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WRITTENSTATEMENTOF
AIRLINEPILOTSASSOCIATION,INTERNATIONAL(ALPA)
BEFORETHE
SUBCOMMITTEEONAVIATION
OFTHE
COMMITTEEONTRANSPORTATIONANDINFRASTRUCTURE
U.S.HOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVES
FEBRUARY27,2018
“STATEOFAVIATIONSAFETY”
AirLinePilotsAssociation,International1625MassachusettsAvenue,NWWashington,DC20036(202)797-4033
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TheAirLinePilotsAssociation,International(ALPA),representsmorethan60,000
professionalairlinepilotsflyingfor34airlinesintheUnitedStatesandCanada.ALPA
istheworld’slargestpilotunionandtheworld’slargestnon-governmentalaviation
safetyorganization.Wearetherecognizedvoiceoftheairlinepilotingprofessionin
NorthAmerica,withahistoryofsafetyandsecurityadvocacyspanningmorethan85
years. As the sole U.S. member of the International Federation of Airline Pilots
Associations (IFALPA), ALPA has the unique ability to provide active airline pilot
expertise to aviation safety issuesworldwide, and to incorporate an international
dimensiontosafetyadvocacy.
Overview
While2017wasthesafestonrecordglobally,U.S.airlinesoperatedunderPart121
have not experienced a single passenger fatality resulting from an accident since
2009;over9years.Thisisduetotheeffortsofaviationindustryandourgovernment
partnersBUTalsoduetotheeffortsofCongress.PriortothepassageoftheAviation
Safety and FAA Reauthorization Act of 2010 the passenger airline industry lost
approximately1100passengersinaircraftaccidents. Sincethepassageofthatbill
therehasnotbeenasinglepassengerfatality.
Whencomparedtotherestoftheworld,theUnitedStatespassengerairlinerecordis
trulyremarkable.Inthesame9-yeartimeframethattherehavebeennofatalUnited
States passenger airline accidents, there have been 81 fatal passenger accidents
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around theworld,which includesmore than4,100 fatalities. Themost important
work this committee can accomplish is to ensure theUnited Statesmaintains the
highest safety levels in the world and continue to lead by example. This allows
passengerstoboardapassengerairline,orsendtheirmail,cargo,andgiftsviaanall-
cargoairline,andknow,withoutadoubtintheirmind,thatallwillgettheresafely.
Fromdayonein1931,ALPAhasmaintainedourmottoof“schedulewithsafety”.It
hasn’tchanged;safetyisstillourtoppriority.
Thus, the hearing today is very important to ALPA. I thank you for putting the
spotlightonsafetybecauseweneedtokeepthefocusonsafetyconstantly,andthe
committeeistoberecognizedforitseffortstodoso.
WewerepleasedthecommitteechosetoholdthishearinginFebruary.Asyouknow,
the most recent passenger airline accident occurred on a cold snowy February
evening in2009, inClearanceCenter,NewYorkwhenColganAirlinesFlight3407
crashedonapproachtolanding.Fiftypeoplelosttheirlives.Earlierthismonththe
pilots of ALPA, and many others directly impacted by that tragic accident
remembered thosewe lost, and recalled the horror that for some,will always be
etchedinourheartsandinourminds.
Whilewestillmournthelossoffamily,friendsandfellowco-workerswealsoareable
toappreciatethetremendousadvancementsinsafetythathasresultedfromthefocus
members of Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and industry
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collectivelyputintoensuringanaccidentlikeColganflight3407wouldbelesslikely
happeninthefuture.And,giventhelawsandrulechangesthathavetakenplace,it
appearsthatCongress,theFAAandindustrygotitright!
However,inorderfortheUnitedStatesaviationindustrytocontinuetobethesafest
andmostefficientairspacesystemintheworld,thiscommitteehasveryimportant
work todo thatneeds tobeaccomplished,withoutdelay. Unlesswekeepairline
safetythetoppriorityweriskdigressionandanincreaseinaccidentsthatimpactour
ability tomake progress on other important aspects of aviation such as airspace
capacityandoperationalefficiencies.
FirstOfficerQualificationsHaveImprovedAviationSafety
Thebestandmostimportantsafetyfeatureofanyairlineoperationisawell-trained,
fully qualified, highly experienced, and adequately restedprofessional flight crew.
