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By Maciej Jonasz

Background

S ix decades have passed since the signing of the armistice that ended hostilities in the Korean War of 1950-53. Those three years of fi ghting generated some 5 million military and

civilian casualties. The war saw Korean, United Nations and Red Chinese armies fi ght up and down the peninsula several times. Yet it ended in stalemate, with the armistice little more than an armed truce along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the country.

In the time since, South Korea—the Republic of Korea (ROK)—has experienced great economic growth while its military has ben-efi ted from being able to acquire top of the line weapon systems, both imported and domestic designs. In the North the communist government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has led the country into economic stagnation and international isolation. North Korea’s economic situation is refl ected in the state of its armed forces. While in earlier decades the North maintained a military parity with the South, today there is no such balance.

Terrain

The Korean peninsula ranges from 150 to 200 miles across. In addition, the terrain is rugged with steep mountains covering about 70 percent of the total landmass. Almost all the remaining space is farmland or urban. Those characteristics limit operational maneuver as well as the usefulness of armor, while placing a premium on highly trained infantry.

By Maciej Jonasz

DRIVE ON PYONGYANG: Battlefield Korea

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The terrain also limits the usefulness of air power in the ground support role. The mountains do chan-nel motor traffi c, however, thereby creating opportunities for strike missions against columns of vehicles.

The peninsula also provides an extensive coastline potentially vulnerable to naval and amphibious operations launched from the Yellow Sea in the west and the Sea of Japan in the east. There are harsh winters

in the northern part of the peninsula and milder ones in the south.

North and South Korea are sepa-rated by the DMZ which, after decades of both sides building fortifi cations along it, offers a formidable barrier to offensive operations in both direc-tions. Those fortifi cations include bunkers, trenches, dragon’s teeth anti-tank obstacles, and minefi elds, all manned by large numbers of troops and covered by heavy artillery.

Armies

The North Korean People’s Army (KPA) is one of the largest in the world, with 1 million personnel on active duty plus 7.7 million reservists. Despite the seemingly impressive numbers, the KPA has many shortfalls.

The KPA is equipped with a col-lection of obsolete weapon systems, largely of Chinese and Soviet-era Russian design. For example, its most advanced main battle tanks (MBT) are Korean and Chinese upgrades of Soviet T-55/54s and T-62s.

In addition, the North’s poor economic situation means there are shortages of fuel, spare parts and

ammunition, which limits training. Malnourishment of the troops also impinges their ability to train and fi ght.

At the same time, the peninsula’s rugged terrain means engagements would often be fought at short range, and close-in fi ghting reduces the

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Recent Clashes

29 June 2002. Two North Korean People’s Navy (KPN) patrol b oats crossed the Northern Limit

Line (NLL)—the maritime demarcation line between the two countries’ territorial waters—and clashed with ROK patrol boats. Six ROK sailors were killed in the exchange of fi re. Subsequently, ROK rules of engagement were changed to allow their warships to open fi re without waiting to obtain government permission.

10 November 2009. A ROK patrol boat fi red warning shots at a KPN warship that had crossed

the NLL. The KPN ship then also opened fi re on the ROK vessel, scoring 15 hits. Four ROK patrol boats replied with heavy volumes of fi re, expending almost 5,000 rounds of ammunition and setting the KPN warship on fi re.

26 March 2010. A torpedo, suspected of having been launched by a North Korean midget

submarine, sank the ROK corvette Cheonan, killing 46 of its crew.

23 November 2010. An artillery ba rrage by 122mm rockets and 76.2mm cannon hit the ROK island

town of Yeonpyeong. ROK artillery returned fi re against the Northern artillery positions, KPA command posts and barracks. During the one hour engagement, two civilians and two Marines were killed and three civilians and 15 Marines were wounded, while the effects of the ROK return fi re are unknown.

A 1:1 replica of ROK patrol boat PKM-357, which was damaged during the 29 June 2002 naval clash with KPN warships. Battle damage on the hull is highlighted with red paint, and plaques onboard indicate where each of the six sailors lost was killed.

A North Korean semi-submersible used to infi ltrate special forces personnel. This one was captured in December 1983 while infi ltrating South Korean waters.

The South Korean town of Yeonpyeong burns during the 23 November 2010 incident.

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Infi ltration Tunnels

As part of their strategy for penetrating the DMZ, the KPA has constructed numerous infi ltration tunnels. Since 1974, four have been discovered while another 25 are thought to exist. They have the capacity to allow the transfer of up to 8,000 men per hour into Southern territory, and they’re wide enough to allow the passage of small motor vehicles.

The purpose of the tunnels would be to infi ltrate elite shock troops and commandos, seizing ROK defensive positions before they can be fully manned and then moving on to spread chaos by attacking rear area installations.

One discovered tunnel, located near a DMZ observation point north of Seoul, has had its southern end turned into a tourist attraction. Dug 240 feet below ground, the six foot high and six foot wide tunnel is accessible by a ramp, and visitors can follow it to within about 500 feet of the DMZ where three concrete barriers have been erected. The tunnel was discovered thanks to a tip from a Northern defector. It was still incomplete when found, stretching only 1,400 feet into Southern territory but running back 4,000 feet on the Northern side.

area by air and by sea. Their likely mis-sion would be capturing key objectives, such as bridges, ahead of advancing regular KPA units, and attacking enemy command control nodes and airbases.

