AUGUST 2013

Driving the System Apart?A Study of United Nations Integrationand Integrated Strategic Planning

ARTHUR BOUTELLIS

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Suggested Citation:

Arthur Boutellis, “Driving the System

Apart? A Study of United Nations

Integration and Integrated Strategic

Planning,” New York: International

Peace Institute, August 2013.

© by International Peace Institute, 2013

All Rights Reserved

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ARTHUR BOUTELLIS is a Research Fellow and Adviser to

the Peace Operations and Africa Programs at the

International Peace Institute.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IPI is grateful to Norway and the other generous donors to

its Coping with Crisis program, whose support makes

publications like this one possible.

The author would like to thank Marc Jacquand, who

offered analytical and drafting support, and Ian Martin,

Youssef Mahmoud, Michael v.d. Schulenburg, and Oliver

Ulrich, who were interviewed for this report. The author is

also grateful to Sophie Broennimann, Charles Hunt, Carole

Magnaschi, Tuesday Reitano, and IPI colleagues Francesco

Mancini, Adam Smith, and Fiona Blyth, who provided

feedback on earlier drafts, as well as Adam Lupel and

Marie O’Reilly, who edited this report.

CONTENTS

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

UN Integration and Integrated StrategicPlanning: Evolution and Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . 4

DPKO LEADS INTEGRATION WITHIN THEUN SECRETARIAT

BEYOND THE SECRETARIAT: FROM STRUCTURAL TOSTRATEGIC INTEGRATION

INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLANNING:

FROM HEADQUARTERS TO FIELD MISSIONS

Hitting the Wall? Current Obstacles toIntegrated Strategic Planning in the UN. . . . . . . . . . . 9

THE GAP BETWEEN ACTUAL COSTS AND PERCEIVEDBENEFITS

TOO MUCH COORDINATION, TOO FEW PLANNINGSKILLS

FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITED INCENTIVES

EXTERNAL PRESSURES

Advancing the Integrated Planning Agenda . . . . . . 14

QUICK FIXES

THE “MISSING WHOLE”

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Abbreviations

AFPs Agencies, Funds, and Programs

BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

CIVCAP Civilian Capacities

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

DFS Department of Field Support

DPA Department of Political Affairs

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

ERSG Executive Representative of the Secretary-General

HC Humanitarian Coordinator

IAP Integrated Assessment and Planning

IMPP Integrated Mission Planning Process

IMTF Integrated Mission Task Force

ISF Integrated Strategic Framework

ITAPT Integrated Technical Assessment and Planning Team

JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Centre

JOC Joint Operations Command

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OROLSI Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions

PBC Peacebuilding Commission

PBF Peacebuilding Fund

PBSO Peacebuilding Support Office

RC Resident Coordinator

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General

SSR Security Sector Reform

iii

UN United Nations

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDG United Nations Development Group

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

iv

1

Executive Summary

Over the last two decades, the United Nations (UN)has undertaken a series of institutional innovationsto promote greater coherence in the organization’sconflict and postconflict engagements across itspolitical, security, development, and humanitarianpillars. The UN has taken the integration agendafurther than many other organizations and “whole-of-government” approaches. It has developed acomprehensive body of integration-related policiesand planning tools, and draws from a wide range ofexperiences with many forms and levels of integra-tion. Earlier this year, the UN secretary-general re-affirmed the UN’s commitment to integrationthrough the endorsement of a new policy onintegrated assessment and planning (IAP).

Yet, this report argues that the UN integrationagenda faces a number of obstacles that threaten toerase some of the hard-won gains. There are signsof integration fatigue from various corners of theorganization, due in part to higher-than-expectedtransaction costs, the lack of incentives and rewardsfor integration, the difficulty of demonstrating andcommunicating the outcomes and impacts ofintegrated planning processes, and continuingstructural impediments to fully realizing the“integration promise.”

Despite a shift away from a focus on structuresto an increasing emphasis on strategy, somenominally integrated UN field operations continueto experience institutional and funding turf battles.This is rendered all the more complex in countriessuch as Mali, Somalia, and Syria, and in regions likethe Sahel, where UN engagement has taken onmultiple forms. In such contexts, peacekeepingoperations, special political missions, and agencies,funds, and programs (AFPs) plan and operatealongside one another, requiring significant effortsto maintain coherence. It also remains unclear howchanges in the broader international landscape andin some of the paradigms that initially set thecontext for UN integration will affect the agendatoday.

As a result, the sentiment that efforts at integra-tion are in fact driving the UN system apart isgaining currency. If integration is confirmed as theway forward at the policy level, how can the UNovercome these obstacles, incorporate theseparadigm shifts, and revive momentum for integra-

tion in practice? This report seeks to capture theevolution of integrated planning efforts at the UNand to identify the next steps for a realistic integra-tion agenda. It is based on a review of progressmade, an assessment of the current state ofintegrated planning efforts, and an analysis ofrelated policy developments. RECOMMENDATIONS

This report argues that future UN action onintegration should combine small but painstakinginternal efforts to strengthen planning capacities(“quick fixes”) with more systemic improvementsdesigned to sustain these by bringing greatercoherence to the UN response in the field of peaceand security (the “missing whole”). Among themain recommendations are the following:Quick Fixes

Integrate Where It Matters• Jointly identify areas where it makes sense for UN

missions and AFPs to come together and agree onthe right form and depth of integration requiredin each area.

• Do not restrict integration to programmaticinterventions. In certain contexts, a UN missionand the UN country team may increase theirimpact by creating more coherence in areas suchas public information and messaging,fundraising, stakeholder engagement, andoperations.

Analyze as One• Systematically carry out joint analytical exercises

(now common practice across the UN system)throughout the mission life cycle, even if they donot lead to integrated responses.

• Establish joint analysis units (bringing togethermission and AFP staff) to assess country trendsand risks, and leverage the mission’s politicalaccess while drawing on the AFPs’ field networks.

• Continue to develop system-wide policies acrossa range of postconflict areas.

• Encourage and reward staff mobility across theUN Secretariat and AFPs throughout employees’careers (rather than only at high levels), as well asstaff collocation in field missions in some cases.

Upgrade the Capacity of System-Wide Planners• Promote joint training for staff in the UN

Development Group and Department of

2 Arthur Boutellis

Peacekeeping Operations and capacity develop-ment for UN planners.

• Establish dedicated integrated planning capaci-ties at headquarters.

Remove Managerial and AdministrativeImpediments• Develop standard approaches, templates, and

procedures for sharing of assets, staff interoper-ability, and transfer of resources, and delegateauthority to missions and agencies in the fieldwhen choosing the right integration modus andtools.

• Increase awareness of both the “delivering-as-one” and the integration agendas, as well as otherUN processes, such as the civilian capacity initia-tive and trust fund operations.

Provide Incentives and Leadership• Create incentives for integration as part of staff

performance evaluations and through greaterrecognition of the value of integration in seniorleadership messaging and discourse.

• Develop a more robust body of evidenceregarding the value of integration as it relates toUN performance in the field, and explain why itmatters—clearly and credibly.

The “Missing Whole”

Peacebuilding: One UN Definition, DifferentApproaches• The UN Secretariat should lead the way with

some of the below systemic reforms, to ensurethat different parts of the UN system complementrather than compete with one another in post -conflict peacebuilding.

• Donors should support and demand integratedapproaches and joint UN initiatives and projects,and create incentives for different UN entities tofurther cooperate in a country or a region.

A Client-Oriented UN Headquarters• Bring teams from the Departments of

Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairstogether in the same regional groupings, with aunified interface to the “clients”—the hostcountries and the UN field missions (whether apeacekeeping or special political mission, or aUN country team).

• Adopt a client-oriented or service providerapproach consisting of peace and security

“products,” which could be based on the existingmodels for electoral assistance or mediationsupport, and “enablers,” such as system-widelessons learned, policies, and planning.

• Encourage “learning as one” through frequentcross-cutting lessons learned to build a commonrepository of institutional knowledge aboutintegration across UN entities.

• All field missions should operate under onebudget, and allow more flexibility and interoper-ability between the regular (assessed) budget andvoluntary contributions.

Building on Partnerships• Partner with the World Bank and the private

sector for stronger integration of economicanalysis into UN postconflict assessments—aswas done in Libya and Yemen, for instance.

• For parallel deployments of a UN field missionand a non-UN force, develop effective coordina-tion mechanisms and interoperability “where itmatters” early during the planning processes.

• Develop more formal guidance for joint strategicassessments (UN-AU, UN-EU, UN–World Bank,etc.) to allow for a clearer division of labor fromthe outset while maintaining flexibility, as eachorganization may end up planning its own modeof engagement.

The Need for a New Integration Consensus?• Rethink UN integration in light of the changing

nature of crises, some of which go beyondtraditional UN peace and security expertise andchallenge state-centric paradigms.

• A second integration movement should putgreater emphasis on building a politicalconsensus that includes host countries and abroader member state constituency, and thatextends to regional organizations and countriesfrom the Global South. The New Deal forEngagement in Fragile States and the post-2015development agenda could serve as catalysts.The report concludes that if the integration

agenda is to reclaim adherents, it is important forthe UN to combine a series of practical fixes to itsintegrated planning practices with broader,systemic changes. At the same time, the UN alsoneeds to build a more compelling narrativeconcerning the value of integration, reduce costsfor its implementation, and clearly demonstrate its

DRIVING THE SYSTEM APART? 3

1 United Nations Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992.

relevance to the evolving parameters of interna-tional engagement in crisis settings and to shiftingoperational requirements. To support and sustainthese efforts, a rekindling of the UN leadership’senthusiasm for integration and a renewed andbroader member state consensus will be required.

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) has come a long waysince Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’sAgenda for Peace in 1992, introduced as one of thefirst attempts to instill greater unity of purpose inthe organization’s conflict and postconflict engage-ment.1 Over the last two decades, despite strongcountercurrents, the UN has undertaken a series ofinstitutional innovations to promote greatercoherence across its political, security, develop-ment, and humanitarian pillars.

