i

EGYPT’S ARMY

BACK IN CHARGE:

Does Uniformed

Mean Uniformity?

EGYPT | WINTER 2013

The Siwa Group Seeing the Middle East in more than Black and White

&%$#"! سسييووةة

The Siwa Group is a specialist consultancy and advocacy group that operates across the Greater Middle East, from Kabul to Casablanca. We provide bespoke analysis, business and cultural training, and more traditional consultancy services, along with an unrivalled database of contacts and access points.

With more than 20 years on the ground operational experience across the Greater Middle East, The Siwa Group exists to make sure you get it right the first time.

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This publication can be downloaded at no cost at www.TheSiwaGroup.com

Cover photo: © Eamonn Gearon. All rights reserved.

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PREAMBLE

This paper is the result of a public lecture delivered on Tuesday 5th November 2013, at the University of Harvard’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES), at the invitation of Professor Roger Owen, A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History.

Egypt’s Army Back in Charge: Does Uniformed Mean Uniformity considers the place and role of the Egyptian Armed Forces in the country’s political life from July 1952, when the Army overthrew and exiled King Farouk, thereby ending the Egyptian monarchy, to August 2013, when the Army overthrew and imprisoned President Morsi, thereby ending the presidency of Egypt’s first democratically elected, civilian ruler.

Readers are invited to write with questions regarding the situation in Egypt, North Africa and the wider region. The Siwa Group exists to provide training, briefings, and other advice regarding the Greater Middle East.

Eamonn GearonCo-Founder & Managing Director,The Siwa Group;Professorial Lecturer, JHU-SAIS.egearon@thesiwagroup.com

Washington, DC - Winter 2013

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Preamble --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Map of Egypt ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Acknowledgements -------------------------------------------------------------------

Introduction ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

In Midan Tahrir-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Part One - “The People and the Army are One” --------------------------------

Marching in Step ----------------------------------------------------------------

Why the Army? -----------------------------------------------------------------

Part Two - Changing Views from the Top ----------------------------------------

July 1952 Coup ------------------------------------------------------------------

Naguib - Power to the People -------------------------------------------------

Nasser - Power to the Army ---------------------------------------------------

Sadat - Power to The President -----------------------------------------------

Mubarak - ... With a Little Help from My Friends -------------------------

Timeline ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Part Three- Terrorism and Other Military Byproducts -----------------------

From SCAF to the MB ---------------------------------------------------------

Islamic Jihad and other Possible Futures ------------------------------------

Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Before all others, thank you to Professor Roger Owen for the invitation to address the University of Harvard community.

Thank you to Liz Flanagan and all of her colleagues at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies: their professionalism and many kindnesses ensured a happy and trouble-free visit to Cambridge.

For recording and editing the lecture, many thanks to Phillip Dade, Harvard University student.

For the design and layout of this paper, special thanks to Laura Clauson at The Siwa Group.

On a personal note, I have been a great admirer of Professor Owen’s work for the decades I have been a student of the history and politics of the Greater Middle East. Anyone who wishes to claim some degree of knowledge of the region and its rich traditions can not do so unless he or she is thoroughly familiar with Roger’s peerless work; not only can one rely on his books setting the standard for academic excellence, but they are also written so gracefully as to make them a pleasure to read and accessible to readers of all stripes.

Eamonn Gearon.

A recording of the “Egypt’s Army Back in Charge” lecture can be found on The Siwa Group YouTube channel: www.youtube.com/user/TheSiwaGroup

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INTRODUCTION

The continuing unrest taking place across the Middle East is displaying very different aspects in each of the countries of the region. While the outbreak of anti-regime protests were in close calendar proximity, largely starting between mid-December 2010 and early February 2011, there are perhaps more differences than similarities in the roots of these uprisings.

In each case, events are a reaction to unique a n d d i v e r s e , h i s t o r i c a l a n d s o c i a l circumstances. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that we have also seen different responses and outcomes in each country. However, one element that is common to each country is the decisive role played by the Armed Forces.

A country’s military is arguably the most important institution when it comes to the survival of a state: they exist to protect the state, and no revolution powered primarily by internal drivers can achieve success without the support of the Army1 or, at the very least, its acquiescence. This is not to argue that the backing of the military is all a revolution needs to succeed, but that military support is one element that is required for revolutionary success.

