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WRITTENSTATEMENTOF

AIRLINEPILOTSASSOCIATION,INTERNATIONAL(ALPA)

BEFORETHE

SUBCOMMITTEEONAVIATION

OFTHE

COMMITTEEONTRANSPORTATIONANDINFRASTRUCTURE

U.S.HOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY27,2018

“STATEOFAVIATIONSAFETY”

AirLinePilotsAssociation,International1625MassachusettsAvenue,NWWashington,DC20036(202)797-4033

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TheAirLinePilotsAssociation,International(ALPA),representsmorethan60,000

professionalairlinepilotsflyingfor34airlinesintheUnitedStatesandCanada.ALPA

istheworld’slargestpilotunionandtheworld’slargestnon-governmentalaviation

safetyorganization.Wearetherecognizedvoiceoftheairlinepilotingprofessionin

NorthAmerica,withahistoryofsafetyandsecurityadvocacyspanningmorethan85

years. As the sole U.S. member of the International Federation of Airline Pilots

Associations (IFALPA), ALPA has the unique ability to provide active airline pilot

expertise to aviation safety issuesworldwide, and to incorporate an international

dimensiontosafetyadvocacy.

Overview

While2017wasthesafestonrecordglobally,U.S.airlinesoperatedunderPart121

have not experienced a single passenger fatality resulting from an accident since

2009;over9years.Thisisduetotheeffortsofaviationindustryandourgovernment

partnersBUTalsoduetotheeffortsofCongress.PriortothepassageoftheAviation

Safety and FAA Reauthorization Act of 2010 the passenger airline industry lost

approximately1100passengersinaircraftaccidents. Sincethepassageofthatbill

therehasnotbeenasinglepassengerfatality.

Whencomparedtotherestoftheworld,theUnitedStatespassengerairlinerecordis

trulyremarkable.Inthesame9-yeartimeframethattherehavebeennofatalUnited

States passenger airline accidents, there have been 81 fatal passenger accidents

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around theworld,which includesmore than4,100 fatalities. Themost important

work this committee can accomplish is to ensure theUnited Statesmaintains the

highest safety levels in the world and continue to lead by example. This allows

passengerstoboardapassengerairline,orsendtheirmail,cargo,andgiftsviaanall-

cargoairline,andknow,withoutadoubtintheirmind,thatallwillgettheresafely.

Fromdayonein1931,ALPAhasmaintainedourmottoof“schedulewithsafety”.It

hasn’tchanged;safetyisstillourtoppriority.

Thus, the hearing today is very important to ALPA. I thank you for putting the

spotlightonsafetybecauseweneedtokeepthefocusonsafetyconstantly,andthe

committeeistoberecognizedforitseffortstodoso.

WewerepleasedthecommitteechosetoholdthishearinginFebruary.Asyouknow,

the most recent passenger airline accident occurred on a cold snowy February

evening in2009, inClearanceCenter,NewYorkwhenColganAirlinesFlight3407

crashedonapproachtolanding.Fiftypeoplelosttheirlives.Earlierthismonththe

pilots of ALPA, and many others directly impacted by that tragic accident

remembered thosewe lost, and recalled the horror that for some,will always be

etchedinourheartsandinourminds.

Whilewestillmournthelossoffamily,friendsandfellowco-workerswealsoareable

toappreciatethetremendousadvancementsinsafetythathasresultedfromthefocus

members of Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and industry

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collectivelyputintoensuringanaccidentlikeColganflight3407wouldbelesslikely

happeninthefuture.And,giventhelawsandrulechangesthathavetakenplace,it

appearsthatCongress,theFAAandindustrygotitright!

However,inorderfortheUnitedStatesaviationindustrytocontinuetobethesafest

andmostefficientairspacesystemintheworld,thiscommitteehasveryimportant

work todo thatneeds tobeaccomplished,withoutdelay. Unlesswekeepairline

safetythetoppriorityweriskdigressionandanincreaseinaccidentsthatimpactour

ability tomake progress on other important aspects of aviation such as airspace

capacityandoperationalefficiencies.

FirstOfficerQualificationsHaveImprovedAviationSafety

Thebestandmostimportantsafetyfeatureofanyairlineoperationisawell-trained,

fully qualified, highly experienced, and adequately restedprofessional flight crew.

