PhD PROPOSAL

THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE AS A CASE STUDY IN THE JUS AD

BELLUM CONVENTION OF JUST WAR THEORY

BROTHERS (UP) IN ARMS:

WAS THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIFIED?

CONTENTS

I. A Personal Interest.............................................................................7

II. Just War Theory.................................................................................11

III. Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)...........................14

IV. The High Jacking of Mozambique.....................................................16

V. The Frelimo Oligarchy Enslaves Mozambique.................................19

VI. Renamo: A Legitimate Representative of The People. .23VII. Rhodesia and South Africa: The Right Intention...........25VIII. Peace Returns to Mozambique and The Region...........32

Conclusion.............................................................................34Bibliography...................................................................................................36

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3

BROTHERS (UP) IN ARMS:

WAS THE CIVIL WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE JUSTIFIED?

A Personal Interest

The civil war in Mozambique (1976-92) between the liberation movement

Renamo and the Frelimo government, was one of the bloodiest and longest civil

wars in Africa; with one million dead and three million displaced people - more

than half of which were refugees in neighbouring countries, - it was a war that

happened because a people were denied the opportunity to be free after almost five

centuries of Portuguese influence and rule. The war has also to be seen in the

context of the ‘Cold War’ prevailing at the time and how the struggle for power

between East and West that is between Communism and Democracy was the cause

of yet another innocent bystander in global affairs sinking into fratricidal violence.

My interest in the conflict, and what motivated me to write and to propose a

doctoral thesis on its moral justification, is a very personal one.

I was born in the country on 13/10/1940 and was as a student at the Salazar

National lyceum in the 50’s, one of many young Mozambicans who held very

strong critical views on Portuguese colonialism.

As a result of major problems of a political nature that I encountered with

the Portuguese Education Authorities, my parents sent me to South Africa in 1957

at the age of 17 to continue my studies and I became a citizen of that country in the

4

early 1960’s, to avoid military service in Mozambique, where the Portuguese were

fighting various Mozambican liberation movements.

Many of my childhood and school friends in Mozambique went on to

become leading figures in the various liberation movements, in particular Frelimo.

To name but a few they are the former President Chissano, a childhood friend the

former minister of information, and chief party ideologue from 1975 to 1991, Dr.

Jose Luis Cabaco and many other officials.

Until 1972, I visited the country on numerous occasions and kept in touch

with most of my friends. My visits came to an abrupt end in September of that

year, when I was detained and “tactically debriefed” by the then Portuguese

security police PIDE1 on allegations of anti-Portuguese activities during the 50’s

and the 60’s.

Despite the independence of Mozambique in 1975 that gave rise to great

expectations of freedom, equality and liberty, I never returned until 1989, at the

time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reason for my absence was my

knowledge that Frelimo, to whom the country was handed over by Portugal, had

transformed itself (as I will argue later in thispresentation), from the original pro

democracy liberation movement under Eduardo Mondlane into a Marxist Leninist

movement under Samora Machel a great admirer of Stalin, after the assassination

of Mondlane in Dar- es- Salaam, 1966.

During the above mentioned period I kept in touch with many former

Frelimo dissidents, who became to varying degrees members of Renamo, and in

the late 70’s early 80’s I assisted the South African security establishment in 1 Hans Strydom ’22 Days of Terror for SA Man in LM Prison’ ’The Sunday Times Johannesburg, November 1972.

5

assessing certain aspects of the civil war, in particular the interpretation of

speeches by the Frelimo leadership.

My close friendship with many South African journalists - in particular Al

Venter2 - from whose book I quote extensively also gave me a great insight into the

origins of the conflict.

This dissertation, then, is an enquiry into the civil war in Mozambique

between Renamo (formerly MNR, Mozambican National Resistance) and Frelimo

(Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) as well as the covert participation by

South Africa in the conflict. The objective is to ascertain whether there was just

cause for the concerned parties to engage in conflict and whether Renamo in the

first instance and South Africa in the second instance were justified respectively

initiating and engaging in the civil war.

Such an enquiry is important for although The Mozambican Civil war has

been well documented, in this instance by Cabrita (2000)3, Hall and Young

(1997)4, Vines (1996)5, Newitt (1995)6 , Venter (1977)7 et al, where one can clearly

follow the origins, causes, conduct and end result of the conflict, no arguments

2Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa, Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg, 1977.

3 Joao M. Cabrita ‘Mozambique, the Tortuous Road to Democracy’ Palgrave, Hampshire 2000.

4Margaret Hall, Tom Young ‘Confronting the Leviathan, Mozambique Since Independence’ Hurst &Co. London,

1997.5Alex Vines ‘ RENAMO, From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?’ Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York 1996. 6 Malyn Newitt ‘A History of Mozambique’ C. Hurst &Co. London 1995.

7 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa, Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg, 1977.

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have ever been advanced nor debated – to my knowledge - as to the justification

for the conflict itself, or the part played by the main actors as outlined above.

