9/30/2011
1
The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI)
Measuring Citizens’ Experiences
1
Jairo Acuña-Alfaro * Policy Advisor, UNDP Viet Nam [email protected] Presentation prepared for Arab Regional Conference “Public Service Delivery in Arab Countries: Corruption Risks and Possible Responses” Gamart, Tunisian Republic September 29-30, 2011
Outline of Presentation
• Background and context
• What is PAPI and why PAPI?
• Methodology
• The PAPI dashboard - components
– Performance – examples from individual dimensions
• Control of corruption and sector level findings
• Lessons learned
2
9/30/2011
2
The Context of Viet Nam (1)
• A single-party ruled socialist country => inevitable broad coverage of the public sector (or ‘the state sector’)
• Public sector taking a large proportion of total employment and state budget
• Almost 5 million people, equivalent to 10% of Vietnam’s workforce classified as state employees, with education taking up 32%, public administration 3%, and health & social work 7.7% (Viet Nam Labour Force Survey, 2009)
• State budget for the public sector in 2010: ~38%, but “roller coaster” type in last decade (excluding national defense, security and special sectors) (MoF, 2010)
• New development stage: Transition towards a middle-income country
• GDP income per capita in 2010: ~1,200USD (GSO Vietnam 2010)
• GDP per capital, US$ at PPP in 2010: 3,150US$ (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2011)
3
The Context in Viet Nam (2)
• Looking forward to new development stage ▫ Governance implications as middle-income country and transition towards
higher human development levels
• Governance implications at new income-levels • Development of institutions and processes that are more responsive to
the needs of ordinary citizens, including the poor. • Lagging behind internationally recognized governance indicators
including Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Global Competitiveness Report (GCR)…
• Monitoring PAR challenges is key to detect change • Incremental steps for shaping the public administration into a
representative, responsive institution, seen as an essential bridge between government and society.
• Shift towards monitoring of performance – oversight role of National Assembly, mass organizations, users of public services
4
9/30/2011
3
5
-2
0
2
BO
LIV
IA
PU
ER
TO
RIC
O
NIC
AR
AG
UA
EC
UA
DO
R
VE
NE
ZU
EL
A
ME
XIC
O
CH
ILE
UR
UG
UA
Y
TU
NIS
IA
PA
KIS
TA
N
UN
ITE
D A
RA
B E
MIR
AT
ES
JA
MA
ICA
HO
ND
UR
AS
IND
IA
PA
RA
GU
AY
EG
YP
T
JO
RD
AN
VIE
TN
AM
TU
RK
EY
CH
INA
IND
ON
ES
IA
CO
LO
MB
IA
Deterioration
(selected countries)
Improvement
(selected countries)
Insignificant Change (selected countries)
Changes in Government Effectiveness, 1998-2008
Changes were calculated on the basis of the differences in country estimates from 1998 and 2008. Classification for major
deteriorations and improvements were based on 75% confidence interval. Source for data: 'Governance Matters VIII: Governance
Indicators for 1996-2008’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2009 - www.govindicators.org 5
6
-2
0
2
ER
ITR
EA
ZIM
BA
BW
E
MA
LD
IVE
S
TO
NG
A
SY
RIA
EG
YP
T
SP
AIN
TU
NIS
IA
HU
NG
AR
Y
IND
IA
YE
ME
N
VIE
TN
AM
CA
MB
OD
IA
BO
TS
WA
NA
PA
RA
GU
AY
TA
NZ
AN
IA
SE
RB
IA
CA
PE
VE
RD
E
LIB
ER
IA
Major Deterioration
(selected countries)
Major Improvement
(selected countries) Insignificant Change
(selected countries)
Changes in Control of Corruption, 1998-2008
Changes were calculated on the basis of the differences in country estimates from 1998 and 2008. Classification for major
deteriorations and improvements were based on 75% confidence interval. Source for data: 'Governance Matters VIII: Governance
Indicators for 1996-2008’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2009 - www.govindicators.org 6
9/30/2011
4
“Reforming Public Administration in Viet Nam: Current Situation and Recommendations”
“… the challenge for the next stage of public administration reforms in Viet Nam is to move towards modernizing the public sector by strengthening the public sector’s responsibilities in implementation of policies and ensuring a more active monitoring role for non-State actors in the evaluation of public administration performance” p.40*
7
Output = a joint publication by UNDP, CECODES and VFF, published by the National Politics Publishing House on key strategic issues:
• Addressing Governance and Public Administration Reforms Effectively
• Public Administration and Economic Development
• Public Financial Management
• Civil Service Reform
• Government Organization Structure
• Institutional Reform for Public Administration
• Corruption and Public Administration Reform
What is PAPI?
