Download - Qualitative evidence of municipal service delivery protests implications for south africa
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This paper is part of the proceedings of the 2nd
Annual
conference on Qualitative Research for Policy
Making, 26 & 27 May 2011, Belfast
Qualitative evidence of municipal service delivery protests:
implications for South Africa
Zacheus Matebesi
Department of Sociology/Centre for Development Support
UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE
P.O. Box 339
Bloemfontein, 9300
SOUTH AFRICA
Tel: +2751 4012590
Fax: +2751 4013518
MAY 2011
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CONTENTS
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………..3
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................3
2. Overview of Local Government in South Africa...............................................................5
3. Demarcation and participation: some conceptual issues....................................................6
3.1 Partocipatory governance...................................................................................................7
3.2 Cross-boundary municipality.............................................................................................7
3.3 Demarcation process..........................................................................................................8
4. Methodology......................................................................................................................8
5. Reasons fo protests..........................................................................................................10
5.1 Structural reasons for the protests....................................................................................10
5.2 Systemic reasons..............................................................................................................11
5.2.1 Poor governance.........................................................................................................11
5.2.2 Individual political struggles......................................................................................12
5.2.3 Complaint management and communication.............................................................13
5.3 Provincial cross-boundary municipal issues - Gauteng case study..................................14
6. Impacts of the protests......................................................................................................17
6.1 Damage to public infrastructure.......................................................................................17
6.2 Economic impact..............................................................................................................17
6.3 Impacts on the education system......................................................................................18
7. Lessons and recommendations.........................................................................................18
REFERENCES.........................................................................................................................19
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Abstract
Social protests in South Africa were to a large degree responsible for making the former
black townships ungovernable. In 2004, a decade since the advent of the new political
dispensation, South Africa witnessed unrest of significant proportions at local government
level. This occurred despite the emphasis on good municipal governance by the national
government. The lack of capacity to deliver on mandates, together with factors such as
individual political struggles, poor communication and ineffective client interface, are key
contributors to the surge in violent protests.
This study was conducted in four cities from three different provinces in South Africa. The
main aim of the study was to identify the reasons for the violent protests and policy
implications. Methodologically, this entailed 100 in-depth interviews with community
leaders, councillors and municipal and provincial government officials. More than 300
community members (both protestors and non-protestors) were interviewed by of focus
groups discussions. This qualitative study is useful to policy makers and planners at all
spheres of government, including security services because it not only identified the reasons
for the protests, but also identified early warning signals and various lessons on how to
prevent or manage these events in future.
1. Introduction
During the apartheid-era in South Africa, social protests against the political system used to
be widespread (Atkinson, 2007). These protests, together with the popular mobilisation for
democracy, were led by the banned African National Congress (ANC) and its ally the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); the South African National Civics
Organisation (SANCO), and the United Democratic Movement (UDF) (Narsiah and Maharaj,
1994).
Despite the transition to a democratic political system 17 years ago, social protests has been
recurrent in South Africa. For those familiar with the popular protests in apartheid “it might
appear as if the rolling mass action of the end-of-apartheid period had simply continued into
the dawn of a democratic government in South Africa (Atkinson, 2007). Data presented in
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Figure 1 below provide some indication of the scale of the protest movement. There has been
no less than 285 service delivery protests between 2004 and October 2010. The years, 2005,
2007, 2009 and 2010 were particularly worrisome for the South African government because
the most number of protests occurred during these times (Municipal IQ, 2009; SABC News
Research, 2011).
10
35
2
3227
83
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0
20
40
60
80
100
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 1: Number of service delivery protests (January 2004
to October 2010)
Source: Municipal IQ, 2009; SABC News Research, 2011.
