Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 16-1 Filed 09/30/13 Page 1 of 32
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JAMES B. GILPIN, Bar No. 151466 [email protected] MATTHEW L. GREEN, Bar No. 227904 Matthew .Green@bbkla w .com BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 655 W. Broadway, 15th Floor San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 525-1300 Facsimile: (619) 233-6118
Attorneys for Defendants SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (erroneously sued as SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY); HON. ROBERT J. TRENT A COST A, Presiding Judge of the Superior Court (erroneously sued as Robert J. Trentacosta); MICHAEL M. RODDY, Executive Officer of the Superior Court; HON. LISA SCHALL, Jud&e of the Superior Court; HON. LORNA A. ALKSNE, Juoge of the Superior Court; HON. CHRISTINE K. GOLDSMITH, Judge of the Superior Court; HON. JEANNIE LOWE, Commissioner of the Superior Court (Ret.); HON. WILLIAM H. McADAM, JR., Judge of the Superior Court; HON. EDLENE C. McKENZIE, Commissioner of the Superior Court; and HON. JOEL R. WOHLFEIL, Judge of the Superior Court
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR Case No. l 3-cv-1944-CAB (BLM) 20 FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, et al., Judge: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
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Plaintiffs,
V.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.
25508.00086\8281324.2
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
Date: Time: Courtroom:
November 22, 2013 3:30 p.m. 4C
[NO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS REQUESTED BY COURT]
Complaint Filed: August 20, 2013
MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 16-1 Filed 09/30/13 Page 2 of 32
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
II. BACKGROUND FACTS ................................................................................................... 3
A. THE APRIL 15, 2010 INCIDENT ......................................................................... 3
B. STUART'S GRIEVANCES WITH THE "FAMILY LAW SYSTEM" ................ 4
III. LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 5
A. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM RULE 12(b)(6) ··················································································································· 5
B. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION - RULE 12(B)(l) ........................................................................ 6
IV. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 7
A. CCFC AND LEXEVIA LACK CAPACITY AND ARE OTHERWISE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION ........................................................... 7
1. CCFC Cannot Proceed In This Action Without Counsel ........................... 7
2. Lexevia Lacks Capacity To Bring This Action Because It Is A Suspended Corporation ............................................................................... 8
B. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO SATISFY RULE 8 .............................................. 9
C. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY BARS STUART'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE SUPERIOR COURT AND ITS JUDGES AND EMPLOYEES IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES .......................................... 10
D. THE JUDICIAL OFFICERS NAMED IN THE COMPLAINT ALSO ENJOY ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM STUART'S CLAIMS ...................... 11
E. THE CLAIMS AGAINST RODDY ARE BARRED BY QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY ....................................................................................... 12
F. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS RELATING TO THE SO-CALLED "STUART ASSAULT" DO NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE SUPERIOR COURT DEFENDANTS .................................................................................................... 12
l. The Complaint Fails To Allege A Cognizable Claim Against The Superior Court Defendants Under Section 1983 ...................................... 13
2. The Complaint Does Not State A Cognizable Claim Under Sections 1985 and 1986 ........................................................................................... 15
G. ALL CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS RELATING TO THE SO-CALLED ''STUART ASSAULT" ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ..................................................................................................... 16
H. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS RELATING TO STUART'S DISSOLUTION PROCEEDING ARE ALSO UNTIMELY AND OTHERWISE BARRED UNDER THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE .......................................................................................................... 17
l. Stuart's Claims Against the Superior Court Defendants Relating To Dr. Doyne And Their Alleged Oversight Over Dr. Doyne Are Time-Barred .............................................................................................. 18
- l -\1EM. OF P. & A IN SliPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS
I 3-cv-1944-CAB (BL\1)
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v.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
2. Stuart's Claims Challenging Court Decisions Relating To Dr.
Page
Doyne Are Also Barred By The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine .................... 18
I. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT AND CANNOT ST ATE A CLAIM FOR FALSE ADVERTISING AGAINST THE SUPERIOR COURT DEFENDANTS UNDER THE LANHAM ACT ................................................. 19
J. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO ALLEGE ANY RICO VIOLATIONS BY THE SUPERIOR COURT DEFENDANTS ......................................................... 20
K. STUART LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT ANY CLAIMS FOR PROSPECTIVE RELIEF ...................................................................................... 21
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 23
- 11 -MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS
13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Ashcr(dt v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................. 6
Ashe/man v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) ............................................................................................... 11
Astoria Fed. Sav. & LoanAss'n v. Solimino, 501U.S.104 (1991)
B. C. v. Plumas Un{fled Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................ 22
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901F.2d696 (9th Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................... 5
Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................... 19
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 6
Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................. 18
Blake v. Dierdoif/: 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988) ................................................................................................ 20
Estate (f Brooks v. U.S., 197 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................ 13
Caf"asso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................... 1, 2, 9, 10
Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriffs Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 198 l) .................................................................................................. 15
In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................. 12
Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1994) .................................................................................................... 15
Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 28 598 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 6
25508.00086\8281324.2 -lll-MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS
13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
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City <~/'Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) .................................................................................................................. 21
Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (Ct. App. 1996) ........................................................................................ 8
Dist. <~f Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460U.S.462(1983) ................................................................................................................ 18
Duerst v. State «f Cal., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24827 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013) ................................................. 10, 11
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) ................................................................................................................ 18
Fann Credit Servs. v. Am. State Bank, 339 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................... 6
Forrett v. Richardson, 112 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................................................................................ 14, 19
Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................... 10
Garcia v. Strayhord, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135998 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2013) (Benitez,].) ................................. 14
Gjurovich v. State «f Cal., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118797 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2010) ..................................................... 11
Greater Los Angeles Council <~f Deqfness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................................ 10
Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................. 16
Harris v. RHH P'rs, LP, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2009) .................................................................... 7
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................................. 15
Kruse v. Hawaii, 68 F.3d 331 (9th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................... 22
Long v. County <d'Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................ 13
