Eclectic and Effective: The Foreign Policy of President

Clinton in the Asia Pacitic Region

Peter F. Johnston

Copyright Peter F. Johnston March, 1997

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During his tirst term President Clinton was criticized for his handlinç of Foreign

afrairs on the grounds that he lacked any clear direction and was merely reacting to

situations as they developed. However, Clinton did have a pragrnatic program which

cuided his decision making throughout this period. His approach to policy makinç and C

implementation was an eclectic one makinç use of unilateral. bilateral, or multilaterai

solutions as best served the situation. The underlying aim of his foreign policy \vas to

stimulate more open markets in order to assist in the economic revitaiization of the

United States by increasing exports. Ta protect these markets, Clinton enhanced

traditional American secun'ty arrangements in the Asia Pacific region and created new

ones to reflect the changing geopolitical situation brought about by the end of the Cold

War This rclectic approach was effective and pragmatic given the international situation

in which he operated. At the end of Clinton's tirs1 tem. the United States is more

prosperous than when he took oflice, is relatively secure from threats to its interests. and

continues to observe the longstanding Amrrican tradition of promoting idealism

throughout the world. The Asia Paci fic area also protited from the manner in which the

United States continued its role as a guarnntor of regional secunty. Moreover, these

objectives where achieved at a minimal cost to the United States.

Acknowledgements

Many people have assisted me in the completion of this thesis and are extended my

heartfèlt thanks. In particular, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Joel Sokolsky, for

his guidance, assistance, and encouragement throughout this period I would also Iike to

thank rny Commanding Oficen for the past few years, LCol Mike Ray and LCol Craig

McQuitty for their patience in allowing me to take time away fiom the office to work on

my studies. Finally, 1 am most grateful for the support, encouragement, and patience my

wife, Judy, has provided me in this endeavour.

Contents

............................................................................................ Introduction

Chapter 1: The Agenda ......................................................................

Chapter 2: The Regional Scene ..........................................................

Chapter 3: Regional Security .............................................................

Chapter 1: The Bottom Line ..............................................................

................................................................. Cbapter 5: Other Interests 107

....................................................................... Chapter 6: Conciusion 125

.......................................................................................... Bibliography: 134

Introduction

Throughout his first term in office, President Clinton was fkequently criticized for his

conduct of foreign policy. He was accused of lacking any clear direction and consequently of

reacting to events as they occurred. In part, this reproach was due to the changes which had

been brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent negation of the

Arnerican policy of containment. The Bush administration did not replace containment with

a clear alternative, thus Clinton was left to formulate a new foreign policy template for the

United States. Recognizing that there was no clear and immediate threat to Amencan

security, he adopted an eclectic approach to the conduct of foreign flairs which allowed him

to react more flexibly to events than other Presidents had been able to during the Cold War.

This flexibility enabled Clinton to utilize unilateral, bilateral, or mdtilateral approaches to

resolve problems and crises. The lack of an immediate threat meant that he could be more

circumspect in his decision-making process, thereby dlowing more time to react to the

situations which presented themselves.

Another phenornenon resulting fiorn the absence of a clear and present threat to

security was the increased dificulty in gaining consensus on international issues amongst

Amencan legislators and foreign allies. Consensus appears more readily apparent amongst

Clinton's detractors than amongst his allies. Criticism of the administration's foreign policy

has been exaggerated to the point where it has begun to distort our understanding of the

events which have transpired during this period Moreover, the critics have offered little in

the way of realistic alternatives to the policies undertaken by the Clinton administration. A

closer examination of Clinton's foreign poiicy throughout his first term will illustrate this fact

and demonstrate that he was by and large successful in what he attempted to accomplish.

The main focus of Clinton's policy has been the economic revitalization of the United

States. In order to accomplish this, the President embarked upon an aggressive campaign to

create freer access to foreign markets for American businesses, services, and products. At the

same tirne, he recognized that it was necessary to promote a stable and prosperous

environment in the areas where this econornic nctivity occurred. Consequently, Clinton has

taken steps to ensure that these regions remain stable and secure by maintaining and

en hancing existing secuxity arrangements, acting to counter the proli feration of weapons of

mass destruction, and also by continuing the long-standing tradition of spreading Ainerican

ideals and supporting democracy. In these terms, it is reasonable to argue that Clinton has

noi embarked upon a radicaily différent foreign policy from that of previous administrations.

The purpose of this study is to descnbe and analyze the main elements of Clinton's

ioreign policy using the Asia Pacific region as a case study. It argues that by objective

standards, given the novel and unceriain post-Coid War international environment, the policy

has been by and large successful. The Asia Pacific focus is pertinent for numerous reasons,

particularly in light of the economic mien of Clinton's foreign policy. Clinton deciared his

intention to create a New Pacific Comrnunity in 1993 and in doing so recognized the potentiai

for Amencan business in this region by focusing considerable energy on maintaining

rconomic. military, and social ties with most countnes in the area.

During his fint tem, Clinton initiated numerous policies and agreements within the

region which have served to increase Amencan access to markets not only for manufactured

goods, but also for service and financial industries. The Praident has also had success in

pressuring Arnenca's trading parniers in the region to enforce the General Agreement on

Trade and Tariffi (GATT) rules protecting copyrights and intellectual property. While there

is still considerable improvement required in this area, progress has k e n made. A major

victory in Clinton's quest to achieve greater market access in the region was secured during

his first term under the Agreed Framework for trade negotiated with Japan. This agreement

took considerable diplomatic effort on the part of both sides. Its cornpletion, in spite of the

difficulties the negotiations entaileci, is a clear indication of the cornmitment Clinton has

placed on securing market access. The same determination has resulted in greater access to

the markets of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The successes that Clinton has had in the region provide a clear pichue of the value of

the multi-faceted approach employed by the President to achieve his goals. Clinton has

varied his approach from occasional unilateral action to bilateral discussions, as was the case

with the Japanese negotiations, to a multilateral one under the auspices of GATT, the

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the Asia Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC). Regarding MEC, Clinton has demonsîrated his ability to mold

multilateral institutions to better suit American purposes. He accomplished this by elevating

the forum fiom a ministeriai level to a summit level when the United States hosted the APEC

meeting in Seattle in November 1993. ' While many pundits have criticized the administration

for this flexible style, as this study will show, it has yielded tangible successes.

' Winston Lord. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific A&llrs. "Building a Pacific Community." U,SL De~artrnent of State Dis~atch. Vol. 6, No. 3, January 16, 1995, p. 34.

Asia Pacific is also a usefil focus for understanding Clinton's foreign policy as it has

presented some conventiona1, unconventional, and non-military threats to American and

world security since Clinton took office. While there have been reductions in the number of

Amencan servicemen stationed in the region, Clinton has reaffirmed ail of the American treaty

and defense agreements in order to rneet these challenges. Moreover, the President has bern

instrumental in modifving ASEAN to discuss rnilitary issues through the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF) meetings.

During his fint term, Clinton faced traditional threats to security in the region of

which the most notable was the confrontation with North Korea over its nuclear weapons

program. Efforts by CIinton effectively stopped the progmrn in its tracks and should reverse

the progam over the next few years. The incident reveals much about Clinton's approach to

Jiplomacy, defense arrangements, and his stand on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction. This is particularly me since Clinton made use of unilateral, bilateral. and

tnuitilaterai dipiomacy as well as international agenciçs including the United Nations (UN)

and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to bring the crisis to a peaceful

resolution.

Other security issues handled by Clinton inciude the ongoing disputes over the

Spratly lslands which have threatened regional security in the recent past. One of the main

disputants in this region, the PRC, also posed a challenge to the United States maintenance of

regional security with its repeated threats to use force against Taiwan. This too evoked an

.4mrrican response and strained the improved U.S.-Sino relations. Closer examination of

these and other topics in the subsequent chapters will reveal the effectiveness of Amencan

foreign policy under the Clinton administration.

While the administration has conducted an overall effective foreign policy, it has

had some errors in the region The two central issues over which Clinton erred involved

the PRC. One was over the linkage of renewal of Most Favoured Nation Status (MFN)

to China's human rights record, and the other was over the initial reluetance by Chton to

gant a visa to the Taiwanese President in the face of Chinese objections. In both cases,

as this study wiii examine, Clinton did recover and acted in accordance with Amencan

interests. Nohnthstanding these erroa, the administration's conduct of foreign policy in

the Asia Pacific has been effective in that it has fùrthered Amencan national interests.

Moreover, these objectives have been achieved at a minimum cost to the United States

which bas assisted the continuing improvement of America's economic condition.

Chapter 1 : The Agenda

-'Progress is a nice word. but its motivator is change, and change has its enemies.. " Robert ~ e n n e d ~ '

Since becoming the President of the United States, Bill Clinton has been criticized

by politicians at home and abroad, by academics, and by many average citizens. The

rrcumng theme of this cnticism has been that the President has an ineffective and reactive

foreign policy. and that he is allowing the role of the United States as a leader on the

international stage to slip away. This cnticism is unjustified and unfounded. Upon

examination, President Clinton has pursued a realistic and thouçhtful foreign policy.

which reflects his stated desire of improving the quality of Iife within the United States.

whik prornoting American interests abroad and maintaining national security in an

cstremely unstable world.

Before his election, Clinton set forth the frarnework for his foreign policy in

Puttin- People First. He arçued that the United States had to continue providing world

leadership as it had done throuçhout the Cold War. The way to maintain American

international primacy was by rebuilding domestic economic strength. remaining engaged

intemationally which included the maintenance of the Ibrces to counter any threats to

mbility. and by shaping the post-Cold War era through the inculcation of Amencan

Values. ' These guiding principles were to enable the United States to pursue three

toréign pol icy objectives:

to reestablish Amenca's economic leadership at home and abroad, to prepare our milita- forces for a new era, and to encourage the spread and consolidation of democracy abroadP3

' William Clinton. "Building a New Pacific Community." U.S. State Department Dispatch. Vol. 4. \O 25. July 13. 1993. p. 485.

\Villiam Clinton and AIbert Gore. Putting Peo~le First. (Randorn House: Toronro. 19%) p. 1 29- i ;ci

' Ibid p 130

Given the lack of the immediate threat to Amencan security caused by the collapse of the

Soviet Union. Clinton recognized that economics could form the central focus of

Amencan foreign policy. The United States had to undergo interna1 improvements in

order to become more economically cornpetitive. Clinton held that this economic edge

would enable the United States to continue its central role on the international scene.

In order to accomplish domestic econornic revival, Clinton proposed numerous

changes such as univend health care, education and welfare refoms, ta.x incentives for

small business, defense industry conversion, stream-lining govenunent to reduce the huge

bureaucracy, and clamping down on crime."o create more jobs for Arnericans, Clinton

pledged that he wouid cany out policies which wouid open foreign markets to Amencan

manufactured goods and services as well as agricultural products. He proposed to

accomplish this through reducing barriers to trade enacted by foreign govemments either

through diplomacy or punitive measures if required Furthemore, Clinton endorsed the

creation of international trade offices to assist businesses in gaining access to foreign

markets.' Clearly the focus of Clinton's proposed foreign policy recognized the

importance of enhancing American economic performance while maintaining forces

suficient to uphold Amencan security. This direction, he argued, would enable the

United States to enhance its power and leadership worldwide.

Upon taking office Clinton began to enact his revitaiization plan. In his inaugural

address the Democratic President remained tnie to the direction he had estabiished in

Putting People First. As he stated:

We must invest in our own people, in their jobs, and in their future, and at the sarne time cut Our massive debt ... and we must do so in a world in which we must compete for every opportuni ty?

- - - --

a lbid p. 3-4. ' Ibid p. 13 & 34. "linton. ..inaugural Address: Proiect Gutenberg Etext. January 70. 1993

Ciinton observed that these objectives would be accomplished in a world which was more

free but less stable due to surfacing animosities which had been previously held in check

by comrnunist regirnes. He concluded that these challenges had to be met in concert with

America's allies under Amencan leadership through diplomacy or force if required

Underlying these assertions the President expressed his desire to promote the traditional

American ideals of democracy and fieedom throughout the world.

More tangible evidence of Clinton's cornmitment to his campaign promises came

on Febniary 17, 1993, when he addressed both houses of Congress outlining his proposed

economic plan. This plan was a substantial depamire from those put forth by previous

administrations in that it called for a major deficit reduction while at the same time calling

for increased public and private investment in sectoa important to America's economic

well-being. In order to achieve these seemingly opposed goals, Clinton proposed an

increase in taxes for the top 1.2 percent of income eamers while maintaining t a rates at

their current levels for the remaining 98.8 percent. At the same tirne the President

proposed substantial cuts to redundant govemment departments as well as political

reforms which would reduce costs.'

At that time Clinton had already cut the White House staff by 15 percent saving

approximately $1 O-million. He pledged to cut the federal bureaucracy by approximately

100,000 positions over four years in order to Save $9-billion. His economic plan called

for spending reductions totaiing $246-biilion. Clinton promised to increase American

access to global trade markets by creating freer markets and particularly by completing

the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the

GATT. Clinton pledged to maintain defense spending at a level consistent with Amencan

interests. As he stated:

Backed by an effective national defense and a stronger economy, our nation will be prepared to lead a world challenged

' Clinton. "Address by the President to the Joint Session of Congress." White House Press Releasc. ( Internet). February 1 7, 1993.

-as it is everywhere- by ethnie conflicf by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by the global dernocratic revolution and by challenges to the health of our global environment.

AI1 of these measures had as their goal the revitalization of the United States economy in

order to allow the counlq to retain its leading role on the world stage.

The Adj ustment

International political cornmeniator Christoph Bertram summed up the motif of

Clinton's foreign policy when he wrote, 'Wiat there is no longer a distinction between

domestic and foreign f i a i n , that Amenca's international connections must serve

America's intemal interest, and ùiat the primary goal of both is to make Arnerica

economically cornpetitive again ...."9 The removal of this distinction has been made

possible since Clinton has been the first president since World War II who has been able

to conduct foreign policy completely absent of the threat from the former Cold War

adversary .

The changes which occurred prior to Clinton's election have allowed him to make

tconomics high politics again thereby reducing the distinction between foreign and

Jomestic policy. As former Secretary of State, Warren CWstopher, wrote:

It used to be said that balance-of-power diplomacy and a n n s control were ""high politics" and economics were "Iow politics." Resident Clinton and 1 reject that distinction. We are convinced that political and economic diplomacy are indivisible. 'O

Many critics of the administration have not fully accepted the reintroduction of

econornic diplomacy into the realrn of high politics.

The CIinton administration cornrnenced its first term under international

conditions which were dramatically different from any previous administration. The key

Ibid. " Christoph Bertram "There is a Foreign Policy," The international Herald Tribune. November 17, 199;. p. 5 .

1 Il Warren Christopher. "America's Leadership. .;\mericals Opportunity," Foreign Policv. No. 98. Spnng 1995, p. 16.

event which has changed the manner in which American foreign policy is conducted was

the demise of the Soviet Union. No longer is the President forced into a security onented

foreign policy since the immediate threat to national security is gone. While the Bush

administration did operate initially after the collapse, it did not adjust to this situation

pnmarily due to the belligerent actions of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait." Given the threat

posed to national security by Hussein, Bush never made the substantive foreign policy

adjustment that Clinton has. The Clinton administration is the first to effectively

challenge what former President Bush tenned the "New World Order."

United States foreign policy fkom the end of World War II to the end of the Cold

War focused on two objectives; the containment of communism and the promotion of a

liberal-economic order. The latter objective was subordinate to the first as evidenced by

the number of oppressive dictaton supported by the United States on the merits of their

anti-communist p~licies. '~ This policy approach not only cost trillions of dollars but

also left numerous Iegacies which Clinton has been forced to confiont:

among them an entrenched national security state, a triurnphalist faith in the virtue of military solutions, the nuclear contamination of the environment, and an international amis trade that eludes reylation. l 3

The vestiges of the national securïty state mindset which pervaded the political landscape

of the United States when President Clinton took office has been a reason why he has

been attacked on foreign policy issues. Clinton has reacted to the new international

circurnstances while many of his detractors have been slow in doing so.

Another event which has had a profound influence on the conduct of Clinton3

foreign policy agenda was the mid-term congressional election which resulted in a

Republican majority in both houses. This has made it increasingly difficult for Clinton to

" Gaddis Smith, What Role for Amenca?" Current History. April 1993, p. 15 1. " Charles William Maynes. .*A Workable Clinton Doctrine," Foreign Pol iv . No. 93. Winter 1993/1994, p. 5 . I J Richard Caplan and John Feffer. "Challenges of a New Era." State of the Union 1994. edited by Richard Caplan and John Feffer (Westview Press: Boulder CO.. 1994) p. 14.

push through his domestic refonn package and allowed him to become more of a foreign

pol icy president by default. '' This is somewhat ironic since Clinton's tlection has been

attributed to the fact that former President Bush was identified by the American

rlectorate as being too focused on foreign policy at the expense of domestic policy.

I ndeed. CI inton was elected "on a platform of dornestic renewal.. ."and was not expected

to engage in an extensive foreign plicy. '' The American public, given the absence of the

immediate threat posed by the Soviet Union, has been more concemed with dornestic

economic and social issues and less supportive of Amencan involvement in the affairs of

other countries. '"linton has recognized that international involvement is a necessary

step on the road to achieving the domestic improvements that the public desires.

The technological changes which have occurred during the latter half of this

century have also had a tremendous impact on the manner in which the President

conducts foreign policy. The technological innovations are those which have sped up the

passage of information and provided images of international events to the general

population. Television and newspaper images of starving people, massacres, or terrorist

activities have created massive popular suppon for govemment action to remedy the

perceived situation. This in turn places pressure on the President to react to the events

which have caused the public reaction. Congress often reacts to the expression of public

opinion and pressures the President to react in kind. I 7 In essence the press and television

have becorne key players in influencing foreign policy. While it is important for the

United States to remain engaged internationally, Amencan foreign policy cannot become

reactionary in nature as this would be counter productive to the established objectives.

The impact of m a s media has increasingly cffected the policy of Amencan Presidents,

I I T h e World at his Feet." The Econornist. October. 14. 1995. p. 29 I = Mark JI Nelson. "Transatlantic Travails." Foreirrn Policv. No. 93. Fall 1993, p. 78. "' John E Riellv. T h e Public Mood at Mid-Decade." Foreipn Policy Uo. 98. Spnng 1995. p 9j . - a

Stephen John Stedman. '.The New [nterventionists." Foreign Affairs Vol. 72. No 1 . p 3 8: 1 5

however, taken in conte* with the other changes which have occurred domestically and

intemationally, it has had a far greater impact on the Clinton administration.

These events have had a defining effect on foreign policy, not only in tems of the

secunty threats to the United States, but also the manner in which the President, the

executive departments, and the legislative branch interact. Interaction between these

policy formulating entities has a profound influence on the conduct and substance of

Amencan foreign and defense policy. Whereas Presidents throughout the Cold War could

raise the spectre of Communist aggression to obtain concurrence to policy direction, I 8 the

Clinton administration cannot resort to this compelling tool. In light of the increasing

influence of mass media on policy makers previously examine4 the absence of the clear

and present threat posed by the Soviet Union has had an even greater impact as the public

is more apt to demand that the administration react to global disastes and occurrences. l9

This situation pressures the President into adopting a more reactive foreign and defense

policy. Clinton has maintained a circurnspect approach to this phenornena by avoiding

reactive decision-making and sticking to his policy objectives. Ofien this approach has

led to unwarranted criticisrn.

The impact of the end of the Cold War on Amencan foreign policy camot be

underestirnated During the Cold War it haci, as its central objective, the preservation of

Amencan democracy and capitalism and the defeat of the Soviet Union. In the absence of

this familiar guidepoçt, the Clinton administration has had to establish new goals and to

devise a strategy to obtain them." While this has never been an easy task for any

administration, it is even more complicated in this unipolar world where governments

must concem themselves not only with traditional threats to security, but also with un-

conventional ones.

I I Smith, "What Role for AmeRca?" p. 150. 19 lames Schlesinger. "Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," Foreign a i r s . Vol. 72, No. 1 , p. 18. -" Joel J. Sokolsky. .'Iner<ia Interests, and Ideals: U.S. Intervention in the Post Cold War Era (Drafi)." Paper presented to the Twelflh Annual Political Studies Student Conference, University of Manitoba. Winnipeg. Manitoba. Canada. February 1-3. 1996. p. 13- 14.

Un-conventional threats and challenges include econornic security, environmentai

problems, resource scarcity, hurnan rights issues, illicit activities, population explosions_

and others. h is dificult for govements to gamer support to combat these non-military

threats before they become threats to national security because they:

1. anse out of the normal, non-rnilitary activities of individuals, groups and States; 2. are cumulative, and usually not perceived as threats, at l e s t not in the short run; 3. affect the ability of govemments to maintain stability and enhance the living conditions within state boundanes: 4. and are neither explicit nor purposeful threats of govemments. "

Thus not only does the Clinton administration have to contend with traditional security

concems it m u t also corne to terms with problems that no other administration has had

to deal with. It is little wonder that Clinton faces criticism from those who have not made

the adjustment to these new challenges.

The lack of an immediate direct threat to American security presented the

President with a range of choices regarding American foreign policy. This change

presented an opportunity for the United States to maintain, increase, or decrease its level

of involvement in international affairs. Critics of the Clinton foreign policy can be found

arguing rither for an increase or decreased role in this area. However, since there is no

pervasive threat to American interests, a more engaged approach than that taken by the

administration is not justifiable. Conversely, a policy of disengagement wi1I mitigate

against the United States becoming more economicalIy cornpetitive and will reduce its

secunty such that pervasive threats tu Amencan interests may develop in regional

locations.

Many theorists argue that the Cotd War was won by the United States because its

economy outlasted that of the USSR. While this ceminly had its influence, the fact that

Robert E. Bedeski. ..Unconventional Security and the Republic of Korea: A Prelirninary .-\ssessment." C.4.ICAPS Pa~ier . No. 8. Au~pst. 1995. p.3.

the Cold War has ended has had an impact on the economic influence of the United States.

In short, countries which in the past have generally acquiesced to American economic

desires in order to maintain its protective umbrella no longer need to do so. Another

economic reality which has had increasing impact in our era is the influence of business on

govemrnent policy. Bonds held by traders, many of them Frorn foreign corntries, can be

durnped at any time if a goverment embarks upon unpopular fiscal adventtues. " Thus

Clinton must work harder to influence allies to follow Amencan economic wishes and he

m u a also consider the impact of his policies on the trading behaviour of foreign and

dornestic investors

Another development which has limited the economic influence of the United

States is increasing regional economic interdependence. As states become more reliant and

dependent on regional neighbours, they become less susceptible to pressure from more

far-rernoved economic powers. This is particularly the case in the Asia Pacific region

where Asian national economies have becorne less susceptible to Arnerican economic

pressures due to their incrwising regional interdependence? Consequently, the United

States must be more willing to concede to the wishes of trading partnen than it had to in

the past. This study argues that Clinton has been able to adapt to this economic power

shift and has k e n successful in reasserting American economic influence in Asia and

throughout the world

In his recent critique of Clinton's foreign policy, "Foreign Policy as Social Work,"

Michaei Mandelbaum wrote:

In these peripheral areas (referring to Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia) the administration was preoccupied not with relations with neighbouring countries, the usual subject of foreign policy, but rather with the social, political, and economic conditions within borden. It aimed to relieve the suffering caused by

I'> - Richard J. Barnet, "Promoting Democratic Stability," The State of the 1 Jnion 1994, edited by Richard CapIan. and John Feffer. (Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1994) p. 49 & 50. '3 Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," Foreism Affaia. Vol. 72, No. 5 , November/December 1993. p. 78.

ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, starvation in Sornalia, and oppression in Haiti. Historically, the foreign policy of the United States has centered on Arnerican interests, defined as developments that could effect the lives of Amencan ci t kens. ''

To ignore the issues which were addressed in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia may have had a

neçligible impact on the lives of Amen'can citizens. While continued Amencan

involvement in Somalia was an e m r on the part of the administration, it must be

remembered that Bush sent troops tkere in the fim place. Insofar as Bosnia was

concemed, Amencan leadership was imperative in order to maintain NATO as a credible

orçanization. Moreover, the Dayton Accord has helped to create peace in many parts of

the former Yugoslavia. Unrest in Haiti impacted on Amencan interests as the resul t of a

massive influx of refugees arnongst other issues. Clinton has recognized that seemingly

benign occurrences in areas where no major Arnerican interest appears to be at stake can

lead to regional instability which can spread and eventuaily become a threat to Amencan

security .

The renowned political theorist, Alexis de Tocqueville, encapsuiated the ageless

difficulties the Clinton administration faces when he wrote:

It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly iderior to other governrnent -... A democracy can only with geat dificulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, penevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of S ~ ~ O U S

obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequence with patience.'5

In terms of the charges of inconsistency leveled against Clinton, this statement highlights

an important consideration. Since Congress has not always let him lead in foreign policy.

it is not reaiistic to accuse Clinton of inconsistency. Certainly there have k e n issues over

which the President has acted inconsistently, however, this has not been the rule.

Michael Mandelbaum. "Foreign Poky as Social Work" Foreig AfFaiq. Vol. 75, No. 1, Januaryffebniary 1996, p. 17. '' James Schlesinçer. *'Quen for a Post-Cold War Foreiyn Policy." p.27

Chnton's Approach

Part of the criticism that Clinton has faced dunng his first term in office has been

the flexible approach he has adopted to international relations issues. According to

Senator Bob Dole, the Clinton administration has allowed the dedine of the United States

role as world leader. Dole argues that the United States should not act multilaterally in

international relations and he advocates a dictatorial approach to international

organizations such as the UN, whereby the United States would tell these bodies how to

react to a given situation. According to Dole, if the international body declines to tow the

American line, then the United States should act uni la ter al^^.'^ In essence Dole and his

supporters have been critical of Clinton for failing to take the lead role in al1 issues.

The intensity of this criticism has been unwarranted The essence of the

administration's approach has been to adopt the strategy best suited to the situation,

thus, Clinton has at times resorted to unilateral, bilateral, or rnultilateral approaches to

solving international iss~es.'~ This approach has been complemented by American

efforts to adopt, or modernize international institutions, such as MEC, the Organization

of Afican Unlnity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and even the UN.

American pressure has resulted in changes for the better to these institution^.'^ Not only

is Clinton willing to resort to v q i n g degrees of involvement when solving issues, he has

at times allowed other states to take the lead. This has occasionally placed the United

States in the position of fo~lower.'~ This eclectic approach to the conduct of foreign

policy is bom out of the realization that while the United States is a superpower, it is not

" Bob Dole. -5haping Arnenca'r Global Future," Foreim Policy. No. 98. Spring 1995, p. 32. & 36- 3 7. " Jeffery E. Garten "1s Arnerica Abandonhg Multilateral Trade?' Foreim Affain. Vol. 74. No. 6. November/December 1 995. p. 55. Also see Michael J. Mazarr. "Going Just a Little Nuclear." International Security. Vol. 30. No. 2. Fa11 1995. 106- 107. 'Warren Christopher. "Amenca's Leadership, America's Opporninity." Foreim Policy. No- 98. Sprinç 1995. p. 13-14. 19 Sokolskv. "Inertia Interests. and Ideals.. .," p.3.

omnipotent and must encourage other countnes and international institutions to take more

responsibility for solving or helping to solve international issues.'' This thesis argues

that, on balance, the eclectic style of foreign policy conduct has been successfui in tems

of the standards on which it is normally judged. Clinton has avoided involving the United

States in a war, his policies have spurred economic growth and increased trade. and he has

not only maintained Amenca's strategic alliances, but enhanced them. These are the

parameters on which previous administrations have been judged, thus in cornpanson to

his predecessors, Cl inton has been largely effective.

Policv in Action

As noted above, Clinton's foreign policy objectives include domestic economic

recovery, spurred on by a quest for more open markets, maintenance and enhancement of

national security, and the promotion of Amencan ideals and democracy worldwide. As

esamined later in this study, the President has transformed the United States into a

stronger economic competitor by opening markets through the reduction of trade bamen

achirved by bilateral, regionai, and international initiatives and agreements. Domestically,

drticit reduction has occurred jobs have been created, exports have increased

dramatically, and inflation has been kept down. From an economic standpoint. Clinton

has been successful.

