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Chinese Foreign Relations with Weak Peripheral States

This book examines China’s relations with its weak peripheral states through the theoretical lens of structural power and structural violence.

China’s foreign policy concepts toward its weak neighbouring states, such as the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy, are premised on the assumption that eco-nomic exchange and a commitment to common development are the most effec-tive means of ensuring stability on its borders. This book, however, argues that China’s over-reliance on economic exchange as the basis for its bilateral relations contains inherently self-defeating qualities that have contributed and can further contribute to instability and insecurity within China’s periphery. Unequal eco-nomic exchange between China and its weak neighbours results in Chinese influ-ence over the state’s domestic institutions, what this book refers to as ‘structural power’. Chinese structural power, in turn, can undermine the state’s development, contribute to social unrest, and exacerbate existing state/society tensions – what this book refers to as ‘structural violence’. For China, such outcomes lead to instability within its peripheral environment and raise its vulnerability to security threats stemming from nationalism, separatism, terrorism, transnational organ-ised crime, and drug trafficking, among others. This book explores the causality between China’s economically-reliant foreign policy and insecurity in its weak peripheral states and considers the implications for China’s security environment and foreign policy.

This book will be of much interest to students of Chinese politics, Asian secu-rity studies, international political economy, and IR in general.

Jeffrey Reeves is Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Secu-rity Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, and has a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is co-author of Non-traditional Security in East Asia: A Regime Approach (2015, with Ramon Pacheco-Pardo).

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Asian Security Studies

Series Editors: Sumit Ganguly, Indiana University, Bloomington, Andrew Scobell, Research and Development (RAND) Corporation, Santa Monica, and Joseph Chinyong Liow, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Few regions of the world are fraught with as many security questions as Asia. Within this region it is possible to study great power rivalries, irredentist conflicts, nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, secessionist movements, ethnoreligious conflicts, and interstate wars. This book series publishes the best possible schol-arship on the security issues affecting the region and includes detailed empirical studies, theoretically oriented case studies, and policy-relevant analyses as well as more general works.

China and International InstitutionsAlternate paths to global powerMarc Lanteigne

China’s Rising Sea PowerThe PLA Navy’s submarine challengePeter Howarth

If China Attacks TaiwanMilitary strategy, politics and economicsEdited by Steve Tsang

Chinese Civil-Military RelationsThe transformation of the People’s Liberation ArmyEdited by Nan Li

The Chinese Army TodayTradition and transformation for the 21st centuryDennis J. Blasko

Taiwan’s SecurityHistory and prospectsBernard D. Cole

Religion and Conflict in South and Southeast AsiaDisrupting violenceEdited by Linell E. Cady and Sheldon W. Simon

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Political Islam and Violence in IndonesiaZachary Abuza

US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st CenturyMore than wordsEdited by Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell

India, Pakistan and the Secret JihadThe covert war in Kashmir, 1947–2004Praveen Swami

China’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-MakingConfucianism, leadership and warHuiyun Feng

Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina WarThe last Maoist warEdward C. O’Dowd

Asia-Pacific SecurityUS, Australia and Japan and the new security triangleEdited by William T. Tow, Mark J. Thomson, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, and Satu P. Limaye

China, the United States, and Southeast AsiaContending perspectives on politics, security, and economicsEdited by Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon

Conflict and Cooperation in Multi-Ethnic StatesInstitutional incentives, myths, and counter-balancingBrian Shoup

China’s War on TerrorismCounter-insurgency, politics and internal securityMartin I. Wayne

US Taiwan PolicyConstructing the triangleØystein Tunsjø

Conflict Management, Security and Intervention in East AsiaThird-party mediation in regional conflictEdited by Jacob Bercovitch, Kwei-Bo Huang, and Chung-Chian Teng

South Asia’s Cold WarNuclear weapons and conflict in comparative perspectiveRajesh M. Basrur

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The Rise of China and International SecurityAmerica and Asia RespondEdited by Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato

Nuclear Proliferation in South AsiaCrisis behaviour and the bombEdited by Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur

Nuclear Weapons and Conflict TransformationThe case of India-PakistanSaira Khan

Managing the China ChallengeGlobal perspectivesEdited by Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu

India and CounterinsurgencyLessons learnedEdited by Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler

Cooperative Security in the Asia-PacificThe ASEAN Regional ForumEdited by Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada

US–China–EU RelationsManaging the new world orderEdited by Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø and Zhang Tuosheng

China, Europe and International SecurityInterests, roles and prospectsEdited by Frans-Paul van der Putten and Chu Shulong

Crime-Terror Nexus in South AsiaStates, security and non-state actorsRyan Clarke

US-Japan-North Korean Security RelationsIrrepressible interestsAnthony DiFilippo

Pakistan’s War on TerrorismStrategies for combating Jihadist armed groups since 9/11Samir Puri

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Indian Foreign and Security Policy in South AsiaRegional power strategiesSandra Destradi

Sri Lanka and the Responsibility to ProtectPolitics, ethnicity and genocideDamien Kingsbury

The Chinese Army Today, Second EditionTradition and transformation for the 21st centurySecond editionDennis J. Blasko

Understanding Security Practices in South AsiaSecuritization theory and the role of non-state actorsMonika Barthwal-Datta

Autonomy and Ethnic Conflict in South and South-East AsiaEdited by Rajat Ganguly

Chinese Industrial EspionageTechnology acquisition and military modernisationWilliam C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi

Power Transition and International Order in AsiaIssues and challengesEdited by Peter Shearman

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic ChangeAdjusting Western regional policyEdited by Joachim Krause and Charles King Mallory, IV

The Arms Race in AsiaTrends, causes and implicationsAndrew T. H. Tan

Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan StraitIn the shadow of ChinaEdited by Ming-chin Monique Chu and Scott L. Kastner

Multilateral Asian Security ArchitectureNon-ASEAN stakeholdersSee Seng Tan

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Chinese Foreign Relations with Weak Peripheral StatesAsymmetrical economic power and insecurityJeffrey Reeves

Democratic Transition and Security in PakistanEdited by Shaun Gregory

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Chinese Foreign Relations with Weak Peripheral StatesAsymmetrical economic power and insecurity

Jeffrey Reeves

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First published 2016by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

© 2016 Jeffrey Reeves

The right of Jeffrey Reeves to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataReeves, Jeffrey (Writer on Asian security issues), author. Chinese foreign relations with weak peripheral states : asymmetrical economic power and insecurity / Jeffrey Reeves. pages cm. — (Asian security studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. China—Foreign economic relations—21st century. 2. China—Economic policy—21st century. 3. Asia, Central—Foreign economic relations—China. 4. China—Foreign economic relations—Asia, Central. 5. South Asia—Foreign economic relations—China. 6. China—Foreign economic relations—South Asia. 7. Southeast Asia—Foreign economic relations—China. 8. China—Foreign economic relations—Southeast Asia. I. Title. HF1604.R44 2016 327.5105—dc23 2015019472

ISBN: 978-1-138-89150-0 (hbk)ISBN: 978-1-315-70962-8 (ebk)

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To my wife, Oyun, and children, Patrick and Julia.

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Acknowledgements xiiiAbbreviations xv

Introduction 1

1 Asymmetrical economic exchange: negative outcomes of structural power and structural violence 22

2 China’s reliance on economic exchange with its peripheral states 39

3 Sino-Kyrgyzstan relations 59

4 Sino-Tajikistan relations 74

5 Sino-Afghanistan relations 91

6 Sino-Pakistan relations 110

7 Sino-Nepal relations 133

8 Sino-Myanmar relations 149

9 Sino-Lao PDR relations 167

10 Sino-Mongolia relations 188

Contents

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xii Contents

11 Weak states, China’s security, and policy prescriptions 205

12 Weak states, structural power, and structural violence 223

Index 229

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I would like to thank the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii, for supporting this research. In particular, I would like to thank the center director, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Dan “Fig” Leaf, and the dean of the College of Security Studies, Capt. (Ret.) Carleton R. Cramer, for giving me the time, space, and resources to research and write. I would like to thank my APCSS colleagues Jeffrey Hornung, Justin and Kerry Nankivell, and Lora Saalman for their advice and support. Lastly, I would like to thank my family for their continual support and acceptance of the long travel and late nights that went into this book.