Withasolidfoundationoftrainingandexperience,pilotsareessentialinmaintaining

the safety of our system and ensuring that aviation safety continues to advance.

Several regionalairlineaccidents from2004to2009 identifiednumerous training

and qualification deficiencies that ultimately led to congressional action and

regulatory changes that significantly improved airline safety. The last of these

accidentsoccurredFebruary12,2009,nearBuffalo,N.Y.Fiftyliveswerelost—49in

the aircraft and one on the ground. This accident is now viewed as a “watershed

event” fortheairline industryandaviationsafetybyresulting in improvements in

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pilot training, qualification, and flight experience requirements as well as

implementationofsciencebasedflight,duty,andrestrequirements.

Thefollowingyear,Congressacteddecisivelyandforcefullyontheidentifiedsafety

deficienciesbysendinglegislationtothepresidentthataddressedthedocumented

shortcomings.P.L.111-216,the“AirlineSafetyandFederalAviationAdministration

ExtensionActof2010,”wassignedintolawonAugust1,2010.

Followingtheestablishmentofthelaw,andbasedonindustryrecommendations,the

FAA,citing31accidentsoveranine-yearperiod,issuedregulationseffectiveAugust

1,2013toestablishminimumfirstofficertrainingandqualificationrequirements.

These regulations require that all airline pilots flying under 14 Code of Federal

Regulations(CFR)Part121mustholdtheairtransportpilot(ATP)certificate.They

alsocreatedtherestrictedATP(R-ATP)certificatepathway,whichcouldbeobtained

with fewer flighthours than theATP, if thepilot applicant receives academic and

flighttrainingfromthemilitaryoranaccreditedaviationcollegeoruniversity.

Thenewrulesemphasizesignificantlygreater focusonacademicsand instruction,

areas of knowledge, and flight experience in various weather and operational

situations.Therulesalsorequireatyperatingintheaircrafttobeflownfortheairline

if operated inFARPart 121 service, amongothernumerous safety improvements

such as increased experience in multi-engine aircraft. The FAA made a specific

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mentionoftheimportanceofacademictrainingwhenitpublishedthefinalrule,and

howtheaccreditedacademicsalongwithgroundandflighttrainingwasnecessaryto

qualifyforareductioninhours.

As mentioned, the law also resulted in science-based flight, duty, and rest

requirements for airlines. Unfortunately, these new flight and duty requirements

were only applied to passenger airline operations. Cargo airline operationswere

carvedout.

Based on the safety improvementswithminimumpilot training and qualification

requirements achieved since P.L. 111-216 became law, we strongly urge the

committee to preserve these critically important safety regulations. We urge the

committee to reject any proposal to modify or change that weakens the current

minimumfirstofficerqualifications. Theserulesareworkingverywellinallaspects,

andliveshavebeensaved.

Safetyregulationsshouldnotbedrivenbytheeconomicdecisionsofairlines.

Therearesomepeopleandorganizationswhowanttofixbusiness-relatedindustry

problems by weakening the First Officer Qualification (FOQ) rules. These

organizationsbelievesafetyissomethingthatcanbenegotiated.Theybelievethat

rollingbackprovisionsinP.L.111-216isthebestwaytofixtheirbusinesschallenges

bywideningtheemploymentpool.Bythatsamelogic,wouldthesesamegroupsbe

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lobbying to shorten the duration ofmedical school in an attempt to attractmore

doctorstoworkinruralareas?

ItissomewhatironicthatsomewhocalledforthechangesinP.L.111-216havesince

becomecriticalofthenewrules,arguingthatthenewFirstOfficerQualificationshave

createdapilotshortage.Smallcommunitieswhichhaveexperiencedchangestothe

levelsofairlineservicesarealsocitingapilotshortage.However,inbothcases,there

isnoreliabledatatosupportthesepositions.

There are several business-related reasons that proponents cite for relaxing the

safetyrules.Theysaythattheruleshavenegativelyaffectedtheindustryinanumber

ofways.