Efforts to better integrate different elements ofthe UN’s work first began within the UNSecretariat, to get the various departments adminis-tering and coordinating the UN’s activities tocombine efforts in support of multidimensionalfield operations. “Integration” would thus bringtogether civilian, military, and police componentsunder one senior UN official on the ground,supported by one budget. Integration thenextended beyond the Secretariat to strengthen thepartnership between peacekeeping and politicalmissions on the one hand and UN agencies, funds,and programs on the other. It sought to ensure that,at the very least, the various UN entities deployedin conflict and postconflict contexts would notwork at cross-purposes. Throughout, significantinvestments have also been made to strengthen theplanning culture and capacities of various UNentities, with a focus on interdepartmental andinteragency processes.

While these efforts have been developed throughtrial and error, and have at times been forced byfailures in the field, it is evident that the UN hastaken the integration agenda further than manyother multilateral and bilateral organizations, andhas achieved greater coherence than many “whole-of-government” approaches. The organization cannow boast of a fairly comprehensive body of

integration-related policies, a range of technicalplanning tools, and a wide compilation of accumu-lated experiences with many forms and depths ofintegration.

Yet, the integration agenda seems to be facing anumber of obstacles that threaten its momentumand even threaten to erase some of the hard-wongains. There are signs of integration fatigue fromvarious corners of the organization, due in part tohigher-than-expected transaction costs, the lack ofincentives and rewards for integration, and contin-uing structural impediments to fully realizing the“integration promise.” Efforts to measure the resultsof integration have been discussed but have so farbeen restricted to achievements in processes ratherthan outcomes or impact, further underminingefforts to calibrate expectations and communicatethe costs and benefits of integration effectively.

With obstacles and costs often more visible thanbenefits, it is not surprising that the principle ofintegration—which should underpin UN responsesin all crisis situations—continues to trigger uneaseand fatigue. Despite a shift away from an exclusivefocus on structures to an increasing emphasis onstrategy, some nominally integrated UN fieldoperations also continue to experience institutionaland funding turf battles, and resistance fromhumanitarian agencies. These divisions have attimes been exploited by various external actors totheir advantage. In addition, UN engagement incountries such as Mali, Somalia, and Syria, and inregions like the Sahel, has taken on multiple forms:peacekeeping operations, special political missions(including regional offices and special envoys), andagencies, funds, and programs all plan and operatealongside one another, requiring significant effortsto maintain coherence.

Moreover, beyond the organization itself, thebroader international landscape and some of theparadigms that set the context for UN integrationand informed its parameters have changed.Integration now needs to be pursued in a politicaland financial climate in which the UN is beingasked to do more with less, increasing emphasis isplaced on flexibility, and the trend toward hybridand parallel operations with other organizations ismultiplying coordination challenges.

4 Arthur Boutellis

At the same time, demands on the UN haveincreased and shifted in nature. Host countries areasserting themselves and resisting the presence offoreign uniformed personnel while calling forgreater UN support for economic development.The Arab Spring and subsequent transitions havechallenged traditional UN state-centric paradigms,and the UN integration model—with its in-builtassumptions about capacity building and othermodes of intervention—remains designed forpostconflict and low-income countries rather thanmiddle-income, fragile contexts. Some of thesechanges have been captured, in part, at the policylevel and in strategic documents such as the WorldDevelopment Report 2011, Civilian Capacity in theAftermath of Conflict, or the “New Deal forEngagement in Fragile States,” and they have beenpart of the global debate surrounding the post-2015development agenda.2 Yet, it remains unclear whatthey mean for the future of UN integration and howintegrated planning approaches reflect and accountfor some of their implications.

Finally, the promise of integration and supportfor it are further constrained by a perceived discon-nect between the results of integrated assessmentand planning processes, and the decisions onmission mandates and resources that are ultimatelymade by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Security Council, and General Assembly,which often use a different set of considerations.

As a result, the sentiment that efforts at integra-tion are driving the UN system apart rather thanbringing it together is gaining currency at the sametime that the secretary-general has re-affirmed theorganization’s commitment to integration throughthe endorsement of a new policy on integratedassessment and planning.3 If integration isconfirmed as the way forward at the policy level,how can the UN overcome these obstacles,incorporate these paradigm shifts, and revivemomentum for integration in practice?

This report seeks to capture the evolution ofintegrated planning efforts at the UN and toidentify the next steps for a realistic integrationagenda. It is based on a review of progress made

and an assessment of the current state of integratedplanning efforts, and includes an analysis of relatedpolicy developments. It argues that future actionshould combine small, painstaking internal effortsto strengthen planning capacities with moresystemic improvements designed to demonstratevalue for transaction costs and efforts. This willrequire rekindling the UN leadership’s enthusiasmfor integration and ensuring that integratedmission planning processes strengthen the UN’sresponse to shifting operational requirements. Arenewed consensus on integration, within andbeyond the UN, will also be needed to support andsustain these efforts.

UN Integration andIntegrated StrategicPlanning: Evolution andCurrent Status

Over the past two decades, the UN has undertakena series of institutional innovations to promotegreater coherence across its political, security,development, and humanitarian pillars. While theterms “integration” and “integrated strategicplanning” are frequently discussed and used asguiding principles throughout the UN community,they encompass both different processes (intra-Secretariat versus Secretariat together with UNagencies, funds, and programs) and outcomes atdifferent levels (structural, strategic, operational,etc.). DPKO LEADS INTEGRATION WITHINTHE UN SECRETARIAT

Integration first began as an intra–UN Secretariataffair, with the creation of the Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Depart -ment of Political Affairs (DPA) in 1992. DPKO wascreated in response to the need to run increasinglylarge and complex multidimensional peaceoperations mandated by the Security Council.These brought together civilian, military, and policecomponents under the single leadership of thespecial representative of the secretary-general

2 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, DC, 2011); UN Secretary-General, Civilian Capacity in theAftermath of Conflict, UN Doc. A/67/312–S/2012/645, August 15, 2012; International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “A New Deal for Engagementin Fragile States,” 2011.

3 The UN “Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning” (IAP) was approved by the secretary-general on April 9, 2013, following endorsement by the IntegrationSteering Group on March 15, 2013, and by the UN Development Group on March 13th.

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6 Arthur Boutellis

(SRSG) and under one budget (the “peacekeepingassessed budget”). This merger, and the fact that theindividual heading the field operation carries anequivalent level of seniority as the under-secretary-general that leads DPKO at headquarters (or onelevel below), are unique features of UN missions.

At field level, the establishment of a jointoperations command (JOC) and a joint missionanalysis center (JMAC) composed of civilian,police, and military in missions further contributedto greater information sharing and joint analysisbetween the civilian and uniformed components ofmissions.4 The need for such integrated structuresto support planning and decision making by amission’s civilian and military leadership grew outof increasingly multidimensional missions andcrises, such as the failure of UN peacekeepers toprotect the city of Bukavu in eastern Congo in2004.5

At headquarters level, the Department of FieldSupport (DFS) was created in 2007 to provide amore integrated logistical and administrativesupport system to peacekeeping missions, afunction previously housed under DPKO. However,this also produced coordination challenges. The“integrated operational teams” (IOTs), envisaged asa single point of contact at headquarters for fieldmissions and partners, therefore became the tool tobring the various civil and uniformed componentsof DPKO in UN headquarters together with theirDFS counterparts.6 Headed by a director, integratedoperational teams serve as information and liaisonhubs in New York and provide integrated supportfor each peace operation managed by DPKO. BEYOND THE SECRETARIAT: FROMSTRUCTURAL TO STRATEGIC INTEGRATION

In parallel with these intra-Secretariat integrationefforts, a broader integration drive incorporatingUN agencies, funds, and programs operating in agiven country started in the late 1990s and early

2000s under the leadership of then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan. As the researchers KathleenJennings and Anja Kaspersen put it, “The impulseto integrate grew out of a conviction that thepeacekeeping failures of the 1990s were at leastpartly attributable to the various elements of theUN acting separately, and occasionally at cross-purposes.”7 This integration drive had the supportof several heads of agencies, including MarkMalloch Brown (administrator of the UnitedNations Development Programme from 1999 to2005) and later Jan Egeland (emergency reliefcoordinator from 2003 to 2006).

Two seminal reports also provided impetus forthese efforts. The 1997 report Renewing the UnitedNations: A Programme for Reform commissioned byKofi Annan noted that “separate UNentities…pursue their activities separately, withoutregard to or benefiting from each other’s presence,”and it promoted the idea that “all UN entities…atcountry level…operate in common premises undera single UN flag.”8 The 2000 Report of the Panel onUnited Nations Peace Operations, known as theBrahimi Report, emphasized the need to“contribute to peace-building…in a genuinelyintegrated manner.”9

Initial steps toward UN integration were focusedon field missions and included both structural andstrategic dimensions. Notably, this included thecreation of a “triple-hatted” deputy SRSG (DSRSG),in whom the authority of both the resident coordi-nator (RC) and humanitarian coordinator (HC)would reside, where feasible. The DSRSG/RC/HC istasked with ensuring coordination across missionactivities set by the mandate and the UN countryteam’s long-term development and humanitarianinitiatives. A further “Note of Guidance” in 2006specified that the DSRSG reports primarily to theSRSG, and through him or her to the under-secretary-general of DPKO or DPA (in the case ofspecial political missions). However, there wouldalso be a secondary reporting line to the chair of the

4 The first DPKO policy directive on JOC and JMAC was released in 2006 and states that all missions shall establish a JOC and JMAC at mission headquarters. SeeUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “DPKO Policy Directive: Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres,” July 1, 2006.

5 See Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace? (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 2011), pp. 197–208.

6 See United Nations Secretary-General, “Overview of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Budget Performance for the Period from 1 July2004 to 30 June 2005 and Budget for the Period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007,” Part II, UN Doc. A/60/696, February 24, 2006.

7 Kathleen M. Jennings and Anja T. Kaspersen, “Introduction: Integration Revisited,” International Peacekeeping 15, No.4, August 2008, p. 445.8 United Nations Secretary-General, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, UN Doc. A/51/950, July 14, 1997.9 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 21, 2000, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809.