A myriad of factors triggering some of the protests identified in studies include lack of
capacity to deliver services at local government level, poverty and unemployment, individual
political struggles and the erosion of public confidence in government leadership (Ballard,
Habib & Valodia, 2006; Desai, 2002, Mandlingozi, 2007, Marais et al., 2008). The
multiplicity of factors at the root of the current protests can best be placed into three broad
categories: systemic (such as maladministration, fraud, nepotism and corruption in housing
lists); structural (such as healthcare, unemployment, and land issues); and governance (such
as weak leadership and the erosion of public confidence in leadership)” (Parliament of RSA,
2009).
Participatory governance, as Friedman (2006: 1) rightfully states, ‘has been a canon of
governance thinking in the new democracy [in South Africa], for it has strong roots in the
fight against apartheid’. In fact, a number of commentators (Edigheji 2004; Friedman 2006;
Papadikis 2005; Thompson 2007) also concurred that participatory governance and
accountability arrangements in South Africa are generally regarded as world-class examples
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of good practice. Scholarly contributions have emphasised the importance not only of the
existence of public participation in governance, but also of the extent and meaningfulness of
participation (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) 2007: 6;
Friedman 2006: 3; Marais et al., 2008). Despite such noble sentiments, examples of
genuinely effective participation by all relevant stakeholders are still the exception rather than
the rule (United Nations 2008: 1.2).
Broadly, Butler’s (2008) assessment of the ANC government’s performance since the first
democratic election in 1994 illustrates how the South African government has struggled to
strike a balance between political and economic development. He further that the South
African government’s failure in meeting the basic services needs of the poor, especially in
terms of housing, education, electricity and water, limits attempts at achieving sufficient
economic redress and, thus contributes to the violent social protests one can contend. This
paper first provides an overview of local government in South Africa. This is followed by a
synoptic description of the methodologically followed.
2. Overview of Local Government in South Africa
The Constitution of South Africa (1996) establishes local governemnt as a distinctive sphere
of government, which is interdependent, and inter-realated with national and provincial
spheres of government. Local government is reagrded as the sphere of government ‘closest to
the people.’During the aprtheid years, there were four (4) administrations, 10 Bantustans and
more than 800 racially-segregated local authorities. The National and Provincial Government
came into effect in 1994 after the adoption of the Transitional Constitution of South Africa.
The new Local Government was inaugarated much later on 5 December 2000, with the
almagamation of the 800 racially-segregated municipalities were amalgamated and
reconstituted to 284 (SABC Research News, 2011).
According to the White Paper on Local Government 1998, the core Constitutional ideals and
mandate entrusted to local government (Section 152) are:
• to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;
• to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;
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• to peomote social and economic development;
• to promote a safe and healthy environment; and
• to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the
matters of local government.
The transformation of local government has probably been the largest undertaking within the
entire democratic governance transformation process since 1994. Enormous progress has
been made but much still needs to be achieved before all 283 municipalities are fully
functional, effective, efficient, responsive and sustainable. A number of “stubborn” service
delivery and governance problems have been identified in municipalities over a number of
years and remain consistently at the forefront of government’s developmental challenges.
These priority areas according to COGTA (2009) include:
• Huge service delivery and backlog challenges, e.g. housing, water and
• sanitation;
• Poor communication and accountability relationships with communities;
• Problems with the political administrative interface;
• Corruption and fraud;
• Poor financial management, e.g. negative audit opinions;
• Number of (violent) service delivery protests;
• Weak civil society formations;
• Intra - and inter-political party issues negatively affecting governance and delivery;
and
• Insufficient municipal capacity due to lack of scarce skills.
3. Demarcation and participation: some conceptual issues
This section of the paper clarifies several concepts used in this article. First, the concept of
‘participatory governance’ is defined, followed by a description of the concept of ‘cross-
boundary municipality’. A brief description of the role of the demarcation process is also
provided.