Acknowledgements

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ADB Asian Development BankAIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment BankANSF Afghan National Security ForcesASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsCNPC China National Petroleum CorporationDP Democratic Party of MongoliaEIA Environmental impact assessmentEITI Extractive Industries Transparency InitiativeETIM East Turkestan Islamic MovementETLO East Turkestan Liberation OrganizationFATA Federally Administered Tribal AreasFDI Foreign direct investmentFTA Free trade agreementGDP Gross domestic productGNI Gross national incomeICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China LtdIMAR Inner Mongolian Autonomous RegionISAF International Security Assistance ForcesJICA Japan International Cooperation AgencyKIA Kachin Independence ArmyKIO Kachin Independence OrganizationLao PDR Lao People’s Democratic RepublicLeJ Lashkar-e-JhangviLPRP Lao People’s Revolutionary PartyMCC Metallurgical Corporation of ChinaMFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of ChinaMOFCOM Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of ChinaNLD National League for DemocracyNUG National Unity GovernmentODA Overseas development aidPLA People’s Liberation ArmyPRC People’s Republic of ChinaRATS Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure

Abbreviations

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xvi Abbreviations

SCO Shanghai Cooperation OrganisationSOE State-owned enterprisesSPDC State Peace and Development CouncilTAR Tibet Autonomous RegionTTP Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-PakistanUCPN(M) Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist)UNHCR United Nations’ High Commission for RefugeesUSDP Union Solidarity and Development PartyUTO United Tajik OppositionUWSA United Wa State ArmyWTO World Trade OrganisationXUAR Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

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Introduction

State weakness is a critical, structural component of China’s peripheral security environment. Of the fourteen states directly on China’s borders at least eight are weak, with varying degrees of instability and insecurity. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Mongolia all struggle with issues of ineffective domestic institutions, governance illegitimacy, and poor state/society relations that result in different levels of internal unrest and trans-national threats. For China, engagement with these weak states so as to ensure stability on its borders is a top foreign policy priority.1

Since the early 1980s, China has relied on a foreign policy approach based on economic exchange to ensure good relations with its neighbouring weak states and stability on its borders. China first advanced this economic-centric approach with the Periphery Policy (zhoubian zhengce) and Good Neighbour Policy (mulin zhengce) concepts, both of which drew heavily on economic exchange as a basis for security. Later foreign policy iterations that stressed economic development as a means of providing security included the South-South Cooperation (nan-nan hezuo), Go Out Strategy (zou chuqu zhanlue), and New Security Concept (xin anquan guan) strategies. While these concepts have evolved over time, they con-tinue to advance economic exchange and development as their core principles for engagement. They also remain essential policies in shaping China’s relations with its weak neighbouring states and in guiding its search for security on its borders.

There is clear continuity between China’s past foreign policies and those of its current leadership under President Xi Jinping. In 2013, President Xi articulated a new foreign policy approach to peripheral security at the October Symposium for Working Periphery Diplomacy in Beijing based on the existing concept of ‘Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous Neighbourhood’ (mulin, anlin, fulin).2 In 2014, President Xi introduced the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategic concept, which is entirely premised on economic exchange between China and the countries in its near abroad.3 While Chinese media lauded both initiatives as breakthroughs in foreign policy thinking on periphery relations, there is little within either con-cept that is different from past policies. Both the Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous Neighbourhood approach and the One Belt, One Road concept continue to assume economic exchange and a commitment to common development are the most effective conduits for security relations with the weak states on China’s borders.

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2 Introduction

The approaches also retain the assumed logic that all economic ties between China and its weak neighbours result in positive outcomes for both parties involved.

It is this book’s position that China’s policy dependence on economic exchange to ensure security vis-à-vis the weak states on its periphery has actually contrib-uted to insecurity on China’s borders and has the potential to do so further. In particular, China’s over-reliance on economic exchange as a basis of security rela-tions is problematic in that not all economic exchange between China and its weak neighbouring states results in positive outcomes. For weak states in particular, economic exchange with China can, and often does, result in China developing a negative influence over their domestic structures, what this book refers to as ‘structural power’, and domestic insecurity, or ‘structural violence’. This paradox of economic exchange’s negative outcomes becomes clearer when one considers the differing nature of China’s economic exchange with developed Asian states and its weak peripheral neighbours.

For developed Asian states, or those with more developed economies and more robust political institutions, China’s role as a regional economic core has been largely beneficial. Economic cooperation with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been a driving force for developed Asian states’ growth over the past two decades. Chinese demand for natural resources such as wood, coal, iron, and copper, for example, has contributed to the development of resource sectors in Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia.4 Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in roads, rail lines, and other infrastructure projects in developed Asian states has enabled more effective transfers of goods and services that have, in turn, spurred developed Asian states’ growth. China’s central role in Asia’s ‘supply chain’ has led to greater intraregional trade in intermediate products, more robust regional export growth, and enabled some developed Asian states to strengthen their manu-facturing sectors. Across many circumstances, economic cooperation with China has been a positive phenomenon for developed Asian states, contributing both to their domestic employment and economic expansion and providing a base for their bilateral relations with the PRC.5

Weak states on China’s periphery also benefit from economic exchange with China in ways similar to developed states, yet such exchange also comes with a price. While developed Asian states are able to mitigate negative outcomes so that economic exchange with China remains, for the most part, a net positive activity, the same is not true for the weak states on China’s borders. Inefficient governance and internal instability together with growing economic dependence on China limits these weak states’ ability to reduce the negative aspects of economic coop-eration so that the overall benefits outweigh the costs. The direct and indirect costs of economic cooperation with China for these weak states include, but are not limited to, disruption or distortion of their economic development, economically driven environmental degradation, social and/or political insecurity, localised vio-lence, and schisms within state/society relations.6

While neither the cause nor the sole driver of weakness within these states, the negative effects stemming from economic ties with China can contribute to these states’ further weakness as defined in this volume. The inability or unwillingness of

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Introduction 3

a weak state’s government to regulate harmful Chinese-originating economic activ-ity (whether state-sponsored or private) can, for example, undermine its legitimacy and/or further weaken the country’s domestic institutions. The perception among a weak state’s society that its government draws on economic ties with China to advance its own interests at the cost of the state’s overall development can harm state/society relations. Unrest, violence, and environmental degradation stemming from economic activity also erode the state’s institutions and lead to greater weakness.

Viewed in line with weak states and the negative aspects of economic develop-ment, one can argue that the Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous Neighbourhood approach and the One Belt, One Road concept can, ironically, contribute to inse-curity for China. China’s over-reliance on economic exchange for its relations with its bordering weak states has created a counter-cycle where unmanaged economic exchange contributes to greater instability. More specifically, China’s economic-centric approach to cooperation with weak states leads to their further weakness and opens China to threats stemming from nationalism, separatism, ter-rorism, transnational organised crime, and drug trafficking, among others.

This book examines China’s relations with its peripheral weak states through the theoretical lenses of structural power and structural violence. Both concepts have their roots in Marxist theories of international political economics and peace and security studies. The book argues that China’s reliance on economic exchange to advance its political and security goals among its weak peripheral states con-tains an internal contradiction that results in a self-defeating policy and a less secure regional environment for China.