Withasolidfoundationoftrainingandexperience,pilotsareessentialinmaintaining
the safety of our system and ensuring that aviation safety continues to advance.
Several regionalairlineaccidents from2004to2009 identifiednumerous training
and qualification deficiencies that ultimately led to congressional action and
regulatory changes that significantly improved airline safety. The last of these
accidentsoccurredFebruary12,2009,nearBuffalo,N.Y.Fiftyliveswerelost—49in
the aircraft and one on the ground. This accident is now viewed as a “watershed
event” fortheairline industryandaviationsafetybyresulting in improvements in
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pilot training, qualification, and flight experience requirements as well as
implementationofsciencebasedflight,duty,andrestrequirements.
Thefollowingyear,Congressacteddecisivelyandforcefullyontheidentifiedsafety
deficienciesbysendinglegislationtothepresidentthataddressedthedocumented
shortcomings.P.L.111-216,the“AirlineSafetyandFederalAviationAdministration
ExtensionActof2010,”wassignedintolawonAugust1,2010.
Followingtheestablishmentofthelaw,andbasedonindustryrecommendations,the
FAA,citing31accidentsoveranine-yearperiod,issuedregulationseffectiveAugust
1,2013toestablishminimumfirstofficertrainingandqualificationrequirements.
These regulations require that all airline pilots flying under 14 Code of Federal
Regulations(CFR)Part121mustholdtheairtransportpilot(ATP)certificate.They
alsocreatedtherestrictedATP(R-ATP)certificatepathway,whichcouldbeobtained
with fewer flighthours than theATP, if thepilot applicant receives academic and
flighttrainingfromthemilitaryoranaccreditedaviationcollegeoruniversity.
Thenewrulesemphasizesignificantlygreater focusonacademicsand instruction,
areas of knowledge, and flight experience in various weather and operational
situations.Therulesalsorequireatyperatingintheaircrafttobeflownfortheairline
if operated inFARPart 121 service, amongothernumerous safety improvements
such as increased experience in multi-engine aircraft. The FAA made a specific
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mentionoftheimportanceofacademictrainingwhenitpublishedthefinalrule,and
howtheaccreditedacademicsalongwithgroundandflighttrainingwasnecessaryto
qualifyforareductioninhours.
As mentioned, the law also resulted in science-based flight, duty, and rest
requirements for airlines. Unfortunately, these new flight and duty requirements
were only applied to passenger airline operations. Cargo airline operationswere
carvedout.
Based on the safety improvementswithminimumpilot training and qualification
requirements achieved since P.L. 111-216 became law, we strongly urge the
committee to preserve these critically important safety regulations. We urge the
committee to reject any proposal to modify or change that weakens the current
minimumfirstofficerqualifications. Theserulesareworkingverywellinallaspects,
andliveshavebeensaved.
Safetyregulationsshouldnotbedrivenbytheeconomicdecisionsofairlines.
Therearesomepeopleandorganizationswhowanttofixbusiness-relatedindustry
problems by weakening the First Officer Qualification (FOQ) rules. These
organizationsbelievesafetyissomethingthatcanbenegotiated.Theybelievethat
rollingbackprovisionsinP.L.111-216isthebestwaytofixtheirbusinesschallenges
bywideningtheemploymentpool.Bythatsamelogic,wouldthesesamegroupsbe
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lobbying to shorten the duration ofmedical school in an attempt to attractmore
doctorstoworkinruralareas?
ItissomewhatironicthatsomewhocalledforthechangesinP.L.111-216havesince
becomecriticalofthenewrules,arguingthatthenewFirstOfficerQualificationshave
createdapilotshortage.Smallcommunitieswhichhaveexperiencedchangestothe
levelsofairlineservicesarealsocitingapilotshortage.However,inbothcases,there
isnoreliabledatatosupportthesepositions.
There are several business-related reasons that proponents cite for relaxing the
safetyrules.Theysaythattheruleshavenegativelyaffectedtheindustryinanumber
ofways.