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3.1 Participatory governance
Participatory governance, as employed in this article, is defined as a set of structural and
procedural requirements to realise public participation in the operation of provincial and local
governments. It also refers to a regulatory framework in which the task of running public
affairs is not only entrusted to both government and public administration, but further
involves cooperation between state institutions and civil society groups (Friedman 2006). The
term goes beyond the public management ‘to a more fundamental question of how the
processes of democracy (citizen involvement, decision-making, procedures and
administrative function) can be adapted to help countries resolve the complex public issues
with which they are challenged’ (Lovan, Murray and Schaffer 2004: xv).
Participatory governance is expected to empower people (Osmani 2008: 36), but it is only
through the use of effective tools that it can yield benefits in terms of efficiency, equity and
responsiveness of policies by giving a sense of ownership to the citizens, by allocating
resources according to citizens’ priorities, needs and preferences, and by utilising their skills
and knowledge (Yemek 2007).
3.2 Cross-boundary municipality
Boundaries have very important political, financial and social effects, because they determine
what each municipality is responsible for, and where. The Constitution and the Local
Government Municipal Structures Act, 117 of 1998, of the Republic of South Africa made
provision for an Act of Parliament to authorise the establishment of a cross-boundary
municipality. The Municipal Demarcation Board, after initial research, noted that there are a
number of areas in South Africa where large tracts of land, including a number of different
communities and settlements, straddle provincial boundaries.
A cross-boundary municipality refers to a situation where parts of a local municipality are
located within the borders of two different provinces. For example, in the case of Merafong,
the smaller part in the south was located in North West Province and the larger part in the
east was located in Gauteng Province. This in effect meant that the governance of these
municipalities was a shared political and fiscal responsibility of two different provinces.
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Since the establishment of cross-boundary municipalities, numerous problems have been
experienced with the administration of these areas.
One of the main challenges experienced with the administration of these areas was the day-
to-day management of the cross-boundary municipalities (Naidoo 2007). This geo-political
arrangement meant that a matter such a local government project in one municipality, for
example, had to be subjected to a tedious, labour-intensive and bureaucratic process of
consultation between the local government concerned and principals of the local government
departments at provincial sphere. According to the GCIS (2006), this process greatly affected
and ultimately constrained the execution of the provincial department of local government’s
mandate in terms of the cross-boundary municipalities. This affected communities negatively,
as government was not able to effectively deliver services.
3.3 Demarcation process
The participation of communities and stakeholders in the demarcation process is important, to
ensure that the Demarcation Board considers all the different views people have about
boundaries. The demarcation process is governed by three different pieces of legislation
which all relate to each other. These are the Constitution, the Municipal Demarcation Act and
the Municipal Structures Act (1998).
According to the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG 2008),
communities can be involved in the demarcation process in three ways:
• Members of communities may respond to invitations by the Board to submit written
representations on how boundaries in their area should be drawn;
• If the Demarcation Board decides to hold a public meeting to discuss boundaries,
members of the public can air their views;
• Any member of a community can object to the demarcation of a municipal boundary
or the delimitation of a ward. The Board must take account of the objection and
respond to the person. It is the responsibility of municipalities to ensure that all
community members participate, particularly people who are illiterate or who cannot
transport themselves to a public meeting.
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4. Methodology
The overall study design was descriptive and explanatory, but also directed towards
recommending interventions at both policy and practice levels. The main aim of the study
was to identify the reasons for the violent protests and policy implications. Methodologically,
this paper is based on three interlinked approaches:
• First, an extensive media and literature scan was conducted. Although most of the
media reports were relatively superficial as they focused on the narrative of the unrest
without any real background analysis, they proved to be pivotal in piecing together
the chronology of events, as they unfolded in the case studies. In respect of scholarly
papers concerning the social protests, very little is available, except for the growing
number of papers on post-apartheid social movements in South Africa.
• The second methodological dimension of the study involved in-depth interviews
conducted with community leaders; councillors; ex-councillors; protest leaders;
business people; officials (both provincial and local); and the police. About 100 in-
depth interviews were conducted.
