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PhD PROPOSAL
THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE AS A CASE STUDY IN THE JUS AD
BELLUM CONVENTION OF JUST WAR THEORY
BROTHERS (UP) IN ARMS:
WAS THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIFIED?
CONTENTS
I. A Personal Interest.............................................................................7
II. Just War Theory.................................................................................11
III. Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)...........................14
IV. The High Jacking of Mozambique.....................................................16
V. The Frelimo Oligarchy Enslaves Mozambique.................................19
VI. Renamo: A Legitimate Representative of The People. .23VII. Rhodesia and South Africa: The Right Intention...........25VIII. Peace Returns to Mozambique and The Region...........32
Conclusion.............................................................................34Bibliography...................................................................................................36
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BROTHERS (UP) IN ARMS:
WAS THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIFIED?
A Personal Interest
The civil war in Mozambique (1976-92) between the liberation movement
Renamo and the Frelimo government, was one of the bloodiest and longest civil
wars in Africa; with one million dead and three million displaced people - more
than half of which were refugees in neighbouring countries, - it was a war that
happened because a people were denied the opportunity to be free after almost five
centuries of Portuguese influence and rule. The war has also to be seen in the
context of the ‘Cold War’ prevailing at the time and how the struggle for power
between East and West that is between Communism and Democracy was the cause
of yet another innocent bystander in global affairs sinking into fratricidal violence.
My interest in the conflict, and what motivated me to write and to propose a
doctoral thesis on its moral justification, is a very personal one.
I was born in the country on 13/10/1940 and was as a student at the Salazar
National lyceum in the 50’s, one of many young Mozambicans who held very
strong critical views on Portuguese colonialism.
As a result of major problems of a political nature that I encountered with
the Portuguese Education Authorities, my parents sent me to South Africa in 1957
at the age of 17 to continue my studies and I became a citizen of that country in the
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early 1960’s, to avoid military service in Mozambique, where the Portuguese were
fighting various Mozambican liberation movements.
Many of my childhood and school friends in Mozambique went on to
become leading figures in the various liberation movements, in particular Frelimo.
To name but a few they are the former President Chissano, a childhood friend the
former minister of information, and chief party ideologue from 1975 to 1991, Dr.
Jose Luis Cabaco and many other officials.
Until 1972, I visited the country on numerous occasions and kept in touch
with most of my friends. My visits came to an abrupt end in September of that
year, when I was detained and “tactically debriefed” by the then Portuguese
security police PIDE1 on allegations of anti-Portuguese activities during the 50’s
and the 60’s.
Despite the independence of Mozambique in 1975 that gave rise to great
expectations of freedom, equality and liberty, I never returned until 1989, at the
time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reason for my absence was my
knowledge that Frelimo, to whom the country was handed over by Portugal, had
transformed itself (as I will argue later in thispresentation), from the original pro
democracy liberation movement under Eduardo Mondlane into a Marxist Leninist
movement under Samora Machel a great admirer of Stalin, after the assassination
of Mondlane in Dar- es- Salaam, 1966.
During the above mentioned period I kept in touch with many former
Frelimo dissidents, who became to varying degrees members of Renamo, and in
the late 70’s early 80’s I assisted the South African security establishment in 1 Hans Strydom ’22 Days of Terror for SA Man in LM Prison’ ’The Sunday Times Johannesburg, November 1972.
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assessing certain aspects of the civil war, in particular the interpretation of
speeches by the Frelimo leadership.
My close friendship with many South African journalists - in particular Al
Venter2 - from whose book I quote extensively also gave me a great insight into the
origins of the conflict.
This dissertation, then, is an enquiry into the civil war in Mozambique
between Renamo (formerly MNR, Mozambican National Resistance) and Frelimo
(Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) as well as the covert participation by
South Africa in the conflict. The objective is to ascertain whether there was just
cause for the concerned parties to engage in conflict and whether Renamo in the
first instance and South Africa in the second instance were justified respectively
initiating and engaging in the civil war.
Such an enquiry is important for although The Mozambican Civil war has
been well documented, in this instance by Cabrita (2000)3, Hall and Young
(1997)4, Vines (1996)5, Newitt (1995)6 , Venter (1977)7 et al, where one can clearly
follow the origins, causes, conduct and end result of the conflict, no arguments
2Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa, Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg, 1977.
3 Joao M. Cabrita ‘Mozambique, the Tortuous Road to Democracy’ Palgrave, Hampshire 2000.
4Margaret Hall, Tom Young ‘Confronting the Leviathan, Mozambique Since Independence’ Hurst &Co. London,
1997.5Alex Vines ‘ RENAMO, From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?’ Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York 1996. 6 Malyn Newitt ‘A History of Mozambique’ C. Hurst &Co. London 1995.
7 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa, Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg, 1977.
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have ever been advanced nor debated – to my knowledge - as to the justification
for the conflict itself, or the part played by the main actors as outlined above.
