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AIR TO AIR HELICOPTER COMBAT(USMC HELICOPTERS VS IRUSSIAN HIND)
by
Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Phillips, USMC
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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 11013 i
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The Soviets possess a formidable now threat with t~'o 111ND armed holicop-ter and it is capable of performing an air to sit role against other belicop-teve In any future conflict. This paper exstniamn the problon and provides a$$cookbook" of actions/tactica. that should or should not be considered when aUS Marine helicopter unit In deployed for combast operations where the enemypousMsses Rtussian HIND I) hulLeopters. It aloo makus rucomaendaciono fro im-proved armammnt, training. and more attack helicopotes. In addition, f~uturedessIgn recmaondationa aer mada. Data was gathered using the literature.
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER
AIR• TO AIR HELICOPTER COMBAT
(USMC HELICOPTERS VS RUSSIAN RIND)
INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
by
Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. PhillipsU8 Marine Corps
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f. US Army War CollegeCarlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
11 May 1979
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AWUHOWO ) Rick Phillips, Lt Col, USMC
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n Air to Air Helicopter Combat (USMC lUelicoptorn vs Rusomian H IIND)
Tz: Individual Study Project
L 11May 1979 PAGESt t)w ILatWFICATION. a1.iurmd t'led'o
tl-Tho Soviets possoom a formidnhl ,•w thrvt with the J1fND armod itop.
ter and it is capable of porforming an air to air role against other 1olicup)ers in any future conflict. This paper examines the problom and provides acookbookO of actions/tacties that should or should not be considered when a
US Marine helicopter unit in deployed for combat operations whero tho enemyposseseas Russian HIND D helicopters. It also makes recommendations for i"-proved armament, training, and more attack helicopters. In addition, futuredesign recormAndations are made. Data was gathered using the literaturesearch, personal interviews with 'weapons/tactics development" pilots at Yum-Asitha and with deusign enginoers at Sikorsky Aircraft,) The author also flesome of the maneuvers at Yuma.•#The full environment is covered includinMavoidance of detection, baoit ovusivV tactics, and use of encortu and nupporin5 arms. A checklist of fifteen items for use when operating in a HIND Denvironment is developed. The Marine Corps nhould niso take the followingactionsi increase the overall number of attack helicopter squadrons and armthem with a better gun ayntim and some air to air miamiles; perform neesmAr ,f 'and training to arm tranimport holicoptura each with two air to airmissiles for survival andlf employed in a HIND environment,_atta1ch thil mi1-ýIlvl m; niid tr h t' ri f xod wilti, alt t clk a11rt'ri-tl't. _W bVk iI!It ,•,'¥ _ t. ., mt,'.,
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PREFACE
The author elected to participate based on his prior experienceand a genuine interest in the subject. An attempt was made to lookat the full environment of helicopter air to air combat rather thanjust focusing in on the flight maneuvers.
lit
. ........
TABLI OF CONTSNTS
Page
A B S T R A C T . . . . . . . . . . . . , .. . iCHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ............ 1
Int roduction . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1US Marine Corps Helicopter Development . % ... . 2Russian Helicopter Development . . ... . . . . . . 4
The•First Soviet Helicopter. . . . . .. .... 4The Mi-2 . . . . a . . . . . . a . . . ... a a 4The Tactical Transportsz Armed . . . . . .a. . . 5The Star of the Show ... .. . ............... 6
HIND Basic Tactics . . ..............a 8I1. US MARINE CORPS BASIC HELICOPTER TACTICS .a. . . . . 9
Philosophy . .a . . . . . . . . . . .a . . . . . . . 9Basic High Threat Avoidance ... .a. ... . . a 10
Terrain Masking . ................ 10Command and Control Considerations , . o a. .a. 13Darkness for Concealment .. . .. . . .... 14Special Night Vision Devices . . . . . . 16Low Ceilings and Visibility ... a a .a a .aa 17ProperPerspective . . .... .19
Basics for Survival in Air Combat .... a..a. 19Tactics Against Fixed Wing Attack ..a ... a .. 24Air Maneuvers Against Fixed Wixg (See SECRET Supplement) "'
III. US MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER TACTICS AGAINST THE HIND. 30Marine Corps Attack Helicopters Against the HIND , , 30
Simulator Experience ... a . a a . 30Mass . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 31HIND D Armament (See SECRET Supplement)Armed Helicopter Air to Air Maneuvers (See SECRET
Supplement)Possible Immediate Armament and Design Improve-
ments . . . . .a a . . .a.a. ..a. . . . 32Marine Corps Transport Helicopters Versus the ,HIND . 33
Flight Planning and Loading. . . a ..a. . . .a. 33Crew and Escort Briefing . a a a a a a . 34Escort and Supporting Arms ., . a a a . . a .a 35Transport Helicopter Air to Air Maneuvers (See
SECRET Supplement)Possible Immediate Armament and Design Improve-
menta . . . a % a a a a a .a 37IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOW ENDATIONS .......... 41
Conclusions .. a . .a o . . . . . . . 41Checklist .a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Recommendations .a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Future Design Recommendations .a. . . . . . . . . . 47
FOOTNOTES . * * a a * a 6 a a a . a. a a I a a a a a a % .a a a 50SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................... 51DISTRIBUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
iv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION
Helicopter versus helicopter'combat is inevitable.It's inevitable because helicopters are armed andwill encounter' each other. In fact, the firsthelicopter air-to-air kill is history. In 1972,a North.Vietnamese AN-2 trying to bomb a place inLaos was intercepted'and shot down by an AirAmerican UH-1 Huey. The people Who say "Thatisn't our (your) mission" can be a problem. Whatthey' don't think about is that' the mission can bethrust on you by the enemy.: we can control ourmissions only in peacetime. 1
The. Soyiets possess a formidable new threat with. the HIND armed
helicopter and it is capable. of'performing an air to air role against
4thei heltcoptera'in any future. conflict., Our possible NATO flank
role would put the Marine Corps up against the HIND and any country
supplied with Soviet arms could theoretically possess this aircraft.
Therefore, some published counter tactics are necessary.
Since little helicopter air to air combat has actually occurred
and the potential is definitely possible today, this is an important
but completely embryonic area of warfare. Very little information
is available on the subject at this time. Until now the only "air
to air" threat a helicopter pilot had to worry about was from a
fixed wing. Although. of definite concern, if the fixed wing was seen
in time the helicopter could use "established tactics" (covered in a
later section) and had a high probability of survival. Normally the
fixed wing will not spend too much time on the helicopter (a few
1
passes). The HIND, on the other hand, lives in the helicopter realm
of flight. It is fast and maneuverable and can hold firing parameters
on another helicopter much longer than a fixed wing. It is an
excellent weapons platform and has pilots trained in air to air
killing. This paper will draw from many sources and try to present
a "cookbook" type of approach. It will provide background information
and actions/tactics that should or should not be considered when a
US Marine helicopter unit is deployed for combat operations where the
enemy is known to possess Russian HIND helicopters. Recommendations
for improvements in armament and other areas will also be made. In
addition, future design possibilitieA will he explored.
US MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER DEVELOPMENT
In 1947 H1NLX-l (Experimental Helicopter Squadron) was formed at
Quantico, Virginia, with the Sikorsky 1103S. Then in January 1951 the
first helicopter transport squadron was commissioned with 1IRS-P's and
set sail for Korea seven months later. Korea was a good proving
ground for combat tactics* and missions included troop lifts, resupply.
medevacs and a large scale night combat mission.
After Korea more squadrons were commissioned and the H111S replaced
the 1IRS-t. Also the HR2S was added for heavy lift. In April 1962
Mnrine Corps helicopters arrived in Vietnam and would stay there in
combat for nine years. In 1964 the corps received the first turbine
powered ITH-IF followed by tOi, C11-46 in 1965 and CII-53 in .1966. All
of these helicopters also were immediately sent to combat and were
tested tinder fire. Sptt cfl mission and support tactics were developed
under combat conditions. It is mostly these tactics along with some
developed by the US Army that the Russians have copied.
The H-46 was used for troop transport, Inserting reconnaissance
teams, medical evacuations, light cargo lift, and large troop move-
ment missions. Both the 11-46 and 11-53 were armed with side mounted
machine guns. The UfH-lE assumed the gunship role in Vietnam in
1966 to augment support from fixed wing air. It proved to be extremely
effective for close ground troop support and the only good escort
for the transport helicopters. Sections of UH-IE's provided
excellent covering fire while the transport helicopters were making
approaches and departures from zones and during the time the trans-
port was actually in the landing zone. The IrH-lE COBRA joined the
battle in the late 1960s. Its smaller silhouette and increased
firepower greatly augmented the UHI-lE gunship missions. In 1971
the two engine COBRA with the 20mm cannon proved to he even more
effective.