Another Northern method used to try to offset US and South Korean technological superiority is to empha-size camoufl age, deception and the use of hardened underground shelters. Drawing on Yugoslavia’s use of decoys during the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, the KPA makes extensive use of dummy weapons and fi ghting positions to reduce the effi ciency of enemy targeting. Extensive use would also be made of real fortifi cations to create defensive positions along the DMZ and protect artillery. The terrain of the peninsula lends itself to that tac-tic, with numerous caves and moun-tainsides in which tunnels can be cut.

For its part, the South has created a large and well armed military. Today it’s a far cry from the army shattered in the fi rst phase of the Korean War. The South maintains an active force of 522,000 backed up by 600,000 reservists, all well equipped with the latest in technology. Their equipment is a mix of US and indigenous designs, such as the K1/K1A1 tank and the new K2 “Black Panth er” main battle tank.

The ROK Army has a large infantry component that’s suited for combat in the mountains. Only three mechanized divisions exist, with many tanks dis-persed throughout the corps in brigade strength. A large special forces branch of 10 brigades and seven regiments provides additional capability for fi ght-ing in the peninsula’s rough terrain and in unconventional warfare missions.

One challenge the South will increasingly face in the coming years is a shortage of new recruits. The country’s 2012 birth rate is currently one of the lowest in the world, at 1.23 children per family, which is far below the minimum required to maintain a steady population size.

Air Forces

The North Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) has 110,000 personnel and 1,700 aircraft. As with the KPA, those numbers at fi rst appear impressive, but there are serious shortfalls that make it no match for a modern opponent. The KPAF is equipped with obsolete Soviet-era and Chinese planes, with its most modern aircraft being 35

US Forces in Korea

An important factor in the Korean peninsula is the continuing American military presence there. The US Army’s main ground unit on the peninsula is the 2nd Infantry Division. There are also USAF units in-country, as well as in supporting positions in Japan and at other bases in the Pacifi c that can deploy to the peninsula on short notice. Even so, the US presence in Korea is being gradually reduced, owing to other global commitments in the ongoing War on Terror. The Marines on nearby Okinawa are also to be redeployed to other bases in the Pacifi c.

In peacetime, ROK and US forces in Korea are commanded by their respective govern-ments. In wartime, joint operational control is under the US Combined Forces Command (CFC). The CFC is to be replaced by a two-nation joint command structure in 2015.

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edge otherwise offered by superior equipment. In the mountains, infantry fi ghting at short range can decide battles while armor is relegated to a supporting role. The mechanized

sweeps executed by US forces in both Gulf Wars aren’t feasible here.

The KPA also has a strong artillery component that’s supposed to make up for the North’s weak air force by providing heavy fi re support from its many guns and multiple rocket

launchers (MRL). At the same time, however, their fi re control procedures are nowhere near as effi cient as those of the US and South Korea.

DPRK doctrine calls for going on the offensive at the start of any new war. Seventy percent of the KPA is therefore deployed just north of the DMZ, which would allow it to start offensive operations after only minimum preparation, thereby exploiting the element of surprise.

Despite its dire economic situation, the North continues to spend large amounts of money on upgrading the KPA’s capabilities. Since 2000 it’s made an effort to improve mobility by providing more motor vehicles, as well as bicycles, for the infantry.

The KPA has developed a large special forces element: some 180,000 in light infantry regiments and battal-ions as well as commando units. Those troops would likely form the spearhead of any attack across the DMZ as well as trying to infi ltrate into the ROK rear MiG-29 fi ghters. Spare parts and fuel

shortages have curtailed fl ight training to about 30 hours per year per pilot. In contrast, ROK pilots get 130 hours.

The KPAF has a considerable capacity to support the country’s special operations forces. It can airlift approximately 5,000 men, though that capacity would quickly be reduced in any future war by interception and air defenses.

The North’s own air defense network, while sizable, also consists of obsolete systems. Its most effective equipment may be GPS jammers intended to reduce the effi ciency of incoming precision guided munitions.

The KPAF makes extensive use of underground and hardened shelters for aircraft and air defense weapons. It’s even gone so far as constructing two airbases in which the runways are partially underground. As a further

protective measure, aircraft mock-ups and derelicts are used as decoys to divert enemy air strikes. While such measures may protect the KPAF from total destruction on the ground, its under-trained pilots and obsolete aircraft are in no position to infl uence the battlefi eld for any length of time.

The ROK Air Force is a strong and modern service manned by 65,000 active duty personnel plus 55,000 reservists. Flown by highly trained pilots, its inventory of 450 combat and 320 support aircraft includes F-16 and F-15K Slam Eagles (K orean model of the Strike Eagle), as well as older F-4 and F-5s. There are also airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. Of course, in the event of war the South Korean Air Force would also have the immediate and full support of US airpower.

A view inside one of the discovered infi ltration tunnels.

A ROK K1 “Black Panther” main battle tank.

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