Such debates and assessments are common in the instance of wars between
Nations, as exemplified by the recent debate on the legality cum justification for
the war on Iraq, but the literature is poor in such discourses pertaining to civil
wars. This may well be because just war theory, in its classical formulation,
confers legitimacy to engage in (just) war only to state-actors, which is a lacuna
not often dealt with8. Thus, albeit more as a byproduct of this proposal than as a
central aim, I will nonetheless demonstrate how the framework of just war theory –
in particular the precepts of jus ad bellum – can easily and fruitfully be applied to
warring political communities other than recognized Sovereign States.
In this instance I will assess the character, role and motivation of Renamo -
the main protagonist in opposing the dictatorial Frelimo regime on behalf of a large
number of Mozambicans - as well as that of South Africa that, albeit covertly, was
a major protagonist in supporting the rebel movement.
In assessing whether a war is justified, the traditional yardstick is what has
become known as Just War Theory. That I shall examine in the next section, and I
will suggest that under the ante bellum circumstances prevailing at the time, the
civil war in Mozambique was unavoidable, was conducted by competent
authorities, was a measure of last resort, that there was just cause, and that it
provided the desired end result.
In addressing a topic as the one of this dissertation, one should be as
objective as one can possibly be. Thus, a word on methodology is in order.
8 Although some authors have experimented with applying just war theory to non-state actors. See, for instance, Andrew Valls’ (2000) attempt to apply just war theory to terrorist acts.
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I am fully aware that because of my intimate knowledge and occasional
involvement in the conflict, it is not an easy task to avoid the trap of subjectivity
and will thus rely on an approach of radical empiricism, often used in
anthropological research. ‘Unlike traditional empiricism which draws a definite
boundary between method and object, radical empiricism denies the validity of
such cuts and makes the interplay between these domains the focus of its interest.9
Radical empiricism means the acknowledgement of the ethnographer’s
[Researcher’s] subjective position rather than the denial of it. Jackson points out
that rather than being a scientific method to accurately describe a situation, it is
probable that ‘objectivity serves more as a magical token, bolstering our sense of
self in disorienting situations’10. This would certainly seem the case in my
dissertation.
Just War Theory
Western just war theories as we postulate them today, can be traced as far
back in history as Cicero (106-43 BC), who believed in universal standards, having
the view that there was a ‘society of mankind [cosmopolitanism] rather than
states’11 (a view which, as we shall see further on, supports our general theoretical
framework).
9 Michael Jackson ‘Paths towards a clearing: radical empiricism and ethnographic enquiry’, 1989, p.310 idem, ibid., p.411 David J. Bederman, ‘Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius’ De jus Belli Ac Pacis’, Emory International Law Review, 1996.
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St. Augustine (354-430 AD)12, in turn, proposed that there should be duties
of just treatment of prisoners and conquered peoples, saying that mercy should be
shown to the vanquished, particularly if they are no longer a threat to peace.
Thomas Aquinas, who in the ‘Summa Theologica’ 13 presents the general
outline of what becomes the just war theory, suggested that there should be three
tests for the justification for war, namely: just cause, competent authority and right
intention.
Post St. Augustine thinkers, as exemplified by Grotius (1583-1645), looked
at just war theories from a secular point of view, and suggested that there are three
basic criteria for a war to be just and justified: firstly, that the danger faced by a
nation is immediate, secondly that the force used is necessary to adequately defend
the nation’s interests and thirdly that the use of force is proportionate to the
threatened danger.
Michael Walzer, among so many other contemporary political thinkers who
have further refined western just war theories (that are well articulated in the
‘Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy’14), has suggested that just war theory can
be divided into four main parts, namely: ante bellum, that concerns the socio
economic and political scenario prevailing at the time; jus ad bellum, that concerns
the justice and justification for going to war; jus in bello, that refers to the conduct
of war; and jus post bellum, that concerns post war peace agreements etc.
12 In ‘Augustine: Political Writings’ Michael W. Tkacz and Douglas Kries, trans, Ernest L. Fortin and Douglas Kries, eds., 1994.13 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Just War Theory’ http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm as downloaded on06/05/02.14 Orend, Brian, "War", The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/war/>.
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As indicated in my introduction, I will now briefly elaborate on the jus ad
bellum aspects of western just war theory. According to the Stanford
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the rules of jus ad bellum are the responsibility of
nations and their heads of government, and it is in this norm that there exists a
lacuna in western just war theory that, with particular reference to current events,
and the absence of reference to civil wars, has led many contemporary political
theorists to suggest that the theory should be upgraded and modernized to keep
pace with the accelerating changes in the concepts of war and other bellicose
conflicts.
The jus ad bellum convention requires that five basic principles be met:
1. Just Cause, that basically can mean self defense from aggression, the protection
of innocents or, as Walzer puts it, ‘simply resistance from aggression’.
2. Proper Authority, meaning that the state has to be recognized by other states
and that a declaration to engage in war must be made to the enemy as well as to the
citizens of the nation concerned.
3. The Possession of Right Intention, meaning that a war should only be waged for
the cause of justice and not for self- interest or aggrandizement.
4. Last Resort, meaning that all other means (i.e. diplomatic efforts or any other
reasonable means must be exhausted.)
5. Probability of Reasonable Success, meaning that whatever the aimed result is,
in order to address the particular just cause, has at the outset to have a reasonable
chance of succeeding.