Forexample,whilesomehavepointedoutthattheruleshavecreatedapilot

shortage,thedatasaysdifferently.Thereisanadequatesupplyofqualifiedpilots

andarobustpipelineofpilotstomeettheneedsofcommercialaviation.In2016,

theFAAissuedmorethan9,500ATPcertificates,whichincludesmorethan2,100R-

ATPcertificates.In2016,ourresearchrevealedthattheairlineshiredsomewhere

between3500-4000pilots,whichisconsiderablyfewerthanthenumberofpilots

whowerequalifiedtoflyfortheairlinesthatyear.

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FlightTrainingCostsNotImpactedbyFOQ

TheFOQruleshavenotdrivenincreasesinflighttrainingcosts.Theflighttraininga

pilotisrequiredtoreceivetoobtainacommercialpilotcertificateisthesametoday

asithasbeenfordecades.Oncepilotsachievetheircommercialpilotscertificate,they

stoppayingfortheirflighttime.Instead,pilotsobtaincommercialflightexperience

throughpaid employment as flight instructors, corporate, cargo, or charter pilots.

The hours and experience garnered in these entry-level commercial flight

environmentsarecritical to thesuccessful creationofawell-trained,experienced,

andfullyqualifiedairlinepilot.

PilotExperiencebeforeAirlineFlyingisCritical

Thelengthoftimefromwhenapilotobtainstheircommercialpilotslicensetowhen

theyhaveaccumulatedthehoursandflightexperiencenecessarytoqualifyforthe

ATPorR-ATPcertificate ismeasuredinmonths,notyearsordecades. Pilotswho

graduatefromanaccredited,structureduniversitythatarequalifiedfortheR-ATP

pathwaycancurrentlyexpecttospend12monthsflyinginentrylevelcommercial

operationsbeforetransitioningtoanairline.

Because each airline conducts training differently, and because they use different

terminology and require pilots to adapt to procedural philosophies that aremost

likely unique, there will be some adjustments needed by pilots. While regional

airlineswouldlikepilotstocomepre-programmedfromaflighttrainingenvironment

thatminimizestheadjustmentsneededbypilotsenteringanairline’sflighttraining

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environment, the pilots are also bringing with them real-world experience that

includesavarietyofweather,terrain,andairtrafficcontrolenvironments.

It is importanttonotethatairlinesdoNOTprovideANYtrainingorprovidepilots

withaircraft toobtainexperience in factors suchasweather (e.g., thunderstorms,

snow,tropicalstorms),terrain(e.g.,highaltitude,mountainflying),andhigh-density

airtraffic(e.g.,NewYorkCityandLosAngelesmetroplex).Today’sflightsimulation

environmentcannotadequatelyreplicate these factors. Therefore, it is critical for

pilotstoobtainflighttimeandexperienceincommercialoperationsaftertheyhave

obtainedthecommercialpilotslicense,butbeforebeinginsertedintothePart121

airlineoperatingenvironment.TheFAAwiselyrecognizedthatthecombinationof

an accredited university, structured FAA approved flight training, and some

commercialpilotingexperience inpre-airline commercial operationswas thebest

andsafesttrainingpathwaytofullyaddresstheshortcomingsidentifiedfromfatal

passengerairlineaccidents.

PilotSupplyIsn’tDrivingAirlineServiceChanges

Thechangesinairlineservicestoanyairportlargeorsmall,aredrivenbyseveral

variablesincludingpassengerdemand,anairline’saccesstoanappropriatelysized

aircraft,economicincentives,accesstogroundservicesandequipment.Likeany

otherbusiness,however,airlinesmustdecidewheretheyareabletoprofitably

provideaffordableairtransportationservices.Airlineschangeservicelevelstoall

airportsonaregularbasis.Asjustoneexample,lastNovember,Southwestairlines

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announcedthatitwouldendservicetoFlint,Michigan.Butthecompanywasclear

aboutthetruereasonforthechangeinservice:theairportwasnotagoodbusiness

fit.ThesameissuethatSouthwestairlinesadmittedtoinFlint,Michigan(see:

http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2017/11/southwest_airlines_pulls_pl

ug.html)isanissueinothersmallcommunitiesaswell.