DRIVING THE SYSTEM APART? 7

10 United Nations Secretary-General, “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions,” January 17, 2006, available atwww.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/missions/sgnote.pdf .

11 Espen Barth Eide et al., “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations,” Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA CoreGroup, May 2005.

12 The governments of eight countries—Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Viet Nam—volunteered to take part in the“Delivering as One” pilot initiative in 2007.

13 United Nations Secretary-General, “Decision No. 2008/24 – Integration,” in Decision of the Secretary-General – 25 June Meeting of the Policy Committee, June 26,2008, available at www.undg.org/docs/9898/Integration-decision-SG-25-jun-08.pdf .

14 United Nations Secretary-General, No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations PeacekeepingOperations, UN Doc. S/2001/394, April 20, 2001.

UN Development Group (as RC) and to theEmergency Relief Coordinator (as HC), whereapplicable.10

The first major independent study on integrationin 2005 found that there was little specificagreement about what an integrated missioncomprised or what integration meant in practice,and it argued for “strategic integration” over“structural integration.”11 It recognized that overlyformal structural tools could be counterproductive,arguing instead that “form must follow function”and that integration should only be pursued inareas where the approach adds value. Thisrecommendation was largely captured insubsequent guidance and led to the emergence of avariety of organizational structures in the field,including several explicitly designed to be moreconscious of the need to preserve the “humani-tarian space.” Indeed, the discussions on theintegration of UN conflict and postconflictpresences were consistent with a broader push forsystem coherence, expressed in the “Delivery asOne” initiative in the development arena and thecluster approach in the humanitarian field.12However, these initiatives have proceeded mostly inparallel, with attempts at convergence emergingonly very recently.

The shift toward strategic integration wasconfirmed by a June 2008 decision by the UNsecretary-general’s Policy Committee, the highestdecision-making body within the UN Secretariat.13Following wide-ranging consultations with themain parts of the UN, the committee reaffirmedintegration as the guiding principle for engagementin conflict and postconflict situations. The decisionclearly stated that the principle of integrationshould be applied wherever the UN has a countryteam and a multidimensional peacekeepingoperation or a special political mission or office. Italso clarified that integration does not only apply tomissions that are “structurally integrated” (with a

triple-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC) and that it can takedifferent structural forms reflecting needs andcircumstances. The discourse on integration thusbegan to focus more on the need for an effectivestrategic partnership and shared vision between theUN mission or office and the country team, underthe overall leadership of the SRSG. INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLANNING:FROM HEADQUARTERS TO FIELDMISSIONS

Throughout this process, significant investmentshave been made to strengthen the planning cultureand capacities of various UN entities, with a focuson interdepartmental and interagency processes.One of the recommendations of the independent“Report on Integrated Missions” in 2005 was thatplanning for integrated missions should be aninterorganizational process, both at headquartersand in the field, and should involve UN countryteams and other relevant actors present in the area.

The Brahimi Report had already recommendedthe creation of “integrated mission taskforces”bringing together the Secretariat and agencies,funds, and programs at headquarters for mission-specific planning and support. But writtenguidance on integrated planning only appearedmuch later. Building on member states’ support forintegrated and strategic planning following the2001 secretary-general’s report No Exit WithoutStrategy, DPKO head Jean-Marie Guéhennolaunched a review of DPKO’s planning process.14 In2004, this resulted in an initial doctrine known asthe 2004 Integrated Mission Planning Process,which incorporated inputs from UN agencies intoDPKO’s internal planning procedures.

In their initial forms, both the integrated missiontaskforces (IMTFs) and Integrated MissionPlanning Process (IMPP) faced strong oppositionfrom agencies, funds, and programs, largelybecause “unlike day-to-day management in thefield, planning is tightly controlled in every UN

agency by strict procedures that reflect the politicsamong member states in oversight bodies ratherthan the needs of the mandate or people on theground.”15 Nonetheless, the guidelines for theIntegrated Mission Planning Process—forheadquarters and field missions—were formallyapproved by Secretary-General Annan in 2006 asthe “authoritative basis for the planning of all newintegrated missions, as well as the revision ofexisting integration mission plans for all UNdepartments, agencies, funds and programs.” Theyalso kept the idea of integrated mission taskforces.

In practice, it was not until the June 2008 PolicyCommittee decision, which reaffirmed that “formmust follow function,” that the integrated missionplanning guidelines started getting some tractionon the ground, and much of it followed existingpractice and innovations in the field. By that time,various UN field offices—such as those in SierraLeone, Liberia, and Burundi—had already experi-mented with a variety of integration models whilestruggling with support issues (including assetsharing and different cost recovery rates betweenDPKO and agencies), and an “integration steeringgroup” had been created to start looking into theseissues. Meanwhile, what had started as a top-downheadquarters/DPKO-led effort toward UNintegrated strategic planning evolved into differentcountry-specific planning processes and experi-ments.

To further strengthen the strategic focus ofintegrated approaches, the Integrated StrategicFramework (ISF) was introduced and made into arequirement in 2008 for countries or circumstanceswhere there was a multidimensional peacekeepingoperation or special political mission or office, anda UN country team. The purpose of the frameworkwas to bring together the mandates and resourcesof the mission and country team, and to reflect “ashared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives” and“a set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibili-ties for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidatingpeace.”16

The Integrated Strategic Framework was thusdesigned to capture the context-specific nature and

depth of the partnership between a mission and acountry team in support of peace-consolidationobjectives. As such, it was not meant to replace orduplicate entity-specific planning tools, such as theResults-Based Budgeting tool for missions or theUN Development Assistance Framework, countryprogram documents, and common humanitarianaction plans for UN agencies. However, despite realevidence of its value in a number of integratedsettings, lingering confusion regarding theIntegrated Strategic Framework’s purpose has alsocontributed to integration fatigue.

8 Arthur Boutellis

15 See Benner, Mergenthaler, and Rotmann, The New World, pp. 190–191.16 United Nations Secretary-General, “Decision No. 2008/24.”17 Special political missions include regional political missions, special envoys/advisers of the secretary-general, and country-specific political and peacebuilding

offices.

Special Political Missions17

In a context of financial austerity and renewedfocus on conflict prevention and mediation, theUN and member states have often presentedspecial political missions as a cost-effectivealternative to larger peacekeeping missions.Their value also comes from their comparatively“light footprint,” at a time when many hostgovernments resist the presence of foreigntroops on their territory, and from theiradaptability to circumstances. The recent trendof special political missions taking up moreoperational mandates has led DPA to develop itsown guidance on planning—namely, the SpecialPolitical Missions Start-Up Guide 2012.

However, special political missions have alsocreated new challenges—not just for DPA butfor the UN system as a whole. Special politicalmissions have been linked to parallel andcompeting DPA and DPKO planning processesin several cases (Libya, Syria, Central AfricanRepublic, and Mali being the most recentexamples), in which each UN entity attempts todictate how peace should be supported throughits own norms and departments rather than adispassionate, historically anchored assessmentor conflict analysis.

The UN’s ability to plan for and deploy suchspecial political missions in a timely manner islimited by the fact that DPA-led missions arecurrently funded through the regular budget

DRIVING THE SYSTEM APART? 9

18 The UN “Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning” (IAP) was approved by the secretary-general on April 9, 2013, following endorsement by the IntegrationSteering Group on March 15, 2013, and by the UN Development Group on March 13th. It was also referred to in Security Council Resolution 2086 (2013) onmultidimensional peacekeeping (para 4).

In spite of controversies, failures, and confusion,the integration agenda has steadily evolved over thelast two decades, sometimes driven by headquartersand other times by experiments in the field, withone source of innovation informing the other. Inthis respect, the UN has demonstrated a remarkablecapacity for perseverance, course correction, andself-reflection, even if such qualities may triggerderision and evoke unpleasant memories for thosemired in the day-to-day workings of integratedplanning, whether at the policy level or in the field.The most significant evolution relates to the shiftfrom a narrow focus on structure to an emphasis onstrategy.

This shift is now clearly articulated in the 2013Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning(IAP),18 which supersedes the prior IntegratedMission Planning Policy and sets out minimumrequirements for joint analysis (through the joint

conduct of strategic assessments), common priori-ties, integrated mechanisms, and integratedmonitoring. The objective of integrated strategicplanning is to agree on where it makes sense towork jointly and to define the depth and structuralform of such work together, on the basis of acommon understanding of the situation and themost appropriate UN responses. The integratedassessment and planning policy thereforeintroduces nuance and diversity where past policyhad been (mis)interpreted, and at times applied, inmonolithic terms. It is hoped that it will help thesystem overcome the wall into which the UNintegrated strategic planning agenda seems to haverun.

Hitting the Wall? CurrentObstacles to IntegratedStrategic Planning in the UN

THE GAP BETWEEN ACTUAL COSTSAND PERCEIVED BENEFITS

After all these efforts, many within and beyond theUN have now begun to ask, “So what has all this ledto?” Unfortunately, the institution has not so farbeen able to demonstrate a consistent causal linkbetween integrated planning approaches andmeaningful impact on the ground. As with otherfunctions and interventions, it is technicallydifficult to establish attribution, and the counter-factual (“what if the UN had not plannedtogether?”) is subject to claims that belong more inthe realm of philosophy than science. Furthermore,

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(rather than the peacekeeping budget, whichfunds DPKO-led missions), and to a lesserdegree by the absence of dedicated DPA strategicplanning capacity (with only a modest planningcapacity within the Guidance and Learning Unitof DPA’s Policy and Mediation Division).Although initially developed by DPKO, the sameintegrated strategic planning instruments (theIntegrated Mission Planning Process andIntegrated Strategic Framework) also apply toDPA-led special political missions, which haveintegrated task forces at headquarters that aresimilar to the integrated mission task forces.

10 Arthur Boutellis

concrete examples of integration’s added value inareas such as electoral assistance may be either toofew or insufficiently commensurate with the associ-ated transaction costs to counter suspicion that,ultimately, there may be less than meets the eye tothe integration agenda.