Insofar as national security is concerned, the President has not lost sight of the

threats to the United States. He has recognized the instability created by the power

vacuum lefi by the fall of the Soviet Union, regional instability resulting frorn unequal

development amongst States, resource scarcity, refugees, and the increasing number of

histonc rivairies and disputes over tenitory such as the Spratly Islands. To counter these

threats. the President has reafirmed traditional alliances worldwide and helped to create

numerous forums whose objective is to encourage dialogue between disputants in order to

{Il .Arthur Schlesinçer. Jr.. " B a d to the Womb?" Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74. No. 4. luly/August 1995. p 5 0

arrive at peaceful conflict resolution. While Clinton has pared defense spending to some

degree he has done so only to the extent that Amenca is still able to mount a credible

amed response if required. Moreover, reductions in defense spending have assisted in

the overriding goal of the administration; economic revitalization of the United States.

Another substantial threat to American and world security which the Clinton

administration has effectively faced is the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the

resultant instability created by the spread of these weapons. To counter this threat, the

President has embarked upon a crusade, not only to stop the proliferation of these

weapons, but dso to reduce existing stockpiles worldwide. Other threats to American

security targeted by the administration include terrorism, and increasing ethnic confl kt. ' Clinton has taken effective action to remedy al1 of these threats by enacting legislation

such as the Nunn-Lugar Act which has paved the way for the eventual removal of nuclear

weapons From the Ukraine and Khazakstan. He has pushed fonvard with the renewal of

the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), continued pressing for a Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty (CTBT), and most significantly he has stopped the North Korean nuclear

program. In terms of reducing ethnic conHict, Clinton scored a major success when he

brokered the Dayton Accord ending much of the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. These

and other measures have served to improve the national security of the United States.

Traditional Amencan idealism and values have piayed an important role in the

Clinton foreign policy as well. kesident Clinton has promoted democracy, hurnan rights,

and the transition of some nations fiom a totalituian style govermnent to a more

democratic one. The rationale for this is straightforward and conducive to the Clinton

administration's aim; these states will provide the international stability required for more

prosperous, open markets if these dernocratic ideas f l o ~ r i s h . ~ ~ Clinton believes that trade

will potentially increase in and arnongst more liberal democratic style societies and that

- - - - - - -

" Anthony Lake. Assistant t o the President for National Senirity AfTairs. -'From Containment to Enlargement." U.S. State De~artment Dis~atch. Vol. 4. No. 39. September 27. 1993, p. 659. 32 Morton H. Halperin, "Guaranteeing Democracy." Foreign Policp. No. 9 1. Summer 1993, p. 105.

countries wil i be more likely to follow international trade precepts if they are dernocratic

rather than totalitanan. The administration has met wiîh some success in the spread of

democratic ideals and in support of human rights abroad. Haiti stands out as a solid

effod3 American support has also been crucial in places such as Russia, the Ukraine,

Cambodia, and Taiwan.

Notwithstanding the successes achieved in the promotion of hurnan rights, Clinton

has created dificulties for himself as a resuit of this policy. In pushing states to adopt

Amencan ideals, Clinton has at times created tensions which have caused problems in

other more important foreign policy areas. This has certainly been the case in relations

with China. Amencan policy towards China has wavered periodically over the issue of

human rights which has resulted in confusion in Beijing regarding Washington's

intentions. While the administration has not had any foreign poiicy reversais as a result

of this friction. it has at times nsked sening back the newly improved relations with

China. Should this occur, Clinton nsks causing extensive darnage to the successes he has

achieved throughout East Asia.

Another problematic aspect of the administration's foreign policy has been the

tendency to resort to the use of trade sanctions to influence the behaviour of other states.

This policy device has been a traditional aspect of intemationai &airs for centuries,

however, it counters Clinton's desire to promote freer international trade and the "use of

tnde as an instrument of economic growth."34 The use or threat of sanctions has occurred

against China, Cuba, and most recently against Iraq and Libya In these cases the

President has been pressured into his action to a varying degree by Congress or other

interest groups. Regardless of the motivation, the continued use of trade sanctions has

been a failing on the part of the Clinton administration.

" Richard H. Ullrnan. -'A Late Recovery..' Foreim Policy. No. 10 1, Winter 1995 -1996. p. 75-77 U James Schlesin~er, "Quest for a Pon-Cold War Foreign Poiicy," p. 24.

These seibacks are relatively minor compared to the achievernents which Clinton

obtained during his first term. The examination of these successes and failures which

tel lows will demonstrate that on the whole, the President has had an eclectic, pragmatic,

and effective foreign policy in the Asia Pacific region. On the main issues, Clinton has

bettered the national interest of the United States at a minimal cost in ternis of money,

manpower, and influence. At the end of his first term Clinton has Ieft the country in

better shape economically and strategically than when he took office.

Chapter 2: The Regional Scene

Many of the geopolitical changes which have had an impact on Amencan foreign

policy in recent years have also affected the nations which encomps the Asia Pacific

region. Most nations within the region are experiencing rapid economic growth which

ofien resuits in demands for increased political participation on the part of the

population. This phenornena is being handled differently in each country. Some, such as

South Korea have responded, aibeit grudgingiy, to these dernands by enacting reforms

which Western observers would consider democratic. Other governments, such as the

oppressive regime of Indonesian President Suharto, have reacted to these pressures by

invoking martial law to suppress the democratic movements in their societies. In short,

the nations which make up the Asia Pacific region are undergoing not only economic

changes but aiso politicai, social, and military ones.

While change is occurring to some degree in al1 countries throughout the region,

events in certain key nations have had, or codd ptentidly have, a greater negative impact

on the Clinton administration's policy towards the region. These changes include:

politicai scanda1 in South Korea; an increasingly draconian policy in North Korea

complicated by the death of President Kim 11 Sung in July 1995 with the resultant

struggIe for power in that country; increasing West w i t h North Korea due to the

wonening economic situation and heightened international isolation; uncenainty over

Chinese intentions resulting from a shift in ideology fkom socialism to nationalism

coupled wirh a developing military capability; social unrest in China due to the unequai

distribution of econornic prosperity throughout the country, compt and disloyal

provincial politicians. and a desire on the part of sorne ethnic groups to pain independence

fiom Beijing: increasinç political uncertainty over the succession of Chinese leadership

caused by Deng Xiaoping's death: a move towards increased democracy in Taiwan

coupled with manoeuvres on the pan of Taiwan3 President Lee Tunç-hui to sain de facto

i ndependence leading to renewed tensions between China and Taiwan: fundamental

changes ro the Japanese politicai and social structure brought about by far-reaching

political corruption: and poteniial violent political strife in Indonesia resulting from the

suspected imminent death of President Suharto in the absence of any clear successor.

These developments have made it diEcu1t to predict how countries within the

rcyion will react to a çiven situation. Consequently, the rapidly evolving political and

social environment has added to the uncertainty with which the Clinton administration

inust deal when formulatinç foreign poiicy towards the countries in the region. While the

changes are in large part due to the increased wealth brought about by developing

sconomies. they have not al1 been changes for the berrer. In many respects the shifiing

political. social. and military environment Washington faces in the region multiplies the

administration's difficulty in devisinp its overall strateky. Thus, while additional trade

and growing markets have benefïted the United States. during his first tenn Clinton has

had io deal with more dynamic change than an? other Arnerican president in planning and

conducting foreign relations in the region.

Rapid econornic çrowth within most Asian nations has created instability due to

tlir widrning gap benveen rich and poor whicb has increased political and social tensions.'

In many instances. these problems have been compounded by the instability and tensions

resulting from the environmental degradation which has occurred to fuel this growth.'

While these phenornena are taking place throughout much of the Asia Pacifie region, this

chapter will restn'ct itself to events in China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, and Indonesia.

These countries have the greatest impact on regional well-being and ultimately on the

interests of the United States.

The Peoples' Republic of China

Relations with China during Clinton's first term were complicated by numerous

interna1 developments within that crucial Asian state. These changes, encornpassing

vinually ali social, political, and econornic facets of Chinese society, have been subnantial

rnouçh to make Chinese behaviour more difficult to anticipate. Complicating this

situation has been the transition in leadership brought about by the death of Deng

Xiaoping. This has created an intemal stmggle which has pitted politicians and

bureaucrats açainst rnilitary leaders and their proponents. As we shall see, this struggle

has resuited in tight-leaning policy directions and pronouncements in many instances.

Adding to these woes is the difieulty the central govemment faces when atternpting to

implement national policies in the provinces. In many instances, these provinces are led

by corrupt politicians or in some cases are pining for independence from Beijing. This

corruption has had its most neçative impact in the enforcement of international trade

agreements regarding copyrights and intellectual property to which Beijing has agreed.

The central govemment lacks the ability and, in certain regards, the willpower to enforce

' Reinhard Drifte. .'The Role of .\mis Cootrol in North-East Asia," Defense Analvsis. Vol. 12. No. 1. April 1996. p. 89

these agreements resulting in a situation whereby the provincial or municipal leaders

disregard them to reaiize vast profits. These aspects of Chinese society and politics have

had a major impact on the manner in which the Clinton administration conducted its

foreign policy in the region dunng its first term in oflice.

The importance of China as a reçional and international power cannot be

undrrstated. Since Deng impiemented the "open door policy" in 1978. the Chinese

cconomy has undergone tremendous gowth. The GNP lias increased at an average of gO/o

annually with an upswing to 1399 between 1990 and 1993.' This e.xpansion has been

aided considerably by massive levels of foreign invrstment made possible by Deng's

rel~nns. China enjoys certain advantages over the current regional economic leader. which

ci\es it the potential to surpass Japan as the leading regional power early in nest century. b

Thrse advantages include a relatively non-existent intemal opposition to such contentious

i ssurs as arms acquisition, a large degree of sel f-rel iancr in naturai resources. and a vastly

larger population base which renders the PRC Far l e s iusceptibie to protectionism in

t'orcign markets? Another advantage attribured to the Chinese population is that amongst

major world powers. China has the most favourablr demographic situation in that

approxirnately 4596 of its population is under 25 years of age compared to the United

Siatrs where the percentage of the population under 25 years of age is approximately

36%. Conversely, only 6% of China's population was over 65 whereas 1396 of

Clan, i d i n t w m h. "China's Evolvins Relationship wit h APEC.'. t ntemational Journal. Vol. t, No. 3. Summer ; w s . p 4114

' Derini Roi.. .-Hegernon on the Horizon." international Secunty Vol. 19. No. 1 . Summer 1991. p. 150- I U.

Amencans were over that age.' Beijing has been quick to utilize the wealth acquired

throuçh these advantages in potentially unsettling ways.

One of the major impacts of this economic boom is that it allowed China to retool

its military in recent years by purchasing vast stockpiles of relatively advanced

technology and equipment. While the oficial figures released for defense spending are

inaccurate due to Beijing's reluctance to disclose them, they are useful in estimating the

amount spent. The officia1 defense spending figures fiom 1988 to 1993 indicate an

increase of 98% to a total of $7.5 billion in 1993. Inflation during this five year period

rose only 32%," thus the increase in real ternis was 66%. Continued military expenditures

of these proportions will allow China to procure an impressive force. However, it must

be remembered that China began its current military development at a comparatively

lower ski11 and technological level than even Taiwan, let alone the West. It will likely take

a decade or more before it is able to maximize the use of its techno~ogies.~

Continued progress, both militarily and econornically, is by no means assured for

the PRC. The country has numerous problems which, if allowed to persist, could

seriously slow or, if some analysts' predictions are realized, destroy China. While the

im proved economy has generall y been beneficial, it is also responsible for the introduction

of new problems. One of the major concerns the economic boom has introduced is the

potential fractionalitation of China due to unrest in parts of the country which are not

Charles William Maynes. *œBottom-up Foreign Policy," Foreim Polic~. No. 104, Fa11 1996, p. 39. >Nichas. D Krinof. "The Rise of China," Foreign -airs. Vol. 72. No. S. November I December 1993, p. 65. ? Kristof. 'The Rise of China" p. 67.

experiencing the sarne level of economic activity as more prosperous regions.'

Dissatisfaction brought about by uneven economic gowth has added to the desire of

some citizens in tem'tories such as Tibet and Xinjiang, which have a predominantly non-

Chinese ethnic base, to separate from china.' These are not the only problems to which

the newfound weaith has added.

Efforts on the part of Beijing to bring its economic and trade policies in line with

international standards have been another source of concern for the PRC and its trading

panners. Although they are improving, curent Chinese trade policies are at wicie

variance with the World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines reçarding state ownership,

subsidies. access to govenunent investment projects, tari ffs, and the continued operation

of state-run businesses. Moreover, the central govemment generally has been unable or

unwillinç to enforce policies meant to protect the rights of foreign businesses, particularly

the protection of intellectual property nghts. This inability is largely the result of

;videspread corruption in the provinces and major cititts ivhich has made the task of

enforcement e.weme1y difficult. Further complicating these problems is the fact that it is

in China's interest to maintain some of its protectionist policies in order to build up its

industrial base as countries such as Indonesia. South Korea, and Japan have done in the

past.'" NI or most of these issues wil1 have to be resolved before China becomes a WTO

mein ber.

Yoichi Funabashi. +'The Asianization of Asia." Foreimi Affairs. Vol. 71. No. 5. November / December 1993, p. 32. Also see Roy. "He~emon on the Horizon," p. 153. ' Krisroi. --The Rise of China" p. 60. !O

Roben S Ross. "Enter the Dragoa" Forei-n Policv. No. 104, FaIl 1996, p. 19-20.

Some analysts argued that these problems would contribute to the eventual

disintegration of China when its preeminent leader, Deng, passed on. However, as

William Overholt argues, this is not likely to happen The proponents ofthe

disintegration theory have likened the PRC to the former Soviet Union. Overholt points

out that unlike the Soviet Union, China has been unified for over 1000 years. He also

notes that the economic growth enjoyed by China is creating unity as was the case in

Thailand and Indonesia Since China is not as politically and ethmcally diverse as was the

case in Indo~esia, there has been less cause for fiactionalization in the PRC. Overholt

also maintains that the tension created by unequal distribution of the economic growth in

China is overstated since al1 areas are enjoying some degree of growth. Regarding the

transfer of power, Deng took rneasures to ensure a smooth m i t i o n by empowenng

Jiang Zemin wiui three crucial posts, president of China, head of the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP), and the head of the amy. Jiang has launched substantial rneasures to curb

corruption which will aid China's economic and political development. Provided that the

economy does not suffer any major reverses, these and other developrnents within China

should ensure that the c o w does not disintegrate in the aftermath of Deng's death. '' Another crucial development which has impacted the manner in which China has

conducted its foreign policy is the recent ideologicd shift China is Iess reliant on

socialisrn to justiw its actions and has increasingly adopted nationalism as a uniQing

cause for discipline and support for governent policy.'* This, dong with the fact that

Il William H. Overholt, "China Mer Deng," Foreim Affai~ . Vol. 75, No. 3, May / $une 1996, p. 68-74. " Kenneth Lieberthal. *'A New China Strategy,- Foreig Anairs. Vol. 74, No. 6, November I Derember 1995, p. 3 6.

China is essential ly suspicious of the intentions of its neighboun and the United States.

makes Beijing extrernely sensitive to attempts by other powers to provide tt guidance. "

Thus any attempt to influence Chinese behaviour must be done in as circumspect a

manner as possible or it will likely fail. As argued below. the mixture of suspicion and

nationalisrn has had a tremendous impact on the manner in which China has conducted

itsel f durinç Clinton's first term and also in the direction that Amen'can foreign and

deknce poi icy has taken vis-à-vis China.

In regards to their relations with other States. the combination of Chinese

suspicions and the influence of nationalisrn on policy making has had a tremendous

impact characterized by the apparent lack of concem exhibited by Beijing for adverse

international opinion to its behaviour and its propensity to use or threaten the use of

force to settle disputes. '' This is panicularly problematic considering the number of

~~mio t i a l disputes in which China is involved with i t s neighboun. Beijing has temtorial

disputes with Vietnam. Brunei. Malaysia. the Philippines. and Indonesia in the South

China Sea. In addition it has seabed boundary disputes with North and South Korea. a

sontroversy with Japan over the ownenhip of the Senkaku islands. and a border dispute

wi t II I ndia. " Other temtorial contentions incl ude border disagreements with Russia.

Tajikistw. and North Korea, a maritime bounda- dispute with Vietnam in the Gulf of

Tonkin. and an ownenhip debate with Vietnam and Taiwan over the Paracel Islands. ''

c'lrarly. the potential for armed contlict between China and one or more of its neighboun

-

' 1 Krisraf. -The Rise of China" p. 73 .

i Rov. -fkgenron on the Horizon." p 156 Chas \\. Freeman. Ir . "Sino-.Mericm Relations: Back to Basics.-' Foreicn Policv Vo 10.1, Fdl 19%. p 7

"

--Chin::. - ( 'cntral lnteliirrence Acencv Countrv Reoon ! 905 i Interner source) 1 996

exists. Beijing has sent contradictory messages about its willingness to resorf to force,

although it seems that a reluctance to resort to this option is slowly gaining the upper

hand amongst Chinese leaders.

While this list of disputes may seem to have the potential to Iead to war,

successful negotiations between China and Vietnam to settie a disagreement regarding the

oil exploration rights to portions of the Spratly Island chain seem to indicate that China

will not readily resort to force." A sign of hope insofar as the Spratlys are concemed is

the recent sale of amis by China to the Philippines. It is not likely that the Chinese

leaders tvould have authorized NoBnco to make the sales to a CO-disputant if it intended

to resort to force.I8 Other indications that China may not be as likely to armed conflict in

settling disputes was its ratification of the LM Convention on the Law of the Sea and also

gestures made to ASEAN States which suggested that it was willing to negotiate

resolutions to temtorial disputes.19 As China becomes more economicaIly vibrant, the

pnce for resortïng to the use of force may be more than it is willing to pay.

Recent diplornatic efforts on the part of the Chinese seem to confirrn this more

peaceful approach to conflict resolution. During the summer of 1996, Beijing sent its

di plomats abroad to reassure regional and international leaders that despite its military

posturing over Taiwan earlier in the year, it is t i l l comrnitted to economic development

and regional integration. Moreover, the PRC has also pledged to join in talks with

17 Michael G. Gallagher. "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Secuntv. Vol. 19, No. 1 . Summer 1994. p. 193. Aiso see Crais~ -4. Snyder. "Making Mischief in the South China S a " CANCAPS Pagier. NO. 7. A u g ~ ~ t 1995. p. 16-1 7. I R

19 Snyder. ",Making .Mischief in the South China Se&" p. 17-18. Freernan. "Sino-American Relations: Back to Basics," p. t 6 .

ASEAN. the United States. and representatives of the EU to discuss its claims to islands

in the South China sea." This is further evidence that Beijing will settle its disputes more

in keeping with accepted international standards.

Indeed, as the Chinese economy gows it is becoming increasingly dependent on

trade with its neighbours and other countries worldwide. Rising economic

i nterdeprndence amongst states has increased the cost of waging war since it wi 11

potentially create massive economic disruption. Aside from the economic disruption and

military costs of waging war, economically interdependent states must also consider the

Fact that conflict will deter direct foreign investment in a region." The negotiations with

Vietnam seem to indicate that the Chinese leaders are considering the economic costs of

thew behaviour which is a positive omen for the future.

One of the facets of China's diplomacy is the tendency to conduct its relations

bilaterally whenever possible. There are good reasons for this from the Chinese

perspective. The first is that its diplomacy aims ro prevent groups of countries from

forming a block of opposition on a panicular issue. The Chinese are viewed by most

Asian nations as being the one regional power standing in opposition to the creation of an

') 1

rtTcctive multilateral security apparatus. -- This stems in part from the suspicion

esamined above. The Chinese desire to prevent consensus building amongst their

neighbours is complemented by the fra-mented nature of interests amongst the nations in

'*l

llarcus. lV Brauchli. "China's Top Leaders Putting on Friendly Face,.' The Globe and Mail. Thursday, July 1 I . 1996, p :I1 3 ' h n i t a u . k h a n & David B . Dewitt. and Carolina G. Hernandez. -S.mainable Development and Security in Southeast Asia: .A Concept Paper." CANCAPS P a ~ i e r . Yo. 6. August 1995. p. 20 & 37. . . - - Geraid Sesal. "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China." international Security. VoI. 20. No. 4. Spring 1996. p I14

the Asia Paci fic region.

Concem over the proiiferation of nuclear weapons in Nonh Korea affects China's relations with other states in Northeast Asia, but has Iittle resonance in Southeast Asia. Concem over the ethnic Chinese populations is a factor in China's relations in Southeast Asia, but has no role in Northeast Asia. China's dificult neçotiations regarding en te into the WTO, or its violation of international copyright agreements, are of primary interest to states with the most developed service sectors. and have Iittle role in Sino-Southeast Asian relations. Thus there is a clear tendency for states to take different views of China, and for China to be able to play on such differences."

The Chinese take dvantage of the traditional disparity amongst other Asia Pacific nations

and funher the dificulty in consensus building through their diplomacy.

Clinton's policy for dealing with the Chinese. -Comprehensive Engagement," was

announced in September 1993. The idea behind comprehensive engagement is that in

order to maintain constructive relations wïth the PRC. the United States must maintain

dialogue with Beijing to influence Chinese behaviour. The purpose of this strategy. as

Scnt Wiedemann. the Deputy Assistant Srcretary ut-State for East Asian and Pacitic

.A t'tàirs, stated is:

To pursue al1 of our interests at the lrvels and intensity required to achieve results:

To seek to build mutual confidence and agreement in areas where our interests converge: and

Through dialogue, to reducr the a res in which we have - di fferences. "

This policy has enabled the administration to tailor its responses to issues on a case by

case basis.

' Segai. .-LIS~ Asia and the -Constrainment' of China." p. 1 14 Kent !L itlticiriann. Deputv Assistant Secretary of State (or East Asian and Pacific Mairs. "Current State o t C S -

('!:ir,ri Rdatwns." L S De~anmenr ofState Disparch.. \;O[. b, 30 30 . Julv 24. 1995. p 587

Clinton's desire to rnaintain an engaged didogue with China in order to encourage

change instead of exertinç pressure reflects a continuum of American foreign policy.

What appears to be a Clinton contradiction, that is contiming to conduct business with

countries in spite of their internai policies, is an ongoing one for the United States.

Simply stated, Washington does not cut off trade with major commercial parniers because

of their intemal policies. This can be seen in American foreign policy dating back to

George Washington. nie Reagan administration had its own policy of "Constructive

Engagement" with South Mrica which offered improved relations and increased economic

activity as inducements for reforms to South Afnca's interna1 policies and peacefid

conflict resolution with its northem neighbours? The similarïty in name between the

two policies is striking, however, Clinton has effectively continued the "Open Door"

policy with the PRC.

Some criticism of the administration has resulted fiom its handling of &airs

through comprehensive engagement. For instance, Senator Robert Dole was very critical

of Clinton for threatening to revoke China's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) s t a t u if

Beijing did not improve its human rights record, and then granting MFN despite few

human rights issues being r e ~ o l v e d . ~ ~ This criticism of a "back and forth" policy regarding

China's human rights record was also shared by other analysts." Certainly, Clinton

should not have issued the threat if he did not imend to carry it out However, as Richard

" James A. Nathan, and James K. Oliver. United States Foreisg Policyand Wodd Order. Fouth Edition. (Harper Collins Publishers: U.S.A., 1989) p. 475-477. " Bob Dole. 5haping America's Global Future," Fore' Poli . No. 98, Spring 1995, p. 36. '' William G. Hyland. '&A Mediocre Record.'. Foreign PyS. 101. Wuiter 1995 / 1996. p. 71-72. Aiso see Lieberthal. p . 43.

Ullrnan pointed out,

China's market for U.S. goods, h m f m products to jet aircrafi, was worth billions. Confronted by the likely loss of many thousands of Amencan jobs, Clinton reversed himself Human rights continues to be important, but so do jobs. Clinton wiil not again threaten Beijing with loss of its MFN status."

The administration recognized that other~sian or European businesses would have

moved into markets held by Amencan businesses and was not willing to nsk the lost jobs

this would have resulted in. Despite his cnticism of Ciinton for backing d o m on the

human rights issue, even Bob Dole was in favour of renewing MFN stat~s. '~

Additionally, revoking the status would have made Sino-American relations sour to the

point that dialogue between the two powen would have broken AIso, Clinton

uscd the delinking of MFN and human rights as a means to gain favour with the other

rnernbers of MEC, who did not support the linkaçe." While the administration did

rvaver on its threat it did so for good reason. the economic well being of the United

Sotes. Moreover, while the Chinese did not bend ro th< American pressure at the tirne of

Cl inron-s threat, the possibility existed that they might have been more receptive. In this

instance, the bluff was ineffective but seemed worth the effort.

There is no question that Sino-Amencan relations went through ups and doms

dunng Clinton's fint term. However, there were sorne substantial accomplishments

including the ability to convince the PRC to join other nuclear weapons States, including

-' Richard 14. Lllman. *'A Late Recovery," Foreien Poli=. Uo. 101. Winter 1995 / 1996, p. 78. .'' Drew Fasan. "Clinton Set to Renew China's Trade S tatus." The Globe and MaiI. Wednesday. May 1 5, 1996. p. 01 5- 15 " Dreik Fagan. "Clinton Defends iMFN Rank for China" The Globe and ,Mail. Tuesday. May 21. 1996. p. B8. ' Klinrsanh Thina 's Evolving Relationship with APEC." p. 499.

the United States, Russia. France. and the United Kingdom, in declanng a moratorium on

nuclear testing. This was the result of considerable pressure and did not occur until the

Chinese completed a nuclear weapon test on July 29, 1 9 9 6 . ~ ~ Other accomplishrnents

included the renewal of Chinese cornmitment to the NPT and the undertaking of

confidence building measures when the United States Secretary of Defense, William

Pe-, visited China in 1994 and reached an agreement to increase transparency in the

region by exchanging defence representatives who would then outline their country's

military strategies and intentions? As discussed below, these are not the only successes

the comprehensive engagement policy has achievd

Japan

Like the other nations in the Asia Pacific region, Japan is in the midst of

substantial change brought about by events both intemal and extemal to the country.

Unlike most other regional States, Japan is not experiencing significant economic

development for it has been an industrial and commercial power for many years. The

areas of most change in Japan have been related to politics and trade. The country has

been rocked in recent years by political and financial scandals which have resulted in a

demand for fundamental reforms. The end of the Cold War has also played significantly

on debate within Japan which is facing the question of whether to align more with the

East :han the West in the absence of a monolithic threat to its security. In addition to

these developrnents, Japan continues to be burdened, in some respects, by its

'' Tariq Raut -'Test Ban Treaty- Asian Concerns." CANCAPS Bulletin. No. 10. August 1996. p. 8. 11 Joseph S Nye. Ir.. T h e Case for Deep Engagement.- Foreimi AEaie. Vol. 74, No. 4, July / August 1995, p. L O0

impen'alist past beike and durinç the Second Worid War. AI1 of these factors play a roir

in the manner in which Japan interacts with other powen and, consequently. on the

manner in which other states interact with it.

Perhaps the most significant impact for the Clinton administration's policy

rowards Japan resulted from the end of the Cold War. t n the absence of a clear and

inrnacin threat to security, some states no longer defer automatically to Washington's

drsires. This is certaînly the case with regards to Japan forcing a change in the tmditional

linkagrs employed by the United States when dealing with it. Whereas trade and securie

uscd to be linked dunnç negotiations, the 1995 dispute over automobiles and automobile

pans with Japan was marked by a deliberate rffon on the part of Amencan negotiators to

k p trade and secutity delinked." The altered security environment has also resulted in

Jehate within japan regardinç the requirement for the continued stationing of United

Siiires service personnel there. This, in addition to othsr factors. has forced Clinton to

rcshape the nature of the United States troop presencc in Japan.

As Japan is pressed to adopt more open trade policies. its trade deficit is being

.;ubstantialIv reduced. This has had the effect of Iessening Japan's international influence.