The book asks three main questions. First, what are weak states and why do they matter for China? Second, how does China’s use of economic exchange with weak states result in negative outcomes? Third, what are the implications for China’s security environment and foreign policy? This chapter provides a framework for understanding the first question. Chapter 1 provides a theoretical basis for examining how China’s economic exchange approach to weak states can undermine their and China’s own security. Chapter 2 surveys Chinese language documents, speeches, and scholarship on its bilateral relations with the eight weak states on its periphery (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Mongolia) to demonstrate China’s continual reliance on economic means to ensure its strategic ends within the respective countries. Chapters 3 through 10 examine China’s bilateral relations with these eight weak peripheral states to demonstrate how Chinese economic exchange translates into Chinese structural power and contributes to structural violence within the weak state. Chapter 11 considers the case studies’ findings in relation to China’s secu-rity environment and foreign policy. Finally, the book concludes with a summary of its major theoretical and empirical findings.

What are weak states and why do they matter?

In employing the concept of state weakness to analysis of China’s periphery secu-rity, the volume knowingly wades into a contentious debate within international

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4 Introduction

relations (IR) and comparative politics on the nature of state weakness. While scholars working within the IR and comparative politics’ traditions have employed the term and concept for decades, there is currently no consensus of what con-stitutes state weakness. Scholars such as Burton Benedict and David Vital, for example, argue state weakness is based on material factors, whether in terms of small territories or small populations.7 Through application of material variables in determining state weakness, both Benedict and Vital suggest that weakness is relational. Others, such as Teygve Mathisen, Raimo Väyrynen, R. P. Barston, and Michael Handel, argue that weakness comes from a state’s external power rela-tions.8 States without global influence, within this model, are weak. States with global influence, conversely, are strong. Material conditions play secondary roles within this strand of reasoning. Still others see state weakness as a psychological rather than material or power issue. Robert Rothstein and Robert Keohane are examples of scholars who view state weakness as stemming, at least in part, from psychological deficiencies.9 While this volume concedes the potentiality for all the aforementioned variables to contribute to state weakness in certain instances over certain periods of time, it employs an alternative, structural approach to state weakness for analysis.

Juxtaposing Weber’s definition of the modern state as consisting of effective institutions, legitimate governments, and state control over society, this book takes the position that state weakness stems from weak institutions, deficien-cies in state legitimacy, and poor state/society relations.10 While a less com-mon approach to state weakness than those highlighted above, this approach to state weakness is entirely in line with existing IR and comparative politics accounts of weak states. Barry Buzan, for example, argues that state weakness exists when incongruence occurs between the idea of the state, the institutional expression of the state, and the physical base of the state.11 T. V. Paul defines state weakness as the inability ‘of a state to develop and implement policies in order to provide collective goods such as security, order, and welfare to its citizens in a legitimate and effective manner.’12 Michael Desch notes that weak states typically have weak governments, ineffective institutions, and a lack of cohesion between the state and society.13 Stewart Patrick, in developing his Index of State Weakness, identifies four components – legitimate political insti-tutions, the effective management of security, the effective management of the economy, and the state’s provision of social welfare – for measuring state weak-ness.14 Joel Migdal similarly identifies inadequate capabilities, both in terms of institutions and social control, and political legitimacy as the drivers behind state weakness.15

This book employs a three-part rubric to determine state weakness and consider how state weakness contributes to insecurity. First, it examines state institutions, such as those that contribute to security, political effectiveness, and economic management, to determine whether a state is capable of delivering public goods. A state’s ineffective institutions of control can translate into a security gap, or ungoverned space, within its sovereign territory that can become the centre of separatist, terrorist, or criminal activity.16 Organised crime groups take advantage

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Introduction 5

of states with ineffective institutions to engage in drug and human trafficking, and terrorist and insurgent groups are more likely to operate in weak states where governments cannot establish institutional control.17 States that have ineffective security institutions cannot deal with internal security challenges, which then have the potential to metastasise to become interstate threats.18 Neither are the security threats stemming from institutional ineffectiveness confined to the harder security concerns within nontraditional security such as transnational crime or terrorism. States that cannot effectively control outgoing migration for lack of an effective customs and borders mechanism are more likely to experience transna-tional pandemics and illicit good smuggling, for example, than those with effec-tive control.19

Second, it considers whether the state is legitimate. To determine legitimacy, this book employs Alagappa’s criteria of normative elements (whether the state has effectively established a relationship with society based on shared goals and values) and performance.20 Weak states with political illegitimacy contribute to transnational threats in a number of ways. First, illegitimate governments are more likely to use force to maintain their hold on power. In instances where the illegitimate government also lacks institutional control (as is the case in most of China’s bordering weak states), this heavy-handed approach can create public resistance that manifests in its violent form in separatist/terrorist groups.21 Sec-ond, these groups can target outside actors seen as supporting the illegitimate state either directly, through terrorist activity, or indirectly, through support of existing separatist groups within the foreign country. Third, illegitimate states lack the political capital to deal with their domestic security issues, which translates into an inability to control transnational threats.

Third, the volume draws on Migdal’s work to look at state/society relations, which entails consideration of a state’s ability to effectively manage its society through instrumental means and its relevance as a central governance body in societies traditionally organised along web-like social groupings.22 The state’s inability to control its society is closely related to both ineffective institutions and illegitimate governance. Poor state/society relations contribute to nontradi-tional security as disenfranchised groups within the state engage in separatist activity aimed at the state or, alternatively, at outside actors that support the state.23 States with weak state/society relations are also more likely to see alter-native structures of control based on clan, ethnic, or religious ties that directly challenge the government’s ability to manage its domestic security environ-ment. Such insecurity can have spillover effects on states with close geographic proximity.

Weak states on China’s periphery

Applying these criteria to the fourteen states on China’s periphery, the volume argues that eight are weak. These include Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Mongolia. The following section iden-tifies weakness across each state, respectively.

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6 Introduction

Kyrgyzstan

The Kyrgyz government lacks the institutional capability and the financial resources to deal effectively with the country’s domestic security situation. Indeed, since 2000, Bishkek’s capacity to effectively deal with organised crime and terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has actu-ally decreased.24 Both the Kyrgyz police and military lack the ability to handle the country’s security threats, particularly the growth of drug traffic passing through the country from Afghanistan to the United States and Europe. As a result of its institutional shortcomings, the Kyrgyz government has become dependent on out-side actors – particularly Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the United States (US) – for its security needs.

While there was hope for political reform following the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan that saw the ousting of President Askar Akaev in 2005, the continu-ation of the essential mechanisms of Kyrgyz politics in the post-Akaev years has led many in the state to see the ‘revolution’ as nothing more than a coup d’état.25 Indeed, Akaev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, provided more continuity with past government institution than reform and was subsequently forced from office in 2010. Charges of vote irregularities and fraud in the 2011 election that brought Kyrgyzstan’s new president, Almazbek Atambayev, into office suggest the state continues to suffer from illegitimacy.26

The strong influence of traditional tribes and tribal loyalties in Kyrgyzstan con-tributes to a general weakening of the country’s political system.27 This is particu-larly the case as the Kyrgyz government has become more and more centralised and its institutions less capable of dealing effectively with parts of the population at some distance from Bishkek. Neither does the Kyrgyz government enjoy wide-spread public support. Indeed, most Kyrgyz see the country’s current political trajectory as ‘backsliding’ away from a more representational government.28

Tajikistan

Tajikistan’s institutional capabilities in security, rule of law, border security, and economic stability are also incredibly weak. The country’s police force and army are endemically corrupt and maintain ties to organised crime groups that operate in Tajikistan and Central Asia.29 Since its independence from the former Soviet Union, both Russia and Uzbekistan have militarily intervened in Tajikistan on numerous occasions to secure their own borders against transnational security threats originating in the country.30 Neither does Dushanbe have the ability to staunch the flow of terrorist activity both into Tajikistan from Afghanistan or from Tajikistan to its neighbouring states. Indeed, Dushanbe is almost entirely depend-ent on external actors (China and Russia) for its security and stability.31