In each case, whether through activity or inactivity, the role of the Army has been critical to the success or otherwise of nascent protest movements. In some cases, the Army has proved decisive because senior commanders have decided to remain loyal to the country’s existing leadership, while in others, commanders have risen up against the regime, throwing their weight of numbers, organisational strength and force of arms behind the protestors.

Throughout phase one of the Egyptian revolution, that is the 18-days of protests that led up to the resignation of then President Mubarak, the Army were keen to be thought of as disinterested bystanders, neutral and unbiased observers whose sole interest was safeguarding – however they saw fit – the state – however they defined it.

In Syria, we have seen limited desertions, with the majority of the national Army remaining loyal to the regime, and engaged in the ruthless repression of popular protests.

In Libya, deep societal divisions quickly resulted in wide-spread defections, even if the anti-Qadhafi movement was unlikely to have p reva i l ed w i thou t fo r e ign mi l i t a ry intervention.

1 Henceforth, for reasons of style, and their relative importance, the term Army will be used when referring to Armed Forces.

2 | Egypt’s Army Back in Charge

In Tunisia, the military, police and other domestic security forces soon found themselves at loggerheads, with the Armed Forces quickly supporting the emerging revolutionary movement, thus effecting the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime.

In Egypt, the Army has been instrumental in replacing rather than removing the existing power structures, reflecting the extent to which the military is integrated in, or perhaps indivisible from, Egyptian society.

Flag of the Egyptian Army.

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From 25 January, Police Day, when anti-Mubarak demonstrators first occupied central Cairo’s Midan Tahrir, until 10 February, the day before his resignation, the Army did everything possible to convince both domestic and foreign audiences that their role consisted of nothing more than protecting Egyptians who had taken to the streets, pro and anti-Mubarak protestors alike. One of the most frequently heard chants during this period was “The people and the Army are one.” For many Egyptians, the events of 2011 and 2013 have restored the Army in the eyes of the people.

Why? The Army’s own narrative, as delivered in a communiqué read out on Egyptian state television on the evening of the 10 February, the day before Mubarak was forced to resign, stated unequivocally that their role was to protect the Egyptian state, not an unpopular regime. To a large extent, Egyptians were happy to accept this at face value; for large numbers of Egyptians, the populist coup of July 2013, which overthrew President Morsi merely served to reinforce their faith in the

Army as defenders of the state rather than, once again, an unpopular regime. In early 2011, friendly relations between the Army and protestors were the norm. Civilians were

permitted to spray paint anti-Mubarak slogans on those tanks and armoured cars that encircled Midan Tahrir. When caught, those suspected of being pro-Mubarak agitators or informers were turned over to the Army, confident that they would take care of the suspects.

As stated above, no revolution can succeed without the support or acquiescence of the Army. In this instance, most Egyptians appeared to be happy to overlook the fact that the senior leadership of Egypt’s Armed Forces (and every senior government official then in place, many of whom were former generals) were Mubarak appointees. As individual Army officers, they owed their loyalty to Mubarak; as an institution, the Army thought otherwise.

IN MIDAN TAHRIR

No revolution can succeed without the support of the Army.

One of the most frequently heard chants during this period was “The people and the Army are one.”

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PART ONE - “THE PEOPLE AND THE ARMY ARE ONE”

The Army in Egypt has been a central institution of Egyptian society, and the backbone of every regime, since 1952. Between 1922 and 1952, when Egypt was formally independent but for all practical purposes under the control of the British, the Egyptian Army was, for reasons that suited the colonial occupier, limited in size. Following the Free Officers’ Coup, a.k.a. 23 July Revolution, that overthrew King Farouk, this rather diminutive force soon grew in size.

Dominating the political life of the country since they toppled the monarchy, when faced with the January 2011 uprising, the upper echelons of the Egyptian military had three options vis-à-vis the regime: retain, replace, or remove. Choosing the middle option, they oversaw the removal of Mubarak, replacing his rather sclerotic government with a military council. When the country’s first democratic election overturned this state of affairs, the country’s first non-military President , Muhammad Morsi , t r ied, unsuccessfully, to co-opt them.