Such debates and assessments are common in the instance of wars between

Nations, as exemplified by the recent debate on the legality cum justification for

the war on Iraq, but the literature is poor in such discourses pertaining to civil

wars. This may well be because just war theory, in its classical formulation,

confers legitimacy to engage in (just) war only to state-actors, which is a lacuna

not often dealt with8. Thus, albeit more as a byproduct of this proposal than as a

central aim, I will nonetheless demonstrate how the framework of just war theory –

in particular the precepts of jus ad bellum – can easily and fruitfully be applied to

warring political communities other than recognized Sovereign States.

In this instance I will assess the character, role and motivation of Renamo -

the main protagonist in opposing the dictatorial Frelimo regime on behalf of a large

number of Mozambicans - as well as that of South Africa that, albeit covertly, was

a major protagonist in supporting the rebel movement.

In assessing whether a war is justified, the traditional yardstick is what has

become known as Just War Theory. That I shall examine in the next section, and I

will suggest that under the ante bellum circumstances prevailing at the time, the

civil war in Mozambique was unavoidable, was conducted by competent

authorities, was a measure of last resort, that there was just cause, and that it

provided the desired end result.

In addressing a topic as the one of this dissertation, one should be as

objective as one can possibly be. Thus, a word on methodology is in order.

8 Although some authors have experimented with applying just war theory to non-state actors. See, for instance, Andrew Valls’ (2000) attempt to apply just war theory to terrorist acts.

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I am fully aware that because of my intimate knowledge and occasional

involvement in the conflict, it is not an easy task to avoid the trap of subjectivity

and will thus rely on an approach of radical empiricism, often used in

anthropological research. ‘Unlike traditional empiricism which draws a definite

boundary between method and object, radical empiricism denies the validity of

such cuts and makes the interplay between these domains the focus of its interest.9

Radical empiricism means the acknowledgement of the ethnographer’s

[Researcher’s] subjective position rather than the denial of it. Jackson points out

that rather than being a scientific method to accurately describe a situation, it is

probable that ‘objectivity serves more as a magical token, bolstering our sense of

self in disorienting situations’10. This would certainly seem the case in my

dissertation.

Just War Theory

Western just war theories as we postulate them today, can be traced as far

back in history as Cicero (106-43 BC), who believed in universal standards, having

the view that there was a ‘society of mankind [cosmopolitanism] rather than

states’11 (a view which, as we shall see further on, supports our general theoretical

framework).

9 Michael Jackson ‘Paths towards a clearing: radical empiricism and ethnographic enquiry’, 1989, p.310 idem, ibid., p.411 David J. Bederman, ‘Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius’ De jus Belli Ac Pacis’, Emory International Law Review, 1996.

8

St. Augustine (354-430 AD)12, in turn, proposed that there should be duties

of just treatment of prisoners and conquered peoples, saying that mercy should be

shown to the vanquished, particularly if they are no longer a threat to peace.

Thomas Aquinas, who in the ‘Summa Theologica’ 13 presents the general

outline of what becomes the just war theory, suggested that there should be three

tests for the justification for war, namely: just cause, competent authority and right

intention.

Post St. Augustine thinkers, as exemplified by Grotius (1583-1645), looked

at just war theories from a secular point of view, and suggested that there are three

basic criteria for a war to be just and justified: firstly, that the danger faced by a

nation is immediate, secondly that the force used is necessary to adequately defend

the nation’s interests and thirdly that the use of force is proportionate to the

threatened danger.

Michael Walzer, among so many other contemporary political thinkers who

have further refined western just war theories (that are well articulated in the

‘Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy’14), has suggested that just war theory can

be divided into four main parts, namely: ante bellum, that concerns the socio

economic and political scenario prevailing at the time; jus ad bellum, that concerns

the justice and justification for going to war; jus in bello, that refers to the conduct

of war; and jus post bellum, that concerns post war peace agreements etc.

12 In ‘Augustine: Political Writings’ Michael W. Tkacz and Douglas Kries, trans, Ernest L. Fortin and Douglas Kries, eds., 1994.13 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Just War Theory’ http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm as downloaded on06/05/02.14 Orend, Brian, "War", The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/war/>.

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As indicated in my introduction, I will now briefly elaborate on the jus ad

bellum aspects of western just war theory. According to the Stanford

Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the rules of jus ad bellum are the responsibility of

nations and their heads of government, and it is in this norm that there exists a

lacuna in western just war theory that, with particular reference to current events,

and the absence of reference to civil wars, has led many contemporary political

theorists to suggest that the theory should be upgraded and modernized to keep

pace with the accelerating changes in the concepts of war and other bellicose

conflicts.

The jus ad bellum convention requires that five basic principles be met:

1. Just Cause, that basically can mean self defense from aggression, the protection

of innocents or, as Walzer puts it, ‘simply resistance from aggression’.

2. Proper Authority, meaning that the state has to be recognized by other states

and that a declaration to engage in war must be made to the enemy as well as to the

citizens of the nation concerned.

3. The Possession of Right Intention, meaning that a war should only be waged for

the cause of justice and not for self- interest or aggrandizement.

4. Last Resort, meaning that all other means (i.e. diplomatic efforts or any other

reasonable means must be exhausted.)

5. Probability of Reasonable Success, meaning that whatever the aimed result is,

in order to address the particular just cause, has at the outset to have a reasonable

chance of succeeding.

