross tabulation
renting of land
yes no occasionally Total
Large 4 0 0 4
Medium 5 5 0 10
Small 2 5 2 9
size of
land
very small 0 7 0 7
Total 11 17 2 30
Source: Compiled by author from field work
It was found in the survey that the villagers rent out land to people from
the nearby townships such as Ndeke and Kabushi. These urban dwellers
come to villagers during farming seasons to solicit for land to rent.
Villagers with larger parcels usually rent out their land. However, it was
also observed that those without agriculture inputs tend to rent out their
land to gain some form of income.
4.6.3.5 Employment
Employment was also considered to be an important aspect of not only the
economic aspect but also the social relations with new farmers in the
chiefdom. It is also the hope of market reform that villagers would be able
to have extra income from employment.
Table 4.12 shows the employment status of homesteads.
67
Table 4.12: Level of employment
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Full time 4 13.3 13.3 13.3
Piece work 8 26.7 26.7 40.0
None 18 60.0 60.0 100.0
Total 30 100.0 100.0
Source: Data compiled from field survey, 2006
Results indicate that only 4 heads of homesteads have villagers with full
time employment. 18 out of the 30 heads of homesteads reported to have
had no form of employment. However, it was also found that other
homesteads have people who are not fully employed but work on part time
basis.
Some of the reasons for not being employed were given as follows:
i. Not enough manpower for their own fields. Some respondent stated
that it would not make sense to work at the farms when their own
fields needed more manpower.
ii. Farmers usually employ only one person and the rest are hired
during farming seasons.
iii. Conditions of service are not conducive. The villagers complained
that some farmers do not pay them agreed amounts. Some farmers
just pay form of pamelas (small packets of mealie meal. Therefore,
there was no motivation to work on the farms.
However, some respondents commented that not all farmers were bad.
Others offer good salaries and help the villagers when they have no food
i.e. in form of food for work. Thus from the survey a few indicated that
they had fairly good relations with farmers.
68
Table 4.13: Relationship with farmers
Relationship Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Fair 5 16.7 16.7 16.7
Bad 18 60.0 60.0 76.7
don’t know 7 23.3 23.3 100.0
Total 30 100.0 100.0
Source: Field survey, 2006
Some respondents did not have a say over their relationship because they
rarely had contact with farmers.
4.6.3.5 Market reform: a gender perspective
Women are often the most affected by land reform processes. This is
because even their own traditions favour men against women in the
distribution of land (Nsemiwe, 2006).
In the research, a few variables were used to determine the livelihoods of
women during the reform process in the chiefdom.
Gender and size of land: It was observed that women headed homesteads
had smaller parcels of land compared to men headed homesteads
.
Table 4.14: Head of homestead and size of land Cross tabulation
Source: Field survey, 2006
It can be observed from the results that women headed households have
generally smaller parcels of land compared to their male counterparts.
Given this scenario, it can also be concluded that women will most likely
Sex size of land Total
Large medium Small very small
Male 3 5 9 3 20
Female 0 1 4 5 10
Total 3 6 13 8 30
69
not be able to rent out their land or sell their produce because of the size of
their land.
The survey also observed that men had better chances of getting
employment as compared to women.
Table 4.15: Head of homestead versus employment status employment status Total
Sex of head of home full time piece work None
Male 4 5 11 20
Female 0 3 7 10
Total 4 8 18 30
Data compiled from field survey, 2006
This was consolidated by the fact that, most respondents were women
although the heads of the homesteads were male. The women remain to
look after the homestead while the men look for work. However, the
women headed homesteads indicated that it was difficult for them to
compete with men in looking for full time employment. However, women
can engage in piecework occasionally.
4.6.3.6 Views on the market land reform process
From the results given in figure , most of the villagers are aware of
market land reform in their area. The views concerning the land reform are
varied. The results below show the mixed feelings of land reform in the
chiefdom.
Table 4.16: Views on market land reforms
Views Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Happy 5 16.7 16.7 16.7
Not happy 23 76.7 76.7 93.3
Indifferent 2 6.7 6.7 100.0
Total 30 100.0 100.0
Source: Field survey, 2006
70
The survey results indicate that 76% of the villagers are not happy with
the conversion of tenure process. The reasons for this unhappiness were
given as follows:
i. The process was making villagers lose their land to urban dwellers.