Los Angeles County Ass 'n of Envtl. Health Specialists v. Lewin, 28 215 F.Supp.2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002) .................................................................................... lO
25508.00086\8281324.2 -IV-MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS
I 3-cv-1944-C AB (BLM)
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Li~jan v. Defenders r<l Wildl~fe, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................................................................................ 21
Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by ............................................... 5
Mahaley v. Mapes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65897 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) ...................................................... 10
Merco Constr. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Mun. Ct., 147 Cal. Rptr. 631(Cal.1978) .................................................................................................. 9
MGIC lndem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1986) .................................................................................................... 5
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) ................................................................................................................... 11
Monell v. New York City Dep 't r<l Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ................................................................................................................ 15
Moore v. Brewster. 96 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................. 11
Morales v. Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................ 16
Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979) ................................................................................................ 12
Mullis v. United States Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................................ 11
Occupational-Urgent Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutro & Co., 711 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Cal. 1989) ........................................................................................ 20
Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. 20
Oliver v. Placer Superior Court, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82627 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 10, 2013) ................................................. 10, 12
Paradise Creations, Inc. v. UV Sales, Inc., 315 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003 ) ............................................................................................. 7, 8
Portman v. County r~{Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................. 15
RK Ventures, Inc. v. City q{Seattle, 28 307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................ 15
25508.00086\8281324.2 -v- MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS I 3-cv-1944-CAB ( BLM)
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Robbins v. P'shipfor Bank Capital, L.P., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167 (Del. Ch. Jul. 23, 2010) .................................................................. 7
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) ................................................................................................................ 18
Samuel v. Michaud, 5 980F. Supp. 1381 (D. Idaho 1996 .......................................................................................... 18
6 Sekerke v. Kemp,
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2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041 ................................................................................................ 16
Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................ 10
Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................ 19
Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................. 19
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) .................................................................................................................. 22
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 ( 1978) ................................................................................................................ 11
Sun Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Dierdorjf, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987) .................................................................................................. 20
Taylor v. Regents (if Univ. rif Cal., 993 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................. 16
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm 'n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en bane) ................................................................................ 21
U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................................. 9, 10
Usher v. City qf Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987) .................................................................................................. 16
Weisbuch v. County (~f Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................... 5
Statutes
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) ...................................................................................................................... 19
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(B) ............................................................................................................ 19
25508.00086\8281324.2 -Vl-MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS
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15 U.S.C. § 1125 .................................................................................................................... 11, 19
42 U.S.C. § 1983 .................................................................................................................... passifn
42 U.S.C. § 1985 ............................................................................................................... 13, 15, 16
42 U.S.C. § 1986 ............................................................................................................... 13, 15, 16
24827, at *5-6. An act. .................................................................................................................. 11
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 6126(b) ................................................................................................... 8
Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§ 335.1 ........................................................................................................ 16
Cal. Gov. Code§ 820 .................................................................................................................... 13
Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code§ 19719 ...................................................................................................... 8
Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code§ 23301 ...................................................................................................... 8
Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code§ 23301a .................................................................................................... 8
25508.00086\8281324.2 -Vll-MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS
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Defendants ( l) Superior Court of California, County of San Diego,
erroneously sued as Superior Court of San Diego County ("Superior Court"), (2)
the Honorable Robert J. Trentacosta, Presiding Judge of the Superior Court,
erroneously sued as Robert J. Trentacosta, (3) Michael M. Roddy, Executive
Officer of the Superior Court, (4) the Honorable Lisa Schall, Judge of the Superior
Court, (5) the Honorable Loma A. Alksne, Judge of the Superior Court, (6) the
Honorable Christine K. Goldsmith, Judge of the Superior Court, (7) the Honorable
Jeannie Lowe, Commissioner of the Superior Court (Ret.), (8) the Honorable
William H. McAdam, Jr., Judge of the Superior Court, (9) the Honorable Edlene C.
McKenzie, Commissioner of the Superior Court, and (10) the Honorable Joel R.
Wohlfeil, Judge of the Superior Court (collectively, "Superior Court Defendants")
respectfully submit the following memorandum of points and authorities in support
of their motion to dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs California Coalition for
Families and Children ("CCFC"), Lexevia, PC ("Lexevia"), and Colbem C. Stuart
("Stuart") (collectively, "Plaintiffs").
I.
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss a complaint totaling approximately
1,300 pages in length and purporting to assert 35 claims against 49 defendants that
Plaintiffs describe as being a part of the "family law community." (Compl. <JI 60.)
Although the Complaint primarily consists of "incomprehensible rambling," see
Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011), the
"central subject" of this action relates to a family law seminar hosted by the San
Diego County Bar Association in April 2010, at which Stuart was arrested pursuant
to an outstanding bench warrant. (See Compl. <J[<J[ 114, 135; see also Request for
Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Ex. B.) The Complaint also purports to challenge the
overall "family law system" based on Stuart's dealings therewith in his own
dissolution proceeding in 2008 and 2009. (See Compl. <J[<J[ 77, 78.8, 237-245.)
25508.00086\828132.+.2 1- MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS
I 3-cv-1944-CAB ( BLM)
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Plaintiffs have named various Superior Court Defendants in 32 of the 35
claims in the Complaint, which consist of claims for alleged federal civil rights
violations, false advertising under the Lanham Act, violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), and equitable relief. (Compl.
<JI<JI 142-176, 180-257, 260-267, 345-374, 392-396.) As an initial matter, however,
both CCFC and Lexevia lack capacity or are otherwise unable to maintain any
claims in this action. Both corporations are attempting to proceed in propria
persona in violation of the laws in the states they were organized. Lexevia also
lacks capacity to bring this action because it is a suspended corporation.