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Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)

Frelimo, as will be discussed in the next paragraph, was the liberation

movement to whom Portugal, under extreme controversial circumstances, handed

over their colony Mozambique and the origins of the organization deserves closer

scrutiny.

As a norm, the origins of most African liberation movements are very

confusing in that the final ‘product’ is often the sum total of many other groupings,

with many diverse opinions and agendas, that for one reason or another - in many

instances pure expediency in fighting a common enemy - have amalgamated into a

prominent organization. Frelimo is no exception.

The literature on Frelimo is abundant and often confusing. It suffices to say

that from the 1920’s some form of protest organizations pleading for better living

conditions for Mozambicans came into being and that according to Gibson 15

Frelimo was created by a merger in June 1962 of the three existing Mozambican

African nationalist movements Udenamo, Manu and Unami, with Eduardo

Mondlane as its first president, a new found unity that was to be very short lived,

and Frelimo continued to be beset by continued fierce faction fighting, ideological,

ethnic and personal rivalries, assassinations, defections and splits.

Gibson further elaborates that the existence of any unity was largely due to

the active concern of president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who had granted

Frelimo major bases in his country from which to launch its struggle against the

Portuguese and the necessity on the part of Frelimo to justify the extensive material 15 Richard Gibson ‘African Liberation Movements’ Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 276-280

11

support that they were receiving from the African Liberation Committee and the

Organization of African States.

The assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in Dar-es-Salaam on then 3rd of

February1969, precipitated an hysterical sequence of accusations and counter-

accusations within Frelimo and Tanzanian officials, such as a possible CIA

involvement as well as the dreaded Portuguese Security police PIDE, but as

Cabrita suggests ‘the full circumstances surrounding Mondlane’s assassination

shall only be known when Tanzania discloses the findings of its investigations

conducted with the help of Scotland Yard and Interpol’.16

For a short period after the assassination, a three man Presidential Council

comprising the vice president Uria Simango, Marcelino dos Santos and the military

commander Samora Machel led the movement for a short period that was

highlighted by numerous purges within the organization17. By 1969, Simango and

many other high ranking officials had been expelled from the party, and Samora

Machel with Marcelino dos Santos as his deputy assumed the party leadership.

Samora Machel was a revolutionary who was not only dedicated to throwing

the Portuguese out of Mozambique but also radically changing the society and is

reported to have said at the time that’ Of all the things we have done, the most

important-the one that history will record as the principal contribution of our

generation-is that we understand how to turn a armed struggle into a revolution;

that we realized that it was essential to create a new mentality to build a new

society.’18

16 Cabrita, op cit., pp. 58-917 idem, ibid, pp. 63-6818 http://www.jlhs.nhusd.Social Science/Mozambique/Samora Machel

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Following independence in 1975, Machel as the first president of

Mozambique called for Frelimo to organize itself into a Leninist party, a highly

organized single political party and proceeded to put his revolutionary principles

into practice. As a Marxist, he called for the nationalization of all private property,

industries, commerce, health services, education and the abolishment of religion.

His systematic destruction of the traditional fabric of society led eventually led to a

bloody and protracted civil war that will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The High Jacking of Mozambique. ‘The ante bellum Scenario’

On the 25th April 1974, the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) seized power

in Portugal, and the new Portuguese Government burdened with the human and

financial costs of their colonial wars, one of the main causes for their revolution,

decided to relinquish its colonies.

As aptly recorded by Hall and Young19 the new regime in Portugal, then

headed by general Spinola, almost immediately started negotiations with the main

Mozambican liberation movement Frelimo, and in May of 1974 a senior member

of the junta, general Costa Gomes, visited Mozambique, appealing to Frelimo for a

cease fire and to enter negotiations to end the war.

The Portuguese proposed that the people of the colony would choose some

kind of arrangement between the ‘extremes of independence and the status quo at a

planned referendum’. It was the intention of the Portuguese government to grant a

19 Margaret Hall, Tom Young ‘Confronting Leviathan, Mozambique Since Independence’ Hurst &Co. London, 1997. pp. 40-43

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great deal of autonomy to the colony, while still maintaining ties with the

‘motherland’ within a framework of ‘Lusophonic Commonwealth’ comprising all

former colonies. This view was not shared by the left wing senior army officers in

Portugal, led by Major Mello Antunes that had close ideological ties with Frelimo.

It is further recorded that Frelimo saw no need to compromise its demand

for full independence under its sole leadership, without any referendum or other

popular consultation on the country’s future, and refused to concede a ceasefire

until their demands were met,

‘Indeed, increasingly aware of the contradictory currents within the Portuguese

government over decolonization, Frelimo stepped up the war ,calibrating the exercise

of military pressure with a negotiating strategy which sought simultaneously to

weaken the Spinola faction and to strengthen the left wing one that was favorable to

their own position’.20

The continuation of the conflict eventually led to further formal and

informal negotiations between the parties, which in turn led to a cease fire on the

8th September 1974, with the Portuguese side still committed to a referendum and

unwilling to concede to Frelimo’s demands, which comprised their legitimacy as

the sole representative of the peoples of Mozambique, the recognition of the

people’s right to complete independence and the immediate transfer of power to

Frelimo.