• The third methodological tool was a series of focus group meetings held with
community members. Two of these meetings were conducted with the leaders of the
protests. Three focus group meetings were also held with ordinary citizens who had
not participated in the protests. Focus groups generally consisted of from ten to 16
participants. In all, approximately 300 people participated in the focus group
discussions.
In addition to the main methodological approaches, three further activities should be
mentioned. The research process started off with workshops in the case study areas. The aim
of the workshops was to inform the relevant role players about the research and afford them
the opportunity to influence the main methodological approaches. After the completion of the
empirical study, feedback workshops were also conducted. On this occasion the findings of
the research were shared with those present. Finally, comments and suggestions received
from these reviewers were incorporated, where appropriate, into the final report.
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All four of these case studies were conducted between 2007 and early 2010 and was funded
by the Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE). In Khutsong1 the conflict is about the
demarcation of the boundary between the North-West Province and Gauteng. Nevertheless,
the Khutsong study is particularly instructive where it comes to deriving lessons concerning
the appropriate handling of local conflicts.
5. Reasons for the protests
This section aims to assess the reasons for the protests. In general, the protests were regarded
as having been sparked off by deficient service-delivery. However, in this section I shall try
to analyse the reasons behind poor service delivery. Notably, not all the reasons pertained in
all four of the case study sites. It was, however, various configurations of these factors that
contributed to the protests. The sections begin with a discussion of the reasons for the unrest
in the four localities. This is followed by an analysis of the impacts of the unrest and, finally,
the lessons to be derived from the case studies are discussed.
5.1 Structural reasons for the protests
There is a body of literature that suggests that structural reasons are the fundamental source
of social protests. Six of these structural reasons are highlighted below.
First, socio-economic conditions such as poverty, unemployment and poor living conditions
contributed to the violent protests.
Second, the lack of economies of scale in small towns in respect of infrastructure investment
should be acknowledged as a contributing reason. The capital expenditure, along with the
1 Khutsong, which ironically means place of peace, has been engulfed in violent protests since the government passed this
controversial cross-boundary municipality legislation. This black town formed part of the Merafong Local Municipality in
Gauteng Province until it was incorporated into the North West Province (Bernstein and Johnston 2007: 144). The agenda
of the cross-boundary municipalities – of which there were 16 in five of South Africa’s provinces – has been the focus of
the Municipal Demarcation Board for the past few years. Since the establishment of these municipalities, numerous
problems have been experienced in respect of administering them. Several attempts at resolving the identified issues have
largely failed. In an attempt to ensure that in future these 16 municipalities would individually be located in one province
only, whereby, ultimately, a more effectively integrated provision of services could be achieved, the Constitution Twelfth
Amendment Bill was adopted in 2005.
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pressure on basic infrastructure that results from the need for maintenance in small towns, is
fairly high in relation to the number of people serviced by the municipalities in the four areas.
A third contributing factor linked to the foregoing reason is rural–urban migration. Large-
scale urbanisation of former farm workers has placed tremendous pressure on the provision
of basic service. For instance one senior municipal official remarked: “The deterioration of
street, electricity and sewerage networks was compounded by an influx of people who had
been evicted from farms.”
A fourth factor cited by leaders from the coloured communities, is the legacy of apartheid,
which divided many neighbourhoods into racial camps and which, to a large extent, still
prevails today.
The fifth reason relates to the amalgamation of municipalities that has exerted huge
institutional pressure on local municipalities and inhibited them from efficiently performing
their normal service delivery and maintenance duties. In the case of the Nelson Mandela Bay
Metro, three towns/cities constitute the newly amalgamated Metro. It has taken several years
to resolve and synchronise the administrative system, created from the separate
administrations. More than eight years ago, small-town research has already indicated that the
amalgamation of municipalities has had a negative impact on local economic development in
those towns not designated as the headquarters of these municipalities (Atkinson 2002).