Tajikistan’s political system is stable, but only as the result of oppressive gov-ernment policies supported by Moscow.32 The state’s authoritarian president, Emomali Rahmon, relies on the government-controlled media, political intimida-tion, and the continued threat of Islamic radicalism as the base for his political

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Introduction 7

legitimacy.33 This authoritarian control, however, does not translate into legitimacy among younger generations of Tajiks, who are increasingly drawn to opposition parties such as the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and see Rahmon’s People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan as fundamentally at odds with their national Mus-lim identity.34

Tajik society is largely organised around the extended family (avlods), several of which constitute a kishlak, or agricultural community.35 These communities engage in subsistence farming and exist outside the formal state structures, main-tain their own internal mechanisms for social order, and provide their own secu-rity.36 They operate outside the government’s control as ‘states within a state’.37 While analysts often cite the Tajik society’s indifference to Dushanbe as a source of political stability, any such stability rests on the state’s complete irrelevancy to society and is, therefore, an indication of structural weakness.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is in many ways the prototypical weak state, as the state’s insti-tutions are almost nonexistent outside Kabul. The lack of institutional control results almost entirely from the government’s inability to provide even basic security to the various ethnic groups and tribes that live within the state’s terri-tory; an inability that has become more pronounced following the International Security Assistance Forces’ (ISAF) late 2014 troop drawdown and mission reconceptualisation.38 As a result of this institutional weakness, a myriad of secu-rity threats exist within Afghanistan that the current government has no means of addressing. Whether terrorism, drug cultivation and trafficking, or organised crime, Afghanistan’s weak institutions translate into state paralysis and Kabul’s inability to affect even nominal domestic sovereignty.39 This institutional weak-ness directly translates into security threats for all the countries on Afghanistan’s borders.40

Years of misrule under the Karzai regime and a US-brokered power sharing agreement between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah following a divisive 2014 have led to a crisis of political legitimacy in Afghanistan.41 The current Afghan government’s institutional weakness (measured by its inability to provide social goods such as healthcare, education, economic opportunity, or security) further compounds Kabul’s illegitimacy in the Afghans’ and foreign observers’ eyes.42

Afghanistan has never been a homogenous nation but rather a geographic area where different ethnic groups, tribes, and family clans lived in proximity to one another and engaged in constant competition or outright conflict. By con-servative accounts, there are at least twenty-five distinct groups in Afghanistan that live far outside the state’s nominal control.43 Post-conflict Afghanistan is extremely divided, as the Kabul-based government remains an abstraction for the majority of the people residing within the country’s delineated borders. In many ways, it is a gross misconception to speak about state/society relations in Afghanistan.44

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8 Introduction

Pakistan

Pakistan is another archetypal weak state in terms of institutions. The country’s formal institutions, far from providing public goods such as health, education, or economic opportunity, are designed to meet its political and business elites’ needs and to perpetuate a system in the country to ensure their continued power and wealth.45 As a result, Islamabad’s institutions do not contribute to political stabil-ity or security for the vast majority of Pakistanis.46 In addition to these current deficiencies, Pakistan’s institutions are on a path to weaken further by 2030 due to insufficient investment, human capital, and leadership.47 Internal conflict and nontraditional security threats related to climate change also present significant obstacles for institutional development.

Poor governance, a lack of input in government decision making, perceived corruption, and weak institutions all contribute to a sense among Pakistanis that Islamabad lacks political legitimacy.48 So has the struggle between liberal and orthodox Islam in Pakistan led to a domestic environment in which orthodox Islamic groups have come to form alternative governance structures, particularly in the country’s far-flung and ill-administered tribal regions.49 This uncertainty over the role of Islam in Pakistan has also created a domestic security environment in the country where a large number of insurgent groups believe it is in their right to engage in violence against the state.50

Islamabad lacks both the institutional capability and the political legitimacy to staunch ongoing tribal and sectarian violence in the state.51 Huge swaths of the state’s territory lay outside the government’s control, raising questions about Islamabad’s domestic sovereignty over parts the population that reside in the country’s territory. Islamabad’s inability to control its society directly translates into insecurity for its neighbouring states, including China, as it is unable to man-age the flow of people across its borders.52

Nepal

Nepal’s institutions are critically weak.53 The state is unable to provide basic secu-rity for its residents both in Kathmandu and those in more isolated, mountainous areas.54 According to the World Bank, more than one hundred violent criminal groups operate in Nepal’s Tarai Region alone.55 Political instability in the coun-try compounds insecurity, as it hinders the development of public goods such as health and education.

Kathmandu’s political illegitimacy is derived from two sources. The first source is the lack of federalism and the resulting political system where more than 70 per cent of the country’s population is effectively marginalised from the politi-cal process.56 Adding to the marginalisation is the continued presence of a caste system which results in a mono-ethnic polity.57 The second source is external powers’ (China and India) manipulation of Nepal’s domestic political situation, which many Nepalese see as undermining the government’s effectiveness and impartiality.58

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Introduction 9

The lack of state presence in large areas within Nepal’s boundaries translates into Kathmandu’s effective loss of control over the country’s domestic sover-eignty. Large areas remain outside the state’s control and have become effective breeding grounds for insurgent groups and transnational criminal gangs.59 The state is also ineffective in dealing with sectarian conflict in the country such as that between Hindus and Muslims.60 Both instances of the state’s inability to control Nepalese society translate into insecurity for neighbouring states.

Myanmar

The ‘security gaps’ resulting from Myanmar’s institutional weakness have allowed insurgent groups, ethnic violence, and drug manufacturing to flourish in the state.61 This development not only contributes to domestic insecurity, undermin-ing the state’s institutional ability to provide even the most basic social goods to its citizens, but also poses nontraditional security threats to the states with which it shares a border. While the government has effectively mobilised coercive force to ensure its survival, its ineffectiveness in providing even basic public goods to the Burmese people translates into state weakness by this book’s applied definition.62

While the former military junta instituted elections in 2010, thereby usher-ing multiparty democracy to the country, it is far from certain that this politi-cal reform translates into political legitimacy for Naypyidaw. Many analysts who study Myanmar argue the most appropriate lens for viewing the state’s political legitimacy is not the political system per se, but the degree to which the system reflects the ethnic and cultural situation in Myanmar, particularly in relation to the country’s disenfranchised minority groups.63 If one uses this measurement of state legitimacy, a 2013 Human Rights Watch report on state-allowed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the county’s Arakan State would suggest gross state illegitimacy.64

By any measure, Naypyidaw lacks control over the country’s society. Large swaths of the country’s territory remain outside the state’s control, existing as governance and security ‘gaps’. Ethnic and sectarian violence remain rampant throughout the country, suggesting the government is either incapable of protecting all the individu-als within its sovereign territory (some of whom, such as the Rohingya Muslims, the state denies citizenship) or willing to allow certain groups in Myanmar, such as the anti-Muslim Buddhist 969 Movement, to engage in ethnic cleansing activities.65

Lao PDR

For Lao PDR, institutional weakness is apparent in the state’s security, politi-cal, and economic sectors. This institutional weakness is most pronounced in the state’s security sector and results in a flourishing of transnational crime groups operating in the country’s ungoverned areas.66 Corruption among the political and business elite is also rampant and contributes to such nontraditional security con-cerns as illegal logging and trafficking in illegal animal products.67 Neither are the country’s economic institutions sufficient to deal with its endemic poverty.68

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10 Introduction

There is perhaps no greater indication of the Laotian government’s illegitimacy than the fact that since the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) came to power in 1975, one out of six Laotians have immigrated abroad.69 Understanding the tenuous nature of its hold on power, the LPRP has been assiduous in oppress-ing opposition political movements and, until 2008, any semblance of civil society in the country. While the LPRP has moved to implement economic reform to improve its standing among the population, Lao PDR continues to experience social instability related to party illegitimacy.70

More than thirty-five years after its founding, the LPRP has not been able to establish a unifying national identity in Lao PDR.71 Indeed, Vientiane’s increas-ing inability to provide social advancement for the majority of the Laotian society has led to the formation of alternative forms of governance at the village level that challenge the government’s role as the provider of public goods. The gap between the state and society in Lao PDR is widening as many Laotians engage in self-marginalisation: a moving away from the central government’s sovereignty to exist in grey zones only nominally a part of the Laotian state.72

Mongolia

Mongolia’s weak institutionalism is primarily the result of its small population, the mass migration of people to the country’s capital, Ulaanbaatar, its expansive territory, and its lack of resources.73 Indeed, outside of Ulaanbaatar, the country is sparsely populated, with large areas completely outside the government’s control. The country’s porous borders together with an understaffed border patrol allow for the flow of illicit goods such as narcotics, illegal timber, and illicit animal goods, as well as human trafficking.74 The state’s weak political institutionalism results in centrally directed policies that are often ignored at the local levels.