It is important to note that while the negotiations that led to the cease fire

were taking place, there were a number of secret meetings in Dar es Salaam

between Frelimo and the left wing elements of the Portuguese regime, this time led 20 Margaret Hall, Tom Young ‘Confronting the Leviathan, Mozambique Since Independence’ Hurst &Co. London, 1997. p 42

14

by Mario Soares (at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs and soon to be Prime

Minister) after the demise of General Spinola, Major Antunes and Almeida Santos

a well known left wing Portuguese lawyer with longstanding connections with

Mozambique and Frelimo, where a secret protocol was signed recognizing Frelimo

as the sole legitimate and authentic representatives of Mozambique21.

The events mentioned above laid the foundations for the final negotiations

that took place in Lusaka on 5-7 September 1974, in which Portugal ceded to all

Frelimo’s demands. By the end of September 1974, the Portuguese government

and Frelimo signed the Lusaka Accord, allowing the transfer of power to Frelimo

without prior elections. On the 25th of June 1975, Mozambique became an

independent one party State, with Frelimo as the sole legal party led by Samora

Moises Machel.

As I argued in 1978, ‘Mozambique was sold to a militarily defeated

Frelimo by the signing of the Lusaka Agreement, made easy by the withdrawal of

troops from Mozambique which were replaced by Portuguese communist-

orientated battalions’, 22 that aided and abetted Frelimo’s illegal transition to

power, well documented in Al Venter’s ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and

Frustration’ .23

The Frelimo Oligarchy Enslaves Mozambique.

‘The Just Cause’

21 Hall and Young, op cit., p.4322 Carlos Santos ‘West and Marxists in Africa’ Cape Times 19/03/1978.23 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg 1977, . (Chapter viii, Mozambique: The Marxist Oligarchy). Pp. 142-165.

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From the outset, the new Mozambican government showed through its

actions that it was totally divorced from the ethos envisaged by its founder

Eduardo Mondlane, who was assassinated in 1969. Mondlane’s vision24 as

recorded by his widow Jeanette in 1985, was very much anthropocentric and he

would not have agreed with decisions taken after independence, ‘many of them

allied to the violation of the idea of the right to individual freedom’, ‘that ideology

is not more important than people’ and that he would have opposed the direction

taken by the new regime.

What happened in Mozambique was that it shifted from one form of totalitarianism

to another and, as Cabrita suggests, ‘ more specifically from Fascism to Leninism’,

although history has subsequently informed us that it was very much a Stalinist

type of regime.

From day one, Samora Machel who was the head of state and government,

the speaker of the parliament, the chief justice and the head of the armed forces,

indicated that ‘the new Mozambican regime was prepared to go to great lengths to

impose the will of the government by forcing those who refuse those who accept

such an imposition and to repress those who oppose such a will’25.

With the introduction of a Marxist Leninist form of government run along

the lines of Stalinism, the people soon found themselves in the grip of fear through

intimidation, the nationalization of homes, the elimination of private medicine and

law practices, private education that was replaced with government schools alike,

modeled on the Soviet system of education, and the nationalization of the press 24 ? Joao M. Cabrita ‘Mozambique, The Tortuous Road to Democracy’ Palgrave, Hampshire 2000.

25 As quoted by Cabrita 2000, p85 from a speech by Machel reported in ‘voz da revolucao’ [the voice of the revolution], Maputo 1975.

16

under the government control. Frelimo was the State with the Nation taking second

place.

Freedom of worship was denied to the people of Mozambique by the

banning and closure of all churches and missions. In line with this purge on

religion, any form of baptism was prohibited , foreign church missions that for

decades had been on the forefront of providing basic education for the masses

came under particular heavy attack, their bank accounts being frozen while they

were being investigated. It was suggested at the time26 that the Soviet Union played

a major role in these developments.

‘The Jehovah’s Witnesses were particularly singled out as they

consistently refused to swear allegiance or indeed to recognize Frelimo as the

ruling party’. The biggest looser was the Roman Catholic Church, despite the fact

that during the war of independence many of its office bearers were pro Frelimo

apologists and were a powerful force for the elimination of colonial principles.

‘Other foreign religious missions under pressure were The Church of the

Apostles, an American body, The Church of the Nazarene, the Swiss Mission

particularly known for their skills in education, The United Apostolic Church of

Zion a powerful Christian organization with millions of adepts in Southern Africa,

The Assembly of God and many others.

More disturbing is what President Samora Machel has done to an estimated

50000 political prisoners held in a string of labor camps established in remote areas

of northern Mozambique27 the elimination of opposition parties such as Rev. Uria

26 Venter, op cit., p. 15027 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg 1977, p.160

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T. Simango’s Fumo (Front for the Unification of Mozambique), ‘ Who broke from

Frelimo in the late 1960’s because it was edging too close to the Soviet camp [this

was after the assassination in 1969 of Frelimo’s founder Dr. Eduardo Mondlane

when the leadership was taken over by Samora Machel]’ 28. Joana Simiao, a

Sorbonne educated leader of 4 million Makua tribesmen from Central

Mozambique, who had remained implacably opposed to Frelimos’ doctrines and

many other pro democracy parties and movements were also banned and outlawed.