However, if real results on the ground—beyondchanges in process—are difficult to measure, fewwould disagree that the more visible transactioncosts are now undermining support for integration.These costs, and the absence of consistent andreliable answers to the “so what?” question, havespawned a sense of integration fatigue across theUN system, with complaints about the time spenton coordination processes, information-sharingprocesses, and consensus-building efforts to agreeon analytical findings, recommendations to seniorleadership, or even entity-specific staffing tables.

Although the facilitation over formalizationapproach would suggest that this interaction andperiodic feedback between elements of the missionis essential to system-level coordination andeffective outcomes, many bemoan the delays indecision making and the dilution of authority andcontent that result from “integrated processes” thatseek to placate everyone without fully satisfyinganyone. These burdens were vividly illustrated inthe integrated peacebuilding frameworks used inthe early days of the UN PeacebuildingCommission. This period spawned serious reformof the commission’s engagement strategies, butinternal UN planning processes, such as theIntegrated Strategic Framework or DevelopmentAssistance Framework, continue to be plagued byhigh-level coordination requirements.

19 The paragraphs on the peacebuilding office in Burundi are adapted from Adam C. Smith and Arthur Boutellis, eds., The Management Handbook for UN FieldMissions (New York: International Peace Institute, June 2012).

focused engagement by the UN country team.BINUB was replaced by a small political office inJanuary 2011, whereas the Security Councildecided that UNIPSIL will close and hand overto the country team in March 2014.

After they were set up, BINUB and UNIPSILbecame the most advanced examples of bothstrategic and structural integration of the UNsystem at the time. Both were led by an executiverepresentative of the secretary-general (ERSG),who also wore the hats of resident coordinatorand humanitarian coordinator, and who wasassisted by a deputy ERSG. This allowed develop-ment-oriented funds to be used for peace -building, despite initial resistance from UNagencies, funds, and programs that had been onthe ground prior to the peacebuilding offices. ThePeacebuilidng Fund’s (PBF) $35 million envelopefor each country (with additional funding grantedlater) played a catalytic role for integration, sincethe ERSG could leverage it via the agencies,funds, and programs that would implement thePBF projects jointly with the UN peacebuildingmission in-country and combine overheads.These projects also promoted integration withinthe host government as their implementationoften involved various ministries.

In Burundi, the ERSG co-chaired a weekly UNIntegrated Management Team meeting withheads of agencies, funds, and programs, as wellas the World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund. The UN IntegratedManagement Team served as a structure forjoint decision making and for reducing thecompartmentalization of the UN’s work inBurundi. It further allowed the head of missionto provide strategic guidance on all criticalaspects of peace consolidation and define a jointUN position with the government and interna-tional development partners.

UNIPSIL and the UN agencies, funds, andprograms in Sierra Leone agreed to combinetheir efforts and resources behind a “jointvision” in support of the government of SierraLeone and its people, which was adopted inDecember 2008 to cover the initial period from

Peacebuilding as a Driver for Integration: UNOffices in Burundi and Sierra Leone19

The UN’s integrated peacebuilding offices inBurundi (BINUB) and Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)were both conceived as follow-on presences topeacekeeping operations, to coordinate theresponse of the UN to the peace-consolidationpriorities identified with the host government.This arrangement allowed for a smooth transi-tion from peacekeeping to a more development-

TOO MUCH COORDINATION, TOO FEWPLANNING SKILLS

Each new crisis sends the UN system scrambling tomobilize resources to lead integrated responses. Inthe absence of system-wide, standby planningcapacity to provide surge support,20 this responsi-bility usually falls back to a lead entity, whose“leadership” is at times disputed and whose staff areusually already under severe strain. Individualswith full time jobs are asked to take on additional,heavy coordination and analytical tasks. Lackingtime and specific planning skills, their ability todesign efficient integrated processes and avoid thegrowing pains of new coordination efforts remainslimited.

This obstacle also brings into focus the stillunderdeveloped nature of the UN’s planningculture, knowledge, and skills, despite real invest-ment and progress in recent years. Progress hasbeen seen in particular in applying results-basedmanagement approaches and techniques, albeitperhaps to an unwieldy extreme in some cases andwith glaring gaps in others. What many plannersnow lack is an awareness of the various strands ofUN reform that can be brought together efficiently,in support of integrated responses. In recent years,the UN has moved forward on several significantinstitutional changes, such as the launch of thecivilian capacity initiative (CIVCAP), the roll out ofthe Global Field Support Strategy, the expansion oftrust-fund mechanisms, and new opportunitiescreated by the PBF. Greater flexibility andoperational innovations can be generated insupport of integrated responses when combiningseveral of these elements. Unfortunately, apanoramic understanding of all of them is neededto realize the potential benefits, as well asknowledge of how to use them in ways that canreduce the transaction costs of integratedresponses. Such versatility is difficult to achieve,given the scattered bits of knowledge and expertisethroughout the UN system.

Much time is also still spent, even in the thick ofcrisis response planning, on lingering debates overmandates and “humanitarian space.”21 While theUN has made significant progress in bridging

DRIVING THE SYSTEM APART? 11

20 A suggestion to create such capacity was made as part of the civilian capacity review. Ironically, it died a quick death partly due to the high transaction costs associ-ated with its set up.

21 There is no commonly accepted definition of “humanitarian space”; it can refer both to the physical access that international aid agencies and their partners have

2009 to 2012. The joint vision replaced themission-wide Integrated Strategic Framework, aseparate UNIPSIL strategic plan, theDevelopment Assistance Framework, and thePeacebuilding Commission and PBF plans.However, agencies, funds, and programs stillhad to produce their own internal plans, andUNIPSIL still had to produce its results-basedbudget. UNIPSIL and the country team alsoestablished common facilities and services, suchas joint regional offices, a multidonor fund, ajoint strategic unit, a medical facility, securityservices, and a vehicle repair shop in order toenable the UN to deliver as one.

In Burundi, observers indicated that certainfactors proved crucial to making integrationeffective, including the leadership and vision ofthe ERSG, Youssef Mahmoud (who hadpreviously held senior positions in DPA and theUnited Nations Development Programme), andthe creation of integrated teams within sections(with staff from DPKO/DPA and agencies,funds, and programs colocating). Despiteadministrative challenges, these elements helpedbring overall coherence to the UN’s support tothe government of Burundi.

Despite significant progress in certain areas—namely, the integration of efforts at the strategic,programmatic, and operational levels—integra-tion ultimately proved a difficult task.Representatives of agencies, funds, andprograms in-country tended to be morebeholden to their respective central and regionalstructures than to the lead official on theground, who was mandated by the UNsecretary-general to coordinate UN responses. Arelated impediment was the concern thatintegration could lead to the loss of the visibilityof individual agencies, which is essential forresource mobilization and individual careeradvancement. The Burundian government,which initially supported having an integratedUN as interlocutor, also started seeing BINUB asa source of political interference in the develop-ment-focused support they began to seek.

divides, in particular between its peacekeeping,political, and humanitarian pillars, no amount ofpolicy development can fully eliminate the tensionsassociated with integrated responses outlinedabove. A recent independent study on the topic ofUN integration and humanitarian space found that,despite reforms to the policy of integration over thelast decade, the debate remains polarized. Itsuggested that stakeholders—including UN depart-ments, funds, agencies, and programs—shouldredouble their efforts to promote greater awarenessof integration policies and procedures and ways totranslate them into practice.22 Such efforts are alsoneeded to build confidence across the political,peacekeeping, and humanitarian communities, sothat the potential benefits of UN integration forhumanitarian operations can be maximized and therisks minimized.23 Yet, even if the revised integratedassessment and planning process incorporatesthese recommendations and provides the space andmechanisms for such tensions to be managed, theyare unlikely to dissolve completely, meaning thatweariness with common approaches will likelypersist. This is particularly true in a context wheremore robust rules of engagement are being given toUN peacekeeping missions, particularly theIntervention Brigade recently authorized as part ofthe UN mission in the Democratic Republic of theCongo.FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS ANDLIMITED INCENTIVES

Ongoing efforts to deepen and widen a UNplanning cadre that is able to support integratedprocesses and manage conflicts of principles mayconstitute a Sisyphean endeavor if agreements onjoint responses continue to face structural obstaclesin practice. One of these obstacles is the difficulty ofallocating mission resources flexibly, according tosituational changes. This shortcoming has alsolimited the impact of recent innovations, such asexpanded opportunities to combine assessed andextrabudgetary resources, and missions’ access toUnited Nations Development Group (UNDG) trustfunds and the Peacebuilding Fund. The operationalapplicability of integrated planning processes has

also been undermined by differing administrativeand financial systems among the UN’s depart-ments, agencies, funds, and programs. In fact, manyaspects of integration policy have moved forwardfaster than the nuts and bolts of administration,personnel, finances, and support (includingadministrative fees, air services, communicationand information technology, safety and security,joint premises, etc.). The Integration SteeringGroup, a standing body at the level of under-secretary-general and assistant-secretary-general,meets quarterly to review UN system-wide work onintegration and has been discussing these complexissues, some of which are being addressed by theDepartment of Field Support (DFS) in coordina-tion with UN agencies, funds, and programs. Butthe slow progress on many of these issues remains aserious impediment to joint efforts on the ground,and an additional irritant within the system.

Beyond outstanding operational and fundingconstraints, integrated approaches also continue toface decentralized governance structures, withresponsibilities and accountability mechanismsspread and separated across the system. The abilityof an SRSG and her or his deputies to translateintegrated plans into effective responses suffersfrom a lack of institutional incentives. While the2006 secretary-general’s “Note of Guidance”positions the SRSG (or equivalent head of mission)at the apex of the UN pyramid in-country, this doesnot change the fact that many entities nominallypositioned within this pyramid have their ownreporting mechanisms and governing boards. As aresult, all of the actors involved in integratedplanning approaches have their own goals andvisions, which may carry equal legitimacy but arenot always aligned with the Security Councilmandate that an SRSG has to implement.

