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Early warning, the protection of civiliansand United Nations peacekeepingoperationsRalph Mamiya & Haidi WillmotPublished online: 23 May 2013.

To cite this article: Ralph Mamiya & Haidi Willmot (2013) Early warning, the protection ofcivilians and United Nations peacekeeping operations, African Security Review, 22:2, 68-77, DOI:10.1080/10246029.2013.792549

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African Security Review 22.2, June 2013, 68–77

ISSN 1024-6029 print / 2154-0128 online© 2013 Institute for Security StudiesDOI: 10.1080/10246029.2013.792549http://www.tandfonline.com

Ralph Mamiya serves with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support(mamiya.un@gmail.com)

Haidi Willmot serves with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (willmot@un.org)

Early warning, the protection of civilians and United Nations peacekeeping operationsRalph Mamiya and Haidi Willmot1

This commentary traces the increasing importance of early warning in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, an emphasis that has emerged in connection with the evolution of protection of civilians mandates in UN peacekeeping missions. It examines the current and emerging practice of early warning in UN peacekeeping as well as the challenges faced, drawing on case studies from the UN missions in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The authors also propose a set of basic principles upon which early warning in UN peacekeeping operations might be approached in the future.

Keywords early warning, protection of civilians, United Nations peacekeeping

Introduction

This commentary seeks to provide a brief overview of the conceptualisation and imple-

mentation of early warning in support of protection of civilians (POC) mandates in United

Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. It argues that due to the nature of UN peacekeeping

and the shared responsibility for the protection of civilians, peacekeeping operations require

operational-level early warning systems that engage with the host state and local communi-

ties. The commentary provides an overview of the growing focus on early warning in UN

peacekeeping and the political and operational challenges associated with the implementation

of early warning systems. Drawing on case studies from the UN Mission in South Sudan

(UNMISS) and the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the

authors offer principles upon which early warning in UN peacekeeping operations might

be approached in the future. It should be noted at the outset that this paper offers a brief

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Commentary 69

commentary from a practitioner perspective, rather than an in-depth academic examination

of the nexus between three complex fi elds: peacekeeping, the protection of civilians, and early

warning. Work on early warning in support of POC mandates in UN peacekeeping opera-

tions is at a nascent stage and would benefi t from more rigorous examination and advice from

early warning scholars and practitioners.

Early warning in the UN peacekeeping context

The concept of early warning has undergone signifi cant evolution in the international rela-

tions context. From its origins in Cold War military intelligence, the idea was adapted to

supporting preparedness and humanitarian response to natural disasters, and more recently to

warning of the instigation or escalation of confl ict. The concept of confl ict early warning has

gained profi le within the UN, having been embraced as an important tool for implementing

the Organisation’s confl ict prevention and civilian protection mandates.

At the strategic level, it is acknowledged in the UN’s constitutional instruments, as

well as by member states, that early warning should be a key enabler in implementing the

Organisation’s confl ict prevention function. The Charter charges the Secretary-General with

bringing threats to international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council,2

and various UN entities are mandated with a strategic early warning function in support of

that role.3 The need for enhanced early warning capacities within the UN has been high-

lighted on numerous occasions, including in the ‘Brahimi Report’4 and in respect of the im-

plementation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.5 The structural and political obstacles

that have inhibited the development of an effi cient and effective strategic level confl ict early

warning system within the UN have been well documented,6 including as part of the recent

‘Petrie Report’.7

Protection of civilians and operational early warning

More recently, international opinion has coalesced around the importance of operational-

level early warning, in particular to implement the POC mandate in UN peacekeeping op-

erations. Strategic-level early warning is relevant to the initial deployment of UN peacekeep-

ing operations, but less so to the execution of mission mandates. Once deployed, missions

require detailed analysis of confl ict dynamics in their environment and predictive assessment

of threats to the implementation of the mission mandate to enable operational planning and

crisis response.