Tactics were also developed for airborne command and control of
this armada of aircraft (fixed wing and helicopter). A tactical air
commander airborne or TAC(A) was positioned in aUH-lE for most larger
operations and he controlled fixed wing, attack COBRA helicopters,
and, the transport helicopters. On large operations this is absolutely
necessary for efficiency,
The latest development in equipment is the recent delivery ot the
TOW missile equipped helicopter (All-IT TOW). In the training area
Miarine helicopter pilots are now training in low level flight, night
3
&oUle use, and fixed wing evasive tactics. Tactics in these areas
are progressing well. However, in the heaicopter air to air area the
tactics are still being developed.
RUSSIAN HELICOPTER DEVELOPMENT
The First Soviet Helicopter
Apart from a few autogyros, no rotary-wing aircraft were produced
in the Soviet Union until the post-war years. Then on December 12,
1947, the first helicopter design bureau was founded under the leader-
ship of M. L. Mil. It was here that the first helicopter, the Mi-i
Hare, was designed. Less than a year later in October 1948, it is said
to have made its maiden flight and three years later was shown to the
world in the 1951 Tushino Air Show.
By the mid- to late-1950s, two different Mi-i heltco,•ter designs
were operational in Frontal Aviation units. The small, lightly armed
Mi-i Hare has now been largely forgotten; but despite its technological
limitations it performed well as a small liaison craft for nearly a
decade.2
The Mi-2
The advent of turbine engines in American and French helicopters
led to the demand for new designs incorporating this new technology.
The first flight of the turbine-engined Mi-2 Hloplite took place in
Poland on August 26, 1965.
While it would be unwise to be too critical of the Soviet practice
oi making proven equipment serve new purposes by "strapping on" new
4
technology, the idea of the Hoplite serving as an attack helicopter
seem quite unlikely. It is more reasonable to assume that it would
be used to transport squad-sized subunits at low altitude over surface
obstacles, including nuclear contaminated zones. Polish marine-
infantry units have, in fact, demonstrated the utility of the Mi-2
in landing airborne units on a coast in connection with amphibious
maneuvers. With each of the five ground armies in the Group of Soviet
Forces in East Germany (GSFG) being supported by a regiment of Mi-2
Hoplites, one can postulate the existence of approximately 150 heli-
copters each capable of transporting eight-ten GSFG infrantrymen.
At least theoretically, that is enough tactical airlift support for
between 1,000 and 1,500 soldiers armed only with automatic rifles
and light machine guns. Configures as a medical evacuation helicopter,
the Mi-2 can carry four wounded on stretchers, one medical corpsman
and equipment.
The Tactical Transports: Armed
The first of the medium-sized helicopters to enter service with
Frontal Aviation was the Mi-4 Hound.
The second of the new turbine-powered helicopter to appear in
Frontal Aviation was another Mil product, the Mi-8 Hip C..-Designed
as a replacement for the weary Hound, the Hip quickly proliferated
throughout the military during the 1960s and also entered Aeroflot
service in great numbers. Capable of transporting at least three
rifle squads, it provides considerable tactical airlift capability.
Twenty of these helicopters could, for example, transport an airborne
5
battalion of approximately 550 men with light arms. Equipped with
large rear clamshell doors, the Hip is said to be also able to trans-
port small vehicles of approximately BRDM (BTR-40) or Uaz-69 bulk.
An East German milltary author points to the fact that the Mi-8
is proof that all capable general purpose helicopters can be armed.
Autv.matic grenade launchers (up to 40mm) and a 12.7mm machine-gun
with a range of 1,000-3,000 m for use against movi.ng targets re
claimed for tlte Hip. In an air assault role, however, .the Hip would
undoubtedly be equipped with four standard 16- or 32-shot 57mm unguided
rockAt poda. Our East German author even points to the possibility
of unguided rockets or guided missiles on side-mounted out-riggers
which are intended for use in an anti-tank role. Moreover, each
window In the Hip's transport sectibn is also equipped with a device
which the infantryman can use to support his weapon to fire at ground
targets from the air. Apart from its obvious ability to support
assault operations, its practical size and fine performance make the
MJ-8 an outstanding utility helicopter which is sure to find increasing
utilization throughout the military forces of the Warsaw Pact,3
The Star or the Show
With more than 200 helicopters (Ni-2s, Mi-6s and Mi-8s) already
present in GSFG 15th Air Army, the Soviets introduced the Mi-24 HIND
into Frontal Aviation's inventory in 1974. The rapid deployment of
this new helic-pter soon resulted in two unite, each of regimental
strength, based at Stendal and Parchim airfields in East Germany.
With at least 72 HINDS--possibly more, considering the Soviet affinity
6
for the principle of mass (a West German source credits GoSG with 180)--
the presence of this aircraft in the forward area has added a new
dimension to theater warfare.
In the cockpit of the Mi-24 HIND A the pilot and copilot/navigator
sit next to each other with the weapon systems operator (quite certainly
also an officer) making up the three-man crew. The cargo area can carry
at leov, eight and perhaps as many as 14 fully armed troops, The speed
of an operationally configured Mi-24 may be a matter for conjecture,
but on July 18, 1975, a helicopter of this game type (known in the press
as thu A-10) set a speed record of 334.461 km/h with the woman pilot
Calina Rostorgevova at the controls.
Two primary variants of the Mi-24 are now in service in the 16th
Air Army. The newer HIND D mounts a large caliber four-barrel Gatling-
type machine gun (referred to as a machine cannon in the East German
Press), and all-weather sighting systems including infra-red and low
light television. A lazer rangefinder to mounted on the left aide of
the HIND above the inside rocket-pod pylon. The HIND A disposes of
a built-in 12.7mm machine gun in the nose with 250-300 rounds, and
less sophisticated aiming devices, in other respects the two variants
are basically similar in that they buth mount four 32-shot 5;mm unguided
rocket pods (the possibility also exists that a different caliber
unguided rocket may be used) and four Swatter anti-tank guided missile
rails. The missile guidance system also allows utilization of air to
ground missiles, and bombs (up to 250 kg) can be carried when required.
The range of the 57mm unguided rocket has been given as approxi-
mately 1,200 m, with the ability to penetrate 200mm of armour. The
7
Statter missile complement@ the 57mm rockets, having a range of
approximately 3,500 m and, more importantly, the ability to penetrate.
500am of armour.
Undoubtedly, the Kremlin's decisionmakers--with a lot of advice
from SoviQt military professionals in a proliferation of higher
military schools--kept close track of the US helicopter tactics in
Southeast Asia. It must be assumed that the heavily armed assault
helicopter with a multi-role capability can better find its place
within the framework of Soviet military art than could a pure gunship-
type attack helicopter such as the American AH-l COBRA. The Soviets
have therefore created a ". . . powerful combat aircraft which can
carry out a broad range of missions, including hitting enemy personnel
and equipment on the battlefield and in the enemy rear," and other
enemy helicopters in the air.
HIND BASIC TACTICS
The HIND is never employed individually--always in sections of
two and where possible in flights of six. The HIND has been used
for air to air training. The Russians use balloons as air to air
targets for the HIND.
8
CHAPTER II
US MARINE CORPS BASIC HELICOPTER TACTICS
PHILOSOPHY
Enemy HINDS can expect to be found near the rRBA (there mainly
in an anti-tank role) or around the peripheral areas of the FEBA in
the modern battlefield. In the peripheral areas they play an air to
ground and an air to air role, Any third world country supplied with
Russian arms could aleso have HINDS and therefore an air to air capa-
bility against our helicopters.
Under current Marine Corps doctrine, the helicopter's mission is
mainly to support the ground troops. Tho pround Marines and the fixed
wing air are supposed to do the fighting. However, the attack hell-
copter squadrons (currently AH-1 COBRAS) do have a mission of offen-
sive fighting while supporting ground forces and escorting transport
helicopters. The first Marine Corps "TOW COBRA" was nlimo just received
for use against mobile ground targets.
In this paper I am not suggesting that the Marine Corpm change
the role of its transport helicopters or that it fly helicopters into
the FEBA. However, 1 do say that the odds of meeting up with this
HIND character are very real. He has trained for air to air combat
and is ready, How ready are we?