• A policy tool that complements, supports and enhances ongoing GoV efforts in “building a democratic, strong, clean, professionalized, modernized, effective and efficient public administration system… able to respond to the requirements of the cause of national building and development”.
• Policy diagnostics instrument that in the short and long-term supports evidence-based policy making processes in Viet Nam, including:
– Public officials / authorities are provided with a tool for monitoring governance and performance in provision of public administrative services
– Evidence-based policy making: data empowers official reformists
– Monitoring creates incentives for competition reform will follow
– The voice of the people is raised: public officials / authorities can learn about citizen’s preferences, frustrations and recommendations
– By way of having discussions on research findings and survey results with the provinces, people will be empowered and given the sense that they are listened
– Data available for different stakeholders: supports planning and analysis 8
9/30/2011
5
PAPI = A Governance and Public Administration Performance Assessment
• Features – A diagnostics tool that collects evidence and data at provincial level but can aggregate at
national level
– PAPI is about the experiences of users of governance and public administration
– Covers six dimensions:
* Participation * Transparency * Vertical Accountability
* Anti-Corruption * Admin. Procedures * Public Services
– Incremental approach: pilot carried out in 2009 in three provinces (Phu Tho, Da Nang and Dong Thap), increased to 30 provinces in 2010 and 63 provinces from 2011.
• Strengths – Large sample: Nationwide survey (2010 ~ n=5,500; 2011 onwards n=13,500 following strict
random selection)
– Comparisons between provinces and across time
– Complements views of government self-assessments and businesses (i.e. PCI) at provincial level
– Reliable implementers: Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), Center for Community Support Development Studies (CECODES) and UNDP.
9
Why PAPI?
Raises people’s voice: The government can learn about citizen’s preferences and frustrations.
Empowers people and gives them the sense that they are listened by way of discussing findings with the provinces.
Provides authorities a tool for monitoring performance
Creates incentive for competition between provinces (to be ranked as the best performer in public administration for instance). Incentives for reforms will follow.
Enables evidence-based policy making: technocratic data empowers official reformists and technocrats.
Data available from such a nation-wide undertaking will be a gold mine for social scientists
10
9/30/2011
6
Monitoring performance of the public sector as policy tool for reform
11
PAPI’s multidimensional assessment
12
Dimensions Sub-dimensions Key performance areas under assessment
D1. Participation at
local levels
- Civic Knowledge
- Opportunities for Participation
- Elections Quality
- Voluntary Contributions
Mechanisms for citizens to take part in
governance and public administration
processes
D2. Transparency - List of poor households
- Commune’s budgets
- Land use plans
Flow of timely and reliable information (of
economic, social and public nature) about
government services provision
D3. Vertical
accountability
(citizens monitoring)
- Interactions with local authorities
- People’s Inspections Boards
- Community Investment Supervision
Boards
The extent to which those who act on behalf
of the people are answerable for what they
do
D4. Control of
corruption
- Limits on Public Sector Corruption
- Limits on Corruption in Public
Service Delivery
