economy & rates rate 12...economy & rates december 2015 (figures and charts updated on 10...

Economy & Rates

December 2015 (figures and charts updated on 10 December 2015)

Bruno Cavalier - Chief Economist, [email protected], 33.(0)1.44.51.81.35

Fabien Bossy - Economist, [email protected], 33.(0)1.44.51.85.38

The Seven Year Itch

Tables of forecasts pages 16-17

Statistical and chart appendix pages 19-43

“Being normal is boring”. (Marilyn Monroe)

Strictement confidentiel

2

• 16 December 2008 – 16 December 2015. Seven years. The Fed will thus have maintained its zero interest-rate policy for seven years. At the end of 2008,

nobody imagined that this measure, taken urgently to avert a 1930s-style depression, would last so long. Nor that it would be replicated in many other

countries, especially in Europe, where interest rates have even gone below zero. Nor that it would be reinforced by massive quantitative easing. In the

past two years, US central bankers have made dozens of speeches about the normalisation of their policy, and everyone has weighed up the arguments

for and against. This is the most painstakingly prepared decision in modern economic history. A return to a more “normal” monetary policy should not

in principle surprise anyone. Can we be so sure about that?

• Despite being warned, no investor can stay completely calm ahead of a change of regime affecting the actions of the most powerful institution in the

world’s leading economy. This change is set to occur in unusual circumstances. Firstly, since there is no precedent for this type of policy (ZIRP + QE),

there is no precedent for its normalisation either. It is not a question of a applying a guiding principle tried and tested by experience. What’s more, the

Fed has demonstrated through its hesitations over the past year that its assessment of the risk and rewards of a rate hike have fluctuated sharply. At the

start of the summer, the Fed seemed to be on the verge of exiting the ZIRP. At the end of the summer, this decision was put on hold, and today, three

months later, it is back on the table. We shudder at the thought that each rate increase (the second, third, etc.) will give rise to similar reversals. The Fed

claims to manage market expectations by setting a course, but it creates volatility if it does not follow it.

• The monetary question is inseparable from that of inflation. It is the weakness of inflation that has allowed the Fed to justify being so patient. Now that

the US economy has returned to full employment and wages are starting to accelerate, the context is quite different. Although global forces continue to

put pressure on prices (technology, ageing demographics and China’s economic transformation), inflation did not weaken in 2015 beyond what is due to

plummeting commodity prices. Excluding the oil effect, inflation has picked up slightly in developed countries. Core inflation is not abnormally low by

historic standards. In the Eurozone, where capacity utilisation is still far from its pre-crisis level, the ECB president nonetheless recently acknowledged

that “the risk of deflation in the Eurozone is firmly off the table” (4 December). This is a thematic rotation that appears highly important to us.

• In 2015, world growth will have been a little weaker than hoped. It will have slowed instead of accelerating. More than 40% of the disappointment is down

to two countries, Brazil and Russia (a total of around 6% of world GDP), the only two countries to be mired in a severe recession. The rest of the

slowdown is due to other emerging countries and commodity producers, and more modestly to China (despite concerns of a hard landing). In contrast,

the Eurozone is the sole region to have delivered positive surprises in 2015. This point is often overlooked or underestimated. The factors for a

continued acceleration of the European recovery are in place: an expansionary policy mix, a credit recovery and a decline in unemployment.

• There are risks in any scenario. One of the possible sources is oil. In 2015, few subjects have been spared the repercussions – positive or negative – of

the oil counter shock: a redistribution of growth, low inflation, capital flows, volatility in exchange rates and stock market indices. The central view of oil

experts is that prices will be stable or rise modestly over the next two years. This is the working assumption behind our macroeconomic forecasts, but

basic caution obliges us to recognise that very different scenarios are possible, both on the upside and downside. Geopolitical risks have intensified in

recent months, creating the combination of a migration crisis and a security crisis in Europe. The direct effects on activity will be modest, but the

political consequences may be considerable, both in the lead-up to the French presidential election and in the debate over Brexit in the UK.

Summary The Seven Year Itch


[Date]

3

Post-mortem of 2015: forecasting errors As in 2014, global growth is half a point below the level forecast at the start of the year. The oil counter shock has

shaved around one point off global inflation

Sources: Consensus Inc, Bloomberg, Oddo Securities.

• Global growth in 2015: estimated at 3.1% vs. 3.7% forecast

– 43% of the disappointment stems from Brazil and Russia

• US: a weak Q1 (temporary shocks)

– Real growth remains above its potential rate

• Eurozone: the only zone to surprise on the upside

– The ECB’s negative message is at odds with reality

• China: high volatility around the same downward trend

– The real surprise concerns the agenda of Chinese authorities

• Global inflation in 2015: estimated at 1.9% vs. 2.9% forecast

– Almost all of the disappointment is due to the oil/commodities effect

• Global core inflation has picked up slightly

– No second-round effects from oil prices on other prices

• Stable medium-term inflation expectations

– Unlike in 2014, when these declined (Eurozone)

• Inflation spike in countries that have suffered an FX crisis

– Latin America, Russia

Weight Forecast* Actual Surprise Forecast* Actual Surprise

2014 at end 2014 at end 2015 at end 2014 at end 2015

PPP$ (a) (b) (b-a) (a) (b) (b-a)

World 100% 3.7% 3.1% -0.6% 2.9% 1.9% -1.0%

US 15.9% 3.0% 2.5% -0.5% 1.9% 0.1% -1.8%

EMU 11.8% 1.1% 1.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1% -0.5%

- Germany 3.4% 1.3% 1.5% 0.2% 1.2% 0.3% -0.9%

- France 2.4% 0.8% 1.1% 0.3% 0.6% 0.1% -0.5%

- Italy 2.0% 0.3% 0.7% 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% -0.3%

- Spain 1.4% 1.9% 3.2% 1.3% 0.4% -0.5% -0.9%

UK 2.4% 2.6% 2.4% -0.2% 1.3% 0.1% -1.2%

Japan 4.4% 1.1% 0.7% -0.4% 1.4% 0.8% -0.6%

China 16.6% 7.0% 6.8% -0.2% 2.1% 1.5% -0.6%

Russia 3.3% 0.1% -3.8% -3.9% 7.5% 15.5% 8.0%

Brazil 3.0% 1.0% -3.7% -4.7% 6.5% 8.9% 2.4%

RoW (e) 42.6% 4.3% 3.7% -0.6% 3.9% 1.9% -2.0%

* based on consensus forecasts data (Bloomberg or Consensus Inc.)

Real GDP growth 2015 Inflation 2015


[Date]

4

Post-mortem of 2015: the themes Macro developments in 2015 have largely reflected the oil counter shock at end-2014/early 2015: very weak inflation,

recession in producer countries/sectors, capital flows and a boost to real consumer income.

Sources: Thomson Reuters, IMF, Oddo Securities.