In this context, effective integration in the fieldoften comes down to leadership and personalitieswithin the UN mission and agencies, funds, andprograms present, and to effective communicationskills and systems. Even when such factors are inplace, integrated plans and decisions lie in aninstitutional no-man’s-land. They require consensus

12 Arthur Boutellis

to populations in need; and to the nature of the “operating environment,” including the security conditions, and whether aid agencies are able to adhere to the coreprinciples of neutrality and impartiality. See Sarah Collinson and Samir Elhawary, “Humanitarian Space: A Review of Trends and Issues,” Humanitarian PolicyGroup Report 32, April 2012.

22 See Victoria Metcalfe, Alison Giffen, and Samir Elhawary, “UN Integration and Humanitarian Space,” an independent study commissioned by the UN IntegrationSteering Group, Humanitarian Policy Group, and Stimson Center, December 2011.

23 Ibid.

DRIVING THE SYSTEM APART? 13

that can often be achieved by settling for generalprinciples and broadly framed results, with littlerelevance on the ground. Integrated approaches areoften characterized by a mismatch between respon-sibility, capacity, and authority. Without unifiedgovernance and decision-making structures,functions and entities with significant responsibilitysee their authority contested by functions andentities with little responsibility. In the absence ofstructural reforms, the UN’s integration agenda willcontinue its struggle to square the accountabilitycircle.EXTERNAL PRESSURES

Another source of frustration with integratedefforts lies in the perceived disconnect between thecontent and results of the technical-level planningand the political decisions that ultimately informthe mandate and size of missions. While alignmentbetween the two levels is not infrequent, there aremany examples of laborious integrated planningprocesses ultimately being ignored by the UN’spolitical leadership (within the Secretariat andamong member states). At no other time does the“so what?” question acquire more legitimacy. UNplanners and programmatic staff involved in thedesign of the mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)harbor vivid memories of this dichotomy. Suchdoubts also resonate with those engaged in discus-sions over the UN presence in Mali.

A final challenge to the relevance of integratedplanning processes is the extent to which they canincorporate policy developments and contextualrealities. For example, the commitment toundertake joint assessment and planning efforts inconformity with the spirit, if not the letter, of theNew Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, consti-tutes a key principle. But without clarity and unityof purpose between various parts of the UN systemon how to translate this principle into practice,particularly when it comes to national ownershipand tensions with a Chapter VII mandate, thiscommitment remains a dead letter and the word“integrated” rings hollow. Yet, processes that enablethe UN to work more effectively with host govern-ments and civil society, established throughagreements like the New Deal, could and shouldhave major consequences for how the UN’s work inthe field is organized and integrated in the comingyears.

In addition, the current global economic context

has led UN member states to increase pressure onUN planners to do more with less. For example,there appear to be increasing requests for(sometimes unrealistic) quantitative rather thanqualitative monitoring and evaluation andbenchmarks. Security Council resolutions are alsosetting inflexible troop ceilings informed less bymission exigencies than by financial constraints(e.g., UNMISS), calling for smaller but multidi-mensional (special political) missions than thosethe UN has traditionally deployed in the immediateaftermath of a conflict (e.g., UN Support Mission inLibya), and at times requiring the UN to plan andimplement mandates in partnership with otherorganizations. The combination of mandates thatinclude peacebuilding and statebuilding tasks withassertive host governments provide furtherincentive to rethink the way the UN plans itsinterventions. And given the high level of volatilityin some of today’s conflict areas where the UN maysoon be asked to deploy missions, the integratedplanning process needs to ensure that the UN canbe flexible and responsive, and that it is not lockedinto rigid plans, structures, and programs. This is alot to ask for any process, but the reality is that theUN’s integrated planning approach must address allof these challenges, if the momentum for integra-tion is to be revived, from within and without.

Planning the UN Mission in South Sudan:Juggling Technical and PoliticalConsiderationsThe planning for the UN Mission in SouthSudan (UNMISS) highlights some of therecurring constraints and challenges faced bythe UN. These challenges arose both internallyin “planning as one” (among DPKO, DPA, andagencies, funds, and programs) and externally inmanaging member states’ influence (budgetaryconstraints and troop ceilings) and in communi-cating and planning with a host state partnerthat had a different set of motivations andexpectations.

First, UN Secretariat staff faced restrictions onstarting the planning process for a future missionin South Sudan prior to the outcome of thereferendum on the south’s independence, despitethe near certainty of the result. After thereferendum result was issued on February 7,

14 Arthur Boutellis

Advancing the IntegratedPlanning Agenda

The range and breadth of challenges that the UN’sintegrated planning ambitions face call for acombination of smaller “quick fixes” and largersystemic reforms. Small but painstaking internalefforts are needed to upgrade planning capacities,demonstrate value, reduce transaction costs andefforts, and rekindle the UN leadership’senthusiasm for integration. More systemicimprovements designed to strengthen the UN’sresponse to shifting operational requirements needto be based on a renewed integration consensuswithin and beyond the UN.QUICK FIXES

The “quick fixes” outlined here aren’t necessarilyeasy to achieve, but they are fixes that do notrequire systemic or even structural changes withinthe UN. Nor do they necessitate a lengthy processof broad-based consensus building and consulta-tion. Instead, they may require a substantialcultural shift, led by a few champions at the toppolitical level and supported by a few good ideasand investments from below. Focusing Planning on Integration WhereIt Matters

To begin with, the UN’s integration agenda shouldbenefit from a renewed emphasis on integration“where it matters,” as articulated in the integratedassessment and planning policy. Instead of exertinga blanket pressure to manufacture “joint-ness”across the board, the policy builds on pragmaticapproaches in the field that focus on jointly identi-fying the areas where it makes sense for themissions and UN agencies to come together and onagreeing on the right form and depth of integrationrequired in each area. For example, depending onthe context, the UN may decide to create anintegrated structure to implement its disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) strategywhile keeping human rights interventions bymission and country team separate. What matters,therefore, is that the system has come together toassess what is needed and has agreed on the rightintegration option, which may range from veryloose to very tight.

This approach is not new, and there are multipleexamples of such flexibility and diversity across the

2011, a UN integrated technical assessment andplanning team (ITAPT) visited and employed ascenario-based approach to mission planning.DPA favored a special political mission thatwould not be mandated to deal with intertribalviolence (which it considered national authori-ties should address instead), whereas DPKO,humanitarian organizations, and the UN countryteam favored a more traditional peacekeepingoperation with troops and a mandate to protectcivilians. While the final ITAPT report opted fora peacekeeping mission (presenting threepossible troop levels), the competing visionswithin the UN Secretariat continued to causesome friction. This was characterized by some asa constructive and natural component of theintegrated planning process.

In his June report however, the secretary-general presented only one option to the council,recommending a force of 7,000 peacekeepersand 900 individual police. It was felt that was theresult of pressure by member states (the UnitedStates, France, and the United Kingdom inparticular), which had made it clear from thestart that any force in South Sudan (whetherUNMISS or the interim security force for theAbyei region) could not be larger or costlier thanthe existing Khartoum-based UN mission inSudan, known as UNMIS. However, councilmembers remained divided over whether or notthe mission should be charged with counteringintercommunal violence.

One day before the formal declaration of SouthSudan’s independence on July 9, 2011, theSecurity Council issued Resolution 1996mandating UNMISS. A three-month technicalrollover of UNMIS was recommended asUNMISS was being set up, and UNMIS closeddown. Although the UN had been consultingwith South Sudanese figures since February 2011,different views existed among them as to whatUNMISS should look like and do. When theresolution was ultimately passed, the newlyformed government of South Sudan expresseddisappointment with the Chapter VII nature ofthe mandate, that UN troops would not be postedalong the border with Sudan, and that the UNwould not support the South Sudanese govern-ment logistically (e.g., via airlift), as it had hoped.

DRIVING THE SYSTEM APART? 15

range of UN presences around the world—muchmore, in fact, than the UN is usually given creditfor. Integrated rule of law structures in Burundi andSomalia; joint mission and country team planningin Haiti; policy-focused integrated strategicframeworks in Lebanon and the occupiedPalestinian territories; joint integrated strategicframeworks and development assistance frame -works in Liberia—all of these examples show thatthe UN’s planning and structural translation ofintegration principles takes on many context-specific forms. But if the integration agenda is toreclaim adherents, such examples must be betterknown and better reflected in the overall UNdiscourse on integration.

Furthermore, areas where integration may berequired, whatever its form and depth, should notbe restricted to programmatic interventions. Incertain contexts, a UN mission and its UN countryteam counterparts may also increase their impactby creating more coherence in areas such as publicinformation and messaging, fundraising,stakeholder engagement, and operations. UNleadership and planners should be encouraged topay greater attention to these non-programmaticopportunities. Analyzing as One

Joint analytical exercises are now common practiceacross the UN system, either as part of the initialmission design process or in the area of UN transi-tions and handovers.24 The need for a sharedunderstanding of context, challenges, and prioritiesis firmly anchored as one of the critical require-ments of the integrated assessment and planningpolicy, even if such a process does not lead tointegrated responses (in fact, one of the purposes ofthe common assessment is to determine whetherand how integrated responses are required). Therehas also been a significant increase in system-widepolicies across a range of postconflict areas,including the Human Rights Due Diligence Policyon United Nations Support to Non-United NationsSecurity Forces25 and the UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, IncomeGeneration and Reintegration.

Likewise, the establishment of peace anddevelopment adviser positions providing policy-level advice and political guidance to UN residentcoordinators and country teams constitutes a realadvance in joining up the system in the field (whilealso reporting to DPA headquarters). This is partic-ularly true in the context of peace operations thatare drawing down and handing over to UN countryteams, such as those in Nepal, Timor-Leste, andSierra Leone. The positioning of political adviserswithin the resident coordinator’s office in Egyptfollows the same commendable logic.

The fact that the UN has started drawing residentcoordinators from different parts of the system(including DPA and DPKO) could also have apositive impact on integration efforts. In general,greater staff mobility within the UN Secretariat andagencies, funds, and programs throughout a career(rather than at the top only) could also bringbenefits, provided such mobility is encouraged andrewarded in practice. Colocating staff in fieldmissions (as in the BINUB/UNIPSIL case above) orheadquarters, although a second-best option, canfurther contribute to improving informationsharing, cooperation, and coherence in somecontexts.