In order to combat this trend Japan could resort to a policy of eniarçing its military as a

inerhod of increasing its influence. However, increased defence spendinç will drain

Jnpan's econornic strengh, exacerbating its problems in the process..'s Japan has also

" Jonathan Clark. .-Leaders and Followers." Foreign Policy Vo 10 1. Winter 1995 / 1996. p. 4-45 ' Ro? . --llepernon on the Horizon." p. 5 1.

anempted to increase its international influence by pressing to obtain a permanent seat on

the LJN Secunty ~ouncil.~"his will also ailow Japan to become less likely to bend to

American pressure on foreign policy issues.

One policy area where the United States would like to gain more support from

Japan is the Chinese human rights record. Unfortunately, Iapan did not support the

Amencan policy of publicly attacking China regarding hurnan rights issues throughout

Clinton's first term. Japan has been willing to deal with China when the United States

has not." Given the current state of international security, it is not likely that Japan wiII

perceive a need to reverse this policy. This has made it dificult for Clinton to influence

human rights reforms in China often forcing the United States has acted unilaterally.

Another difficulty which Clinton has faced in regards to Japan is the political

uncertainty in which the country fin& itself Due to a series of political scandals which

have rocked Japan in recent years, there has been significant public outcv for political

refom. The result has been attempts to reshape the political Iandscape to end the old

patronage politics which characterized Japanese govemment since the end of World War

II. The problem that this has created is that no form of strong governent has replaced

the old compt ~ ~ s t e r n . ~ ' Consequently the nature of Japanese politics is uncertain ai

best.

The problems facing the Japanese government are systemic in nature. Currently,

bureaucrats decide where public money will be spent, not elected officiais. Misuse of

funds has led to many scandals in recent years, the rnost prominent of which have

'" Funabashi. T h e Asianization of Asia" p. 75. 1-

Robert B Ounam. "Asia i Pacific Challenges." Foreign Affairs. p. 68.

included the slow response in relief for the Kobe earthquake, and a decision which

allowed hemophiliacs to use blood products tainted with aids. Other causes of public

discontent are the 3.3% unemployment rate. This rate is srnall in comparison with the

r a t of the industrialized world, however it is at a post World War II high in Japan.

Cornpounding the unemployment problem is the fact that the govemrnent is operating at

a budget deticit of 7% of GDP, whereas five yean ago it recorded a surplus of j0/o. Prime

Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto has announced a reform package which promises to make

the bureaucracy more efficient. reduce the sweeping powen of the finance ministry,

increasr deregulation, and generally promote activity on the financial markets. Analysts

rire not convinced that Hashimoto can deliver this package given that his cabinet is

çncumbered with older, less reform-minded politicians."' It is uncertain whether Japan

çan quickly overcome these problems or if it will tace increased unrest and reduced

productivity.

I'hc Lo ran Peninsula

Wliilr South Korea is currently esprriencing some instability due to interna1

p d II ical debates and occasional rioting, stabilitv. or more accurately, instability. on the

Pcninsula has been caused prirnarily by North Korea. Conditions in this country have

dcteriorated considerably in recent years. Nonh Korea is extremely volatile and secretive

making its behaviour difticult to predict. Food and resource shortages are the rule. In a

couniry which maintains a military force of 1.1 million soldiers, such destabilizing

' "Eas! - h a ' s Security Wobbies." The Econornist. December 3. 1995 to January 5 . 1996, p. 35. " Rod Llicklchur&. "Japan Contionts a Xeed to Change." The Globe and mail. Tuesday, Decernber 17. 1996. p 11-

circumstances are a cause for concern."" Compounding these problems was the fact that

the North Korean leader, Kim II Sung, died on July 8, 1994 leaving a power struggle in his

wake." North Korea is also generally considered to be a pariah state and has few

supporters in the international community.

China provides North Korea with its greatest support given their heretofore

similar political ideologies. These ties are crucial to North Korea and its new leader, Kim

Jong Il, whose shaky succession has left him in search of allies. The importance of this

alliance cannot be understated as China provides North Korea with 75% of its food and

oil imports. China benefits primarily fiom North Korea's rogue image as it tends to

divert attention fiom less dubious Chinese behaviour. N ~ ~ t h s t a n d i n g this relationship,

China did tell North Korea in June 1994 that it could not depend on it for support

indefinite~~." As China moves towards increased observance of internationally accepted

standards ofbehaviour it will likely distance itself more from its rogue neighbour.

North Korean leaders have long suspected that the South Koreans, aided by the

Amencan troops stationed in the South, would attempt to reuniQ the Peninsula by force.

As a result, the North Koreans have focused on increasing their military capabilities

thereby adding to the unpredictability on the Peninsula Even more destabilizing is the

frequent incursions by North Korean spies and saboteurs into the South. The United

States has contributed somewhat to a reduction of the feeling of insecurity by removing

-- - -

III Nye. Jr . "The Case of Deep Enga~ement," p. 95. 11 Michael J Mazarr. "Going Just a Little Bit NocIear," International Security. Vol. 20, No. 2, Fa11 1995, p. 97 '' Roben E. Bedeski. "Sino-Korean Relations: Triande of Tension, or Balaneing a Divided Peninsula." International Journal. Vol, L, No. 3. Summer 1995, p. 526-53 1 .

i ts arsenal of nuclear weapons which had bren prrviously deployed in the south." In

order to promote stability, both the Nonh and South Korean govemments have been

znçouraged. primarily by the United States, to engage in arms control talks.

Yet the amis control talks between the peninsular neighbours do not foster muc h

stability. One of the reasons for this is that the proposais put forth by Pyongyang are

ofirn so outlandish as to be viewed by Seoul as merely propaganda.'4 Moreover. the two

rides have fundarnentally opposite views on the rolr of anns control as it relates to

ongoing talks reçarding unification. The North Koreans view arms control as something

which can on ty be implemented atter unification while the South Koreans view arms

control as a confidence building measure and thus conducive to reunification talks." In

light of the uncertain conditions within North Korea and the reluctance on the part of the

von h Korean govemment to engage in rneaningtbl conventional amis control talks. the

Kurean Peninsula will likely remain a relativrly unsrahle place for some time.

The recently completed Agreed Frarnework. hich halted the North Korean

n~iclcar amis program, is one positive sign that Pyongyang may alter its behaviour for the

brncr. Howver. as examined below. the agreement is to be implemented over a long

prrrod of t imr and the North will still have ample opportunity to renege on its promises.

Of al1 the potential flashpoints within the Asia Pacitic region. the Korean Peninsula is the

iiiost volatile. Thus the continued Amencm troop presence and the treaty with South

Korea are prudent undertakinçs on the pan of the Clinton administration.

. . Suh !:IR; Lse and MichaeI Sheehan, "Building Confidence 2nd Security on the Korean Peninsuia"

( '~inrt.riini~r;ir\~ Cecuritv Policv Vol 16. Vo 3. December 1995. p 268 R: 288 "

Drilic. " The Rote of .4ms Control in Yorth-East Xsia." p SS "

I .cc . i : i~i (iicehan. "Building Confidence and Security on the Korean Penirtsula." p 273-373

North Korea is not the only source of instability on the Korean Peninsula. South

Korea has recently been shaken by demonstrations in protest of two of its fonner

Presidents who were both found guilty of embezzling governrnent fun& and incarcerated

for lengthy terms. Protests have also centred on the issue of reunification which many

university students in South Korea perceive as taking too long. Compounding these

problems is the ofien violent crowd control methods used by the South Korean police and

military to suppress these demonstrations. While these issues pale in comparison to the

behaviour exhibited by the North, the Clinton administration has to temper its foreign

policy initiatives towards South Korea as a result.

Indonesia

Political strife in Indonesia is not an unknown entity. Neither is American

involvement in the strife as witnessed by CIA support for guemlla insurgencies in the

country during the i 960s which resuited in the deaths of tens of thousands of people.JG

Under the current authoritarian regime of President Suharto, suppression has continued,

although it has been able to stimulate economic growth of around 7% annually in recent

years. This growth is expected to continue into the next century provided the country

does not politically disintepte. NoNthstanding this impressive economic growth, there

are nurnerous causes for stife in Indonesia but the most important one is the phenomenal

population b~owth problern.

46 Lock K. Johnson. America as a World Power. (McGraw-Hill, Inc.: New York. 1991) p. 250 and Markus Raskin "Cornin3 in from the Cold," .4ltered States (Olive Branch Press: New York, 1992) Edited by Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck p. 75

Currently the country boasts the tourth largest population in the world and. if it

continues to increase at its current rate of three miil ion people per year. it is espected to

reach a population of 260 million by 1075. In response to this problem. the govemment

has enacted a policy of forced relocation to relieve pressure on the main island of Java.

This in tum has created tensions particuiarly arnongst vanous rthnic minorities. Further

cornpounding these tensions are those created by the demands amongst the population for

im proved human rights and a more democratic political system. " Another major cause

of'social unrest is the increasing gap between nch and poor in Indonesia. For esample. the

awrnge incorne in the capital. Jakarta. is approximately three times higher than the

national average."' Suharto's govemment has O fien adopted autoc ratic measures to quel1

dissension as witnessed during public protests in late July 1996 when the army anacked

t hc crowds. killinp three protesten. This response seems to have quieted the revoit in the

i hon tsrm. however, it did nor address the roor causes."' The tenuous political situation

in indonesia has been further complicated dur to Suharto's uncertain health.

Suharto came to power in the mid- 1960s whrn he overthrew Sukarno in a military

coup. Since that time politicai power has been strictly centralized resulting in a situation

wherti the country will almost certainly succumb to a state of anarchy if Suharto were to

die without appointing a successor. The apparent replacement is B.J. Habibie. the

currrnr Minister for Research and Technolo~y~ howevrr it is not clear that Habibie will be

able to muster the political, rnilitary, and social suppon required to avoid the anarchic

' Robert 5 Chase. Emily B Hill. and Paul Kennedy. "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," Foreign Afairs Vol

7 q hi I . January February 1996, p. 4 1-42 . \ Stcici,lio~ise. "l'oung hians Rage at Those in the Driver's Seal.-' p .A9

' ' 'IF Iiicitmeilia Eruprs.-' The Globe and Mail Mondav. Augusr 5 . 19%. p .A 13

state which could result if Suharto were to pass. The tenuous circumstance which

playes Indonesian succession was hiçhiighted in July 1996 when Suharto traveled to

Germany seekinç treatment for undisclosed ailments. The uncertainty created by

Suharto's questionable health had a tremendous impact on the Indonesian economy

droppinç the currency, the rupiah, to a year-long low.jO This is a strong indication that

the country will undergo a potentially disastrous transformation when Suharto dies.

The danger which turmoil in Indonesia might cause the Asia Pacific region as a

whole is dificult to quanti-. There is no doubt however that the impact will be

significant. Indonesian instability could spread due to the potential for disrupted shippinç

throuçh the Java Sea. the reduction or cessation of Indonesian oil exports to regional

dependents. substantial financial losses which would be incurred by foreign investors, and

tinally due to the regional and intemationai economic disruption created by reduced access

to the large Indonesian import and export market. Economic growth throughout the Asia

Pacific region could be severely damaged by events in 1ndonesia.j' This couid have

disastrous consequences beyond the region.

While the govemment has oflen reacted to protest with martial law, there is sorne

hope that it is beçinninç to moderate its approach and is addressing the root causes for the

unrest. Arnongst these measures has been the reduction of the role of the military in

quelling strikes and walkouts. Suharto has also allowed hurnan rights groups to operate in

Indonesia. and he has allowed the creation of more newspapers, magazines and a closely

;Il Ethan Case?. '-Suharto's Health Woes Renew Guessing Game," The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, July 10. 1996.

p .A9 Chase. Hill. and Kennedy. *.Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy." p. 43.

monitored independent trade union. In addition to these measures, the Suharto

govemment has created a credit progam to encourage the creation of more small business.

and it has raised the minimum level of funded schooling to grade nine from grade six." Al1

of these measures are steps in the right direction, however the question remains as to

whether the reform wiIl go far enough before Suharto passes on and quick enough to

plsase the vociferous populous?

Given the importance of maintaining stability in Indonesia to prevent an economic

cnsis in the whole Asia Pacific region, it would seem appropriate for the Clinton

administration to intercede and prevent a breakdom. One rnethod of achieving this goal

wouid be through an aid package designed to promote stability5' However, the

administration has been unable to gamer the support for foreign aid from Congress. One

reason for this is that Indonesia is a wealthy country. The problem for the average

Indonesian citizen is that the wealth is not well distributed. Moreover, the Republican

domination of Congress since the 1994 mid-term elecrions has resulted in substantial

sftbns to curtail foreign aid packages. The result of theçe cuts is that the American

Ioreign aid accounts for only 0.15% of its GDP. This srna11 amount of aid ranks the

United States rwenty-first amongst industrialized nations in tems of the amount it

provides.'" Thus the administration would have a difficult time convincing Congress of

the need to provide the aid This dificulty would be compounded by the abysmal human

rights record of the Suharto regime. Clinton would be hard pressed ro gain any money

'- Stackhouse. "Young Asians Rage at Those in the Driver's Seat." p. A9. . i Chase. Hill. and Kennedy, --Pivotal States and U.S. Strate-y:' p. 34-35.

* A r chlesinger. Jr . "Back to the Nromb.-' Foreign .AfEaira. Vol. 74, No. 4. July ! Xuyust 1995. p. 6-7

from Congress to suppon the regime.

Some members of the academic commun@ maintain that the Clinton

administration should become more involveci in promoting stability in Indonesia given its

regional However, the difficulty of this argument is that it is not clear how

C!inton should act to stabilize the situation. Given the uncertain outcorne of Suharto's

imminent replacement it would not be prudent for the United States to support any one

lndonesian leader. To back the wrong horse in such an uncertain race risks creating an

enemy of the ne.ut Indonesian leader. Moreover, Clinton would be hard pressed to

convince the tight fisted Congress to release money in aid of Indonesia, particularly when

doinç so would only act to prop up the current regime.

While it may not be the most appealing option, waiting out the eventuai power

struggle is the most prudent. In this manner, the United States can establish relations

with whichever faction gains control upon its ascension to power. Short of a full scale

invasion. there is no ciear method for Clinton to have a substantial impact on the outcome

of an Indonesian power struggle. Since there is no apparent causus belli justiwing such

drastic action. it is pragmatic for Clinton to adopt a patient policy regarding Indonesia. In

suppon of this approach. Clinton has taken measures to enhance stability in neighbouring

countries. This is particularly tnie of Australia where Washington has substantially

increased its commitment to a defensive alliance. The new arrangement will result in the

< 5 Chase. Hill. and Kennedy. -*Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy." p. 37

çreation of a United States Marine training base in Australia and in the conduct of regular

csrrcises between the forces of the two countries. '" Conclusion

Never before has American foreign policy towards the Asia Pacific region

faced such dynamic changes as it has throughout Ciinton's first term. The region is

undergoing immense political. economic, social. and rnilitary changes which have made the

m a t ion of effective foreign policy extremely chal lrnging. The Clinton administration has

rcacted to the changing situation in formulating its policy vis-&vis the states in the region.

.-1s is argued in this chapter and elaborated upon in subsequent chapters. thîs polit)..

hile it has had some setbacks. has been lagely successful. Clinton has effectively

rcicted to the changes which have taken place leading up to and during his first term. and

tic has formulated a foreign policy towards the region which has served American

intcrcsts and enhanced the well-being of the United States.

- --

\liclixi Kiiiinrdson. --L' S . .Australia to Strengt hen Detence .Vliance." The Globe and Mail Friday. Juty 26. 1 . ) t h \ . 11 10

42

Chapter 3: Regional Security

The maxim of Clinton's foreign policy is that the physical security of the United

States must be maintained in order to continue along the road to economic revitalization.

It is in the area of security that the end of the Cold W a . has had the greatest impact on

Amencan foreign and defence policy. The most obvious of these changes was the fa11 of

the Soviet Union and the end to the perceived threat it presented as the pnmary raison

d'Ctre of Amencan defence policy. Clinton was not oblivious to this fundamental change

in international relations, nor was he heedless of the need to adapt existing Amencan

defence policies and alliances to the changing world. This realization has had an impact

on the nature of the Amencan defence involvernent throughout the Asia Pacific region.

Clinton has attempted to maintain and enhance American alliances and security structures

in the region. More irnportantly, the President has tried to react to the numerous threats

to regional security in such a manner as to enhance stability. The key challenges which

Clinton addressed were the continued development of a North Korean nuclear weapons

program, and the threat of Chinese aggession towards Taiwan, and the Spratly Islands.

American security policy in the region is based on three objectives. The first has

been to reinforce the cument alliance partnerships. n i e second ha been the maintenance

of a fonvard-based troop presence. The third and tinal part of the policy has been the

development of a regional security institution under the auspices of ASEAN. By

adhering to these policy objectives, the Clinton administration has attempted to enhance

regional stability throughout Asia Pacifi c.

'. Joseph S Nve. I r . T h e Case for Deep Engasement." Fore in Affairs. Vol. 74. No. 4. JulyIAugpsr 1995 p.%-95 46

Critical Analvsis

As in al1 other areas of Clinton's foreign policy. there has been much criticism of

his policies relating to security. Initial criricism of the administration's defence policy

çcntred on the allegation that the President was neglectins American security and fail ing to

provide the leadership to its allies that had been provided throughout the Coid War. This

was. the charges continued, particularly the case regarding American defensive alliances

throughout the world. President Clinton has tried to maintain and enhance Amencan

alliances throughout the world durinç his tirst term in otrice. This has been done for good

rttcison. namely that the defensive alliances in South East Asia and Europe have

contributrd to regional and global stability allowing the United States and its allies to

dcvote more time to concentrate on economic revitalization. Moreover, these alliances

have promoted economic ties between the United States and its allies. Increasing

i.conomic interdependence and improved security have led to enhanced regional stability.

.incc local rivais have been less likely to embarli on dcstabilizing arms races.'

Asidr from the clearly conventional nature of these alliances, they also promote

reg ional stability through the continued protection provided by the Amencan nuclear

umhrrlla. This urnbrella. in concert with the American non-proliferation efforts examined

below. has penuaded Washington's allies. such as Japan and South Korea. to refrain from

crcatin y thrir owvn nuclear arsenals. Japan in panicular could perceive the need to m a t e

sucli an arsenal considering the threat possd by the North Korean, Russian, and Chinrse

nuclex chernical. and biological weapon capabilities. However, the continued protection

('liri\rc-:ihcr I.a\.ne and Benlamin Schwarz. *-Arnerican Hegernonv - Without an Enerny." Foreicn Policv K o L I ~ .

/ , l i i l t j k l ; - 7

47

provided by the American nuclear urnbrella has penuaded Japan to remain tme to its

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.' Thus the Clinton administration has

attempted to enhance the security arrangements of the United States with the aim of

fostering global stability in order to create an environment conducive to increased

international trading. The increased trading activity has the potential to increase

opportunities for Amencan businesses thereby improving the Amencan economy.

When the last United States forces lefl Subic Bay in the Philippines in November

1997, thereby ending the stationing of Amencan troops in that country, many analysts

interpreted this as a sign of the beginning of the complete withdrawal of American forces

from the Asia Pacifie region. However, throughout his first term, Clinton steadfastly

reafimed his commitment to continue stationing United States service personnel

throuçhout the reçion. The White House renewed and, in some cases rnodified, its

military alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia.

While there were reductions to the number of troops stationed following the withdrawal

from the Philippines, Amencan naval, air and army service personnel posted to the region

remain at approximately 100,000. These reductions reflect the shifi from a land based

strategy to one based more on air and sea assets. They also reflect a realistic modification

of the United States defense needs following the Cold ~ a r . " Of the 100,000 personnel

remaininç in the region, 36,000 are stationed in South Korea and 47,000 are in .lapan.'

To some critics, the poiicy of maintaining the presence of United States

' .Alan Tonelson, --The End of Internationalism'?," The New Reoublic

' Robert B Oxnam, -'.4sia/Pacific Challenges," Foreim Affairs p. 6 1 Syr. Jr . "The Case for Drep Ensa-ment." p. 9f

servicemen in the Asia Pacific region is outdated. They argue that it ignores the shift from

military to economic power worldwide, and particularly in Asia. They also argue that the

cost of maintaining these troops is not worth the return. "is argument is dificuit to

substantiate for numerous reasons. The cost of maintaining the troops in Japan is

lessened somewhat since Tokyo continues to absorb 70% of the expenditures associated

with the Americans stationed there.' The troops stationed in the region are part of the

number identitied in the Pentagon' s 1993 "Bottom-up Review" and therefore would not

be disbanded if they were to leave the regionmu Thus the American agreement with Japan

mitigates mon of the excess cost associated with keeping the troops there.

Moreover, the continued presence of American forces in the region contribues to

regional stability by preventing a wholesale arms race and by discouraging potential

agzressors from taking advantage of weaker nations. Evidence of the stabilizing effect

çreated by the continued American presence was sumrned up by Sinçaporean Air Force

Chirf Brigadier General Bey Sookhianç in early 1993 when he stared rhat the

reduction of the Arnerican mil itaiy presence in the Asia-Paci fic reçion is likely to be destabilizing .... We will then have a region fraught with potential for a cornpetition for influence. To aven becoming another Kuwait. or suffering the tragedy of k i n g builied ... counm'es will attempt to strengthen their national resilien~e.~

Chaimers Johnson, and E.B. Kehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74, No. 4. July'Auçust 1995, p. 103-104.

'-East Asta Security Wobbles." The Economig. December 23. 1995 - January 5 , 1996. p. 36. ' S y . ..The Case for Deep Engagement." p. 97-98. ' Xlichael G Gailasher. -'China's Iilusory Threat to the South China Sea," IntemationaI Security Vol. 19. No. 1. 7 ! 7 7

49

This sentiment is shared by many other officiais in the region. Clearly, the continued

presence of the Amencan troops in the region has a positive impact on regional security,

and consequently that of the United States interests within the region.

While there has been significant increases in defence spending on the part of many

of the regional powers as evidenced by the data in table L below, this increase has not

been caused by insecurity and is not indicative of any shortcoming of American defence

policy in the region. Certainly , there is an element of concem for security füeling the

desire to acquire new weapons technology, however, the prirnary factor leading to

increased arms purchases is the availability of h d s created by the rapid economic

growth which has led to decisions to modernize or upgrade. 'O Increasing proliferation has

also been influenced by the rise of nationalism which "has demanded the acquisition of

arms as symbols of prestige."" In addition to the prestige afforded states by the

acquisition of new weaponry, several of the more oppressive regimes acquire weaponry

to suppress intemal opposition, while other states have been building up naval forces to

combat pirates and other unwanted intruders. '' There is evidence to suggest, therefore,

that these purchases would occur regardless of the stability created by the defensive

policies of the Clinton administration in the region.

Another factor which is usehl in explaining the recent increase in arms

acquisitions is the strategic shift in force structures fiom a land-based emphasis to a naval

and air ernphasis. This shift has occurred largely due to the adoption of the 1982 UN

Io Arnitau Acharya. David B. Dewitt. and Carolina G. Hemandez "Sustainable Devetopment and Security in Southeast Asia: A Concept Paper," Cancaps Papier. No. 6, August 1995 p. 16. I I Richard Hailoran. "The Rising East." Foreign Policv. No. 103. Spring 1996. p. 4. " Halloran. "The Rising East." p. 19

Convention on the Law ofthe Sea by most of the regional powers. This convention

created t h e lOOnrn Exclusive Econornic Zone (EEZ). Local powers must now be more

capable of protecting their maritime interests, cspecially with the reduction in the number

of colonial powers which remain strateçically ençaged in the region. Notwithsianding

t hesr increased roles, it is important to note that the avense percentaçe of GNP

euprnded acquiring arms by countries in the region has actually dropped in recent years.

Wliile GNP has risen for most countries. conventional arms acquisition by nations in the

region peaked in 1989. In 1997 and 1993 Asia as a whole imported half as many arms as

i t did in 1989." Thus much of the increased detènse spcnding would have occurred

regardlrss of Amencan involvement in the repion.

Table 1. Defence Spending 1994 1985-94 Population( 1994 S Billion (real s.0 change) estimate. millions)

R u s s i a h p a n China S o u t h Korea Taiwan Sorth Korea Thriiland S i ngapore Malaysia I ndonesia Vietnam Philippines Myanmar Brunei Cam bodizi Laos klongol ia

WNFS * 1 7 miilion in Far East and eastern Siberia ''

In addition to providing stability for Washington's regional allies, the continued

Arnen'can military presence also assuages its potential advenaries. This is paàcularly

the case reçarding the continued United States - Japan defense arrangement which is

viewed by the Chinese as an enhancement to regional security. Chinese strategists view

this relationship as a means for limiting the impact of hawkish elements within Japan and

also as a means of preventing a Japanese military buildup. There is also an element of

trust in this Chinese support for the Amencan - Japanese alliance. In short, the Chinese

mismist the Japanese for obvious historic reasons and they prefer the presence of

American armaments and vessels in the region to an increase in Japanese a r m ~ . ' ~ Clinton

must be wary of increasing the rnilitary role played by the Japanese in order to avoid

increasing Chinese feelings of insecun'ty and nsking the resultant actions by Beijing.

Enhancing the Security Structure

The speed with which the President visited the region is indicative of the

importance he placed on maintaining Amencan involvement and his commitment to

regional security. In fact. Clinton's July 1993 visit to Tokyo and Seoul was his fint

oficial overseas trip. l 6 During this t ip , Clinton reafinned the bilateral defence alliances

the United States had maintained with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and

Australia as proof of the continued American commitment to the region. These

agreements have allowed countries in the region to concentrate on economic growth rather

1 ' Thomas J . Christensen. "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreim Affaiq. Vol. 75, No. 5, SeptembedOctober 1996, p. 40- 4 1 If' Winston Lord. +.Building a Pacific Community." U S Deoartment of State Dispatch. Vol. 6. No. 3. Januaq 16. 1995. p 34 Strobe Talbott. '-L: S.-Japanese Leadership in the New Pecific Community." U. S. De~artrnent of State Disuatcli Vol. 6. No 7 . February 13, 1995. p. 90

52

than engaging in costly and destabilizing arms races. It was during this visit that Clinton

declared to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea that. "the time has corne to

crrate a new Pacific community built on shared strength. shared prosperity, and a shared

cornmitment to dernocratic values.""

Clinton has had a çreater challenge fosterinç discussion and çaining consensus

regarding security issues in the Asia Pacific region than in Europe or North Amenca. This

is because regional security structures like NATO did not exist in the area before Clinton

hrcarne President. Consequently the Clinton administration endeavoured to promote

multilateral cooperation and consuitarion amonçst local nations as means to enhance

rcgional security and stability. According to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. as

one of its four principles of foreign policy, the United States "must adapt and build

lasring institutions to enhance cooperation."'% Europe this has been evolving through

tlic Partnership for Peace and the Oganization for Srcurity and Cooperation in Europe

The reluctance to form multilateral security institutions in the region is the

product of cultural differences between Asians and the West. Historically, Asians have

pre ferred in forma1 negotiation and consensus building to the Western notion of forma1

structures and organizations. They tend to rely more on bilateral defence and security

treaties than on more cornples multilateral ones. '" This can be attributed to a geoeographic

and historic lack of cohesion. Sorne theorists argue that it is prernature, even in the

-- - -- f -

LVilIiam ('linton. "Fundamentals of Security t'or a New Pacific Community." U.S Depanment of State Dispatch \ ' I I I 4. \ O Y. Julv 19. 1993. p. 509-5 I O ' Warrcn ('lirisiopher. -'Amerka's Leadership. .berica's Opponunity." Foreipn Policv No 98. Spring 199;- p S

Crnig \ \n\ der -1laking Llischief in the South China Sea." C.ASC.-\PS Pa~ier No 7 -4ugust I 995. p 5 - - ' 2

increasingly interdependent Asia of today, to create institutions such as OSCE. They

ague that existing bilateral approaches are best suited to the region, but that a multilatenl

approach should be examined under the auspices of the APEC conference." Clinton has

done exactly this.

Another impediment to the creation of a rnultilateral security organization is the

reluctance on the part of the Chinese to support it. The leaders in Beijing have

traditionally been suspicious of multilateral organizations of any nature. With regards to

military organizations in the region, the Chinese are particularly suspicious, fearing that

any such çroup will becorne a defensive block allied against them. Also, the transparency

which a regional secunty forum would strive to create with regards to military intentions

and capabilities is not in keeping with the secretive nature of the Chinese govemment.