1) The oil price has changed equilibrium (market supply glut)

– More generally, confirmation of the inversion of the commodities super-cycle

2) Unconventional monetary policies (ZIRP/NIRP/QE) have decreasing

returns

– This explains communication errors/hesitations by central banks

3) Emerging countries truly deserve their name

– Their economic cycle has a much higher beta than that of mature countries

4) Chinese leaders are neither infallible nor omnipotent, but they are

maintaining control of their economic cycle

– The stabilisation of the yuan is a sign of international monetary cooperation

5) The US economy is in full employment but without profits

– It has become untenable for the Fed to maintain the zero interest-rate policy, but at

the same time it is very tricky to exit

6) Deflationary risk in the Eurozone is “off the table” (Draghi)

– The economy is out of the woods, but what about the political landscape?

0

3

6

9

12

10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% Real GDP growth: developed vs emerging countries

Developed countriesEmerging countries ex-ChinaChina

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15

2015 $ Real price of crude oil *

1st oil shock (1973)

2nd oil shock(1979)

* nominal price adjusted for the US core CPI and denominated in 2015$shaded areas are periods or real oil price decline of more than 45% y/y

Gulf war (1990)

Iraq war (from 2003)


[Date]

5

Snapshot of the world economy at the end of 2015 The industrial slowdown amid an oil recession and the inversion of the commodities super-cycle is no longer

worsening. Trade is gradually recovering after a poor H1. Non-industrial sectors are proving resilient to shocks,

allowing unemployment to continue falling

Sources: Thomson Reuters, Oddo Securities.

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% G3 inflation * G3 core inflation *

*US-EMU-China

rising oil prices

collapsing oil prices28

30

32

34

36

38

10 11 12 13 14 15

millions Unemployed (in developed countries*)

*US, EMU, UK, Japan

48

50

52

54

56

58

10 11 12 13 14 15

points World business confidence : non-manufacturing

World business confidence: manufacturing

-10

0

10

20

30

10 11 12 13 14 15

3m/3m % (ar) World trade index (volume)


[Date]

6

Theme of 2016: global inflation With the US and Europe growing above their potential rate, the output gap will continue to narrow as long as monetary

policy remains ultra-accommodative overall. These are the ingredients for a rise in inflation. Upside pressure may

come from geopolitical risk.

Sources: Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg, Oddo Securities.

• What might cause a (slow) return of inflation

• Technical rebound (inversion of base effects on oil)

• Narrowing of the output gap (spillover effect on US wages)

• Rise in post-QE expectations (Eurozone)

• Geopolitical risk (war, trade frictions)

• Still some downside pressures: China, ageing, technology

• Implications

• Monetary policies

• Bond yields

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.01

2

3

4

04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% (inv)y/y% US: wage growth vs unemployment

US wage metric*

US jobless rate (rhs)

* simple arithmetic average of various wage and compensation indicators

40

60

80

100

120

140

1.5

1.7

1.9

2.1

2.3

2.5

13 14 15

$/b% EMU: inflation swap 5y5y Brent (rhs)

2% = ECB's target

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

2014 2015

Brent price ($/b)2014

2015

January July December

-55%-50%

-37%


[Date]

7

Theme of 2016: US profitability at full employment The erosion of domestic profits (≈ -5% y/y) reflects the twin oil + dollar shock. Even if these effects will ease, the US

economy is no longer in the natural phase of accelerating profits. Without productivity gains, growth will slow. Market

valuations are somewhat stretched.

Sources: Thomson Reuters, Fed, R.Shiller website, Oddo Securities.

• Pressures on company margins

• Domestic growth is levelling off (second half of the cycle), although it

is still solid today.

• Companies’ pricing power remains weak

• The underemployment of labour has disappeared

• Financial conditions are tightening (corporate spread)

• Implications

• US stock market

• Volatility

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

77 80 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 07 10 13 16

% US corporate profits/value added ratio

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

77 80 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 07 10 13 16

Z-score US: Labour Market Conditions Index (Fed's LMCI)

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

77 80 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 07 10 13 16

ratio US Shiller's CAPE ratio US Tobin's q ratio (rhs)


[Date]

8

Theme of 2016: the reflation of the Eurozone The Eurozone recovery has external sources (oil, euro) and internal sources (job market, credit and policy mix). In the

short term, there are no unsustainable economic imbalances, not even public debt. A virtuous circle is underway. This

is the zone with the most acceleration factors.


• Should we be worried about an economy where…

• The unemployment rate has been falling for two years

• Household consumption has rarely been as dynamic

• Financial fragmentation has disappeared

• The credit cycle has picked up over the past year

• Public deficits have returned within the authorised limits

• Domestic political risks are secondary

• However, the principal driver, Germany, is experiencing several shocks

• Macro (global demand), sectoral (VW) and political (migrants)

-4

-2

0

2

4

03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

EMU: real retail sales* (year-over-year %)

* 3M moving average -12

-9

-6

-3

0

3

6

03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP EMU credit impulse to the private sector (6mma)*

* credit impulse is the change in new borrowings (as a % of GDP)

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

EMU: unemployment rate (% of LF)


[Date]

9

Theme of 2016: the BRICs, especially the BR (Brazil and Russia) China has loosened its economic policy to stabilise its growth. The trend remains that of a slowdown amid an

expansion of the service sector. Concerns about a hard landing may resurface but are not the baseline scenario.

Elsewhere, trajectories vary: India (strong growth), Russia (stabilisation), Brazil (recession)


• Russia – Brazil: comparable points

• In 2015, the two countries have experienced a very severe recession

(real GDP contracted by almost 4% on average).

• Their currencies have depreciated sharply (by around 40% against

the dollar), triggering a strong inflationary spiral.

• Russia – Brazil: differentiating points

• The policy mix response was swifter, more flexible and, in the end,

more effective in Russia (monetary and fiscal easing). Brazil has lost

all monetary and fiscal credibility (downgrade).

• Signs of a stabilisation of activity in Russia, but not in Brazil.

• The risk of political instability is higher in Brazil than in Russia.

1.5

3.0

4.5

25

50

75

11 12 13 14 15

vs USDvs USD Russian Rubble (lhs) Brazilian Real (rhs)

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

11 12 13 14 15

% Russia policy rate Brazilian policy rate

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

11 12 13 14 15 16

%GDP Russia and Brazil: net public lending (ex. interest)

Russia Brazil

fiscal easing

(e)


[Date]

10

Theme of 2016: Fed’s normalisation After many hesitations, the Fed will end seven years of the ZIRP. There is little disagreement about the end point of the

cycle. But views within the Fed about the trajectory to get to the “normal” level of the Fed Funds rate remain divergent.

This is conducive to communication and management errors.

Sources: Thomson Reuters, Fed, Oddo Securities.

• The advantage of being “gradual” (Bernanke, 2004)

• Take into account the uncertainty of the economic system

• Manage expectations and the reaction by bond yields

• Reduce the risk of financial instability

• “Gradual”… compared with what?