Otherconsiderationsincludeproximitytolargerairportswithairtravelthatisless

expensiveduetotheuseoflargeraircraft.Sometimes,airlinesenhancetheservice

tosmallcommunitiesbychangingfromapropelleraircrafttojetaircraft,which

addsseatsinalmostallcases.Byaddingseats,theairlinereducesthefrequencyof

theflightsbutmayactuallyprovidemorecapacitythanwithpropelleraircraft.

ALPAisastrongproponentforensuringthatallAmericanshaveaccesstopassenger

airlineservices,andwhenpossibletheservicesshouldbemadeavailabletothe

smallcommunitiesacrossthenation.Loweringsafetystandardswillnotincrease

servicetosmallcommunitiesitwillsimplymakeflyingtothosecommunitiesmore

dangerous.Thereareotherrulesandpoliciesthatcanbechangedtomorefully

supportairtravelfromsmallcommunities.

FlightTrainingEnrollmentsAreIncreasing,NotDecreasing

Severalaccrediteduniversitieswithflighttrainingprogramshavestatedthat

enrollmentsofprofessionalpilotstudentsaresignificantlyhigherthisyearas

comparedtolastyear,anddemandforfutureyearsremainsstrong.Thisisastrong

indicatorthattheR-ATPpathwaythatisavailabletostudentswhoenrollat

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accreditedaviationcollegesanduniversitiesisworking.Pilotscananddocomplete

atwo-orfour-yearuniversitydegreeprogramandaccumulate12-18monthsof

flyingexperienceinentry-levelcommercialaviationemploymentbefore

progressingtoairlineflying.

Bycallingforchangestosafetyrulesastheirnumberonesolutiontotheirbusiness

problem, theseother interestedpartiesare telling the travelingpublicandelected

officials that they need to accept reduced levels of safety in pilot training and

qualificationssothatbusinessproblemscanbefixed.Theyaresayingthatnoother

law, regulation, or policy change in all of the United States code, and associated

regulationscansolvetheirproblem.Intentionallyorotherwise,theyarealsotelling

thetravelingpublicthattheyneedtoacceptreducedlevelsofsafetywhenflyingto

smallcommunities.Theyaretellingthepublicthatweneedtogobacktothewayit

wasinFebruary2009.

Pilotfreemarketsupplyanddemandwilldictateifwecontinuetohaveenoughpilots

inthefuture,ALPAandtheflyingpublicwillnotacceptareductioninsafetyinan

attempttoinfluencethepilotsupplyfreemarket.

Those few regional cargo and passenger airlines that report a shortage of pilots

typically offer lower salaries and benefits, poor work-life balance, and fewer

opportunities for career progression than airlines that are not reporting such a

shortage.Qualifiedpilotshavemanyemploymentopportunitiesandsomeregional

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airlineshaverealizedthattoattractqualifiedcandidates,theyhavetobecompetitive

insalaryandbenefitstoattractpilots.

Weurgethecommitteetoseektounderstandtheissuesthatappeartobeforcingthe

airlinesandsmallcommunityairportadvocatestocallforchangesinsafetyrules,in

ordertofixaproblemthatispurelyabouteconomics.TravelersintheUnitedStates

shouldnotberequiredtosacrificelevelsofsafetytoaccessairlinetravelfromtheir

homeairports.Butweakeningfirstofficerqualificationrulesattempttodojustthat.

SafeShipmentsofHazardousMaterials

ALPA has long advocated for improved transport requirements for hazardous

materials.Aswitnessed in2015withhoverboards, andagain lastwinterwith the

SamsungGalaxyNote7,lithiumbatteriesandotherhazardousmaterialscancreate

realsafetythreatsintheabsenceofproperregulations.Mitigatingtherisktoaviation

safety fromhazardousmaterialsrequiresa focusontwospecificareas: improving

hazardousmaterialsregulationsandeliminatingshipmentsofundeclaredhazardous

materials.

Thesignificantconsumerdemandforthesehigh-densitypowersourceshasresulted

in rapid expansion in lithium battery production, supply, and proliferation.

Consequently, this hazard is increasing exponentially. While lithium batteries

represent a significant technological improvement over older battery technology,

their high energy density and flammability make these batteries more prone to

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failure, resulting in fire and explosion. The lack of comprehensive hazardous

materials regulations for the carriage of lithium batteries as cargo onboard

commercial aircraft, both passenger and cargo, continues to pose risks to air

transportation.

NewstandardsimplementedbytheInternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO)

onApril1,2016,madesignificantimprovementstoprovisionsunderwhichlithium

batteriesareshippedascargobyairaroundtheglobe.AndwhiletheDepartmentof

TransportationhasbeguntheprocessofharmonizingtheseintotheU.S.regulations,

noproposedorfinalrulehasbeenissuedafter22months.Wewereverypleasedto

seelanguageincludedinH.R.2997torequireDOTtoharmonizeitsregulationswith

thenewICAOstandards.

While the ICAO limitations are a good first step, they do not go far enough in

addressing the safety risk created by lithium batteries. Work must continue to

develop and mandate performance-based packaging standards that will prevent

and/orcontainalithiumbatteryfire.Thesestandardsmustalsoaddressthethreat

fromexternalfires.

In the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95), Section 828,

Congress directed the DOT not to regulate lithium batteries carried as cargo on

aircraftstricterthantheICAOstandardsunlessafireonboardanaircraftcouldbe

proventohavesubstantiallycontributedtoafireinvolvinglithiumbatteriesinthe

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cargohold.Therehavenowbeenthreesuchaccidents(UPS1307,UPS6,andAsiana

991),twoofwhichwerefataltothepilotsonboardandallthreeofwhichdestroyed

theaircraft.Theaccidentreportsattributelithiumbatteriesasalargefactorinallof

theseevents.

TheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard(NTSB),followingthemostrecentaccident

involvingAsianaAirlinesFlight991,issuedasafetyrecommendationstatingthatit

“believes that the circumstances and findings in the Asiana Flight 991 accident

constitutes such credible evidence that demonstrates a deficiency in cargo-

segregation requirements that would permit the HMR [hazardous materials

regulations]tobechangedtobemorestringentthanthecurrentICAOrequirements.”

ALPAagreeswiththeNTSBthatthethresholdsetbylegislationhasbeenmetandit

istimetomoveforwardoncomprehensiveregulationsgoverningcargoshipmentsof

lithiumbatteries.

Hazardousmaterials,comprisedofliquids,flammables,andothermaterials,shipped

as cargo without being identified by the shipper are considered undeclared

hazardousmaterials. There are no official estimates ofwhat percentage of parcel

shipments contain undeclared hazardous materials; however, the FAA tracks

incidentswhere hazardousmaterials shipments create safety hazards for various

reasons,suchasaleakingpackageorothertypeofexternalevidencethatthepackage

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isasafetyconcern.In2015,theFAAreceived1,129reportsofsuchevents,and564

oftheincidentsinvolvedundeclaredhazardousmaterials.

ALPA’sresearch indicates that thebiggestweakness in theshipmentofhazardous

materialsbyair is therelianceonan“honorsystem”approachbytheairlinesand

regulators. Increased attention to and accurate data is needed to eliminate

undeclaredhazardousmaterialsshipmentsbyair.

FAALeadstheWayonPortableDeviceSafetyinCheckedBaggage

ALPAconcernsaboutlithiumbatteryfiresincheckedluggagespikedearlyin2017

whensecurityissuesdrovemanypassengerstostoretheirlargepersonalelectronic

devicesintheircheckedbaggage.

WewerepleasedtoseethattheFAAhastakenthesignificantstepatICAOtopropose

a prohibition of installed lithium batteries in certain electronic equipment from

checkedbaggageonpassengeraircraft.ALPAfullysupportsthisproposal,whichwas

basedontestingconductedbytheFAAattheWilliamJ.HughesTechnicalCenter(the

TechnicalCenter),outsideofAtlanticCity,NewJersey.TheFAAexpertiseandrigor

appliedtothetesting,andproposaldevelopmentistobecommended.

SafeIntegrationofUnmannedAircraftSystems

WiththerapidlygrowinguseofUnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS)foranynumberof

applicationsanduses, thesafetyrisks toairlineoperationsneeds tobemonitored

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very closely. We applaud this committee’s commitment to ensureUAS safety, by

holdingahearingattheendoflastyearonthetopic,andbyprobingtheneedfora

robustriskmitigationplan.Clearly,atsomepointinthefuture,UASwillbeintegrated

intothenationalairspacesystem(NAS),interactingwithotheraircraftinamanner

similarto“pilotonboard”aircrafttoday.