Thus civilian and military leaders have argued against the creation of such a forum."

Notwithstanding this Chinese reluctance, Washington has worked with its regional

partners and helped to lay the groundwork for a regional secun-ty apparatus.

As nations in the Asia Pacific region have become increasingly economically

interdependent, economic forums such as APEC and ASEAN have taken a more

important role in resolving economic issues and increasing dialogue between member

States. The Clinton administration has recognized the rising importance of these

organizations and has used the cooperative forums to enhance not only economic

exchanges but also security dialogues. In keeping with the willingness of the

administration to use al1 means, be they unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral to achieve

111 Oxnam, '-.Asia/ Pacitic Challenges." p. 62.

' Christensen. Thinese Realpolitik." p 38-39

Arnerican policy objectives, Clinton has used his influence in the region to overcome the

reluctance to form multiIatera1 secwity organizations and heiped to create the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF), the fim multilateral agency devoted to enhancing regional

stability and security.

Due in part to Clinton's support, ARF met for the first time in July 1994 and

continues its meetings on a reguiar basis. ARF membership includes the ASEAN states

( Brunei. Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), the seven

ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, Japan. South Korea New Zealand, the

United States, and the EU), in addition to China, Cambodia, Laos, Papua New Guinea,

and Russia. The intent of the forum is to promote transparency by allowing members to

convey their intentions. This is meant to reduce tension, develop confidence, restrain

a m s proliferation, and encourage discussion and collaboration on security issues." ARF

is n ryab ly a more reasonable institution than its European counterpart, OSCE, in that by

i ts very nature it does not raise unrealistic expectations about what it can achieve. ARF is

rncrelv a consultative body which serves to rnaintain dialogue and reduce tensions.

The Clinton administration views this forum as a supplement to the existing

alliances and troop presence it has in the region. Moreover, the ARF and the enhanced

security dialogue it represents cornplements the increiised economic integration

throughout the region." Thus the administration is maintaining a wide variety of means

. . -- \Vinston Lora. '-L'.S. Poiicy Toward East Asia and the Pacifie." U.S, Depanment of State Dis~atch. Vol. 6 , No. 4. Febniary 27. 1995. p. 145. - I

b'arren CIir~çropher. "Xmerica's Strategy for a Peacefül and Prosperous Asia-Pacifie." Li'. S . Depanment of State Disnatci; i ' o ! 3. 50 3 I , July 3 1 . 1995, p. 593 - -

2 3

to influence secunty in the region. These range from unilaterai action, bilateral alliances.

and multiiateral institutions such as ARF.

inclusion of the PRC in the membership of ARF has strengthened its effectiveness

by ensunng that it does not create defensive blocks in the region and thereby foster

instability. Moreover, the inclusion of the Chinese has sofiened Beijing's mistrust

towards security organizations somewhat. Although the Chinese remain "reluctant to use

the multilateral forum to settie sovereignty disputes in the South China ~ e a -..."'" Clearly,

this forum has the potential to contribute to enhanced security in the region. The

inclusion of China has lent the ARF greater credibility and has contributed to the policy

of constructive engagement between the United States and China

Renewing the AIliances

Underlying the move towards greater multilateral security consultation throughout

the region, Amencan security policy in the Asia Pacific centres on the maintenance of

bilateral alliances behveen the United States and its long-standing partr~ers. The key

bilatenl partners in the region are South Korea and Japan where the United States

maintains a troop presence.'j In the case of kpan, bilateral relations inherited from the

Bush administration were strained when Clinton took office making the task of

revitalizing them d i f i c~ i t . '~ While Clinton did reaffi~nn the American comrnitment to

maintaining alliances when he visited the region in July 1993, this was mereiy a starting

point for his administration. Since that time, Clinton has re-negotiated several agreements

" Christensen. Thinese Realpolitik." p.40. 7 < -' Christopher. -'Amerka's Leadership. her ica 's Opportunity," p. 12. 3 1

Osnam. --.L\sia/PaciFrc Challenges." p. 58.

in the region. The most dramatic changes were negotiated with the Japanese with whom

negotiations revolved not only on defence maners. but also on trade and oiher regional

issues which will be examined below.

Like al1 American foreign policy issues in recent yean, the relationship with Japan

has been immensely intluenced by the end of the Cold War. With the removal of the

immediate perceived threat to J a p a ~ the relationship behveen the two has been shaped

increasingly by domestic pressures in both countries. Moreover. increasing economic

vitality and interdependence amongt local states has made Asian nations less susceptible

to Amrrican economic pressure. This coupled with the reduction of the threat from

Russia following the Cold War has made Asian nations more asertive in pressing tlirir

own agendas and iess likely to bow to American wishes." The increasing assenivsncss

amongst Asian states has influenced the relationship between the United States and

-1 apan .

Critics in both countnes have called for an end to the Amencan troop presence in

.lapan. From the Amencan stand point the arguments are rnainly e c o n ~ m i c . ~ ~ o w r v r r .

as esamined earlier. Japan foots 700'0 of the costs incurred by stationing the Amencan

troops there. The increased stability the Arnencan presence provides the region is wonh

the estra espenditure. It would cost far more to enter into an Asia Pacific \var brought

about instability caused by the absence of American troops in the reçion.

Another cnticism holds that the presence wili make it difticult for Japan to

. - t 'nichi Ftinahashi. ' -The Asianization of Asia." Foreicn .Wâirs

-<--?,

\ \ c .I'i:c (..~.;c t9r Deep Engagement." p 97-sS

Vol 72 . %O 5 . NovembevDecember 1993. p

57

assume a leadinç security role both regionally and internationally. This argument goes on

to deduce that Japan is not developing as a "normal" country should." However,

advocates of these arguments ignore the impact that such a role would have on regional

securky, particularly in ternis of Chinese apprehension as discussed above. Given the

Japanese record from World War II, it is not likely that other regional States would be any

more eager than the Chinese to see Tokyo becoming more militady independent.

Pressure against the continued United States military presence in Japan is not

exclusive to Amencan academics. Many Japanese are critical of the ongoing involvement

and resent the presence of the Arnericans on their soil. Negative pressure within Sapan is

greatest on the island of Okinawa which currently hosts the bulk of the Arnencan forces.

This sentiment was exacerbated in 1995 when a Japanese schoolgirl on Okinawa was

raped by three American soldier~.~' Some Japanese citizens also resent the fact that their

government pays so much for the continued presence of the American troops on their

soit.." Notwithstanding these pressures, the United States and Japan have forged a new

alliance which recognizes the importance of the continued Amencan presence in the region

and at the same tirne recognizes the diminished strategic threat to American and Japanese

interests.

From a strategic viewpoint, the new agreement leaves the United States with a

substantial array of forces stationed in, or based out of Japan. The United States Air

Force will maintain approximately 15,000 personnel in Japan spread over two airfields

'" Johnson and Kehn. T h e Pentaçon's Ossified Strateu." p. 107- 108. : I I '*Why hsia Still Seeds America" The Economist. November 18, 1995, p. 16 ' .-East s i a ' s Securitv Wobbles." p. 36.

and a Hradquarten and Communications centre. This continçent will operate 7

squadrons of F- 15 Eaples (54 in total), 2 squadrons of F- 16 Falcons (18 in total). and a

few E-3 AWACs. The Navy will maintain its port facility at Yokosuka, home of the USS

Independence camer group. This is the only camer group with its home port outside of

the United States. The lndependence is accompanied by eiçht escort vessels and cames

an Air Wing. The Air Wing consists of 20 F- 14 Tomcats, 20 FIA- 18 Homets, and a few

P-3C Orion Anti-Submanne aircraft. Additionally, the navy will continue to station three

amphibious landing craft in Sasebo, çivinç it the capability of disembarking a Manne

Division. The Marine Corps will continue to base the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa

and Iwakuni. The Division consists of approxirnately 2 1,000 personnel including an air

component equipped with AV-6B Hameers. FIA-1 8 Homets, and Apache Attack

Hslicopter. The United States A m y will continue to man a "skeleton" A m y Corps

Headquarters in Japan numberinç some 1,000 personnel. ''

The new agreement, heralded by both powen as being one which will take them

into the 2 1 st Century, has maintained the same restrictions on joint Amencan - Japanese

combat operations allowing Japan to participate in the defence of its own temtory only.

\\.hile excluding it from operating outside of its territonal boundaries. Tbe new deal

iiddressed some of the resentment felt by Okinawans by retuming some of the land

occupied by American service personnel to its former ownen. This will be accomplished

b> the closure and consolidation of some bases. The Japanese govemment has ageed to

nbsorb inost of the estimated S 1 billion cost for these consolidations in addition to

---

' S I ~ .ir! Pni i eil. -1. S . Japan Reach Milita- Deal." The Globe and Mail Wednesdav. April 17. 19%- p 4 l fl 59

continuing to provide approximately $5 billion per year to subsidize 70% of the costs of

maintaining the troop presence.3' Thus the regional allies have been largely assuaged by

this new deal since it maintains the American presence. From the Amencan standpoint,

the renewed pledge to pay for 70% of the costs of the troops in addition to the money

pledged to cover the relocation and closure of bases minimizes the expense argument of

American critics.

The Chinese were lukewarm in their reception to the new arrangement. The

Chinese tend to view any increased military role for Japan as a nse of the militaristic

se~ment of Japanese society.'' Thus, Chinese opposition to the revamped agreement was

primarily due to the slightly greater role created for the Japanese. Under the agreement,

the Japanese defence forces will increase the logistical support they provide Amencan

missions in the region. Additionally, there was consideration given in the agreement to

future American - Japanese cooperation on theater missile defence systems. This would

counter the implicit missile threat currently enjoyed by Beijing. The negative response

was resticted to a verbal barrage from some Chinese analyst~.~' This mild Chinese

display of dissatisfaction is negligible compared to the importance of completiiig the new

agreement. This is particularly tnie considering the manner in which the agreement

addresses the concems of opponents in both the United States and Japan.

The Amencan forces in Japan combined with approximately 36,000 service

personnel stationed in South Korea in addition to the various naval contingents which

; 1

;4 Powell. % . S . . Japan Reach Military Deai." p. A 1 O.

15 Dennv Rov, "Heçemon on the Horizon." International Secunty. Vol. 19, No. 1. p. 163 Christensen. "Chinese Realpoli tik." p. 43

patrol the region comprise an impressive counter threat to those of the other regional

powers as seen in table 2. While numerically, the table would seem to indicate that

United States forces are at a disadvantage, it must be remembered that the equipment

listed is for the most part significantly inferior to that operated by the United States,

Japan, and South Korea. Additionally, none of the regional nations which could

conceivably engage in hostilities with the United States possess aircraft camers, thus their

mobility and ability to project power are extremely limited. More importantly, it is

estremely unlikely that any significant combination of these forces will ever fight together

against the United States and its allies in the region.

Table 2. Naval and Air Forces Available to China. Selected ASEAN Countries, and Vietnam.

Corn bat Ainiraft Large W~nhips Patrol Craft Submarines

China ( S S W

5000 54 860 (207) 46 + 5 SSN Malaysia 69 +S armed helos 4 fngates 37 (8) O Singapore 192 + 6 armed 6 corvettes 24 (6 ) O

heIos tndonesia 81 17 figates 48 (4) \ ' k t nam 185+ 20 armed 7 figates CF (8)

helos Notes: Aircrafi totals include naval air forces; patrol craA include gun and torpedo boats; SSM = Surface-to-Surface Missiles; SSN = attack submarines. Source: Compiled from I nternationai Institute of Strategic Studies, The Militarv Balance 1993-94. (London: Brassey's, 1993) pp. 145-165.''

The Clinton administration has also renewed and modified its military treaties

wivirh Amencaos other allies in the region. In July 1995, South Korean President Kim

traveled to Washington and engaged in talks with Clinton which confinned the continued

alliance between the two counties. These taIks were particdarly important as they

occurred in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear weapons confrontation with North

"' Taken :ion> Gallagher. Thina's Illusory Threat to the Sourh China Sea." p. 174

Korea and confirmed the commitment of both the United States and South Korea to the

Frarnework Agreement which had resolved that crisis. '' In November 1994, CI inton

traveled to the Philippines and renewed the American alliance with that

more tellinp indicator of the enhanced Amencan commitment to the security of the Asia-

Pacific region was the recent agreement reached with Australia Warren Christopher

traveled to Sydney in July 1996 and concluded a deal with the Australian govemment

which wi11 result in the establishment of United States Manne training facilities in

Aumalia and in regular exercises between the forces of the two couniries. This agreement

was described by one Australian official as "the biggest step-up in defence co-

operation.. ." between the two counties in many ~ e a n . ' ~ It is reasonable to conclude,

therefore, that the Australians perceive the Clinton administration as possessing the

capability and intent to uphold his commitments. This is a good indication that the

United States is engaged in its role as a major Pacific power. Al1 of these arrangements

and pledges undertaken by Clinton during his first term underscore its desire to maintain

and demonstrate the American commitment to the region.

Flashpoints

Since Clinton became President, there have been three major flashpoints in the

Asia Pacific region with which he has dealt Specifically, Clinton was faced with ongoing

disputes amongst Asian nations over ownership of the Spratly Islands, increased Chinese

-

17 Clinton and South Korean President Kim. "The U.S. and South Korea: Renewing a Historic Alliance," U.S. Department o f State D i s~a tch . Vol. 6, No. 32, Auyust 7, 1995, p. 607-608. 1% CIinton and Philippines President Ramos. "Remarks at State Luncheon Mafacang Palace, Manila. Philippines." White House Press Release ( Internet). November 13. 1994. t't Michael Richardson. " U S . . Australia to Strengthen Defence Ailiance," The Globe and Mail. Friday. July 36. 1996. p .A9

63

sabre rattling and a threatened invasion of Taiwan. and the revelation that the North

Koreans had developed a nuclear weapons program. These three events had the potential

to escalate into lzrge connfcts. The issue of the North Korean nuclear program was

panicularly troublesome due to the potential that Pyongyang might use its suspected

arsenal in the event of open hostilities. Moreover, the North Korean crisis was

cornplicated by the ongoing issue of reunification whereby the South has maintained its

cornmitment to a peaceful resolution while the Nonh "has repeatedly threatened milita-

action to maintain its regime ... or to uni@ the peninsula under îts c~ntrol. '~" Clinton has

responded to all of these challenges in a manner which has prevented escalation and

contributed to peace both regionally and intemationally.

The Spratly Islands are claimed in whole or in part by China, Vietnam. the

Philippines. Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei. Possession of the Spratly lslands is

considered to be of immense importance for four reasons. The first is the strategic

importance of the islands given that they control the main shippinç routes between the

lndian and Pacific Oceans. Thus vast quantities of goods, panicularly oil. pass through

thrse islands each &y. The second reason the islands are coveted is because they are

cornmonly believed to contain substantial pools of natural resources such as oïl, jas. and

o t her val uable minerais. Thirdly, the islands represent a major fishery which increases the

economic imponance attached to the ability to possess and control them."' The potential

« i l deposits are of particular import to China which has recenrly become a net oil

importer thus its economic growth could be slowed if it expenenced difticulty importing

" ' Hallornn. .'The Rising East." p. 7 ': $nvJcr. - \ laking \ l ischid in the South China Sea." p I

enouçh oil.'" Finally, the countnes vying for control of the islands also have the incentive

of prestige at home and abroad as a driving force in their behaviour.

This later factor is particularly true regarding China's claims to the islands.

Throuçhout the period of Western expansion and colonialisrn, the Chinese suffered

numerous blows to their prestige and status, particularly the loss of territory during the

Opium Wars. These events have made the Chinese governrnent very sensitive to the

issue of international acknowledpent of its economic growth and subsequent military

enlargement.4s This factor increases the likelihood that China could resort to the use of

force to secure control of al1 the Spratlys. A related tendency, observed by many

political theorists, is that nsing powen tend to test their status and "enhance their

securi ty by increasing their capabil ities and their control over the extemal environment."'"

In China's case this is particularly troubling since it is aiso facing increasing internai

pressures spurred on by unequal economic growth."' Under these conditions it is not

unusual for a dictatorial governent to refocus internai dissent by engaging in foreign

conflicts. Another factor leading many experts to suspect Chinese intentions vis-à-vis the

Spratlys is the fact thar socialism has lost credibility in China causing leaders to

increasingly appeal to the nationalist sentiment of the population as a unieing force.

Consequently, Chinese sensitivity to issues such as Taiwan and the Spratlys has been

" .-East Asia's Security Wobbles." p. 26. 1% Nicholas D. Kristot: "The Rise of China," Foreign ARairs. Vol. 72, No. 5, November/December 1993. p. 72. U ROV. --Heyemon on the Horizon." p. 159 1 2 Rov. -Wegemon on the Horizon." p. 153.

64

hrightened in recent years.J"~l of these tàctors have reafirmed the requirement for a

continued Amencan military presence in the region.

HistoricaIly, the Chinese have claimed the islands goinp back as far as the Han

Dynasty some 1700 years aga." It was not until Taiwan occupied Itu Aba in 1956 that

the competition to çamson the islands began in earnest. In 1968, the Philippines

occupied 8 of the Freedom Islands and have continued to improve their fortifications in

the ensuing years. Vietnam began occupying islands in 1974 and today garrîsons soldiers

on some 25 features. Malaysia fomally annexeci Swallow Reef in 1983. while the

Chinese began occupying islands in 1987 and have continued until the 1995 acquisition of

Mischief Reef brinçing its total up to 9 occupied islands. China has also improved its

çapability to project its air power over the Spratlys by building an air strip on Woody

Island in the nearby Paracel Islands. This chain is also subject to ownership controveny

as it is claimed by the Viemamese in addition to the hin ne se."' Aside from these States,

IV hich are in direct competition for occupation of the islands, other local and foreig

powers have interests at stake due to the need to maintain the immense flow of trade

through the sea lanes surrounding the islands. Clearly. the potential for a conflict which

could involve many countries exists due to the competition for the Spratlys.

During the Clinton administration, there has bern some fear that China would

reson to the use of force to gain control of some or al1 of the islands. This fear has

stemmtd frorn the realization that as China rmbraces a more nationalistic approach to

- - - - -- -

;" Kenneth Liebenhal. -*A New China Strategr." Foreign Atfairs Vol 74. \o. 6. November/Decernber. 1995. p 4 0 i-

.5

Gailaghcr. "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea" p 17 1 Sn? der. '-\laking Liischief in the South China Ses.-' p 12- 1 5

foreig-n poiicy formulation, militaristic elements wïthin the govemment are gaining more

influence. Some analyas believe that memben of the militarist elite within China are

pressing for the seizure of the Spratlys as part of a greater security belt focusing on al1 the

major shipping lanes within China's sphere of infl~ence."~ These fears have also been

spurred on by recent engagements over the islands. In January 1996, a clash occurred

between Philippines gunboats and vessels believed to have been Chinese. This event was

particularly tense due to the potential, albeit rernote, that the United States could be

drawn into a war with China on the side of the Philippines over the Spratlys due to the

defensive pact between the two c o ~ n t r i e s . ~ ~

Yet another crisis occurred between Vietnam and China when both countries

granted oi1 exploration rights to a foreign company in areas claimed by both countries. In

May 1993 China granted an American oil Company, Crestone, the exploration rights to a

portion of the islands it claims." n ie Vietnarnese government also granted exploration

rights to another Amencan oil company for the same area This resulted in tense

posturing on the part of both countries, but the cnsis was resolved in late 1994 when the

two opponents were able to agree to a negotiated ~ettlement.'~ This negotiated sealement

was viewed as a positive sign for future resolutions regarding these islands.

The Clinton administration has remained relatively removed from this imbroglio.

While this might be interpreted as an indication of weakness or a desire to disengage fiom

4'4 Michael Richardson. "China's Muscle Worries Asians," The Globe and Mail. Friday, March 8, 1996, p. AI S. "' Ethan Casey. Waniia Keeps Wary Eye on South China Sea." The Globe and Mail. Saturday. February 10. 1996. p;. A I L

Kristot: T h e Rise of China.-' p. 68 " Snyder. -.Clakins Mischiet' in the South China Sea" p. 16- 17.

regional security issues, this appean to be a realistic approach to a problem which, while

it has had the potentiai to escalate, is not likely to do so for numerous reasons. Perhaps

the most likely reason why disagreement over island ownenhip will not resuit in armed

conflict is the increasing ewnomic interdependence amongst the states in the region. As

this interdependence continues to increase, the cost of waging wat with one's neighbours

becomes higher. The economic disniption that such a conflict would create is such that

the incentive to resort to inter-state violence is dimini~hed.~~ This is particularly tme of

the Spratlys where the cost of maintaining complete control of ail the islands in the face

of regional and international opposition is too overwhelming for any of the regional

powen to attempt. Although, increased economic interdependence is not always a

guarantee that these issues wiU not result in open confl ict because with it cornes a growth

in economic cornpetition between these states which is sometimes a cause for more

belligerent behaviour." Fortunately, the burgeoning economic activity in the region is not

the only check of aggression in the Spratlys.

Amencan actions during the Clinton administration have increased the stakes for

any potential hepmonic occupier of the Spratlys. The key act in this regard was the June

1995 pronouncement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for international Security,

Joseph Nye, that if the fieedorn of the sea in the Spratly Islands was threatened by

military action the United States Navy would escort any civilian ships through the

region.'' This American insistence on the maintenance of fieedorn of the sea has been

; 1

54 Acharya. Dewitt. and Hernandez, "Sustainable Development and Security in Southeast Asia ...," p. 70.

< < Roy "Heçemon on the Horizon," p. 158. Snvder. "Making Mischief in the South China Sea" p. 1 1 .

reiterated in other areas of the region such as the Java seajG and the Taiwan Strait. in

addition, the normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam which

occurred under u lin ton^' begiming in May 1994 has made open hostilities between China

and Vietnam more risky for ~ e i j i n ~ ? Other factors relating to interna1 problems in China

also point to a reluctance on the part of the Chinese govemment to resort to amis over the

Spratlys.

These disincentives for aggressive Chinese behaviour towards the Spratiys inchde

the ongoing intemal peasant unrest Consequently, the PLA cannot afford to have too

many of its troops abroad as they rnight be required to que11 this unrest. Another

disincentive is the Chinese inability to maintain an adequate naval and air presence in the

reçion to avoid vulnerability in the face of attack. Finally, the Chinese would risk facing

diplomatic isolation should they invade the islands on a grand ~cale. '~ This latter factor

may not weigh very heavily in Beijing given the apparent lack of concem for diplomatic

implications regarding the Tiananmen Square massacre, but it cannot be discounted out of

hand. As the neçotiations with Vietnam would seem to indicate, the Chinese are adopting

a less hard line approach to the issue of possession of the Spratlys. This can be credited

in part to initiatives undertaken by the Clinton administration.

A potentially more serious conflict arose between China and Taiwan during

Clinton3 first term. Beijing has maintained its daim to the island since it was occupied

" Michael Richardson. 'bIndonesians Pressed to Open More Sea Lanes." The Globe and Mail. Thursday. May 16, 1996. p. A l 9. " Clinton. "U.S. Nonnalizes Diplornatic Relations with Vietnam." Y.S. De~artrnent of State Dispatch. Vol. 6. No. 28. Julv 10. 1995. p. 5 5 1-554. '* ~ a l l a ~ h e r . "China's lllusory Threat to the South China Sea" p. 183. r9 Gallagher. "China's [Ilusory Threat to the South China Sea." p. 192- 193.

68

by the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949. The Chinese have applied steady

pressure aginst moves on the part of the Taiwanese to achieve independence and

recogition as a country. China wivill almost surely use tome against Taiwan or its

interests to prevent it from seekinç "de ju re independence. Some experts argue that this

will occur no matter what level of support the United States provides for Taiwan. The

reasons for this willingness to engage in a confiict which has a high potential to becorne

dobal in size açain can be traced back to the hurniliating loss of autonomy and temtoiy - suftèred by China durinç the era of colonialism until the defeat of the irnpenalist Japanesr

fbrces in World War 11. This temtorial angst is further cornplicated by the ascendancy of

narionalism in shaping Chinese policy and also a fear that if Taiwan is allowed to go its

i n \ n \i.ay. other rogue States in China will follow suit."" It is important to note thar the

Chinese have never renounced their riçht to use force to reunifi China and ~aiwan. ' ' '

Consequrntly. the leaders in Taiwan have traditionail! sterred a cautious course insofar

as threi gn relations were concerned.

The Chinese have steadfastly sought to isolate Taiwan in the international

coinmunity. Most recently. China estabiished diplomatie relations with South Korea on

August 34. 1992. Pan of the cost for the South Koreans \vas the Chinese insistence that

ihey sewr Seoul's relationship with Taipei thus eliminatinp one of Taiwan's major

regional allies. China had other interests in mind when it made these ties, however. the

. - . -- . A-

' ' ('Iir!.;tcnwn. --Cliinese Reafpolitik." p . 45-44 -\iirirc\\ ( 'olicn. -ldt.oiogicaI Disputes LVon't be Ignored." The Globe and .Mail Fridav. Februap 9. 19%. p

\ i : i

69

isolation of Taiwan occurred at Beijing's in~istence.~~ These efforts have been countered

to a degree by the diplomacy of Taiwan's President, Lee Tmg-hui.

Lee took over the reigns of power in Taiwan in 1988 and has diligently enacted

democratic domestic reform while at the same time seeking to enhance Taiwan's position

by pressing for international recognition of its independence. He has done this in a rather

cautious marner, stopping short of declanhg independence fkom China in order to avoid

provoking an armed response fiom E3eijingQ However, his efforts have evoked a

considerable response from the increasingly nationdistic Chinese govemment.

The first response occurred in July 1995 when the Chinese conducted live missile

tests in the Taiwan Strait, dangerously close to Taiwan. This sabre rattiing was a direct

response to the visit of President Lee to the United States in June 1995." The visa to

visit the United States had been granted so that Lee could attend a ceremony at Cornell

University where he was awarded an honourary degree. The Chinese viewed this visit as

an endowment of legitimacy to an independent Taiwan by the United ta tes.^^

Compounding the situation was the fact that Warren Christopher had persondly told the

Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen that no visa wouid be granted However,

Congressional pressure convinced Clinton to change his mind and grant the v i d 6 This

pressure fiom Congress was brought about by the intense efforts of the Taiwan Lobby in

the United States. As Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. points out, no "administration can hope to

" Roben E. Bedeski, .'Sino-Korean Relations: Triangle of Tension, or Balancing a Divideci Peninsula" International Journal. Vol. L. No. 3, Summer 1995, p. 520. 63 Ian Bunima, "Taiwan's New Nationalism," Foreign Af%n. Vol. 75, NO. 4, JuIy/August 1996. p. 89-9 1. 6.l "Taiwan Threatens to Hit Back at China,'' The Ottawa Citizen. Saturday, March 9, 1996, p. Ad. 11 5

66 Cohen. "Ideoloçical Disputes Won't be Ignored," p. A16. Liebert hd. "A Xew China Stratesy," p. 44.

conduct a policy successfully if it is under constant attack from Congress and if the

policv is subject to reversal by iobbyists representing foreign govemments and

intere~ts.'~' This policy reversal wrought havoc on Sino-Arnerican relations because the

Chinesr became increasingly convinced that the United States was intent on dismembenng

their country. This forced the administration to issue a statement confirminç its '-one

China" poli~y.hR Clinton should not have promised China to withhold the visa in the tirst

place since in doing so he \vas allowing Beijing to dictate a decision that was his own to

make. The pressure exened by Congress caused him to revoke this eariier decision and

Isd to a proper course of action under the circumstances.