• Past normalisation cycles

• Market expectations

• Macroeconomic figures (unemployment and inflation)

• The frequency of hikes (auto pilot)

3.25

3.50

3.75

4.00

4.25

Ap

ril 2

012

Jun

e 2

012

Se

pt. 2

01

2

Dec. 2012

Mar.

2013

Jun

e 2

013

Se

pt. 2

01

3

Dec.2

013

Mar.

14

Jun

e 1

4

Se

pt. 2

01

4

Dec.2

014

Marc

h 1

5

Jun

e 2

015

Se

pt.2015

% Fed funds: FOMC members average estimate of long-run level

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

0 18 36 54 72

Fed funds at end-of -year (individual FOMC views in Sept. 2015)

end 2015 end 2016 longer run

* each dot represents one FOMC participant

end 2017

median=0.38%

sdt.dev=0.25%median=1.38%sdt.dev=0.69%

median=2.63%sdt.dev=0.72%


end 2018


-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15

% Fed funds rate in real terms (nominal rate - inflation*)

mean

* 5YMA of CPI inflation


[Date]

11

Theme of 2016: the ECB’s decoupling and the euro Inflationary risk in the Eurozone is asymmetrical and biased towards the downside. The ECB has no reason to halt its

unconventional policy prematurely. There is no operational or legal limit to the extension of QE as long as inflation

remains below the target. Divergence from the one-size-fits-all policy will increase.

Sources: Thomson Reuters, ECB, Oddo Securities.

• The ECB’s reaction function (instrument target)

• Balance sheet tool anchor inflation expectations

• Liquidity tool encourage the credit recovery

• Interest rate tool immunise the Eurozone against the Fed cycle

• (Not acknowledgeable) FX tool import reflation

• Implications

• Interest rates / intra-zone spreads / slope of the curve

• Exchange rate (Fed-ECB monetary divergence has been played for

several quarters and is not in itself a reason to push the euro down

against the dollar) 0

10

20

30

40

50

<0.0% 0.0-0.4%

0.5-0.9%

1.0-1.4%

1.5-1.9%

2.0-2.4%

2.5-2.9%

3.0-3.4%

>3.5%

% EMU : probability distribution of inflation forecasts 2Y ahead

Q3 2007 (pre-crisis)

Q4 2015 (current)

ECB's inflationtarget zone

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

0

5

10

15

20

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

y/y%%GDP ECB's assets purchases EMU core inflation (rhs) 7 Dec 2015 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Sw itzerland -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9

Germany EM U 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3

Netherlands EM U 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2

Austria EM U 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3

Finland EM U 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3

Belgium EM U 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3

France EM U 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3

Sw eden 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5

Denmark 0.9 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4

Ireland EM U 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2

Italy EM U 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0

Spain EM U 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0

UK 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5

US 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.6

Portugal EM U 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.0

Yield on government bonds at various horizons (years)


[Date]

12

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

14 15 16

y/y% EMU: inflation dynamics under various oil scenarios

low scenario

high scenario

Theme of 2016: the oil unknown Oil experts (e.g. the IEA) are forecasting a modest rise in the oil price as the supply surplus is run down. But it is

easy to imagine very different trajectories, both on the upside (in case of conflict in the Middle East) and the

downside. The implications for all macro parameters would be severe.

• Alternative scenario for oil

1. Doubling of the price (towards $80/b): decline in OPEC/US shale

production, supply shortages in the Middle East

2. Halving of the price (towards $20): slowdown in demand, increase in

supply (e.g. from Iran)

• Inflation

1. Sharp acceleration in headline inflation (above targets)

2. Return to zero or even negative territory in developed countries

• Activity

1. Consumption ↓ exports ↑

2. Consumption ↑ exports ↓

• Fed / ECB

1. Acceleration of Fed rate hikes, premature end of the ECB’s QE

policy

2. Return of US rates to zero, more QE/NIRP in Europe

• Currencies

1. Depreciation of the dollar, appreciation of emerging currencies

2. Appreciation of the dollar, review of dollar pegs (e.g. Saudi Arabia)

1000

1050

1100

1150

1200

1250

1300

1350

1400

3200

3300

3400

3500

3600

3700

3800

3900

4000

12 13 14 15

bn$ China FX reserves OPEC FX reserves (rhs)



[Date]

13

Theme of 2016: political/geopolitical risk in Europe The migration crisis (a consequence of the Syrian civil war) and the security crisis (Islamic attacks in Europe) are

separate. But they are both increasing the risk aversion of European populations, swelling public deficits and slowing

trade. They are a blessing for anti-EU parties (France, UK).

Source: Wikipedia, Oddo Securities

• Map of political forces in France (at 6 December 2015)

– Front National: 28%, centre-right: 27%, Socialist party: 23%

• Three-party French political landscape

– A 2017 presidential campaign geared to the first round

– Security theme takes priority over economic themes

– Who will Marine Le Pen come up against in the second round of the

presidential election?

• Map of the Schengen area

– Temporary reintroduction of internal border controls

• Responsibilities and consequences of the migration crisis

– Greece: incapable of controlling the external border

– Germany: generous political welcome, with no preparation

– UK: debate about Brexit (see following page)


[Date]

14

Theme of 2016: Brexit and other risks ending in “xit” For internal policy reasons, PM Cameron has promised a referendum on a Brexit by 2017, probably in mid-2016.

Fundamentally, a Brexit makes no sense since the UK is not in the euro or in Schengen. The migration crisis totally

changes the terms of the debate (economy vs. migration) and increases the risk of a Brexit.

Sources: Thomson Reuters, Wikipedia, Oddo Securities.

• The UK referendum on staying in or exiting the EU

• Initial goal: counter eurosceptics and UKIP, ensure David Cameron’s

re-election in 2015 (as happened)

• According to opinion polls, no camp has a decisive advantage

because of the number of undecided voters

• David Cameron’s position is unknown at this stage and depends on

“negotiations” with the EU (to be finalised by February)

• Effects of a Brexit

• At the local level, possible disintegration of the UK (exit of pro-EU

Scotland). It is hard to see any positive effects on the economy

• At the European level, an institutional headache and an

unprecedented victory for anti-EU parties (risk of a domino effect)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Exports to EU Imports from EU Exports to UK Imports from UK

%total UK-EU: trade links2000

2015

UK EU

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

% of total UK: polls on EU membership

Remain Leave Undecided

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Germany(AfD)

UK (UKIP) Spain(Podemos)

Italy (M5S) France (FN)

% Europe: share of votes of main eurosceptic parties


[Date]

15

Theme of 2016: US elections The name of the Republican candidate is the chief unknown in the short term. Donald Trump holds a considerable lead

over his numerous rivals, to the surprise of all political experts. As in Europe, this expresses a criticism of the way in

which institutions function, totally eclipsing the real political debate.