Of great significance for the majority of the people of Mozambique was

the abolishment of the traditional tribal system. According to Venter29, Machel

decreed that forthwith there would be no tribes in Mozambique, but only

Mozambicans ‘which is like telling the Arabs they are no longer Muslims’. Machel

further abolished the offices of chieftainships and many tribal heads and their

followers resisted the change, went into hiding and became a component of the

new resistance to overthrow the new government by force very much in the same

way that Frelimo fought Portuguese authority in the decade long guerrilla war of

liberation.

Against the background of political parties and movements banned and

many of their leaders killed or imprisoned, with civil liberties removed from

citizens and a non existent rule of law to afford protection to the citizens, any hope

of the dreamed of democratic process was eliminated. The people were in a worst

situation when compared with colonial rule and were ruthlessly dealt with when

attempting to address their plight, the implementation of all these acts that removed

all the freedom from the people was achieved through the use of the new security

police (SNASP) created in October 1975, an organization molded along the lines 28 idem, ibid, P.155.

29 idem, ibid., p. 145

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of the KGB in the Soviet Union as I will expound on when I discuss the role of

South Africa in the civil war.

I would like to suggest that at the above- mentioned stage of the history of

Mozambique; its peoples were denied ‘equality as equality of fair opportunity,

liberal equality and democratic equality.’30

In a thesis for an MA in politics ‘Civil Wars In Africa, Causes and

Effects’31 Ahmad Mahmoud suggests that Africa’s civil wars break out due to a set

of motives some of which relate to the political and social structures, while others

are closely linked with outside intervention in the continent’s internal struggles.

I concur with his assessment, as that was very much the case of the

Mozambican civil war under discussion. It broke out firstly as a result of the taking

over of power by the undemocratic Frelimo regime, followed shortly afterwards by

the establishment of a Marxist Leninist system of government with the social

constraints and loss of freedom imposed by such regimes, and the outside

influences imposed upon the region by the main cold war rivals namely the USA

and the USSR, alongside with their respective allies or sympathizing nations.

In recent correspondence with a friend, I was reminded that ‘A wise

professor once commented that governments should not act like the criminals

they’re set to protect us from. Legitimacy, accordingly, vanishes once a ruling

party becomes a criminal regime and aggresses against the people and property of

its jurisdiction’32 and had no option but to as a last resort engage in civil war that as

30 John Rawls ‘A Theory of Justice’ Oxford University Press, Revised Edition 1999, p. 57.31 Ahmad Mahmoud Abdel Atti ‘Civil Wars in Africa, Causes and Effects’ African Perspective, Fourth Issue- Winter 2000-2001. http://www.sis.gov.eg/public/africanmag/issue04/html/enafr13html as downloaded on 22/05/02.32 Dr. Alexander Moseley in private correspondence with the author March 22, 2004

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mentioned in earlier paragraphs was conducted by the majority of Mozambicans

under the Renamo banner.

Renamo: A Legitimate Representative of the People

‘The Proper Authority’

One of the preoccupations of the theorists of Just War Theories from Saint

Thomas Aquinas who in the ‘Summa Theologica’ 33 presents the general outline of

what becomes the just war theory, through to modern thinkers such as Michael

Walzer, is the competence of Nations to engage in war. Modern Just War Theory

disregards civil wars and hence there is an obvious lacuna that should be

addressed.

In the case of civil wars in which normally a section of the population

enters into war with the ruling government as a result of the case in this conflict ‘A

national grievance where the performance of a government is held to be against

the national interest’,34 I looked at ‘The Libertarian Just War Theory’ to justify the

competence of Renamo, ‘The war must be declared by a competent authority, and

against a proper enemy. The proper authority to exercise a right of self- defense

against an aggressor is the individual whose rights have been violated or his /her

designated agent’. 35

33 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Just War Theory’ http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm as downloaded on06/05/02.34 K.Y.Amoako, UN Under-Secretary- General and Executive Secretary of Economic Commission for Africa ‘The Economic Consequences of Civil Wars and Unrest in Africa’ address to the 70th ordinary session of the council of the Organization of African Unity, Algeria, 8 July 1999. http://www.afbis.com as downloaded on 22/05/02.35‘Libertarian Just War Theory’ http://www.nonaggression/justwar.html as downloaded on 05/07/02.

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In the fifteen months between the Portuguese revolution of 25 April 1974,

and the controversial independence of Mozambique on the 25 th of September 1975,

there were a number of attempts to put together a viable opposition movement

against Frelimo, the most important one at the time was the 7 th of September 1974

revolt when dissatisfied Mozambicans led by dissatisfied Portuguese whites,

attempted to seize power by taking control of the radio station amid much

pomposity and bravado. As Venter36 aptly puts it: ‘this was nor totally unexpected

and a little more determination and perhaps a few moments of courage and a few

more single minded individuals might have pulled if off. Especially as Frelimo was

strung pretty thin on the ground at that stage their power structure was very much

vulnerable to internal dissent’.