Although often heralded by scholars as an oasis of political stability in Asia, few Mongolians would accord the country’s polity with such legitimacy. Corrup-tion, deteriorating public services, factionalism, and conflicts of interest between the state and business elite all undermine public support for the Mongolian gov-ernment.75 Other sources of political illegitimacy include cash handouts for votes, the constant postelection turnover in government employees based on party affili-ation, lack of effective long-term planning, and the politically motivated charges government officials raise against opposition members, including the arrest and imprisonment of former Mongolian president Nambaryn Enkhbayar.

Outside Ulaanbaatar’s more developed central district, the state has little con-trol over Mongolia’s population. Mongolians still engaged in traditional nomadic practices, for instance, subside far outside the state’s authority in areas with lit-tle or no connection to the central government.76 Neither does the state’s control extend to Mongolians who have migrated to Ulaanbaatar to live in the city’s ger districts, or shantytowns. Ulaanbaatar does not provide these migrant workers with even basic public goods such as running water, sanitation, education, or healthcare, nor does the state ensure even a modicum of security to these impov-erished areas.77 The results of this lack of government control are higher incidence of infectious disease and greater exposure to violence.78

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Introduction 11

Why does it matter for China?

While one weak state on China’s periphery may present a narrow security chal-lenge, similar pressure from all the weak states on China’s borders at once would constitute a significant threat. This is particularly the case as China’s most sensitive domestic regions – the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR), and southern and southwestern Yunnan Province – share borders with these weak states. Stability in the weak states is essential not only for China’s continued eco-nomic development but also to its ability to deal with domestic unrest. Far from a hypothetical scenario, China already faces such security pressures from all the weak states on its borders, as the following section demonstrates.

Kyrgyzstan’s weak institutions, political illegitimacy, and poor state/society relations present specific nontraditional security challenges for China that include the ‘three forces’ of terrorism, radicalisation, and separatism, and energy insecu-rity.79 Regarding the ‘three forces’, the country is home to radical Islamic groups outside of Bishkek’s control that provide training and support for the East Turke-stan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the terrorist/separatist organisation active in China’s XUAR. Weak border control by the Kyrgyz government allows for the flow of illicit peoples and goods into China that undermine its domestic security and control.80 In regard to energy security, China relies on Kyrgyzstan as a transit point for its oil and gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Internal instability in the country resulting from weakness, therefore, threatens China’s ability to imple-ment a ‘diversification’ strategy to ensure it avoids dependence on any one state (mainly Kazakhstan) for its Central Asian and Middle Eastern energy imports.81

Tajikistan’s shared border with the XUAR, its weak border protection, and its status as a transit and source country for drug trafficking all translate into direct threats to China’s security environment.82 The presence of potential subversive actors within the country coupled with Dushanbe’s inability to deal effectively with these groups also contributes to a sense of insecurity for China.83 China is also concerned with the growth of radical Islam within the country both as a potential trigger to unrest within the XUAR and as a challenge to Tajikistan’s existing political system. Such concern is well founded, as 85 per cent of Tajiks in 2010 identified Islam, not their national identity, as their most influential source of self-identify.84

The security issues stemming from Afghanistan’s weakness for China are mul-tifaceted and complex. First, the state’s poor institutional control over huge swaths of territory within Afghanistan allows for security gaps to form where separa-tist groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) can train and launch attacks into China. Similarly, poor border security between Afghanistan and China on the Afghan side allows for the spread of radical elements into the XUAR that undermine the region’s already fragile security.85 Second, alternative structures of governance based on clan and ethnic ties that depend on drug culti-vation and manufacturing for sustenance have developed within the state due to its weak institutions, political illegitimacy, and poor state/society relations. These narcotic-based societies present a direct threat to China’s security through drug

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12 Introduction

trafficking and localised violence. Afghanistan is now one of the largest sources of drugs and weapons into China, with little indication Kabul will be able to bring these domestic security issues under control in the short to medium term.86 Third, Afghanistan’s instability undermines China’s economic security and energy secu-rity, as Kabul is unable to secure the safety and continuity of its investments in Afghanistan’s mineral sector.87

The Pakistan government’s inability to secure its territories and borders pre-sents a direct threat to China’s security environment. The country’s ungoverned spaces allow for the development and transfer of separatist groups such as the ETIM. The country’s weak state/society relations and the resulting alternative sources of governance and legitimacy also contribute to radicalisation that has spillover effects in China’s XUAR.88 The country’s porous borders also allow for the continual flow of narcotics and weapons into China’s western regions. Understanding the larger security implications should Islamabad lose more of its tenuous hold on power, China has adopted a policy of supporting the state, despite its illegitimacy and inability to effectively govern.89 Such support also has security implications for China. China’s state support for Islamabad puts Chinese workers in Pakistan at risk as domestic terrorist groups attack them as proxies of China’s foreign policy.90 This both affects China’s economic security and fosters anti-Chinese sentiment at a social level.

China depends heavily on Nepal’s government to ensure its security interests vis-à-vis the TAR and is, therefore, directly affected by the state’s institutional weakness. Kathmandu’s inability, for example, to stem the flow of Tibetans returning from Dharamsala to the TAR through Nepal exposes China to radical and separatist ideology, as many Tibetans travel to India to see the Dalai Lama.91 China also relies heavily on Nepal’s internal security forces to keep control of the country’s sizable Tibetan minority and refugee community. While Nepalese police do effectively deal with Tibetans within Kathmandu, their ability to do so diminishes greatly outside the country’s capital. Indeed, as highlighted earlier, huge areas within Nepal are effectively ungoverned spaces, contributing to drugs and goods smuggling between the two states.

Myanmar’s huge ungoverned spaces allow for the growth and proliferation of drug trafficking into China’s Yunnan Province. The steady flow of opiates and methamphetamines from Myanmar into China contributes to human and societal security issues such as localised crime and an increasing rate of addicts in China.92 Naypyidaw’s political illegitimacy and poor state/society relations perpetuate civil conflict in the country, particularly between the government and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in Kachin State, and also has spillover effects in China’s Yunnan Province both in terms of localised violence and refugees, as seen clearly in early 2015.93 While the changing nature of Myanmar’s politi-cal and economic system offers some hope that the state might achieve a greater degree of legitimacy, for the time being it remains a weak country with serious influence on the security situation in China.

China relies heavily on Vientiane to help stem the flow of nontraditional secu-rity threats into China, as linkages between the two states are extensive.94 In this

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Introduction 13

respect, Vientiane’s current inability to ensure security within its borders has severe security implications for China. First, the Lao PDR government’s insti-tutional weakness and resulting gaps in governance over large areas within the country’s borders contribute to drug trafficking and addiction within China. As with Myanmar, large portions of the country lay beyond Vientiane’s control, and organised crime groups act with impunity within those areas. The government has little control over the criminally run casinos on the Laotian side of the two coun-tries’ shared border, which encourages illegal crossings between China and Lao PDR. Despite pressure from Beijing to close these enclaves, the Laotian govern-ment has been unable to do so.95 Poor state/society relations in Lao PDR also con-tribute to ethnic movement that negatively affects China’s own cross-border ethnic populations in what amounts to spillover instability.96 Lao PDR’s nontraditional security implications for China, therefore, directly stem from state weakness.