Yet, the practice of joint analysis remainsincomplete, and its potential has not yet been fullyrealized. The willingness and incentives to assess asituation together, across silos, often recedefollowing the establishment of a mission or ifformal requirements—such as mandated handoverof tasks or planning reviews—are absent. Theestablishment of joint analysis units, which bringtogether mission and agency capacities to assesscountry trends and risks, serves to leverage themission’s political access while drawing on theagencies’ field networks. This should becomestandard practice across all integrated presences.

Furthermore, with a few exceptions, there is alsocontinued reluctance, for missions in particular, toexpand their indicator base and produce politicalanalysis that interprets socioeconomic factors,including financial data, and incorporates perspec-tives from a wider range of local actors, including

24 See “UN Transitions: Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal,” New York: International Peace Institute, August 2012.25 United Nations Secretary-General, Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces, UN Doc.

A/67/775–S/2013/110, March 5, 2013.

the diaspora and the private sector.26 The substanceof integrated strategic planning efforts wouldgreatly benefit from systematic joined-up analysisbetween the mission and the UN country team,looking at and analyzing together a broader set ofinformation than what is traditionally perceived asrelevant or “within the mandate” of one or anotherUN organization, as such factors will likely impactthe implementation of their mandate down theroad. Upgrading the Capacity of System-WideUN Planners

Integrated strategic planning requires that UNplanners in particular be equipped with sufficientknowledge of these various processes and that theypossess the creativity and skills to utilize themstrategically. Evidence of such ingenuity exists, asdemonstrated by the UN in Timor Leste, Lebanon,or Sierra Leone, but its application is still few andfar between. Ongoing training and capacitydevelopment support to planners, now undertakenjointly by UNDG, DPKO, and DPA, shouldcontinue, but this will remain limited in itseffectiveness if it does not receive greater backingfrom the respective leaderships.

Furthermore, efforts to continuously upgradeplanning capacities in the field would acquiregreater and more lasting impact with the establish-ment of dedicated integrated planning capacities atheadquarters. Such capacities, to be used for thedevelopment of UN system-wide responses toconflict or postconflict challenges, would remedythe usual scramble for coordination and planningmanpower each time a crisis erupts and mitigatethe turf war syndrome that has plagued the lead-agency approach. In addition, by providing apanoramic understanding of various UN processes,such UN system-wide planning capacities couldsystematically mobilize all relevant instruments insupporting a coherent response. Removing Managerial and AdministrativeImpediments

Broadening the analysis and being more familiarwith the UN system as a whole to design innovativeoptions for joint work in turn requires that the UN

accelerate progress on removing managerial andadministrative impediments to integration. Thisrequires the development of standard approaches,templates, and procedures for sharing of assets, staffinteroperability, and transfer of resources. Theeffectiveness of such measures would then begreatly enhanced if their implementation weresupported by greater delegation of authority to thefield, offering mission and agency leadershipgreater leeway in choosing the right integrationmodus and tools.

In this regard, the approaches presented in the2012 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Reviewand the recently adopted UNDG StandardOperating Procedures for implementing the“delivering as one” approach offer politicalmomentum and technical guidance, respectively,on how greater “joint-ness” can be achievedthrough enhanced delegation of planning andprogrammatic and operational authority.27 Thedelivering-as-one agenda and the integrationagenda are in many ways related, and would benefitfrom greater mutual awareness and learning. Thepath to lower transaction costs requires greaterlinkages between the integration agenda and notonly delivering-as-one efforts but a range of otherUN processes, such as the civilian capacity initiativeand the trust fund operations. While the idea oflinking these various streams seems fraught withcoordination challenges, there are considerableeconomies of scale to be achieved over time bythinking through how each stream benefits theother and by exploiting their complementarities. Providing Incentives and Leadership

These recommendations stand little chance ofsuccess, however, unless three conditions are inplace. First, the UN must significantly increaseincentives for integration. This can be done as partof staff performance evaluations and other formalsystems, but it can also be achieved through greaterrecognition of the value of integration in seniorleadership messaging and discourse, in donorsupport, and in demand for integrated approachesat headquarters and—more significantly—in thefield. This in turn requires the presence of, andvisible actions by, integration champions at the top.

16 Arthur Boutellis

26 DFID was one of the first donor agency to develop a tool for analyzing political economy and how power and resources are distributed and contested in differentcontexts, see “Political Economy Analysis: How To Note,” DFID, 2009.

27 UN General Assembly Resolution 67/226 (January 22, 2013), UN Doc. A/RES/67/226; UNDG High Level Group, “Standard Operating Procedures for CountriesWishing to Adopt the ‘Delivering as One’ Approach,” March 22, 2013.

DRIVING THE SYSTEM APART? 17

After the great integration push in the first half ofthe previous decade, led by Kofi Annan andLakhdar Brahimi in particular, the integrationagenda has experienced a certain leadership lull,which the regular production of integrationmaterial since 2006 cannot hide.

The recent convergence of people with fieldexperience of integration in senior leadershippositions at the UN may prompt renewed politicalsupport for integrated planning processes, despitethe challenges recently exhibited in several missionplanning processes, such as the one in Mali. Yet,even within the realm of “quick fixes” that remainwithin the power of the UN, no amount ofenthusiasm for integration on the part of UNleadership will be fully convincing unless and untilthe UN can develop a more robust body of evidenceregarding the value of integration as it relates to UNperformance in the field. The UN must thereforecraft a more compelling and credible argument forintegrated planning, causally linking coordination,information sharing, joint matrices, and all relevantforms of integrated approaches with real impact onthe ground. Impact can be defined in many legiti-mate ways, from efficiency to host partner percep-tions to services to populations in need, as long as itis about what matters to the various stakeholders towhich the UN answers. Before arguing for systemicchanges and taking the case to member states, theUN internally must be able to credibly answer the“so what?” question and clearly establish whyintegration is worthwhile.

THE “MISSING WHOLE”

Despite the significant integration achievementsdescribed earlier in this paper, these could be easilyreversed if they are not supported and sustained bylarger systemic reforms. These reforms need tobring greater coherence to the UN response in the

Planning a “Designer” Special PoliticalMission: The UN Support Mission in LibyaThe most salient features of the design, launch,and implementation of the UN Support Missionin Libya (UNSMIL) included (1) early andsystem-wide conflict analysis, which broughttogether planning capacity from various UNentities at headquarters level, and (2) a phaseddeployment based on an initial three-monthmandate, which offered the UN system theopportunity to develop longer-term plans on thebasis of engagement with Libyan counterpartsand a better understanding of the country. Therewas also an emphasis on defining not just themandate areas but also the modes of engage-ment with Libyan actors and institutions, and

their implications for staff profiles. Furthermore,an effort was made to link various recent institu-tional developments in support of jointresponses (e.g., trust funds, PBF, secondmentsfrom agencies, and CIVCAP deployments).

The impact of such an approach remains to bedetermined, but the experience to date illustratesseveral of the current challenges to integratedstrategic planning. While the analytical processand the establishment of UNSMIL were, by andlarge, perceived as fully integrated and reflectiveof a wide UN consensus, the transaction costsremained significant, imposing severe strains onan operation that needed to proceed quickly andinclude the inputs of a wide range of actors at thesame time. Efforts to reduce the time spent oncoordination, notably between the field andheadquarters, generated a certain level of resent-ment in several parts of the system, the manage-ment of which then required additional energies.In some areas, the identification of the rightcivilian capacity brought into sharp focus thepaucity of existing rosters and networks, partic-ularly the supply of Arabic-speaking experts.

While the pre-assessment combined elementsof political and security analysis with socioeco-nomic data, once the mission deployed, the UNcontinued to struggle to develop analytical toolsand capacities to ensure adequate representationof economic developments in its analysis of thecountry’s stability and longer-term prospects.

Finally, despite a clear mandate from theSecurity Council to coordinate internationalassistance, the UN’s integrated planningapproach did not yield coherent programmaticresponses with other multilateral and bilateralinstitutions, particularly in the area of securitysector reform. Nor did these actors alwaysdemonstrate a high level of enthusiasm for theirengagement to come under an integrated UNplanning framework.

field of peace and security but also renewedrelevance in the face of evolving peacebuildingparadigms. Such efforts should include structuralreforms for a more integrated and client-orientedUN headquarters. The term “reform” is not meantto indicate seemingly insoluble issues, such aschanges to the Security Council, but these reformswill challenge established powers structures,behaviors, and mindsets of individuals, depart-ments, and member states. As such, they should besupported by building a new political consensusamong member states around integration, also inlight of the changing realities on the ground. This isthe “missing whole.” Peacebuilding: One UN Definition,Different Approaches

While the UN system has been operating under acommon definition of peacebuilding since 2009, ithas yet to yet to deliver a coherent and effectiveresponse in the field.28 Each UN entity currentlyapproaches peacebuilding according to its mandate,experience, and institutional constraints. Without aclear division of labor, there is an unwieldycompetition for peacebuilding resources.

Peacebuilding has become both a buzzword andan industry since the creation of the UNpeacebuilding architecture in 2005.29 Some hadhoped that the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)would act as a governing body for UNpeacebuilding missions—one that could take overfrom the Security Council, for instance, once agiven situation was no longer considered a threat topeace and security. Many also hoped the PBCwould help shore up member states’ politicalsupport behind integrating UN engagement inpostconflict situations. However, neither of thesethings happened.30 Instead, the PBC and thePeacebuilding Fund (PBF) were superimposed ontoexisting structures.

Peacekeepers have now become “early peace -builders,”31 and DPKO and DFS finalized their ownEarly Peacebuilding Strategy in June 2011. Thestrategy is meant to provide guidance to UNpeacekeepers on prioritizing, sequencing, andplanning critical early peacebuilding tasks, broadlydefined as “those that advance the peace process orpolitical objectives of a mission, ensure security,and/or lay the foundation for longer‐term institu-tion‐building.”32 In addition, the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) and the UnitedNations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) each developedtheir own peacebuilding vision papers. However,these strategic documents do not necessarily reflecta coherent UN response. Instead, they oftenunwittingly contribute to creating institutional silosand turfs, with each UN entity carving out a slice ofthe peacebuilding pie.