As I have elaborated on in the previous paragraph the traumatic events that

followed, only reinforced Mozambicans desire to liberate themselves, resulting in

many Mozambicans of all origins, color, belief, religion ethnicity and race

gathering together in the central Manica and Sofala province of Mozambique,

where the various representatives decided to join efforts in order to defeat and

remove communism from Mozambique and thus, Renamo (Resistencia National

Mocambicana) led by Andre Matade Matsangaissa, a former Frelimo commander,

was founded in 1976 Upon his violent death in 1978, Afonso Dhlakama was

democratically elected as the new leader of the liberation movement.

There is a general perception that Renamo was not a genuine liberation

movement representing many Mozambicans but the creation of the then isolated

Jan Smith’s Rhodesian government and that subsequently after Zimbabwe under

Robert Mugabe gained independence the movement was taken over by South

Africa became a tool of alleged destabilization policies towards the Frelimo 36 Venter, op. cit., p.145

21

regime. These perceptions fanned by the writings and observations of, inter alia,

(Vines, 1996), (Hall and Young, 1997) and (Newitt, 1995) are not entirely a true

reflection of the events and I shall brief deal with the subject in my next chapter.

Rhodesia and South Africa:

“The Right Intention”

Despite Rhodesia’s internal settlement and a black majority government

led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1972 having being democratically elected, Great

Britain insisted on facilitating communist oriented freedom movements namely

Robert Mugabe’s Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo’s Zanu and Sithole’s Zapu, all of

whom had refused to participate in the elections, to eventually come to power in

1980 after the signing of the Lancaster House agreement.

In the interim period, Frelimo came to power, and from 1975, Mugabe had

operational bases in Mozambique that facilitated his movement’s terrorist activities

in Rhodesia. With the denial of Rhodesia’s access to the port of Beira by the new

Mozambican government, Rhodesia facilitated the re-organization and

continuation of an anti-Frelimo guerrilla movement that had been created by the

former Portuguese security police PIDE/DGS, comprised mainly of the

Mozambican Diaspora who had fled their country after the Frelimo takeover.

These were to become the core of Renamo’s military after it’s inception in 197637

It is thus reasonable to suggest that Rhodesia’s actions, and continued

support for Renamo until 1980, can be construed as an act of self- defense against

a foreign country’s aggressive interference in its territorial integrity, and that the 37 Hall and Young, op. cit. pp. 117-123

22

Rhodesian government was fully justified in getting involved in the civil war in

Mozambique.

Albeit in a covert manner, South Africa also played a major role in the

civil war under discussion, decisively affecting the outcome of the war by having

covertly assisted Renamo following the Zimbabwean independence in 1980.

Having previously mentioned that many political authors and historians

have through their accounts of the war assisted in creating the general impression

that the Mozambique Civil War was South Africa’s war, and by implication not a

justified conflict, I will briefly elaborate on some of those accounts, that are either

dismissive of South Africa’s foreign policy prevailing at the time or totally devoid

from the actual facts.

According to Vieira et al.38 ‘the South African regime knowing that that it

was militarily and politically impossible to turn Mozambique into a Bantustan,

tried to make the existence and functioning of any kind of organized society

enviable. It defined its strategy as the devastation of Mozambique and of its

capacity for later recovery’. I would like to suggest that this assessment is

incorrect, as South Africa was at the time, as will be discussed later, not

particularly concerned about developments in Mozambique as illustrated in an

assessment by Ellis and Sechaba39 that ‘the idea that South Africa feared invidious

comparison with Mozambique’s successes ( an important part of Frelimo

propaganda, endlessly repeated in the academic literature) seems bizarre,

although this does not mean that Frelimo’s victory did not have a symbolic value

for young South African blacks’.

38 Vieira, Martin & Wallerstein ‘How Fast the Wind? Southern Africa 1975-2000 p.216.39 Ellis and Sechaba ‘Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and The South African Communist Party in Exile’ p75

23

One of the most important factors of the civil war in the 1980’s was the

South Africans; ‘the precise determinants and objectives of whose foreign policy

during this period remain obscure, although some of the more florid explanations

are hardly worthy of discussion’40. Coming from such distinguished academics, I

find this kind of suggestion intriguing as South Africa’s foreign policy prevailing

at the time and in particular in its relationship with Africa was clear-cut and was

based on the non-interference in the internal affairs of their neighboring states and

one of mutual economic co-operation.

South Africa had always had a policy of non-interference in the internal

affairs of other countries. Despite the abhorrent apartheid laws that as far as I

recollect were not only being opposed by nationalist movements such as the ANC

but also by the powerful internal and multi racial liberal lobby, the country had a

whites only multi party form of democracy, was a member of the United Nations,

had diplomatic relations with most nations, fought in both world wars on the side

of the allied forces and was thus in international law, competent to engage in

hostilities with other nations whenever if felt threatened.

It should be noted that Prime Minister John Vorster had been engaged in

detente or constructive engagement, with a number of independent African nations

in West and East Africa such as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Zambia etc. the same

happened in relations between S.A. and Mozambique when the latter obtained

independence from Portugal in 1975.

From Independence Day on 25 September 1975 and in line with South

Africa’s foreign policies towards African nations pertaining at the time, the South 40 Hall and Young, op cit., p.120

24

African government went to great lengths to maintain cordial relations with the

new Mozambican government.