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Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)
Frelimo, as will be discussed in the next paragraph, was the liberation
movement to whom Portugal, under extreme controversial circumstances, handed
over their colony Mozambique and the origins of the organization deserves closer
scrutiny.
As a norm, the origins of most African liberation movements are very
confusing in that the final ‘product’ is often the sum total of many other groupings,
with many diverse opinions and agendas, that for one reason or another - in many
instances pure expediency in fighting a common enemy - have amalgamated into a
prominent organization. Frelimo is no exception.
The literature on Frelimo is abundant and often confusing. It suffices to say
that from the 1920’s some form of protest organizations pleading for better living
conditions for Mozambicans came into being and that according to Gibson 15
Frelimo was created by a merger in June 1962 of the three existing Mozambican
African nationalist movements Udenamo, Manu and Unami, with Eduardo
Mondlane as its first president, a new found unity that was to be very short lived,
and Frelimo continued to be beset by continued fierce faction fighting, ideological,
ethnic and personal rivalries, assassinations, defections and splits.
Gibson further elaborates that the existence of any unity was largely due to
the active concern of president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who had granted
Frelimo major bases in his country from which to launch its struggle against the
Portuguese and the necessity on the part of Frelimo to justify the extensive material 15 Richard Gibson ‘African Liberation Movements’ Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 276-280
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support that they were receiving from the African Liberation Committee and the
Organization of African States.
The assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in Dar-es-Salaam on then 3rd of
February1969, precipitated an hysterical sequence of accusations and counter-
accusations within Frelimo and Tanzanian officials, such as a possible CIA
involvement as well as the dreaded Portuguese Security police PIDE, but as
Cabrita suggests ‘the full circumstances surrounding Mondlane’s assassination
shall only be known when Tanzania discloses the findings of its investigations
conducted with the help of Scotland Yard and Interpol’.16
For a short period after the assassination, a three man Presidential Council
comprising the vice president Uria Simango, Marcelino dos Santos and the military
commander Samora Machel led the movement for a short period that was
highlighted by numerous purges within the organization17. By 1969, Simango and
many other high ranking officials had been expelled from the party, and Samora
Machel with Marcelino dos Santos as his deputy assumed the party leadership.
Samora Machel was a revolutionary who was not only dedicated to throwing
the Portuguese out of Mozambique but also radically changing the society and is
reported to have said at the time that’ Of all the things we have done, the most
important-the one that history will record as the principal contribution of our
generation-is that we understand how to turn a armed struggle into a revolution;
that we realized that it was essential to create a new mentality to build a new
society.’18
16 Cabrita, op cit., pp. 58-917 idem, ibid, pp. 63-6818 http://www.jlhs.nhusd.Social Science/Mozambique/Samora Machel
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Following independence in 1975, Machel as the first president of
Mozambique called for Frelimo to organize itself into a Leninist party, a highly
organized single political party and proceeded to put his revolutionary principles
into practice. As a Marxist, he called for the nationalization of all private property,
industries, commerce, health services, education and the abolishment of religion.
His systematic destruction of the traditional fabric of society led eventually led to a
bloody and protracted civil war that will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
The High Jacking of Mozambique. ‘The ante bellum Scenario’
On the 25th April 1974, the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) seized power
in Portugal, and the new Portuguese Government burdened with the human and
financial costs of their colonial wars, one of the main causes for their revolution,
decided to relinquish its colonies.
As aptly recorded by Hall and Young19 the new regime in Portugal, then
headed by general Spinola, almost immediately started negotiations with the main
Mozambican liberation movement Frelimo, and in May of 1974 a senior member
of the junta, general Costa Gomes, visited Mozambique, appealing to Frelimo for a
cease fire and to enter negotiations to end the war.
The Portuguese proposed that the people of the colony would choose some
kind of arrangement between the ‘extremes of independence and the status quo at a
planned referendum’. It was the intention of the Portuguese government to grant a
19 Margaret Hall, Tom Young ‘Confronting Leviathan, Mozambique Since Independence’ Hurst &Co. London, 1997. pp. 40-43
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great deal of autonomy to the colony, while still maintaining ties with the
‘motherland’ within a framework of ‘Lusophonic Commonwealth’ comprising all
former colonies. This view was not shared by the left wing senior army officers in
Portugal, led by Major Mello Antunes that had close ideological ties with Frelimo.
It is further recorded that Frelimo saw no need to compromise its demand
for full independence under its sole leadership, without any referendum or other
popular consultation on the country’s future, and refused to concede a ceasefire
until their demands were met,
‘Indeed, increasingly aware of the contradictory currents within the Portuguese
government over decolonization, Frelimo stepped up the war ,calibrating the exercise
of military pressure with a negotiating strategy which sought simultaneously to
weaken the Spinola faction and to strengthen the left wing one that was favorable to
their own position’.20
The continuation of the conflict eventually led to further formal and
informal negotiations between the parties, which in turn led to a cease fire on the
8th September 1974, with the Portuguese side still committed to a referendum and
unwilling to concede to Frelimo’s demands, which comprised their legitimacy as
the sole representative of the peoples of Mozambique, the recognition of the
people’s right to complete independence and the immediate transfer of power to
Frelimo.