- Equity in Public Employment
- Willingness to Fight Corruption
Extent of corruption; as well as citizen’s
motivation in denouncing corruption and their
fears of discrimination
D5. Public
administrative
procedures
- Public Notary Services
- Procedures for Construction Permits
- Procedures for Land Use Rights
Certificates
Implementation and performance of selected
but relevant administrative provinces in terms
of intensity of use and efficiency of services
rendered
D6. Public service
delivery
- Public Health Care
- Public Primary Education
- Infrastructure
- Law and Order
Public services (i.e. health care, education,
water supply and citizens’ safety) being
provided at local levels
9/30/2011
7
PAPI’s multidimensional dashboard - components
13
Participation/Elections
Transparency
Downward Accountability
Control of Corruption
Administrative Procedures
Public Service Delivery
Zero Kon Tum Lai Chau Dien Bien Dak Lak Yen Bai
Quang Tri Cao Bang Hung Yen Kien Giang Nam Dinh Lang Son
Ha Noi Ha Nam Tien Giang Bac Giang Vinh Long Phu Tho
Hai Phong Hau Giang Dong Nai Hai Duong Binh Phuoc Ha Tinh
Phu Yen Ca Mau TT-Hue Da Nang Long An Binh Dinh
HCMC Perfect
PAPI – Composite Index (by dimensions) - Unweighted
14
9/30/2011
8
Dimension 1. Participation at local levels
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lang Son
Kon Tum
Lai Chau
Quang Tri
Tien Giang
Kien Giang
Phu Yen
Yen Bai
Dak Lak
Cao Bang
Hau Giang
Ha Noi
Ca Mau
Bac Giang
Vinh Long
Phu Tho
Nam Dinh
Hung Yen
Long An
Dien Bien
Ha Nam
TT-Hue
Hai Phong
Dong Nai
Binh Phuoc
Da Nang
HCMC
Ha Tinh
Binh Dinh
Hai Duong
Civic Knowledge
Democratic Participation Opportunities
Village Election Quality
Voluntary Contributions
15
Dimension 2. Transparency
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Kon Tum
Lai Chau
Quang Tri
Dak Lak
Kien Giang
Hung Yen
Hau Giang
Ha Nam
Tien Giang
Phu Tho
Yen Bai
Binh Phuoc
Ha Noi
Dien Bien
Hai Phong
Cao Bang
Binh Dinh
Vinh Long
Dong Nai
Ha Tinh
Nam Dinh
Bac Giang
Long An
Hai Duong
Ca Mau
Phu Yen
Lang Son
TT-Hue
Da Nang
HCMC
Poverty Lists
Communal Budgets
Land-Use Plan/Pricing
16
9/30/2011
9
Dimension 3. Vertical Accountability
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lang Son
Yen Bai
Nam Dinh
Tien Giang
Kien Giang
Phu Tho
Dien Bien
Cao Bang
Dak Lak
Ha Noi
Bac Giang
Lai Chau
Hung Yen
Kon Tum
Vinh Long
Binh Phuoc
Hai Phong
Phu Yen
Binh Dinh
TT-Hue
Ca Mau
Ha Nam
Quang Tri
Hau Giang
Da Nang
Dong Nai
Long An
HCMC
Hai Duong
Ha Tinh
Interactions with Local Authorities
People's Inspection Board
Community Investment Supervison Board
17
Dimension 4. Control of Corruption
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Kon Tum
Nam Dinh
Dien Bien
Lang Son
Yen Bai
Cao Bang
Ha Noi
Da Nang
Hai Phong
Ha Tinh
Quang Tri
Ha Nam
Hai Duong
Dak Lak
Hung Yen
Lai Chau
Dong Nai
Bac Giang
Tien Giang
TT-Hue
Vinh Long
Phu Tho
Phu Yen
Kien Giang
Binh Phuoc
Hau Giang
Binh Dinh
Ca Mau
Long An
HCMC
Limits on Public Sector Corruption
Limits on Corruption in Public Service Delivery
Equity in Employment
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms
18
9/30/2011
10
Dimension 4 - Control of corruption
• Dimension 4: Control of Corruption
– Limits on Public Sector Corruption
– Limits on Public Service Delivery Corruption
– Equity in Employment
– Willingness to fight corruption
• Top 8 and 12 of top 15 are south provinces
• Dimension with highest variance
• Large differences in scores between the low and the high performers (HCM 6.3 points vs Kon Tum’s 3.4 points)
Equity in employment in the public sector at the grassroots level tends to be most problematic and to vary greatly between provinces.
How serious is your provincial government in dealing with corruption?