On July 3, 2013, Morsi, arguably the Arab World’s first freely elected president, was overthrown by the Army after just one year in power; the Egyptian Constitution he had forced through a few months earlier was

suspended; and the country’s Chief Justice, Adly Mansour, now holds military-backed power until fresh elections are held, likely in the spring of 2014. A democratic façade may have been in place for much of this period, but the Army is at the heart of the state and, as such, has long sought to protect its interests. These include economic interests, control of foreign policy, political influence, and a central role in directing the popular nationalist narrative.

MARCHING IN STEP?

A country’s military does not, indeed cannot, exist outside of society. As Roger Owen and others have noted, in spite of their particular, one might say peculiar, habits, rules and procedures, armies always exist within a

broader societal setting or culture. 2 As such, it is somewhat misleading to think of the

2 Roger Owen, State, Power, and Politics (2000, 2nd edition): ch.10.

A country’s military does not, indeed cannot, exist outside of society... in spite of their particular, one might say peculiar, habits, rules and procedures, armies always exist within a broader societal setting or culture.

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Egyptian Army, or any such major institution, as a single unit. In considering an Army, it is important to understand that while one might be able to train a battalion to attack in close order, or a platoon to march in step, and halt as a single unit, once the order “Fall out” is given, they leave the parade square as individuals in uniform: this costume hides, not eliminates, the diverse identities, backgrounds and histories of the men wearing it.

The Egyptian Army’s economic interests are among the deepest and most entrenched of any state-level military force in the world. To a great extend, it was these interests that encouraged the Army High Command to behave as it did, as an agent of continuity. Today, this means standing in the way of a transition to a genuinely democratic state: populist or otherwise, history shows us that

coups are not typically evidence of a transition towards democracy. To a large extent, the role of the Egyptian military is to protect the interests of the Egyptian military.

One of the easiest ways to do this is through maintaining economic influence, ideally without having direct control over, or respons ib i l i ty for, the government . Unfortunately for General Sisi, this looks to be exactly the corner he has marched into, should he decide to stand in the Presidential elections of 2014.

It is a fact that the military is involved in every major sector of industry. Indeed, most of their economic interests are concerned with non-military industries, both manufacturing and service. These include water bottling plants, olive processing, olive oil bottling and manufacturing, and everything from foodstuffs to white goods: from macaroni to washing machines.

Since 2000, however, and the introduction of neo-liberal economic policies, following the lead of Mubarak’s son, and sometime heir presumptive, Gamal Mubarak, the economic power of the Army came under threat. Uniformed and retired generals saw their economic interests, and concomitant influence, being whittled away, and replaced by civilian businessmen and technocrats. The officer corps had come to see these economic benefits as a perk of a career of loyal service in uniform, and they were not keen to lose

Populist or otherwise, history shows us that coups are not typically evidence of a transition towards democracy.

6 | Egypt’s Army Back in Charge

such valuable sweeteners. This was just one reason why the military were never likely to accept the non-military Gamal as Hosni Mubarak’s successor. As President Mubarak grew increasingly in thrall to the plans for economic liberalisation, as promoted by his son, he grew increasingly out of touch with his erstwhile military colleagues.

However, the economic treats enjoyed by the military are by no means evenly distributed. Typically, more senior officers can expect the greatest rewards, whether before or after retiring. Discontent among the less well paid, largely ill-trained, undervalued and widely abused conscripts should not come as a surprise. Resentment and growing annoyance among middle ranking officers, both those in charge of the country’s 350,000-plus conscripts and 100,000 professional soldiers is growing and today represents a more dangerous threat to the High Command than they perhaps realize. Reducing the size of the

Army is hardly an option. If the government ever tried to reduce the number of conscripts in the Army, national unemployment would rise to even greater levels than exist today.

Thus, as imperfect as it may be, any government of Egypt can only view conscription as a useful, short-term form of employment. In addition to the 450,000 men in the Army, Air Force, Navy and paramilitary forces, another half a million men are in the reserves.

Financial worries are a source of concern for many in the West, and young men and women in uniform are not immune to such matters. American corporations may be considered people for the purposes of taxation, but spreadsheets that monitor late payments and calculate interest do not show anxiety. In questions of financial insecurity, Egyptian soldiers are not so different from their American or British counterparts, except in questions of degree: on the one hand, Egyptian soldiers are less likely than their

If the government ever tried to reduce the number of conscripts in the Army, national unemployment would rise to even greater levels than exist today.

As President Mubarak grew increasingly in thrall to the plans for economic liberalisation, as promoted by his son, he grew increasingly out of touch with his erstwhile military colleagues.