However,itseemsattimesthattheFAAisstrugglingtokeeppacewiththeexpansion

oftheUASindustry.WemustnotallowpressuretorapidlyintegrateUASintotheNAS

withoutappropriatesafeguardsinplace.Thisprocessmustbefocusedonsafetyas

the highest priority. Riskmitigation plans,which have yet to be fully developed,

combined with consensus-based technology standards that will ensure

interoperabilitywithmannedaircraft,mustbeinplacebeforeaUAScanoccupythe

sameairspaceasmannedaircraftoroperateinareaswhereitmightinadvertently

strayintoairspaceoccupiedbyairliners.WhenUASoperateinthesameairspaceas

airlineaircraft,thepilotswillneedtobeabletoseethemoncockpitdisplays,andair

trafficcontrollerswillalsoneedtoseethemontheirdisplaystosafelyseparateair

traffic.Further,theUASmustbeequippedwithactivecollision-avoidancetechnology.

Wewillopposeanyintegrationthatdoesnotincludecollisionavoidancesystemsthat

areinteroperablewithairlinecollisionavoidancesystems.

If a UAS operator does not intend to fly in the same airspace as airliners, then

limitationsthatensurethattheUASstaysoutoftheairspacemustbeprogramedinto

theUASinawaythatcannotbeoverridden.

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FAAAuthoritytoFullyRegulateallUAS

TheFAAhasestablished14CFRPart107,whicharerulesforsmallUAS(sUAS).The

regulatory framework created is limited to commercial operations only. This is

because Congress prohibited the FAA from promulgating any new rules on

“hobbyists”operators inSection336ofP.L.112-95of theFAAModernizationand

ReformActof2012. Thislawwascitedinanappealscourtdecisioninearly2017

thatstruckdowntheFAAregulatoryrequirementthatrequiresalloperatorsofsUAS

that weigh more than .55 pounds to register with the FAA. Fortunately, this

committee’s bill - HR-2997-- includes a provision that would legislate the FAA’s

authoritytorequireregistrationofallsUASabovetheminimumweightthresholdof

0.55 pounds. Additionally, Congress saw fit to include this same registration

requirement in the annual National Defense Authorization Act signed into law in

December2017andALPAwasfullysupportiveofthiseffort.

TheprohibitionagainsttheFAA’sauthoritytoregulatehobbyistsUASalsocreatesan

interestingsituationwherecommercialsUASpilotswhoarecertifiedbytheFAAhave

more operational restrictions on them than the hobbyist operators. While

commercialsUASoperatorsmustobtainexplicitapprovalfromairtrafficcontrolto

operateinthevicinityofanairportwithanoperatingcontroltower,model/hobby

sUASoperatorsmerelyneedtoadviseATC.Thisseemssomewhatcounter-intuitive

fromasafetyperspective.Theoperatorswhoarenottrained,andwhohavenotbeen

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issued a certificate from the FAA, should have more safety restrictions than

commercialoperators.

Ashasbeenwidelyreported,adronerecentlycollidedwithaU.S.Armyhelicopter

onemileeastofMidlandBeachinStatenIsland,NewYork.Fromtheinvestigation,

weknowthataTemporaryFlightRestriction(TFR)wasineffectfortheareaofthe

flight, the UAS was not equipped with any type of identification or tracking

technology.TheNationalTransportationSafetyBoardusedpiecesofthesUASthat

werefoundlodgedintheaircraft,andusingtheinformationfromthesepieces,the

hobbyistpilotofthesUASwasidentifiedandlocated.Theindividualoperatingthe

sUASroutinelyoperatedhishobbyaircraftinthevicinityofthecollisionsite,which

wasbeyondhisvisuallineofsight.Afterlosingcontroloftheaircraft,andbecauseit

failedtoreturntohisposition,heindicatedthathesimplybelievedhisaircrafthad

“gonedown”andhewasunawarethatithadbeeninvolvedinamid-aircollision.