Finally, considering the fact that young people were at the forefront of the protests in the
former black townships, these protests probably, to some degree, had a bearing on issues of
youth development. One respondent at a focus-group meeting remarked, ‘If the municipality
can become serious about youth development, I will not take to [the] streets again. I once
asked the then mayor to get us someone [to] act as a mentor for young aspiring entrepreneurs.
Most young people struggle to write business proposals …’
5.2 Systemic reasons
Although the structural causes already discussed cannot be ignored, a number of systemic
reasons for the municipal protests should also be considered
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5.2.1 Poor governance
“Governance” refers to the ability of institutions to take decisions. In the cases under review, poor
governance contributed markedly to the protests. For example, the fact that the Phumelela
Council (in the Free State Province) did not meet for long periods of time resulted in a complete
lack of basic decision making and direction. This left the Municipal Manager and the municipal
officials rudderless and had the effect of hampering service delivery which contributed to the
conflict and protest. In the case of the Nelson Mandela Metro, it took years for its draft Integrated
Development Plan (IDP)2 to be accepted.
5.2.2 Individual political struggles
In most of the case studies there was evidence of political in-fighting. In the two case studies
in the Free State Province some of these struggles were between local factions, whereas
others seemed to emanate more from provincial level. In the Gauteng and Eastern Cape
municipalities there was evidence of deep ideological divisions within the tri-party alliance3.
The protest in Free State case studies is an example of how protesters, pursuing an agenda
that involved getting rid of a certain councillor, managed to force the issue via recourse to
violence.7 There was no compelling evidence for any of the allegations made against the
councillor in question. Despite their inability to prove their case, the protesters were able to
capitalize on the rupture in communication lines between the councillor and the community,
and this helped ensure that via their protest actions the councillor was finally compelled to
resign. The fact that many of these upheavals occurred within the twelve months prior to the
local government elections furnishes further evidence of political jockeying for position.
The nature of leadership in post-apartheid South African towns remains complex and
obscure, and it will require a great deal more qualitative research for the dynamics of this to
2 In terms of Chapter V of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (No 32 of 2000), local
government bodies are required to formulate and implement Integrated Development Plans (“IDPs”) for their
respective areas of jurisdiction. These IDPs are meant to deal with all developmental and planning related
issues for a period of five years. The main objective in formulating IDPs is: “To guide implementation
oriented planning which is strategic and consultative and is integrated requiring holistic thinking across the
conventional sectoral boundaries”. Specifically the IDP is to guide decisions in respect of the Municipal
budget, improve spatial management, promote local economic development and at the same time ensure
effective institutional transformation in a consultative, systematic and with strategic interventions
(Government Gazette no 21776, 2000). 3 This refers to the alliance between the ruling African National Congress, South African Communist Party and
the labor federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions.
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be fully understood. Firstly, the party political structures within affected communities have
had to develop a mode of response to this leadership style, and to the growing level of public
grievances that it has precipitated. But there seem to be no formal mechanisms to deal with
such cases within most of the political parties. Secondly, this type of leader has unwittingly
created an ethos of counter-leadership within communities. As public frustration with poor
service delivery mounts, and people attempt to find responsive communication channels to
vent their grievances, the attitude of delinquent councillors often becomes increasingly
offensive.
5.2.3 Complaint management and communication
Atkinson (2006 and 2007) has outlined the inability of municipal government to be
appropriately responsive to the needs of municipal residents. The lack of a complaint
management system and the inability to create open communication channels (and thus, the
inability to listen) were probably the main factors that triggered the protests. Numerous
interviewees mentioned that their complaints had neither been listened to nor been addressed
adequately. One of the focus groups summarised the situation: ‘After four years of
complaints and frustration, residents may believe that the only effective way to achieve [a
solution] is through violence and confrontation … but listen, this is not born out of a desire to
be violent. Instead, it is born out of [the] belief that nothing will significantly change
exclusively through non-violence and appeasement …’ The complaints voiced by residents
during the focus groups can be categorised in terms of three overall issues: politicians/
officials who do not wish to listen to complaints; the arrogance of many politicians/officials;
and the inability to communicate effectively.