Operational, rather than strategic early warning, is thus key in the peacekeeping environ-

ment, particularly for the POC mandate. The POC mandate originated with the UN Mission

in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999 and has been included in the mandate of almost every

UN peacekeeping mission since then. Today, more than 90 per cent of peacekeeping person-

nel serve in missions mandated to protect civilians. Over the past fi ve years there has been in-

creased focus on the POC element of UN peacekeeping mission mandates, and the Council

has explicitly prioritised protection activities in MONUSCO, UNMISS, the African Union/

UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the

UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).

The UN’s failures to protect civilians, whether paradigm-shifting disasters such as the

Rwandan genocide or more recent tragedies in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

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70 African Security Review 22.2 Institute for Security Studies

(DRC), often receive more attention than its successes. In examining the factors behind the

challenges of protecting civilians, evaluators noted a lack of early warning information.8 The

Council’s focus on effectively implementing POC mandates thus led to an increased atten-

tion to missions’ early warning practices, evidenced in its Resolution 1674 (2006)9 on the pro-

tection of civilians in armed confl ict and Resolution 1996 (2011), providing UNMISS with

the fi rst explicit mandate to develop a dedicated early warning system.10

The POC mandate potentially requires a peacekeeping force to actively use force to protect

civilians, and in a ‘best case’ scenario, to intervene early enough that only a show of ability and

willingness to use force is necessary as a deterrent. Work on improving the implementation

of the POC mandate has continually highlighted the need for timely intelligence as a critical

factor in effective mandate implementation.11

Current practices and challenges

Despite the acknowledged importance and profi le of the issue, there is little clarity and no

common understanding regarding what is actually meant by ‘early warning’ in the UN

peacekeeping context. As in the broader international relations context, confl ict early warning

in the UN peacekeeping context has eluded defi nition, and the mechanisms and processes

used to achieve what may generally be considered early warning have varied signifi cantly.

Niels von Keyserlingk and Simone Kopfmüller observed in 2006:

In the current discourse on confl ict early warning, a variety of different understandings

and concepts are employed, sometimes leading to inconsistencies. The term ‘early warn-

ing’ itself is often used to describe activities such as confl ict analysis and monitoring,

data analysis, risk assessment or advocacy, which are related to early warning, but do not

represent early warning approaches in the strict sense.12

This remains the case in the UN context.

Issues of defi nition aside, the range of activities described by Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller

are conducted by a wide range of actors in a modern peacekeeping mission, from political

analysts and military observers to human rights monitors. To organise this wide array of

information, missions have developed Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) and Joint Mission

Analysis Centres (JMACs), integrated entities intended to serve as situational awareness

and analytical hubs for missions.13 However, the way that JOCs and JMACs operate, their

composition and substantive focus, and the procedures and methodologies employed varies

as signifi cantly as the environments in which they are deployed. A mission’s mandate and

focus, its size and structure, and the relationship with UN agencies, the host Government,

and other external actors all impact on JOC and JMAC functioning.14

The recognised need for early warning in support of the implementation of the POC

mandate builds upon but transcends earlier efforts to enhance situational awareness. While

JOCs and JMACs have the potential to be critical mechanisms in an early warning system,

effective early warning for protecting civilians requires a system which is sensitive and tar-

geted toward threats against civilians – a system that incorporates mechanisms for input from

a spectrum of actors across the mission and UN country team (UNCT), the host govern-

ment and, importantly, the civilian population. Clear channels for early warning information

to be fed into response mechanisms are also required. Missions continue to struggle to fulfi l

all of these requirements.