Member states themselves differ over whether tostick to a minimalistic “negative” definition ofpeace as the absence of war and military conflicts orto broaden the spectrum of peacebuilding to dealwith the sources of instability—in the economic,social, humanitarian, and environmental fields.They also differ over who should be responsible fordifferent kinds of peacebuilding. While severalmember states argue that peacebuilding should bethe objective from the outset of the peacekeepingmission, others argue peacekeepers should only begiven initial recovery duties while UN specializedagencies, regional and subregional organizations,and the donor community should be more activelyinvolved in peacebuilding processes and interven-tions of a purely socioeconomic nature. In order toreconcile these differing views, the UN Secretariatshould show the way by initiating systemic reforms,such as those described below, that would allow thedifferent parts of the UN system to complementrather than compete with one another. Donorscould also play a part in encouraging and

28 For the common UN understanding of peacebuilding, see United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the ImmediateAftermath of Conflict, UN Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304, June 11, 2009.

29 The cornerstone of the peacebuilding architecture is the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), supported by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Peacebuilding SupportOffice (PBSO). The peacebuilding architecture is intented to help postconflict countries avoid slipping back into war by providing strategic advice and harnessingexpertise and financing. See the secretary‐general’s 2009 report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (op. cit.) and the 2010 “Review of theUnited Nations Peacebuilding Architecture” (see UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393).

30 Michael von der Schulenburg, “Why is UN Integration so Difficult to Achieve?” unpublished report in the author’s possession.31 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” New

York, July 2009.32 UN DPKO/DFS, “The Contribution of United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding: A DPKO/DFS Strategy for Peacekeepers,” June 27, 2011, available at

www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6797~v~The_Contribution_of_United_Nations_Peacekeeping_to_Early_Peacebuilding___a_DPKO_DFS_Strategy_for_Peacekeepers.pdf .

18 Arthur Boutellis

DRIVING THE SYSTEM APART? 19

33 See Susanna P. Campbell with Leonard Kayobera and Justine Nkurunziza, “Independent External Evaluation of Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi,” March2010, p. 74.

34 The original Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict (CIVCAP) report, conducted by an independent team of experts, which consulted widely with memberstates, actually recommended that the whole UN system build a “cluster” model (as used in the humanitarian sphere) to clarify “who does what” (who has “thelead”) in the UN and that it should adopt a global service provider model. This could have far reaching implications for UN integrated strategic planning, but itremains unclear whether the UN will be acting on this specific recommendation of the report.

35 United Nations Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace.36 For instance, the UN Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force (IASSRTF) has contributed to developing UN guidance, standards, and practice on a

number of areas in security sector reform (SSR), and manages a roster of SSR experts. It was established in 2007 to develop and promote an integrated, holistic, andcoherent UN approach to SSR. Initially it was composed of seven UN entities, including DPA, DPKO, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights(OHCHR), PBSO, UNDP, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Development Fund for Women (now part of UN Women). It hassince increased to fourteen entities and is co chaired by DPKO and UNDP, while the SSR Unit, located within the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and SecurityInstitutions (OROLSI), provides its secretariat.

37 DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP have agreed to colocate a portion of their respective teams from early 2013 in a single location at UN Headquarters.38 The UNOCC brings together the former DPKO Situation Center (Sitcen) as well as other parts of the system, which are now represented in the UNOCC, including

DPA, UNDP, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The center has three core functions: situational awareness, crisis response, andexecutive communications.

39 Ian Martin, “All Peace Operations Are Political: A Case for Designer Missions and the Next UN Reform,” in Review of Political Missions 2010 (New York: Center onInternational Cooperation, 2010), available at http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/political_missions_2010_martin_allpeace2.pdf .

40 A single head for a merged DPKO-DPA would effectively have more powers than the secretary-general but would also imply that some powerful Security Councilmembers (in the case of DPKO and DPA, France and the US, respectively) relinquish key senior positions traditionally “reserved” for their nationals.

41 Currently, DPKO’s Office of Operations regions and integrated operational teams (Africa I and Africa II Divisions, Asia and Middle East Division, Europe andLatin America Division) do not even match DPA’s regions (Africa I and II Divisions, Americas Division, Asia and the Pacific Division, Europe Division, andMiddle East and West Asia Division).

supporting joint UN initiatives and projects bycreating incentives for different UN entities tofurther cooperate in a country or a region ratherthan compete. Some PBF projects jointly managedand implemented by staff from the mission andfrom agencies, funds, and programs in Burundihave, in some cases, served to promote suchintegration at the programmatic level, but on alimited scale.33

A Client-Oriented UN Headquarters

Recognizing that past reform efforts aimed atdesignating UN “global leads” by sector have beendifficult (other than in the humanitarian field),such difficulties do not render the underlying ideainvalid.34 Much of the past integration and“delivering as one” innovations have taken place inthe field, and institutional adaptation to improvedintegrated strategic planning also needs to happenat headquarters.

There have been many institutional innovationsto respond to certain capacity gaps since An Agendafor Peace35—the creation of DPKO and DPA in1992, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) in2005, and DFS and the Office of Rule of Law andSecurity Institutions (OROLSI) in 2007. In practice,these innovations have led to the compartmental-ization of the UN’s responses in the field of peaceand security and the creation of institutional silos.As an attempt to overcome these silos, variouscoordination mechanisms have been set up withinand beyond the Secretariat, including interagencytaskforces and working groups.36 More recent

initiatives to integrate include the secretary-general’s September 2012 decision to appointDPKO and UNDP as the “global focal point forpolice, justice and corrections areas in the rule oflaw in post-conflict and other crisis situations”37

and the establishment of a United Nations Crisisand Operations Center (UNOCC)38 in February2013 as a central venue at UN headquarters forresponding to crises in the field.

Bringing the pieces of the UN Secretariat backtogether will take more than these innovative butlargely ad hoc initiatives, and more than colocatinga few staff from different UN entities. It alsoremains unclear whether and how these initiativeswill impact the coherence and quality of the UNresponse in the field. While in the past some havecalled for the merger of the two departmentsrunning field operations, namely DPKO and DPA,into a single peace and security department alongwith PBSO,39 such reform may not be feasible politi-cally.40

A workable alternative would bring togetherDPKO and DPA teams in the same regionalgroupings41 with individual regional directorsproviding a unified interface to the “clients” of bothdepartments—the host countries and the UN fieldmissions (whether a peacekeeping operation, specialpolitical mission, or UN country team). DPKO’sintegrated operational teams would, de facto, bereplaced by these unified regional groupings, whichwould benefit from the consolidation of their staffsinto stronger units with across‐the‐board expertise

20 Arthur Boutellis

and knowledge of conflict management tools. Thiswould prevent duplication of work and confusion inplanning processes and would help prevent the kindof departmental rivalries observed during theplanning for the missions in South Sudan and, mostrecently, Mali. It could further help achieve greatercoherence in messaging and actions between variousSRSGs and special envoys, which currently havedifferent reporting lines to the Security Council: viaDPKO for peacekeeping missions and DPA forspecial political missions and special envoys.42

As part of moving toward a client-orientedheadquarters, these unified DPKO-DPA desks couldthen be the point of entry to system-wide “serviceproviders” supporting them (see figure 3). A “serviceprovider” institutional setting that is oriented towardits clients could be modeled after the ElectoralAssistance Division (anchored in DPA but servicingall DPKO and DPA field missions and UN countryteams) and after DFS, which already developed thesystem-wide Global Field Support Strategy.43 TheUN change management initiative, which is still awork in progress, called for such a “common service”model in the December 2011 UN Change Plan buthas so far primarily focused on administrative,policy, and evaluation functions only.44

This paper instead broadens the concept of“common services” to peace and security“products,” which could include the likes ofpolitical analysis, rule of law support, human rights,etc., and “enablers,” such as system-wide lessonslearned policy and planning (each of DPKO, DPA,and the Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs currently has its own policyand knowledge management unit). As clients,“host” countries may also at times directly request

assistance from UN headquarters when there is noin-country UN field presence.

A second-best option for the UN system to better“learn as one” would be for different entities toengage in frequent cross-cutting research onlessons learned that would break out of thesestovepipes and build a common repository ofinstitutional knowledge about integration acrossthese entities. Like the adjustments to the incentivestructures in the discourse on integration (see theProviding Incentives and Leadership subsectionabove), such changes in the organizational learningprocess at headquarters and in the field can have adisproportionately positive effect in this space.

This would ultimately require that all fieldmissions operate under one budget and mayrequire more flexibility and interoperabilitybetween the regular (assessed) budget andvoluntary contributions.45 This would likely lead tosome rationalizations and savings in the mediumterm, and it would further render the system morecoherent and flexible in terms of being able torespond to and engage effectively with the needsand demands of its primary clients: host countries(via UN field presences where applicable) andmember states. Building on Partnerships

Due to financial constraints and ever more complexpeace and security challenges, the UN will increas-ingly not be able to do it all by itself—it will have torely even more on partnerships. On the civilian side,the CIVCAP project team’s focus has been ondeveloping better models and mechanisms forpartnerships with member states and regionalorganizations to enable fast and effective deploymentof civilian capacities. The team seeks to promote

42 Mali provides a recent example of a situation in which there was potential for duplication and confusion in roles and responsibilities, given the overlappingmandates of the UN Office in West Africa (which was not given the mandate for regional coordination although it has a regional purview ), the UN political officein Mali (replaced by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel. Similarly, ineastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), there is overlap between the regional mandate of the new UN Special Envoy Mary Robinson and the head of thepeacekeeping mission (MONUSCO), and in Syria between the supervision mission (UNSMIS) and the Office of the Special Envoy.