Forexample,whilesomehavepointedoutthattheruleshavecreatedapilot
shortage,thedatasaysdifferently.Thereisanadequatesupplyofqualifiedpilots
andarobustpipelineofpilotstomeettheneedsofcommercialaviation.In2016,
theFAAissuedmorethan9,500ATPcertificates,whichincludesmorethan2,100R-
ATPcertificates.In2016,ourresearchrevealedthattheairlineshiredsomewhere
between3500-4000pilots,whichisconsiderablyfewerthanthenumberofpilots
whowerequalifiedtoflyfortheairlinesthatyear.
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FlightTrainingCostsNotImpactedbyFOQ
TheFOQruleshavenotdrivenincreasesinflighttrainingcosts.Theflighttraininga
pilotisrequiredtoreceivetoobtainacommercialpilotcertificateisthesametoday
asithasbeenfordecades.Oncepilotsachievetheircommercialpilotscertificate,they
stoppayingfortheirflighttime.Instead,pilotsobtaincommercialflightexperience
throughpaid employment as flight instructors, corporate, cargo, or charter pilots.
The hours and experience garnered in these entry-level commercial flight
environmentsarecritical to thesuccessful creationofawell-trained,experienced,
andfullyqualifiedairlinepilot.
PilotExperiencebeforeAirlineFlyingisCritical
Thelengthoftimefromwhenapilotobtainstheircommercialpilotslicensetowhen
theyhaveaccumulatedthehoursandflightexperiencenecessarytoqualifyforthe
ATPorR-ATPcertificate ismeasuredinmonths,notyearsordecades. Pilotswho
graduatefromanaccredited,structureduniversitythatarequalifiedfortheR-ATP
pathwaycancurrentlyexpecttospend12monthsflyinginentrylevelcommercial
operationsbeforetransitioningtoanairline.
Because each airline conducts training differently, and because they use different
terminology and require pilots to adapt to procedural philosophies that aremost
likely unique, there will be some adjustments needed by pilots. While regional
airlineswouldlikepilotstocomepre-programmedfromaflighttrainingenvironment
thatminimizestheadjustmentsneededbypilotsenteringanairline’sflighttraining
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environment, the pilots are also bringing with them real-world experience that
includesavarietyofweather,terrain,andairtrafficcontrolenvironments.
It is importanttonotethatairlinesdoNOTprovideANYtrainingorprovidepilots
withaircraft toobtainexperience in factors suchasweather (e.g., thunderstorms,
snow,tropicalstorms),terrain(e.g.,highaltitude,mountainflying),andhigh-density
airtraffic(e.g.,NewYorkCityandLosAngelesmetroplex).Today’sflightsimulation
environmentcannotadequatelyreplicate these factors. Therefore, it is critical for
pilotstoobtainflighttimeandexperienceincommercialoperationsaftertheyhave
obtainedthecommercialpilotslicense,butbeforebeinginsertedintothePart121
airlineoperatingenvironment.TheFAAwiselyrecognizedthatthecombinationof
an accredited university, structured FAA approved flight training, and some
commercialpilotingexperience inpre-airline commercial operationswas thebest
andsafesttrainingpathwaytofullyaddresstheshortcomingsidentifiedfromfatal
passengerairlineaccidents.
PilotSupplyIsn’tDrivingAirlineServiceChanges
Thechangesinairlineservicestoanyairportlargeorsmall,aredrivenbyseveral
variablesincludingpassengerdemand,anairline’saccesstoanappropriatelysized
aircraft,economicincentives,accesstogroundservicesandequipment.Likeany
otherbusiness,however,airlinesmustdecidewheretheyareabletoprofitably
provideaffordableairtransportationservices.Airlineschangeservicelevelstoall
airportsonaregularbasis.Asjustoneexample,lastNovember,Southwestairlines
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announcedthatitwouldendservicetoFlint,Michigan.Butthecompanywasclear
aboutthetruereasonforthechangeinservice:theairportwasnotagoodbusiness
fit.ThesameissuethatSouthwestairlinesadmittedtoinFlint,Michigan(see:
http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2017/11/southwest_airlines_pulls_pl
ug.html)isanissueinothersmallcommunitiesaswell.