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Commentary 71

Despite the formal recognition by the UN Security Council of the importance of early

warning, in 2009 the highly infl uential study on the implementation of the protection of civil-

ians in peacekeeping missions, commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

(DPKO) and the Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), stated:

The United Nations has recognized the need for better information and intelligence,

specifi cally in relation to the protection of civilians, yet various and inconsistent models

exist in the fi eld … most missions do not have suffi cient capacity to collect and analyze

the information needed to address day-to-day threats nor to predict potential crises that

could lead to rapid escalations of violence.15

In developing early warning systems, UN peacekeeping missions face many political and

structural challenges. Politically, some UN member states remain wary of the concept of

early warning on the basis of concerns that it may involve covert activity. This reticence can

impact the approval of resources for the development and implementation of an early warning

system. The host government may harbour similar political sensitivities with respect to the

UN carrying out early warning activity in its territory. Conversely, information-sharing with

governments that may be involved in the perpetration of violence against civilians is a sensi-

tive issue for the UN. Challenges also exist in respect of personnel; the rotation of mission

staff is often high, particularly for military and police personnel.

The large, often complex nature of modern peacekeeping missions can also pose structural

problems for using early warning information to trigger a response. Many missions lack in-

tegrated planning or working level operations coordination forums into which early warning

information can be systematically fed. Missions also face challenges drawing information

from all elements of the UN presence. UN humanitarian agencies, for example, are generally

very reluctant to share sensitive information with armed peacekeeping missions if it could

jeopardise their neutrality.

In addition, while national governments have the primary responsibility for protecting ci-

vilians, many governments do not have dedicated early warning systems. When mission early

warning actors work with governments, the most closely related government organs are often

security and intelligence services, which may themselves be implicated in past or present abuses.

To date, few missions have made concerted efforts to build their situational awareness

capacities and activities into a systematic and comprehensive early warning system. Two

missions that have notably focused their efforts on early warning, and achieved success in

doing so, are UNMISS and MONUSCO. UNMISS, as noted above, is the fi rst mission

to be explicitly provided with an early warning mandate by the UN Security Council, and

MONUSCO has undertaken a number of innovative early warning strategies.

Case Studies

UNMISS

When UNMISS was established in July 2011, it was provided with a strong POC mandate

and specifi cally tasked with the ‘establishment and implementation of a mission-wide early

warning capacity’.16 The mission’s early warning system calls for a whole-of-mission ap-

proach, with the collection and analysis of information carried out by a spectrum of mission

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72 African Security Review 22.2 Institute for Security Studies

components, including civilian, military and police.17 The mission has created an Early

Warning Team at the headquarters level, working closely with the JOC and JMAC, and criti-

cally with situational awareness capacities at the regional levels, known as State Operations

Centres. A tailored information technology platform, the Joint Events Tracking System

(JETS) has also been developed to support early warning activity.

While the UNMISS early warning system is an internal mission system, it is intended

to link into the Government of South Sudan Confl ict Early Warning and Early Response

System, currently being implemented by the Catholic Relief Service, and regionally into the

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Confl ict Early Warning and Response

Mechanism (CEWARN). It is intended that the UNMISS early warning system will eventually

be fully integrated into the national system, so the mission is providing capacity development to

the government to operationalise the national system on a countrywide basis.

MONUSCO

The protection of civilians has been a focus of MONUSCO for many years. The mission’s

protection and early warning instruments were developed in response to repeated cycles of

massacres and large-scale human rights violations that the mission was unable to stop. In

2008, for instance, militia killed more than 100 civilians, despite the presence of 180 peace-

keepers barely a kilometre away.18 The mission traced the failure to respond to the peace-

keepers’ lack of understanding of the context. Based in a remote area, without speaking lo-

cal languages or French, and with frequent rotations of personnel, the peacekeepers on the

ground had little understanding of the community they were supposed to protect. In effect,

the troops lacked even the most basic early warning of the militia’s activity.

MONUSCO developed three mechanisms to improve the situational awareness of its

troops. First, it developed a cadre of national staff to serve as Community Liaison Assistants

(CLAs). These staff members, who receive special training on protection, work alongside

military units. Their ability to communicate with the population, knowledge of the DRC,

and their constancy despite frequent military rotations, allows improved understanding of the

communities in confl ict. Second, the mission worked with the humanitarian community to

develop procedures for developing a weekly POC threat matrix, informing mission decisions

on troop deployments.