The following statements by interviewees reflect the perceived inability of officials to listen
to reasonable demands of ordinary people:
Maybe they [officials and councillors] did not worry because they were still getting
paid. They subscribed to the notion that their actions are not to be questioned. In this
age of democracy and civilisation, it is a surprise that officials expect us … to accept
their behaviour without question.
The community has complained many times to the councillor, but he was so
arrogant he could not even listen to them. He was arrogant and he abused his
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powers; as a councillor he had to go because he was the one standing between
service delivery and the community.
We complained to our ward Councillor, but he was never helpful. It was decided
that no one should vote for the councillor during the forthcoming elections. This
particular councillor acted like a prima donna. He never listened to the people.
One of the main factors that, perhaps, could have stopped the unrests, was the
removal of one corrupt councillor. We were challenged to provide proof of the
corrupt practices of this councillor, which we did. We knew that no one can just
be dismissed, but our leaders decided to protect this man. The community felt that the
ANC was protecting corrupt officials at their expense.
5.3 Provincial cross-boundary municipal issues – Gauteng case study
This section highlights the confusing demarcation process by means of a literature review and
empirical findings. In terms of the latter findings about public involvement in the case study,
it offers a comprehensive presentation of the reasons for the violent protests in the Gauteng
case study (Botes et al. 2007; Marais et al. 2008). This case study illustrates how how
participatory governance could go wrong (from a social engineering perspective), but equally
importantly, how it could thrive for civil society. While participatory governance is regarded
as a tenet of governance thinking in the new democratic South Africa, the Merafong City
Local Municipality demarcation process is a classic example of the weakness of participatory
governance efforts. In this regard, the following two arguments hold: first, it is argued that
the sequence of events, decisions and communications intended to give effect to the
incorporation of Merafong City Local Municipality into the North West province were both
confusing and haphazardly executed (see Table 1 below). Second, it is argued that public
involvement was not effective and that, to some extent, served largely to grant legitimacy to a
predetermined policy agenda.
Table 1: Trail of governance activities/decisions about Merafong
Date Activity/Decision Preference for
province
The year 2000 Merafong City Local Municipality was established
within the West Rand District Municipality
19 August 2005 Government Gazette No. 27937 North West
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29 August 2005 Government Gazette No. 27962 North West
18-20 November
2005
Written memoranda directed to the Gauteng
Provincial Legislature, as well as to the NCOP and
other governmental role-players
Gauteng
21 November 2005 Municipal Demarcation Board (Government Gazette
28236)
North West
25 November 2005 Joint Public Hearing (Gauteng and North West
Provincial Legislatures)
Gauteng
29 November 2005 Local Government Portfolio Committee, Gauteng
Legislature
Gauteng
14 December 2005 National Council of Provinces North West
19 March 2009 National Council of Provinces Gauteng
The following were comments of some stakeholders supporting the unrest:
It was never decided to riot, but we got the message from our leaders that we cannot
allow a government we voted for to take us for granted. Immediately after the
announcement in Pretoria, we rushed into the streets and hurled stones, in fact
anything that we could lay our hands on, at the police. The police reacted by firing
rubber bullets at us. It was then that we decided to target the houses of councillors. I
did not care what will happen to me, but I was prepared to sacrifice my life for a good
cause, to die for my parents who are now suffering at the hands of a so-called
democratic governmen
Some other important reasons for the conflict are the following:
• History of settlement-uncertainty in Khutsong due to dolomitic condition of the
land
Due to the geological make-up of the residential land in Khutsong (i.e. predominantly
dolomite formation) the Merafong City Local Municipal councilors and officials
communicated since 2000 to the residents of Khutsong that many of them in the larger part of
Khutsong should be re-located due to the possible dangers of house slumping and house
subsiding.