The villagers worry that their children who are neither at school
nor have hope for employment will suffer more because they will
not have enough land to cultivate food.
ii. Although they are aware about the conversion of title, it still remains
a fact that conversion will only benefit the rich since villagers
cannot afford to convert.
iii. They are not consulted about giving part of their land to others; land
is simply grabbed from them.
iv. Farmers were being allocated land in areas that have communal
resources such as wild fruits and streams for gardening.
v. The new farmers have done nothing to improve the state of roads,
schools, clinics or even help village farmers in the acquisition of
fertilizers.
vi. Although some farmers allow villagers to draw water from their
hand pumps, villagers can only draw water before 07:00hrs in the
morning and after 17:00hrs in the evening.
While others were quite indifferent about the process, others were happy
that urban people were coming in their areas. The reasons were given as
follows:
The farmers will help set up cooperatives where even the rural people can
benefit.
There was no hope for the villagers to develop on their own areas. Urban
dwellers can help them to develop.
71
Piecework from farmers helps them in difficult times. When villagers have
no more food in their homes, piecework helps them to acquire some
money to buy food.
4.6.4 Findings from the Chief
An interview with the chief brought out the following findings:
4.6.4.1 General land administration
The chief is guided by the village act of 1971 which provides for the
establishment of villages within the chiefdom. In order to effectively
manage his area, the chiefdom has been divided into 25 catchment areas.
4.6.4.2 Land allocation to subjects
The procedure of land allocation to villagers follows the same pattern as
other chiefdoms in Zambia.
A villager seeking land approaches the headman and presents his request.
The headman will look for an area which is vacant within his area and if
available, the person is granted land. Once the procedure is completed, the
villager granted land will present a gift to the, chief who is the owner of
the land .There are no money transactions when allocating land to
subjects.
However, many villagers still access land without the chiefs’ consent
through inheritance from family members.
4.6.4.3 Land allocation to outsiders
According to the chief, the rate of outsiders seeking land in his area is
about 50 to 100 requests per year.
72
An outsider will approach either a headman or visit the chief directly.
Usually, outsiders have particular areas in mind as they approach the
chief.
It is the duty of the headman to verify if that parcel of land is occupied by
the villagers or not. Once the headman verifies, the request is submitted to
the chief for approval.
The process of approval is basically a short interview with the applicant.
The chief seeks to determine the personal details for the applicant thereby
establishing the quality of the applicant. Depending on the size sought for,
the chief may personally give a demarcation of the parcel of land. If the
area is relatively small, the chief may approve the headmen’s proposal.
When the approval process is complete, the chief signs a written letter or
document of application prepared by the applicant.
As is the case with villagers, the chief does not sell the land but may
receive money as a token of appreciation for the land given.
4.6.4.4 Benefits from allocating land to outsiders
The chief stated that the initial intention of improving customary areas by
allowing outsiders to settle in customary areas was not wrong in itself.
However, the process has raised a number of disputes in his area.
Some outsiders have been faithful and have benefited the chiefdom, but
others simply get land and resale it at a higher price.
It was also alluded to that others come with a lot of promises to improve
roads, build schools and clinics and generally help the villagers. But so far
none of the promises have been fulfilled.
73
Commenting on the level of infrastructure, it was stated that infrastructure
was very poor in his chiefdom.
4.6.4.5 Comment on market based approach to land reform
The chief fears that his people will remain landless and will not be able to
access important resources in the chiefdom. This is because of the high
level of corruption in the process of obtaining land.
The chief noted that other applicants bribe his headmen to extend the
chief’s demarcations. Unfortunately, others extend into villagers land and
thus a source of dispute.
Final remarks from the chief were that customary land should remain
customary land and the people seeking for land should not obtain title for
it. This would offer more security of tenure for village communities.
74
4.6.5 Findings from the farmers
The Market based approach to land reform is an approach that seeks to
make land available for those in need of land, while improving the
livelihoods of the local people.
The following were the findings from some of the farmers that have
settled in chief chiwala’s area.
4.6.5.1 Land acquisition and size of land
The survey established the following results from the farms surveyed.