Currently the only armitment on our transport helicopters are
machine guns out the aides. Our COBRAS are basically equipped air
to ground and are presently "outRunned" by the HIND. (More discussion
9
q .... .....
wll follow on this in Chapter III.) The transport helicopters are
not equipped air to air and our few COBRAS are not very well equipped
air to air. Our transport helicopters would have to play a basically
defensive role in the air to air battle--in short first avoid being
seen and second if seen use other supporting arms to draw attention
or engage the HINDS while the "transport helicopter" is "beating feet"
out of the area.
First, to avoid being detected, the same basic tactics which are
used by helicopters against all high threat weapons apply and will
work against enemy air (both fixed wing and HIND). These basic tactics
are terrain masking by low altitude flight, the use of darkness by
night operations, and the use of low ceilings and visibility. In this
section each of these three basic tactics areas will be expanded upon
to some degree. In the next section basic evasive tactics and basic
tactics helicopter against fixed wing will be covered. Then in the
section following helicopter tactics and use of escorts/supporting
arms against the HIND will be addressed.
BASIC HIGH THREAT AVOIDANCE
Terrain Masking
Terrain flight is the employment of an aircraft in such a manner
as to utilize terrain, vegetation, and manmade objects to enhance
survival by degrading the enemy's ability to visually, optically, and
electronically detect or locate the aircraft. It involves a constant
awareness of the positions and capabilities of enemy weapons and
10
detection means in relation to the flight route and masking terrain.
Terrain flight is flying close to the earth's surface using low-
level, contour, or nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight techniques to counter
an enemy's capability to acquire, track, and engage the aircraft.
Terrain flying is the only effective technique to counter a high
threat environment. When selecting terrain flight routes, detection
avoidance and protective cover are the governing factors. Terrain
flight route selection planning shall consider the following additional
principlest 4
1. Keep a terrain mass and/or vegetation between the enemy
and the helicopter, Take advantage of masking provided by radar
ground clutter.
2, In mountainous terrain, use the friendly side below the
evest of the ridgeline,
3, In flat to rolling terrain use the lowest contours.
Either ground or vegetation contours as appropriate.
4. Avoid avenues of approach which lead to enemy positions.
5. When paralleling a vegetated area, fly below the crest
of the vegetation and close aboard.
6. Avoid built up areas.
7. Do not follow manmade linear features and avoid using
manmade objects as checkpoints.
8. Use heavily vegetated areas an opposed to open terrain.
Aircraft shadows are broken and lost in darker vegetation.
9. Avoid silhouetting the aircraft when crossing ridgelines.
'I
...........-- -.!.
10. Know the terrain. Use recent photographic maps when-
ever possible.
In addition the planner must evaluate prospective helicopter
landing zones (HLZs) and approach and retirement lanes for terrain
flying compatibility. HLZs should be easy to identify from low
altitudes and should provide cover and concealment for helicopters.
Avoidance of detection and enemy fire should be two of the governing
criteria for HLZ and lane selection. HLZ selection should be based
on the concept of landing just beyond the enemy's detection and
weapons' engagement range., then m&neuver to attack. HLZs should be
at locations which the enemy cannot defend.
Approach and retirement lanes should be based on control points
which can be easily identified from low altitudes to facilitate
enroute navigation. They should be wide enough to permit evasive
action and accommodate the meandering flight routes used in terrain
flying. They should conform to the terrain to take advantage of
terrain masking, rather than be linear in shape and based on direct
routing. Alternate routes must be selected based on the threat.
Will the postulated threat that could close the primary lane affect
the alternate lane? Do the routes unduly channelize the flow of
traffic and render it predictable?
High Threat Environment Departures. Terrain flight techniques
are used to execute tactical departures in a high threat environment.
After takeoff, a rapid transition is made to either low-level, contour,
or NOE flight for departure from the landing zone. Specific recommen-
datlono ns to the execution of these departures cannot be made due to
12
the variables in threat and terrain which can be encountered. As a
general rule, both the approach and the departure methods employed should
be based on the same concept of avoiding the threat. That is, if a
contour flight approach was required to reduce vulnerability, then a
contour flight departure should be employed. The primary aims of the
method employed are to avoid enemy detection and to make optimum use
of the terrain for cover and concealment. It must be remembered that
use of these methods requires extensive preflight planning.
Command and Control Considerations
The helicopterborne unit commander will no longer be able to use
a command and control aircraft to supervise and control the activities
of several units simultaneously from altitude. Rather, he will have
to use the aircraft as a means of mobility between his units or
possibly delegate the final decisionmaking authority to the helicopter
unit commander. To ensure the success of the mission, the helicopter
unit commander should have extensive knowledge of the helicopterborne
commands concept of operation.
Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC(A)) is an experienced
aviator airborne in the area of operations in a he'licopter or fixed-
wing aircraft. His primary responsbility is to coordinate and direct
the activities of aircraft assigned to him and to report to the
appropriate ground and air control agencies in his area of responsi-
bility.
Normally, the high performance jet is not as effective for use
In the TAC(A) role as slower aircraft due to performance characteristics.
13
The high performance aircraft's advantage lies in its ability to
survive in a high threat area due to speed and ECM equipment, its
compatibility with high performance strike aircraft, and its air-
refueling capability. A slow mover's advantage, as the term implies,
lies in the ability to move over the area at a relatively slow rate
of speed, providing the TAC(A) better maneuverability and observation.
If a TAC(A) is used it might be advantageous to have the high perfor-
mance jet version not only for his own survivability but also to scare
off any lurking HINDS and provide a limited ECM capability. In many
possible battlefields "no communication" will be necessary. This will
make pre-engagement supporting arms (both airborne escorts and ground)
extremely difficult to coordinate. Once the friendly helicopter has
actually been jumped (by either enemy fixed wing or HINDS) then communi-
cations will have to be used but then it is too late for much coordina-
tion.
Darkness for Concealment
Night helicopterborne operations offer a means of achieving tacti-
cal surprise, of improving detection avoidance, and of countering
weapons which rely on visual target acquisition. However, achievement
of these results in a high threat environment continues tp depend on
the effective use of terrain masking to avoid detection. The prolifer-
ation of sophisticated air defense systems for detection and target
acquisition and the widespread introduction of night vision/sighting
devices negate part of the tactical advantage gained from the conceal-
ment afforded by darkness for flights at altitudes above the terrain
1.4
mask. Visual acquisition is definitely more difficult at night but
the HIND does have FLIR and low light TV. Marine helicopters could
definitely tise some improvements in the night vision devices area.
Before selecting a night flight route, obtain information which
identifies the enemy's air defense capabilities. The air defense
threat will dictate the type of flight (low-level, contour, or NOE)
to avoid detection by the enemy. A safe altitude will vary with the
type of terrain and the distance of weaponry from the aircraft and
can be determined by conducting a terrain profile. The helicopter
can then be flown at the highest altitude which assures safety as it
passes from the rear area forward to the forward edge of the battle
area. This procedure relieves the pilot of the stress and fatigue
that he would experience if he flew the entire route NOR.
To ensure that the flight route will be planned to avoid known
enemy air defense artillery positions, plot them on the map, Identify
enemy ground forces and, when possible, avoid overflying them. Con-
sider also the enemy threat in the landing zone. Intelligence reports
may indicate a sufficient number of profitable targets in and around
the landing zone; however, the effect gained by an artillery prepara-
tion may not offset the loss of surprise. Artillery preparations are
normally omitted from night helicopterborne assaults, but are pre-
planned for on-call use on and around the landing zone. Smoke can be
used effectively at night and its use should be considered.
Before conducting a terrain flight at night over enemy positions,
aircrews should be advised of the enemy's passive defensive capabilities.
15
To ensure a terrain mask for helicopters, select, a route on which
higher terrain lies between the route and the known enemy position.
Mask the helicopter from both electronic and optical weaponry. When
terrain or the location of enemy weapons restricts masking from both
systems simultaneously, mask the helicopter from the electronic system.
This situation occurs when the enemy's optical weapons are strategic-
ally located to fill gaps where his radar cannot detect low-flying
aircraft. Visual detection at night is difficult for optical guncrews,
even what% the helicopter is not masked; hut electronic detection is not
affected by conditions at night.
During the initial planning phase of at night operation, identify
requirements for special equipment. Based upon mission and ambient
light conditions, one or more of the following special items may be
required for night terrain flight;:
1. Helicopter with special night configuration device.
2. Night vision goggles.
3, Special night map.