Before the unrest one of the major challenges was the unstable land. This is a
dolomite area. 90% of the land in Khutsong has scientifically been declared unfit
for human settlement due to the dolomitic condition of the land. We often
encounter sinkholes which lead to pipe bursts. From time to time we have to re-
route water pipes. This affects the municipality’s budget. We embarked on a
process to declare Khutsong a disaster area and a Presidential project.
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According to community members and leaders of the protests, the dolomite issue is just a
ploy from the mining companies not to invest in Khutsong. Questions were also raised about
why only townships are often regarded as dolomitic. The confusion among residents about
the dolomitic condition of the area seems to be exacerbated by the activities of the
municipality and individual councillors which contradict what they state in public:
I agree that the mayor did inform the community about the unstable condition of the
land in Khutsong. But while they preach about the dolomitic nature of the land, one
local councillor extended his house. Is that not sending out the wrong signals that
we are taken for granted? A road construction project was also awarded to a
Welkom company. The owner of the company is regarded as a ‘Mandela from the
Free State.’ Why are these infrastructural projects allowed to continue when our
officials know that they ultimately want to resettle the community? The roads here
resemble swimming pools…i
This dolomite thing is nothing, but modernised slavery. The mines do not want to
contribute anything to the development of Khutsong. The municipality want to
relocate people to a place which was also regarded as being dolomitic. How do you
understand? If this is true, why are they taking so long to come up with a solution?ii
• History of cross border arrangements
From the beginning of the cross border arrangement, administratively it places a huge burden
on the Local Municipality of Merafong City to report to two provinces. From 2002 problems
of communicating and reporting lines started to resurface but this was handled through trial
and error. Different stakeholders indicated that the issue of demarcation is a long standing
one.
• Unilateral decisions regarding cross-border arrangements without proper
communication and buy-in on the ground/Political decisions taken at national
level without considering local opinions and conditions sufficiently
If one follows the paper trail of notices in the Government Gazettes there are quite clearly
some conflicting decisions and communiques that caused confusion at grass roots level.
Community stakeholders also indicated that the national government was not sensitive to
their specific request and that the reasons for this decision were not communicated
satisfactory:
It was never decided to riot, but as we got the message from our leaders that we will
finally become part of North West Province, we told ourselves not to allow a
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government we voted for, in the first place, to take us for granted. Immediately after
the announcement, we rushed to the streets and hurled stones at or anything else we
could lay our hands on, at the police. The police reacted by firing rubber bullets at us.
It was then that we decided to target the houses of councillors.
I did not care what will happen to me, but I was prepared to sacrifice my life for a
good cause, to die for my parents who are now suffering at the hands of a so-called
democratic government.
One of the major flaws in respect of the demarcation seems to be the manner in which the
community was informed about the decision:
Residents were not consulted. The few that were allegedly consulted cannot be
equated with the rest of the community. The mayor was always diplomatic in his
interaction and dealings with the community. He approached the Faith-based Forum
which consists of the pastors of all major denominations in Khutsong about the
issue. We later realised that the ploy was for us to spread the news during our
sermons that Merafong will remain as part of GP. Some pastors began to label the
mayor as a sell-out and refused to interact with him.iii
We were sold out by our mayor, the most unpopular mayor in South Africa. He,
together with all the councillors knew that Merafong would ultimately be
incorporated into North West, but they decided to keep quiet about it. The majority
of us here [in Khutsong] were ANC members, but our party betrayed us. Minister
Mufamadi and the provincial government delayed to inform us. Information leaked
to us that the ANC was pushing for our incorporation into North West. In fact, this
demarcation monster has been there for a long time, why the community was not
consulted earlier still baffle our minds. The first time they made contact with the
community was merely to inform us, and not to consultiv
.
6. Impacts of protests
Although the protests were not wholly negative, there were a number of destructive impacts.