Table 4.17: Farm size and method of Acquisition
Name of farm Method of acquisition Size of land
Farm 42 Applied through Ministry of
Agriculture
10 hactares
Bweupe Applied through Ministry of
Agriculture
10 hactares
Farm 33 Bought from the chief 20 hactares
Polido Applied through the chief 20 hactares
Mpombo Bought from the chief 10 hactares
Musa Bought from another farmer 8 hactares
Source: compiled from field survey, 2004
From the results given, it can be noted, that directly seeking consent from
the chief is not the only method of acquiring land in the chiefdom.
From the sizes of land, it can also be noted that titled farm plots in
comparison with villagers farming plots are relatively large.
75
4.6.5.2 Productivity
The major economic activity was found to be maize cultivation and
represented 100% of the sample. 2 out of the 6 respondents engage in
gardening vegetables and other plants like cassava and sweet potatoes.
Only one respondent had an extra activity of chicken rearing.
Table 4.18: Activities of Farmers in the Chiefdom
Name of farm Commercial activity Other activities
Farm 42 Maize cultivation Vegetable gardening
Bweupe Maize cultivation, Chicken
rearing
sweetpotatoes,cassava,
vegetables
Farm 33 Maize cultivation None
Polido Maize cultivation None
Mpombo Maize cultivation None
Muma Maize cultivation None
Source: compiled from field survey, 2006
4.6.5.3 Market for farm products
From the results obtained, all the farmers have sufficient market for their
produce. 4 out of the 7 farmers sell their maize to the Food Reserve
Agency (FRA), while the other 3 respondents make their own private
arrangements. The farmer who rears chickens supplies the chickens to
restaurants in Ndola town.
All the farmers indicated a high market for their produce.
4.6.5.4 Benefits to the villagers
Employment
All farmers alluded to a positive benefit of their presence to the villagers.
This positive benefit was seen in view of employment opportunities for
76
the villagers. During farming season, farmers usually employ villagers to
work on part time basis, giving them some form of income.
Provision of basic infrastructure
4 out of 6 farmers submitted that they have also helped the villagers in
providing water through their boreholes. Water is a major challenge in the
chiefdom.
It was however noted that besides provision of water, the farmers have not
improved the level of infrastructure in the chiefdom. The farmers also
complained of the bad state of roads in the chiefdom but had no capacity
to improve the roads.
Farming inputs
Farm 33 submitted that the village community surrounding his farm has
learnt new farming techniques. This has enabled them to produce more
food. The villagers who work on his farm learn better farm techniques and
teach others in the village.
In terms of farming inputs, the farmers stated that it was difficult and
expensive to help the villagers because of inadequate finances. It was
emphasized that the Government should help the villagers in provision of
farming inputs.
4.6.5.5 Comments on market reform process
The farmers all responded that the process is good because it will help to
reduce urban landlessness. It was also stated that rural land is too vast
hence needed to be explored for development. However, the process of
land acquisition should be revised to ensure transparency and avoid
disputes with villagers.
77
4.7 Summary of major finding
Market land reforms in Zambia have been received with mixed feelings. In
the research area, the views on the land reform indicate a conflict of
interests. From the analysis of data, the following were the major findings
of the socio economic impact of market based land reform in chief
chiwala’s chiefdom:
Land allocation procedures are inconsistent
Procedures in land allocation are unclear leading to loopholes in the
system. The results from the farmers indicate that outsiders can acquire
land even without consulting the chief. It is no wonder then that disputes
have arisen in several chiefdoms.
There is no strategy to develop rural areas through reforms
The process of market land reform was embarked on without setting out
strategies of developing customary areas. It therefore follows that
customary areas are not likely to improve their status even when land is
being appropriated to others. While it is being appreciated that customary
areas are a prime source of land for development, it would not be fair that
these areas do not benefit from the apparent loss of their land.
Reforms have increased insecurity of tenure among villagers
Survey results indicate that almost 80% of villagers are not happy with the
reforms. This stems from the fact that land belonging to villagers is at a
high risk of being grabbed and converted to private use. The debate on
security tenure in customary areas has always been concluded that
customary tenure is insecure and discourages investment. This research
established that insecurity of tenure has been as a result of external factors
78
such as the apparent loss of land to outside applicants. Before this,
villagers were happy and secure with their customary arrangements.