Otherconsiderationsincludeproximitytolargerairportswithairtravelthatisless
expensiveduetotheuseoflargeraircraft.Sometimes,airlinesenhancetheservice
tosmallcommunitiesbychangingfromapropelleraircrafttojetaircraft,which
addsseatsinalmostallcases.Byaddingseats,theairlinereducesthefrequencyof
theflightsbutmayactuallyprovidemorecapacitythanwithpropelleraircraft.
ALPAisastrongproponentforensuringthatallAmericanshaveaccesstopassenger
airlineservices,andwhenpossibletheservicesshouldbemadeavailabletothe
smallcommunitiesacrossthenation.Loweringsafetystandardswillnotincrease
servicetosmallcommunitiesitwillsimplymakeflyingtothosecommunitiesmore
dangerous.Thereareotherrulesandpoliciesthatcanbechangedtomorefully
supportairtravelfromsmallcommunities.
FlightTrainingEnrollmentsAreIncreasing,NotDecreasing
Severalaccrediteduniversitieswithflighttrainingprogramshavestatedthat
enrollmentsofprofessionalpilotstudentsaresignificantlyhigherthisyearas
comparedtolastyear,anddemandforfutureyearsremainsstrong.Thisisastrong
indicatorthattheR-ATPpathwaythatisavailabletostudentswhoenrollat
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accreditedaviationcollegesanduniversitiesisworking.Pilotscananddocomplete
atwo-orfour-yearuniversitydegreeprogramandaccumulate12-18monthsof
flyingexperienceinentry-levelcommercialaviationemploymentbefore
progressingtoairlineflying.
Bycallingforchangestosafetyrulesastheirnumberonesolutiontotheirbusiness
problem, theseother interestedpartiesare telling the travelingpublicandelected
officials that they need to accept reduced levels of safety in pilot training and
qualificationssothatbusinessproblemscanbefixed.Theyaresayingthatnoother
law, regulation, or policy change in all of the United States code, and associated
regulationscansolvetheirproblem.Intentionallyorotherwise,theyarealsotelling
thetravelingpublicthattheyneedtoacceptreducedlevelsofsafetywhenflyingto
smallcommunities.Theyaretellingthepublicthatweneedtogobacktothewayit
wasinFebruary2009.
Pilotfreemarketsupplyanddemandwilldictateifwecontinuetohaveenoughpilots
inthefuture,ALPAandtheflyingpublicwillnotacceptareductioninsafetyinan
attempttoinfluencethepilotsupplyfreemarket.
Those few regional cargo and passenger airlines that report a shortage of pilots
typically offer lower salaries and benefits, poor work-life balance, and fewer
opportunities for career progression than airlines that are not reporting such a
shortage.Qualifiedpilotshavemanyemploymentopportunitiesandsomeregional
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airlineshaverealizedthattoattractqualifiedcandidates,theyhavetobecompetitive
insalaryandbenefitstoattractpilots.
Weurgethecommitteetoseektounderstandtheissuesthatappeartobeforcingthe
airlinesandsmallcommunityairportadvocatestocallforchangesinsafetyrules,in
ordertofixaproblemthatispurelyabouteconomics.TravelersintheUnitedStates
shouldnotberequiredtosacrificelevelsofsafetytoaccessairlinetravelfromtheir
homeairports.Butweakeningfirstofficerqualificationrulesattempttodojustthat.
SafeShipmentsofHazardousMaterials
ALPA has long advocated for improved transport requirements for hazardous
materials.Aswitnessed in2015withhoverboards, andagain lastwinterwith the
SamsungGalaxyNote7,lithiumbatteriesandotherhazardousmaterialscancreate
realsafetythreatsintheabsenceofproperregulations.Mitigatingtherisktoaviation
safety fromhazardousmaterialsrequiresa focusontwospecificareas: improving
hazardousmaterialsregulationsandeliminatingshipmentsofundeclaredhazardous
materials.
Thesignificantconsumerdemandforthesehigh-densitypowersourceshasresulted
in rapid expansion in lithium battery production, supply, and proliferation.
Consequently, this hazard is increasing exponentially. While lithium batteries
represent a significant technological improvement over older battery technology,
their high energy density and flammability make these batteries more prone to
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failure, resulting in fire and explosion. The lack of comprehensive hazardous
materials regulations for the carriage of lithium batteries as cargo onboard
commercial aircraft, both passenger and cargo, continues to pose risks to air
transportation.
NewstandardsimplementedbytheInternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO)
onApril1,2016,madesignificantimprovementstoprovisionsunderwhichlithium
batteriesareshippedascargobyairaroundtheglobe.AndwhiletheDepartmentof
TransportationhasbeguntheprocessofharmonizingtheseintotheU.S.regulations,
noproposedorfinalrulehasbeenissuedafter22months.Wewereverypleasedto
seelanguageincludedinH.R.2997torequireDOTtoharmonizeitsregulationswith
thenewICAOstandards.
While the ICAO limitations are a good first step, they do not go far enough in
addressing the safety risk created by lithium batteries. Work must continue to
develop and mandate performance-based packaging standards that will prevent
and/orcontainalithiumbatteryfire.Thesestandardsmustalsoaddressthethreat
fromexternalfires.
In the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95), Section 828,
Congress directed the DOT not to regulate lithium batteries carried as cargo on
aircraftstricterthantheICAOstandardsunlessafireonboardanaircraftcouldbe
proventohavesubstantiallycontributedtoafireinvolvinglithiumbatteriesinthe
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cargohold.Therehavenowbeenthreesuchaccidents(UPS1307,UPS6,andAsiana
991),twoofwhichwerefataltothepilotsonboardandallthreeofwhichdestroyed
theaircraft.Theaccidentreportsattributelithiumbatteriesasalargefactorinallof
theseevents.
TheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard(NTSB),followingthemostrecentaccident
involvingAsianaAirlinesFlight991,issuedasafetyrecommendationstatingthatit
“believes that the circumstances and findings in the Asiana Flight 991 accident
constitutes such credible evidence that demonstrates a deficiency in cargo-
segregation requirements that would permit the HMR [hazardous materials
regulations]tobechangedtobemorestringentthanthecurrentICAOrequirements.”
ALPAagreeswiththeNTSBthatthethresholdsetbylegislationhasbeenmetandit
istimetomoveforwardoncomprehensiveregulationsgoverningcargoshipmentsof
lithiumbatteries.
Hazardousmaterials,comprisedofliquids,flammables,andothermaterials,shipped
as cargo without being identified by the shipper are considered undeclared
hazardousmaterials. There are no official estimates ofwhat percentage of parcel
shipments contain undeclared hazardous materials; however, the FAA tracks
incidentswhere hazardousmaterials shipments create safety hazards for various
reasons,suchasaleakingpackageorothertypeofexternalevidencethatthepackage
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isasafetyconcern.In2015,theFAAreceived1,129reportsofsuchevents,and564
oftheincidentsinvolvedundeclaredhazardousmaterials.
ALPA’sresearch indicates that thebiggestweakness in theshipmentofhazardous
materialsbyair is therelianceonan“honorsystem”approachbytheairlinesand
regulators. Increased attention to and accurate data is needed to eliminate
undeclaredhazardousmaterialsshipmentsbyair.
FAALeadstheWayonPortableDeviceSafetyinCheckedBaggage
ALPAconcernsaboutlithiumbatteryfiresincheckedluggagespikedearlyin2017
whensecurityissuesdrovemanypassengerstostoretheirlargepersonalelectronic
devicesintheircheckedbaggage.
WewerepleasedtoseethattheFAAhastakenthesignificantstepatICAOtopropose
a prohibition of installed lithium batteries in certain electronic equipment from
checkedbaggageonpassengeraircraft.ALPAfullysupportsthisproposal,whichwas
basedontestingconductedbytheFAAattheWilliamJ.HughesTechnicalCenter(the
TechnicalCenter),outsideofAtlanticCity,NewJersey.TheFAAexpertiseandrigor
appliedtothetesting,andproposaldevelopmentistobecommended.
SafeIntegrationofUnmannedAircraftSystems
WiththerapidlygrowinguseofUnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)foranynumberof
applicationsanduses, thesafetyrisks toairlineoperationsneeds tobemonitored
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very closely. We applaud this committee’s commitment to ensureUAS safety, by
holdingahearingattheendoflastyearonthetopic,andbyprobingtheneedfora
robustriskmitigationplan.Clearly,atsomepointinthefuture,UASwillbeintegrated
intothenationalairspacesystem(NAS),interactingwithotheraircraftinamanner
similarto“pilotonboard”aircrafttoday.