If the helicopter itself is not configured with a special night
device, the night vision goggles offer excellent possibilities and
should be considered for night terrain flight, The use of the night
vision goggles for night terraini flight requires pilot experience and
excellent crew coordination, Some amblent light is also ntece"mary for
the goggles to work properly.
.. ... .... .....
The decision to conduct night terrain flight should be based on
existing and forecast meteorological ronditions. These conditions
must be considered in the planning phase to determine their effect
on the night operation.
Although forecast weather conditions do not always materialize,
the risk of encountering adverse conditions during the mission pre-
cludes terrain flight at night into forecast IMC.
Existing weather conditions allow an immediate evaluation of the
effects upon ambient light. With a cloud cover (overcast), hemispher-
ical illumination may be reduced to total darkness. Operations may
be conducted during conditions less than overcast; however, the use
of night vision devices will decrease the risk. Missions should be
conducted with the unaided eye under these conditions when the moon
is at its zenith. Restrictions to visibility (e.g., fog, haze, smoke)
are the most serious of the meteorological conditions experienced at
night, since both the unaided eye and night vision devices are affected.
Low Ceilings and Visibility
Low ceiling and reduced visibility can be assets when flyinvg in
a high threat environment. There will be less enemy aircraft in theair (both fixed wing and helicopters). The enemy'Is opticaly and
visually guided antiaircraft weapons will be less effective and may
even be neutralized. An infrared seeking missile's effectiveness will
probably also be reduced, because the enemy must acquire the target
optically. In reduced visibility, no one can pinpoint the location
of a helicopter or judge a heading or distance by sound. A low ceillng
.17
may be an asset in an operating area in which friendly forces have
at best only air parity, since enemy aircraft are forced to work
above IMC and have a reduced capability to locate and attack heli-
copters using terrain flight techniques.
Such assets, combined with the need to conduct a critical mission,
may make it advantageous to conduct terrain flight in adverse weather.
Visibility is the primary limiting factor and will determine whether
the flight can be conducted successfully. Terrain flight is most
difficult and extremely hazardous when conducted in ground fog. It
can be conducted when there is sufficient visibility for accurate
navigation and avoiding obstacles. Adequate visibility is required
at the takeoff point, en route, and in the objective area. Sufficient
visibility is required over water to provide a visible horizon. During
the conduct of the flight, the most important considerctions are main-
taining both visual reference with the terrain and a slow rnough air-
speed to avoid obstacles.
Missions conducted in adverse weather should consist of as few
helicopters as possible. A single aircraft or a section of two air-/
craft can operate under worse conditions than a large flight. iMulti-
helicopter operations require sufficient visibility and ceiling to
permit "see and nvoid" air traffic separation and to minimize inadver-
tent entry into IMC. An airborne weather reconnaissance flight should
be conducted to determine existing weather cnnditions before a multi-
helicopter operation is executed in adverse weather.
18
Proper Perspective
A very strong case has now been advocated for flying around at
low altitude, at night, and in bad weather to minimize dangers of a
high threat environment. It must also be pointed out that this -t
an extremely demanding and dangerous type of flying. This type of
flying should only be done when necessary, in a professional manner,
and with strict adherence to established procedures. It should be
remembered that of the Marine Corps helicopters lost in the Vietnam
War a large percentage were not due to actual combat and many just
ran into mountains at night or in bad weather. The HIND may be a
formidable threat but he will not be lurking behind every tree on
the battlefield, and it is better to die fighting than by running
into a mountain at night or in bad weather,
BASICS FOR SURVIVAL IN AIR COMBAT
Regardless of the type of helicopter flown or the tactic used,
there are five basics for survival in contested nirspacet
1. Seeing the enemy aircraft first.
2. Recognizing the enemy aircraft.
3. Avoiding detection.
4. Anticipate the aggressors attack profile/scheme.
5. Taking evasive action.
Seeing the Enemy Aircraft First. This factor has long been
established as an element of survival in any combat situation. The
advantages in seeing the enemy first are in large measure self-evident
19
.. .. ... ..
and their importance cannot be overemphasized. All aircrewmen, even
passengers, must be thoroughly aware of their responsibilities in
this area. If significant enemy air activity has taken place or is
expected, some aircrewmen may be assigned the task of watching for
enemy aircraft as their sole responsibility. The field of vision
from some helicopters is extremely limited, particularly up and to
the rear. This is a very dangerous area, since fighters prefer to
attack from the rear or blind side if they are given the opportunity.
Fighters normally operate in pairs, but may be encountered in
fours. They usually depart on and return from missions in fours and
are split up into two elements, so that one element can engage a
target and the other stay loose (for four together, there will be two
elements of two each; with only two, there will be two elements of
one each). The loose element usually directs the attack of the
engaging element. Whenever one fighter is acquired, it is prudent
to continue the search for the other(s). Fighters are quite diffi-
cult to see because they fly at high speeds and, once acquired, are
difficult to keep in sight.
It is noteworthy that most airborne radar are relatively ineffec-
tive for acquiring helicopters using terrain flight. Helicopters are
slow moving targets and ground clutter considerably reduces' the
efficiency of airborne, radar. It is not outside the technological
capability of threat forces to develop a look-down shoot-down radar.
Monitoring of guard, tactical air-ground, and command nets may
provide early warning of hostile air activity. Exhaust smoke and
20
glints from canopy surfaces and external stores are often seen before
the aircraft itself is sighted. Friendly antiaircraft fire is a dead
giveaway that hostile aircraft are present.
Recognition of Enemy Aircraft. Every aircraft sighted must be
considered to be hostile until it can be positively identified. A
knowledge of national markings is not enough. Aircrewmen must he
thoroughly familiar with all of the types of helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft employed in the combat zone. This familiarity should
include the tactics of both friendly and enemy aircraft. Aircrewmen
must be able to differentiate quickly between a nonaggressive maneuver
and a maneuver for attack, as this will be the first clue in determining
whether or not the helicopter has been detected. Airrrewmen must also
develop the capability during training to recognize aircraft at maximum
range and at various angles and altitudes. Binoculars may aid in early
detection and identification and so enable the helicopter pilot to take
timely action to avoid acquisition or engagement.
Avoiding Detection. What is not seen will rarely be hit. Heli-
copter crews must be thoroughly familiar with the principles for avoid-
ing detection and must put them into practice during mission planning
and training until they have become second nature to them.
Heading. Avoid flying in a straight line for extended periods,
particularly down valleys, which make good avenues of approach for high
speed aircraft. Valley floors are often devoid of dense vegetation and
hill masses, which makes the helicopter relatively easy to detect. It
is preferable to fly below ridge lines and when possible to use the
21
reverse elope. Varying heading frequently decreases the helicopter's
susceptibility to detection and, in the event of an undetected enemy
aircraft attack, can very well save the helicopter.
Airspeed. The varied airspeeds flown during terrain flight also
reduce an enemy aircraft's ability to detect the helicopter, Nap-of-
the-earth (NOE) flight using lower airspeeds will, stgnificantly degrade
the enemyt. ability to detect the helicopter, However, NOE flight cancontribute to detection should rotor wash cause tree limbs, leaves,
duet, snow, sand, and debris to blow, and so make the helicopter's
signature recognisable from the air. Surface conditions are an
important consideration when in NOE flight or operating at other
terrain flight altitudes.
Altitude. An extremely important consideratio3n in selecting
flight altitude is that the lower aircraft may have the advantage of
acquiring the higher aircraft first. This gives the lower ailreraft
Sthe initative in choosing a course of action to avoid detection, hIt
terrain flight, aircraft tend to blend with the background. while #itr-
craft flying nt alttitkdto are cilhouetted agitinst the sky.
Naneuvers. Violent aircraft maneuvers are usually counter'-productive
as a means or avoiding the airtraft, Errntic movement It mory likely to
attract the eye anti cause i magnification in the glare and glint from
the windscreen and rotor. Violent maneuvers also signIficantly Increase
the likelihood of striking an object and losing control, which Just an
quickly and permanently results In a citastrepho, as being htit by the
enemy,
22
Silhouette. Pilots must he constantly alert to the aircraft's
position relative to the horizon ("sky lining"). Any time that the
helicopter is silhouetted against the sky, it is relatively easy to
acquire. Also. the position of the sun and the type of terrain may
silhouette the helicopter. For example, a helicopter that is painted
a dark color should avoid overflying a sandy area.