While Stuai1 has the capacity to proceed pro se, his claims against the
Superior Com1 Defendants are subject to dismissal on numerous grounds. The
1,300-page Complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8, as it is confusing and conclusory and
requires the defendants and the Court "to penetrate a tome approaching the
magnitude of War and Peace to discern [the] plaintiff's claims and allegations."
Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058. Eleventh Amendment immunity also bars Stuart's
claims against the Superior Court and its judges and employees in their official
capacities. In addition, all of the judges named in the Complaint enjoy absolute
judicial immunity, while Mr. Roddy, the Superior Court's Executive Officer, is
protected by quasi-judicial immunity.
Moreover, with regard to those counts relating to the so-called "Stuart
Assault" at the family law seminar, such claims do not state facts sufficient to state
a cause of action against the Superior Court Defendants and are otherwise barred by
the statute of limitations. As to those counts concerning Stuart's dissolution
proceeding, these claims are also untimely and barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Stuart's false advertising claim against the Superior Court Defendants is
nonsensical, as the Superior Court Defendants do not advertise or sell services and
are not commercial competitors of anyone. The Complaint also does not and
cannot satisfy the elements needed to assert a viable RICO claim. Finally, Stuart
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lacks standing to obtain prospective relief because there are no allegations that he is
likely to be harmed in the future by any Superior Court Defendants. Accordingly,
the Court should grant the Superior Court Defendants' motion to dismiss without
leave to amend.
II.
BACKGROUND FACTS
A. THE APRIL 15, 2010 INCIDENT
The "central subject of this litigation" relates to a family law seminar hosted
by the San Diego County Bar Association ("Bar Association") on April 15, 2010.
(Compl. 11 114-115.) Attendees at the seminar included family court judges,
atton1eys, and other forensic professionals. (Compl. 11 115, 125.) The Complaint
alleges that Judges Goldsmith, McAdam, McKenzie, and Wohlfeil and
Commissioner Lowe were "organizers and panel members" in connection with the
seminar. (Compl.1125-29.) The Complaint also alleges Judge Alksne, the former
Family Law Supervising Judge, attended the seminar and made some openmg
remarks. (Compl.11115, 130.)
According to the Complaint, Stuart attended the semmar to obtain
information to help advance his goal of improving perceived deficiencies in the
"family law system." (Compl. 1 127; see also Compl. 11 71 111.) Stuart was a
member of the Bar Association at the time and purportedly was a "regular attendee"
at Bar Association events. (Compl.1127.) Contrary to his allegations, at the time
of the seminar, there was an outstanding warrant for Stuart's arrest in connection
with a criminal action against Stuart alleging stalking and 26 counts of harassment
involving his ex-wife. (Compl.1145; RJN, Exs. A, B.)
The Complaint alleges that Judge Alksne took a break during her remarks to
speak to some Sheriff's deputies, security guards, and other individuals in the back
of the conference room regarding Stuart. (Compl. 11 130-132.) Following this
conference, the Complaint avers that Sheriff's deputies and private security officers
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asked Stuart multiple times to accompany them in leaving the seminar. (Compl. 1
133.) Stuart refused to leave and was ultimately handcuffed and arrested at the
seminar pursuant to the outstanding warrant. (Compl.11133-135; RJN, Ex. B.)
B. STUART'S GRIEVANCES WITH THE "FAMILY LAW SYSTEM"
Aside from the incident at the bar event, the remainder of the Complaint
arises out of Stuart's dissatisfaction with the "family law system." According to the
Complaint, "the present family law system increasingly ignores the supremacy of
the Constitution and the laws of the United States in depriving U.S. Citizens within
California the rights, privileges, and immunities under U.S. law." (Compl. 1 72.)
The Complaint alleges that "it has been Plaintiffs' collective experience within the
state of California [that] [federal family rights] are frequently ignored in the hands
of those exercising jurisdiction over parents and families[.]" (Compl.177.)
Aside from these generic allegations, the Complaint avers that the Superior
Court has "systematically fail[ed] to observe the laws requiring Child Custody
Evaluators to be properly licensed, educated, trained, and overseen by the Superior
Courts[.]" (Compl.178.8.) Although buried in the Complaint, this averment arises
out of Stuart's own dissolution proceeding and events that occurred therein in 2008
and 2009. (Compl.11237-242.)
According to the Complaint, in April 2008, Judge Wohlfeil recommended
that Dr. Stephen M. Doyne mediate custody in Stuart's dissolution proceeding, and
Stuart hired Dr. Doyne as the mediator pursuant to the recommendation of Judge
Wohlfeil and Stuart's counsel at the time. (Compl. 11 237-239.) Citing to Dr.
Doyne's alleged "history of illegal conduct, fraud, and abuse," the Complaint
alleges that Judge Wohlfeil, and later Judge Schall, "culpably and unreasonably
permitted Doyne to commit [] fraud, abuse of process, extortion, and terror against
Stuart." (Compl.11243-245.)
Ill
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Through vanous activities, including the commencement of this lawsuit,
Stuart seeks to end these purported "trespasses and redress the grievances of those
offended." (Compl. 11 77-78.) The Complaint alleges that the defendants "have
acted aggressively and illegally against Plaintiffs to commit criminal and civil
violations of Plaintiffs' state and [federal] civil rights, obstruct justice, abuse
process, interfere with existing and prospective business relations, and commit civil
and criminal violations [otl federal law prohibiting Racketeering Activity .... "
(Compl.1112.) As set forth below, Plaintiffs do not and cannot state a cognizable
action against the Superior Court Defendants.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM -RULE 12(B)(6)
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the
complaint. A dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) where there is either a "lack
of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a
cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699
(9th Cir. 1990). A Rule 12(b )(6) motion for failure to state a claim may also
challenge defenses disclosed on the face of the complaint or which are apparent
from matters subject to judicial notice. Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles, 119
F.3d 778, 783 n. l (9th Cir. 1997); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500,
504 (9th Cir. 1986); Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279,
1282 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Solimino, 501U.S.104 (1991).
Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint
must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." While detailed factual allegations are not required, Rule 8
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"demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A pleading that offers
'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)). The allegations in a complaint "must be sufficient to raise a right of
relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). "While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations." Id. at 679. A court is "free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported
conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the
form of factual allegations." Farm Credit Servs. v. Am. State Bank, 339 F.3d 764,
767 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
B. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION - RULE 12(b)(l)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) allows a defendant to move to
dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Federal courts
may adjudicate only actual cases or controversies. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. "The
Article III case or controversy requirement limits federal courts' subject matter
jurisdiction by requiring, inter alia, that plaintiffs have standing and that claims be
'ripe' for adjudication." Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d
1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010). "Because standing and ripeness pertain to federal
courts' subject matter jurisdiction, they are properly raised in a Rule l 2(b )(1)
motion to dismiss." Id.
Ill
Ill
Ill
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IV.
ARGUMENT
A. CCFC AND LEXEVIA LACK CAPACITY AND ARE OTHERWISE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION
1. CCFC Cannot Proceed In This Action Without Counsel.
A corporation's capacity to sue is determined by the law in which it was
organized. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(2); Paradise Creations, Inc. v. UV Sales, Inc., 315
F.3d 1304, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2003). As a Delaware corporation, which was only
incorporated the day before filing this action, CCFC' s capacity to sue is governed
by Delaware law. (Compl. at l; RJN, Ex. C.) Under Delaware law, CCFC must
appear in this action through counsel and cannot proceed in propria persona.
Robbins v. P'ship for Bank Capital, L.P., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Jul. 23, 2010); Harris v. RHH P'rs, LP, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *6 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 3, 2009); see also CivLR 83.3(k)(requiring corporations to appear in court
"only through an attorney permitted to practice pursuant to Civil Local Rule 83.3).
The Local Civil Rules of Practice for this Court require that the title page of
every pleading include the address and telephone number of the attorney appearing
for a party or of an individual appearing prose. CivLR 5.l(j)(l). The title page of
the Complaint in this action identifies Stuart and Dean Browning Webb, a
Washington attorney. (Compl. at 1.) Neither Stuart nor Mr. Webb, however, are
counsel for CCFC.
With regard to Stuart, the Complaint alleges he is an att01ney licensed and
admitted to practice in California, Arizona, and Nevada "at all relevant times," has
been admitted to practice law in multiple federal districts, assisted with preparing a
petition for certiorari in a separate action in June 2013, and is "an officer of the
courts." (Compl. <j{<j{ 3, 102, 103, Ex. 2.) Stuart, however, was disbarred in
25508.00086\8281324.2 - 7 - MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
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California effective December 2012, for committing a crime of moral turpitude, 1
and his licenses in Arizona and Nevada are both suspended. (RJN, Exs. D-H.)
Stuart therefore cannot serve as counsel for any party in this case.2
As to Mr. Webb, although the title page to the Complaint indicates a pro hac
vice application is pending, no such application is reflected on the Court's docket.
Mr. Webb also did not sign the Complaint. (See Compl. at 171.) Indeed, Mr.
Webb informed the Superior Court's counsel on August 26, 2013, that Stuart used
his name on the Complaint without permission. (Nesthus Deel. <J[ 4.) Because
CCFC is attempting to proceed without counsel in violation of Delaware law, the
Court should dismiss all of CCFC's claims in this action.
2. Lexevia Lacks Capacity To Bring This Action Because It Is A Suspended Corporation.
With regard to Lexevia, its capacity to sue is determined by California law.
(Compl. at 1.) According to the California Secretary of State, it is a suspended
professional corporation. (RJN, Ex. I.) Under California law, a suspended
corporation lacks capacity to sue.3 Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443,
446 (Ct. App. 1996); see also Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code§ 23301; Cal. Corps. Code§
2205. While a California corporation may revive its power to sue, Cal. Rev. & Tax.
Code § 23301 a, a corporation that files suit in federal court must also have standing
to sue in federal court under Article III of the Constitution. Paradise Creations,
315 F.3d at 1308. Because Article III standing is determined at the inception of the
suit, a corporation that revives its capacity to sue after commencement of a lawsuit
lacks Article III standing. Id. at 1309-10. As a suspended corporation, Lexevia
As noted in the California Bar Journal Discipline Summary, "Stuart was convicted criminally of creating and sending approximately 21 emails and/or telephone calls to his former wife that were threatening, obscene and calculated to harass." (RJN, Ex. 0.) 1 The practice of law by a disbarred attorney constitutes a crime punishable by imprisonment for up to six months. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 6126(b). 3 Anyone who purports to exercise the rights and powers of a suspended corporation is also guilty of a misdemeanor. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code§ 19719.
25508.00086\828 l 32-L2 - 8 - MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
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therefore lacks capacity to maintain this action.
Lexevia has also appeared in this action without counsel. Similar to
Delaware law, a California corporation may only appear in an action through
counsel. Merco Constr. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Mun. Ct., 147 Cal. Rptr. 631, 635 (Cal.
1978); see also CivLR 83.3(k). The lack of counsel for Lexevia also supports the
dismissal of all of Lexevia' s claims in this action.
B. THE C01\i1PLAINT FAILS TO SATISFY RULE 8
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 "requires parties to make their pleadings
straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need not try to fish a gold coin
from a bucket of mud." U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th
Cir. 2003) (dismissing 155-page complaint with prejudice that was so "sprawling"
as to be "incomprehensible"). The Ninth Circuit has opined:
... [W]e have never held - and we know of no authority suppo~ing the r.roposition - _that a 12leading may be of un11m1ted length and opacity. Our cases mstn1ct otherwise. See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (urholding a Rule 8(a) dismissal of a complaint that was ' argumentative, ~rolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant'); Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2Cl 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholdin$ a Rule 8(a) dismissal of a complaint that "exceedea 70 pages in length, [and was] contusing and conclusory"); Nevrjel v. North Coast Lij_e Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that Rule 8(a) is violated when a complaint is excessively "verbose, confusing and almost entirely conclusory"); Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding a Rule 8(a) dismissal of "confusing, distracting, ambiguous, and unintelligible pleadings") .... Rule 8(a) has "been held to be violated by a pleading that was needlessly long, or a complaint that was foghly repetitious, or confused, or consisted of incomprehensible rambling." [Citation.] Our district courts are busy enough without having to penetrate a tome approaching the magnitude of War and Peace to discern a plaintiff's claims and allegations."
Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (denial of
request to file 773-page proposed amended complaint).
The Complaint in this action totals approximately 1,300 pages with all of its
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voluminous exhibits. Similar to the authorities referenced above, the Complaint
consists of "incomprehensible rambling" and requires the defendants and the Court
"to penetrate a tome approaching the magnitude of War and Peace to discern [the]
plaintiff's claims and allegations." Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058. Additionally, the 32
claims asserted against the various Superior Court Defendants are "confusing and
conclusory." Id.; (Compl. <JI'Il 141-257, 260-267, 345-396). Because the Complaint
exemplifies a pleading that requires a court and the adverse parties to "try to fish a
gold coin from a bucket of mud[,]" Lockheed-Martin, 328 F.3d at 378, the Court
should dismiss the Complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8.
C. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY BARS STUART'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE SUPERIOR COURT AND ITS JUDGES AND EMPLOYEES IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES
The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against a state or an arm of the
state under principles of sovereign immunity. Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828,
831 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit has consistently held California superior
courts are considered arms of the state and therefore enjoy Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161
(9th Cir. 2003 ); Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d
1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987); Los Angeles County Ass 'n of Envtl. Health Specialists
v. Lewin, 215 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Duerst v. State of Cal., 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24827, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013). The Ninth Circuit has
also recognized that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars claims against judges and
court employees in their official capacities, as they are considered arms of the state.
Simmons, 318 F.3d at 1161; Oliver v. Placer Superior Court, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82627, at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 10, 2013); Mahaley v. Mapes, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 65897, at* 19 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013). Such immunity applies to
suits for damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. Zolin, 812 F.2d at 1110
n.10.
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Here, the Complaint purports to assert the following 32 claims against
various Superior Court Defendants: 17 civil rights counts, (Compl. <J[<J[ 142-175,
180-257), one count for "respondeat superior liability," (Compl. <J[ 176), one count
for false advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 of the Lanham Act, (Compl. <J[<J[ 260-
267), 12 claims under RICO, (Compl. <J[<J[ 345-374), and one count for prospective
relief, (Compl. <J[<J[ 375-396). Because the Superior Court, and its judges and
employees in their official capacities, are immune from such claims under the
Eleventh Amendment, the Court should dismiss these claims with prejudice.
D. THE JUDICIAL OFFICERS NAMED IN THE COMPLAINT ALSO ENJOY ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM STUART'S CLAIMS
Judges are generally immune from civil liability for damages for acts
performed in their judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per
curiam); Mullis v. United States Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987);
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en bane); see also Duerst,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24827, at * 5-6. An act is "judicial" for purposes of judicial
immunity where it is a function normally performed by a judge and the plaintiff
dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 362 (1978).
Judicial immunity applies even where a judge is accused of acting in bad
faith, maliciously, com1ptly, erroneously, or in excess of jurisdiction. Mireles, 502
U.S. at 11-13; Stump,435 U.S. at 356; Gjurovich v. State of Cal., 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 118797, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2010). Judicial immunity is not limited to
suits for damages, "but extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive and other
equitable relief." Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996).
Here, the 32 claims asserted against the various Superior Comi Defendants in
this action arise out of either the April 2010 bar event incident or Stuart's
conclusory allegation that family court judges fail to follow the law, particularly in
connection with the Child Custody Evaluators and Stuart's own dissolution
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proceeding. As to the latter, it is clear that any claims challenging allegedly
unlawful rulings and decisions are barred by judicial immunity. Oliver, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82627, at *9-10 (dismissal of claims alleging Superior Court judges
issued "illegal orders," "ignored the facts and laws," and conspired with other
individuals to violate the law).
E. THE CLAIMS AGAINST RODDY ARE BARRED BY QUASIJUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Similar to judges, non-judicial officers enjoy absolute quasi-judicial
immunity when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.
In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d
1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). Quasi-judicial immunity applies to "court clerks and
other nonjudicial officers for purely administrative acts - acts which taken out of
context would appear ministerial, but when viewed in context are actually a part of
the judicial function." Id. at 952.
In addition to the individual judges named in the action, the Complaint
purp011s to assert claims against Mr. Roddy, the Executive Officer of the Superior
Court. According to the Complaint, Mr. Roddy "administers and manages 'day-to
day' operation of the [Superior Court], including its family law division, [San
Diego County Sheriff's Department] security, the family law facilitators offices,
operations, services, personnel, and paperwork therein." (Compl. 1 8.) Because
such tasks are an essential part of the operation of the courts and the judicial
process, the claims against Mr. Roddy are barred by quasi-judicial immunity.
F. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS RELATING TO THE SOCALLED "STUART ASSAULT" DO NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE SUPERIOR COURT DEFENDANTS
As stated in the Complaint, the "central subject" in this matter is the April 15,
2010 family law seminar where Stuart was arrested pursuant to an outstanding
bench warrant. (Compl. 1114; see also RJN, Ex. B.) The Complaint purports to
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assert a total of 13 civil rights claims relating to the so-called "Stuart Assault" -
eight claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and one
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (Compl. <JI<JI 142-150, 158-176, 180-215.)