It is important to note that while the negotiations that led to the cease fire
were taking place, there were a number of secret meetings in Dar es Salaam
between Frelimo and the left wing elements of the Portuguese regime, this time led 20 Margaret Hall, Tom Young ‘Confronting the Leviathan, Mozambique Since Independence’ Hurst &Co. London, 1997. p 42
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by Mario Soares (at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs and soon to be Prime
Minister) after the demise of General Spinola, Major Antunes and Almeida Santos
a well known left wing Portuguese lawyer with longstanding connections with
Mozambique and Frelimo, where a secret protocol was signed recognizing Frelimo
as the sole legitimate and authentic representatives of Mozambique21.
The events mentioned above laid the foundations for the final negotiations
that took place in Lusaka on 5-7 September 1974, in which Portugal ceded to all
Frelimo’s demands. By the end of September 1974, the Portuguese government
and Frelimo signed the Lusaka Accord, allowing the transfer of power to Frelimo
without prior elections. On the 25th of June 1975, Mozambique became an
independent one party State, with Frelimo as the sole legal party led by Samora
Moises Machel.
As I argued in 1978, ‘Mozambique was sold to a militarily defeated
Frelimo by the signing of the Lusaka Agreement, made easy by the withdrawal of
troops from Mozambique which were replaced by Portuguese communist-
orientated battalions’, 22 that aided and abetted Frelimo’s illegal transition to
power, well documented in Al Venter’s ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and
Frustration’ .23
The Frelimo Oligarchy Enslaves Mozambique.
‘The Just Cause’
21 Hall and Young, op cit., p.4322 Carlos Santos ‘West and Marxists in Africa’ Cape Times 19/03/1978.23 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg 1977, . (Chapter viii, Mozambique: The Marxist Oligarchy). Pp. 142-165.
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From the outset, the new Mozambican government showed through its
actions that it was totally divorced from the ethos envisaged by its founder
Eduardo Mondlane, who was assassinated in 1969. Mondlane’s vision24 as
recorded by his widow Jeanette in 1985, was very much anthropocentric and he
would not have agreed with decisions taken after independence, ‘many of them
allied to the violation of the idea of the right to individual freedom’, ‘that ideology
is not more important than people’ and that he would have opposed the direction
taken by the new regime.
What happened in Mozambique was that it shifted from one form of totalitarianism
to another and, as Cabrita suggests, ‘ more specifically from Fascism to Leninism’,
although history has subsequently informed us that it was very much a Stalinist
type of regime.
From day one, Samora Machel who was the head of state and government,
the speaker of the parliament, the chief justice and the head of the armed forces,
indicated that ‘the new Mozambican regime was prepared to go to great lengths to
impose the will of the government by forcing those who refuse those who accept
such an imposition and to repress those who oppose such a will’25.
With the introduction of a Marxist Leninist form of government run along
the lines of Stalinism, the people soon found themselves in the grip of fear through
intimidation, the nationalization of homes, the elimination of private medicine and
law practices, private education that was replaced with government schools alike,
modeled on the Soviet system of education, and the nationalization of the press 24 ? Joao M. Cabrita ‘Mozambique, The Tortuous Road to Democracy’ Palgrave, Hampshire 2000.
25 As quoted by Cabrita 2000, p85 from a speech by Machel reported in ‘voz da revolucao’ [the voice of the revolution], Maputo 1975.
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under the government control. Frelimo was the State with the Nation taking second
place.
Freedom of worship was denied to the people of Mozambique by the
banning and closure of all churches and missions. In line with this purge on
religion, any form of baptism was prohibited , foreign church missions that for
decades had been on the forefront of providing basic education for the masses
came under particular heavy attack, their bank accounts being frozen while they
were being investigated. It was suggested at the time26 that the Soviet Union played
a major role in these developments.
‘The Jehovah’s Witnesses were particularly singled out as they
consistently refused to swear allegiance or indeed to recognize Frelimo as the
ruling party’. The biggest looser was the Roman Catholic Church, despite the fact
that during the war of independence many of its office bearers were pro Frelimo
apologists and were a powerful force for the elimination of colonial principles.
‘Other foreign religious missions under pressure were The Church of the
Apostles, an American body, The Church of the Nazarene, the Swiss Mission
particularly known for their skills in education, The United Apostolic Church of
Zion a powerful Christian organization with millions of adepts in Southern Africa,
The Assembly of God and many others.
More disturbing is what President Samora Machel has done to an estimated
50000 political prisoners held in a string of labor camps established in remote areas
of northern Mozambique27 the elimination of opposition parties such as Rev. Uria
26 Venter, op cit., p. 15027 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg 1977, p.160
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T. Simango’s Fumo (Front for the Unification of Mozambique), ‘ Who broke from
Frelimo in the late 1960’s because it was edging too close to the Soviet camp [this
was after the assassination in 1969 of Frelimo’s founder Dr. Eduardo Mondlane
when the leadership was taken over by Samora Machel]’ 28. Joana Simiao, a
Sorbonne educated leader of 4 million Makua tribesmen from Central
Mozambique, who had remained implacably opposed to Frelimos’ doctrines and
many other pro democracy parties and movements were also banned and outlawed.