Con~~essional pressure over the issue of Taiwan is not surpnsing since Congress

has mûintained an interest since the Kuorningtanç flrd the mainland in 1949. While the

(initrd States is not obligated to protect Taiwan from attack under the Taiwan Relations

r k t . the President could find himself under domestic pressure focused through Congress

t i i inrsrvene in the event of a Chinese invasion. "" The Ji tXculties faced by the Clinton

administration due to ovenealous Congressional pressure are readily apparent in the case

The rise of separatist sentiments coupled with the increase of diplornatic activity

undenaken by the Taiwanese in recent yean has increasinçly alamed the Chinese. These

activi ties have included the establishment of di plornatic ties including embassies in some

Chas \\ Freeman. Jr . "Sino-American Relations- Back to Basics." Forei~li Policv Yo. 104, Fall 19%. p 17 ' Jonathan ('iarke. "Leaders and Foilowers." Foreicn Policv Vo 10 1 . Winter 1992-96. p.45 Also see Kent

ii'icdernann, -Clment State of C S -China Relations." L S De~anment ofstate Dispatch Vol 6. '10 30. July 21. th)<. [, < S L L < O I J

Liehcr!i.ii. 1 \ait China Strategy." p 46 71

African countries. Taiwan went so far as to offer $ 1 billion to the UN for a seat in the

General Assembly. These activities, coupled with the onset of democratic elections in

Taiwan in March 1996 led the Chinese to renew their military exercises near Taiwan and,

more ominously, recommence their missile tests nearly ciosing the two main ports into

the island. Beijing3 motivation in these acts was to reduce support in Taiwan for an

increased diplornatic profile or independence. The missile tests did seem to increase the

num ber of Taiwanese who preferred the status quo to independence?' Notwithstanding

this Chinese sabre rattling, President Lee was reelected

The Amencan response to the Chinese actions was to dispatch two cam'er groups

to the sea near Taiwan leading to the cessation of the Chinese missile tests ahead of

schedule." It also seerned to have an impact on the Chinese leadership as indicated by

the sofieninç of the rhetoric issued by Chinese Premier, Li Peng in the days folIowing the

camers' dispatch. Li Peng announced on state radio that the Arnerican action would

cornplicate rnatters? however he did indicate that the peace would not be broken &y

Beijing. More importantly he refiained Corn repeating the standard Chinese threat to use

force to retake Taiwan if it deciared independence and he also avoided issuing the standard

cnticisms of President Lee ~un~-hu i . " The American response d so had an impact on

independence forces in Taiwan.

The nationalkt forces interpreted the American action as a demonstration of the

willinçness of the United States to go to war with China in support of Taiwan if the

:O Freeman. "Sino-herican Relations: Back to Basics." p. 12- 14. -1 Rod Mcklebaugh. "China Raises Stakes with New War Drill Closer to Taiwan." The Globe and Mail. Saturday. March 16. 1996. p .Q. -, - -'China Rattles Sabre at Lr S..-' The Globe and 'Mail. .Monday. .March 18. 1996, p. At & AS.

72

-. situation evçr required it."' Adding credence to this interpretation was the action

undenaken in the United States House of Representatives which voted 396- 14 in favour

of --a non-binding resolution callinç on the United States to help defend Taiwan against

anp Chinese at-ta~k."~' In order to deflect focus on the issue of defending Taiwan.

Washington claimed that in addition to pressunng China to stop it provocative behaviour.

i ts actions were due to the desire to reiterate the American adherence to the freedom of

the seas. The administration argued that the Taiwan Stnit was to be kept open to

shipping at al 1 times." The overall effect of the Amencan involvement in the Taiwan

crises was to reduce tension by convincing Beijing io moderate its tone and to curb its

a~gressive behaviour. Although, this came at the expense of Sino-Amencan relations.

Kndsr the circumstances, this was a necessary cost to incur for the Clinton

administration.

Clinton's actions regarding Taiwan were nt times contradictocy. This was the

rcsult of pressure applied by the Taiwan lobby through ~ o n ~ r e s s . ' ~ . It could be argued

that had Clinton not allowed the visa to be granred to Lee Tung-hui in 1995 that the crisis

mi y ht have k e n avoided. However. had that been the case, the administration would have

appeared to be subservient to the Chinese regarding this issue. The fact that the United

States was seen to vacillate regarding the issue of the visa did lead many Chinese

pol iticians to doubt the sincerity of the American's plrdges to continue with the policy of

-. -. Buninra. "Taiwan-s New Nationalism," p.88. " --C S has JIilitan; Clout. Chinese Rerninded." The Globe and Mail. lt'ednesday, March 20, 1996. p. A l 1

A.

I1ichst.l Rjcliardson. "Freedom of the Sea Underlines Tensions." The Globe and Mail. Tuesdav. March 19. 1996. p .-\ 14 " Robttrr *; ~;reenber_ier. "Dateline Capitol Hill. The Sew Majority-s Foreign Policy." Foreiy Policv \O 10 1 . \i inter ! J ( j i - t + . 1 (T-

73

"one China"

The greatest threat to international security which occurred in the Asia Pacific

region during Clinton3 first term was the continued development of a nuclear weapons

capability by the govemment of North Korea. North Korean interest in the production of

nuclear weapons began in the mid 1950s. It was not until 1984 that the North Korean

govemment built nuclear reactors capable of producing weapons grade plutonium. The

United States has always maintained an interest in preventing the creation of a nuclear

weapons program in the North. Consequentiy, in 1984, Washington penuaded Moscow

to influence North Korea to sign on to the NP?. It was not until 1988 that Pyongyang

became a signatory However, as the United States intelligence cornmunity discovered in

the late 1980s, the North Koreans were developing the capability to produce several

nuclear weapons per year utilizing the nuclear facility at ~ o n ~ b ~ o n . ~ By signing the

NPT, North Korea became subject to periodic inspections conducted by the M A , thus

the opportunity existed to ascertain the extent of the nuclear program.

Initially, Pyongyang allowed the IAEA inspections to be conducted at its nuclear

facilities. However, Amencan intelligence reports and the IAEA's own reports in late

1991 noted that there were anomalies in the North's nuclear waste inventory. This led

the IAEA and the Clinton administration to suspect that North Korea was conducting a

secret nuclear weapons program. Consequently, the IAEA requested a special inspection

in February 1993. The North Koreans would not allow the inspections to be conducted

- - - - - - - " blichael J 14azaar. -'Going Just a Little Nuclear." International Seçurity VoI. 20. No. 2. Fall 1995. p. 94

74

and withdrew from the NPT on March 12, 1993." This development Ied to a Lengthy

and tense Arnerican effort to diffuse the program.

The threat to security presented by the North Korean program was multi-faceted.

Of immediate concem was the ongoing stmggle benveen North and South Korea and the

implications Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal had on the issue of reunif cation. Also at nsk

was the credibility and idility of the Arnerican nuciear umbrella in the region. The

potential existed that if Washington allowed North Korea to continue developing its

nuclear weapons program that other reçional powers who possessed the capabiIity to

create nuclear weapons might do so. This was of particular concern regarding the

Japanese and South Korean govemments.79 Clearly, the administration had to stop the

program from progressing any further.

During meetings in July 1993 Clinton and South Korean President, Kim Young

Sam, called upon North Korea to abide by the NPT and its inspection obligations. These

meetings also demonstrated the continued Amencan cornmitment to stand by South

Korea in the face of the adversity from its northern nvaLR0 Aside from seekin;

international support in the effort to stop the North Korean nuclear arms prognm,

Cl inton initially adopted a unilateral carrot and stick approach to resolving the crisis. The

administration prornised Pyongyang m e r relations if it complied with international

pressure to halt its program while at the same time Clinton threatened increased

-i( Da@ ff owlett and John Simpson. "The NPT Renewal Contèrence." International Secunty. Vol. 19, Yo. 1. Summer t 993. p. 53. -1

Donald S. Zagoria "Clinton's Asia Poiicy," Current Historv. Vol. 92. No. 578. December 1993. p. 404. < I I Clinton and Kim Young Sam President of the Republic of Korea "U.S.-South Korean Relations," L'. S De~anrncnt of State Dimatch. Vol. 4. No. 29. July 19. 1993. p. 512-513

75

diplomatic isolation and hardships if it did n ~ t . ~ ~ In February 1994, the administration's

efforts seemed to pay off as the North Korean president, Kim 11 Sung, agreed to allow the

IAEA inspect North Korean nuclear plants. However, this was merely a ploy, as the

North Koreans would not allow the inspecton to examine crucial areas within the

Yongbyon site." Consequently, the renewed inspections were scuttled

In response to Sung's continued obdurate behaviour, Ch ton adopted a more hard-

the approach asking the UN Security Council to impose substantial economic sanctions

against North Korea. Additionally, the administration gained South Korean permission to

deploy the Patriot anti-missile systern and ais0 to re-institute the annual joint United

States-South Korean military exercises which had been conducted in the ou th.^^ niese

initiatives increased the pressure on Pyongyang to modie its behaviour.

Upon requesting the economic sanctions, Clinton faced another hurdle in bis

attempt to end the North Korean program. This hurdle was presented by China which

was in a position to use its extensive influence with the North Koreans to gain their

cooperaiion with the international cornmunity. However, Beijing refused to intercede in

the affàir and blocked the Amencan attempt to enact economic sanctions through the UN.

China also opposed a UN resolution cntical of the North Korean's refusal to allow

inspections of its nuclear sites. Given that China supplies approximately 75% of North

Korea's food and oil imports and is one of the few nations which maintains normal

11 1 Anthony Lake, "Contionting Backlasb States." Foreim An*. Vol. 73, No. 2, March/ApriI 1994, p. 47. '' David E. Sanger. "North Korea Said to Block Taking of Radioactive Samples h m Site." The New York Times. Wednesday, March 16, 1994. p. A l & A5. X I Michael F. Gordon. "U.S. \Vil1 Urge U.N. to PIan Sanctions for North Korea," The New York Times. Sunday. March 20. 1994. p. A 1.

76

relations with Pyon~yang it could have exerted considerable pressure on the Nonh

Koreans. However China refused to use its influence constructively. This is in part due

to the fact that the rogue behaviour exhibited by Nonh Korea in this and other events has

focused unwanted attention away fiom China's unsavoury interna1 policies." The

Chinese behaviour effectively blocked American efforts to gamer UN support for ending

the nuclear program and forced Clinton to act essentially unilaterally.

In order to secure a halt to the nuclear program. Clinton sent former United States

President. jimmy Carter to meet with Kim Il Sung in June 1994. This act pavrd the way

IOr the Agreed Framework treaty signed between the two countries in October 1994.

Tliis dral might have been reached sooner had it not been for the death ofKim I l Sung on

.l ul'. S. 1 994. the day scheduled for taiks to commence in Geneva forcing a postponement.

Uoiwithstanding the delays. the agreement was reached. resulting in a phased solution

\\ hrreby the North Koreans have committed to halt al l activities at the existing reactors

~ ind reprocessing sites. Additionally, Fyongang agrtsd that it will not build new

reprocessing sites or graphite reactors and that it will place al1 of its spent-fuel rods into

srorage for eventual disposal. Moreover. the Nonh Korea govemment agreed to allow

IAEA insprcton to continue their work unrestricted. A key incentive in reaching this

agreement was the pledge to produce two Liyht Water Reactors (LWR) to replace the

csistiny nuclear facilities. Thesz reactors. which will be built and financed jointiy by the

l initrd States. South Korea. and Japan. oprrate in such a rnanner as to make nuclear

w3p0n production more cornplicated than is the case with the current North Korean

--- -

' Reurih! Lino-Korean Re!ations Triangle of Tension. or Balanciny a Divided Peninsula." International Joiirnai ?',)i 1. 'kt! : Sitmmer l Q 9 5 . p 522-5jo

77

reactors. The agreement will defer the resolution of Nonh Korea's past nuclear proçram

to a later date? Thus the Clinton administration appears to have halted the North

Korean nuclear weapons program at an acceptable cost to the United States.

This success may be reversed by the potentiai collapse of the North due to its

crumblinç economy and shortage of vital foodstuffs. UN agencies monitoring food

shortages in North Korea have recently reported that the situation in the country is

deteriorating. Continued shortaçes or a worsening of the current situation could lead to a

massive refugee problem or even war. Some analysts predict that North Korea's leaders

would rather fight a war than allow their country to collapse into the controi of South

~ o r e a ? Thus, in spite of Clinton's efforts to halt the North Korean nuclear weapons

program, other interna1 factors could eventually result in a resumption of this activity.

Criticism of the Agreed Framework was extensive. Republican Senator, Bob Dole

said the agreement did not result in the immediate dismantling of North Korea's nuclear

arsenal." Other critics have shared this opinion, claiming that the main t h w t of the deal

does not result in a complete and irnmediate dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapon

arsenal and program. However, as Michael J. Mazaar points out, Clinton has adopted a

pmdent motivational approach. Had he pushed for an immediate and complete

dismantling of the program the North Koreans would not have made any deal and their

program wvould still be producing nuclear weapons. Clinton's approach was the only

reasonable one to take. The total option would likely have resulted in rising tensions with

9 5 hlazaar. "Going Just a Little Nuclear." p.96- 103. '" -.When Nonh Korea Goes Critical." The Globe and Mail. Thursday. May 30. 1 996. p. ,423. *- Bob Dole. "Shaping Xmerica's Global Future." Foreign Policy. No. 98. Spring 1995, p. 36

a potential For the outbreak of war, or would have forced Clinton to back down and ignore

the i s s ~ e . ~ It is not likely that the public would have supported either a war or a retreat

on the part of the administration. The Ageed Fnmework allows for confidence to

develop between the two sides and has the potential to succeed.

Conclusion

The challenges faced by the Clinton administration regardinç the mil i tary security

of the Asia Pacific region have been numerous. The changes brought on by end of the

Cold War. the ernerçing economic vitality and independence amongst countries in the

region. and the chançinç face of political structure and power amongst these same nations

hüs resulted in an increasinçly complex and uncertain environment. The difficulty

presented by these complexities in tems of policy formulation have been occasionally

esacerbated by Congess. which while quick to criticize has offered few realistic

ülternatives. This laner phenomenon has caused Clinton to appear uncertain about his

w n policies and occasionally reverse his decisions. Ç!early the reversal of decisions such

2s the issuing of a visa to Lee Tung-hui are mistalies on the part of the administration.

Ilowever. thesr mors are rninor in cornparison to the successes Clinton has had in the

region.

The administration has strengthened Arnerican security and that of its allies in the

region by adopting a flexible and muiti-faceted approach. Clinton has reafinned and

renctwed the traditional Arnerican bilateral deknse agreements with the regional allies. He

succrssfully negotiated a new defensr agreement with Japan which provides for the

continued presence of American troops in that country. Moreover, he has been intluential

in prornoting and establishinç a regional securiq consultative body in the fom of the

ARF. These efforts have resulted in continued regional confidence regarding security and

in increased cooperation and t hus transparency amongst local powen regardi ng the

intentions of their neighbours. In short Clinton has contibuted to regional security by

helping to foster trust and reduce tensions.

The acid tests of Clinton's resolve to maintain regional secwity came in the forms

of continued debate and tension over ownership disputes in the Spratly Islands, a flare up

in cross strait tensions between China and Taiwan, and the discovery of the North

Korean nuclear arms progam. Al1 three issues were dealt with effectively and

pngmatically by the administration. The final result of the Clinton administration's

efforts in the region is an atmosphere of stability and a consequent continuation of the

economic and political development which has corne to characterize the majority of Asia

Pacific countries in recent years.

Chapter 4: The Bottom Line

The focus of Clinton's foreign policy has been ta enhance the economic position

«f the United States. With this goal in mind the President set about to maintain and

improvr the security of areas throughout the world where Amencan commerce interests

csisted. In order to capitalize on these efforts. Clinton set out to promote greater access

international markets to for Amencan goods and services. As Secretary Chnstopher

indicatrd. American security depends on a strong çconomy which is dependent on the

opcning of foreign markets and the promotion of frer trade and investments. ' Through

hi5 trade policy and handling of trade agreements during his tirst term Clinton sought to

rcaç h sol utions which benetited American trade. and thus national interests throughout

the worid.

As i r did in other areas of its foreisw policy. the Clinton administration maintained

a !lc.sible approach to trade and the opening of foreign inarkets throughout the first term.

' onsr que nt1 y. there were instances where objectives i\ iiere attainrd via multilateral trade

orcanizations - such as the WTO. instances were regional bodies such as APEC or ASEAN

~i crt' uti l ized. and other cases where deals were stmck in a bilateral forum. This

u ~Ilingnrss to tailor the approach to reach agreements conducive to American well-beinc -

n ü s etident in the administration's tradr policy towards the Asia Pacific region.

Multilateral tradc oganizations used by Clinton in Asia Pacific dealings included the

M'TO- the G7. APEC, and ASEAN. Not only did the administration seek to enhancr

\inricri's rconomic well-being through thrse bodies it also took steps to rnhance the

status of some of these groups to make them more effective. This was panicularly true in

the case of APEC which was elevated from a ministerial forum to a summit organization.

APEC çained this elevated status due to the Clinton administration which sponsored the

organization's summit meeting in Seattle in 1993.

In addition to seeking recouse through these bodies, the administration has also

engaged in bilateral trade negotiations with numerous countries in the region. The main

focus of Washington's bilateral talks centred on opening Japanese and Chinese markets to

American goods in order reduce the trade deficit with these two nations. Trade talks with

China also resulted in agreements designed to reduce the incidents of copyright violations

particulariy in regards to American intellechial property rights. Mile these were not the

only bilateral trade talks involving the United States which occurred in the region, they

were the crucial ones and created more economic opportunities for Amencan businesses.

The importance of increasing the amount of foreign trade undertaken by American

business cannot be understated. Statistics fiom 1995 indicated that exports accounted for

nearly 2596 of Amencan GDP and supported 8.5 million jobs in the United tat tes.' Of

these jobs nearly 7.7 million were supported by exports to Asia. American expons to the

region accounted for nearly one-third of the overall exports leaving the United tat tes?

Clinton reaiized that the economic success of the United States i s extremely dependent on

the amount of exports it makes and consequently set about revitaiizing its trade policies

and relations.

- - - - -

- loan E. Spero W.S. Global Economic Leadership in the Post-Cold War Er&" U.S. De~artrnent of State Dimatch. vol 6. No. 16. April 17. 1995. p. 306. ' Spero. -'L S Policy Toward MEC." L S Deuarrment of State Dis~atch. Vol. 6. No. 29, M y 17. 1995. p. 562.

52

The Inheritance

Upon taking office, Clinton was faced with a wmk domestic economy which had

suffered as the result of the policies of previous administrations and the costs incurred

during the Cold War. The dollar had been weakened and the growth in productivity had

îàllrn behind the economies ofGermany and ~apan.' The poor state of the economy l a s

primari l y attributable to the extensive deficit spending undertaken throughout the Reagan

and Bush yean. During this period. spending on programs such as job retraining and

ducation l a s cut in order that costly military research and development prognms couid

br tinanced. To spur on the economy, both Reagan and Bush enacted policies of de-

rcgulation allowing b i s corporations to realize extensive profits without creating

sipiiicant spin-offs for the workinç Amencan. From 1977 to 1990. the income of the

poorcst 10°,0 of Amrncans dropped by approximately PO while that of the wealthiest

cor, increased by approsimately 9%~' During the Reagan - Bush yean. the Arnrrican debt

: 1-1 plcd and the United Siares was transfomed from the higgzst creditor to the biggest

dchtor nation in the world."[n short. the Arnrrican cconorny was in poor shapr when

Cl inron took otfice.

Clinton's task was to revitalize the Amencan rconomy in order to help amelionte

t hc socio-rconomic problems which have increasingl?. cffected the quality of life in the

1 n i t d States. in order to accomplish this the Presidznt had to recognize that "the United

States has n vital interest in creating and supporting an international regime that fosters

-- -

Kicliard (':!plan and John Fefer. T h a l l e n y e s of a Yew Ers.'- State of the [:nion 1994 edited by Richard Caplan .ind Jonn I-eiier i \.! esn.iew Press Boulder CO . 1994) p 1 7 I '.ipiiin .inci I'r.:tkr. --Chailenges of a New Era." p 23-24 t,irin ( .:\.ili.iyh Robin Rroad. .md Peter \treiss. ' -Forzing :, \ai Deai.-* State of the Cnion 1994 p ;O

stability and growth."' An examination of the policies, negotiations, and treaties

undertaken by the administration during the first term indicates that this was the aim and

that the troubled state of the economy was being addressed

MultiIateraI Engagement

Early in his fint tenn, Clinton demonstrated his desire to create more open trading

worldwide by obtaining ratification of NAFTA, and also by successNly completing the

negotiations of the Uruguay round of the GATT. This negotiation proved particularly

troublesome for the White House owing to the reluctance of French fanners to bring

agriculture under the auspices of the agreements This factor led the administration to go

ahead with NAFTA prior to closing the GATT negotiations. While NAFTA was

concluded to increase fiee trade on the continent it also demonstrated American economic

leaders hi^.^ As former Secretary of State, Henry Kissenger declared following the

ratification of NAFTA:

About once in a generation, this country has an opportunity to do something defining, something that establishes the structure for decades to corne. So this is one of the crucial moments in the post- cold war period Io

Critics declared that by pursuing a regional trade deal, Clinton was circurnventing his own

poiicy of enhancing international free trade." However, by resorting to a regional

initiative, Clinton demonstrated to the recalcitrant Europeans that he could work around

' -The Improbable Statesmas" The Economist. December 16, 1995. p. 14. ?mmanuel Wdlemein. -'Focs as Friends," Foreign Policv. No. 90, Spnng 1993. p. 155. " Fred Barnes. "Going Going ...." The New Republic. November 29. 1993. p. 12. 10 Barnes, "Going Going ..., - p. 13. I l Jagdish Bhagwati. "Beyond NAFTA: Clinton's Trading Choices," Foreinn Policy No. 91, Sumrner 1993, p. 155

GATT ifit becarne necessary. This likely modented the European stance. paving the

way for the successful completion of the GATT neyotiations.

The completion of the Uruguay round was important for numerous reasons.

Perhaps the most important of these was the creation of --a new World Trade

Organization ( WTO). ~ 4 t h a broader scope, more authority. and a modem set of rules

covrnnç such issues as intellectual property, services. and invesmient."" The WTO has

bcrn the main multilateral trade organization to which the United States has resorted

rrgarding its Asia Pacific policy. In particular. the United States has used the Chinese

desire to become a member ofthis body as a means of pressuring Beijing to adopt

rconomic practices in keeping with WTO guidelines. Current Chinese trade practices are

at widr variance with these guidelines with respect to state ownership of business.

subsidies. and access to government investmenr projccts. Also. China maintains high

iari lh and regulations which protect its own private and state operated businesses.

;\nothrr key variance from WTO policy has bern thc unwillin~wess and inabiliv of the

CCP io protrct intellectual propem rights. The United States has been using its

inilurncr within the WTO to prevent China fiom becoming a member until such timr as it

cffects rrforms which will bring it in line with the organization's own trade policies.'-'

LVliile the Amencan action to prevent Chinesr: mrmbrnhip has been criticized by some. it

i s in the best interest of both the United States and the WTO.

From the perspective of American rconomic interests. Washington has more to

gain at this time from denying Chinese entry into the WTO. The United States can

$ p y r j . ' 1 5 ( i i ~ h a l Economic Leadership in the Post-Cdd War Ers.'- p 307 K~i i ic i - r i h ~ . "Eriter the Dragon.'- Foreim Policv \O 1 O-!. FalI 1W6. p 19 8: 21

currently effect its trade relationship with China bilateraily and thus does not need the

leverage of WTO sanctions. This is primarily because the administration has been able to

use the promise of eventual membenhip as an enticement to encourage Beijing to change

its trade policies. '" Moreover, the mechanisms of the WTO are geared more towards

traditional trade issues such as tariffs and are not yet capable of effectively dealing with

more recent ones such as intellectual property rights. Thus, in some cases. the United

States can settle disputes biiateraliy more quickly than it can through the WTO.'~

Clearly, Amencan business benefits from delaying Chinese membership into the

organization.

Clinton's leadership in delaying Chinese membership not only benefits the United

States but also the WTO. The reason for this is that a negative precedent would be set if

the Chinese were granted membership to the organization pnor to enacting substantial

economic refom. Other nations desiring mernbenhip including Russia, Saudi Arabia, and

Vietnam would interpret this as a sign that they do not have to enact economic reform

prior to yaining membership. The WTO would suffer damage by bending its own

standards to accommodate early Chinese rnember~hip'~ Tlius Clinton's efforts have

helped not only specific Arnerican econornic interests, but also broader world econornic

interests.

I I Grei Mastel, "Beijin~ at Bay." Foreirzn Poiicv. No. 104. Fa11 1996. p. 3 1. 1 ' Jeffèt-y E. Garten. "1s America Abandoning iMultilateral Trade?" Foreim Affairs. Vol. 74, No. 6 , November December L 995. p 55 tri Mastel. -'Beijing at Bay,'. p. 32.

86

Rccionai Approac hes

President Clinton has made extensive use of rsisting rnultilateni organizations.

modi-ing them where necessary. to promote Amencan trade interests. A case in point

occurred in 1993 when he convened the first ever APEC leaders sumrnit in Seattle. Pnor

to this. APEC had met at the ministerial levcl only. By enhancing the status of this

croup. Clinton has added more clout to its endeavors. This has led to positive results as C

witncssed in 1994 at the summit in Bogor. Indonesia. where the leaders agreed to establish

frer tradr throughout the region by 7020." At the APEC meeting in February 1996. this

cornmitment was developed funher when it was agrerd that fiee trade would occur

hetwen the developed rnernber states by 10 10 and by the developing states by 2010. ''

This !vas a considerable accomplishment for Clinton since leadership of Asia Paci fic

rcgionai irade integation is cxtremely difficult for non-Asian nations as their intrrests are

pcrccivrd by .r\sian leaders as being dîfferent. ! " Arnrrican leadership undrr the Clinton

:idminisrration has had the effict of committing meinhcr states to promise to adopt frecr

trrrde practicrs.

Frerr trade amongst member states will greatly enhance Amencan and world tradr

considering that APEC membership includrs .Australia. Brunei. Canada. Chile. China.

Hong Kong. lndonesia, Japan. South Korea. Malaysia. Mexico, New Zealand. Papua New

\Varrt.n ('hristopher. '-.A Peacehl and a Prosperous Asia-Pacifie." Vital Speeches of the Dav Vol LX[. 4'0 2 1 . -\ugust i G . I W F - p a 5 ' Etn~ii;i ('asella. --Focus on Commerce at Bangkok Sumrnir." The Globe and Mail. Fridav. March 1. 1996. p

B i Jack \\ Hou. Shinichi Ichimura. Seigi \aua. Lars [Verin. and Lesiir )'oung. "Pacific Rim Trade 2nd

Dc\tic~r~!iit.nt Hisroricd Encironment and Future Prospects." Conremnoran* Economic Polie Vol SIII. Octoher . \ )< )< .> ;

Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, and the United t ta tes.'"

These countnes account for approximately "40 per cent of the world's population, 50

per cent of its gross domestic producf and 43.5 per cent of world trade."" Given these

numbers and the move to free trade, it behooves the Clinton administratirri to remain an

engaged partner in APEC.

One of the reasons that Clinton took the step of enhancing the status of APEC

was to dispel the notion amongst Asian businessmen and politicians that there was a lack

of interest towards their markets on the part of American business. This perception

resuited frorn the fact that dunng the late 1980s and early 1990s American businesses

Focused on European and Nonh American markets. This probiem was exacerbated by the

creation of NAFTA and the integration of the European Union which heiped to convince

Asians that the United States was continuing on a Western trade path. Thus, Clinton's

suppon for APEC has helped to reassure Asians that the United States is keenly

interested in doing business throughout ~ s i a . " This is not to suggest that the United

States is experiencing the geatest amount of growth in regional trade. Indeed, many local

powen. such as Japan, are doing better in this regard However, Clinton is committed to

increasinp the amount of business conducted by Americans in the region.

APEC retlects Asian ways of conducting business by its structure which does not

mandate negotiation. but instead consultation." This approach is more practical as it

'" --Facl Sheet: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation," U.S. Deoartment of State Dispatch. Vol. 6. No. 3 1 . M y 3 1 . 19%. p. 597. ' Ga- Klintwonh. ..China's Evolving Relationship with APEC." International Journal. Vol. L. No. 3. Sumrner

-- Robert B Oxnam. "XsiaiPacific Challenges." Foreig Affairs. p.60-6 1 . -" Frank B Gibnev. Treat ing a Pocific Community." Foreien AfTairs. Vol . 72, No. 5 , November ! December 1093. p 21

58

docs not forci: mrmber states to adopt unwanted courses of action. Thus if a mrmbsr

doss not wish to follow a certain direction. it can opt out of that one panicular area

without having to leave the organization. This approach is conducive to maintaining

dialogue arnongst member states.