Shadow. An enemy pilot may often see the shadow cast by a hali-
copter before he sees the helicopter. A shadow on an open field with
little vegetation in much easier to see than a shadow cast in a forest
or broken terrain. Shadow size and resolution are relative to altitude
and the position of terrain. Terrain flight minimizes shadow sise.
Remember that a shadow in there and that it can give the helicopter
away, Though difficult, there are ways to eliminate or camouflage an
aircraft's shadow. Try to keep the shadow of the helicopter in the
shadow of the clouds, in terrain features, or in weed lines. Shadows
will cause considerabI6 JiffItculty in desert combat, but over most
other terrains, they can be partially hidden or diffused by selecting
flight routes and p~ositions with reference to the sun's position.
Camouflage. Camouflage patterns and colors on helicopters are
particularly effective at altitudes less than L,000 meters. Rotor
blades should not be camouflage painted. What may be an excellent
pattern when the rotor Is at rest may create a barberpole effect when
the rotor turns at operating speed. All portions of the helicopter's
moving parts, including blades. head, swaah plate, ned control tubes,
should he painted with low IR paint, Cargo doors whould bv ,losed
23
. .
during flight to prevent reflections from floors or the shiny surfaces
of objects carried internally.
Reflection. Reflection from glass surfaces in reduced if the
helicopter is kept between the enemy aircraft and the sun. When hover-
ing, parked, or flying, use shadows to reduce glints.
Night. When operating a helicopter on a moonlit night, consider
the possibilities of silhouetting against the moon or clouds. 5
TACTICS AGAINST FIXED WING ATTACK
A pilot can never know when or if his helicopter has been acquired
by an enemy aircraft. An enemy pilot may have acquired the helicopter,
but elected not to engage because of a higher priority mission. Perhaps
because of the presence of friendly fighter., or the threat posed by
local air defense weapon., the enemy pilot may consider an attack on
the helicopter not worth the risk.
One of the most critical decisions that a helicopter pilot must
make is whether to rely on avoiding detection or to initiate evasive
action. There are some indicators of when a fighter is about to attack.
If the fighter begins to circle, fly toward the helicopter, or make a
sudden climb to get into attack position, then the helicopter pilot
should assume that he has been detected and will be attacked. It it
then time for him to initiate evasive action. In any event, whenever
in doubt as to an enemy fighter's intentions, begin evasive action.
Range and altitude will also determine if the enemy fighter is in
position to attack. If not In position, the enemy fighter must execute
a turning and/or climbing maneuver. The turning radius of modern jet
24
ftighters is quite large. The fighter pilot will usually lose sight
of the helicopter during the turn and will only be able to orient his
attack on a terrain location, where he last had visual contact with
the helicopter. The fighter pilot will initiate the firing pass and
attempt to reacquire the helicopter, normally about halfway down the
attack run. If the helicopter has moved to another concealed location,
oven as much as100 meters from the previous location, it may have
made it impossible for the fighter to engage on the initial firing
pass after he reacquires the helicopter. The fighter pilot must then
go through the entire process again. When fighters are working in
pairs or coordinating, their effectiveness will increase even if the
initial attack is unsuccessful.
Fighter aircraft are armed with fixed, forward-firing weapons
which require the fighter to line up on the target under attack. After
the fighter pilot is lined up on the target, he must allow the gyro-
stabilized sight one to three seconds to stabilize. He must then
track steady to achieve a well-aimed shot. If the helicopter pilot
can deny him this opportunity, the chances of survival increase con-
siderably. However, just because the helicopter is concealed does
not mean that the enemy fighter can't hit it if the pilot knows where
it is. Tree bursts and ricochets from exploding projectiles can be
just as fatal as a direct hit.
The recommended tactic for a helicopter pilot under fighter attack
is to fly directly toward the attacking fighter to cause the fighter
pilot to deepen the dive and Increase airspeed. Just before anticipated
engagement, make a sharp turn either right or left hut in the direction
25
from which the helicopter pilot will best be able to keep the fighter
in sight. Should the fighter stay on the helicopter in the turn,
another sharp turn in the opposite direction should end in disengagement.
If the maneuvers are timed and executed properly, the fighter pilot
should not be able to stay with the helicopter and bring his weapons
to bear. The direction of the helicopter's initial turn depends on
many variables, including terrain, obstacles, available cover or conceal-
ment, position relative to the attacker, and the probable direction of
succeeding attacks.
Fighters attack from altitude to gain more time to line up the
target in the sights, The steeper the dive angle, the greater the
accuracy achieved by fixed, forward-firing weapons. A fighter pilot
can get into serious difficulty in a steep, high speed dive when he
gets close to the ground. If pullout is not executed properly, the
downward momentum (sink rate) from the dive may force the fighter into
the ground. Mountainous, rugged terrain will normally force a fighter
to make steep diving attacks. If the direction of the helicopter's
evasive turn induces the fighter pilot to maintain his attack too long,
the fighter may impact with the ground.
Friendly fighters can always help. Immediately call for help and
attempt to lure enemy fighters toward friendly elements which'can assist.
It is vital to know the locations and radio frequencies of air defense
units in the operational area. Coordinate with forward air controllers
to determine how to receive assistance rapidly from nearby friendly
fighters. Nearby tactical units can also be of assistance with their
26
supporting air defense weapons. This coordination should always be a
part of pro-mission planning.
Formation@ of helicopters are easier for enemy fighter pilots to
acquire and attack. Avoid tight geometric formations because they
prohibit effective evasive action when the formation is attacked by
surprise. Trail formations may provide a fighter pilot with an oppor-
tunity to hit all helicopters in one pass. Loose, staggered, or free
trail formations are probably the best formations to use.
The use of smaller rather than larger formations is preferable
when fighter aircraft are the greatest threat in the operational area.
Consideration of the type of formation to use will depend on the threat,
degree of control required, and tactical -qquirements. Regardless of
what formation is used, when fighters are the threat, aircrowe must be
thoroughly briefed on what to do when attacked by a fighter. The
briefings should stress the responsibility of looking for enemy air-
craft. When flying in a formatioi, aircrews may he lulled into a false
sense of sectirity due to "strength in numbers" or "the other guy Is
watching for them" attitudes. Flying in a formation also diverts the
pilot's attention because of the demands placed on him to maintain
relative position In the formation and, when in terrain flight, to
avoid obstacles. Briefings must include formation break-up procedures,
rendezvous points, and mission contingency If the formation is attacked
by fighters.6
The most vulnerable point of a mission for a large formation of
helicopters is to be caught by fighters while on short final approach
27
to a landing none, because not only have the helicopters lost the
ability to maneuver, but rockets and bombs will also be effective
against the entire formation. It is essential that large helicopterborne
operations, which are conducted in areas where enemy fighters present a
threat have friendly fighter protection and that the first echelons
landed have sections which will provide landing zone air defense protec-
tion.
For evasive actions to be executed successfully, excellent team
work is required from the members: of the aircrew. The pilot must
devote his attention to operating the helicopter, especially in terrain
flight, and must rely on accurate, timely information from the aircrew
about all the activity that he cannot see for himself. Most fighters
begin firing from 1,500 to 1,000 meters out. The greater the range at
which an enemy fighter is spotted, the better the chance the helicopter
pilot has to plan and execute timely evasive maneuvers. Timing of
evasive action is of critical importance. Evading too early may not
prevent the attack; taking action too late will be fatal.
It should not be overlooked that helicopters might be able to
take some offensive actions against the fixed wing during the maneuvering.
For this they must have the correct weapons. CH-53 and AH-I helicopters
are. capable of converting to an air to air missile (SIDEWINDER'OR STINGER)
launch zone rapidly, especially if they begin to turn just prior to
crossing during a head on pass. Both helicopters can obtain 0-30 degrees
off the tail at 3000 feet range as the fixed wing aircraft pulls off.
The pull-up silhouettes the fixed wing against blue sky, an excellent
28
background for IR missile discrimination. This fact is vorth remember-
ing when possible helicopter armament solutions are discussed in
SSection 1ll, Just the fact that the helicopter has some air to ait
capability will make the enemy stand off to some degree.