6.1 Damage to public infrastructure
The impacts of the unrest were experienced, first and foremost, in terms of the destruction of
public and private infrastructure. The burning (or attempt to do so) of vehicles, libraries and
councillor housing, was a widespread feature of the protests. By the end of 2009, the
Khutsong upheavals had cost an estimated of USD 10 million. Damage to private property
alone was estimated at USD 2.5 million.
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6.2 Economic impacts
The economic impact of the protests varied from place to place. In most cases the economic
impact on businesses in the predominantly black townships was more severe than in the
traditionally white areas. The main reason for this was that many of these areas were barricaded
and nobody was allowed in. Towards the end of 2008 Eskom (the electricity supplier in South
Africa) was providing power to 126 Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs) in
Khutsong. By June 2009, they were providing electricity to only 35 of these enterprises. Larger
enterprises were also affected in that workers were not allowed to leave the townships. In the Free
State, a small town (Hennenman) estimated a daily loss to the economy of USD 35,678.25as a
result of the protests there. A further impact was that many of the protests degenerated into the
looting of ‘foreign-owned’ shops.
6.3 Impacts on the education system
One of the short-term impacts was that schools were disrupted as many pupils were in the forefront of
the protests. The matric pass rate for Port Elizabeth (the Eastern Cape case study) decreased by 8%
from 75.8% to 67.8% during the year of the protest. Although it is not clear to what extent this can be
ascribed to the conflicts in Port Elizabeth. At the same time however, the pass rate for the province as
a whole increased from 53.5% to 59.3% during the same period, thereby suggesting that at least one
of the factors responsible for the decrease in performance in Port Elizabeth could be the protests.
Education in all the case study sites was seriously disrupted by the protests. In Khutsong,
schooling was disrupted sporadically for almost three years.
7. Lessons learned and recommendations
This article has attempted to assess the municipal, service-related unrest experienced in South
Africa, and, more specifically, in the Free State, Gauteng and Eastern Cape provinces. This
section briefly reflects on the lessons learned.
Firstly, was sometimes speculated that the presence of the media, and most especially
television cameras, had the effect of artificially fuelling the protests. It seems as if playing up
for the camera is an expression of the desire to ‘become someone’. The media should
arguably be more sensitive to their potential role in fanning the flames of these protests.
Although the sensationalising nature of media coverage is a difficult area on which to make
98
pronouncements, there is a great need for proper investigative journalism which can uncover
the causes of the protests, and fairly convey all the protagonists’ points of view.
Secondly, is the point that political or legal coercion does not minimise conflict. Two of the
case studies showed that political coercion and legislative directions do not contribute to
conflict resolution. In the case of Khutsong, the conflict was not alleviated by the
redemarcation being confirmed by parliament. Attempts in Phomolong to dampen the conflict
by demanding legally sound evidence of the allegations against the councillor, proved
fruitless. Although no such evidence could be produced this did nothing to quell the unrest.
Thirdly, the government needs to rethink development approaches in small towns. Two of the
case studies were derived from small towns and it needs to be more fully realized that many
policies, some of them essentially good policies, nonetheless have negative impacts on small
town environments. Small towns might also find it increasingly difficult to attract qualified
municipal staff. The fact that the National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP)
designates some of these areas as being without much economic potential may also tend to
reinforce a perception of regional inferiority, or purposive neglect, entertained by
government.
Finally in terms of the Khutsong case study, an in-depth socio-political analysis of cross-boundary
disputes may prevent the often violent outbursts that accompany such disputes. Again, there is a
need for more multicase-oriented studies, in that the current literature on provincial boundary
disputes has a single-case orientation. According to Mavungu (2007), a single-case study limits the
understanding of the structural and systemic factors that cause and shape such clashes.
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i Interview with leader of the protests,
ii Interview with involved resident, iii Interview with community leader. iv
Interview with protest leader