While APEC is a multinational organization. the consultative forum has a positive

impact in tems of bilateral deals amongst member states. Ofien bilateral deals have been

rcached on various issues as sidelines to the broadrr APEC issues. An esample of this

\vas the re-establishment of American-Sino ties which had been severed since the

Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989. Clinton used the Seattle APEC summit in

Uo\ embrr 1993 as a means of reestablishing official contact by welcoming Jiang Zemin

ainongsr the other leaders in attendance." The administration has been adept not onfy in

oprrnting multilaterally within APEC. but also bilatrrally.

Another regional rnultilateraf organization tha~ the United States participates in is

S . This bodv is similar to APEC in that it pminotes economic and political

coopsration amongst its membership, howrver thrre is a distinction between the two

orgnizations in that ASEAN has dialogue partners in addition to reçular members. Its

incinbers consist of Brunei. Indonesia. Malaysia. the Philippines. Singapore. Thailand.

and Vietnam. while the dialogue pannrrs includr the United States. Japan. New Zealand.

-\ustralia. Canada. South Korea. and the European Union. ASEAN also maintains otticial

rdat ions wit h China. Russia, and several ot her countries. Another distinction between

4PEC and ASEAN is that ASEAN meets at the foreign minister level. The ASEAN

member and dialogue partner foreign rninisters meet annuaily at the pst-rninisteriai

conferences which follow the ASEAN ministerial meetings and the ARFmLS While it does

derive trade benefits through dialogue resulting fiom membership, ARF is the focus of

Amencan involvement with ASEAN. The reason for this is that ARF helps the United

States influence regional security through consultation Trade issues are handied

primarily through N E C .

B ilateral Achievements

One of the administration's centrai goals has been the reduction of the substantial

trade deficit with Japan. This deficit has been caused p r h a d y by restrictive access to

Japanese markets. Japanese access to Arnerican markets has been fàr less restricted

resulting in a large deficit favouruig .Japad6 In order to address this problem, Clinton

embarked upon nurnerous negotiations with the Japanese throughout his first term.

In July 1993 the President and the Japanese Prime Minister at the time,

Miyazawa, amved at a new fiamework for trade between the two countries. The

Framework for Economic Cooperation was supposai to increase the Japanese dernand for

Amencan goods by lowering taxes in Japan thereby stimulating consumer spending.

Additional 1 y, the Japanese government was to have established "objective criteria" for

opening its domestic market to Amencan business.27 Subsequent to reaching this

agreement , Miyazawa's government fell. Unfortunately his successor, Morihiro

7 < - "Fact Sheet: Association of Southeast Asian Nations," Y.S. D e p w t of e Dispatch, Vol. 6, No. 3 1, Jufy 3 1. 1995, p. 595. '' William Clinton. .'Building a New Pacific Community," U.S. Depamnent of State Dispatch. Vol. 4, No. 28. luiy 12. 1993, p. 486. '' Clinton. -%.S.-Japan Economic Relations." US. Depanment o f State Dispatch. Vol. 4, No. 28, July 12. 1993. p. 489.

90

Iiosakawa. did not obtain the support necessary to tùlly implemrnt the agrerd

fiarnewvork. Hosakawa claimed that the tax and tariffreductions required to open the

market to Amencan goods were so substantial as to be politically suicida1 for him to

impiement. Thus instead of the promised permanent Y7 trillion annual tax cut. Hosakawa

enacted a one year Y6 trillion cut." This decision wvas not received favorably in the

IJnited States.

In an effort to find a solution to this problem. the two leaders met in Washington

in Frbruav 1994. These talks proved unsuccessful. Forcing Clinton to threaten trade

smctions against .Japan." These would have been ievied against cellular phones. since the

Japanrsr govrmment had failed to honour a 1989 agmment giving the American

Company. Motorola. access to the Japanese market. The threat of sanctions worked to a

Jcgree as Motorola was able to reach a deal with the Japanese providing it with increasrd

acccss to their market."" included in the Motorola deal u-as a monitoring process which

i ndicatrd as early as August 1994 that the Japanrse w r r in cornpliance." While the

~hrcat of sanctions did not result in the tas break that the administration had been

promised. it did increase accrss to the Japanrsr market for a major Amencan Company.

In spite of Hosakawa's attempt to maintain his domestic support, his govemment

1211. Throughout Clinton's first tem. Japancse govemrnents fell on a regular basis as

Licmonstrated by the fact that dunng this period there were four Japanese Prime

' Frea Barnes. '-Goin- Cellular." The Yew Re~ublic. March 7. 1994. p. 1 I ' 3 S rci .-\uthorize Trade Sanctions Asainst lapan.'. The Globe and Mail Tuesday. February 15. 1994. p B3

-\ncireu Pollack. "Votorola. lapanese Firm Reach Agreenient." The Globe and Mail. Saturday ltlarch 12. 1994.

il, B 1 \I~c.ic'i Limer. '-Press Brieting i First annitersary of the enactment of the President's deticit reduction program 1."

\\ Iiiit ' I ~ . ~ L I x ~ P r e ~ Reiease r Interner Sourcei .-\ug~sr 4. I q0-I

9 1

Ministers, Miyazawa, Hosakawa, Muriyama, and finally ash hi moto." As was clearly

demonstrated by the change from the Miyazawa govemment to the Hosakawa

government, these shifts have made implementation of negotiated deals extremely

difticult. This factor is out of the President's control and has slowed his efforts to

establish trade parity with Japan,.

The U.S.-Japan Economic Frarnework is useful in that it provides the basis upon

which trade issues between the two States are negotiated. By rnid - 1995, the Nio

countries had resolved trade disputes through 16 agreements. Included amongst these

pacts was a deal which widened access to the Japanese auto and auto parts market for

A mencan manufacturers and anot her deal which resolved a dispute regarding air cargo.23

The administration was able to conduct successful bilateral negotiations with Japan

throughout its tirst tem. Ultimately, greater access to the large Japanese market was

gained on the behalf of Amencan manufacturers due to the efforts of the Clinton

administration.

The negotiation of the auto pact was a particularly contentious process taking 70

rnonths to complete. Durinç the bargaining process, the United States Trade

Representative had to resort to the threat of trade sanctions to finally achieve an

agreement. Under the ternis of the deal announced by Clinton on June 38, 1995, Japan

"will increase the number of dealers selling non-Japanese cars by 200 next year and 1,000

over the next five years." Additionally, "Japanese carmakers will expand their production

in the United States and buy more Amencan parts both here and in Japan. These

- - - -

i:

relecon wit h Chenl Ylclntyre. Information and Culture Section, Japanese Embassv. Ottawa. January 70. 1997 1:

Chrisiopher. ".A Peacch1 and Prosperous isia-Pacifie." p. 643 'z

measurable plans should increase purchases of Amencan car parts by alrnost 59 billion in

three yean - a 50 percent increase."" This deal. achieved under the framework was a

substantial boost for the United States auto industry and ultimately, the Amencan

lncreased access to the lapanese market for investon and service providers was

also an objective for the President as evidenced when the US-Japanese lnvestment

.i\rrangement was reached in July 1995.

Throuçh this arrangement, the Govemrnent of Japan has explicitly made several of its economic development progarns available to non-Japanese firms. It also has announced policies and measures that will reduce the time and cost of investing in Japan, improve the climate for m e r p n and acquisitions. and encourage fùrther deregdation. 'j

This deal l a s related specifically to investment issues. The narrow focus of this

arrangement illustrates the difficuky political leaders rncounter when atternpting to

c hnnge the nature of trading with other States in a shon tirne. This difficulty is

çompounded by the amount of trade betwren two çounrries. As the level of trade

i ncreases so to does the divenity of goods and services. Consequently, negotiations are

olien compartmentalized making it difficult to obtain more than incremental

iinprovements to the nature of the trading relationship. This is particularly true in the

case of the United States - Japan trade relationship where the Clinton administration has

cornpIetrd many progressive trade deals yet at the same time it is criticized due to the

' ' C1inrc.n. -.Sraternent on Japanese Trade Negoriations." \Vhite House Press Release ( Inrernet Source 1. June 18. 1 L I C ) ~

Strc~Dc 1-rlihott. S -Japanese Investment .-irrangement." 1.' S Decianment ofstate Dispatch Vol. 6. So 29. J t i i \ : - 'SN>; P ~ ( J C

93

inherentl y slow process under which these deals are reached.

The Framework Agreement is an example of the Clinton administration's

willingness to adopt a flexible approach to its trade negotiations. In order to resolve the

numerous US.-Japan trade issues, Clinton took the more expeditious bilateral route. In

under two yean, issues were resolved which would likely have taken the WTO over a

decade to consider. Moreover, the bilateral agreements which Tokyo and Washington

reached can now set precedents for similar issues between other trading partners and

thereby assist the WTO adjudicate more eficiently in the future.36 Clinton's decision to

resolve these issues bilaterally rather than mu1 tilateraily served to better American

interests by expediting the process, while at the same time the decision served

international interests by establishing precedents for future negotiations.

As was the case with Japan, and generally throughout the world, the bilateral

negotiations with China were primady aimed at paining fieer access to markets3'

However, t hese negotiations were strained by the contentious issue of intellectual

property rights and also the ongoing efFon to convince China to improve its human rights

record.

it was over the renewal of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status with China

that Clinton vacillated. At the start of his first term, the President maintained that

renewal of MFN would only occur if China made a tangible effort to improve its human

rights record. However, by 1994, Clinton reversed this decision and delinked MFN from

- - -

i(, Ganen. " Is .Amerka Abandoning hlultilateral Tradel" p. 56. i -

tl'inston Lord. -'Building a Pacitic Comrnunity." Li S Deoanment of State Dis~atch. Vot. 6 . No. ;, Janua- 16. 1995. p 5 5

94

thc human rights issue. He decided that the rights issue should be punued by alternative

means such as the ~ N ' v h i s poiicy shifi, while clrtirly a public relations blunder.

underlined the importance the President placed on enhancing the economic well-being of

the Unired States. Clinton realized that while the Chinese might stand to lose some

cconomic benefit from not havinç MFN bestowed upon them. the real losen would be

Amrrican business which would face retaliatory baniers to the China market. Moreover.

the Chinese wvould likely have tumed to Asian or European markets to obtain the goods

t hey had previously acquired from Amencan suppl irrs. " Delinking the MFN from

human rights also had the benefit of prwiding the administration some flexibility in

dcding with China for with MFN status, the United States could resort to sanctions on

rürgrted markets. Additionally, by delinking the two. Clinton was able to maintain a

dialogue with the Chinese leaders"' which m q have brrn the case had he revoked MFN.

This policy reversal was also sigiiiticant becausc it dernonstrated that in the

imgoing struggle between ideals and interests in Amcrican Foreign poiicy Clinton has actrd

in Icrpiny with previous administrations. Unrortunately. in the eyes of the Chinese.

Clinton appeared to waver over the issue. His rrror in this case was that h e had linked

MFY with human rights in the tirst place." He was willing to apply pressure on China

io e f k t human rights changes but stopped short of damaging national interests in the

p-

i Lurd. .. l nteilrctual Property Rights and ti. S -China Relations.'. Li S . ûe~artment of State Disparch. Vol 6. Vo i .;. Clarcii 17. 1 W5. p 2-46. " Drcn F:igan. Tl in ton Set to Renew China's Trade Status." The Globe and .Mail. Wednesday. .Mav IF. 1996. p.

t31 f BtC ;i 8

Fagnn. .( 'linion Detènds MF\ Rank for China." The Globe and Mail Tuesday. May 2 1. 1996. p. 08 " KCLIWI!! [.:cherthal. - 4 Xttu China Strategy." Foreicn Att'airs Vol 74. C'o 6. Xovember December 1995. ,l 11

process. In this regard, his foreign policy is reflective of the continuum of ideal ism as part

of policy. In the end, Clinton did act in the best interest of the United States.

The administration demonstrateci its willingness to apply this flexible approach

when, at the same time that it renewed MFN r a n g for China, it announced that it was

enacting sanctions on the Chinese electronic and textile sectors. The sanctions were

resorted to as a result of Washington's ongoing struggle to gain Chinese cooperation in

enforcing intellectual property rightsq Due to the lack of central control and the

apparent lack of willpower to enforce inteilecnial property rights, Beijing has been slow

to close plants which manufacture pirated cornputer hardware and software, music

coinpact discs, videos, and other intellectual goods. Thus the administration has withheid

its endorsement of China as a new mernber of the WTO.'~

In addition to trade sanctions and the lever of WTO membership, Arnerican

negotiators also concluded the Intellecrual Property Rights (PR) agreement with China in

1995. The purpose of the P R was to bnng Chinese behaviour vis-a-vis intellectual

property in line with the internationally accepted noms. Additionally, the

administration intended the successfii Chinese implementation of the P R to serve as a

stepping Stone to the eventual integration of the PRC into the WO." As Clinton stated

following the signing of the agreement

China will undertake irnrnediate steps to crack d o m on piracy, enforce intellectual property rights, and provide more open access for U.S. exporters to the burgeoning China market. This agreement wi II el iminate practices that have cost Amencans over $ l billion a

" Fagan "U.S. Slaps China with Massive Trade Sanctions," The Globe and Md- Thursday. May 16. 1996. p. B 1 & B4. 4 3 Roben S. Ross. "Enter the Dragon," Foreim Policv. No. 104, Fail 1996, p. 19-20. U Lord. "Inteilectuai Propenv Rights and U.S.-China Relations," p.245 - 246.

year in high value rxports. It will mean thousands of jobs for Amerkans in key industries including computer software. pharmaceuticals, agricultural and chemical products, books and periodicals, and audiovisual products. ''

Un fortunately, the Chinese have been unable, or refuse, to fully comply with the [PR

resulting in the imposition of sanctions in May 1996.'" As indicated earlier, the central

rrovemment hrts had signiticant dificulty enforcing its own economic policies even within C

the capital. The issue of intellectuai property nghts continues to be a point of contention

bctween the two countnes. Notwithstanding this fact. Clinton has maintained his course

ot'comprehensive engagement thereby enhancinç American access to Chinese markets.

Another major bilaterai trade issue resolved in the Asia Pacific region by the

c l inton administration was the trade embargo with Vietnam. The thirty year embargo

\\-as litied in February 1994, when the President manapd to get a Senate resolution.

reestablishing economic ties with Vietnam. passed by a 67-38 margin. This was a v r n

motionai issue within the United States as the fate ohorne 2000 Amencan servicemen.

in issing since the Vietnam War remains unciear. [nit id Ilp. the United States withheld full

di plornatic recognition until such time as the Vietnamese governinent provided more

disclosure regarding the fate of the missing personnel. Even as the announcement was

king made American businesses such as Prpsi. Amencan Express, and United Airlines

w r e breaking into the Vietnamese market." This approach paid dividends regardinç the

missi ng personnel.

" Clinton. 5tatenient on Intellectual Property Rights Agreement with China." White House Press Release I f iirernctr 1 Fcttiniary 26. 1995 i,.

Fiig;iii. - I S Slaps China with L1assit.e Trade Sanctions." p BI '

J;iti:c~ \\ . iLh. . - A t Long Last Peace.'* Tirne Vol 1-13. Uo 7 . Febnian 1-1. 1994. p 16 - 1 7

W ithin 1 7 months the Vietnamese governent had provided extensive information

and in many cases returned the remains of those personnel which it had. The result of

these actions was the normalization of diplornatic relations between Vietnam and the

United States in July 1995."' Lifting the embargo and the eventual normalization of

relations demonstrated significant leadership and courage on the part of the Clinton

administration. Previous presidencies had not taken these steps and deprived American

business of extensive opportunities in Vietnam. Moreover, by opening trading relations

with Vietnam, the Amencans were able to gain access to the information regarding missing

personnel which had previously eluded them.

During Clinton's first t em the United States also maintained and improved trade

with al1 of America's trading partners in the region. In August 1995, Secretary of State

Christopher visi ted Malaysia and took part in signing ceremonies which launched the

Fulbright program, a student exchange project, and implemented an extradition treaty.

Secretary Christopher also witnessed the conclusion of a commercial agreement

undertaken by the American company, FMC-Jetway to modemize the Kuala Lumpur

International ~ i r ~ o r t . ' ' ~ As Chnstopher pointed out, the "United States is now the

largest foreibg investor in Malaysia as well as Malaysia's second-largest trading partner.

and Malaysia is the 13th-largest trading partner of the United tat tes."'^ The financial

value of the deal, while important to the company involved was outweighed by the

- -

l x Clinton. W . S . Normalizes Diplomatic Relations with Vietnam," U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Vol. 6. Vo. 28. July 10, 1995, p. 5 5 1 . 1') Chnstopher. "The L'nited States and iMalaysia: .A Dynamic Relationship," U.S. De~artment of State Dis~atch. Vol. 6. NO. -33. .AU-usr 14. 1995. p. 636-637. i l ) Christopher. -'The Lnited States and .Malaysia. ." p 637

98

signiticance of the cooperation between the two governments. The Malaysian Prime

Minister. Mohair, is outspoken in his criticism of the West and has proposed the creation

of an East Asian Economic Caucus which would exclude North Amencan and European

businesses from freely accessing Asian markets." The United States has also çained the

support of the other rnember states of ASEAN in discouraging the Malaysian attempt to

mate an exclusive economic zone." In light of the anti-Western position of the

Malaysian govemment these agreements are particularly sibmificant and are indicative of

the administration's efforts to open up the Asian market to American businesses.

Environmental Concerns

One potentially negative consequence of the rapid Pace of economic development

undenaken by counmes worldwide is the effect it c m have on the environment. The

potcntial environmental impacts in tum can negatively efTect secunty within and amongst

Unsustainable and mismanaged economic açtivities which degrade the cnvironment. aggavate human relations. and exacerbate intra- state as well as inter-state relations can Iead to social upheaval. challenging the security of the individual. of the cornmunitv, of the country, and potentially of the region."

A s the cnvironment becomes increasingly susceptible to ecological degradation and as

world population continues to yrow the concept of sustainable development must form a

key component of trade policy for nations.

.. '

Richard Halloran. .*The Rising East..' Foreign Policv Vo 102. Spring 1996. p. 17-1 8. - \,[arc Jason Gilbert. '-Tiçers in the Shatterbelt: ASEhX Secunty Architecture to the Year 2000 and Beyond." -\sran 'ieciiritv to the l'car 2000. Edited by Dianne L Smith. (Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Anny War College P.1- Dectmhttr II. I W6) p I 1 1 . - .

\tiiiraii \c i iapa, Da\.id B Dewitt. and Carolina G EIernandes. "Sustainable Development and Securitv in ';ouriit.;i~r \1;i;i \ ('oncepi Paper." C.AXC.-IPS Papier \O ci. .-Iugust 1905, p ?

39

Early in his fint term Clinton stated his goal of promoting economic growth

within an ecologically sensitive framework. The reasoning behind this aspiration was the

realization that the quality of American life is directly effected by the state of the world

environment. Amongst the ecologicai initiatives taken by the Clinton administration was

the signinç of the Biodiversity Treaty, a product of the Rio Conference of June 1993.

This was an agreement reached by the developed and developing countries of the world

which outlined guidance for prornoting sustainable development Dornestically, Clinton

created the Council on Sustainable Development which has forged cooperation behveen

industry, govemment, and environmental groups with a view to developing "new

approaches to inteçrating economic and environmental policies."Y

interna1 Support Mechanisms

In addition to the efforts that the administration has made abroad, programs have

been implemented domestically which have aided American exporters and businesses to

become more cornpetitive internationally. A component of this support is the National

Export Strategy program created by the Clinton administration. Under this program

senior administration oficials have pesonally advocated business deals for American

fimis abroad. This strategy has paid off as evidenced at the successful APEC summit in

November 1 994 when YSecretanes Christopher and Brown witnessed or signed deals for

Amencan companies worth 9400 million in the Philippines, more than $250 million in

' 4 .Alben Gore. Vice President of the United States. "U.S. Support for Global Cornmitment to Sustainable Development." G S . Denanment of State Dis~atch. Vol. 4. No. 24, June 14. 1993, p. 43 1 .

Malaysia, and an estimated $40 billion in hdonesia."" Advocacy by senior

administration officiais lends credibility to American businesses abroad and has been

instrumental in helping to close deals for these firms.

Another program which the administration undertook was the Amencan Des% at

the State Department. Secretary Christopher utilized this fonirn by regularly consulting

with Amencan business leaders to leam iheir concems regarding foreign and trade policy.

One major achievement of this consultative approach was the launch of an initiative to

curb the practice of illicit payments to foreign business cornpetitors by their

covemmrnts. '~he Amenca Desk has been useful as a means of introducing inputs to -

the foreign and trade poiicy agendas that might othenvise have been overlooked. This in

tum has helped focus the efforts on the part of the Clinton administration to lrvel the

international playing field.

Clinton also enacted other prograrns open to a11 businesses whether they traded

ioods and services abroad or on the domestic marker. One such program was the small -

business permanent investment credit protTered to businesses with annual revenues under

SS million. Since these firms account for approximately 90% of businesses in the United

States and empioy approximately 40% of the work force." this incentive had the

potrntial ro benefit the American economy to a large degree. Thus, Clinton's dornestic

policies towards business. in concert with his trade policies, are conducive to his goal of

rwitalizing the Amencan economy.

. . Spero. - '1_ ' 5 Global Economic Leadership in the Post-Cold War Ers.'. p. 308

"

Sprro. "1 ' S Global Econamic Leadership in the Post-Cold War Era" p. 308 Clinr ori. Iddrcjs bu the President to the Joint Session of Congess." Mite House Press Release ( Internet

$cturc~r irei.rriiap,. I '. 1993

101

The Report Card

The economic and trade policies undertaken by the Clinton administration have

had a positive impact on the economic vitality of the United States. One of his main

goals on taking office was to reduce the budget deficit The deficit in fiscal year 1992 was

S290 billion with a projection of $298 billion for fiscal year 1996. In fiscal year 1995, the

budget deficit was reduced to % 164 billion and current projections for fiscal year 1996

predict a deficit of $1 17 billion. The current deficit is lower than any time since 198 1. jR

In 1992, the budget deficit was 4.9% of GDP. By the end of the 1995 fiscal year it was

1.6% of GD P.^^ This is considerably better than the EU budget deficit average for 1995,

which was 4.9% of GDP. In fact, the Amencan budget deficit was the srnallest of the big

seven economies. The United States net public sector debt to GDP had risen 1 1 % since

1985 to 38% whereas the EU the debt rose 22% to 60% over the same period. Amencan

govemment spending, 33% of GDP, was significantly lower than Europe's at 50% of

GDF in 1995. Based on these indicators, the United States had "the best overd1 fiscal

position of any large industnal econ~rny.'"~ With evidence such as this it is clear that the

fiscal and economic policies of the Clinton administration have had a positive impact on

the Amencan econorny and consequently, the national interest.

This conclusion is supported by the annual report by the Geneva based World

Economic F o m which ranked the United States as the world's fourth most economically

cornpetitive nation amongst the 49 rated behind Singapore, Hong Kong, and New Zealand

'' Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff: "Press Briefing" White House Press Release (Internet Source). JuIy 16, 1996. -1

Drew Fagan. *-Clinton Leams Mistakes on Economy," The Globe and Mail. Monday, October 28. 1996, p. B5. "" T h e Tide of Red Ink." The Economisr. Novernber 18, 1995, p. 18.

103

respectively."' The 1994 World Competitiveness Report, published by the Lausanne

lnstitute for Management Development. ranked the United States first in terms of its

rconomic competitiveness followed by Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, and other nations

consec~tivel~." The main reason for these economic successes were the policies enacted

by the Cl inton administration.

WhiIe the United States still has a trade deficit, the Clinton administration has

made some headway by clearing the way for increased amounts of Amencan expons.

Since 1993, United States e.xports have increased by more than S 100 billion annually." In

1 993. the value of American esports totaled $4 10.8 billion while irnports totaled $526.4

bill~on."~ In 1994, the value of Amencan expom totaled $5 17.4 billion while imports

totaleci $663.8 billion." Over the two year period, exports increased by a total of 24.7%

while imports increased by 26.1%. The United States did improve its trade balance

substantially in the expon of services during Clinton's first term. In 1992, this sector had

a surplus of $58 billion which was increased to S80 biilion by 1997." Overall, the trade

dcticit continues to gow, however the increased amount of expons are an indication of

the rconomic revitalization process upon which Clinton embarked on taking office.

in terrns ofjob creation, Clinton had pledged to create 8 million newjobs during

his tirst tem. Nearing the end of this period I O million new jobs were created, surpassing

" Jlichael S . Sherrill. Wnlock the Shackles.'. Time. Vol. 147. No. 24. lune 10, 1996. p. 37. "-

Hou. Shinichi. Naya. Werin. and Young, "Pacific Rim Trade and Development.. .," p. 10. " Ganen. -*ls h e r i c a Abandoning Multilateral Trade?" p. 52. " .-Appendis." 1993 National Trade Estimate Repon on F~reifw Trade Bamers. (U.S. Govemment Printing Otticer, IVt'nshingon D.C.. 1994) .,i

".Appendis.'- 1994 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, (Internet Source). " Doilcias BrinkIey. --Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine." Foreirrn Policv No. 106. Spring 1997. p ! 17

l OZI

the expectations of the admi~tistration.~' Of these new jobs, approximately 1.6 million

were directly ansbutable to the more than 200 new market opening agreements reached

by the administration from 1993 to 1 996.68 Overall, his policies have helped to

strengthen the dollar, invigorate the stock market, lower inflation, and rejuvenate

Amencan economic competitiveness.69 The significant economic irnprovements achieved

during Clinton's first term were the result of many factors such as fiscal policy,

govemment reforms, tax incentives, and otherç. While it is veiy difficult to quanti9 the

impact of trade policy on the economic boom, Clinton's accomplishrnents in this area

have been important in creating these positive developments.

Conclusion

The comerstone of Clinton's foreign policy has been the increased emphasis on

trade as an element of the policy. This has been clearly evident within the Asia Pacific

repion where the administration made a concerteci effort to open up markets to American

goods, and also to bring the practices of its trading partners in line with accepted

international standards. Clinton dernonstrated flexibility in his appmach to achieving

trade objectives as demonstrated by the shifi from either multinational, regionaI, or

bilateral negotiations dependùig on the nature of the issue. This flexibility gave Clinton

the ability to settle disputes to the bettement of the United States national interest in

virtually al1 cases. In situations where a mulîilateral approach, such as adjudication by

the WTO, would have taken too long, Clinton adopted a regional or bilateral approach.

67 Peter Cook. "A Smoking Gun in the U.S.." The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, July 611

hlJ Brinkley. "Democratic Edargement. ..." p. 123. Peter Cook. ".LI Smoking Gun in the U.S.." The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, July

Clinton was not content only to make use of the plethora of rnul tinational and

regional tnde organizations, instead he chose to shape these bodies to suit Amencan

interests. The prirnary interest in shaping these bodies was the promotion of what he

saw as fker and fairer trading practices worldwide. In the Asia Pacific region this was

apparent in Clinton's effort to enhance the status of APEC. Intemationally, the President

also demonstrated leadership in helping to finalize the Uruguay round of the GATT and

in shaping the WTO in its wke. It has been pnmarily American pressure which has kept

China out of the WTO. Clinton has done this in order to speed the Pace of economic

refom in that country thereby benefiting not only the United States, but also China3

or her trading partners.

At the end of Clinton's first term, the Arnencan economy was in better condition

than it had been when he took office. His efforts regarding trade have resulted in renewed

econornic vitality, an increase in the amount ofjobs directly linked to foreign trade, and

ernenl economic improvements not wimessed since the penod preceding former - President Reagan's tenue. While trade foms only one part of the economic landscape of

a country, it is a substantial one. Thus the efforts that Clinton made in strengthening the

economic position of the United States abroad helped to spur this economic tumaround.

Some critics might argue that American economy has improved in spite of Clinton's

pol icies. This line of thinking would point to the overall improving economic situation

worldwvide. However, these same critics would be amongst the first to attack Clinton's

pol icies and blame the President if the United States' economy was in a downward spiral.