Mongolia affects China’s security in several important ways. First, Mongolia’s institutional weakness and the country’s vast ungoverned spaces translate into insecurity for China, as Ulaanbaatar has very little capability to ensure organised crime groups, terrorists, or separatists from the XUAR or IMAR do not use its vast territory as a base for activity aimed at China.97 While Mongolia is not home to the same types of criminal or terrorist activity as states in Central, South, or Southeast Asia, it does present significant security vulnerability for China, par-ticularly as it shares a long border with China’s XUAR and IMAR.98 Second, the state’s weak institutional control over its mining and agricultural sectors has resulted in severe desertification in Mongolia. Desertification in Mongolia causes sandstorms in China on an annual basis that affect the country’s environmental situation, cause massive public health issues, and undermine economic activities in key cities such as Beijing and Tianjin.99 While different in nature than the other weak states on China’s borders, Mongolia’s influence on China’s nontraditional security is no less significant.

China’s approach to peripheral security

Rather than engage directly to mitigate the security threats on its borders, the PRC relies on economic exchange to advance its security objectives. While the state’s rationale for privileging economic over other forms of engagement has evolved over time, one can trace the logic behind China’s use of economic means to achieve its security ends to the commonly held belief among China’s early communist leadership that poverty and class struggle inherently resulted in vio-lence. Mao Zedong’s 1927 ‘Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan’ is an important example of early Chinese communist thinking on the nexus between economic development, poverty, and violence in this respect.100 In the essay, Mao argues that poor peasants are left with little recourse other than violence to deal with exploitative capitalist landlords and gentry. Violence, for Mao, is a means toward more egalitarian ends, idealised as peasant-administered co-operatives. Mao assumes that violence would cease once poor peasants achieve their economic goals, suggesting that economic development is the inherent

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14 Introduction

answer to violence resulting from poverty and exploitation. While one of count-less writings on the relationship between economic development, poverty, and violence, the ‘Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan’ is a salient example of early Chinese thinking on the topic, as it influenced domestic and foreign policy in the PRC for decades after its publication.

Indeed, the report’s logic that egalitarian economic development could address the sources of violence within a society influenced China’s foreign policy during Mao’s tenure from the 1950s to the 1970s, despite what were otherwise broad policy swings in China’s approach to foreign affairs. China’s propagation of an international order consisting of a Third World coalition, for example, included a call for common economic development between postcolonial states so as to address issues related to poverty and violence.101 Chinese support for revolution-ary groups within Third World states employed similar logic that strengthening weak states against imperialist powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States through economic aid was the only way to overcome violence inherent in the international system.102

China’s reliance on economic exchange to secure its interests abroad continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s under Deng Xiaoping. Deng advocated increased trade between China and Asian states, Chinese financial support for Third World partners, and mutually beneficial economic development to ensure security in Asia through development.103 While Deng’s foreign policy approach included a desire to expand China’s access to foreign markets for the sake of its own develop-ment and stability, his continued reliance on win-win exchange to secure China’s periphery is clear.

More recently, Chinese leadership reaffirmed their belief in a causal relationship between poverty and insecurity in the 1996 New Security Concept, which identi-fies poverty, underdevelopment, and injustice as the main contributors to insecu-rity in Asia.104 Similarly, China’s 2002 ‘Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues’ recognises poverty, a develop-ment gap, social injustice, and unfairness as key drivers of regional insecurity. Both concepts specifically distinguish the further development of economic ties between China and Asian states as critical to ensuring stability and security in the Asian region.

China’s contemporary foreign policy concepts are also heavily premised on the idea that economic exchange between states is the most effective means of ensuring good relations and a secure regional and international environment. The South-South Cooperation, for example, argues that China can improve security relations with developing states by “unifying, leading, and coordinating” eco-nomic relations through targeted investment and aid.105 Similarly, the Periph-ery Policy and the Good Neighbour Policy highlight the centrality of economic exchange to security. Specifically, the concepts stress “win-win” (or mutually beneficial) economic exchange, economic partnership, mutual development, and expanding trade as means of ensuring China’s security within periphery states.106 The Go Out Strategy is China’s way of pursuing security (and access to foreign markets and technology) by encouraging its enterprises to invest overseas.107

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Introduction 15

President Xi Jinping’s articulation of the Friendly, Secure, and Prosperous Neighbourhood policy in 2013 stressed the importance of economics as a driver of security relations. President Xi’s One Belt, One Road strategy is equally reliant on economic exchange as a means of increasing stability. In its wider application, the One Belt, One Road concept includes China’s provision of finance through the 2015 establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and China’s trade and investment schemes toward Central and South Asia through the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road, respectively.108 One Belt, One Road also includes China’s development of economic corridors with Mongolia and Russia, with Pakistan, and with India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh.109 The con-cept also calls for the establishment of a free trade agreement between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).110 As such, the strategic concept is a concerted effort to expand China’s economic relations within a ‘one bank, two belts, three corridors, one FTA’ framework to strengthen state coopera-tion with China’s peripheral states on matters related to security and stability.111

To be sure, China’s foreign policy concepts and approaches are not entirely focused on economic exchange but also contain regular, rote commitments to advance cooperation on issues such as education, health, and cultural exchange. Within all the above-mentioned foreign policy directives, China identifies the importance of these more developmentally focused areas to its overall bilateral relations. Such commitments are, nevertheless, always secondary in order of pres-entation and importance to China’s stated goal of relying on economic exchange to secure state-to-state ties. Indeed, all the above concepts premise education, health, and cultural exchanges on China and its respective partner first establish-ing win-win economic relations. For China, economic exchange provides the basis upon which to build other aspects of state relations.

This book demonstrates that China’s use of economic linkages to advance its security interest in its weak periphery states is both inadequate and counterpro-ductive. Rather than ensuring security vis-à-vis these weak states, China has and continues to undermine its periphery security through structural power and struc-tural violence. The book will demonstrate this process through eight case studies. Having demonstrated the prevalence of weak states on China’s borders and the implications these weak states have on China’s nontraditional security, the fol-lowing chapter provides a theoretical outline for understanding how China’s eco-nomic cooperation with these same weak states translates into instability within the state, between the state and China, and for China itself.

Notes

1 ‘Fei chuantong anquan tiaozhan dui zhongguo weilai zhoubian huanjing de yingxi-ang’ (Non-Traditional Security Challenges and Their Influence on China’s Future Periphery Environment), Central Committee of the CPC (2013), http://www.idcpc.org.cn/globalview/sjzh/120905.htm; Yu Yingli, ‘Dongya anquan de kunjing yu jiangou zhongguo zhoubian anquan xin silu’ (East Asia’s Security Challenges and Develop-ing a New Thinking on China’s Periphery Security), Journal of Eastern Liaoning

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16 Introduction

University Vol. 14, No. 6 (2012), pp. 14–21; Feng Shaolei and Feng Shuai ‘Zhongguo zhoubian anquan de xin renzhi: tedian, gongneng, yu qushi’ (Reconsidering China’s Periphery Security: Characteristics, Function, and Trends), Global Security Research (2013), pp. 49–50.

2 ‘Xi Jinping zai zhoubian waijiao gongzuo zuotanhui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua’ (Xi Jinping gives an important speech at the Symposium for Working Periphery Diplo-macy), Renmin Ribao, October 25, 2013, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1025/c1024-23331526.html.