Of great significance for the majority of the people of Mozambique was
the abolishment of the traditional tribal system. According to Venter29, Machel
decreed that forthwith there would be no tribes in Mozambique, but only
Mozambicans ‘which is like telling the Arabs they are no longer Muslims’. Machel
further abolished the offices of chieftainships and many tribal heads and their
followers resisted the change, went into hiding and became a component of the
new resistance to overthrow the new government by force very much in the same
way that Frelimo fought Portuguese authority in the decade long guerrilla war of
liberation.
Against the background of political parties and movements banned and
many of their leaders killed or imprisoned, with civil liberties removed from
citizens and a non existent rule of law to afford protection to the citizens, any hope
of the dreamed of democratic process was eliminated. The people were in a worst
situation when compared with colonial rule and were ruthlessly dealt with when
attempting to address their plight, the implementation of all these acts that removed
all the freedom from the people was achieved through the use of the new security
police (SNASP) created in October 1975, an organization molded along the lines 28 idem, ibid, P.155.
29 idem, ibid., p. 145
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of the KGB in the Soviet Union as I will expound on when I discuss the role of
South Africa in the civil war.
I would like to suggest that at the above- mentioned stage of the history of
Mozambique; its peoples were denied ‘equality as equality of fair opportunity,
liberal equality and democratic equality.’30
In a thesis for an MA in politics ‘Civil Wars In Africa, Causes and
Effects’31 Ahmad Mahmoud suggests that Africa’s civil wars break out due to a set
of motives some of which relate to the political and social structures, while others
are closely linked with outside intervention in the continent’s internal struggles.
I concur with his assessment, as that was very much the case of the
Mozambican civil war under discussion. It broke out firstly as a result of the taking
over of power by the undemocratic Frelimo regime, followed shortly afterwards by
the establishment of a Marxist Leninist system of government with the social
constraints and loss of freedom imposed by such regimes, and the outside
influences imposed upon the region by the main cold war rivals namely the USA
and the USSR, alongside with their respective allies or sympathizing nations.
In recent correspondence with a friend, I was reminded that ‘A wise
professor once commented that governments should not act like the criminals
they’re set to protect us from. Legitimacy, accordingly, vanishes once a ruling
party becomes a criminal regime and aggresses against the people and property of
its jurisdiction’32 and had no option but to as a last resort engage in civil war that as
30 John Rawls ‘A Theory of Justice’ Oxford University Press, Revised Edition 1999, p. 57.31 Ahmad Mahmoud Abdel Atti ‘Civil Wars in Africa, Causes and Effects’ African Perspective, Fourth Issue- Winter 2000-2001. http://www.sis.gov.eg/public/africanmag/issue04/html/enafr13html as downloaded on 22/05/02.32 Dr. Alexander Moseley in private correspondence with the author March 22, 2004
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mentioned in earlier paragraphs was conducted by the majority of Mozambicans
under the Renamo banner.
Renamo: A Legitimate Representative of the People
‘The Proper Authority’
One of the preoccupations of the theorists of Just War Theories from Saint
Thomas Aquinas who in the ‘Summa Theologica’ 33 presents the general outline of
what becomes the just war theory, through to modern thinkers such as Michael
Walzer, is the competence of Nations to engage in war. Modern Just War Theory
disregards civil wars and hence there is an obvious lacuna that should be
addressed.
In the case of civil wars in which normally a section of the population
enters into war with the ruling government as a result of the case in this conflict ‘A
national grievance where the performance of a government is held to be against
the national interest’,34 I looked at ‘The Libertarian Just War Theory’ to justify the
competence of Renamo, ‘The war must be declared by a competent authority, and
against a proper enemy. The proper authority to exercise a right of self- defense
against an aggressor is the individual whose rights have been violated or his /her
designated agent’. 35
33 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Just War Theory’ http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm as downloaded on06/05/02.34 K.Y.Amoako, UN Under-Secretary- General and Executive Secretary of Economic Commission for Africa ‘The Economic Consequences of Civil Wars and Unrest in Africa’ address to the 70th ordinary session of the council of the Organization of African Unity, Algeria, 8 July 1999. http://www.afbis.com as downloaded on 22/05/02.35‘Libertarian Just War Theory’ http://www.nonaggression/justwar.html as downloaded on 05/07/02.
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In the fifteen months between the Portuguese revolution of 25 April 1974,
and the controversial independence of Mozambique on the 25 th of September 1975,
there were a number of attempts to put together a viable opposition movement
against Frelimo, the most important one at the time was the 7 th of September 1974
revolt when dissatisfied Mozambicans led by dissatisfied Portuguese whites,
attempted to seize power by taking control of the radio station amid much
pomposity and bravado. As Venter36 aptly puts it: ‘this was nor totally unexpected
and a little more determination and perhaps a few moments of courage and a few
more single minded individuals might have pulled if off. Especially as Frelimo was
strung pretty thin on the ground at that stage their power structure was very much
vulnerable to internal dissent’.