31% not serious, 29% serious, 37% don’t know
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Kon Tum
Nam Dinh
Dien Bien
Lang Son
Yen Bai
Cao Bang
Ha Noi
Da Nang
Hai Phong
Ha Tinh
Quang Tri
Ha Nam
Hai Duong
Dak Lak
Hung Yen
Lai Chau
Dong Nai
Bac Giang
Tien Giang
TT-Hue
Vinh Long
Phu Tho
Phu Yen
Kien Giang
Binh Phuoc
Hau Giang
Binh Dinh
Ca Mau
Long An
HCMC
Limits on Public Sector Corruption
Limits on Corruption in Public Service Delivery
Equity in Employment
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms
19
Dimension 5. Administrative Procedures
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ca Mau
Kon Tum
Kien Giang
Long An
Vinh Long
Cao Bang
Lang Son
Bac Giang
Hung Yen
Lai Chau
Ha Nam
Phu Tho
Hai Duong
Dien Bien
Nam Dinh
Dak Lak
Yen Bai
Phu Yen
Binh Dinh
Hai Phong
HCMC
Da Nang
TT-Hue
Quang Tri
Tien Giang
Hau Giang
Dong Nai
Ha Noi
Ha Tinh
Binh Phuoc
Notary Services Construction Permit Land Use Rights Certificate
20
9/30/2011
11
Dimension 6. Public Services
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lai Chau
Dien Bien
Ca Mau
Kien Giang
Binh Phuoc
Yen Bai
Dak Lak
Hau Giang
Long An
Phu Yen
Vinh Long
Ha Nam
Bac Giang
Tien Giang
Cao Bang
Hai Duong
Kon Tum
Quang Tri
Phu Tho
Lang Son
Hung Yen
Dong Nai
Ha Noi
TT-Hue
Ha Tinh
Binh Dinh
Nam Dinh
HCMC
Da Nang
Hai Phong
Public Health
Education
Infrastructure
Law & Order
21
Dimension 6 – Public Services
• Dimension 6: Public Services
– Public Health
– Public Primary Education
– Basic Infrastructure
– Law and Order [Residential Safety]
• Large differences in subdimenions
• No regional pattern to be noticed
• Provinces similar in terms of economic and geographical conditions can perform significantly differently (i.e. Northern mountainous provinces)
• Big cities tend to perform better; others tend to perform lower mainly due to poorer infrastructure
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lai Chau
Dien Bien
Ca Mau
Kien Giang
Binh Phuoc
Yen Bai
Hau Giang
Dak Lak
Long An
Phu Yen
Vinh Long
Ha Nam
Tien Giang
Bac Giang
Cao Bang
Hai Duong
Kon Tum
Quang Tri
Phu Tho
Lang Son
Hung Yen
Dong Nai
Ha Noi
TT-Hue
Ha Tinh
Binh Dinh
Nam Dinh
HCMC
Da Nang
Hai Phong
Public Health
Education
Infrastructure
Law & Order
For example: Overall 28% of all respondents from all 30 provinces said they had to pay bribes at public hospitals
22
9/30/2011
12
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
Co
mp
osi
te P
AP
I
75th Percentile
25th Percentile
23
Composite PAPI 2010 (un-weighted 90% Confidence Intervals)
Bribes at Public Notary and Hospitals (Range bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals; Diamonds represent the mean number of activities for respondents
receiving Form A; Triangles represent mean values for respondents receiving Form B.)
2.398
2.198
2.1
2.1
52
.22
.25
2.3
2.3
52
.42
.45
2.5
A B
Bribe at Notary
1.764
2.04
1.7
1.7
51
.81
.85
1.9
1.9
5
2
2.0
52
.1
A B
Bribe at Hospital
Nu
mbe
r of
Activitie
s R
esp
on
de
nt
En
ga
ge
d I
n
Form of Questionnaire
20% Pay Bribe 28% Pay Bribe
24
9/30/2011
13
No Diversion of Public Funds
No Bribes for Land Title
No Bribes for Construction
Zero Kon Tum Dong Nai Lang Son Dien Bien Nam Dinh
Lai Chau Cao Bang Hai Phong Dak Lak Quang Tri Ha Tinh
Yen Bai Ha Nam Da Nang Ha Noi Vinh Long TT-Hue
Binh Phuoc Ca Mau Tien Giang Hung Yen Kien Giang Bac Giang
Hai Duong Hau Giang Phu Yen Long An Phu Tho HCMC
Binh Dinh Perfect
Experience with Petty Corruption in the Public Sector (Branch Size= % of respondents who claim type DOES NOT take place; Perfect =100%)
• Most common forms of petty corruption: extra payment to receive construction permits …
• The bigger the star graph, the less corruption
• 73% in HCMC and 67% in Binh Dinh deny diversion of public funds
25
No Bribes at Hospital
No Misuse of Education Fees
No Informal Payment in Education
No Bribes to Teachers
Zero Da Nang Ha Noi Dien Bien Dak Lak Ha Tinh
Nam Dinh Quang Tri TT-Hue Hai Phong Hai Duong Kon Tum
Lai Chau Dong Nai Bac Giang Kien Giang Cao Bang Hung Yen
HCMC Yen Bai Vinh Long Hau Giang Ha Nam Lang Son
Phu Yen Tien Giang Ca Mau Phu Tho Binh Phuoc Long An
Binh Dinh Perfect
Experience with Petty Corruption in Accessing Public Services (Branch Size= % of respondents who claim type DOES NOT take place; Perfect =100%)
At the national level:
• 52.4% of respondents disagree with the notion that teachers favour students whose parents give them bribes,
• 38.8% of respondents claim that informal payments to primary education institutions are uncommon,
• 56.8% say paying bribes to teachers is not common, and
• 39% deny paying bribes at hospitals.