Third, to augment the work of the CLAs, the mission also developed Community Area

Networks (CANs), which essentially comprise the distribution of mobile phones to at-risk

communities for the purpose of directly providing threat information to the mission. In its

current form (the system is still under development), the CAN is a hub-to-spoke system,

rather than a more open network, and thus is a more traditional model than recent forms of

mobile and crowd-sourced early warning. Nonetheless, the CAN represents the furthest step

that any peacekeeping mission has taken to develop sustained and direct relationships with

communities to respond to their protection needs.

Framework for early warning systems within UN peacekeeping missions

With the recognition of the importance of early warning for the effective implementation

of POC mandates, the time is ripe to consider how early warning systems could be (better)

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Commentary 73

established in UN peacekeeping operations. There are a plethora of models that can be drawn

upon19 and a robust and useful body of scholarship drawing the distinction between intel-

ligence and early warning systems, considering the comparative benefi ts of qualitative and

quantitative methodologies and offering good practices in respect of objectives, mechanisms,

products and procedures.20 However, the UN context is unique. A framework for early warn-

ing must be conceived within the confi nes and capitalising upon the assets of the UN. Any

concept for a model for early warning systems in UN peacekeeping operations must ensure

that the system is closely tied to the POC mandate, is light and fl exible enough that it can be

embraced in the complex and varied confi gurations of peacekeeping missions, and is sensi-

tive to the political realities of the UN and its work. Within those general parameters, the

authors offer the following principles for the development of early warning systems in UN

peacekeeping missions.

Principles

Clear objectives

The objectives of a mission’s internal early warning system should be clear: early warning

of what; for what purpose; and to whom? Early warning in missions with POC mandates

should have, at its core, a focus on threats to civilians.

Leverage and professionalise existing tools

Many of the tools for an effective system exist in most missions and should be lever-

aged – brought together in a coherent manner and professionalised – rather than parallel

systems established.

Operational focus

To effectively support the implementation of a mission’s POC mandate, a peacekeeping mis-

sion’s early warning system should be focused at the operational level, seeking to identify

specifi c threats to particular subjects in defi ned areas and producing short-to-medium-term

predictive analysis.

Whole-of-mission effort

A mission’s early warning system should be a whole-of-mission effort. It is incumbent upon

the senior mission leadership to develop a culture of information-sharing across the mission,

and to ensure that early warning products are effectively utilised, and systematically fed into

integrated planning, crisis response and decision-making forums.

Responsible information collection

Information collection should be conducted in a responsible manner, avoiding ‘source fa-

tigue’, sensitive to the retaliatory risks that sources might face, and cognisant of the need for a

UN mission to be transparent.

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74 African Security Review 22.2 Institute for Security Studies

Integrated and predictive analysis

Information analysis should be integrated, drawing on civilian, military and police expertise

within the mission, the UNCT, and externally. This process must produce predictive assess-

ments to support anticipatory decision-making.

Effective information dissemination

The overarching objective must be to ensure that those with the ability and responsibility

to act are in receipt of early warning information. Such information should be shared as

widely as necessary, within the constraints of responsible information-handling. Effective

information dissemination should be based on strong information-security protocols

and infrastructure.

Link to response

To be effective, early warning systems must be linked to response mechanisms within the

mission, the host-state security apparatus and communities at risk. This must include access

and clear entry points to decision-making forums.

Support to host government early warning and early response systems

As the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians lies with the host government,

a UN peacekeeping mission’s early warning system should support and, as appropriate, link

with early warning and response systems within the host government, where in existence.

Engagement with local communities

Engaging local communities on the provision of information and participation in analysis

should be key elements of an early warning strategy. There should also be mechanisms in

place to ensure that early warning information can be communicated to communities.

However, such engagement should be cognisant of the resultant risks to community mem-

bers and dangers associated with raising expectations.

Conclusion

The concept and practice of early warning has gained profile within UN forums in

the context of the implementation of POC mandates. While situational awareness

and conf lict analysis mechanisms are well established in many peacekeeping mis-

sions, the absence of a comprehensive, coherent and robust early warning system re-

sults in peacekeepers often lacking key information required to develop appropriate

protection responses.