7'-
I}: [
CHAPTER IlI
US MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER TACTICS AGAINST THE HIND
The Marine Corps inventory has two basic types of helicopters;the transport consisting of CHl-53'a, CH-46's, and UH-1N's, and the
"attack helicopters consisting of the COBRA gunships (AH-l's, All-1T'.,
and AH-IT TOW0s Since once of the main missiona of the attack hali-
copters is to escort and protect the transport helicopters, the tactics
of the attack helicopter against the HINI)lwLl be considered first,
MARINE CORPS ATTACK HELICOPTERS AGAINST THE HIND
When looking at m attack helicopter versus another three areas
are extremely impLt itit. These three areas are helicopter capability
(both flight pitrameters and a1mament), pilot capability (training and
experience), and mass (numbers and ability to attack using good section
tactics), Keelptng these three areas in mind the capability of the
COBRA versun tho IIHNIN will now he analyzed.
Simul.ator N•Mxy . rnen
Before simulators are used certain limiting assumptions must he
made. In the case of helicopter combat simulation done so far the
assumptions are limiting and therefore the results of the simulAtion
become subject to question. However, it is a place to start,
The CIOBRA and HIND seem reasonably matched in flight paramsterm.
The COBRA has a tighter radius of turn, but the HIND in faster and
30
carries more weight, If a one helicopter against one helicopter duel
is assumed and the COBRA and HIND had equal armament (which they do
not), the pilot with more experience will win most of the time. How-
ever, the pilot learning curve is fairly rapid (if he stays alive).
This is simply the old case of locking two out of three variables and
the side with the edge in the only remaining variable wine, It is
interesting to note that if the pilots have basically equal experience
they both shoot each other down 40 percent of the time on the first
pass. Fix all the variables and that is the result. But if the HIND is
given a gun with a higher rate of fire, higher velocity, and a better
sighting system (which is the true case with the HIND), the outcome
changes. Even if the COBRA has a better pilot the HIND can engage the
fight outside the COBRA range and usually win, The HIND simply has the
COBRA "outgunned," If the HIND has an air to air missile the situation
becomes much worse.
Mass
Since simulation currently only allows a one-on-one situation
there is no empirical data to support the following conjectures.
However, basic logic will. probably support them. If more COBRAS are
introduced there will obviously be a point where a single HIND will
he shot dowii even if he can "outgun" the COBRAS. But it is probable
that at least one COBRA will be lost, The HIND never travels alone,
so you can depend on at least a section of HINDS. As the progression
is made into fights of a section or sections of HINDS against a
section or sections of COBRAS, the actual flight experience and section
tactics become more important and the outcome harder to predict. But31
i:
one fact remains clear, the better armament on the HIND gives it a
definite advantage. Also with only one Marine attack helicopter
squadron per air wing, which also must support the ground troops,
the luxury of having enough COBRAS to sufficiently mass against the
HIND in any European war will seldom exist. The situation might be
different if fighting a third world country which only possessed a
few HINDS.
So here is a case where the attack helicopter, whose mission is
to escort and protect the transport helicopters, would be at a dis-
advantage if it became engaged in air to air combat with the HIND.
Possible Immediate Armament and Design Impifovements
It was mentioned earlier that the COBRA would be at a basic die-
advantage if it became engaged in air to air combat with the HIND (D
model) because the HIND D has it outgunned. So one of three things
must be done to accomplish the mission (i.e. killing HIND D's and
protecting transport helicopters). The three choices are (1) acquire
more COBRAS to increase mass (but also more COBRAS will be lost),
(2) improve COBRA armament so it is not "outgunned," or (3) give
another supporting arm the mission of killing HINDS and escorting
transport helicopters.
The problems with choice (1) are self evident. Choice (3) will
be explored in the next section when the tactics of the transport
helicopters versus the HIND will be examined.
Choice (2) could be accomplished if a Sun with a higher rate of
fire and ammunition with more energy (distance and hitting power) were
32
installed along with better sights and some air to air missiles.
Also tracers should be more frequent and brighter than with the current
ammunition.
MARINE CORPS TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS VERSUS THE HIND
Since this is essentially a case of unarmed helicopters versus
armed helicopters, one of the best solutions is to avoid the confronta-
tion by not being seen as was discussed earlier. However, nondetection
cannot always be depended upon and additional planning considerations
are definitely necessary if the transport pilots want to continue having
birthdays. There are four main areas to be considered. These are the
areas of flight planning for the specific mission, supporting arms
(attack helicopter or fixed wing air escort and/or ground supporting
arms), actual air to air flight tactics, and possible immediate armament
and design Improvements. Each of these areas will now be expanded upon.
Flight Planning and Loading
Flight planning to include route selection, crew and escort brief-
ing, payload weight, and aircraft configuration are more critic~l in
a high threat environment. If enemy air to air capable helicopters are
included in the threat, then some additional considerations are necessary.
Low level flight requires more power margin for maneuverability so
the transport helicopter should only be loaded to a percentage of its
maximum possible payload. External loads require less time in the
zone and may be released if the helicopter must have maximum power
margin and maneuverability to escape or perform air to air combat.
33
However if a HIND just forces a transport helicopter to drop its load
then the HIND's mission was at least in part accomplished. External
loads have some drawbacks. A helicopter is much slower and less
maneuverable with an external load, and development is necessary to
make slingg that are shorter and more stable for low level flight.
Even though each case requires separate consideration the advan-
tage of external loads probably outweigh the disadvantages.
Crew and Escort Briefing
When enemy air is present (either fixed wing or helicopter), a
crew member other than a pilot will almost always see the enemy air-
craft first. It is extremely important that all crew members attend
briefings and that all facets of crew coordination are covered and
clearly understood.
If there is an airborne escort all crews should have a combined
face to face briefing whenever possible to include hypothetical
actions and possible uses of supporting arms.
As a basic rule the flight should be planned to fly as near
friendly supporting arms as possible and as far from enemy supporting
arms as possible.
If a low level or night flight is to be conducted, procedures
outlined in the assault helicopter tactics manual should be followed.
If a large flight (section plus) is to be conducted and a TAC(A)
is required, consideration should be given to a fixed wing attack air-
craft for this role so it could also provide air cover against the
HIND.
34
Escort and Supporting Arms
Escort
The COBRA attack gunship proved to be the beat possible escort for
transport helicopters in Vietnam. It would still be the best possible
escort if it were not currently outgunned by the HIND. Therefore, for
the COBRA to do the job well it would need a gun with a higher rate
of fire and better ammunition and sighting as previously outlined,
If the HIND acquires air to air missiles then the COBRA would also need
a couple of these to perform the escort mission.
Although fixed wing attack aircraft cannot truly "escort" trans-
port helicopters (because of their speed), they can provide protection.
However this is only true if they are dedicated for the mission, air-
borne, and know where the helicopter is at all times. If all the above
stipulations are not met, the fixed wing attack aircraft is worthless
because the HIND has killed the unarmed helicopter before the fixed
wing "finds the battle." The Harrier AV-8 appears to be a good fixed
wing for this mission but definitely not the only one. It can deploy
to forward bases, it has a weapons array appropriate for the mission,
and it has the thrust to weight/acceleration necessary for successful
extension maneuvering. 7 The 30mm gun system is an excellent weapon
but another excellent fixed wing attack weapon against a low flying
helicopter is the MK-82 bomb because of the area coverage. The biggest
problem with the fixed wing covering the transport helicopters is that
there will probably never be enough available for the mission, and this
is not the kind of mission where a hot pad aircraft will help. A hot
pad aircraft would just be too late.
35
Suppertine Arms
It was previously mentioned that it is desirable to fly in areas
where friendly supporting arms are available and the onemias' are not
available. It is also important to realise that friendly supporting
arms will be of the most assistance before any actual aerial engagement
Sbegins (even if it is just a chase). Once the engagement begins it is
difficult to hit the "bad guys" without hitting the "good guys."
The three main types of ground supporting arms are guns, ground to
air missiles, and artillery. A good heavy gun system is probably the
best ground supporting arm against the HIND. The problem is getting
a clear shot against the low flying HIND. As was demonstrated in
Vietnam, small arms if coordinated in mass can also be effective
against air.
In the ground to air missiles the heat seekers (such as the Redeye)
can be very effective against enemy air. However, there are some
problems when employed against low flying enemy helicopters such as
the HIND. It is hard to get a clear shot, there is a lot of terrain
background clutter, and if there are friendly aircraft in the area(even if not engaged) the missile may like a friendly tail pipe better
than an enemy tail pipe. The newer "TOW" wired-guided missile is
primarily a ground to ground and air to ground antitank missile but
could be effective against enemy helicopters under specific conditions.
If the HIND stays in a hover then the TOW has a chance of a kill.