While the international influence of the '4merican economy has diminished over the pas1

couple of decades, the well-being of the world economy is still closely tied with that of

the United States. n i u s the Clinton administration is in part responsible for the recent

vitality of the world economy.

Chapter 5: Other Interests

Dunng Clinton's tint term two other long-standing, American interests. the

pursuit of conventional and non-conventional amis control and the global promotion of

American ideals were addressed. The laiter of these two policy areas focused on the

promotion of human rights and liberal democracy. In pursuing these agenda items, the

Clinton administration did not differ significantly from its recent predecessors. Clinton

did achieve success in both areas, however, the most tangible successes occurred in arms

control.

Both of these important agenda items were punued in order to promote security

throughout the world. In the case of arms control. it is theorized that there is a linkage in

that a reduction in the arnount of arms which proliferate the world will ease tensions and

reduce the possibility of conflict resulting from an arms race. The contribution to

increased security brought about by the promotion of ideals throughout the world is

pèrhaps less obvious. The aim of this endeavour i s to reduce dornestic strife in countries

by prornoring the enhancernent of human rights. This will in tum lessen the likelihood of

a n e d revolt which could eventually spi11 across borders and Iead to broader conflicts.

The rationale for promoting democracy abroad is that throughout history. western style

democracies have not yet waged \var amonpst themselves and are perceived to be less

inclined to do so. They are also considered to be more predictable in the conduct of

foreign affain. Thus by encouraging countrirs to improve their human nghts records and

adopt more democratic forms of govemment. the Clinton administration has aaempted to

incrrase the number of stable global partners and thereby enhance international security .

Amis Control

The Clinton administration achieved signifiant success in the area of arms control

dunng its first term. As in al1 other areas of foreign policy, the administration acted

multilaterdly, regionally, bilaterally, or udaterally, as the situation wananted

Consequently, the successes achieved varied fiom international agreements, regional

monitoring agencies, or bilaterai arrangements to curb the proliferation of arms or arms

technology. The major agreements that the administration achieved include the renewal of

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NP'I) and also the nearly completed

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In the case of the CTBT virtually a11

countries, with the exception of India have agreed to the ternis of the treaty.

Other significant achievements include the deals which will eventually lead to the

removal and destruction of the nuclear weapons anenal fiom the Ukraine and

Khazakstan. [n the Asia Pacific region Clinton achieved a major success when he stopped

the Nonh Korean nuclear weapons program in its infancy. Washington has been

instrumental in the creation and improvement of variou conventional and non-

conventional amis registers which have helped to promote regional stability by creating

transparency .

Yet again, the end of the Cold War has had a large role to play on this aspect of

Clinton's foreign policy. During the Cold War the United States was embroiled in an

amis race with the Soviet Union and as a result had very Iittle latitude to embark upon a

vigorous arms control agenda. Throughout this period, m s control w u viewed either as

a bargaining tool used by the superpowers, or even as a threat to national security. Due

to the changes in the international environment, arms control is now perceived as -'a

legitimate and effective component of a national security strategy."' Now that the

justification for a massive Arnencan armarnents program has disappeared, Clinton has

been able to punue arms control as no President has since World War II.

In an address to the UN General Assembly on Septernber 77, 1993, Clinton

demonstrated the importance he placed upon arms control and non-proliferation. Citing

t hr regional and global instabil ity created by nuclear, biological, and chem [cal weapons.

the President indicated the need to reduce the number of countries which possess them.

i n order to achieve this reduction Clinton advocated strengthening the IAEA, applying

pressure on States to discourape them from acquin'ng these types of weapons and to abtde

by accepted international rules. Clinton pledçed to create international agreements

hannin y the production ofweapons grade uranium and plutonium as well as an agreement

to end ail nuclear weapons testing.' As soon became rvident. Clinton was able to back up

Iiis words with action.

The administration's efforts to dismantle pan of the nuclear arsenal of the former

Soviet Union began to bear fruit early in his first tem. i n January 1994' he met with

Russian President, Bons Yeltsin, and Ukrainian President, Leonid Kravchuk, in Moscow.

The threr leaders signed an agreement which resulted in the dismantling of the Soviet

riuclear menai in the Ukraine: somr 1 76 long range missiles armed with 1 800 warheads.

Reinhard Dritic. --The Role of A m s Conrrol in North-East Asia." Detense .4nalvsis Vol 12, Yo 1 . April 1Q06. s i

\\'iIlrriri: i'linron. Tontionting the Challenses of a Broader WorId." L' S Depanment of State Dis~a tch \-DI 4- \ O :a v ;ycmbcr ::. 1993- p 65 i

IO9

Signing the agreement was not the only hurdle which had to be crossed as Kravchuk faced

a dificult time convincing the Ukrainian parliament that it was in their country's interest.

This was to prove no easy feat due to the state of economic disorder in the Ukraine at

that timeS3 Demonstrating his resolve to dismantle the arsenal, Clinton invited Kravchuk

to Washington where the two leaders signed agreements "including a fnendship treaty, an

agreement on taxation, and an economic pact." The quid pro quo for Ukrainian

cornpliance was an aid package valued at $700 million. Following these talks Kravchuk

piedged that his country would dismantle the arsenal and abide by the WT.' Clinton's

efforts to secure the aid package paid dividends in the fom of Ukmhian nuclear

disarmament.

In order to reduce the number of sûategic nuclear weapons the Clinton

administration also remained engaged in implementation and negotiation with Russia.

American efforts related ta the arsenal of the former USSR also resulted in agreements

which will lead to the removal of nuclear weapons from Khazakstan, and Belanis. Major

accomplishments in this area included the completion of the Strategic Arrns Reduction

Treaty (START) and a continuation of the implementation process for START II. The

aim of these treaties is to reduce the Russian and Amencan strategic arsenals by two-

thirds. Both powers also concluded a deal which has resulted in the conversion of

Russian enriched uranium which is being sold to the United States and converted to low-

3 Bob Cohn and Dorinda Elliott, "Danger if the Ukraine Deal Doesn't Stick" Newsweek. January 34, 1994, p. 34. Winton announces lncrease in Econornic Aid to Ukraine." The Globe and Mail. Saturday, March 5. 1994. p.

A I 3 110

enriched uranium for reactor fuel.' One American Company, United States Enrichment

Corporation began receiving shipments of uranium in March 1 995. This marked the

beginning of a 70 year contract which will result in the conversion of 500 metric tons of

weapons grade ~raniurn.~ In addition to these deals and negotiations, the United States

passed the Nunn-Lugar act which has helped to improve Russian nuclear weapons

materials accountability and control.' These efforts have had a positive impact on

reducing the amount of and access to both nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons material.

ln addition to the non-proliferation accomplishments pertaining to the nuclear

arsenal of the former USSR, the United States remained active in various world bodies

formed to reduce the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The main aim of

these bodies is to monitor and stop the trade of technologies or goods which can be used

in the production or development of nuclear, chernical, or biological weapons. In a letter

to Congress, dated February 16, 1995, Clinton descnbed some of the actions which his

administration had undertaken regarding the proli fent ion these weapons. He pointed out

how he had submirted the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to Congress for

ratification on November 73, 1993. This convention was, at that time, signed by 158

nations and had been ratified by 16. In September 1994, the administration was

represented at the Third Biological Weapons Convention (B WC) Review conference. The

conference established an ad hoc group whose purpose was to develop enforcement

' Warren Christopher. .*Arnenca1s Leadership, herica's op port uni^,- Foreign Poolicy. No. 98. Spring 1995. p. 7 Kr 23 " Lynn E. Davis. Under Secmary of State for Anns Control and Internarional Security Anairs. "The ..\drninisrrarion's Foreign Policy Priorities for 1995 in the Area of Non-Prohferatios" V.S. Department of State Press Reiasc r Internet Source). February 28. 1995. - Dr John I Deutch. Director. CIA, -*Speech at the Conference on Nuclear. Biological. Chemical Weapons Proiiferxion ana Terrorism." DCI Speech (Intemet Source). :May 33, 1996.

I l l

instruments to strengthen the BWC.' The BWC, ratified by 137 countnes, prohibits --the

development, production, stockpihg or transfer of biological agents, weapons, and

mandates the destruction of ail existing s t~ck . "~

The United States also participated in the Australia Group (AG) as one of 28

member nations. This group supports the CWC and BWC as the only means to achieve a

permanent ban on chemical and biological weapons. Additionally, the AG has deveioped

export licensing measures to monitor the trade of chernicd or biological weapons, their

parts. or technoiogy. Other activity described in the letter included the imposition of

sanctions on companies and foreign nationais who had participated in chemical weapons

pro1 iferation activities. 'O These activities formed only a small portion of the non-

proliferation effort undertaken by Clinton.

The administration demonstrated its willingness to take unilateral action to end the

proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Asia Pacific region. Specifically, the removal of

Amencan nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula was a demonstration of

Washington's changing attitude on the necessity of placing nuclear weapons on foreign

soil. Rernoving the weapons was also seen as a confidence building measure, meant to

foster more positive negotiations between North and South Korea regarding

reunification. ' ' Unfortunately, the North chose to continue its nuclear weapon program

"linton. "Letter to Congess from President Clinton on Chernical and Biological Weapons," White House Press Release (Internet Source). February 16. 1995. " Dr Gordon C. Oehler. CIA Direnor of Nonproliferation Center, "Statement for the Record to the Senate h n e d Services Cornmittee." CIA Speeches (Internet Source). March 27. 1996. !O Clinton. "Letter to Congress from President Clinton on Chernical and Biological Weapons," " Sul; Junr Lee and Michael Sheehan. -.Buildinp Confidence and Security on the Korean Peninsula," Contemporarv Secut-itv Policv Vol. 16. 'io. 3, December 1995, p. 388.

in spite of the removal ofArnericm nuclear weapons resulting in a significant regional

Perhaps the geatest achievement of the administration in reducing the

pro1 iferation of weapons of mass destruction was in the Asia Pacific region with the

successful negotiations ha1 ting the Nonh Korean nuclear weapons pmgam. Despite its

efforts. the administration drew condemnation over the deal because it did not address the

suspected Nonh Korean arsenal of one or two nuclear weapons nor !vas it perceived to

end Pyongang's nuclear weapon production capability quickly enough. Criticism of the

dca1 ignored the tact "that motivational strategies ... sometimes demand limited goals for

non-proliferation. at least in the short tertn.*'" Critics have advocated an ail or nothing

approach to arms control in this case however. this did not appear to be a viable strateg.

Hrid Clinton pushed any harder the North would have become recalcitrant and a deal

n i ~ u l d not have been made. The only options open to Clinton had this occurred would

ha\ e been to either accept the gowing Nonh Korean nuclrar weapons capabilih. or

increrisr: tensions on the peninsula. Nrither of these options are very appealing.

The deal which the administration cornplrted wirh Nonh Korea was quite

Iàvourable to the United States. The costs of replacing the weapons grade plutonium

producing nuclear power plants in Nonh Korra have been passed on to both Japan and

South Korea. The only associated cost for the United States wil1 be the provision of oil

to Nonh Korea to compensate for lost powver if required. l 2 This aspect of the agreement

appcars to have been overiooked by cntics but was a considerable coup For the

' llichnel 1 \inzanr. '-Going lust a Lirrle Viiclear." International Security Vol 70. Xo 2. Fall 1905. p 101 ' l l n ~ r i ~ r . ' h i m g Itist a Lirrle Kuclear.'- p 98

113

administration. 1 n effect. Cl inton has ha1 ted the progam and convinced his regional allies

to pay for the clean-up.

The United States was also involved in important bilaterai non-proliferation

discussions with China during the Clinton administration's first term. One contentious

arms control issue between the two powers was the sale of ballistic missiles and missile

technolopy to Pakistan by the Chinese.'' The sale of these missiles, which have a range

of 400 km and a payload of 800 kg, was in violation of a promise made by the Chinese to

former Secretary of State. James Baker, that they would abide by the Missile Technolog

Control Regime (MTCR) prohibition on the export of missiles with a range greater than

300 km. ' j Given the onçoing tension between Pakistan and India, these missiles adcied to

the insecurity between the two neighbouring States. In addition to these sales, the Chinese

were also alleged to have sold nuclear weapons technology to Iran. l 6 The challenge for the

Clinton administration was to curb the proiiferation activities of the PRC.

On August 75_ 1993, upon determining that China had sold the M- 1 1s to Pakistan

in 1991, Clinton invoked sancîions against one Pakistani and eleven Chinese companies

involved in the deal. Additionally, manufacturers of satellite and rocket technology in the

United S tates had their sales to China and Pakistan severely restricted. Clinton appeared

to vacillate again over these sanctions when he permitted the sale of three commercial

satellites to China by Amencan fims in January 1994. However, this was a confidence

II 'licholas D. Kristof, **The Rise of China." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 72. No. 5. November / December 1993. p. 71 '' Drifle. -.The Role of Ams Control in Nonh-East Asia." p. 93. '" Kennerh Lieberthai. '-A Yew China Strateg." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74. No. 6. Yovember l December 1995. p 3 c

1 I - i

building mesure made to address the wonening relations betwern the two counrries at

the tirne. " The utility of this approach becarne apparent in October 1994, when Chinese

Vice Premier, Qian, and Secretary Chnstopher signrd a joint statement by which the

Chinese pledged to abide by the ternis of the MTCR and also joined the United States in

calling for a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.'% response

to the Chinese acceptance of the MTCR, the President lifted the trade sanctions he had

rnacted" Thus, while it took a slight shift in policy on the part of the Clinton

administration, the goal of gaining an agreement to curb the proliferation of strategic

tveapons from China was achieved.

The administration has been criticized for policy shifting regarding the issue of

tcchnolo~g transfer to China. However. Beijing insists that these transfen must occur

and that sanctions rnust be Iified in order to normaiize relations between the two

countries. Thus it is extremely dificuit for the administration io apply pressure on China

n I t h a corn plete embargo on tec hnology tram fers under these circumstances. " Moreover.

sanctions in todafs high technolog marketpiace 0th only hun the manuhcturers of

the çountries which impose them. Thus the policy of compromise undertaken by the

Clinton administration regarding the acceptance of the MTCR by China sermrd most

r d istic and effective under the circumstances.

. - '

Jing-dong l'uan. -'United States Technoio~y Ttanskr Policv Toward China: Post-Cold War Objectives and Strategics." International Journal. Vol. LI.. No. 2. Sprins 1996. p. 526-327 : Y Clirrsropher. "Comprehensive Ensasement in US.-China Relations." L S Deoartment of State Dis~atch Vol b. \o i7. .\prii 24. 1995, p. 354. 8 ' 1

C'linrirn. "Letrer ro the Conyress of the United States," White House Press Release (Internet Source} Slarch 3 1 . 1 oc,3

The United States has also been instrumental in convincing other countries to

refrain h m selling anns technology to China. In May 1996, Washington leamed that

China was attempting to purchase SS- 1 8 ICBM technology Gram Russia This ICBM.

with a range of 11,000 km and the ability to hold a 10 MIRVed warhead, would have

çiven the Chinese govemment a potent offensive nuclear weapons platforni and upset the

strategic balance worldwide. In response to this attempt, Secretacy of Defense, William

Peny, urged both parties to stop, reminding them that such a technology transfer would

violate both START and the MTCR." Pressure from the United States has halted the

transfer and helped to maintain the strategic balance.

Another of Clinton3 successes regarding non-proliferation was the renewal of the

MT. This agreement came into effect on March 5, 1970, and is crucial in promoting non-

proliferation in that it obliges non-nuclear weapons signatories to accept IAEA safeguards

on the use and storage of nuclear material possessed by them. It aiso "remains the only

global legal instrument which commits both the non-nuclear-weapon states to refrain fiom

acquinng nuclear weapons and that commits nuclear-weapons states to seek reduction of

their nuclear arsenals."" Given the significance of the NPT on halting the proliferation of

nuclear weapons arnongst signatones, renewal of this treaty in 1995 was of vital

importance to the CIinton administration.

The NPT Conference which occurred Apnl 1 FMay 12 1995 at the LM

headquarters formed the central focus of the non-proliferation policy of the United States

Brïan Knowlton, *%.S. Opposes Selling Amis Information to China," nie Globe and Mail. Wednesday. May 22. 1996. p. A I O . 7 Y

-- John Simpson and Danyi Howlett. "The 'iPT RenewaI Conference." International Sec*. Vol. 19. No. 1. Surnrner 1994. p. 4 1-12.

116

from late 1994 until the completion of the conference. The efforts of the Clinton

administration in pursuing a permanent renewal of the NPT bore fruit on May 1 1, 1995,

when the treaty was extended indefinite~y.'~ Successful completion of the NPT renewal

process allowed the administration to concentrate on other nuclear ams issues.

Another major nuclear ams control endeavour undenaken by the Clinton

administration was the CTBT. Clinton decided in 1993 to pursue this treaty and

unilaterally demonstrated his cornitment to a test ban by extending the Amencan

moratorium on nuclear testing leading up to the conference. In addition to the test ban,

the administration also called for negotiations to end the production of fissile mate ria^.^"

The CTBT has been under negotiation by the 6 1 nation Conference on Disarmament in

Gsnrva since 1994. Initially, the Chinese were opposed to the treaty primarily on

prccedural çrounds.'* As a sign of its disdain for the CTBT, the Chinese conducted two

nuçlrar weapons tests in 1995." However, United States negotiators were able to reach a

compromise agreement with the Chinese gaining their support for the treaty ." Adding to

the .Amencan di f f icul~ in achieving this treaty was the conduct of testing by the French

in the South Pacific in 1995.

Unfortunately, India and Iran rejected the treaty. The lndian negotiators

" Clinron. -5taternent by the President on the Extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," White House Press Release I lnternet Source). May 1 1 . 1995. " John Holum Direcror U.S. h s Control and Disarmament Agency. "Press Briefing" U.S. Depanment of State Press Release 1 lnternet Source) April 13, 1995.

c - - "China Re.i,erses Stand. Agrees to Global Nuclear Test Ban.'' The Globe and Mail. Thursday, Auest 8, 1996. p. .A 1 o. -"' Mike I I ç C x p . Press Secretary. "Statement by the Press Secretary." May 15. 1995, and ''Press Secretary Statemenr cn China Xuclear Test." August 17, 1995. Both of these statemenrs were taken on the dates indicated trom LVliite Hwse Press Release (Intemet Source).

--China Xe! erses Stand. Agrees to Gtobal Nuclear Test Ban," p. AI O 117

mainiained that they would not s i g unless al1 of the declared nuclear weapons countries -

Britain, France, Russia, China, and the United States, "agree to a scheduled destruction of

their nuclear arsenals.'. While this has prevented the acceptance of the CTBT, the United

States and other members of the Conference on Disarmament agreed at the tirne to put the

treaty before the UN General Assembly, where it is estimated that there is enough

support to pass i t . 'vhis has not yet occurred.

The United States also engaged in m s control rneasures as a result of its

participation in ARF. At the ASEAN conference in Bangkok on December 15, 1995, the

South East Asian rnember States declared the region a nuclear weapons free zone. This

protocol was signed by the ASEAN rnembers only. Neither the United States nor China

signed. The United States objected to the protocol due to the fact that it restrîcted the

passage of naval vessels which are nuclear powered or canying nuclear weapons. This

limits freedorn of the seas and would have required the United State to disclose the nature

of the weapons carried on its vessels. China did not adhere to the protocol as the zone

included some portions of the South China Sea to which Beijing lays daim."

The United States, as part of ARF, helped to enhance conventional a n s control

by agreeing to participate in cornpiling the annual UN Reginer of Conventional Arms. In

July 1994, ARF called upon al1 of its members to comply with the annual conventional

arms report required under the convention. Within ARF, only Brunei, Cambodia, and

'* --India Sralls Test-ban Treaty Ta1ks.'- The Globe and Mail. Thursday. .4ugust 15. 1996. p. A 13. '1 1 - Carivle .\ Thaver. ".41ms Control in South-East hsia." Detènce Analvsis Vol. 12. No. 1 . Apnl 1996. p. SO

I l 8

Laos did not agrer to assent.'" This registry, if it is adhered to by al1 participants. is

useful in creating stability in that it increases transparency in terms of the amount of

conventional weapons held by countries.

Promoting Ideals

Part of United States foreig policy during the latter half of this çentury has brrn

an effort to prornote ideais pertaining to human rights and democracy throughout the rest

of the world. Unfortunately, hurnan rights issues often confiict with American trade or

security interests. In such instances. human rights issues are offen sacrificed to thrsr

othrr aspects of American forei~m policy which are prrceived to be more crucial to the

national interest. While Presidents have &en corne into cnticism for backing down on

human rights. there often is no other reasonabie choice. Thus, much of the criticism over

human rights faced by Presidents is not realistic given the other issues at stake.

Notwithstanding this situation. Arnerican presidents have historically taken rvery

upportunity to promote human rights and democracy whenever and wherever

appropriate. Clinton has not differed in this approach as ctvidenced by his human rights

efforts in the Asia Pacific relion.

The administration's support for the promotion of human rights in the region was

based on the belief that accountable govemment and respect for the rule of law create a

stable environment both within and amongst countries. Moreover, the administration is

convinced that this type of positive atmosphere will lrad to increased prosperity due to

-- --

" III:~\ er ' Irms Control in South-East Asia." p S 1

the Fact that citizens within a counw have more incentive to be productive. As Secretary

Chnstopher stated,

Each nation will find its own way consistent with its history and culture. But a11 have a responsibility to meet international obligations and to respect the standards of the Universal Declaration of Hurnan Rights. America will continue to champion human rights and the movement toward more open so~ieties.~'

Mile the United States has been promoting these values, the Clinton administration has

been carefui in smphasizing that it is not attempting to impose a Westem style society-''

This assertion is important given the resentment former colonial powen throughout Asia

experience when regional couniries perceive that Westem nations are trying to dictate

proper behaviour to them.

Resentment over human rights criticisrn is present in numerous nations in the

world. In the Asia Pacific region. China is particularly suspicious of American efforts to

cffect change. This suspicion causes Chinese leaders to regard the United States as

attempting to create an intemal uprising leading to the eventual overthrow of the

governrnent." Other Asian nations view the American insistence on improving their

humans rights records as an unfair impingement on their ability to develop

economically." Moreover, Westem concepts of human rights, liberalism, and rule of law

are not necessanly shared by other nations. Thus atternpts to instill a value system in

11 Christopher. "America's Strategy for a Peacefùl and Prosperous Asia-Pacifie," U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Vol. 6, No. 3 1, p. 594. " John Shatruck. Assistant Secretary for Democracy. Human Rights. and Labor. "Human Rights and Dernocracy in Asia" U.S. De~artrnent of State Dis~atch. Vol. 6. No. 14, p. 374. 4;

u Kristot: "The Rise of China." p. 73. Frank B Gibney. "Creating a Pacific Community," Foreirrn Mairs. Vol. 72, No. 5. November / December

1993. p. 12.

130

foreign locations are ofien met with disdain." The President rnust weigh these hctors

before deciding to go ahead with action to promote human rights irnprovements in Asian

countries. The American interest at stake must be worth the animosity created by efforts

to effect change.

The challenge to the Clinton administration is disceming where the application of

pressure regarding human rights will benefit Amencan national interests or be merely an

overestension of foreign policy. The criticism Clinton faced over his failure to become

rngaged in the Rivandan crisis of 1994 is a case in point. Those who criticized the

administration For not becoming involved

paid little attention to the relative insigni ficance of Rwanda's stability for American interests. The universal approach common to many advocates of global environmental protection or human rights, commendable in principle, does not discriminate between human rights abuses in Haiti. where proximity and intemal instability made intervention possible and rven necessary, and similar abuses in Somalia. where the United States had few concrete interests.'"

li \\.as genrrally understood that Rwanda was of littlc signiiicance in terms of national

interest. The administration has avoided the global approach to hurnan riçhts and focused

i ts cftorts on areas where Amencan national interest is at stake.

Another challenge presrnted by advocating hurnan rights as pan of foreign policy

is srlrcting the correct rneans to encourage states to respect them. One area where the

administration has faltered was the linkagr of human rights to renewal of MFN for the

PRC. Tnde sanctions or the loss of MFN would have ultimately hun the United States.

" Samiiel P tlunrington. --The Clash of Civi1izations.'- Foreicn Affairs Vol 72. No. 3. Summer 1993. p 40

"'

Koticrt 4 (liast5. Emily B Hill. and Paul Kennedy. --Pivotal States and U S . Strategy." Foreicn ARairs Vol - - ?. ho i . J'lr~ii;in Febniary 19%. p 36

121

The result of not renewing MFN would have been lost business to Arnerican companies.

Clinton realized this and reversai his decision to link renewal of MFN to the Chinese

hurnan rights record." The futility of imposing sanctions against Asian countries to

convince change their human rights policies has increased in recent years due to the

groowing economic interdependence and economic vitality of these nations. The booming

economies have made these countnes less susceptible to American economic pressure.38

Even though many nations in the region conduct considerable trade with the United

States, in today's global marketplace it is not difficult to find another source for a product

or service. Sanctions in general are not an effective way to modifl the human rights

behaviour of other nations. Consequently, the Clinton administration has focused its

efforts in other arenas.

In order to address human nghts concems while not darnaging other aspects of

Arnerican foreign and trade policy, Clinton has focused his efforts through the UN

Human Rights Commission and bilateral discussions. This is particularly the case vis-a-

vis China. Human rights foms part of the agenda in any bilateral meeting between

representatives of the two countries and the United States has joined other nations in

pressuring China through the Bilateral or multilateral pressure is not the only

rnanner in which the United States has attempted to encourage change in the Asia Pacific.

The administration has also embarked upon projects airned at encouraging change

37 Drew Fayan, "Clinton Set to Renew China's Trade Status," The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, May 15, 1996, p. BI 5 . " Yoichi Funabashi. The Asianization of Asia" Foreim Atrairs. Vol. 72, No. 5. November I December 1993, p. 78. 19 Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs," U.S. De~anment af State Dis~atch. Vol. 6 . ' Io . 13, Varch 27. 1995. p. 146.

122

by providing financial support, expertise, and incentives. One such project was the

Democracy Initiatives Project which will provide 51 5 million of aid over five years to

assist in the development of democratic institutions in Asia. A more substantial effort

has been embarked upon in Cambodia through USAID. This program, which commenced

in March 1995, will result in the expendihire of $40 million to improve public health,

infrastructure, build democratic institutions, and to promote economic g r o w h M

Washington substantially increased its efforts to promote democracy and human rights in

Cambodia in August 1995 by providing an aid package worth $55 million. This package

provided S3O million to irnprove prirnary education, SZO million to improve public health

services, and S5 million worth of rice to offset severe food shonages caused by excessive

tloodîng. Additionally, the administration permitted the Overseas Pnvate Investment

Company (OPIC) to operate in Cambodia. OPIC provides insurance financing progams

which would encourage foreign investors to invest in ~ambodia." These efforts will

iikrly help to assist Cambodia in its transition to a democratic government.

The difficulty in assessing the promotion of human rights and democracy as part

of ibreign policy is that there are few quantifiable indicators of success. Certainly, the

Clinton administration has maintained its pressure on human rights violators in Asia

Pac i tic. This has been done through unilateral pressure, bilateral negotiations, or as part

of a rnultilateral effort. Aside from pressure. the United States has provided incentive for

change such as the aid package to Cambodia. AI1 of these efforts have at least served as a

411 Shattuck. "Human Rights and Democracy in Asia" p. 26.1-275. ;' Chnsropher. .-Reaffirming U S Cornmitment to Democracy and Reconstruction in Cambodia" U S. De~anment d' Statt. Dtsnnrch L'ol a. No 33. August 14. 1995. p 634

123

reminder to offendin2 nations that improvement is required. In some cases, such as the

release of Burmese political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi, American efforts have resul ted in

more tangible payoffs.42 Clinton has been effective in his incorporation of human rights

issues as pan of his foreign policy toward the region.