Conflicts have resulted to loss of respect for leaders
The fact that the villagers are not consulted in the conversion process has
increased disrespect for leaders. Villagers feel betrayed by their leaders
because they would rather serve outsiders instead of their people. A lot of
respondents felt that their leaders were corrupt and the buying of land by
outsiders has increased desire for more money on the side of tradition
leaders. It was commented that the leaders will end up selling all the land
in the villages.
Influence of reforms has led to desire to rent out land
Money transactions on land have led to villagers developing initiatives of
renting underused land to gain some income. Villagers now realize that
since land has value, idle land can be used to gain income through renting
it out to people from nearby townships.
No meaningful benefit to villagers in terms of employment
While the aspect labour on their own farms is paramount, it was also
observed that not much of employment opportunities have been created by
the farmers and investors in the area.
In particular, Zambezi Portland Cement in their Environmental Impact
Assessment stated that they would employ 300 villagers on part time and
247 on full time basis as a way of giving back to the rural community
(Zambezi Portland Cement, 2005).
During the survey, it noted that priority was not given to the villagers.
Instead people from the nearby townships had benefited.
79
From the farmers, it was observed that at most 2 villagers were employed
at full time basis.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyzed field data and presented field data in line with
research questions in chapter one. The next chapter will now revisit the
objectives and compare with the findings in chapter 4. The chapter will
further make final conclusions and give recommendations for areas of
further study.
80
CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusions and Recommendation
This study assessed the socio-economic impact of the market based
reform to land in Zambia. From the findings in chapter four, it is now
imperative to look at the main findings and draw conclusions, before
making recommendations.
The following were the major findings in chapter four:
i. Unclear procedure of land allocation in customary land
ii. No strategy for development planning in customary land
iii. Increased insecurity of tenure
iv. Villagers have not been able to convert their land even
when they are aware of the reform
v. Social disputes between traditional leaders and subjects.
vi. renting of land has become common among households
Having outlined the major findings of the research, it is necessary to
evaluate the research questions and objectives with regard to the major
findings.
5.1 Research questions and answers
Are village communities aware of the market based approach to land
reform in their areas?
The study brought to the fore the fact that majority of the villagers are
actually aware about the conversion of title from customary land to
statutory land. It was found that villagers were also aware that land has
value and it can be bought or sold at market prices.
81
Have customary communities benefited from market based land
reform in their areas?
It was established that the market based approach has achieved varied
results but generally, it has not benefited the chiefdom.
Socially it has led to an increase in disputes between traditional leaders
and their subjects, a factor that could lead to disintegration of village
societies. When a community loses respect for its leaders, the rules laid
down to govern the community cannot easily be followed.
The loss of land could mean a reduction in large homesteads which is a
principle feature of village communities. Furthermore, women headed
households feel more disadvantaged since their livelihood depends mainly
on farming and collection of forest products.
Economically, some villagers no longer have access to certain resources
that act as social safety nets in hunger periods. Loss of cultivable land to
urban dwellers or outsiders has led to reduction in productivity of village
homesteads as not enough land is available to cultivate food for their
consumption and for sale.
The level of infrastructure in the chiefdom has also not improved since the
implementation of the Land Act, 1995. Farmers and investors have
acquired land in the chiefdom but have not helped to raise the level of
infrastructure. The area is still characterized by poor roads, inadequate
water facilities, limited clinics and schools. To the villagers, this is a
betrayal and hence it is feel that no good thing can come from the
investors.
However, the renting of land has been seen as a positive benefit. The fact
that people can utilize dormant land by renting it out and gaining income
is an indication that to a small extent, the reform has contributed to the
village economy.
82
Is the market based approach the best method for appropriating and in
customary areas?
What has been noted in the study is that the principles of market based
land reform are not bad in themselves. However, the method of
implementation has marred the objectives of the reform.
The fact that administrative procedures are not clear has led to disparities
in land acquisition, thus a source of disputes. It was observed for instance
that some farmer were able to acquire land without seeking permission
from the chief, while another submitted that they bought they land from
the chief.
Lack of clarity in the procedures has also led to evictions of villagers from
their land. As in other customary areas, the rate of squatting on farms has
increased because indigenous people are not considered when allocating
land.
Another factor to consider is the inability of villagers to convert their
customary titles to statutory title. Since the cost of conversion cannot be
borne by the villagers, it therefore follows that the approach will
marginalize poor people from accessing the so called secure tenure.