As I have elaborated on in the previous paragraph the traumatic events that
followed, only reinforced Mozambicans desire to liberate themselves, resulting in
many Mozambicans of all origins, color, belief, religion ethnicity and race
gathering together in the central Manica and Sofala province of Mozambique,
where the various representatives decided to join efforts in order to defeat and
remove communism from Mozambique and thus, Renamo (Resistencia National
Mocambicana) led by Andre Matade Matsangaissa, a former Frelimo commander,
was founded in 1976 Upon his violent death in 1978, Afonso Dhlakama was
democratically elected as the new leader of the liberation movement.
There is a general perception that Renamo was not a genuine liberation
movement representing many Mozambicans but the creation of the then isolated
Jan Smith’s Rhodesian government and that subsequently after Zimbabwe under
Robert Mugabe gained independence the movement was taken over by South
Africa became a tool of alleged destabilization policies towards the Frelimo 36 Venter, op. cit., p.145
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regime. These perceptions fanned by the writings and observations of, inter alia,
(Vines, 1996), (Hall and Young, 1997) and (Newitt, 1995) are not entirely a true
reflection of the events and I shall brief deal with the subject in my next chapter.
Rhodesia and South Africa:
“The Right Intention”
Despite Rhodesia’s internal settlement and a black majority government
led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1972 having being democratically elected, Great
Britain insisted on facilitating communist oriented freedom movements namely
Robert Mugabe’s Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo’s Zanu and Sithole’s Zapu, all of
whom had refused to participate in the elections, to eventually come to power in
1980 after the signing of the Lancaster House agreement.
In the interim period, Frelimo came to power, and from 1975, Mugabe had
operational bases in Mozambique that facilitated his movement’s terrorist activities
in Rhodesia. With the denial of Rhodesia’s access to the port of Beira by the new
Mozambican government, Rhodesia facilitated the re-organization and
continuation of an anti-Frelimo guerrilla movement that had been created by the
former Portuguese security police PIDE/DGS, comprised mainly of the
Mozambican Diaspora who had fled their country after the Frelimo takeover.
These were to become the core of Renamo’s military after it’s inception in 197637
It is thus reasonable to suggest that Rhodesia’s actions, and continued
support for Renamo until 1980, can be construed as an act of self- defense against
a foreign country’s aggressive interference in its territorial integrity, and that the 37 Hall and Young, op. cit. pp. 117-123
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Rhodesian government was fully justified in getting involved in the civil war in
Mozambique.
Albeit in a covert manner, South Africa also played a major role in the
civil war under discussion, decisively affecting the outcome of the war by having
covertly assisted Renamo following the Zimbabwean independence in 1980.
Having previously mentioned that many political authors and historians
have through their accounts of the war assisted in creating the general impression
that the Mozambique Civil War was South Africa’s war, and by implication not a
justified conflict, I will briefly elaborate on some of those accounts, that are either
dismissive of South Africa’s foreign policy prevailing at the time or totally devoid
from the actual facts.
According to Vieira et al.38 ‘the South African regime knowing that that it
was militarily and politically impossible to turn Mozambique into a Bantustan,
tried to make the existence and functioning of any kind of organized society
enviable. It defined its strategy as the devastation of Mozambique and of its
capacity for later recovery’. I would like to suggest that this assessment is
incorrect, as South Africa was at the time, as will be discussed later, not
particularly concerned about developments in Mozambique as illustrated in an
assessment by Ellis and Sechaba39 that ‘the idea that South Africa feared invidious
comparison with Mozambique’s successes ( an important part of Frelimo
propaganda, endlessly repeated in the academic literature) seems bizarre,
although this does not mean that Frelimo’s victory did not have a symbolic value
for young South African blacks’.
38 Vieira, Martin & Wallerstein ‘How Fast the Wind? Southern Africa 1975-2000 p.216.39 Ellis and Sechaba ‘Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and The South African Communist Party in Exile’ p75
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One of the most important factors of the civil war in the 1980’s was the
South Africans; ‘the precise determinants and objectives of whose foreign policy
during this period remain obscure, although some of the more florid explanations
are hardly worthy of discussion’40. Coming from such distinguished academics, I
find this kind of suggestion intriguing as South Africa’s foreign policy prevailing
at the time and in particular in its relationship with Africa was clear-cut and was
based on the non-interference in the internal affairs of their neighboring states and
one of mutual economic co-operation.
South Africa had always had a policy of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries. Despite the abhorrent apartheid laws that as far as I
recollect were not only being opposed by nationalist movements such as the ANC
but also by the powerful internal and multi racial liberal lobby, the country had a
whites only multi party form of democracy, was a member of the United Nations,
had diplomatic relations with most nations, fought in both world wars on the side
of the allied forces and was thus in international law, competent to engage in
hostilities with other nations whenever if felt threatened.
It should be noted that Prime Minister John Vorster had been engaged in
detente or constructive engagement, with a number of independent African nations
in West and East Africa such as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Zambia etc. the same
happened in relations between S.A. and Mozambique when the latter obtained
independence from Portugal in 1975.
From Independence Day on 25 September 1975 and in line with South
Africa’s foreign policies towards African nations pertaining at the time, the South 40 Hall and Young, op cit., p.120
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African government went to great lengths to maintain cordial relations with the
new Mozambican government.