However, the TOW cannot follow movement much faster than a tank so
normally it would only be useful for distracting the 111ND or possibly
scaring him off.
36
Pre-positioned artillery fire* can be very useful if the friendly
helicopter knows exactly where they are located (difficult when flying
low level). Even if they do not hit the HIND they may be useful in
distracting him or scaring him off, Considering the use uf artillery
for anything more than pre-positioned fires against the HIND in really
wishful thinking.
It is readily apparent in the came of all three types of support-
ing arms that pre-mission coordination planning and establishing
supporting arms communications is absolutely essential to any success.
This has been clearly demonstrated by the years of live fire combined
arms exercises at Twentynine Palms. The preflight coordination bacomen
even more important and more difficult when the battle altuation dictates
a "no communftations" environment.
Possible Immediate Armament and Dosij._ImrovementsP
Given that there is no need or desire to alter the mission of the
transport helicopter, design and armament changes will he -onsidered
only from a survivability point of view.
These must he changes that can be accomplished without major
changes to the air frame. Any design change that makes the helicopter
harder to see or find is an advantage. These include low IR paint,
low IR rotor blades, non-glint cockpit windows, and others. These
types of changes are relatively inexpensive and they help not only
against detection by the HIND but also against all enemy weapons on
the high threat battlefield.
37
ArmMen t
Several possible armament changes have been hypothesized. The
advantages and disadvantages will now be examined.
A forward firing gun would add weight to the cockpit area and a
transport having a gun dual with a HIND is not tactically very sound.
The transport is lees maneuverable, especially when loaded, has less
visibility, and would be departing from its missions. A ramp mounted,
rear firing gun at first appears to have some definite advantages. It
could be used to hold the HIND at a distance while the transport heads
back to friendly territory. It would have a reasonably good field of
fire because of higher speed the transport is in a nose low and tail
high configuration. Cranking off a string of 30mm tracers would help keep
a HIND (at least one without air to air missilc) at a safe distance.
The big disadvantage is that the gun would block the main loading area of
the transport helicopters.
The Redeye missile is light and transportable. It has been suggested
that the transport could land and the Redeye team jump out and fire the
heat seeking missile at the HIND. (The missile cannot be fired inside
the transport because of the backblaat.) This is not a viable solution
because the transport is vulnerable while landing and the Redeys must
be carried partially disassembled when transported by helicopter. It
would have to be assembled on the ground prior to firing.
The Russians have provided for their troops to fire out the sides
of their Hip helicopters. This may well be one area where their lack
of helicopter combat experience surfaces. It is definitely possible
38
L . .... ..
that troops inside a friendly helicopter could shoot more parts off
the friendly helicopters than off the enemy helicopters.
Another possibility is to mount a couple of air to air missiles
on the transport helicopter. This has the advantage of letting the
HIND know that if he plays around with the transport he could be
bitten back. The transport would no longer be an unarmed helicopter.
The HIND could have the best gun in the world and he would think twice
before attacking that missile. Another major advantage is that then
the transport would probably not require an escort. The friendly
attack helicopters and fixed wing could concentrate on their other
mission@, Another consideration is that Lhis would provide a minor
offensive capability against enemy fixed wing. As was mentioned in
the evasive maneuvers sections transport helicopters occasionally
obtain missile firing pararmters on enemy fixed wing. In short all
enemy air would be much more hesitant to tangle with the transport
helicopter. Disadvantages are in the areas of cost and weight. However,
if the system and rails were installed on the helicopters, the missiles
themselves would not be required unless the helicopters were deployed
to a theater of combat where HINDS were actively employed.
It is highly probable the HIND will attach an air to air missile
in the near future. In this age of precision guided ordinance, if both
sides have air to air missiles the probability of either getting a kill
without being killed in return is low (assuming at least two helicopters
per flight on each side). This would probably cause the HIND to stick
to his air to ground mission. However, if the HIND had air to air
39
missiles and the friendly helicopters did not, the probability of a
kill for the HIND would be extremely high. The HIND would then spend
a lot of time "looking for helicopters."
Once again it should be emphasised that there should be no change
in mission for the transport helicopters, They can go about their
transport mission much more efficiently if not bothered by HINDS, not
requiring escorts as often, not being attacked by enemy fixod wing as
frequently, and not requiring complicated supporting arms procedures.
Two air to air missiles (modified Stingers or like missiles) would
without a doubt be the best solution to the transport helicopter
armament problem.
40
I•
.4O
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOOtENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
Considering the probabla Marine Corps NATO flank mission and the
number of countries worldwide that possess Soviet weapons the possibility
of encountering the Russian HIND becomes a reality. The Marine Corps
relies heavily on its transport helicopters both for mobility and
supplies.
It appears that the greatest threat to transport (essentially
unarmed) helicopters is the HIND. The HIND is much more mobile and
maneuverable than the ZUS-23 and other high threat weapons. The HIND
will not necessarily stay close to the FEBA or main enemy positions.
Unlike fixed wing aircraft the HIND lives in the helicopter flight
environment and can maintain firing parameters on other helicopters
for much longer periods of time than the fixed wing. Clutter from
terrain flight background or flares will usually distract portable
ground fired SAM-7 missiles and the STRAGGER cannot track n target
moving much faster than a tank. However. a transport helicopter with
a HIND on its tail is a "dead duck."
At the beginning it was stated that this paper would present a
"cookbook" or "checklist" of actions to be taken if a Marine helicopter
unit were deployed to combat where the enemy employs HIND helicopters.
The checklist has boon formulated as this paper has progressed. First,
methods to avoid detection were discussed. Next, evasion tactics in
41
general and evasion tactics against fixed win& were discussed. Then
flight planning and escort methods were considered. At present there
are definite problems because an escort is needed, The other means
for avoidance/protection, although helpful, probably do not provide
enough security. Currently there are no where near enough fixed wing
to be dedicated escorts and the HIND outguns the COBRA attack helicopter.
With the probability of the HIND adding an air to air missile the
transport helicopters become even more vulnerable and the COBRA would
need both a better gun and an air to air missile to provide adequate
escort, The real problem is that there are just not enough fixed wing
aircraft to dedicate to airborne escort/support of every transport
helicopter flight. There are also not enough attack COBRAS for the
escort mission because they are heavily involved in the ground support
role. The TOW is not a good air to air missile because it cannot
follow any target much faater than a tank. Therefore, future recommen-
dations are required and will be stated after the checklist. The
recommendations will be given after the checklist because the checklist
is based on current capabilities.
CHECKLIST
Avoid Acquisition b. the HIND
1. Use terrain masking.
2. Minimum use of radios.
3. Use darkness and special night vision devices.
4. Use low ceilings and visibilities,
42
Know Basic and Fixed Wins Evasive Tactics
3. Use basic air combat survival tactics.
6. Know fixed wing evasive tactics.
Fli iht Planin&
7. Select route considering best use uf supporting arms.
8. Plan less than maximum load--consider terrain flight and
maneuverability.
9. Use short, stable elings for external loads.
10. Entire crew attend briefing and establiuh clear lookout
procedures.
Escort Considerations,
11. Use fixed wing escort/support aircraft--only on the conditinn
they are dedicated to the mission and airborne.
12. Use COBRA escort and realise armament limitations. However,
if armament has been improved to at least equal to HIND since this
writing then COBRA escort is preferable to fixed wing.
13. All transport helicopter flights should be at least two air-
craft.
Supporting Arms
14. Prior to flight conduct coordination for use of ground Sun
system, missile, and/or artillery supporting arms.
Air to Air Haneuvers
15. Know classified air to air combat maneuvers cold.
43
...................... ........................
RECOMMENDATIONS
First, the three main recommendations resulting from this study will
be made, then they will be expanded upon. The three main recommendations
are as follow.:
1. Perform necessary R&D and training to arm transport helicop-
ters each with two air to air missiles for survival and if employed in a
HIND environment attach the missiles.
2, Arm Marine Corps attack helicopters with a better gun
system and some air to air missiles and increase the number of attack
helicopter (COBRA) squadrons in the Marine Corps.
2.a. Alternate Solution--Buy the Army Advanced Assault Helicop-
ter (AAH) and use them to augment current USMC attack helicopter assots.
Incorporate an air to air missile on both types of attack helicopters.
3. Train fixed wing attack aircraft In "killing HIND helicopters."
Recommendrtion 1 Discusson--Mounting two air to air missiles (modified
Stingers or like missiles) on each transport helicopter would be the best
solution to the HIND threat problem. As was previously mentioned in arma-
ment recommendations, they can go about their normal transport mission not
being bothered by HINDS, not requiring escorts as often (only for larger
flights), not being attacked by enemy fixed wing as frequently, and not
requiring complicated supporting arms procedures in no radio environments.