It can thus be concluded that the market based land reform in the chiefdom
is not the best way as it lacks strategy of ensuring that indigenous people
are not negatively affected by the reform. A tenure system ought to
increase social welfare, equity and justice by protecting the poor who
cannot protect their own interest.
5.2 Evaluation of the Research model in relation to survey results
In chapter 2, an adaptation model for the evolving of customary land to
meet current socio-economic needs was proposed. This section is
83
dedicated to the assessing the potential of the model in relation to the
results that were obtained from the field.
The main characteristics of the model were:
1. Characteristics of the land
2. Characteristics of the community
5.2.1 Characteristics of the land
Physical
It was established in the survey that the area is characterized by fertile
soils suitable for maize cultivation and other crops and vegetables.
Economic
Demand for land in the chiefdom is very high. Although actual statistics
were not given, it was approximated that 50-100 outsiders seek for land in
the chiefdom. The demand for land by villagers within the chiefdom is
also very high due to expansion of households. It is this high demand from
both the villagers and outsiders that has led to land disputes within the
chiefdom.
Chief Chiwala’s area extends from Minsundu to Mkushi and also borders
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Supply of readily cultivable land is
limited within the chiefdom. Although the actual area is unlimited, it is
difficult to settle in the remote areas because the land is not cleared and
covered with thick forests. Thus at present, the economic supply of land is
limited. Applying this to the model, tenure is thus likely to change
automatically because of changes in the supply and demand of land.
Legal characteristics
The chiefdom is mainly governed by local rules and customs of the
people. However, the chiefdom has a forest gazetted under protected
areas. This forest is known as Kansanfwe forest reserve.
84
In the above discussion, the main characteristic of the land that can cause
an evolution of tenure is the demand and supply of land.
5.2.2 Characteristics of the community
Land Administration
The Chief is the custodian of the land and governs it on behalf of the
president. According to the chief, land allocation procedures are typical to
any chiefdom. It is not a merit based system of allocation because anyone
is entitled to land in the chiefdom.
From the findings it was observed that land parcels allocated by the chief
to his villagers are smaller compared to those acquired by inheritance.
Also, families on land acquired from the chief are smaller in size
compared to homesteads on inherited land. This could indicate a gradual
change of family grouping from larger homesteads to smaller ones; a
change in tenure from very communal to individual family land
ownership.
Economic characteristic
The villagers are peasant farmers growing mainly maize and vegetables.
Produce is often sold to the Food Reserve Agency. Another form of
activity observed is the brewing of illicit beer.
Because of insufficient farming inputs, other homesteads have idle lands
during farming seasons. The resolution has been to rent out part of their
land to urban dwellers. This also marks a change in the economic
characteristic of the community. This desire to rent can lead to a desire for
a more secure tenure system whether individual or grouped.
85
Demographic characteristics
The annual growth rate in the area is 1.2 %( CSO, 2000) and the total
population of households is 3753 households. However, the influx of
urban dwellers has led to fluctuations in the population size. This change
has implications in the tenure system in that, rising populations have led to
rising demand.
It can be noted that both variables i.e. Land and the community, have
undergone changes that may cause an evolution of tenure system in the
chiefdom.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be noted that much of the change in
characteristics has been induced by external factors i.e. demand for land
from outsiders which has a direct effect on the supply of land.
It is no wonder that the reform process has been characterized by disputes
in the area. When policies have been imposed on local people instead of
allowing policy to change internally, the resulting effects are social
disintegration of communities marked by loss of respect for leaders.
The introduction of market reforms on the people without consultations
and patience has indeed not benefited Chief Chiwala’s area.
5.3 Recommendations
Based on the above conclusions, the following recommendations were
made in order to effectively achieve fair distribution of land.
The concept of rural land management boards should be implemented in
chiefdoms to allow chiefs to effectively manage their areas .Rural
management board should be compose of the chief, village
representatives and representatives from district councils. This would
86
achieve transparency as land seekers would have to be approved by the
board and not the chief alone.
The question of securing land tenure, particularly for the most economic
and socially vulnerable groups should be taken seriously
Insecurity of tenure among villagers has been accelerated by the land
reform process. There is need to reduce this insecurity by finding
affordable title to villagers whose areas have already been affected by the
reform.