Sources: Wikipedia, Oddo Securities.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

% of total US: polls for the 2016 Republican primary

Trump

Carson

Cruz

Rubio

Bush

• The presidential election

• After Barack Obama’s two terms, this should in theory be an

opportunity to reshuffle the cards. At the electoral level, the

Democrats have an edge (Republican voters are more

geographically and socially concentrated)

• Who will the Republican candidate be? Donald Trump is way ahead

in opinion polls. Experts have been predicting for months a collapse

in his support, but his provocations have instead bolstered his

position. The alternative within the GOP is not clear

• Who will the Democratic candidate be? Barring a surprise, it will be

Hillary Clinton

• Elections to Congress

• The House of Representatives will be entirely renewed (two-year

term). The Republicans should retain a majority (247 out of 435).

The party’s rural base and the setting of electoral districts play in its

favour

• A third of the Senate will be renewed (six-year term). The

Republicans may lose their majority (54 out of 100), since 24 of the

34 seats up for renewal are in Republican hands. It would take a

landslide for either party to attain 60 seats

• Local elections

• Less is at stake locally than at mid-term elections. Around a dozen

governors are putting their seats up for grabs

Date Event

Feb. 1 Iowa caucus

Feb. 9 New Hampshire primary

March 1 Super Tuesday

June 14 Last scheduled primary

July 18-21 Republican convention

July 25-28 Democratic convention

Sept. 26 First national debate

Oct. 19 Last national debate

Nov. 8 Election Day

Jan. 20, 2017 Inauguration

2016 US presidential election


[Date]

16

Table of forecasts (1)

2014 2015 2016 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2015 2016

World 3.4 3.1 3.1

US 2.4 2.5 2.3 0.6 3.9 2.1 1.8 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.6

EMU 0.9 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.5 1.5 1.7

- Germany 1.6 1.5 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.8

- France 0.2 1.1 1.5 2.9 0.2 1.4 0.5 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.1 1.5

- Italy -0.4 0.7 1.6 1.7 1.1 0.8 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 0.8 1.3

- Spain 1.4 3.2 3.1 3.5 4.0 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 2.7

UK 2.9 2.4 2.4 1.5 2.6 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4

Japan -0.1 0.7 0.9 4.4 -0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 0.6 1.3

China (y/y%) 7.3 6.9 6.0 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.9 6.5

* y/y or q/q annualised rate **9 November 2015

FORECASTS - REAL GDP GROWTH*

Consensus**Average 20162015

High Low 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Policy rate

Fed funds 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.96

ECB deposit rate 0.75 -0.20 0.50 0.15 0.00 -0.08 -0.20 -0.30

10Y rate

US T-note 3.6 1.5 2.8 1.8 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.7

German Bund 3.4 0.2 2.6 1.6 1.6 1.2 0.5 0.9

French OAT 3.7 0.4 3.3 2.5 2.2 1.7 0.8 1.2

Forex

EUR/USD 1.45 1.07 1.39 1.29 1.33 1.33 1.11 1.10

USD/JPY 124 77 80 80 98 106 121 121

USD/RMB 6.60 6.05 6.47 6.31 6.15 6.16 6.28 6.51

*monthly average

6.60

Target

3M 12M

-

-

2.5

0.8

0.50

120

3.3

1.3

-

1.10

122

6.43

2.2

0.6

0.25

1.10

FORECASTS - RATES & FX

-0.30

Actual

09/12/2015

Last 5 years* Average

-0.30

1.25

-0.30

0.9 1.1 1.6

Source: Consensus Forecasts, Bloomberg, Oddo Securities.


[Date]

17

Table of forecasts (2)

2014 2015 2016 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

United States

Real GDP 2.4 2.5 2.3 0.6 3.9 2.1 1.8 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.0

Private Consumption 2.7 3.1 2.6 1.7 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.2

Nonresidential Investment 6.2 3.1 3.1 1.6 4.1 2.4 2.5 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0

Residential Investment 1.8 8.5 5.2 10.1 9.4 7.3 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 3.0

Domestic Demand (contribution, %pt) 2.6 2.9 2.6 1.7 3.8 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3

Inventories (contribution, %pt) 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.9 0.0 -0.6 -0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0

Net Exports (contribution, %pt) -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -1.9 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2

Inflation (CPI, % yoy) 1.6 0.2 1.7 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 1.7 1.3 1.7 2.0

Unemployment rate (%) 6.2 5.3 4.5 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2

Euro area

Real GDP 0.9 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.5


Investment 1.3 2.2 2.6 6.2 0.3 0.0 2.4 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.7


Inventories (contribution, %pt) 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.9 0.9 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0

Net Exports (contribution, %pt) 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.7 1.5 -1.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3

Inflation (HICP, % yoy) 0.4 0.0 1.1 -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.6 1.4 1.5


France

Real GDP 0.2 1.1 1.5 2.9 0.2 1.4 0.5 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.0


Investment -1.2 -0.3 1.5 0.7 -0.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.5


Inventories (contribution, %pt) 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.6 -1.8 3.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1

Net Exports (contribution, %pt) -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 1.7 -2.8 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2

Inflation (HICP, % yoy) 0.6 0.1 1.2 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.7 1.5 1.6


* y/y or q/q annualised rate

FORECASTS - KEY MACRO DATA for US, EMU, & France *

Average 20162015

Source: Oddo Securities.


Recently published Oddo Economic Research Visit our new Economic Research website: https://www.oddosecurities.com/#economy

Eco notes

The slow inflation thaw (November 13, 2015)

Waiting for the Fed (October 15, 2015)

The sun is rising in the West, the fog thickens in the East (Sept.10, 2015)

Black box and fixed points (August 24, 2015)

The he euro is dead. Long live the euro 2.0! (July 9, 2015)

The bright side of rising bond yields (June 12, 2015)

The sun is rising in the West, the fog thickens in the East (Sept.10, 2015)

Ready for lift-off... fasten your seatbelts (May 13, 2015)

Black gold – Green light for growth – Red alert on inflation (Jan.15, 2015)

Reflation: passing the baton (September 11, 2014)

Manufacturing in a low pressure world (June 5, 2014)

Europe after the migrant crisis and terrorist attacks (December 4, 2015)

Industrial accident at the ECB (December 4, 2015)

25 ways to ease the ECB’s policy (November 30, 2015)

China's currency: the cooperative game between China and the IMF (Nov.18)

Draghi: heads, I ease, tails, I ease all the same (November 10, 2015)

One year of cheap oil already (November 5, 2015)

Taking stock of the US economy (October 21, 2015)

ECB: how not to find itself (already) with its hands tied (October 19, 2015)

Shocks on the German economic model (October 12, 2015)

Can macro data save European markets? (October 2, 2015)

What would happen if the Fed never raised its rates again? (Sept. 24, 2015)

Greece: much ado about very little (September 17, 2015)

What could trigger a recession in the US in the coming year? (Sept. 3, 2015)