Despite Samora Machel’s continued bellicose rhetoric, preaching
revolution and liberation not only for his country, but for Southern Africa in
general and South Africa in particular – which that led at the time of Maputo being
jokingly referred to as [The Cape Canaveral of revolution in the sub-continent] -
the relationships with South Africa remained good.
As argued by Venter, ‘ much of the goodwill generated between the two
countries, has stemmed from premier Vorster’s détente policy and from a mutual
acceptance by both nations that while they abhorred each other’s policies, their
economic beds had been made for them by others and that they had better continue
to lie in them’41, indeed Mozambique was receiving direct and indirect aid from
South Africa to the tune of one hundred million US dollars per annum, albeit on a
reduced scale, no restrictions were placed on Mozambican miners’ continued
employment in the gold mines, the port of Maputo, a major but not only route
through which many South African exports and imports were routed continued to
be used albeit at a reduced capacity due to the diminishing labour resources
available in Mozambique that came about as a result of a major exodus of skilled
Portuguese management threatened by the new regime; these and many similar
actions are not those of a government bent on destabilizing a neighboring country.
Other than the internal conflict with the ANC, PAC (Pan African
Congress) and other similarly communist oriented militant organizations, that
conducted a low key resistance conflict against the apartheid regime, South Africa
did not consider itself under any significant threat from its neighboring countries.41 Venter, op. cit., pp. 162-3
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When, in 1976, Mozambique adopted a Marxist-Leninist form of
Government, the military threat to S.A. became alarming due to the deployment of
Soviet intelligence agencies, weapons such as missiles, fighter aircraft, military
advisers and an assorted number of other offensive weaponry. Furthermore, the
Frelimo government allowed Umkonto I Swize, the armed wing of the ANC, as
well as other liberation movements to have operational bases inside Mozambique,
a fact vehemently denied by the authorities; it is ironic that Nelson Mandela, then
imprisoned on Roben Island, knew of such assistance as he later recalls in his
autobiography, ‘Thousands of our young people that left the country to join our
own liberation movement, were trained in our camps in Algeria, Tanzania and
Mozambique. There is nothing more encouraging in prison as learning that the
people outside are supporting the cause for which you are inside’42
Al Venter illustrates the above points by describing what happened in
Mozambique after Machel signed an agreement in Moscow in 1976. Inter alia,
‘The Soviet Union would provide military assistance to Mozambique in the form of
weapons, equipment, advisers, liaison staff and instructors. The Soviets were also
to supply (Extra Military Means) in the case of (External Aggression) [with
obvious reference to S.A.]’43
By mid 1976, South Africa, as well as most western observers were
worried about the military developments in Mozambique as the Indian Ocean was
fast becoming a bridgehead for Soviet expansionism in the area44, with the Soviet
fleet having access to the ports of Maputo, Quelimane, Beira and Nacala, backed
42 Nelson Mandela ‘Long Walk to Freedom’ BCA London 1995 p471.43 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg 1977, . ( Chapter viii, Mozambique: The Marxist Oligarchy). P.147.44 idem, ibid.
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by an intelligence service in Maputo totally out of proportion to the normal
requirements that are generally accepted within the realm of diplomatic relations
between two nations.
Other than the setting up of SNASP, the Mozambican new security police
along the lines of the KGB and the GRU, the Soviets, under the leadership of Boris
Nikolayvich45 was responsible for the setting up of an organization to co-ordinate
the activities of the underground South Africa communist party and its ally the
ANC, South Africa was the last domino in Soviet expansionism in the African sub-
continent.
The cold war that was prevailing at the time, led western nations to resort
to rhetoric rather than action, and S.A. felt isolated and threatened by events taking
place in its neighboring countries: Angola had been handed over by the Portuguese
to the communist Agostinho Neto’s MPLA movement, in the same fashion as
Mozambique, at the expense of Holden Roberto’s FNLA, Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA,
and FLEC, the freedom movement of the enclave of Cabinda, with the added
problem of a strong presence of the Cuban army to prop up the illegal new regime.
South Africa’s involvement in the civil war by actively, albeit covertly
supporting Renamo was an act of self-defense and gave further legitimate
justification to the conflict. In conclusion, did South Africa’s intervention have the
desired effect? In the light of above paragraph’s I would like to suggest that it
assisted in restoring democracy in Mozambique, and struck a blow to the Soviet’s
presence in the sub-continent and facilitated the ‘Demise of Marxist orientated
governments in Southern Africa’46 it set the tone for the eventual ‘Formation of a
45 idem, ibid.46 Carlos Santos ‘West and Marxists in Africa’ Cape Times 19/03/1978.
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confederation of non-Marxist Southern African Sates soon after South Africa
settles with all its population groups,’ 47
The civil war in Mozambique occurred because a nation wanted freedom,
but the 17-year event was interconnected with regional and international
developments prevailing at the time. Ten years after the conflict ended, South
Africa has settled internally, the SADA a powerful regional body dedicated to the
socio-economic development of the region involving all Southern African nations
is functioning well for the benefit of all, the South African active involvement and
the positive results that it helped to bring about are another indication as to the
justification for the civil war.