UNMISS and MONUSCO represent two approaches to overcoming the challenges faced

by peacekeeping missions in carrying out effective early warning. UNMISS is developing

an overarching early warning system that emphasises integrated information collection and

analysis through an institutionalised database. MONUSCO has taken a slightly different

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Commentary 75

route and, rather than focusing on central collection and analysis, has improved commu-

nity relations to gather more detailed information on the threats that communities face. The

approaches are not, of course, exclusive, and future missions will almost certainly need to

fi nd ways to effectively strengthen centralised analysis alongside improved fi eld collection.

In addition, missions must effectively develop their relationships with host governments,

building government early warning capacity to ensure sustainable confl ict prevention after

peacekeepers leave.

Walter Dorn asserts that ‘effective early warning systems are an idea whose time has

come’.21 This is certainly the case with UN peacekeeping. The increased focus on the POC

mandate and the broad recognition of the importance of early warning for the effective im-

plementation of that mandate have created an environment ripe for dedicating effort to estab-

lishing and enhancing early warning systems in UN peacekeeping operations. There is a clear

mandate and a suffi cient political will, many of the key elements such as JOCs and JMACs are

already in place, and good practices can be drawn both from the UN peacekeeping context

and the broader international community’s confl ict early warning experience. Importantly,

with six UN peacekeeping missions in Africa mandated with the protection of civilians, the

establishment and implementation of effective early warning mechanisms in those missions

could save many lives on the continent.

Notes

1 The authors write in a personal capacity and their views do not necessarily refl ect those of the United Nations (UN) or

any of its offi ces, departments, or affi liates.

2 UN, United Nations Charter, 1945, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (accessed 18 March 2013), Article 99.

3 These include, but are not limited to, the Department of Political Affairs, the Offi ce for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Assistance, the Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Offi ce of the Special Adviser

on the Prevention of Genocide, the Inter-departmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive

Action, and most recently the UN Operations and Crisis Centre.

4 UN General Assembly, Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (A/55/305 and S/2000/809), New York, NY: UN, 21

August 2000, paragraph 6(d).

5 UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General on early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect (A/64/864),

New York, NY: UN, 14 July 2010.

6 See for example Micah Zenko and Rebecca R. Friedman, UN early warning for preventing confl ict, International

Peacekeeping 18 (2011), 21–37; A. Walter Dorn, Early and late warning by the UN Secretary-General in threats to the

peace: Article 99, in Albrecht Schnable and David Carment (eds), Confl ict prevention from rhetoric to reality: volume 1,

organizations and institutions, Latham, ML: Lexington Books, 2004, 305–344; James S. Sutterlin, Early warning and

confl ict prevention: the role of the United Nations, in Klaas van Walraven (ed), Early warning and confl ict prevention:

limitations and possibilities (Nijhoff Law Specials, 39), The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, 121–130; Susanna

Campbell and Patrick Meier, Deciding to prevent violent confl ict: early warning and decision-making within the UN,

Report prepared for the International Studies Association Conference, Chicago 2007, http://irevolution.fi les.wordpress.

com/2011/07/campbell-meier-isa-2007.pdf (accessed 18 March 2013); Ingvar Carlsson, Report of the independent inquiry

into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (S/1999/1257), New York, NY: UN, 16 December

1999; UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: the fall of Srebrenica

(A/54/549), New York, NY: UN, 15 November 1999.

7 UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General’s internal review panel on United Nations action in Sri Lanka,

November 2012, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.

pdf (accessed 18 March 2013).