Customary areas should be allowed to evolve with minimal government
intervention. However, it is the role of the Government to provide basic
infrastructure. The land development fund should be implemented at
district level to allow districts councils to plan for their areas.
5.3 Areas of further research
The subject of land is an ever evolving matter and calls for further study in
various dimensions. This study has brought out the effects of land reform
on customary communities. Based on the findings, the following have
been recommended for further research:
Pro-poor land titling as a concept should be thoroughly studied to see how
it can be implemented within chiefdoms.
Research should also be done to explore various ways of using the land
development fund to benefit customary areas.
As a matter of priority, land data systems in customary land should be
studied. Any successful land policy should be based on reliable data, on
access to and distribution of land. Currently, no data systems exist to
monitor distribution of land in customary areas.
87
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APPENDIX 1
Homestead Interview Schedule Name of respondent……….. …………………. Age…………………. Sex………………………….. Marital status…… Number of family……………. 1. Do you own land?................................. 2. How did you acquire it?
……………………………………………………………………………
3. Are there any other means of acquiring land besides the one mentioned? ………………………………………………………………………………………
4. What is the size of your plot?....................................... 5. How do you determine your boundary?.................................................
6. What do you use the land for?
……………………………………………………………………………… 7. Do you sell your produce?
……………………………………………………………………………… 8. Do you have sufficient market for your produce? 9. What is your average income?...........................................................
10. Are you able to sell your land?
Yes No
Dear respondent This questionnaire is intended to obtain information to help in assessing the socio-economic impact of the market reform process in customary areas, with specific interest to Chief Chiwala’s chiefdom. The study is required in partial fulfillment of the completion of the award of the Bachelor of Science in Land Economy at the Copperbelt University. The answers provided in this questionnaire will be purely for academic purposes and will be treated with utmost confidence. Your kind assistance will be greatly appreciated.
93
11. What is your understanding of the rules regarding transfer of land in your area?
12. Can you buy or sell land? .............................................................................................................................. 13. Can you rent out your land? ………………………………………………………………………………… 14. Can you use your land to get a loan? ………………………………………………………………………………… 15. Are you aware that outsiders can buy land in your area? ………………………………………………………………………………… 16. Are you happy with this arrangement?
……………………………………………………………………………… 17. Are you consulted when people from outside want to settle or invest in
your area? Yes No
18. How would you rate your relationship with the investors in your area? ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
19. What in your opinion have the investors done to improve your area? 1…………………………………………………………………………. 2…………………………………………………………………………. 3………………………………………………………………………….
20. In nothing in 15, what are your expectations? 1…………………………………………………………………………. 2………………………………………………………………………
21. Do investors offer employment to the local people? 22. Are the conditions of service favorable?
23. What resources do you share as a community?
1……………………. 2……………………. 3…………………….
24. Are there any rules that you follow in accessing or using these resources? Explain…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
25. Are there cases of enclosure of community resources by investors? Yes No
26. If yes in 24, how has it affected your livelihood?......................................... ………………………………………………………………………………… 27. Is the market land reform the best way of sharing land?
94
Appendix 2
Interview schedule with the Local Authority
1. What is the area extent of chief Chiwala,s area.
………………………………………………………………………………
2. What are the legal boundaries?
…………………………………………………………………………………
3. What is the estimated population of the chiefdom?
..............................................................................................................................
4. What are the major economic activities of the chiefdom?
.............................................................................................................................
5. What is the current demand of land in the area?
………………………………………………………………………………
6. What is the procedure of land allocation in chiefdom?
……………………………………………………………………………
7. How many investors have acquired land in chief chiwala’s chiefdom?
8. What is the current state of infrastructure in the area? Number of schools,
clinics?
9. How many if any, have been built by investors?
Dear respondent This questionnaire is intended to obtain information to help in assessing the socio-economic impact of the market reform process in customary areas, with specific interest to Chief Chiwala’s chiefdom. The study is required in partial fulfillment of the completion of the award of the Bachelor of Science in Land Economy at the Copperbelt University. The answers provided in this questionnaire will be purely for academic purposes and will be treated with utmost confidence. Your kind assistance will be greatly appreciated.
95
10. Would you say the investors or farmers have contributed to the economy
of the chiefdom?
..............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
11. What is your role as a Local Authority in the reform process?
12. Is the market approach the best way of appropriation of land in customary
areas?