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Western counterparts to be granted a loan, and on the other hand, the young Egyptian soldier is almost certainly going to find himself under a far greater degree of familial responsibility, which will also, because of societal norms, be felt more keenly.

Approximately 78 percent of the Egyptian Army is made up of conscripts, who will typically serve for between one and three years, followed by nine years as reservists. The salary for these soldiers is so meagre that the idea of being able to buy a house, or afford to get married, is but a dream. The monthly wage is LE 235 (USD 34), whereas the average civilian salary after tax is LE 2,000 (USD 290) per month.

Conscripts also tend to be drawn from poorer segments of society, with disproportionate numbers of rural poor in their ranks. If a family has only one son, he is exempt from military service; for better off families, university attendance will delay conscription, as will wasta, or influence. Knowing a person of influence means a contact who can sign the right piece of paper to exempt a boy from doing his national service. Poor, with no chance of making a living, or getting married, but with the vigour, urges and drive of youth, these young men are a problem for the

authorities, as the authorities have seen more than once since January 2011.

Egypt is a highly homogenous society of Sunni Muslims with weak tribal identities. The indigenous Christian population, or Copts, make up some 10 percent of the populous. Thus, ethnic favouritism does not and will not play any part in the Army. Religiosity, however, does have a role to play, as evidenced by the continual and heavy-handed efforts to weed out any members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi or other Islamist-inclined groups, efforts that started under Nasser in the mid-1950s and have periodically continued under Sadat and Mubarak, and most obviously in the post-Morsi era.

Young Army officers in Egypt today – perhaps idealistic, perhaps not, Islamist-inclined or dyed-in-the-wool secularist – are not immune to the radical political shifts, for

Young Army officers in Egypt today – perhaps idealistic, perhaps not, Islamist-inclined or dyed-in-the-wool secularist – are not immune to the radical political shifts, for good or ill, taking place in society.

8 | Egypt’s Army Back in Charge

good or ill, taking place in society. The fear that existed in the Mubarak era, the only period a young officer can remember, has been swept away, but then so too has a democratically elected Islamist government.

While the Army has been used to quell civilian protests in the past, they have not had to do so during a period of such widespread tumult. If they are forced to move out of the cities, into more conservative, rural areas from whence the mass of ill-educated conscripts hail, the results could be very different. At different times in 2012 and 2013 there have been certain acts of rebellion and small-scale mutinies in the Army, and the possibility of these spreading and growing cannot be ignored.

While the Army has been used to quell civilian protests ... If they are forced to move out of the cities, into more conservative, rural areas from whence the mass of ill-educated conscripts hail, the results could be very different.

Composition of the Egyptian Armed Forces

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WHY THE ARMY?

An Egyptian Army officer and senior member of the military junta, explaining or justifying his behaviour, wrote the following:

“Why the Army? I have long asked myself this question … Was it necessary for us, the Army, to do what we did …? The answer is yes, beyond any subterfuge or equivocation. I can say now that we did not ourselves define the role given us to play; it was the history of our country that cast us in that role....“I can now state that that we are going through two revolutions, not one revolution. Every people on earth goes through two revolutions: a political revolution by which it wrests the right to govern itself from the hand of tyranny, or from the army stationed upon its soil against its will; and a social revolution, involving the conflict of classes, which settles down when justice is secured for

the citizens of the united nation....“Peoples preceding us on the path of human progress have passed through two revolutions, but they have not had to face both simultaneously; their revolutions, in fact, were centuries apart in time. For us, the terrible experience through which our people are going is that we are having both revolutions at the same time.”3

The author of the above was Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt’s second president, writing in 1953, the year after he and his fellow Free Officers seized power from the King. As Nasser tells it, all of this was done for the good of his country. In the 61 years between the 1952 Free Officers coup and the 2013 ouster of President Morsi, there have been about 26 coups across the Middle East, with a few more unsuccessful attempts. While not the first, the actions of the Free Officers inspired many who came after them.

3 Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution. Page 82 (1953).