In another recently reportedevent, adroneappears tohave capturedvideoof an

ALPA-crewed airline aircraft flying underneath the drone while on approach to

landing. Inlightthesesituations,wehavereachedouttoallmembersofCongress

withthesupportofotherorganizations,callingforittogivetheFAAtheabilitytofully

regulateallUASoperations.

Andwesayitagaintoday,ALPAstronglyurgesthecommitteetoremovethecurrent

restrictions thatCongresshasplacedon theFAA’sability to fullyregulateallUAS,

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includinghobbysUAS.WearenotcallingonCongresstoapplyoverlyrestrictiveand

burdensomeregulationsontherecreationalsegmentofthesUASindustry.However,

wearecallingonCongresstoallowtheFAAtouseitsregulatoryauthoritytoaddress

theknownandconstantlyincreasingrisktoairlinesafety.

sUASIdentificationandTrackingTechnologiesareNeeded

ALPA also encourages Congress to work closely with the FAA to implement

mandatoryidentificationandtrackingcapabilitiesasquicklyaspossible.Anaviation

rulemakingcommittee(ARC)recentlyconcludeditsworkinthisveryimportantarea,

and provided the FAA with recommendations that should result in a regulatory

framework that increases safety and addresses security concerns as well. ALPA

participatedontheARC,andIcantellyouthataverydiversegroupofparticipants

workedverywelltogethertoachieveexcellentresults.

If an identification and tracking system had been in place prior to the October

collision with the Army helicopter, much more information would have been

immediatelyavailabletoaccidentinvestigatorsandlawenforcement.Suchasystem

wouldlikelyhavepreventedthecollisioninthefirstplace,becauselawenforcement

mayhaveobservedthesUASoperatingonapreviousflight,andproactivelycontacted

the hobbyist about the illegal use of the aircraft. Until there is a way for law

enforcementtoidentifyandtrackdownthesUASpilots,thereisverylittleincentive

fornon-conformisthobbyoperatortodososafely.

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StrengtheningtheVoluntarySafetyReportingPrograms

Voluntary safety reporting programs such as the Aviation Safety Action Program

(ASAP)andFlightOperationsQualityAssurance(FOQA)areimportant,collaborative

toolsthatenhanceaviationsafetythroughtheanalysisofvoluntarilyreportedsafety

eventsanddiscrepanciesthatleadtothepreventionofaccidentsandincidents.The

purpose of ASAP and FOQA is to encourage and use voluntarily reported safety

informationprovidedby frontlineemployeesandairlines, respectively, to identify

safetyrisks.Withoutthesevaluablesafetyreports,unidentifiedrisksgounmitigated

andremainwithinthesystem.

For example, more than a decade ago the implementation of stabilized approach

technology and procedures became a top safety priority upon discovering the

frequencyofnon-stabilizedapproachesbeingreportedbypilots.Morerecently,data

sourceshavebeen combined to identifypotential risks that are initially identified

through the voluntary safety programs. Ground radar data, historical weather

information, andotherdata sourceswereused to identify instanceswhenaircraft

trafficandterrainwarningsystemswererepeatedlyalertingtofalsealarms.These

voluntary safety programs triggered these studies, which ultimately led to the

discoverythat improvementstoairspaceandproceduresdesignwouldreducethe

false alarms. These examples prove that the underlying voluntary safety program

reportingbytheoperatorsisthebestsourcetoidentifypotentialriskareasandto

investigateandultimatelymitigatetheserisks.

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AutomaticAcceptance

WecanimproveandincreasethesafetybenefitofASAPandvoluntarilysubmitted

aviation safety information by automatic acceptance of ASAP reports. Several

programsalreadyhaveautomaticacceptanceprotocolsbuiltin(e.g.,Americanand

DeltaAirLines).However,whereASAPreportsarenotautomaticallyaccepted,the

safetybenefitisdelayed,sometimesbyweeksorlonger,waitingforanEventReview

Committee (ERC) tomeet, review, and accept these reports. Under an automatic-

acceptance scenario, the safety benefit of the information would be realized

immediately.However,areportcouldbeexcludedwhentheERCconvenesanditis

determined to meet established exclusionary criteria. The automatic acceptance

modelworksandshouldbeuniversaltoASAP.ALPAispleasedthatHR2997includes

thisveryimportantprovision.