Notwithstanding the Superior Court Defendants' immunity from this suit, absent
from the Complaint are sufficient facts to support a cognizable civil rights action
against the Superior Court Defendants.4
1. The ComQlaint Fails To Allege A Cognizable Claim Against The Supenor Court Defendants Under Section 1983.
To succeed on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show "that a right
secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States was violated[.]" Long
v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). "Causation is, of
course, a required element of a § 1983 claim." Estate of Brooks v. U.S., 197 F.3d
1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). While none of Stuart's Section 1983 claims identify
the federal Constitutional right allegedly violated with anything more than a
reference to various Constitutional amendments in each claim's caption, (Compl. at
69, 71, 77, 78, 81, 83, 84 ), the Complaint also does not assert facts establishing that
any conduct by the Superior Court Defendants caused the purported Constitutional
violations.
According to the Complaint, Stuart was detained by Sheriff's deputies
following a conversation between unidentified Sheriff's deputies and Judge Alksne.
(Compl. <JI<JI 130-133.) The Complaint further alleges Judges Goldsmith, McAdam,
McKenzie, and Wohlfeil and Commissioner Lowe were "organizers and panel
members" at the seminar. (Compl. <JI<JI 25-29.) The Complaint also summarily avers
that all defendants conspired to support the so-called "Stuart Assault." (Compl. <JI<JI
137-140.) Moreover, the Complaint purports to impose supervisory liability and
Although Count 3 of the Complaint does not expressly reference the so-called "Stuart Assault," it likewise fails to state a valid claim. (See Compl. <J[<J[ 151-157 .) Count 3 asserts nothing more than legal conclusions and purports to identify a legal basis for liability under California Government Code section 820.
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principles of respondeat superior against Judges Alksne and Trentacosta and Mr.
Roddy. (Compl. <J[<J[ 166, 176.)
None of the foregoing allegations meet the causation requirement for Section
1983 liability. That Judge Alksne took a break during her remarks and spoke to
Sheriff's deputies prior to Stuart's arrest is insufficient to have caused any of
Stuart's alleged injuries. That Judges Goldsmith, McAdam, McKenzie, and
Wohlfeil and Commissioner Lowe organized the Bar Association event and sat on a
panel at the seminar also lacks any nexus to any injury purportedly sustained by
Stuart.
As to the conspiracy allegations, the Complaint avers that "Defendants and
each of them affiliated, came to a meeting of the minds, and agreed to support the
Stuart Assault in retaliation, abuse of process, and obstruction of justice as
described herein." (Compl. <J[ 138.) "To allege a claim of conspiracy under§ 1983,
Plaintiff must allege facts with sufficient particularity to show an agreement or a
meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights." Garcia v. Strayhord,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135998, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2013) (Benitez, J.) (citing
Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998); Woodrum v. Woodward
County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). Given the Complaint does not and
cannot allege any details regarding a purported agreement to support the so-called
"Stuart Assault," none of the Superior Court Defendants are proper defendants in
any conspiracy claim.
The Complaint's supervisory liability and respondeat superior allegations are
also without merit. Because there are no facts establishing that any judges in
attendance at the seminar violated Stuart's constitutional rights, none of the judges'
purported supervisors can be liable under Section 1983. Forrett v. Richardson, 112
F.3d 416, 421 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, it is well-settled there is no Section 1983
liability for alleged constitutional violations under the theory of respondeat
superior. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 691
25508.()0086\8281324.2 - 14 - MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
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(1978).
2. The Com~laint Does Not State A Cognizable Claim Under Sections I 85 and 1986.
The Complaint next purports to assert four counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1985
and one count under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (Compl.11191-215.) Count 11 of the
Complaint attempts to allege a claim under Section 1985( 1) for preventing an
officer from performing his duties. (Compl.11 191-192.) Section 1985(l)'s
protections, however, only apply to federal officers, which Stuart is not. Can/is v.
San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1981).
Sections 1985(2) and (3), upon which Counts 12 through 15 are based,
prohibit conspiracies to interfere with the civil rights of others. Karim-Panahi v.
Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). An allegation of
racial or class-based discrimination is required to state a claim for relief under
either subsection. See RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1056
(9th Cir. 2002); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir.
1993 ). A § 1985 claim "must allege facts to support the allegation that defendants
conspired together. A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is
insufficient." Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626. Given the Complaint alleges
nothing more than the defendants "conspired" together in committing the so-called
"Stuart Assault," (Comp I. 11 203, 205, 207, 209), and fails to set forth any facts
establishing racial or class-based discrimination, there is no cognizable claim
against the Superior Court Defendants under Sections 1985(2) and (3).
Count 16 of the Complaint alleges a violation of Section 1986, which
"authorizes a remedy against state actors who have negligently failed to prevent a
conspiracy that would be actionable under § 1985." Cerrato v. San Francisco
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 971 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994). A conspiracy under§ 1985
is therefore a prerequisite to a valid claim under § 1986. Sekerke v. Kemp, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041, at (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) (Moskowitz, J.) (citing
25508.00086\8281324.2 - 15 - MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS l3-cv-l944-CAB (BLMJ
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Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626). Given the Complaint does not state a cognizable
action under Section 1985, Stuart's claims under Section 1986 also fail.
G. ALL CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS RELATING TO THE SOCALLED "STUART ASSAULT" ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Claims brought under Sections 1983 and 1985 must be filed within the time
specified by the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts. Usher
v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1987); Taylor v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that same limitations
period applies to both § 1983 and § 1985 claims). California law sets a two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1;
Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2003). "Although state law determines the length of the limitations period,
federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues." Morales v. Los Angeles,
214 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000). Under federal law, a cause of action
accrues when the "plaintiff knows or had reason to know" of the injury which is the
basis of the action. Id.
Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the Complaint purport
to assert civil rights claims against the Superior Court Defendants relating to the
"Stuart Assault." (Compl. <JI<JI 142-150, 158-176, 180-215.) Given this incident
occurred on April 15, 2010, (Compl. <JI 114), Stuart had two years thereafter to file a
civil rights action relating thereto. Because Stuart did not file this action until
August 20, 2013, Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 9 through 16 of the Complaint are
untimely.
H. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS RELATING TO STUART'S DISSOLUTION PROCEEDING ARE ALSO UNTIMELY AND OTHERWISE BARRED UNDER THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
Counts 17 through 19 of the Complaint attempt to allege Section 1983 claims
against certain Superior Court Defendants arising out of Stuart's dissolution
25508.00086\8281324.2 - 16 - MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT TO DISMISS I 3-cv-1944-CAB ( BLM)
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proceeding. (Compl. <]{1 216-257.) While Count 17 names Judges Wohlfeil and
Schall as defendants, this claim makes no allegations concerning either judge and
clearly fails to state a cognizable count against these judges. (See Compl. <]{<]{ 216-
235.)
The allegations concerning Judges Wohlfeil and Schall are instead set forth
in Counts 18 and 19. According to the Complaint, Judge Wohlfeil, who presided
over Stuart's dissolution proceeding at one time, recommended that Dr. Doyne
mediate custody concerning Stuart's son on April 10, 2008, and assured Stuart that
Dr. Doyne was a "trustworthy[,] competent mediator." (Compl.11237. 239.) The
Complaint alleges Stuart followed Judge Wohlfeil's recommendation to use Dr.
Doyne, and that Judge Wohlfeil "retained administrative supervisory authority,
oversight, and ability to prevent or aid in preventing the breaches of duty, fraud,
extortion, and abuse of [Dr. Doyne] .... " (Compl.1239.) Judge Schall is alleged
to have taken over Judge Wohlfeil's courtroom in December 2008, and to have
continued with the same purported oversight responsibilities until November 2009.
(Compl. <]{1240-41.)
The Complaint avers that Judges Wohlfeil and Schall permitted Dr. Doyne
"to commit the fraud, abuse of process, extortion, and terror against Stuart."
(Compl. 1 243.) The Complaint also attempts to impose liability against Judges
Alksne and Trentacosta and the Superior Court based on these allegations.
Notwithstanding the Superior Court Defendants' immunity from these claims, such
claims are barred by the statute of limitations and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
1. Stuart's Claims Against the Superior Court Defendants Relating To Dr. Dg;ne And Their Alleged Oversight Over Dr. Doyne Are Time- arred.
As noted above, Stuart had two years to file a Section 1983 action
challenging any of the Superior Court Defendants' orders or decisions concerning
Dr. Doyne in the dissolution proceeding. Given that Counts 17 through 19
challenge conduct that occurred between April 2008 and November 2009, (Compl.
25508.00086\82813242 - 17 - MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 16-1 Filed 09/30/13 Page 26 of 32
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<JI1237, 240-41 ), they are time-barred.
2. Stuart's Claims Challenginf Court Decisions Relating To Dr. Doyne Are Also Barred y he Rooker-Feldman Doctrme.
Insofar as the Complaint challenges decisions rendered by Judges Wohlfeil
and Schall, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state court. Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005); see also
Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
jurisdiction in federal district court if the exact claims raised in a state court case are
raised in the subsequent federal case, or if the constitutional claims presented to the
district court are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's denial of relief.
Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2003).
Rooker-Feldman therefore bars federal adjudication of any suit whether a
plaintiff alleges an injury based on a state court judgment or directly appeals a state
court's decision. Id. at 900 n.4. The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
either to conduct a direct review of a state court judgment or to scrutinize the state
court's application of various rules and procedures pertaining to the state case.
Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F. Supp. 1381, 1411-12 (D. Idaho 1996), ajf'd, 129 F.3d
127 (9th Cir. 1997). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies even where it is alleged
that the state court's action was unconstitutional.
Despite Stuart's exhausting and confusing allegations, the crux of Counts 18
and 19 is that Judges Wohlfeil and Schall erred in the recommendation to use Dr.
Doyne as the mediator in Stuart's dissolution proceeding. Such a challenge is
nothing more than an attack on decisions and the conduct of Judges Wohlfeil and
Schall during the dissolution proceeding. These claims are therefore also subject to
25508.00086\8281324.2 - 18 - ME:VL OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT TO DISMISS I 3-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
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dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.5
I. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT AND CANNOT STATE A CLAIM FOR FALSE ADVERTISING AGAINST THE SUPERIOR COURT DEFENDANTS UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
In Count 21 of the Complaint, Stuart purports to assert a false advertising
claim against all defendants under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125. (Compl. 11
260-267.) According to the Complaint, unspecified "advertisements" and
"promotions" of the Superior Court contain "words, terms, names, symbols, and
devices" that are "false and misleading." (Compl.11260, 261.E, 265.)
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits the use of false designations of
origin and false descriptions or representations in the advertising and sale of goods
and services. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981); 15 U.S.C. §
l 125(a). A false advertising claim requires the plaintiff to "allege commercial
injury based upon a misrepresentation about a product, and also that the injury was
'competitive,' i.e., harmful to the plaintiff's ability to compete with the defendant."6
Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995).
Contrary to Stuart's suggestion, the Superior Court Defendants do not engage
in the advertisement or sale of goods or services and are not involved in interstate
commerce. The Superior Court Defendants also do not compete commercially with
anyone, let alone Stuart. Accordingly, the Complaint does not and cannot allege a
5 Count 18 of the Complaint also attempts to impose supervisory liability against Judges Alksne and Trentacosta and the Superior Court. (Compl. at 101.) Because there are no facts establishing that either Judge Wohlfeil or Judge Schall violated Stuart's constitutional rights, none of these purported supervisor defendants are liable under Section 1983. Forrett, 112 F.3d at 421. 6 A false advertising claim under the Lanham Act has five elements: (1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement about its own or another's product; (2) the statement is actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused the statement to enter interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by lessening of the goodwill associated with its products. Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012); 15 U.S.C. § l 125(a)(l)(B).