26
9/30/2011
14
Land Registry
Commune Justice Officer
Policeman
Teacher
People's Committee
Bribes for Public Job
Zero Dien Bien Hai Phong Kon Tum Ha Tinh Ha Noi
TT-Hue Dak Lak Hai Duong Yen Bai Da Nang Hung Yen
Quang Tri Vinh Long Lang Son Phu Yen Phu Tho Dong Nai
Kien Giang Bac Giang Nam Dinh Ha Nam Lai Chau Binh Phuoc
Binh Dinh Tien Giang HCMC Cao Bang Hau Giang Long An
Ca Mau Perfect
Equity in Employment: Need for Relationships by Job Type & Province (Branch Size= % of respondents who claim relationship or bribe is NOT necessary)
• Throughout the country only 33% of respondents denied the importance of bribes.
• In some provinces, bribes for public sector jobs were deemed critically important, with only 5% of respondents denying it.
27
No Shared Beds
Electric Fans
Restroom Clean
Regular Check-Ups
Treated w/Respect
Expenses Reasonable
Waiting Period Reasonable
Zero Da Nang Lang Son Bac Giang Lai Chau Ha Tinh
Ca Mau Ha Noi Phu Tho Hai Duong Vinh Long Binh Dinh
Dak Lak Kon Tum Ha Nam Hung Yen Binh Phuoc Dong Nai
Hai Phong Nam Dinh Yen Bai Cao Bang HCMC Phu Yen
Tien Giang TT-Hue Dien Bien Hau Giang Quang Tri Kien Giang
Long An Perfect
Citizens' Assessment of District Public Hospitals
• Confirms public observation that patients have to share beds at public hospitals within districts.
• Healthcare expenses in district hospitals and waiting times are not reasonable and the quality of sick-rooms remains poor.
28
9/30/2011
15
Citizens' Assessment of Public Primary Schools
Brick Walls
Clean Toilets
Less than 40 Students
Less than 3 shifts
No Informal Payments
No Bribes to Teachers
No Favoritism
Teacher Quality
Zero Da Nang Kien Giang Tien Giang Hai Duong Bac Giang
TT-Hue Quang Tri Ha Noi Dak Lak Ha Tinh Dien Bien
Lai Chau Hai Phong Kon Tum Cao Bang Hung Yen Nam Dinh
Yen Bai Lang Son HCMC Hau Giang Phu Yen Ca Mau
Ha Nam Dong Nai Vinh Long Binh Dinh Long An Phu Tho
Binh Phuoc Perfect
• Large variations in performance
• Infrastructure of public primary schools and quality of teachers generally good.
• However, teachers tend to favor school children participating in extra classes, and classes remain crowded in general.
• Also, problems of informal payments and bribery to teachers
29
Equity in Employment: Need for Relationships by Job Type
• In general, relationships appear to be critically important for obtaining high prestige and stable public sector employment.
• Only about 18% to 19% of respondents deny its importance for all positions
• Exception is for teachers, where 24.1% of respondents deny the need for relationship to get a job in this sector.
30
9/30/2011
16
Citizens’ level vs businesses’ level corruption PAPI 2010 vs PCI 2009 corruption measures
• Positive correlation (0.30) but NOT statistically significant.
• Some provinces, especially those in the Mekong Delta and Binh Dinh perform well in both indices, but in other cases substantial variation is noted.
•Da Nang rate corruption much worse than business, while the opposite is true in HCMC and Binh Phuoc.