If the HIND knows it stands to get bitten back if it attacks the transport
it will probably stick to its ground support role.
Recommendation 2 Discussion--In this age of precision guided munitions
(PGM's) the attack helicopter, with systems such as the TOW, becomes even
more important as a ground support weapon. However, it will still be
44
__.-,, , .
F'
needed to support other helicopter flights--one attack helicopter
squadron per MAF is just not enough. An improved Run system is required
that includes the following items--much higher rato of fire gun, higher
energy ammunition (more distance and hitting power), better tracers,
better sighting system (head@ up display and lead computing). This
improved gun system will also help considerably with ground targets. The
air to air missiles should be of the modified Stinger variety and adapt-
able to existing racks so TOWS and air to air missiles may be carried
concurrently. In short, an attack helicopter should at least have arma-
ment equal to if not bettor than its opponent.
Recommndation 2a Discussion--The new Army AAH already has the better gun
system (3Onm--high rate of fire),excellent target acquisition and night
capability (TV, FLIR, telescopic optice,, and laser rangefinder), and
some hardening and redundancy (oval engine and flight controls), The
Amy has already paid for the development and will purchase over 500 to
lower the cost per aircraft. Therefore, it might be cost effective to buy
the AAH rather than modify the COBRAS. This would cause further speciali-
sation of missions--the existing COBRAS would mainly support the ground
forces and escort the transports in a non-HIND environment and the AAH
would support the ground forces and also escort the transport helicopters.
This would equate to something like the Army's Hi-Lo mix. If the HIND
does attach an air to air missile both types of attack helicopters would
than also need to attach a couple of air to air missiles for survivability.
Recomiriondation 3 Discussion--For fixed wing to kill helicopters, especially
ones that are heavily armed with trained pilots, it is not as easy as
one might think. Major Ryan of the MATS-I Squadron at Yuma has recommended
45
tactics in hJis paper "Some Thoughts on Killing Helicopters." These are
the best tactics I have found so far, and fixed win& attack squadrons
could well use these in their training programs.
Overall Discussion--So the R&D, testing and system acquisition should
begin immediately. As a minimum for training, pilots attending the
bi-annual MATS-1 "Weapons-Tactics Instruction" courses should receive
ir some air to air missile delivery training.
It is possible that dog fights in helicopters (like WWI and WII!
fixed wing gun duels) are already obsolete before they even began. If
both sides have air to air missiles they will probably concentrate on
their other missions. But if one combatant has air to air missiles and
the other does not, it will be no contest. It is very probable the
SHIND will have air to air missiles in the near future.
46
.. ."
Development is currently under way on higher speed, more survivable
helicopters and VTOL aircraft which will be discussed in the nuxt aection.
However, it looks like the 1990's before any of these exotic machines
will be sitting on Marine Corps flight lines. The speed will help then
but something is necessary now to counter the HIND threat. When you
consider that in this age of "smart weapons" and "PGMs" a helicopter
with an air to air missile could theoretically shoot down an attacking
500 knot plus fixed wing maybe all that speed is not as important (at
least right away) as improvement in armament.
FUTURE DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS
First 15t@ list the principal basic qualities that I believe a
combat machine of future should have:
1. Maneuverability.
2. Survivability (redundancy and hardened).
3. Capabilitity of high speed for short periods.
4. Easily maintainable (current helicopters with all their
shafting require extensive maintenance).
5. Modern cockpit--excellent visibility, designed for new
systems (i.e. heads of displays, fly by wire, ordnance systems).
6. Appropriate armament.
7. Appropriate survival systems.
The HARRIER is at one end of the spectrum of modern combat flying
machines (primarily fixed wing that can fly slow). So now lees look
at the other end of the spectrum (priwarily rotor craft that can fly
fast).47
.. ...
Machines at the rotor end of spectrum are able to carry external
loads and truly "live" in slow flight environment. Most of these that
are available now are compound helicopters (single rotor helicopters
with short wings and an additional engine). Because of "retreating
blade tip stall" these machines do not solve the speed and aerodynamics
problem they only push against it. The US Army's new AAM is of this
type of design and even though it has some improvements in armament,
hardening, and other systems it is still a single rotor helicopter with
the same speed limitations and also the maintenance problems associated
with a tail rotor and the accompanying shafting. Another design, "the
Tilt Wing" has tremendous problems with center of gravity movements.
However, there is one more machine and although it is still under
development it is certainly worth attention. This is the Sikorsky Advancing
Blade Concept (ABC) machine. It is a co-axial machine that unloads the
retreating blades and balances the advancing blades at higher speeds
thereby allowing much higher speeds without A wing. This concept also
allows exceptional maneuverability. The tail rotor and shafting is
completely eliminated and would reduce maintennnce considerably. It
should be noted that this machine is Htill uinder devolopment and more
work must be done in the areas of vibrntion control and directional
control at slow speeds. However, ovarything dono so nar looks very
gooI--the ABC In a fl.ytng prototype and has been for quitte some time.
Thin may well be our btst hope if we want to "leap frog" the Russians
In flying machine eapahiltty rather than struggle along sli4lghtly behind
them.
'.8
The systems that should definitely be included in any future
machine are:
-- Inertial Navigation System
-- FLIR
--Rad#X Warning Receiver
-- Survivability Systems
-- Air to Air Missile system
And if it is used in an attack role the following should also be
included:
-- High Rate of Fire Gun with High Knergy Ammunition
-- Heads Up Display
-- Laser Range Finder
-- Lead Computing Gunsight
49
FOOTNOTES
A,1. Georg* Heertn "AnaloSie8 and Implications From Fixod Wing
SACH," U.S. AMrY AvlatIo Digest, April 1978, p, 8,
12. Lynn MI. Hanson, Lt Col (USAIr)$ Edinburgh, "Soviet CombatHelicopter Operations," international Defense Review, 8/1979, p. 1242.
3. jkiA., p. 1243.
4.* Department of the Navy, ISCsol UotI io~eTactical _inul, NWP 55-9-ASH Volume I (NAV AIR ol-1ASH-IT),Wa.hingtont D.C., Juno 1.978, p. 12-6.
;: • ~6. I:.bid., p. 4-5. ,•
7. MAJ Ryan (IISMC), Yuma, Arizona, "Some Thoughtm on KilltngHoliecoptors," p, 9.
so
B IBLIOGRAPHY
"ABC--A Breakthrough in VTOL Technology," §.gcial S-umm - SikorskyAircraft, Stratford, Conn,
Browne, BG Edward M. (USA), "On the Attack Helicopter," U.S. ArmyAviation Digjet, January 1979, pp. 2-7.
Hasring, George. "Analogies and Implications from Fixed Wing ACM,"U Ao-my_ Aviattipl Digest, April 1978, pp. 7-11.,
Hanson, Lynn H,, Lt Col (USAF), Edinburgh. "Soviet Combat ileli.copterOperations," International-,e9eRevijw, 8/1979, pp. 1242-1274.
Kennedy, Dr. Robert. "Precision ATGM's and NATO Defense," MilitaryZusues Research Maerordum, Strategic Studios Institute, Carlsle,farrackii, PA.
"MIL HIND D," Air lnterngational, February 1979, p. 70-72.
Miller, Retase H,, Lt Col (USA). Air Superiority at The Treetops,"1
Military Review, March 1979, pp. 2-9.
Morrison, Philip and Paul F, Walker. "A New Strategy for MilitarySpending," Scenttific rig•. lai,, Volume 239, October 1978, pp. 48-6L.
Ryan, MAJ (USMC), Yuma, Arix. "Some Thoughts on Killing Ullicoptera."
"Sikorsky Type a V/STL Weapon System," RxecutivoS•wmurir•, Vol , 1.Sikorsky Aircraft, Stratford, Cotin., 31 May 1977.
US Army. Field Manual No. 17-50: Attack liellcopter OperntionN.Waohingtont 1 July 1977.
US Army. Field Manual No. 90-It Employmeott of Army Aviation Units! in a High Threat Environment, Wnshingtoti,
US D)epartment of the Navy. USNC Asoault Su-p-port Helicopter TacticalManual, NWP 55-9-ASH Volume " NAVAIR o -1ASHl.-IT). WnsihingtontJuno 1978,
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51