96
Appendix 3
1. What is the population estimate in your
area?..............................................................
2. How many Villages are in your area?.........................................
3. What are the livelihood sources of the chiefdom?
…………………………………………………………………………
4. What economic challenges does your area face?
…………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………
5. Are there any social challenges in the chiefdom?
…………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………..
6. How do you value land in this area?
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
7. What are the rules governing land allocation?
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
8. Who formulates these rules?........................................................
9. Can land be sold in your area?.........................................................
10. Do people use land as collateral to access finances?........................
Dear respondent This questionnaire is intended to obtain information to help in assessing the socio-economic impact of the market reform process in customary areas, with specific interest to Chief Chiwala’s chiefdom. The study is required in partial fulfillment of the completion of the award of the Bachelor of Science in Land Economy at the Copperbelt University. The answers provided in this questionnaire will be purely for academic purposes and will be treated with utmost confidence. Your kind assistance will be greatly appreciated.
97
11. What is the estimated demand for land in the chiefdom from
outsiders?
…………………………………………………
12. Are there any investors or outsiders in the area?..............................
13. What is the criterion of allocating land to outsiders?
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
14. Do they convert the interest from customary to private?..............
15. Are there any specific areas that are of interest to both outsiders
and local people?.............................................................................
16. How are these areas treated?...........................................................
17. Who determines the land extent and boundaries for outsiders?
………………………………………………………………
18. Has this process affected your people in any way?..........................
19. Are you happy with the conversion of land from customary to
statutory?
20. What are the benefits of having investors or outsiders in your area?
..................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................
21. Are there any demerits?..............................................................
22. What is the relationship between investors and the local people?
………………………………………………………………………
23. What is the level of infrastructure in your area?.............................
24. Do you think the outsiders have helped to improve livelihoods in
your area?......................................................................................
25. Is the market based land reform the best way of appropriating
land?
…………………………………………………………………………
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Appendix 4
The Copperbelt University School of the Built Environment
Department of Real Estate Studies Name of Respondent……………………..
1. When did you settle in Chief Chiwala’s area?......................................... 2. What attracted you to the area?......................................................................
……………………………………………………………………………… 3. What was the method did you use to acquire the land?.................................
……………………………………………………………………………… 4. What is the size of your land?........................................................................ 5. Can you access credit using your land as collateral?....................................
…………………………………………………………………………….. 6. What activities do you carry out on your land?.............................................
....................................................................................................................... 7. Have you faced any challenges as a farmer in the chiefdom?.......................
…………………………………………………………………………….. 8. How is your relationship with the villagers?.................................................
…………………………………………………………………………….. 9. How many villagers have you employed on your farm?.......................... 10. Apart from employment, what other things have people benefited from
your farm investment?....................................................................................................
11. What would you say have been the negative impacts on the village community? ………………………………………………………………………………
12. Why did you opt for titled land?.................................................................... ………………………………………………………………………………
13. What is your opinion of the market reform in customary areas?.................. ………………………………………………………………………………
Dear respondent This questionnaire is intended to obtain information to help in assessing the socio-economic impact of the market reform process in customary areas, with specific interest to Chief Chiwala’s chiefdom. The study is required in partial fulfillment of the completion of the award of the Bachelor of Science in Land Economy at the Copperbelt University. The answers provided in this questionnaire will be purely for academic purposes and will be treated with utmost confidence. Your kind assistance will be greatly appreciated.
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APPENDIX 5 SPSS DATA SHEET
Variable Variable label Variable Name Coding System V1 sex Sex of respondent 1=male; 2=female V2 head Sex of head of
homestead 1=male;2=female
V3 marista Marital status 1=married; 2=widowed;3=single
V4 landown Land ownership 1=yes; 2=no V5 mthofacq Method of land
acquisition 1=From chief;2=Inherited;3=bought
V6 landext Land extent 1=large;2=medium;3=small; 4=very small
V7 Prodsell Sell of produce 1=yes; 2=no;3= Occasionally V8 rent Renting of land 1=Yes; 2=no;3=Occasionally V9 awmktrf Market reform
awareness 1=aware;2=not aware
V10 views Views on reform 1=happy;2=not happy;3=indifferent
V11 employmt Employment status
1=fulltime;2=partime;3=none
V12 relation Relationship with farmers
1=good;2=fair;3=bad