Peace Returns to Mozambique and the Region:
‘The End Result’
We the demise of the Soviet Union on the horizon, I overtly returned to
Mozambique in August of 1989, on a visit that - until 1993 - was to be the first of
many, and experienced first hand the human and physical devastation that had
taken place. In my mind there was often the question: was this civil war, that was
not yet ended, justified? During those four years, I traveled extensively in the
interior, assisting in what were then the early stages of returning to normality. In
the process I met with my friends, many still in Government, and with countless
innocent bystanders caught up in the conflict.
47 IBID.
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My observations, at the time shared by many, were that both Frelimo and
Renamo were exhausted by the fighting, and looming political change in South
Africa, as well as the end of the Cold War, had improved the international
environment for peace.
At the fifth congress of the Frelimo Party held in Maputo during July of
1989, the Mozambican Government abandoned its Marxist Leninist system of
governance and replaced it with a 0ne Party Democratic System that immediately
drew opposition from the Renamo leadership and widespread consternation among
the populace. Frelimo was at all costs trying to hold onto power without the
consent of the people.
The one party democracy rationale was made public by Jose Luis Cabaco,
Frelimo’s External General Secretary and a childhood friend of mine, who at the
time argued:
‘People say we are a one party state. We are not a one party state, we are a one
party democracy… it is difficult to explain this to Westerners because the West has
such short memories of its own history [democratic history] (…) and are too
narrow minded to understand that a one party state is a product of African culture
and history and not a product of ideology… those foreign interests, and I am
talking about racist colonialist people, are forcing us to have talks with Renamo
and treat them as a valid opposition, understand only too well how this would
threaten our sovereignty and independence… they do not wish to change the
government of Mozambique, they do not even want Renamo to share power, they
just want Renamo to be recognized as an opposition which can then be mobilized as
a destabilizing force…’48.
48 Part of interview with Dr. Cabaco ‘Political Puzzles’ The New Internationalist, No.192 February 1989 pp14/5.
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The above illustrates the Frelimo political paranoia prevailing at the time.
When, as his guest in August of 1989, he tried to explain to me the political
scenario confronting his government, I cautioned Cabaco how such views would
only prolong the civil war, which it did until a ceasefire that became known as the
General Peace Agreement (GPA) between Frelimo and Renamo was signed in
Rome on 4 October 1992. The effective date for the cease-fire was on the 15 th of
October 1992 and a UN Peace Keeping Force (ONUMOZ) oversaw the two-year
transition period to democracy, leaving the country in early 1995.
Despite many setbacks, which were painstakingly overcome - such as the
protracted part of the peace negotiations that led Frelimo to introduce
constitutional changes providing for political pluralism and free speech -
Mozambique’s first multi party elections were held in 1994. They returned Frelimo
and the moderate and reformist president Chissano to power with 56% of the vote,
with Renamo attaining a credible 41%, and 3% going to a myriad of minor
political parties. In 1998, the country’s first municipal democratic elections in 33
urban areas took place with an almost equal share between Frelimo and Renamo,
ensuring that the political opposition will continue to have an important role in
Mozambique’s maturing democracy.
Conclusion
In the introduction to this dissertation, I indicated that in order to assess the justification for the civil war in Mozambique, I looked as a yardstick to the generally accepted conventions of traditional just war theory, that I have explained in an earlier
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paragraph. In particular, I looked at the jus ad bellum conventions of just war theory.
My rationale is that I see no difference between a war between states and a war between peoples within a state, if both can be regarded as bounded political communities, possessing legitimate and widely accepted authority, and following ethical principles in the pursuit of warfare. Nonetheless, I have yet to come across a similar perspective applied, in particular, to civil conflicts such as that of Mozambique. Authors have dabbled with the application of just war theory to secessionist movements, and also to terrorist or guerrilla movements, but to my knowledge there is no literature attempting to consider whether or not civil wars were justly initiated/justified ( jus ad bellum ), nor whether they were justly conducted ( jus in bello ). In trying to answer whether the Mozambican conflict, in its tremendous magnitude as a human tragedy but also as a political shift in the southern African socio-political arena, was justified from such a tradition of thought, I hope to have also
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given a modest and incipient contribution to stimulate such a needed analysis of civil conflicts. I hope that they will not forever remain outside the pale and purview of some sort of ethical framework.
As we have seen in the sections above, the essential criteria of jus ad bellum – just cause, proper authority, right intention and end result – can all be applied to the civil war that shook my country for so long, and its key players. The method is thus justified – but what of the war itself?
Peace appears to be firmly established, with no political violence since
1994. There has been a return to the rule of law, the freedoms of worship, speech
and movement. The rights to private ownership, of free enterprise and of where
and how to educate one’s children have been restored. Despite all the suffering and
grief associated with the 17-year war, there was always hope that some day the
principles of freedom, equality and liberty would be attained, and they have.
In the light of the aforementioned sequence of events, I would suggest that under
all the circumstances that I have expounded, and particularly according to the
criteria of jus ad bellum, the civil war in Mozambique was justified.
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