Ha Noi Cao Bang
Dien Bien
Lai Chau
Yen Bai
Lang Son
Bac Giang
Phu Tho
Hai Duong
Hai Phong
Hung YenHa Nam
Nam Dinh
Ha Tinh Quang Tri
TT-Hue
Da Nang
Binh Dinh
Phu Yen
Kon Tum
Dak Lak
Binh Phuoc
Dong Nai
HCMC
Long An
Tien Giang
Vinh Long
Kien Giang
Hau GiangCa Mau
34
56
7
PA
PI:
Corr
uptio
n
5 6 7 8
PCI: Informal Charges
95% Confidence Interval
Fitted
Observedr=.30
31
Size of Bribe Required Necessitating Formal Action
How much corruption are individual citizens’ willing to endure before taking formal action with a local inspectorate across the country?
• Very little difference between tolerance for bribes demanded by the policeman or the commune official.
• Citizens, on average, appear to tolerate bribes up to about 100,000VND (~ 5 usd) from both actors, where only 30% of respondents are willing to appeal.
• A large jump takes place between 100,000 and 500,000VND (~ 25 usd), where the proportion of respondents willing to appeal doubles.
• At 10 million VND (~ 500 usd), however, there are still 10% who cannot bring themselves to appeal a corrupt act.
32
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
10 50 100 500 1000 5000 10000 50000 100000
Cu
mu
lati
ve
Pro
po
rtio
n o
f R
esp
on
de
nts
Denunciation Price in 1000s of Vietnamese Dong
Police Officer
People's Committee
9/30/2011
17
Relationship between Denunciation Price and Crime
33
Ha Noi
Cao Bang
Dien Bien
Lai Chau
Yen Bai
Lang Son
Bac GiangPhu Tho
Hai Duong Hai Phong
Hung Yen
Ha Nam
Nam Dinh
Ha Tinh
Quang Tri
TT-Hue
Da Nang
Binh Dinh
Phu Yen
Kon Tum
Dak Lak
Binh Phuoc
Dong Nai
HCMC
Long An
Tien Giang
Vinh Long
Kien Giang
Hau Giang
Ca Mau
010
20
30
40
50
Avera
ge C
rim
e R
ate
in P
AP
I S
urv
ey
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
r=.49*
Crime Rate
Ha Noi
Cao Bang
Dien Bien
Lai Chau
Yen Bai
Lang Son
Bac Giang
Phu Tho
Hai Duong
Hai Phong
Hung Yen
Ha Nam
Nam Dinh
Ha Tinh
Quang Tri
TT-Hue
Da Nang
Binh Dinh
Phu Yen
Kon Tum
Dak Lak
Binh Phuoc
Dong Nai
HCMCLong An
Tien Giang
Vinh Long
Kien Giang
Hau Giang
Ca Mau
1.6
1.8
22.2
2.4
2.6
Avera
ge S
afe
ty in P
rovin
ce
(1 t
o 3
)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
r=-.32
Safety Assessment
Average Denunciation Price for Police Bribes (Millions of VND)
•Strong and positive
correlation between
denunciation prices for
police officers and crime
rates.
•The more tolerant a
citizen is of police
corruption, the higher the
amount of crimes
experienced by PAPI
respondents in that
province.
•~~~~~~~~~~~
•A less strong but similar
relationship is found
between denunciation
price and perceived safety
on the part of citizens.
•The higher the
denunciation price, the
less safe citizens feel.
Is economic status (GDP/head) relevant?
Provinces don’t need to be wealthy to perform well.