Despite Samora Machel’s continued bellicose rhetoric, preaching

revolution and liberation not only for his country, but for Southern Africa in

general and South Africa in particular – which that led at the time of Maputo being

jokingly referred to as [The Cape Canaveral of revolution in the sub-continent] -

the relationships with South Africa remained good.

As argued by Venter, ‘ much of the goodwill generated between the two

countries, has stemmed from premier Vorster’s détente policy and from a mutual

acceptance by both nations that while they abhorred each other’s policies, their

economic beds had been made for them by others and that they had better continue

to lie in them’41, indeed Mozambique was receiving direct and indirect aid from

South Africa to the tune of one hundred million US dollars per annum, albeit on a

reduced scale, no restrictions were placed on Mozambican miners’ continued

employment in the gold mines, the port of Maputo, a major but not only route

through which many South African exports and imports were routed continued to

be used albeit at a reduced capacity due to the diminishing labour resources

available in Mozambique that came about as a result of a major exodus of skilled

Portuguese management threatened by the new regime; these and many similar

actions are not those of a government bent on destabilizing a neighboring country.

Other than the internal conflict with the ANC, PAC (Pan African

Congress) and other similarly communist oriented militant organizations, that

conducted a low key resistance conflict against the apartheid regime, South Africa

did not consider itself under any significant threat from its neighboring countries.41 Venter, op. cit., pp. 162-3

25

When, in 1976, Mozambique adopted a Marxist-Leninist form of

Government, the military threat to S.A. became alarming due to the deployment of

Soviet intelligence agencies, weapons such as missiles, fighter aircraft, military

advisers and an assorted number of other offensive weaponry. Furthermore, the

Frelimo government allowed Umkonto I Swize, the armed wing of the ANC, as

well as other liberation movements to have operational bases inside Mozambique,

a fact vehemently denied by the authorities; it is ironic that Nelson Mandela, then

imprisoned on Roben Island, knew of such assistance as he later recalls in his

autobiography, ‘Thousands of our young people that left the country to join our

own liberation movement, were trained in our camps in Algeria, Tanzania and

Mozambique. There is nothing more encouraging in prison as learning that the

people outside are supporting the cause for which you are inside’42

Al Venter illustrates the above points by describing what happened in

Mozambique after Machel signed an agreement in Moscow in 1976. Inter alia,

‘The Soviet Union would provide military assistance to Mozambique in the form of

weapons, equipment, advisers, liaison staff and instructors. The Soviets were also

to supply (Extra Military Means) in the case of (External Aggression) [with

obvious reference to S.A.]’43

By mid 1976, South Africa, as well as most western observers were

worried about the military developments in Mozambique as the Indian Ocean was

fast becoming a bridgehead for Soviet expansionism in the area44, with the Soviet

fleet having access to the ports of Maputo, Quelimane, Beira and Nacala, backed

42 Nelson Mandela ‘Long Walk to Freedom’ BCA London 1995 p471.43 Al J. Venter ‘Vorster’s Africa Friendship and Frustration’ Ernest Stanton Publishers, Johannesburg 1977, . ( Chapter viii, Mozambique: The Marxist Oligarchy). P.147.44 idem, ibid.

26

by an intelligence service in Maputo totally out of proportion to the normal

requirements that are generally accepted within the realm of diplomatic relations

between two nations.

Other than the setting up of SNASP, the Mozambican new security police

along the lines of the KGB and the GRU, the Soviets, under the leadership of Boris

Nikolayvich45 was responsible for the setting up of an organization to co-ordinate

the activities of the underground South Africa communist party and its ally the

ANC, South Africa was the last domino in Soviet expansionism in the African sub-

continent.

The cold war that was prevailing at the time, led western nations to resort

to rhetoric rather than action, and S.A. felt isolated and threatened by events taking

place in its neighboring countries: Angola had been handed over by the Portuguese

to the communist Agostinho Neto’s MPLA movement, in the same fashion as

Mozambique, at the expense of Holden Roberto’s FNLA, Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA,

and FLEC, the freedom movement of the enclave of Cabinda, with the added

problem of a strong presence of the Cuban army to prop up the illegal new regime.

South Africa’s involvement in the civil war by actively, albeit covertly

supporting Renamo was an act of self-defense and gave further legitimate

justification to the conflict. In conclusion, did South Africa’s intervention have the

desired effect? In the light of above paragraph’s I would like to suggest that it

assisted in restoring democracy in Mozambique, and struck a blow to the Soviet’s

presence in the sub-continent and facilitated the ‘Demise of Marxist orientated

governments in Southern Africa’46 it set the tone for the eventual ‘Formation of a

45 idem, ibid.46 Carlos Santos ‘West and Marxists in Africa’ Cape Times 19/03/1978.

27

confederation of non-Marxist Southern African Sates soon after South Africa

settles with all its population groups,’ 47

The civil war in Mozambique occurred because a nation wanted freedom,

but the 17-year event was interconnected with regional and international

developments prevailing at the time. Ten years after the conflict ended, South

Africa has settled internally, the SADA a powerful regional body dedicated to the

socio-economic development of the region involving all Southern African nations

is functioning well for the benefit of all, the South African active involvement and

the positive results that it helped to bring about are another indication as to the

justification for the civil war.