However,itseemsattimesthattheFAAisstrugglingtokeeppacewiththeexpansion
oftheUASindustry.WemustnotallowpressuretorapidlyintegrateUASintotheNAS
withoutappropriatesafeguardsinplace.Thisprocessmustbefocusedonsafetyas
the highest priority. Riskmitigation plans,which have yet to be fully developed,
combined with consensus-based technology standards that will ensure
interoperabilitywithmannedaircraft,mustbeinplacebeforeaUAScanoccupythe
sameairspaceasmannedaircraftoroperateinareaswhereitmightinadvertently
strayintoairspaceoccupiedbyairliners.WhenUASoperateinthesameairspaceas
airlineaircraft,thepilotswillneedtobeabletoseethemoncockpitdisplays,andair
trafficcontrollerswillalsoneedtoseethemontheirdisplaystosafelyseparateair
traffic.Further,theUASmustbeequippedwithactivecollision-avoidancetechnology.
Wewillopposeanyintegrationthatdoesnotincludecollisionavoidancesystemsthat
areinteroperablewithairlinecollisionavoidancesystems.
If a UAS operator does not intend to fly in the same airspace as airliners, then
limitationsthatensurethattheUASstaysoutoftheairspacemustbeprogramedinto
theUASinawaythatcannotbeoverridden.
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FAAAuthoritytoFullyRegulateallUAS
TheFAAhasestablished14CFRPart107,whicharerulesforsmallUAS(sUAS).The
regulatory framework created is limited to commercial operations only. This is
because Congress prohibited the FAA from promulgating any new rules on
“hobbyists”operators inSection336ofP.L.112-95of theFAAModernizationand
ReformActof2012. Thislawwascitedinanappealscourtdecisioninearly2017
thatstruckdowntheFAAregulatoryrequirementthatrequiresalloperatorsofsUAS
that weigh more than .55 pounds to register with the FAA. Fortunately, this
committee’s bill - HR-2997-- includes a provision that would legislate the FAA’s
authoritytorequireregistrationofallsUASabovetheminimumweightthresholdof
0.55 pounds. Additionally, Congress saw fit to include this same registration
requirement in the annual National Defense Authorization Act signed into law in
December2017andALPAwasfullysupportiveofthiseffort.
TheprohibitionagainsttheFAA’sauthoritytoregulatehobbyistsUASalsocreatesan
interestingsituationwherecommercialsUASpilotswhoarecertifiedbytheFAAhave
more operational restrictions on them than the hobbyist operators. While
commercialsUASoperatorsmustobtainexplicitapprovalfromairtrafficcontrolto
operateinthevicinityofanairportwithanoperatingcontroltower,model/hobby
sUASoperatorsmerelyneedtoadviseATC.Thisseemssomewhatcounter-intuitive
fromasafetyperspective.Theoperatorswhoarenottrained,andwhohavenotbeen
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issued a certificate from the FAA, should have more safety restrictions than
commercialoperators.
Ashasbeenwidelyreported,adronerecentlycollidedwithaU.S.Armyhelicopter
onemileeastofMidlandBeachinStatenIsland,NewYork.Fromtheinvestigation,
weknowthataTemporaryFlightRestriction(TFR)wasineffectfortheareaofthe
flight, the UAS was not equipped with any type of identification or tracking
technology.TheNationalTransportationSafetyBoardusedpiecesofthesUASthat
werefoundlodgedintheaircraft,andusingtheinformationfromthesepieces,the
hobbyistpilotofthesUASwasidentifiedandlocated.Theindividualoperatingthe
sUASroutinelyoperatedhishobbyaircraftinthevicinityofthecollisionsite,which
wasbeyondhisvisuallineofsight.Afterlosingcontroloftheaircraft,andbecauseit
failedtoreturntohisposition,heindicatedthathesimplybelievedhisaircrafthad
“gonedown”andhewasunawarethatithadbeeninvolvedinamid-aircollision.