AddressingCargoSafety

Many of the safety and security layers working to protect our passenger airline

industryareabsent fromall-cargooperations.Cargoairlines fly the sameaircraft,

takeoffandlandfromthesameairports,utilizethesameairspace,andflyoverthe

samecitiesaspassengeraircraft.Fromasafetyandsecuritystandpoint,thereisevery

reasontoholdall-cargooperationstothesamestandardsaspassengeroperations.

All-cargoairlineoperationscurrentlyexperienceanaccidentratethatisseventimes

higherthanpassengerairlineoperationsworldwide.

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Whilemanyofthesameregulationsareusedforbothcommercialpassengerandall-

cargoairlines,therearelesserrequirementsplacedonall-cargooperationsinseveral

veryimportantareas,whichresultsinunnecessarysafetyrisk.

Oneexampleofthissafetydoublestandardbetweencargoandpassengeroperations

is flight crew flight, duty, and rest regulations. While new flight- and duty-time

regulationsforpassengeroperationswereissuedin2011andimplementedin2014,

thoserulesapplyonlytoflightcrewmembersatpassengerairlinesanddonotinclude

all-cargo pilots. The FAA’s original rule included all pilots, passenger, and cargo

operations, but the cargo sector was removed by the Office of Management and

Budget due to a flawed cost-benefit methodology. We believe that science-based

flight,duty,andrestregulationsmustbedevelopedforflightcrewmembersofall-

cargooperations.

Another example of a safety gap is that all-cargo operations are exempted from

AircraftRescueandFireFighting(ARFF)requirementscontainedin14CFRPart139.

ThismeansthatARFFisnotrequiredtobestaffedorevenpresentatairportsduring

operationsofcargoaircraft.

Further, cargo aircraft carry some very hazardous cargo such as blood-borne

pathogen,chemical,andevenradioactivematerial.NotonlyshouldARFFbestaffed

duringcargooperations,butARFFpersonnelmustbetrainedfordealingwithfires

on cargo airliners. Measures need to be developed and implemented that will

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properlypreparefirefightersfordealingwithacargoaircraftfire.Thereisalackof

proper ARFF equipment needed to fight all-cargo aircraft fires at some airports,

including nozzle tips designed for penetrating cargo airliner hulls, and a lack of

funding, because the exemption of cargo from 14 CFR Part 139 requirements

interferes with fire departments’ ability to get the money they need for staffing,

equipment,training,anddevelopingstrategyforcargo-specificevents.

ALPAhasmaintainedastrongstancethatall-cargooperationsmusthavethesame

levelofsafetyaspassengerairlines.Thefactshowever,speakforthemselves.The

UnitedStates fatalaccidentrateofall-cargooperations issignificantlyhigher than

that of passengers. In the same period that there have been no fatal passenger

accidentsonU.S.airlines,therehavebeenseveralfatalcargoaccidents.Thesefacts

arethereasonwhyALPAhasinvestedourresourcesintheeffortsoftheCommercial

AviationSafetyTeam(CAST)andtheirtechnicalgroups,toidentifythedifferences

between passenger and all-cargo that need to be addressed. We appreciate the

Committee’s support of the work being done by CAST and the Aviation Safety

InformationAnalysisandSharing(ASIAS)activity.Weknowthatwiththesupportof

Congress,wewillachievethesafetygoalsthatallarestrivingtoachieve.

ALPAandAviationSafety

Weappreciatethecommittee’s invitationtoofferour insightsandperspectiveson

theseimportantsafetyissues.Moreimportantly,weappreciatetheleadershipthatis

being exertedby the committee to advance thesehigh-priority safety issues. The

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airline industry is best positioned to fully meet the needs of all passengers and

shipperswhensafetylevelsremainattheircurrentlevels.Itisinourcollectivebest

interest as legislative leaders, labor organizations, companies, and regulators, to

ensurethefoundationofsafetyissolid,andcontinuestoleadtherestoftheworld.I

lookforwardtoworkingtheseissueswithyouinthecomingmonthsaswestriveto

makemeaningfulsafetyimprovementstoaviationintheworkwearedoingtogether.