8 See discussion in Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations:

successes, setbacks and remaining challenges, New York, NY: UN, 2009, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/fi les/

resources/B752FF2063E282B08525767100751B90-unocha_protecting_nov2009.pdf (accessed 18 March 2013);

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Alison Giffen, Addressing the doctrinal defi cit: developing guidance to address and respond to widespread or systematic attacks

against civilians, Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2010, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-

pdfs/1_-_Addressing_the_Doctrinal_Defi cit_2010.pdf (accessed 18 March 2013); Department of Peacekeeping

Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS), Lessons learned: note on the protection of civilians in UN

peacekeeping operations: dilemmas, emerging practices and lessons, 2010, UN DPKO Policy and Practice Database: http://

ppdb.un.org/Policy%20%20Guidance%20Database/100406DPKODFSLessonsLearnednoteonPOC.pdf (accessed

23 April 2013).

9 UN Security Council, Resolution 1674 (2006), adopted by the Security Council at its 5430th meeting on 28 April 2006,

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/331/99/PDF/N0633199.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 18 March

2013), OP16.

10 UN Security Council, Resolution 1996 (2011), adopted by the Security Council at its 6576th meeting on 8 July 2011,

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/405/83/PDF/N1140583.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 18 March

2013), OP3(b)(ii).

11 Holt and Taylor, Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations; Giffen, Addressing the doctrinal defi cit; DPKO

and DFS, Lessons learned.

12 Niels von Keyserlingk and Simone Kopfmüller, Confl ict Early Warning Systems: lessons learned from establishing a

Confl ict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa (GTZ Working Paper), October 2006.

13 See UN DPKO, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Policy: Joint Operations Centres (JOC) (Ref.

2010.4), 1 February 2010, http://ppdb.un.org/Policy%20%20Guidance%20Database/JOC%20Policy%20-%20

approved%20(eff%201%20Feb%2010).pdf (accessed 18 March 2013); UN DPKO, United Nations Department

of Peacekeeping Operations, Policy: Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) (Ref. 2010.7), 1 June 2012, http://ppdb.

un.org/Policy%20%20Guidance%20Database/DPKO_DFS_ JMAC_RLUSitcen_Feb2010_GDL.pdf (accessed 18

March 2013).

14 See Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Towards intelligence-driven peace operations? The

evolution of UN and EU intelligence structures, International Peacekeeping 18 (2011), 454–467; Philip Shelter-Jones,

Intelligence in integrated UN peacekeeping missions: the Joint Mission Analysis Centre, International Peacekeeping 15

(2008), 517–527; A. Walter Dorn, Intelligence-led peacekeeping: the United Nations stabilization mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH), 2006–07, Intelligence and National Security 24 (2009), 805–835; Melanie Ramjoué, Improving United

Nations intelligence: lessons from the fi eld (GCSP Policy Paper No.19), August 2011; Briefi ngs of the Situation Centre

to the regular sessions of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, available at: http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/

serviceengine/Files/ESDP/132139/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/82febbdb-c808-4bab-b7f3-119922b6d8eb/

en/GCSP+Policy+Paper+19.pdf

15 Holt and Taylor, Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, 9.

16 UN Security Council, Resolution 1996.

17 ‘Whole-of-mission’ refers to an integrated approach used in multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, where a

mandate is carried out by all mission components (military, human rights, political, etc.), rather than solely being the

responsibility of one part of the mission.

18 Holt and Taylor, Protecting civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, 276–277.

19 Herbert Wulf and Tobias Debiel, Confl ict early warning and response mechanisms: tools for enhancing the effectiveness

of regional organizations? A comparative study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF (Regional and

Global Axes of Confl ict, Working paper No. 49), May 2009, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28495/1/WP49.2.pdf (accessed

18 March 2013); Fredrick Barton and Karin von Hippel, Early warning? A review of confl ict prediction models and

systems, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), February 2008, http://csis.org/fi les/publication/080201_

early_warning.pdf (accessed 18 March 2013).

20 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Preventing violence, war and state collapse:

the future of confl ict early warning and response, Paris: OECD, 2009, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/fi les/reso

urces/318BF9C6C8868F4EC12576DF0048FE82-OECD-jun2009.pdf (accessed 18 March 2013); Report of the

Workshop on the Establishment of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) (Background Paper No.

1), in Confl ict Management Division of the Peace and Security Department, African Union (AU) Commission

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