In another recently reportedevent, adroneappears tohave capturedvideoof an
ALPA-crewed airline aircraft flying underneath the drone while on approach to
landing. Inlightthesesituations,wehavereachedouttoallmembersofCongress
withthesupportofotherorganizations,callingforittogivetheFAAtheabilitytofully
regulateallUASoperations.
Andwesayitagaintoday,ALPAstronglyurgesthecommitteetoremovethecurrent
restrictions thatCongresshasplacedon theFAA’sability to fullyregulateallUAS,
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includinghobbysUAS.WearenotcallingonCongresstoapplyoverlyrestrictiveand
burdensomeregulationsontherecreationalsegmentofthesUASindustry.However,
wearecallingonCongresstoallowtheFAAtouseitsregulatoryauthoritytoaddress
theknownandconstantlyincreasingrisktoairlinesafety.
sUASIdentificationandTrackingTechnologiesareNeeded
ALPA also encourages Congress to work closely with the FAA to implement
mandatoryidentificationandtrackingcapabilitiesasquicklyaspossible.Anaviation
rulemakingcommittee(ARC)recentlyconcludeditsworkinthisveryimportantarea,
and provided the FAA with recommendations that should result in a regulatory
framework that increases safety and addresses security concerns as well. ALPA
participatedontheARC,andIcantellyouthataverydiversegroupofparticipants
workedverywelltogethertoachieveexcellentresults.
If an identification and tracking system had been in place prior to the October
collision with the Army helicopter, much more information would have been
immediatelyavailabletoaccidentinvestigatorsandlawenforcement.Suchasystem
wouldlikelyhavepreventedthecollisioninthefirstplace,becauselawenforcement
mayhaveobservedthesUASoperatingonapreviousflight,andproactivelycontacted
the hobbyist about the illegal use of the aircraft. Until there is a way for law
enforcementtoidentifyandtrackdownthesUASpilots,thereisverylittleincentive
fornon-conformisthobbyoperatortodososafely.
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StrengtheningtheVoluntarySafetyReportingPrograms
Voluntary safety reporting programs such as the Aviation Safety Action Program
(ASAP)andFlightOperationsQualityAssurance(FOQA)areimportant,collaborative
toolsthatenhanceaviationsafetythroughtheanalysisofvoluntarilyreportedsafety
eventsanddiscrepanciesthatleadtothepreventionofaccidentsandincidents.The
purpose of ASAP and FOQA is to encourage and use voluntarily reported safety
informationprovidedby frontlineemployeesandairlines, respectively, to identify
safetyrisks.Withoutthesevaluablesafetyreports,unidentifiedrisksgounmitigated
andremainwithinthesystem.
For example, more than a decade ago the implementation of stabilized approach
technology and procedures became a top safety priority upon discovering the
frequencyofnon-stabilizedapproachesbeingreportedbypilots.Morerecently,data
sourceshavebeen combined to identifypotential risks that are initially identified
through the voluntary safety programs. Ground radar data, historical weather
information, andotherdata sourceswereused to identify instanceswhenaircraft
trafficandterrainwarningsystemswererepeatedlyalertingtofalsealarms.These
voluntary safety programs triggered these studies, which ultimately led to the
discoverythat improvementstoairspaceandproceduresdesignwouldreducethe
false alarms. These examples prove that the underlying voluntary safety program
reportingbytheoperatorsisthebestsourcetoidentifypotentialriskareasandto
investigateandultimatelymitigatetheserisks.
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AutomaticAcceptance
WecanimproveandincreasethesafetybenefitofASAPandvoluntarilysubmitted
aviation safety information by automatic acceptance of ASAP reports. Several
programsalreadyhaveautomaticacceptanceprotocolsbuiltin(e.g.,Americanand
DeltaAirLines).However,whereASAPreportsarenotautomaticallyaccepted,the
safetybenefitisdelayed,sometimesbyweeksorlonger,waitingforanEventReview
Committee (ERC) tomeet, review, and accept these reports. Under an automatic-
acceptance scenario, the safety benefit of the information would be realized
immediately.However,areportcouldbeexcludedwhentheERCconvenesanditis
determined to meet established exclusionary criteria. The automatic acceptance
modelworksandshouldbeuniversaltoASAP.ALPAispleasedthatHR2997includes
thisveryimportantprovision.