3 ‘Xi Jinping ti zhanlue gouxiang: “yi dai yi lu” dakai “zhumeng kongjian” ’ (Xi Jin-ping advances a strategic concept: the ‘one belt, one road’ gives us space to build dreams), People’s Daily, August 11, 2014, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0811/c1001–25439028.html.

4 Masuma Farooki and Raphael Kaplinsky, The Impact of China on Global Commodity Prices: The Global Reshaping of the Resource Sector (London: Routledge, 2013), 182.

5 Lok Sang Ho and John Wong, APEC and the Rise of China (Singapore: World Scien-tific, 2011), 87.

6 Li Kunwang and Song Ligang, ‘China’s trade expansion and the Asia-Pacific Econo-mies’, in eds. Ross Garnaut and Ligang Song, The China Boom and Its Discontents (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2005), 241.

7 David Vital, The Inequality of States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Burton Benedict, Problems of Smaller Territories (London: Athlone Press, 1967).

8 Teygve Mathisen, The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Pow-ers (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971), 21; Raimo Väyrynen, ‘On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status’, Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics Vol. 6, No. 2 (1971), 92–93; R. P. Barston, ‘Introduction’, in The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States, ed. R. P. Barston (London: George Allen & Unwind, 1973), 15–16; Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 30.

9 Robert Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, International Organisation Vol. 23, No. 2 (1969), 291–310; Robert Rothstein Alliance and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

10 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 156.

11 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 40–41.

12 T. V. Paul, South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predica-ment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 5.

13 Michael Desch, ‘War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?’, International Organization Vol. 50, No. 2 (1996), 242.

14 Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Secu-rity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 19.

15 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies, Weak States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 5.

16 Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, ‘Rebuilding Weak States’, Foreign Affairs Vol. 84, No. 1 (2005), 134.

17 Edward Newman, ‘Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 19, No. 4 (2007), 466.

18 Paul, South Asia’s Weak States, 7.19 Patrick, Weak Links, 17.

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Introduction 17

20 Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 32–33.

21 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 146.

22 Migdal, Strong Societies, 37–39.23 Desch, War and Strong States, 243–44.24 Mariya Y. Omelicheva, Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia (London: Taylor &

Francis, 2010), 30.25 Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese, The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet

Republics: Successes and Failures (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 45.26 Martin Albrow, Hakan Seckinelgin, and Helmut K. Anheier, Global Civil Society 2011:

Globality and the Absence of Justice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 137.27 P. Nar Ak Al, Pinar Akçali, and Cennet Engin-demir, Politics, Identity and Education

in Central Asia: Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan (London: Routledge, 2013), 44.28 Ibid., 44.29 Lawrence P. Markowitz, ‘The Limits of International Agency: Post-Soviet State Build-

ing in Tajikistan’, in Stable Outside Fragile Inside?: Post Soviet Statehood in Central Asia, ed. Emilian Kavalski (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 157.

30 Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, Globalizing Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2012), 15.

31 Robert I. Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair’, in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 17.

32 Abel Polese and Donnacha Ó Beacháin, ‘From Roses to Bullets – The Rise and Decline of Post-Soviet Colour Revolutions’, in Totalitarismus und Transformation, eds. Uwe Backes, Tytus Jaskułowski, and Abel Polese (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 87.

33 Hooman Peimani, Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Santa Bar-bara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009) 167–68.

34 Karina Korostelina, ‘Religion, War, and Peace in Tajikistan’, in Between Terror and Tolerance, ed. Timothy D. Sisk (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 178–79.

35 John Heathershaw, Post-Conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peacebuilding and the Emergence of Legitimate Order (London: Routledge, 2009), 74.

36 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Conflict and Fragility: The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010) 26.

37 Ibid., 26.38 Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan in the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2013), 256.39 Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group

Behavior (New York: NYU Press, 2010), 168–69.40 Raul Bakhsh Rais, ‘Afghanistan: A Weak State in the Path of Power Rivalries’, in

South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament, ed. T. V. Paul (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 213.

41 Rubin, Afghanistan in the Post-Cold War Era, 259–260.42 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Prince-

ton University Press, 2010), 8.43 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the

Rise of the Taliban (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012), 15.

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18 Introduction

44 Ibid., 16–17.45 Masooda Bano, Breakdown in Pakistan: How Aid Is Eroding Institutions for Collective

Action (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 33–34.46 Stephen P. Cohen, The Future of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press,

2011), 104.47 Daniel Moran, Climate Change and National Security: A Country-level Analysis

(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 89.48 Anas Malik, Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology (London: Taylor & Fran-

cis, 2010), 170.49 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, Islam and Political Legitimacy (London:

Routledge, 2013), 70.50 Steven R. David, Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American Interests (Bal-

timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 75.51 Rebecca L. Schiff, The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of

Civil-Military Relations (London: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 89.52 Ibid.53 Susan E. Rice, ‘Poverty and State Weakness’, in Confronting Poverty: Weak States and

U.S. National Security, eds. Susan E. Rice, Corinne Graff, and Carlos Pascual (Wash-ington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 34.

54 Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States’, 17.55 World Bank Publication, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and

Development (Washington, DC: World Bank Publication, 2011), 91.56 Ibid., 90.57 Mahendra Lawoti, ‘Ethnic Politics and the Building of an Inclusive State’, in Nepal

in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 148.

58 Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan, ‘Introduction’, in Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace, eds. Sebastian von Einsie-del, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 23.

59 Raul Caruso, Ethnic Conflicts, Civil War and Cost of Conflict (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2011), 118.

60 Megan Adamson Sijapati, ‘The National Muslim Forum Nepal: Experiences of con-flict, formations or identity’, in National and Ethnic Conflict, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Susan I. Hangen (London: Routledge, 2012), 109.

61 Patrick, Weak Links, 246.62 David I. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2010), 183.63 Ang Cheng Guan, ‘Political Legitimacy in Myanmar: The Ethnic Minority Dimen-

sion’, Asian Security Vol. 3. No. 2 (2007), 134; David Camroux, ‘Burma’s Schizo-phrenic Transition’, SciencesPo (2013), http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/fr/content/burma-s-schizophrenic-transition.

64 Human Rights Watch, All You Can Do Is Pray: Crimes against Humanity and Eth-nic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State (Zurich: Human Rights Watch, 2013), 109.

65 Ibid.66 Christopher B. Roberts, ‘Laos: A More Mature and Robust State?’, in Southeast Asian

Affairs 2012, eds. Daljit Singh and Pushpa Thampibillai (Singapore: Institute of South-east Asian Studies, 2012), 153.

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Introduction 19

67 Carol J. Pierce, ‘Minefields in Collaborative Governance’, in Collaborative Govern-ance of Tropical Landscapes, eds. Carol J. Pierce Colfer and Jean-Laurent Pfund (Lon-don: Routledge, 2011), 242.

68 Ian C. Porter and Jayasankar Shivakumar, Doing a Dam Better: The Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the Story of Lao Nam Theun 2 (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2011), 33.

69 Robert Dayley and Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era (Boul-der, CO: Westview Press, 2011), 532.

70 Helen E. S. Nesadurai, ‘The Indo-Chinese Enlargement of ASEAN’, in Regional Inte-gration in East Asia and Europe: Convergence or Divergence?, eds. Bertrand Fort and Douglas Webber (London: Routledge, 2013), 203.

71 Vatthana Pholsena, Post-war Laos: The Politics of Culture, History, and Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 215.

72 Ibid.73 Raffael Himmelsbach, ‘Collaborative Pasture Management: A Solution for Grassland

Degradation in Mongolia’, in Change in Democratic Mongolia: Social Relations, Health, Mobile Pastoralism, and Mining, ed. Julian Dierkes (Leiden, Netherlands: Drill, 2012), 180.