Can the euro’s recent appreciation incite the ECB to action? (Sept. 1st, 2015)

China: a closer look at some received ideas (August 27, 2015)

Economy & Rates (monthly)

Economic Report

Economic calendar (weekly)

18

Focus France (twice a month)

France: what terror, the budgetary constraints! (November 25, 2015)

French economic growth, on the threshold of job creation (November 13, 2015)

France 18 months before the presidential elections (October 28, 2015)

France stripped bare (October 13, 2015)

What does Macron stand for?…or the art of reform in France (Sept.28, 2015)

France: negotiation and negotiators (September 14.2015)

Focus US (weekly)

The US economy really is at full employment (December 4, 2015)

Financial markets ahead of the Fed’s rate hike (November 27, 2015)

US inflation: reports of its death have been greatly exaggerated (Nov. 20)

On Fed’s gradualism (November 13, 2015)

https://www.oddosecurities.com/#economy


[Date]

19

Statistical and chart Appendix

List of appendices

1. Real GDP growth in the major countries (% quarterly change)

2. Contributions to real GDP growth: G7 countries

3. Real GDP growth: G7 countries + China

4. Real GDP growth: countries of Asia excl. China-Japan (selection)

5. Real GDP growth: other countries (selection)

6. Industrial production: G7 + emerging countries (selection)

7. Consumer price inflation: G7 countries + China

8. Consumer price inflation: emerging countries (selection)

9. Unemployment rates: G7 countries

10. Purchasing managers’ confidence (PMI indices): G7 + BRIC countries

11. Consumer confidence: developed countries (selection)

12. Car sales: G7 countries + China + Brazil

13. Central bank policy rates: developed countries (selection)

14. Central bank policy rates: emerging countries (selection)

15. Central bank balance sheets: developed countries (selection)

16. Currency reserves: world and principal holders

17. Current account balances: G7 countries + China

18. Current account balances: emerging countries (selection)

19. Exchange rates against the EUR or USD: major currencies

20. Government debt (as % of GDP): European countries (selection)

21. Sovereign ratings: European countries (selection)

22. Bank financing by the Eurosystem

23. Bank loans to the private sector: European countries (selection)

24. 10-year government bond yield


[Date]

20

Source : Thomson Reuters, Oddo Securities.

Appendix 1 Real GDP growth in the major countries (% quarterly change)

GDP 2014

bn $ current $ PPP $

% % Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3

World * 77329 100.0 100.0 -1.25 1.52 1.46 1.42 1.53 1.54 1.16 1.28 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.90 0.93 0.71 0.77 0.64 0.77 0.99 1.07 0.90 0.65 0.86 1.04 0.74 0.61 0.73 0.95 eDeveloped countries 42022 54.3 37.4 -2.17 0.04 0.29 0.86 0.58 0.95 0.69 0.45 -0.04 0.32 0.53 0.49 0.38 0.09 0.06 -0.12 0.33 0.42 0.55 0.56 0.18 0.39 0.52 0.49 0.40 0.56 0.42 e

Asia excl.Japan 16572 21.4 31.2 0.61 3.48 2.63 2.03 2.75 2.23 1.83 2.16 2.12 1.76 1.51 1.42 1.75 1.42 1.68 1.68 1.39 1.72 1.87 1.52 1.36 1.66 1.95 1.17 1.34 1.43 1.95 e

US 17348 22.4 15.9 -1.4 -0.1 0.3 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.6 -0.4 0.7 0.2 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.9 -0.2 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.5

EMU 13190 17.1 11.8 -3.0 -0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3- Germany 3874 5.0 3.4 -4.5 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.8 2.0 0.8 0.8 1.9 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.5 -0.3 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.7 -0.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3

- France 2834 3.7 2.4 -1.6 -0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.1 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.8 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.3

- Italy 2148 2.8 2.0 -2.9 -0.5 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2

Japan 4602 6.0 4.4 -4.0 1.7 0.1 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.5 -0.5 -2.0 -0.6 2.7 0.2 0.9 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 1.0 0.8 0.5 -0.2 1.2 -1.9 -0.7 0.5 1.1 -0.1 0.3

UK 2950 3.8 2.4 -1.6 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.2 1.0 -0.1 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5

Switzerland 704 0.9 0.4 -1.4 0.0 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.7 -0.2 0.7 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.7 -0.3 0.2 0.0

Canada 1785 2.3 1.5 -2.3 -1.1 0.5 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.2 1.4 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.5 0.8 -0.2 -0.1 0.6

Australia 1443 1.9 1.0 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.0 -0.2 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.9

China 10357 13.4 16.6 1.8 3.4 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.2 1.8 1.4 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.8 2.3 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.8 1.8

India ** 2051 2.7 6.8 -0.8 5.5 2.4 1.4 3.2 2.8 1.9 2.6 2.4 1.1 0.4 2.3 1.7 0.2 1.7 1.6 1.3 2.3 1.7 1.2 1.4 2.1 3.2 -0.1 2.1 1.6 3.5

Korea 1410 1.8 1.6 0.1 1.5 2.8 0.4 2.2 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.3 1.3

Indonesia ** 889 1.1 2.5 1.5 0.9 1.6 1.5 2.1 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.4 0.8 1.2 1.2

Taiwan 530 0.7 1.0 -1.2 3.6 2.6 4.9 1.9 2.7 0.8 0.8 2.7 0.5 -0.5 -1.3 2.5 -0.2 1.7 0.2 -0.1 0.7 0.8 1.8 0.4 0.7 1.5 0.5 0.6 -1.7 0.1

Thailand 405 0.5 1.0 -3.0 2.3 3.2 2.9 2.9 -0.4 0.6 0.4 2.2 -1.4 1.6 -6.3 9.7 1.8 0.7 2.4 0.2 -0.6 0.8 0.2 -0.7 0.7 0.9 1.2 0.3 0.3 1.0

Malaysia ** 338 0.4 0.7 -3.7 2.6 3.0 2.4 1.8 1.4 0.1 1.6 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.8 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.9 -0.2 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.0 1.7 1.3 0.9 0.8

Philippines 285 0.4 0.6 -2.3 1.3 1.7 1.3 3.4 1.9 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.6 2.3 1.0 2.1 2.0 2.2 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.7 0.7 2.3 0.5 2.0 1.1

Singapore 308 0.4 0.4 -2.3 4.4 4.4 -0.5 8.2 5.6 -2.3 2.8 3.1 -0.1 1.6 0.0 2.3 0.6 -1.3 1.9 1.2 2.2 0.1 1.8 0.5 -0.1 0.6 1.2 0.9 -0.7 0.5

Brazil 2347 3.0 3.0 -1.9 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.4 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.5 0.2 0.5 1.5 0.6 -0.2 0.6 -1.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.8 -2.1 -1.7