AddressingCargoSafety
Many of the safety and security layers working to protect our passenger airline
industryareabsent fromall-cargooperations.Cargoairlines fly the sameaircraft,
takeoffandlandfromthesameairports,utilizethesameairspace,andflyoverthe
samecitiesaspassengeraircraft.Fromasafetyandsecuritystandpoint,thereisevery
reasontoholdall-cargooperationstothesamestandardsaspassengeroperations.
All-cargoairlineoperationscurrentlyexperienceanaccidentratethatisseventimes
higherthanpassengerairlineoperationsworldwide.
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Whilemanyofthesameregulationsareusedforbothcommercialpassengerandall-
cargoairlines,therearelesserrequirementsplacedonall-cargooperationsinseveral
veryimportantareas,whichresultsinunnecessarysafetyrisk.
Oneexampleofthissafetydoublestandardbetweencargoandpassengeroperations
is flight crew flight, duty, and rest regulations. While new flight- and duty-time
regulationsforpassengeroperationswereissuedin2011andimplementedin2014,
thoserulesapplyonlytoflightcrewmembersatpassengerairlinesanddonotinclude
all-cargo pilots. The FAA’s original rule included all pilots, passenger, and cargo
operations, but the cargo sector was removed by the Office of Management and
Budget due to a flawed cost-benefit methodology. We believe that science-based
flight,duty,andrestregulationsmustbedevelopedforflightcrewmembersofall-
cargooperations.
Another example of a safety gap is that all-cargo operations are exempted from
AircraftRescueandFireFighting(ARFF)requirementscontainedin14CFRPart139.
ThismeansthatARFFisnotrequiredtobestaffedorevenpresentatairportsduring
operationsofcargoaircraft.
Further, cargo aircraft carry some very hazardous cargo such as blood-borne
pathogen,chemical,andevenradioactivematerial.NotonlyshouldARFFbestaffed
duringcargooperations,butARFFpersonnelmustbetrainedfordealingwithfires
on cargo airliners. Measures need to be developed and implemented that will
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properlypreparefirefightersfordealingwithacargoaircraftfire.Thereisalackof
proper ARFF equipment needed to fight all-cargo aircraft fires at some airports,
including nozzle tips designed for penetrating cargo airliner hulls, and a lack of
funding, because the exemption of cargo from 14 CFR Part 139 requirements
interferes with fire departments’ ability to get the money they need for staffing,
equipment,training,anddevelopingstrategyforcargo-specificevents.
ALPAhasmaintainedastrongstancethatall-cargooperationsmusthavethesame
levelofsafetyaspassengerairlines.Thefactshowever,speakforthemselves.The
UnitedStates fatalaccidentrateofall-cargooperations issignificantlyhigher than
that of passengers. In the same period that there have been no fatal passenger
accidentsonU.S.airlines,therehavebeenseveralfatalcargoaccidents.Thesefacts
arethereasonwhyALPAhasinvestedourresourcesintheeffortsoftheCommercial
AviationSafetyTeam(CAST)andtheirtechnicalgroups,toidentifythedifferences
between passenger and all-cargo that need to be addressed. We appreciate the
Committee’s support of the work being done by CAST and the Aviation Safety
InformationAnalysisandSharing(ASIAS)activity.Weknowthatwiththesupportof
Congress,wewillachievethesafetygoalsthatallarestrivingtoachieve.
ALPAandAviationSafety
Weappreciatethecommittee’s invitationtoofferour insightsandperspectiveson
theseimportantsafetyissues.Moreimportantly,weappreciatetheleadershipthatis
being exertedby the committee to advance thesehigh-priority safety issues. The
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airline industry is best positioned to fully meet the needs of all passengers and
shipperswhensafetylevelsremainattheircurrentlevels.Itisinourcollectivebest
interest as legislative leaders, labor organizations, companies, and regulators, to
ensurethefoundationofsafetyissolid,andcontinuestoleadtherestoftheworld.I
lookforwardtoworkingtheseissueswithyouinthecomingmonthsaswestriveto
makemeaningfulsafetyimprovementstoaviationintheworkwearedoingtogether.