Peace Returns to Mozambique and the Region:

‘The End Result’

We the demise of the Soviet Union on the horizon, I overtly returned to

Mozambique in August of 1989, on a visit that - until 1993 - was to be the first of

many, and experienced first hand the human and physical devastation that had

taken place. In my mind there was often the question: was this civil war, that was

not yet ended, justified? During those four years, I traveled extensively in the

interior, assisting in what were then the early stages of returning to normality. In

the process I met with my friends, many still in Government, and with countless

innocent bystanders caught up in the conflict.

47 IBID.

28

My observations, at the time shared by many, were that both Frelimo and

Renamo were exhausted by the fighting, and looming political change in South

Africa, as well as the end of the Cold War, had improved the international

environment for peace.

At the fifth congress of the Frelimo Party held in Maputo during July of

1989, the Mozambican Government abandoned its Marxist Leninist system of

governance and replaced it with a 0ne Party Democratic System that immediately

drew opposition from the Renamo leadership and widespread consternation among

the populace. Frelimo was at all costs trying to hold onto power without the

consent of the people.

The one party democracy rationale was made public by Jose Luis Cabaco,

Frelimo’s External General Secretary and a childhood friend of mine, who at the

time argued:

‘People say we are a one party state. We are not a one party state, we are a one

party democracy… it is difficult to explain this to Westerners because the West has

such short memories of its own history [democratic history] (…) and are too

narrow minded to understand that a one party state is a product of African culture

and history and not a product of ideology… those foreign interests, and I am

talking about racist colonialist people, are forcing us to have talks with Renamo

and treat them as a valid opposition, understand only too well how this would

threaten our sovereignty and independence… they do not wish to change the

government of Mozambique, they do not even want Renamo to share power, they

just want Renamo to be recognized as an opposition which can then be mobilized as

a destabilizing force…’48.

48 Part of interview with Dr. Cabaco ‘Political Puzzles’ The New Internationalist, No.192 February 1989 pp14/5.

29

The above illustrates the Frelimo political paranoia prevailing at the time.

When, as his guest in August of 1989, he tried to explain to me the political

scenario confronting his government, I cautioned Cabaco how such views would

only prolong the civil war, which it did until a ceasefire that became known as the

General Peace Agreement (GPA) between Frelimo and Renamo was signed in

Rome on 4 October 1992. The effective date for the cease-fire was on the 15 th of

October 1992 and a UN Peace Keeping Force (ONUMOZ) oversaw the two-year

transition period to democracy, leaving the country in early 1995.

Despite many setbacks, which were painstakingly overcome - such as the

protracted part of the peace negotiations that led Frelimo to introduce

constitutional changes providing for political pluralism and free speech -

Mozambique’s first multi party elections were held in 1994. They returned Frelimo

and the moderate and reformist president Chissano to power with 56% of the vote,

with Renamo attaining a credible 41%, and 3% going to a myriad of minor

political parties. In 1998, the country’s first municipal democratic elections in 33

urban areas took place with an almost equal share between Frelimo and Renamo,

ensuring that the political opposition will continue to have an important role in

Mozambique’s maturing democracy.

Conclusion

In the introduction to this dissertation, I indicated that in order to assess the justification for the civil war in Mozambique, I looked as a yardstick to the generally accepted conventions of traditional just war theory, that I have explained in an earlier

30

paragraph. In particular, I looked at the jus ad bellum conventions of just war theory.

My rationale is that I see no difference between a war between states and a war between peoples within a state, if both can be regarded as bounded political communities, possessing legitimate and widely accepted authority, and following ethical principles in the pursuit of warfare. Nonetheless, I have yet to come across a similar perspective applied, in particular, to civil conflicts such as that of Mozambique. Authors have dabbled with the application of just war theory to secessionist movements, and also to terrorist or guerrilla movements, but to my knowledge there is no literature attempting to consider whether or not civil wars were justly initiated/justified ( jus ad bellum ), nor whether they were justly conducted ( jus in bello ). In trying to answer whether the Mozambican conflict, in its tremendous magnitude as a human tragedy but also as a political shift in the southern African socio-political arena, was justified from such a tradition of thought, I hope to have also

31

given a modest and incipient contribution to stimulate such a needed analysis of civil conflicts. I hope that they will not forever remain outside the pale and purview of some sort of ethical framework.

As we have seen in the sections above, the essential criteria of jus ad bellum – just cause, proper authority, right intention and end result – can all be applied to the civil war that shook my country for so long, and its key players. The method is thus justified – but what of the war itself?

Peace appears to be firmly established, with no political violence since

1994. There has been a return to the rule of law, the freedoms of worship, speech

and movement. The rights to private ownership, of free enterprise and of where

and how to educate one’s children have been restored. Despite all the suffering and

grief associated with the 17-year war, there was always hope that some day the

principles of freedom, equality and liberty would be attained, and they have.

In the light of the aforementioned sequence of events, I would suggest that under

all the circumstances that I have expounded, and particularly according to the

criteria of jus ad bellum, the civil war in Mozambique was justified.

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