Chile 258 0.3 0.4 -1.2 0.5 1.7 1.5 -1.3 4.5 2.5 0.6 1.3 0.7 0.5 2.7 0.7 1.8 0.8 1.9 1.3 -0.1 1.7 -0.1 0.8 -0.2 0.4 0.8 1.1 -0.1 0.4

Mexico 1291 1.7 2.0 -3.9 -1.0 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.8 1.5 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.3 0.9 0.6 -1.1 1.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.8

Russia ** 1861 2.4 3.3 -5.1 -0.4 1.5 1.1 1.9 0.8 0.1 1.7 0.8 1.0 1.7 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.4 -0.2 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.5 -1.0 1.2 0.2 -0.1 -3.0 -1.2 -

Poland 548 0.7 0.9 1.3 0.4 0.5 1.5 0.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9

Turkey 798 1.0 1.4 -5.6 5.1 4.1 1.3 0.7 3.1 1.2 4.6 2.5 0.6 1.2 0.8 -0.3 1.2 0.1 0.4 1.7 2.0 0.2 0.7 1.3 -0.2 0.4 1.0 1.5 1.3 -

South Africa 350 0.5 0.6 -1.6 -0.3 0.2 0.7 1.2 0.6 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.3 1.2 -0.4 0.1 0.5 1.0 0.3 -0.3 -

* as usual, w orld w eighting is based on real GDP at PPP exchange rate (IMF data)

** for those countries, seasonaly-adjusted f igures by Oddo Securities

2011

Real GDP change (Q/Q non annualised, %)

2012 2013 2014 2015

Weights 2014

2009 2010


[Date]

21


Appendix 2 Contributions to real GDP growth: G7 countries

Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis

1999-2007 Q3 08-Q2 09 2010 to date Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3

US

Real GDP qoq % 0.7 -1.0 0.5 -1.4 -0.1 0.3 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.6 -0.4 0.7 0.2 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.9 -0.2 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.5

- Inventories 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.3 -0.5 0.7 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1

- Net exports -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.6 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 -0.1

- Final demand 0.8 -1.1 0.5 -1.4 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 0.2 1.1 0.4 0.8 -0.1 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.7

Japan

Real GDP qoq % 0.3 -1.7 0.3 -4.0 1.7 0.1 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.5 -0.5 -2.0 -0.6 2.7 0.2 0.9 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 1.0 0.8 0.5 -0.2 1.2 -1.9 -0.7 0.5 1.1 -0.1 0.3

- Inventories 0.0 -0.4 0.1 -1.8 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.4 -0.2 0.4 -0.5 0.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.4 1.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.5 0.3 -0.2

- Net exports 0.1 -0.7 0.0 -1.7 1.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -1.2 1.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.4 0.2

- Final demand 0.2 -0.6 0.2 -0.5 0.6 -0.3 0.9 0.2 0.6 1.0 -0.5 -1.2 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.3 0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.1 1.6 -3.7 -0.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.2

Germany

Real GDP qoq % 0.4 -1.7 0.5 -4.5 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.8 2.0 0.8 0.8 1.9 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.5 -0.3 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.7 -0.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3

- Inventories 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -0.8 -1.7 1.1 -0.6 1.6 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.4 -0.7 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.2

- Net exports 0.2 -0.8 0.1 -2.5 1.7 0.0 1.3 -0.9 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.5 0.3 -0.8 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 0.8 0.0 -0.2 0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.6 -0.4

- Final demand 0.2 -0.3 0.4 -1.2 0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.1 1.3 0.5 0.3 1.3 -0.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.7 -0.3 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.5

France

Real GDP qoq % 0.5 -0.9 0.3 -1.6 -0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.1 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.8 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.3

- Inventories 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.8 -0.7 0.2 0.8 -0.5 0.2 0.3 -0.2 1.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.3 -0.4 0.7

- Net exports -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.7 0.0 -0.7 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.6 0.5 0.1 0.8 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.4 -0.7

- Final demand 0.6 -0.4 0.2 -0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.4 -0.7 0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3

Italy

Real GDP qoq % 0.4 -1.8 -0.1 -2.9 -0.5 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2

- Inventories 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.1 -0.1 1.0 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.8 -0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.8 0.5 0.2 0.3

- Net exports 0.0 -0.3 0.2 -1.1 0.6 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.7 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.4

- Final demand 0.4 -1.0 -0.3 -1.4 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.7 -1.3 -2.0 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -1.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2

EMU

Real GDP qoq % 0.6 -1.4 0.2 -3.0 -0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3

- Inventories 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -1.1 -0.4 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -

- Net exports 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.5 0.7 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -

- Final demand 0.5 -0.8 0.0 -1.4 -0.5 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.2 -

UK

Real GDP qoq % 0.7 -1.4 0.5 -1.6 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.2 1.0 -0.1 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5

- Inventories 0.0 0.2 0.0 -2.3 3.9 -1.3 0.4 1.0 -0.4 0.4 -0.7 0.2 -0.1 0.6 -0.5 -0.5 0.7 0.7 -0.6 -0.8 0.3 1.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -1.1 -

- Net exports -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 -1.1 0.7 1.3 0.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.9 0.2 -1.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.7 0.8 -0.6 1.0 -

- Final demand 0.8 -1.8 0.5 -0.1 -4.0 1.4 0.6 -0.4 0.9 1.1 0.0 -0.7 0.1 0.7 0.6 1.1 -0.6 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.1 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.3 1.1 0.8 -

* do not sum up exactly due to roundings

Real GDP change (Q/Q non annualised, %) + contributions to growth *

201520142009 20132010 2011 2012


[Date]

22


Appendix 3 Real GDP growth: G7 countries + China

-10

-5

0

5

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% US : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-10

-5

0

5

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% EMU : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

0

5

10

15

20

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% China : real GDP growth

q/q % (annual rate)

y/y%

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Japan : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.) y/y%

Fukushima

VAT shock

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Germany : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-10

-5

0

5

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% France : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-10

-5

0

5

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% UK : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

Olympics

-10

-5

0

5

10

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Canada : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%-15

-10

-5

0

5

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Italy : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%


[Date]

23


Appendix 4 Real GDP growth: countries of Asia excl. China-Japan (selection)

0

5

10

15

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% India : real GDP growth

y/y%

new methodology from 2012

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% South Korea : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

0

5

10

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Indonesia : real GDP growth

q/q % (annual rate)

y/y%

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Taiwan : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Philippines : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Singapore : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-5

0

5

10

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Australia : real GDP growth

q/q % (annualised rate)

y/y%

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Malaysia : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Thailand : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%floods (-23%)

+45%


[Date]

24


Appendix 5 Real GDP growth: other countries (selection)

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Brazil: real GDP growth

q/q % (annual rate)

y/y%

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Turkey : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Mexico : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Russia : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-5

0

5

10

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Poland : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.) y/y%

-10

-5

0

5

10

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% South Africa : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.) y/y%

-10

-5

0

5

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Switzerland: real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Chile: real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Hungary : real GDP growth

q/q % (a.r.)