43 United Nations Secretary-General, Global Field Support Strategy, UN Doc. A/64/633, January 26, 2010. The strategy is a DFS-led initiative aimed at transformingand rationalizing service delivery to all UN field missions (peacekeeping and special political missions) and at strengthening resource stewardship and accounta-bility while achieving greater efficiencies and economies of scale. This includes the sharing of civilian air assets across different missions and pooling missionsupport functions at regional hubs, such as the Regional Service Center in Entebbe.

44 The December 2011 UN Change Plan included sixty-one recommendations or proposals for the secretary-general. Recommendation 56 is the most relevant interms of UN integration: “Expand the DPKO/DFS ‘common service’ model to all Departments of the Secretariat dealing with field operations, including DPA, theOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Peacebuilding SupportOffice (PBSO) and the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) to ensure maximum coordination and minimum overlap in such areas as policy development andplanning, administration of field offices, evaluation and other such areas as deemed relevant.” See United Nations, “The Change Plan: Proposals by the ChangeManagement Team to the Secretary-General,” New York, December 2011, available at www.un.org/sg/pdf/the-change-plan.pdf .

45 Similar recommendations for enabling UN agencies, funds, and programs to access the UN peacekeeping budget have already been made in the past, including inthe original CIVCAP report, which suggested channeling mission funds based on the principle of comparative advantage (to national or local actors, UN countryteams, or external partners).

South-South cooperation and include experts theUN may not have readily available or who may onlybe needed for a short length of time. Partnershipswith actors like the World Bank and the privatesector also provide an opportunity for strongerintegration of economic analysis into UN postcon-flict assessments, with encouraging precedents set incountries such as Libya and Yemen.

On the peacekeeping and military side, a numberof different partnerships have already been tried,

but the general trend has been toward paralleldeployments of UN and non-UN forces, with thelatter coming from national and multinationalentities. The most integrated forms of partnershipsattempted to date have been with the African Union(AU). The AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur(UNAMID) and the UN logistical support packageto the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) bothresulted from joint UN-AU assessments andplanning processes.46 While these partnerships have

DRIVING THE SYSTEM APART? 21

46 See Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, “Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships,” New York:International Peace Institute, April 2013.

Figure 3: Visualizing a UN client-oriented approach.

been based on a tacit recognition of the compara-tive advantage of one organization over the other(non-UN forces being able to carry out peaceenforcement, for instance), they have also beenlargely ad hoc rather than a result of joint strategicassessments.

The reality of a parallel deployment of a UNpeacekeeping force and a non-UN fighting force isagain apparent in Mali and the UN is likely to relyon similar partnerships in the future, so more focuswill need to go on developing effective coordina-tion mechanisms and interoperability “where itmatters” between the UN and these other entitiesearly in the planning processes. The fact that thesenon-UN entities have different structures anddecision-making processes and may not be asintegrated as the UN creates additional challenges.47While flexibility will always be required, thedevelopment of some more formal guidance forjoint strategic assessments (UN-AU, UN-EU,UN–World Bank, etc.) may allow for a clearerdivision of labor from the outset, even if eachorganization ends up planning its own mode ofengagement. Such guidance should also address adhoc processes in situations where different partnershave different constraints, as in Syria today.The Need for a New IntegrationConsensus?

To date, the UN integration agenda has beenlimited to UN engagements in certain types ofconflict and postconflict settings. Yet, the nature ofthe crises the UN faces and changes in the globalorder have led the organization to deal with newtypes of “clients,” beyond traditional postconflictcountries. Host country governments are increas-ingly asserting themselves, asking for “lightfootprints” and resisting the presence of foreignuniformed personnel while calling for greater UNfocus on supporting economic development andcapacity building, including through South-Southcooperation. The nature of crises has also changed,and the UN is now facing new challenges that go

beyond its traditional peace and security expertise,some of which were captured in the WorldDevelopment Report 2011.48 The Arab Spring andsubsequent transitions (which involve post-author-itarian settings rather than postconflict contexts)have challenged traditional UN state-centricparadigms. They have also challenged the UNintegration model, with its in-built assumptionsabout capacity building and other modes ofintervention, designed for low-income countriesrather than middle-income fragile contexts.

The UN peacekeeping principles are equallychallenged by more assertive African states andorganizations that are ready to take on peaceenforcement missions. They are further confrontedby new and emerging threats, such as those posedby transnational organized crime and the effects ofclimate change.49 More than ever, multifacetedcrises like the one affecting the Sahel requirecoordinated, holistic regional and multisectorapproaches. Increased emphasis on regionalresponses (particularly to transnational threats)may lead to the creation of regional structures (e.g.,offices) or country-specific missions with aregional purview. These make the integrationchallenge “cross border,” with integrated planningefforts requiring the participation of multiple UNcountry teams and/or regional mechanisms, alsofrom the development and humanitarian sides.This trend will only compound transaction costsand put further stress on the integration promise.

These paradigm shifts and the integration fatiguedescribed in this paper call for a revisiting of thefoundations of UN integration as captured in theJune 2008 Policy Committee decisions. While thismajor integration push was initially driven by theUN Secretariat itself and then by traditional donorswanting to see greater UN coherence, sometimes aspart of a “stabilization” strategy,50 a “second integra-tion” movement should put greater emphasis onbuilding a political consensus that includes hostcountries and a broader member state constituency

22 Arthur Boutellis

47 For instance, the EU has a separate security pillar (different from its political and development pillars), while the UN has a single peace and security pillar with itsmost senior official, the secretary-general, at its head.

48 The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report called for a new approach to international engagement on conflict-affected and fragile states, focused onstrengthening legitimate institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs.

49 For more on the threat that transnational organized crime poses to peace operations, see Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw, and Arthur Boutellis, “The Elephant in theRoom: How Can Peace Operations Deal with Organized Crime,” New York: International Peace Institute, June 2013.

50 While in the past mission structures were largely determined by the UN Secretariat, the United States successfully pushed for the new mission in Somalia to be“structurally integrated” (Security Council Resolution 2093 of March 13, 2013) in line with the Somali government’s request to have a single “door to knock on.”This was in spite of strong advocacy by a number of humanitarian NGOs against it, fearing such integration would subsume humanitarian action into broaderpolitical and stabilization objectives.

that extends to regional organizations andcountries from the Global South now occupying agreater presence in the political and securitylandscape. The New Deal for Engagement inFragile States, which focuses on new ways ofengaging in conflict-affected and fragile states thatsupport inclusive country-led transitions, can serveas a catalyst in two ways.51 On the one hand, theimplementation of the New Deal at country andglobal level could be the opportunity for the UN tostart planning differently with host country author-ities.52 It could move forward some of the above-suggested reforms, helping the UN to become moreclient-oriented and, most importantly, todemonstrate results. On the other hand, the NewDeal is also the opportunity for member states—Security Council members, troop- and police-contributing countries, traditional and emergingdonors, and host countries—to launch a broaderconversation on integrated approaches in conflict-affected and fragile states, and to build a new andbroader circle of integration supporters. Finally, theglobal and inclusive debate on the post-2015development agenda, although it is just the start ofa process, could contribute to creating a newmomentum and consolidating a political consensusaround the necessity of approaching conflict,fragility, and development together and in anintegrated manner.53

Conclusion

Over the years, the UN has made remarkablestrides in increasing the coherence of its multifac-eted responses in conflict and postconflict settings.Out of necessity and out of vision, based on fieldexperiments and through headquarters policies, theorganization has in fact gone further than manyother international actors in developing its ownversion of a “whole of government” approach. Thelevel of system-wide collaboration has risen

exponentially in just a few years, a fact all the moreremarkable in light of decades of pressure todecentralize and the absence of any fundamentalstructural changes.

However, this reality may be of little comfort tothose who experience, or endure, integration on adaily basis, and whose frustrations with transactioncosts and unclear benefits are now fueling increaseddoubts about the value proposition of integratedplanning requirements. Such fatigue is furthercompounded by a shifting operational and fundingenvironment, which the integration agenda has notclearly addressed. In response to the constraintsand costs that integrated efforts have faced, integra-tion practice and policy has gradually moved awayfrom monolithic, structure-driven approaches to agreater focus on strategy and joint assessments. Ithas started to focus on facilitation rather thanformalization, thereby recognizing and allowing forgreater diversity in what integration can look like inthe field, depending on the context.

The shift of emphasis does not, however, makeintegration easier to apply or to sell. When integra-tion was approached solely as a triple-hatteddeputy-head-of-mission function, many questionswere left unaddressed. The spotlight on integratedassessment and planning has brought many of thesequestions into sharp focus, and there are few simpleanswers. As such, if the integration agenda is toreclaim adherents, it is important for the UN tocombine a series of practical fixes to its integratedplanning practices with reflections on systemicchanges. Such a process may provide the bottom-upre-emergence of a broad consensus for the UNintegration agenda, built on a more compellingnarrative of its value, reduced costs for itsimplementation, and greater demonstration of itsrelevance to the evolving parameters of interna-tional engagement in crisis settings.

DRIVING THE SYSTEM APART? 23

51 For more on the New Deal, see Rachel Locke and Vanessa Wyeth, “Busan and Beyond: Implementing the ‘New Deal’ for Fragile States,” New York: InternationalPeace Institute, July 2012.

52 The UN has a field presence in all seven of the New Deal pilot countries (Afghanistan, DRC, Liberia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Central African Republic, andSierra Leone), and it strongly supported the process as a whole (it was supported by UNDP/UNDG, OCHA, DPKO/DFS, and DPA). In addition, DPKO, as chair ofthe UN integration steering group, started convening special meetings of the integrated mission task forces in pilot countries with DPKO-led missions to discussimplications. In June 2012, the secretary-general’s Policy Committee formally decided that the UN would strongly support follow-up to and implementation of theNew Deal.

53 See the report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, “A New Global Partnership: EradicatePoverty and Transform Economies Through Sustainable Development,” New York: United Nations, 2013, particularly under “Goal 10: Ensure Good Governanceand Effective Institutions” and “Goal 11: Ensure Stable and Peaceful Societies.” The report is available at www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/UN-Report.pdf .

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