Phu Tho, TT-Hue, Long An, Phu Yen, Binh Dinh seem to perform better than other with similar GDP per capita
Kon Tum performs much lower that other provinces with similar economic status (ie Dien Bien, Cao Bang, Ha Tinh)
34
Ha Noi
Hai Phong
Da Nang
HCMC
Ha Tinh
Quang Tri
TT-HueBinh Dinh
Phu Yen
Tien Giang
Vinh Long
Kien Giang
Ca Mau
Binh Phuoc
Long An
Hau GiangDong Nai
Ha Nam
Hai Duong
Hung Yen
Nam Dinh
Bac Giang
Cao Bang
Dak LakDien Bien
Kon Tum
Lai Chau
Lang Son
Phu Tho
Yen Bai
30
32
34
36
38
40
We
ighte
d P
AP
I 2
010
1 2 3 4 5
GDP Per Capita (ln)
95% Confidence Interval
Fitted
Observedr=.56
9/30/2011
18
Governance and PA for Human Development
35
Bac Giang
Binh Dinh
Binh Phuoc
Ca Mau
Cao Bang
Da Nang
Dak Lak
Dien Bien
Dong Nai
Ha Nam
Ha Noi
Ha Tinh
Hai Duong
Hai PhongHau Giang
HCMC
Hung Yen
Kien Giang
Kon Tum
Lai Chau
Lang Son
Long An
Nam Dinh
Phu Tho
Phu Yen
Quang Tri Tien Giang
TT-Hue
Vinh Long
Yen Bai
28
30
32
34
36
38
Com
posite
PA
PI (u
nw
eig
hte
d)
.55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8Human Development Index (HDI) 2008
95% CI Fitted values
Composite PAPI (unweighted)
PAPI strongly associated
with overall Human
Development Index
(r=0.6799***).
Overall provinces with
higher levels of
performance in PAPI also
tend to have higher
human development
levels.
Associations between PAPI’s dimensions and the HDI at the provincial level
36
Provinces with higher
levels of performance in
terms of public service
provision have higher
scores in terms of
overall human
development.
Correlation is
statistically significant at
the 99% confidence
level (r=0.6262).
9/30/2011
19
Final reflections – implications and potential uses
• Scientific nature and robustness of implementation reflects accurately
experiences (or awareness and feedback) of citizens
• PAPI as a reference for provinces as it reflects the reform efforts in the
process to improve the quality and availability of governance and public
administration
• Provincial authorities can see their strengths and weaknesses as well as
causes, so that they can find practical solutions to improving the performance
of the public administration system
• Objective information supports policy making, implementation and
monitoring processes at national and provincial levels
• Ongoing and increasing demand from government agencies and
provincial authorities for data and implications. i.e. Government
Inspectorate and OSCAC using PAPI data for corruption control related
policy discussions
37
Policy implications – official/governmental “voices” on PAPI and its added value
“Findings from the PAPI research are a reference source that complements assessments from the
Government. The Justice Committee of the National Assembly wishes to receive annually the results from PAPI as inputs for discussion at the National Assembly sessions and for reference to the Annual Report of the National Assembly. The
findings from this research can be used as sources of evidence to assess the performance of provincial
government leadership.”
Mdme. Lê Thị Nga , Vice Chairwoman , Justice Committee of the National Assembly
“PAPI findings provide an important channel of evidence drawn from citizens’ experiences that
contribute to reflecting the performance of public administration at the provincial level. In parallel
with annual government assessment of the Public Administration Reform Master Programme
conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and provincial Departments of Home Affairs, I hope PAPI research will be conducted on an annual
basis, so as to contribute to effective implementation of the Public Administration
Reform Master Programme for the period from 2011-2020.”
Mr. Nguyễn Tiến Dĩnh, Vice Minister, Ministry of Home Affairs
38
“The assessments and findings from the PAPI research regarding Hau Giang province’s performance are very valid. They will help us in public administration reform efforts. The
Report helps to understand better our provincial problems in order to find solutions. We will take the findings seriously as they reflect the reality of the province.”
Mr. Võ Minh Tâm, Standing Member of the Provincial Party Committee, Head of Office , Hau Giang Provincial People’s Committee
9/30/2011
20
39
www.papi.vn
Thank you very much!
•Citation: CECODES, VFF and UNDP (2011).
The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and
Public Administration Performance Index
(PAPI): Measuring citizens’ experiences. Hanoi
www.papi.vn
40
The views expressed in this presentation do not
necessarily reflect the official views or positions of
UNDP Viet Nam or PAPI partner organizations.
9/30/2011
21
Dimension 4: Control of Corruption
Sub-dimension 1:
Public Officials
Diversion of State Funds
Bribe for Construction
Permits
Bribe at Notary
Bribe for LURCs
Sub-dimension 2:
Public Services
Bribe at Hospital
Extra Educational
Funds
Bribe to Teachers
Sub-dimension 3:
Employment Equity in State Agencies
Bribe for Employment
Nepotism for Employment
Sub-dimension 4:
Willingness to Fight Corruption
Serious about
Corruption Fight
Denunciation Used
Example of PAPI’s Control of Corruption (Dimension 4) Construction