y/y%


[Date]

25


Appendix 6 Industrial production (index): selected countries

80

90

100

110

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

100=Jan.07US : industrial production index

80

90

100

110

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

100=Jan.07EMU : industrial production index

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

275

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

100=Jan.07China : industrial production index

60

70

80

90

100

110

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

100=Jan.07Japan : industrial production index

80

90

100

110

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

100=Jan.07Canada : industrial production index

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

100=Jan.07South Korea : industrial production index

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

100=Jan.07Taiwan : industrial production index

80

90

100

110

120

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

100=Jan.07Brazil : industrial production index

80

90

100

110

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

100=Jan.07Mexico : industrial production index


[Date]

26


Appendix 7 Consumer price inflation: G7 countries + China

-2

0

2

4

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% EMU : CPI inflation

y/y%

target ECB

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% China : CPI inflation

y/y%

official target

-4

-2

0

2

4

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Japan : CPI inflation

y/y% target BoJ

VAT rate hike

-2

0

2

4

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Germany : CPI inflation

y/y%

target ECB

-2

0

2

4

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% France : CPI inflation

y/y%

target ECB

-2

0

2

4

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% UK : CPI inflation

y/y%

target BoE

-2

0

2

4

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Canada : CPI inflation

y/y%

target BoC

-2

0

2

4

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% US : CPI inflation

y/y%

target Fed

-2

0

2

4

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% Italy & Spain : CPI inflation

Italy

Spain

target ECB


[Date]

27


Appendix 8 Consumer price inflation: emerging countries (selection)

0

5

10

15

20

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% India : CPI inflation

y/y%

0

2

4

6

8

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% South Korea : CPI inflation

y/y%

target BoK

0

5

10

15

20

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Indonesia : CPI inflation

y/y%

-5

0

5

10

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Taiwan : CPI inflation

y/y%

-5

0

5

10

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Thailand : CPI inflation

y/y%

0

5

10

15

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Turkey : CPI inflation

y/y%

2

4

6

8

10

12

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Brazil : CPI inflation

y/y%

target BCdoB

0

2

4

6

8

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Mexico : CPI inflation

y/y%

0

4

8

12

16

20

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Russia : CPI inflation

y/y%


[Date]

28


Appendix 9 Unemployment rates: G7 countries

4

6

8

10

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% US : unemployment rate

"threshold " for ending ZIRP

3

4

5

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Japan : unemployment rate

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% EMU : unemployment rate (harmonised)

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Germany : unemployment rate (harmonised)

6

8

10

12

14

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Italy : unemployment rate (harmonised)

4

6

8

10

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% UK : unemployment rate (harmonised) *

* last 2 points are estimated

based on alternative job data

"threshold " for ending ZIRP

5

6

7

8

9

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Canada : unemployment rate

5

10

15

20

25

30

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Spain : unemployment rate (harmonised)

7

8

9

10

11

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% France : unemployment rate

Eurostat definitionINSEE definition


[Date]

29

Source : Markit, Thomson Reuters, Oddo Securities.

Appendix 10 Purchasing managers’ confidence (PMI indices): G7 + BRIC countries

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

points US ISM index

manufacturing

non manuf.

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

points EMU : PMI index

manufacturing

services35

40

45

50

55

60

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

points China : PMI index (manufacturing)

HSBC/Caixin index

NBS index

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

points Japan : PMI index

manufacturing

services

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

points Germany : PMI index

manufacturing

services

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

points France : PMI index

manufacturing

services

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

points UK : PMI index

manufacturing

services

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

points other EMU : PMI index

Italy (composite)

Spain (composite)30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

points other BRIC : PMI index

Brazil (composite)

India (composite)

Russia (composite)


[Date]

30


Appendix 11 Consumer confidence: developed countries (selection)

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

st.dev. US: consumer confidence

Univ.of Michigan

Conference Board

0= 1990-2007 avg

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

st.dev. EMU: consumer confidence

0= 1990-2007 avg

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

st.dev. Japan: consumer confidence

0= 1990-2007 avg

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

st.dev. UK: consumer confidence

0= 1990-2007 avg

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

st.dev. Germany: consumer confidence

0= 1990-2007 avg-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

st.dev. France: consumer confidence

0= 1990-2007 avg

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

st.dev. Italy: consumer confidence

0= 1990-2007 avg

sample change

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

st.dev. Spain & Portugal: consumer confidence

Spain

Portugal

0= 1990-2007 avg

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

st.dev. Netherlands & Belgium: consumer confidence

Netherlands Belgium

0= 1990-2007 avg


[Date]

31

Source : Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg, Oddo Securities.

Appendix 12 Car sales: G7 countries + China + Brazil

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

'000s US: monthly car sales *

*light trucks included

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

2000

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

'000s China: monthly car sales

100

200

300

400

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

'000s Japan: monthly car sales

200

250

300

350

400

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

'000s Germany: monthly car sales

100

150

200

250

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

'000s France: monthly car sales

100

150

200

250

300

350

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

'000s Brazil: monthly car sales

0

50

100

150

200

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

'000s Spain: monthly car sales

100

150

200

250

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

'000s UK: monthly car sales

50

100

150

200

250

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

'000s Italy: monthly car sales


[Date]

32


Appendix 13 Central bank policy rates: developed countries (selection)

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% World: weighted-average policy rate*

*current GDP weighted

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Japan: O/N rate

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% UK: base rate

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Canada: O/N rate

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Switzerland: policy rate*

*middle of the target rangefor the 3M LIBOR rate

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Sweden & Norway: policy rates

Sweden

Norway

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Australia & New Zealand: policy rates

Australia

New Zealand

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% EMU: ECB refi rate

deposit rate0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% US: Fed funds rate


[Date]

33


Appendix 14 Central bank policy rates: emerging countries (selection)

4

5

6

7

8

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% China: 1-year lending rate

5

7

9

11

13

15

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Brazil: SELIC rate

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Russia: policy rate

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% India & Indonesia: policy rates

India

Indonesia

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% South Korea: policy rate

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Poland & Hungary: policy rates

Poland

Hungary

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Taiwan: policy rate

0

2

4

6

8

10

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Chile: policy rate

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% Mexico: policy rate


[Date]

34

Source : Thomson Reuters, Fed, ECB, Oddo Securities.