" Mike McCtirry. 5tatement bv the Press Secretary." -White House Press Release (Internet Source). Julv 10. 1995

1 Z-l

Chapter 6: Conclusion

While President Clinton faced much criticisrn regarding the conduct of his foreign

pol icy during his first terni, at the start of his second term the United States position

serms strong with relatively little controversy . This suggests that Clinton had a realistic

Framework within which American foreign policy was conducted in light of the

international environment he operated in. The objective was the economic rejuvenation of

the United States and al1 of the aspects of American foreign policy during this penod

servrd t his goal. Moreover, the aim of economic revi ta1 ization supported the broader

national interest which Clinton had set For his administration. nameiy, the irnprovement

ofthe quality of life for Americans. Nowhere was the success of this foreign policy more

zvident than in the Asia Pacific.

Clearly. Clinton has made mistaks during this period. The major regional enors

involvrd the policy towards China. Specifically. the vr-'"ation exhibited over the

grnntiny of a visa for the Taiwanese Prrsident and thc l inpage between the renewal of

MFN and the Chinese human rights record. There is no question that these incidents

strained relations with BeiJing, howevrr. in the end_ the administration recovered. In

t e n s of his broader policy objectives in the region. Clinton has not made anp major

mors which have scuttled them.

M i t a n .

In ordrr to support the increase in Amrncan economic activity during this period

Clinton's foreign policy had as its first aim the rnhancrment of secunty throughout the

rcgion and throughout the world. To achievr this in the Asia Pacific region. he adopted

the existing secunty framework and modified it to better reflsct the geopolitical realities oot'

the day. Thus, the administration renewed al1 of Arnenca's bilaterai alliances within the

region, and in doing so, demonstrated that the United States was remaining engaged. Not

oniy did Clinton renew the arrangements, he made changes as necessary. This resulted in

an increased support role for the Japanese military, the consolidation of American bases

in Japan, and enhanced military cooperation with the Australians including the

construction of training facilities in Australia. By renewing and revamping these alliances,

Clinton strenphened America's stabilizing role in the region.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the importance of maintaining the presence of

American troops in the region continues. Many of the regional tensions and threats have

rernained unchanged. Adding to the traditional tensions is the increasing economic

strength and cornpetition amongst states in the region. This newfound weaith has enabled

most countries to improve their arsenals. This in tum has led to increased tension and

uncertainty. Thus the requirement for the United States to continue its role in reducing

regional insecurity has not been lessened. The Clinton administration recognized this and

rnhanced the abiiity of the United States to carry out this vital fùnction.

The necessity of the presence of the United States forces was demonstrated quite

clearly by two incidents which occurred in the region during this period. The most

srrious was the revelation that the North Koreans had developed a substantial nuclear

weapons program. In seeming to halt this program in its tracks, the Clinton

administration demonstrated leadership, resolve, and flexibility. The contribution this

t.ffm made to regional and world peacr was quite substantial and has a potentially lasting

impact. This potentially Iatiny impact will only ocçur provided North Korea does not

collapse into a state of anarchy due to its destitute intemal condition. Rrcent peaceful

ovrnures to the South by North Korea, including an apology for sending a submaiinr to

spy on the South. indicate that perhaps Pyonbyanç will become more accommodating in

the îùture. Another major incident in which the United States demonstrated the

continued importance of its security guarantee in the region was the Chinese sabre rattling

over Taiwan. The administration's decision to depioy the 7th Fleet to the arra during the

height of the crisis reminded Beijing that the United States had the abili- to muster a

formidable force in the region and had the political resolve to use it. This resulted in more

inoderate Chinese behaviour. These two incidents provide tan~ible proof of Clinton's

contribution to regional stability during his first term.

In addition to rnaintaining and enhancing traditional alliances. the administration

d s o contributed to stability by influencing the creation of a regional rnultilatenl secunty

iipparatus. This body, the ARF. was largely the rrsuit of American diplomacy and

w w d to reduce tensions by prornoting dialogue iirnongst members. This achievement

\vas al1 the more impressive in light of the reluctance on the part of many regional States

io tom such a body. While the ARF did not contribute significantly to regional security

in an? panicular incident, it has the potential io do so in the future.

Anothrr aspect of American Foreign policy which mhanced security in the region

K;I.F the administration's arms control program. In this area. much of the effort was

fi1cust.d international ly as evidrnced by the successful renrwal of the NPT. Rrnewal of

t h i i crucial a m s control treaty was largrly due to Ainerican diplomacy and will

contribute to international, and thus regional, secudy for the foreseeable future. Another

major effort on the part of the Clinton administration in this area was the attempt to

complete the CTBT. Unfortunately, the United States has not yet realized this goal,

however, Clinton has continued to push for the concIusion of this important treaty.

Regional successes regarding amis control were a h achieved by the

administration. Of paîticular importance was the pressure applied on China to stop the

sale of missiles to Pakistan. In convincing Beijing to case this activity, Clinton aiso

secured the Chinese cornmitment to abide by the MCTR. Provided that the Chinese

honour this pledge, a major supplier of missiles and missile technology will no longer

contribute to the proliferation of these weapons. Another substantial non-proliferation

success was achieved by the administration when it convinced the Rwians to cancel

plans to sel1 ICBMs to China. Efforts such as these have enabled the administration to

have a positive influence on regionai security in Asia Pacific.

Economic Vitaiity

The enhanced security which the United States provided to the region allowed

Clinton to stive towards increasing trade to the region With regard to trade, the

administration has consistently negotiated to remove foreign barrien to Amencan goods

and services worldwide. In this respect, Clinton achieved considerable success in the

region, particuiarly in Japan where numerous de& were negotiated to increase American

and international access to Japanese markets. These deals were reached largely due to the

successful negotiation of the Framework Agreement between Washington and Tokyo

under the Clinton administration. This Framework pavrd the way t'or the mu1 titude of

deats between the two countries which followed.

Japan was not the only Asia Pacific country in which American businesses gained

casier access during Clinton's first tem. Due to rhe cessation of the trade embargo and

punuant normalization of relations with Vietnam, considerable business was conducted

thete by American companies for the first time since the carly 1970s. This took

notewonhy leadership on the part of the Clinton administration cjven the emotional

Irgacy of the Vietnam War on the Amencan psyche. Moreover. by normalizing relations

wirh Virmam Clinton risked inflarning those critics who regularly attacked him for

avoiding active service during the war. Despite these potentially damaging deterrents,

Cl inton pushed the normalization issue through and in doing so created substantial

business oppominities for Americans.

These were not the only successes rnjoyed by the administration regarding trade

In the rtgion. Throughout the Asia Pacific, numerous business deals were consummated

Li!. Leu administration oficials, such as Secreta- Christopher. The aim of these public

displqs was to demonstrate to the Asians that the United States was keenly interested in

increasing the amount of trade and services it provides in the area. These and other

cffons ielated to trade undertaken by Clinton during his first term did substantially

incrrase the amount of Amencan espons headed for the Asia Pacific region and

throughout the world. While Clinton was not successful in reducinç the trade deficit, as

he had hoped. the massive iocreasi: in exports coupled with an effective fiscal poiicy,

including substantial govemment spendiny cuts. did result in a significant decrease in the

budget deficit. At the end ofTlinton-s fint terni, the American rconomy had made

considerable gains and the United States was beginning to enjoy the economic

rejuvenation that Clinton had pledged it wouid.

Promoting IdeaIs

[n keeping with traditional Arnerican foreign policy, Clinton embarked upon a

program of urging other nations to respect intemationally accepted standards of human

rights and promoting democracy throughout the world and within the Asia Pacific region.

This aspect of the administration's foreign policy complemented the othen in that the

spread of these values and practices is perceived to create an international amiosphrre

more conducive to positive relstions amongst states. It is thought that improved

observance of human rights within states will reduce the propensity of people to resort to

destructive brhaviour such as revolution, terrorism, or sabotage, and ~ i l l reduce the

number of citizens who feel compelled to become refugees. The administration focusrd

its efforts on promoting human rights and democracy through such bodies as the UN and

APEC. through bilaterai discussions with various govemments, and through the provision

of aid such as the progam in Cambodia.

The decision to pursue human nghts issues through these international bodies was

a reasonable one since thrre is no indication that an increase in pressure on a particular

country wiil have any tangible results. In light of this, there is no compelling argument for

increasing economic sanctions to try to force countnrs such as China to change.

Sanctions would have resulted in lost business for American firrns and consequentiy

wvouid have damaged United States interests. Another compelling reason to attack the

human riyhts records of other countrirs through international bodies is the reduction in

risk such a move rntails. If the rffons of these groups fails to effect human rights

improvsrncnts thrn the administration c m pass the responsibility for the failure onto the

The national interest of the United States is not directly threatened by these

ri y hts violations. rather the ideals of the United States are. However, in most cases. the

national intrrest is somethiny of greater importance than ideals. Only when thrsc rights

violations lead to a reduction in American security such as could occur in the case of a

rwolution do they become matters of national interes t. Unless thesi: circumstancrs occur.

il 1s unrealistic to expect the Clinton administration to have committed itself to a greater

rsteni than it did in promoting human rights in the Asia Pacific region.

The Poiitical Landscape

The political conditions under which Clinton \vas elected differed substantially

rioin thosr which existrd for any other Presidrnt in the latter half of the 20th century.

Prrtvious administrations operated within the contest ol'facing a very real and irnmediate

ilircrii to Arnrncan national security. This threat was generally presented by the ongoing

cornpetition with the Soviet Union or. following its demise. the threat of Iraqi hegernony

in the Middle East under Sadaam Hussein. While. the correct course for meeting these

ilireats was not always agreed upon. the Presidents operating under this circurnstance did

ai lrnst have the consensus that these threats had to be challenged. In the absence of these

iininediate threats to Amencan seçurity. it has been dificult for Clinton to gain a

consensus t'or man? of the foreiyn policy initiatives htr has undertaken.

Cornpounding the dificulty in gaining the support for foreign policy was the

retum of a Republican majority to Congress. the first in forty years. at the mid-ten

elrctions in 1994. The partisan attacks on Clinton3 decisions have been numerous, and

often unrealistic. Conservative Republican lawmakers such as Newt Gin@ch. Roben

Dole, ksse Helms and others have al1 been vociferous in their opposition to Clinton's

foreign policy throughout the fiat tem. Yet these, and numerous other, critics of the

administration have offered few realistic alternatives to the major policy initiatives

undertaken by Clinton.

Clinton's dificulty in gaining a consensus regarding foreign policy issues is not

only domrstic. Again. the absence of a clear and immediate threat to world security has

resulted in a situation where allies of the United States no longer feel as inclined to accept

Amencan leadership on major issues. Strengthening this tendency is the decline of

Amencan economic power relative to its allies. The impact of economic decisions made

in the United States on other nations is no longer as great as it was a decade ago.

Consequently, other nations feel less of a necessity to acquiesce to American desires.

Summation

Despite the many factors which rnitigate against a continuation of American

leadership. the Clinton administration has enacted a foreign policy which has strengthened

Washinsqon's international influence. He has successfully dealt with nurnerous crises

during the first tem. In the Asia Pacific aione, Clinton kept Chinese ambitions for

expansion in the Spratly Islands and the subjugation of Taiwan in check, and he has halied

the Nonh Aorean nuclear weapons prohgarn and completed an agreement which could

eventually result in the dismantling of the existing arsenal. Moreover, hr has added to

regional stability through the creation of a multilateral secunty organization and by

renrwing and modifying existing bilateral treaties. Economically, the administration

contributed to an aîmosphere of freer trade both in the Asia Pacific region and the world.

H is etTons signiticantly strengthened the economic wel l-being of the United S tatrs.

Furthemore, Clinton continued to promote ideals and democracy throuçhout the world

but not at the expense of American national inierests. In short, Clinton has done a11 that

hr could be reasonably expected to do.

To have embarked upon a more ambitious foreign policy would have required an

sffon that the American public would not have supponed. This is particularly tnir in the

absence of a clear and ominous threat to national security. Undrr this circumstancr.

consensus building for expensive foreign prognms is estrrmely di ficuit. Congress and

thc public did not provide any indication that the? w r c willing to support a level of

ingagement above that attainrd by Clinton during his lirst term. Consensus building

amongst traditional Amencan allies was also çharactrrizrd by this change in international

relations. Thus there is little evidence to suggest that an increased lave1 of Arnerican

international involvement would have accomplished an? more than the administration

achirvrd. Therefore. Clinton's eclectic approach to foreiyn policy as conducted in the

-\sis Pacif c region was not oniy eftéctivr in tems of its achievements. but also cost

etYtxtive.

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Caplan. Richard, and Feffer, John. "Challenges of a New Era," State of the Union 1994. Westview Press: Boulder CO., 1994. Edited by Caplan, Richard, and Feffer, John. p 12- 29.

Covanaugh, John; Broad, Robin; and Weiss. Peter. '-Foging a New Deal," State of the Union 1994. Westview Press: Boulder CO.. 1994. Edited by Caplan, Richard, and Feffer, John. p. 29-45.

Chase. Robert S., Hill, Emily B., and Kennedy. Paul. "Pivotal States and U.S. Strateby," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 75, No. I , January/February 1996, p. 33-5 1.

Christensen, Thomas J. --Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 75, No. 5. SeptembedOctober 1 996, p. 3 7-52.

Christopher, Warren. -'America's Leadership, Arnerica's Opponunity," Foreign Policv. No. 98, Spn'ng 1995, p. 6-29.

Clarke, Jonathan. "Leaders and Followen," Foreign Policy. No. 10 1, Winter 1995-96, p. 37-5 1.

Clinton, William, and Gore, Alkn . Putting People First. (Random House: Toronto, 1992).

Dole, Bob. "Shaping America's Global Future," Forei-gn Polic~. No. 98, Spring 1995, p. 39-43.

Drifie, Reinhard. 'The Role of Arms Control in North-East Asia," Defense Analysis. Vol. 12, NO. 1 , Apnl 1996, p. 87- 100.

Freeman, Chas. W., Ir. --'Sino-American Relations: Back to Basics," Foreign Policv. No. 104. Fall 1996, p. 3- 17.

Funabashi, Yoichi. -'The Asianization of Asia," Foreigp Affairs. Vol. 72, No. 5, NovernbedDecember 1993, p. 75-85.

Gaddis, John Lewis. How Relevant was U.S. Shate~v in Winning the Cold War? Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College: PA., March 17, 1992.

Gallaghrr, Michael G. -'China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Srcuritv. Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, p. 169- 194.

Ganen, Jefîery E. "1s Arnerica Abandoning Multilateral Trade?" Foreikm Affain. Vol. 74. No. 6, NovembedDecember 1995, p. 50-62.

Gibng, Frank B. "Creating a Pacific Community," Foreign AAWirs. Vol. 72, No. 3. NovembedDecember 1 993, p. 70-25.

Gilbert, Marc Jason. "Tigers in the Shatterbelt: ASEAN Security Architecture to the Year 3000 and Beyond," Asian Security to the Year 2000. Edited by Dianne L. Smith. (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College: PA, Dec 15, 1996) p. 105- 1 1 8.

Godwin, Paul H.B. "China's Security Policy Enters the 2 1st Century: The View from Beijing,"Asian Securitv to the Year 7000. Edited by Dianne L. Smith. (Strategic Studies [nstitute. U.S Army War Collegr: PA, Dec 15, 1996) p. 37-64.

Greenberger, Robert S. --Dateline Capitol Hill: The New Majority 's foreign Pol icy." Forei- Policy. No. IO I . Winter 1995-96. p. 159- 169

Halloran. Richard. T h e Rising East," Forei~m Policv. No. 1 O?. Spring 1996, p. 3-2 1 .

Halperin. Morton, H. .'Guaranteeinç Democracy," Forei~q Policv. No. 9 1, Surnmer 1993. p. 105-123.

Hou. Jack W.; Ichimura, Shinichi; Naya, Seiji: Wrrin. L m : and Young, Leslie. '-Pacific Rim Trade and Development: Histoncal Environment and Future Prospects," Contemporarv Economic Policv. Vol. XiIi, October 1995, p. 1-25.

Howlrtt. Danyl, and Simpson, John. "The NPT Renrwal Conference," International Securitv. Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, p. 4 1-71.

Huntington, Samuel P. -'The Clash of Civilizations." Foreign Araks. Vol. 71, No. 3. Summer 1993, p. 32-49.

t!\.land. William G. " A Mediocre Record," Foreiyp Poliçy . No. 10 1. Winter 1 995-96, p. 70- 74.

Johnson. C.. and Kehn, E.B. -' The Prntagon's Ossified Strateby..' Foreth- Policv. Vol. 74. No. 4. July/Augu~t 1995, p. 103- 1 14.

Johnson. Loch K. America as a World Powr. McGraw-Hill Inc.; New York, 199 1 .

Kim. Abraham, and Taylor, William J. Jr. "The K o r r s in the Changing Northeast Reg ion." Asian S ~ C U ~ ~ V to the Yrar 1000. Edi trd Li!. Dianne L. Smith. (S trategic Studies Institute. U.S A m y War College: PA. Drc 15. 1996 1 p. 1-36.

KI intwonh, Gary. "China's Evolving Relations hip with APEC," International Journal. Vol. L. No. 3. Summer 1995, p. 488-5 15.

Korb. Lawrence J. "Our Overstuffed A m r d Forces." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74. No. 6. NovembeciDecember 1995. p. 27-34.

Kristoff. Nicholas D. -*The Rise of China." Foreign Atfairs. Vol. 72, No. 5, Novem brdDrcember 1993. p. 59-74.

Kull. Stevrn. "What the Public Knows that Washington Dosen't," F0rei.m Policv. No. 1 O 1. Winter 1995-96. p. 107- 1 15.

Lake, Anthony . Tonfronting Backlash States," Foreign Affain. Vol. 73, No. 2, Marc h/April 1 994, p. 45-55.

Layne, Christopher., and Schwarz, Benjamin. "Arnerican Hegernony - Without an Enemy,-' Forci-gn Policy. No. 92, Fall 1993, p. 5-23.

Lee, Suk Jung, and Sheehan, Michael. " Building Contidence and Security on the Korean Peninsula," Contemporary Security Policy. Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1995, p. 267-298.

Lieberthal, Kenneth. "A New China Strategy," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74, No. 6, NovembedDecember 1 995, p. 35-49.

Mandelbaum, Michael. -'Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs. Vol 75, No. 1, January/February, 1996, p. 16-32.

Mastel, Greg. "Beijing at Bay," Forein Policy. No. 104, Fall 1996, p. 27-34.

Maynes, Charles William. "A Workable Clinton Doctrine," Forei-gn Poky. No. 93. Winter 1 9 9 3 1994, p. 3-2 1.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ . "Bottom-up Foreign Policy,' Forei-rn Policv. No. 104, Fa11 1996, p. 35-53.

Mazarr, Michael J. "Going Just a Little Bit Nuclear," international S e c u r i ~ . Vol. 10, No. 7, Fa11 1995, p. 92- 122.

Nelson. Mark M. "Transatlantic Travails," Foreign Policy. No. 92, Fa11 1993, p. 75-9 1

Nye, Joseph S., Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defence for international Security. "The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreign Affain. Vol. 74, No. 4,luly/August 1995, p. 90- 102.

Overholt William H. "China After Deng," Foreim Affairs. Vol. 75, No. 3, May/June 1996, p. 63-78.

Oxnam, Robert. B. "Asia/Pacific Challenses," Foreign Affairs. p. 58-73.

Rielly, John E. "The Public Mood at Mid-Decade," Foreign Policy. No. 98, Spring 1995. p. 76-93.

Raskin, Marcus. "Corning in From the CoId?" Altered States. Olive Branch Press: New York, 1992, p. 70-82.

RauC Tariq. "Test Ban Treaty: Asian Concems," CANCAPS Bulletin. No. 10, August 1996, p. 8- 1 O.

Rosnrr. Jeremy D. "The Know-nothings Know Something," ForeiLm Policv. No. I O 1. Winter 1995-96, p. 1 16- 158.

Ross, Robert S. --Enter the Dragon," Foreign Policv No. 104, Fail 1996, p. 18-25.

Roy, Denny. "Hegemon on the Horizon," International Securitv. Vol. 19, No. 1. Summer 1994, p. 149-168.

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "Back to the Womb?" Foreign Affairs. Vol. 74, No. 4, Juiy!August 1995. p.?-8.

Schlesinger. lames. "Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," F o r e i . ~ Affairs. Vol. 71. No. 1, p. 17-28.

Srgal. Genld. "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Srcuritv. Vol 10. No. 4. Sprins 1996, p. 107- 135.

Smith. Gaddis. "What Role for America?" Current Historv. Apnl 1 993, p. 150- 1 54.

Snyder, Craig A. '-Making Mischief in the South China Ses,.' CANCAPS Papier. No. 7 Auçust 1995.

Sokolsky, Joel J. "[nenia, Interests and Ideals: U.S. Intervention in the Post Cold War Era i Draftj.-' Paper presented to the Twelfih Annual Poiiiical Studies Student Conference --International Intervention: A Challenge to World Order," University of Manitoba, W innepeg, Canada, Frbruary I -3, 1 996.

Stsdrnan. Stephen John. "The New Interventionists," Foreign AKairs. Vol. 77, No. 1. 1993. p. 1-16.

Thayer. Carlyle A. "Ams Control in South-East Asia." Defence Analvsis. Vol. 17, No. I . Apnl 1996, p. 77-86.

Tonelson. Alan. "The End of Intemationalisrn'?" The New Republic. Frbruary 13. 1 989. p. 23-25.

------------------ , "Superpower Without a Sword." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 71, No. 3. Summer 1993- p. 166-180.

Ullman, Richard H. "A Late Rrcovery," Foreign Policy. No. 10 1, Winter 1995-96, p.76- 79.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. "Foes as Friends," Foreim Policy. No. 90, Spnng 1993, p. 145- 157.

Walsh, James. "At Long Last Peace," T h e . Vol. 143, No. 7, February L4, 1994, p. 14- 19

Wood, Peny. "The United States and Southeast Asia: Towards a New Era," Asian Securiw to the Year 2000. Edited by Dianne L. Smith. (Strategic Studies Institute, U-S Amy War College: PA, Dec 1 5, 1996) p. 1 19- 156.

Yuan, Jing-Dong, "United States Technology Transfer Policy Toward China: Post-Cold War Objectives and Strategies," International Journal. Vol. LI, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 3 14- 338.

Zagoria, Donald S. "Clinton's Asia Policy," Current History. Vol. 92, No. 578, December 1993, p. 40 1405.

Zoellick Robert B. "China: What Engagement Shouid Mean," The National Interest. Winter 1996197 p. 13-22,

''China," Central LnteIiigence Agency Country Report: 1995 (Intemet Source) 1996.

"East Asia's Secunty Wobbles," The Economist. December 23, 1995 to January 5, 1996, p. 35-37. T h e Improbable Statesman," The Economist. Decernber 16, 1995, p. 14.

"The Tide of Red Ink," The Economist November 18, 1995, p. 17- 18.

"The World at His Feet," The Economist. October 14, 1995, p. 29-30.

"Why Asia StiIl Needs Amerka," The Economist. November 18, 1995, p. 16.

Newspaper Articles

Bertram, Christoph. "There is a Foreign Policy," International Herald Tribune. Novernber 1 7, 1 993, p. 6 .

Bnuchli, Marcus W. "China's Top Leaders Putting on a Friendly Face," The Globe and Mail. Thursday, July 1 1, 1996, p. A 13. -

Casella, Emelia "Focus on Commerce at Bangkok Sumrnit," The Globe and Mail. Friday, March 1, 1996, p. 55.

Casey, Ethan. "Manila Keeps Wary Eye on South China Sea," The Globe and Mail. Saturday, February 10, 1996, p. A 12.

---II------ . "Suharto's Health a Guessing Game," The Globe -and Mail. Wecinesday , July 10, 1996, p. Ag.

Cohen, Andrew. "Ideological Disputes Won't Be Ignore&" The Globe and Mail. Friday, February 9, 1996, p. A 16.

Cook, Peter. "A Smoking Gun in the U.S.," The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, July 10, 1996, p. B2.

Eliason, Marcus. "War of Nerves Escalates as Dream of Reunification Fades," - The Ottawa Citizen. Saturday, March 9, 1996, p. A6.

Fagan, Drew. "Clinton Set to Renew China's Trade Statu," The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, May 15, 1996, p. B 1 & B 15.

-_L_l__-_____ . "US. SIaps China with Massive Trade Sanctions," The Globe and Mail. Thursday, May 16, 1996, p. B 1 & B4.

_______I-______ . 'Clinton Defends MFN Rank for China." The Globe and Mail. Tuesday, May 3 1, 1996, p. 88.

Fraser' Graham. 'Clinton Gains frorn Triumphs. Tragrdirs, " The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, J d y 3 1, 1996, p. A 10.

Gordon, Michael F. "U.S. Will Urge U.N. to Plan Sanctions for North Korea," The New York Times. Sunday, March 20, 1994, A I & AZO.

Knowlton, Brian. "U.S. Opposes Selling Arms Information to China," The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, May 72, 1996, p. A 10. - Mickleburgh, Rod. ''China Raises Stakes with New War Drill Closer to Taiwan," The - Globe and Mail Saturday, March 16, 1996, p. A 1 -A?.

-----------UC--I--- , "US. Set to Impose Tariffs on China,'. The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, May 15, 1996, p. A 1 -A-.

Pollack, Andrew. "Motorola, Japanese F i m Reach Agreement," The Globe and Mail. Saturday, March 12, 1994, p. B 1 & 84.

Powell, Stewart. "U.S., Japan Reach Military Deal," The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, April 17, 1996, p. A IO.

Richardson, Michel. "Asians Expect to Answer Air Threat," The Globe and Mail. Friday, Febnüuy 9, 1996, p. A 16.

------------CI----- . "China's Muscle Womes Asians," The Globe and Mail. Friday, March 8, 1996, p. Al & A I 5

-----O-----*- . 'Treedom of Sea Underlies Tensions," The Globe and Mail. Tuesday, March 19, 1996, p. A 14.

-O-----.---LILI----- . "Indonesians Pressed to Open More Sea Lanes," The Globe and Mail. Thursday, May 16, 1996, p. A 19. - --------- . "U. S., Australia to Strengthen Defence Alliance," The Globe and Mail. Friday, July 26, 1996, p. Ag. - Sanger, David E. "'North Korea Said to Block Taking of Radioactive Samples fkom Site," The New York Times. Wednesday, March 16, 1994, p. Al & A5.

ShemlI, MichaeI S. "Unlock the Shackles," Time Magazine, Vol. 147, No. 24, June 10, 1996, p. 37.

Stackhouse, John. "Young Asians Rage at Those in the Driver's Seat," The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, JuIy 3 1, 1996, p. Ag. - Tyler, Patrick. "Chinese get Top Russian Jets as Military Leaders Win Round," The Globe and Mail. Thmday, Febniary 8, 1996, p. A16.

"Agriculture Looming as Major APEC Issue," The Globe and Mail. Thursday, Novernber 16, 1995, p. A1 8.

"China Rattles Sabre at U.S.," The Globe and Mail. Monday, March 18, 1996, p. A 1 & AS.

"China Reverses Stand, Agrees to Global Nuclear Test Ban," The Globe and Mail. Thursday, August 8, 1996, p. A 10.

"Clinton Amounces Increase in Economic Aid to Ukraine," The Globe and Mail. Saturday, March 5, 1994, p. A13.

-'If Indonesia Erupts," The Globe and Mail. Monday. Augut 5, 1996, p. A 13.

"Japanese Surplus Cut Nearly in HaIf," The Globe and Mail. Monday , March 1 8, 1996, p. A9.

"EU Moves to Counter Helms-Burton," The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, July 3 1 , 1996, p. Ag.

"India Stalls Test-ban Treaîy Talks," The Globe and Mail. Thursday, August 15, 1996, p. A13.

"No Sanctions Against China," The Globe and Mail. Saturday, May 1 1 , 1996, p. Al 8.

"Taiwan Threatens to Hit Back at China," The Ottawa Citizen. Saturday, March 9, 1996, p. A6.

"U.S. Has Military Clout, Chinese Remindeci," The Globe and Mail. Wednesday, March 20. 1996, p. A 1 1.

"US. to Authorize Trade Sanctions Against Japan," The Globe and Mail. Tuesday, February 15, 1994, p. B3.

--When North Korea Goes Critical," The Globe and Mail. Thursday, May 30, 1996, p. A23.