25508.00086\8281324.2 - 19 - MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS I 3-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
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cognizable cause of action under the Lanham Act.
J. THE COlVIPLAINT FAILS TO ALLEGE ANY RICO VIOLATIONS BY THE SUPERIOR COURT DEFENDANTS
The Complaint next attempts to assert 12 RICO claims against various
Superior Court Defendants, the majority of which appear to arise out of the so
called "Stuart Assault." (Compl. 11 345-374.) "[T]he following are essential
elements of any civil RICO action: (1) the existence of a RICO 'enterprise'; (2) the
existence of a 'pattern of racketeering activity'; (3) a nexus between the defendant
and either the pattern of racketeering activity or the RICO 'enterprise'; and (4)
resulting injury to plaintiff, in his 'business or property."' Occupational-Urgent
Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutro & Co., 711 F. Supp. 1016, 1021 (E.D. Cal. 1989).
"To establish the existence of ... an enterprise, a plaintiff must provide both
evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and evidence that the
various associates function as a continuing unit." Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486
F.3d 541, 552 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy
RICO's pattern requirement, a plaintiff must allege two or more predicate acts. Sun
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff
must plead such acts with specificity and identify the individual actions of each
defendant sufficient to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. Blake v.
Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988).
As to the enterprise element, the Complaint alleges the existence of three
enterprises purportedly involving Superior Court Defendants. These consist of the
"Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise (DDICE)," the "San Diego Family
Law Community Domestic Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise (SD-DDICE),"
and the "Domestic Dispute Industry Intervention Advocate Criminal Enterprise
(DDC-IACE)." (Compl. 11 273-283.) Not only does the Complaint fail to state
specific facts establishing an ongoing organization involving any Superior Court
Defendants, but the Complaint is devoid of any allegations identifying the
25508.00086\8281324.2 - 20 - MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS I 3-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
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individual actions of any Superior Court Defendants.
With regard to RICO's pattern requirement, the Complaint lists 25 alleged
statutory violations constituting "racketeering activity," which include fraud,
witness tampering, and several crimes relating to slavery. (Compl. <JI 336.) Absent
from the Complaint are any allegations amounting to a pattern. Also missing are
any averments specifying the conduct of any individual Superior Court Defendant.
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the second through thirteenth RICO claims
against the Superior Court Defendants.
K. STUART LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT ANY CLAIMS FOR PROSPECTIVE RELIEF
Finally, the Complaint attempts to assert a claim for prospective relief against
all defendants. (Compl. <JI<JI 392-396.) The Complaint generally asks the Court to
enjoin defendants from further alleged violations of Stuart's rights. (Compl. <JI 396.)
Notwithstanding Stuart's inability to establish past violations by any Superior Court
Defendants, Stuart also lacks standing to pursue prospective relief.
Article III requires that "federal courts take jurisdiction only over 'definite
and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract' cases and controversies." Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en bane)).
In the particular context of injunctive and declaratory relief, a plaintiff must show
that he has suffered or is threatened with a "concrete and particularized" legal harm,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 ( 1992), coupled with "a sufficient
likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way." City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). Indeed, "[t]o obtain injunctive relief, a reasonable
showing of a sufficient likelihood that plaintiff will be injured again is necessary."
Kruse v. Hawaii, 68 F.3d 331, 335 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). An undifferentiated interest shared with the public at large in
the proper application of the Constitution or other laws is not sufficient to show
standing. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998)
25508.00086\82813242 - 21 - MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF Y!OT TO DISMISS I 3-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
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("vindication of the rule of law" insufficient for Article III standing).
Absent from the Complaint are any allegations that Stuart is likely to be
wronged in the future by any of the Superior Court Defendants. Stuart's claim for
prospective relief is simply in response to alleged past wrongs committed by the
Superior Court Defendants. Stuart's mere desire to effectuate what he believes to
be the proper application of the law is insufficient to establish standing. 'To have
standing to seek injunctive relief, [plaintiff] must demonstrate a real or immediate
threat that defendants will again subject him to [the harm complained of]." B.C. v.
Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1999). Because Stuart
does not and cannot make such a showing, the Court should dismiss Stuart's claim
for prospective relief against the Superior Court Defendants.
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
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Ill
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Ill
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25508.00086\8281324.2 - 22 - MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT. TO DISMISS 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
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v. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should grant the Superior Court
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend.
Dated: September 30, 2013
25508.(J0086\828I124.2
BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP
By: /s/ Matthew L. Green
- 23 -
JAMES B. GILPIN MATTHEW L. GREEN Attorneys for Defendants SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (erroneously sued as SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY); HON. ROBERT J. TRENTACOSTA, Presiding Judge of the Superior Court (erroneously sued as Robert J. Trentacosta); MICHAEL M. RODDY, Executive Officer of the Su2erior Court; HON. LISA SCHALL, Judge of the Su2erior Court; HON. LORNA A. AI:KSNE, Jud_g~ of the Su2erior Court; HON. CHRISTINE K. GOLDSMITH, Judge of the Sl1perior Court; HON. JEANNIE LOWE, Commissioner of the Superior Court (Ret.); HON. WILLIAM H. McADAM, JR., Judge of the Su2erior Court; HON. EDLENE C. McKENZIE, Commissioner of the Superior Court; and HON. JOEL R. WOHLFEIL, Judge of the Superior Court
MEM. OF P. & A IN SUPP. OF MOT TO DISMISS 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM)
Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 16-1 Filed 09/30/13 Page 32 of 32
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed
to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this
document via the court's CM-ECF system per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
5(b )(2)(E). Any other counsel of record will be served by facsimile transmission
and/or first class mail this 30th day of September 2013.
25508.00086\8305161. I
/s/ Matthew L. Green
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE l 3CV 1944-CAB (BLM)