Appendix 15 Central bank balance sheets: developed countries (selection)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP G6: total assets of central banks*

*US, EMU, Japan, UK, Canada, Switzerland

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn $ Fed: total assets

QE programmes other

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Fed: total assets

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP ECB: total assets

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Bank of England: total assets

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Swiss National Bank: total assets

CHF/EUR peg

0

2

4

6

8

10

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Bank of Canada: total assets

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Bank of Japan: total assets

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn € ECB: total assets

QE programmes other


[Date]

35


Appendix 16 Currency reserves (in US$): world and principal holders

6000

8000

10000

12000

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn$ World: FX reserve assets

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn$ China: FX reserve assets

800

1000

1200

1400

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn$ Japan: FX reserve assets

700

900

1100

1300

1500

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn$ OPEC: FX reserve assets

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn$ Asia ex-China/Japan: FX reserve assets

300

400

500

600

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn$ Russia: FX reserve assets

RUB free float

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn$ Latin America: FX reserves assets

200

250

300

350

400

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn$ EMU countries: FX reserve assets

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bn$ Switzerland: FX reserve assets

SNB targets CHF


[Date]

36


Appendix 17 Current account balances (% of GDP): G7 countries + China

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP US : C/A balance

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP EMU*: C/A balance

* sum of EMU countries

-2

0

2

4

6

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP Japan : C/A balance

4

5

6

7

8

9

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP Germany: C/A balance

-4

-2

0

2

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP France: C/A balance

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP UK : C/A balance

-4

-2

0

2

4

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP Canada: C/A balance

-12

-9

-6

-3

0

3

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP Italy/Spain : C/A balance

Italy

Spain

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP China : trade balance & C/A balance

trade balance

C/A balance


[Date]

37


Appendix 18 Current account balances (% of GDP): emerging countries (selection)

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP India : C/A balance

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP Brazil : C/A balance

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP Russia : C/A balance

-4

-2

0

2

4

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP Indonesia : C/A balance

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP Mexico : C/A balance

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP Turkey : C/A balance

6

8

10

12

14

16

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP Taiwan : C/A balance

-2

0

2

4

6

8

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP South Korea : C/A balance

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

%GDP South Africa : C/A balance


[Date]

38


Appendix 19 Exchange rates vs. EUR or USD: major currencies

1.0

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1€ = … US$

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

1.9

2.0

2.1

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1£ = … US$

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1US$ = … JPY

6.0

6.5

7.0

7.5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1US$ = … RMB (renminbi)

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1€ = … CHF

CHF/EUR peg

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1US$ = … KRW (won)

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1US$ = … BRL (real)

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1US$ = … AUD & CAD

AUD

CAD

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1US$ = … RUB (Russian ruble)


[Date]

39

Source : Bloomberg, Oddo Securities.

Appendix 20 Government debt (as a % of GDP) : European countries (selection)

60

65

70

75

80

85

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Germany: government debt

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP France: government debt

100

105

110

115

120

125

130

135

140

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Italy: government debt

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Spain: government debt

80

90

100

110

120

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Belgium: government debt

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

170

180

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Greece: government debt

haircut

2030405060708090

100110120130

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Ireland: government debt

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP Portugal: government debt

-9

-6

-3

0

3

6

9

12

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

% GDP EMU: government debt

budget balance (rhs)


[Date]

40


Appendix 21 Sovereign ratings: European countries (selection)

08 08 10 11 12 13 14 15

scale France rating (average S&P, Moody's, Fitch)

AAA / Aaa

BB+ / Ba1

junk

IGS&P cut

Moody's cut

Fitch cut

S&P cut

Fitch cut

Moody's cut

08 08 10 11 12 13 14 15

scale Germany rating (average S&P, Moody's, Fitch)

AAA / Aaa

BB+ / Ba1

junk status

investment grade

08 08 10 11 12 13 14 15

scale Belgium rating (average S&P, Moody's, Fitch)

AAA / Aaa

BB+ / Ba1

junk

IG

08 08 10 11 12 13 14 15

scale Italy rating (average S&P, Moody's, Fitch)

AAA / Aaa

BB+ / Ba1

junk

IG

08 08 10 11 12 13 14 15

scale Spain rating (average S&P, Moody's, Fitch)

AAA / Aaa

BB+ / Ba1

junk

IG

08 08 10 11 12 13 14 15

scale Ireland rating (average S&P, Moody's, Fitch)

AAA / Aaa

BB+ / Ba1

junk

IG

08 08 10 11 12 13 14 15

scale Portugal rating (average S&P, Moody's, Fitch)

AAA / Aaa

BB+ / Ba1

junk

IG

08 08 10 11 12 13 14 15

scale Greece rating (average S&P, Moody's, Fitch)

AAA / Aaa

BB+ / Ba1junk status

investment grade

08 08 10 11 12 13 14 15

scale UK rating (avg S&P, Moody's, Fitch)

AAA / Aaa

BB+ / Ba1

junk

IG Moody's cut

Fitchcut


[Date]

41

[Date]

41

Sources: central banks, Oddo Securities.

Appendix 22 Bank financing by the Eurosystem

0

100

200

300

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bnEUR Germany: ECB refinancing

LTRO

MRO

0

25

50

75

100

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bnEUR Netherlands: ECB refinancing

MRO + LTRO

0

50

100

150

200

250

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bnEUR France: ECB refinancing

LTRO

MRO

MRO+LTRO0

100

200

300

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bnEUR Italy: ECB refinancing

LTRO

MRO

0

100

200

300

400

500

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bnEUR Spain: ECB refinancing

LTRO

MRO

0

25

50

75

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bnEUR Portugal: ECB refinancing

LTRO

MRO

0

50

100

150

200

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bnEUR Ireland: ECB/NCB refinancing

ELA

LTRO

MRO

0

5

10

15

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bnEUR Finland: ECB refinancing

LTRO

MRO

0

50

100

150

200

09 10 11 12 13 14 15

bnEUR Greece: ECB /NCB refinancing

ELA

LTRO

MRO


[Date]

42

[Date]

42

Sources: central banks, Oddo Securities.

Appendix 23 Bank loans to the private sector: European countries (selection)

-3

0

3

6

9

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% Germany: loans to the private sector

-6

-3

0

3

6

9

12

15

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% France: loans to the private sector

-6

-3

0

3

6

9

12

15

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% Italy: loans to the private sector

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% Spain: loans to the private sector

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% Ireland: loans to the private sector

-3

0

3

6

9

12

15

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% Netherlands: loans to the private sector

-3

0

3

6

9

12

15

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% Finland: loans to the private sector

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% Greece: loans to the private sector

-6

-3

0

3

6

9

12

15

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

y/y% Portugal: loans to the private sector


[Date]

43

Appendix 24 10-year government bond yield


0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

% US: 10Y government bond yield

2000-2009

2010-2012

0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

% Japan: 10Y government bond yield

2000-2009

2010-2012

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

% Portugal/Ireland: 10Y government bond yield

Ireland

Portugal

0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

% Germany: 10Y government bond yield

2000-2009

2010-2012

0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

% UK: 10Y government bond yield

2000-2009

2010-2012

0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

% France: 10Y government bond yield

2000-2009

2010-2012

0

1

2

3

4

5

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

% Netherlands: 10Y government bond yield

2000-2009

2010-2012

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

% Spain: 10Y government bond yield

2000-09

2010 -2012

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

% Italy: 10Y government bond yield

2000-09

2010 -2012

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