74 Ulziilkham Enkhbaatar, ‘Cases of Securitization: Human Trafficking in Mongolia and Kazakhstan’, in Mongolian Transborder Migration: Historical and Contemporary Accounts, ed. Ulziilkham Enkhbaatar (Ulan-Ude, Russia: IMBT, 2010), 79.

75 Sant Maral Politbarometer Vol. 12, No. 45 (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: Sant Maral, 2013), 3–5.

76 B. Batkhishig, ‘A Case Study of Community-based Rangeland Management in Jinst Soum, Mongolia’, in Restoring Community Connections to the Land: Building Resil-ience Through Community-based Rangeland Management in China and Mongolia, ed. María Edith Fernández-Giménez, Baival Batkhishig, and Wang Xiaoyi (Wallingford, UK: CABI, 2012), 126.

77 Takuya Kamata, Managing Urban Expansion in Mongolia: Best Practices in Scenario-based Urban Planning (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2010), xvi.

78 Ulziilkham Enkhbaatar, ‘Outbound Migration and Human Security: Case of Mongo-lia’, in Mongolian Transborder Migration: Historical and Contemporary Accounts, ed. Ulziilkham Enkhbaatar (Ulan-Ude, Russia: IMBT, 2010), 187.

79 Jia Lihong, ‘Jierjisisitan dui zhongguo de zhongyaoxing jiqi dongjin jushi dui zhongguo de yinxiang’ (On the Significance Kyrgyzstan Has on China and the Influence of the Cur-rent Situations on China), Journal of Xinjiang University Vol. 38, No. 6 (2010), 94–95.

80 Lei Ling and Luo Xizheng, ‘Quanqiuhua jincheng zhong de Jierjisisitan bianju yu kunjing’ (Kyrgyzstan’s Changes and Problems in Globalisation), Journal of Xinjiang University Vol. 39, No. 6 (2011), 84.

81 Jia, ‘Jierjisisitan dui zhongguo’, 95.82 Xiao Bin, ‘Zong-Ta guanxi ershi nian de yingxiang yinsu ji lishi qishi’ (Factors of

Influence and Historical Elimination in China-Tajikistan’s Ten-Year Relations), Xinji-ang Social Science No. 1 (2012), 80.

83 Xu Haiyan, ‘Wei yu ji: 2012 nian Tajikistan guojia fazhan pingshu’ (Threats and Opportunities: 2012 Discussion of Tajikistan’s Development), Journal of Xinjiang Normal University Vol. 34, No. 4 (2013), 52.

84 Wen Feng, ‘Shizilukou shang de Tajikesitan: shisuhua haishi Yisilanhua’ (Tajikistan on the Silk Road: Secularization or Islamization), Journal of Xinjiang Normal Univer-sity Vol. 32, No. 6 (2011), 30.

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20 Introduction

85 Hu Juan, ‘Meiguo xin zhanlue xia Afuhan anquan xingshi jiqi dui zhongguo xibu bianjing anquan de yingxiang’ (The US’ New Security Strategy in Afghanistan and Its Effects on China’s Western Border’s Security), Southeast Asia South Asia Research No. 3 (2009), 30.

86 Zhao Huasheng, China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2012), 3.

87 Li Zongmin, ‘Afuhan chongjian, zhongguo banyan shenme jiaose’ (What role can China play in the rebuilding of Afghanistan), World Affairs No. 12 (2013), 51.

88 Rosheen Kabraji, The China-Pakistan Alliance: Rhetoric and Limitations (London: Chatham House, 2012), 7.

89 Zhou Yushu, ‘Zhong-Ba guanxi xuyao xin de lunshu’ (The Need for Discussion of the Chinese-Pakistan Relationship), Journal of Inner Mongolia Normal University Vol. 41, No. 2 (2012), 52.

90 Wen Lulu, ‘Lun shi shiqi zhong-ba guanxi mianlin de tiaozhan’ (The Challenges Fac-ing the New Phase of Sino-Pakistan Relations), Wide Angle Lens No. 3 (2013), 255.

91 Wu Guofu and Yang Jingxin, ‘Fazhan hexie zhong-ne guanxi de guojia liyi jiaodu kaoliang’ (National Interests and the Development of Peaceful Sino-Nepal Rela-tions), Journal of Yichun College Vol. 32, No. 9 (2010), 34.

92 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organised Crime in East Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok: UNODC, 2013), 53.

93 Li Zonglin, ‘Xin shiqi zhongguo zai miandian de zhanlue liyi ji tiaozhan’ (The Strate-gic Benefits and Challenges in the New Phase on Sino-Myanmar Relations), Journal of Jiangnan Social University (2012), 30.

94 Zhang Ruikun, ‘Zhengchanghua yilai de zhong-lao guanxi’ (Sino-Laos Relations after Normalization), Southeast and South Asia Research No. 4 (2010), 12.

95 Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araujo, China’s Silent Army: The Pioneers, Trad-ers, Fixers, and Workers Who Are Remaking the World in Beijing’s Image (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2013), 160.

96 Li Chenyang and He Shengda, ‘China’s Participation in the GMS Cooperation: Pro-gress and Challenges’, in China-Asian Sub-Regional Cooperation: Progress, Prob-lems, and Prospect, eds. Li Mingjiang and Chong Guan Kwa (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011), 30.

97 Phil Williams, ‘Here Be Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security’, in Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sover-eignty, eds. Anne Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-sity Press, 2010), 36.

98 Bazarsad Indra, ‘Sino-Mongolian Security Cooperation’, China Institutes of Contem-porary International Relations No. 1 (2010), 139.

99 Qian Zhengan, et al., ‘Zhongmeng diqu shachenbao yanjiu de ruogan jinzhan’ (Some Advances in Dust Storm Research over China-Mongolia Areas), Chinese Journal of Geophysics Vol. 49, No. 1 (2006), 86–87.

100 Mao Zedong, Hunan nongmin yundong kaocha baogao (Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan) (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1951).

101 Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People’s [sic] Solidarity Organization, 1957–1967 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1968), 5.

102 Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 194.

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103 Zou Jin, ‘Deng Xiaoping nannan hezuo sixiang yanjiu (On Deng Xiaoping’s Thought of South-South Cooperation)’, Journal of Jiangxi Radio & TV University Vol. 2 (2006): 13–15.

104 ‘Zhongguo guanyu xin anquan guan de lichang wenjian’ (China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website (2002), http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/ziliao/tytj/t4549.htm.

105 ‘Dui zhongguo nan-nan hezuo fazhan zhanlue de sikao’ (Consideration of China’s South-South Cooperation Development Strategy), The National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, August 20, 2009, http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/2011/09/24/ARTI1316828751015203.shtml.

106 ‘Kaichuang mulin youhao hezuo xin jumian’ (Initiation of a New Phase of the Good Neighbour Policy) Xinhua, December 10, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2012-12/10/c_113964759.htm.

107 ‘Shiwu qijian zhongguo “zou chuqu” zhanlue youli tuidong duiwai jingji hezuo’ (Fol-lowing the 15th Communist Party Congress, China’s Go Out Strategy Has Pushed Forward Foreign Economic Cooperation), The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, February 13, 2006, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2006-02/13/content_187120.htm.

108 ‘Xi Jinping ti zhanlue gouxiang: “yi dai yi lu” dakai “zhumeng kongjian” ’ (Xi Jin-ping Advances a Strategic Concept: The ‘One Belt, One Road’ Gives Us Space to Build Dreams’, People’s Daily, August 11, 2014, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0811/c1001-25439028.html.

109 Wang Weihua, ‘Hangshi jingji zoulang jianshe, zhu tui “yi dai, yi lu” zhanlue’ (Build-ing Economic Corridors Will Help Push ‘One Belt, One Road’ Forward’, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, April 17, 2015, http://www.siis.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=22&id=631.

110 ‘Zhongguo-Dongmeng qiaoding “Yidai, Yilu” da dan’ (China and ASEAN Have Agreed on the General Outline of ‘One Belt, One R