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PART TWO - CHANGING VIEWS FROM THE TOP

JULY 1952 COUP

In the early hours of 23 July 1952, a small group of less than 100, largely young and junior, Egyptian Army officers launched a military coup. By 0600, a number of important senior officers with known royalist sympathies had been arrested: by 0730 the plotters, who called themselves the Free Officers Movement, were confidant enough of success to make their first public a n n o u n c e m e n t o v e r t h e a i r w a v e s . Communiqué Number One was delivered in the name of General Muhammad Naguib (1901-1984), the oldest and best-known member of the group, to the Egyptian people. It stated the justification for the “revolution,” which included the corruption of the ancien régime, and the defeat in the 1948 war against Israel. A member of the Free Officers, and future president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, read the message.

The plotters’ first act was the removal from power and exile of King Farouk. On 26 July, Naguib travelled to Alexandria to say goodbye to Farouk. Arriving at the quayside just in time to see the royal yacht sailing away, Naguib boarded another vessel and gave chase, in order to bid farewell to the King in person. When Naguib boarded the

yacht that was taking Farouk away from his homeland, it was not the first time the men had met, but it was undoubtedly their most awkward encounter. Naguib told Farouk that he had been entirely loyal to the monarchy until 1942, and the King’s embarrassing stand down in the face of British armour that surrounded the Abdin Palace: that incident, for Naguib, changed everything. Of the coup,

Naguib told Farouk, “Sir, we were forced to do what we did,” to which Farouk is said to have replied: “Yes, I know. Your mission is a difficult one. As you know, governing Egypt is not an easy task.”4 To what extent, one wonders , have subsequent Egyptian presidents heard and understood this message?

The political ambition of the Free Officers was far more radical than the mere overthrown of a monarch. The group was quickly reconstituted as the Revolutionary Command Council, or RCC, which 18-man

Of the coup, Naguib told Farouk, “Sir, we were forced to do what we did,” to which Farouk is said to have replied: “Yes, I know. Your mission is a difficult one. As you know, governing Egypt is not an easy task.”

4 See Naguib’s 1984 memoir, Kanat ra’is li-Misr (I Was President of Egypt), later translated into English as The Fate of Egypt.

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body began reordering as many aspects of Egyptian society as occurred to them to do so. This included an overhaul of the country’s political structures and economic models, with land redistribution mandated and, in January 1953, the dissolution and banning of all political parties. In their stead, a three-year transitional period of RCC rule was declared.

Almost 11 months after the coup, on 18 June 1953, Naguib declared the end of the Egyptian and Sudanese monarchy and the establishment of the Republic of Egypt, at which moment he also became the country’s first president.

NAGUIB – POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Born in Khartoum, in 1901, then part of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, where his father was serving as an Egyptian Army officer, Naguib was never supposed to join the Army. His father pleaded with him not to join an institution that he had come to see was little more than an instrument of British control, a realistic and fair assessment at that time. Naguib’s father even got Ibrahim Urabi (also Orabi), son of Ahmed Urabi, leader of the 1879-82 uprisings against European

domination of Egypt, to speak to Naguib. In an effort to dissuade him from joining the Egyptian Army, the young Urabi told him that if he did so, he would be nothing more than “a supervisor in the service of the British.”

Ignoring the counsel of both men, Naguib joined the Army in 1918, and soon earned a series of promotions. At this same time, he also earned Masters degrees in Political Science and Law. In 1934, he transferred to a land-based posting with the Egyptian Coast Guard, where he was tasked with chasing down smugglers, who were becoming a destabilising force on the Sinai Peninsula. In 1942, following the Abdin Palace incident, he tendered his resignation from the Army to King Farouk, but as the King refused to accept it, Naguib stayed in the Army. In 1948, he fought with distinction in the Arab-Israeli War, also known as the First Arab-Israeli War.

Naguib was president of Egypt from 18 June 1953 to 14 November 1954, when he was arrested and placed under house arrest by his erstwhile companion and the country’s next President, Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970). The main cause of contention between the former allies was a difference of opinion about who should rule Egypt. For Naguib, having overthrown the King was good

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enough: the Army had fulfilled its obligation to remove a corrupt regime in the national interest. From that point on, he argued, the military should work, in stages, to relinquish all political influence and power, handing the country to civilian rule. The military’s role,

according to Naguib, was not to rule the country, but to protect those in power. Depending on whom one listens to, or how one interprets the messages being circulated by the different interest groups, the parallels and contrasts with the situation in Egypt since the fall of Mubarak are striking, to say the least.

Nasser formally removed Naguib from power on charges that ran from, ironically, being dictatorial and, laughably, backing the recently re-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.

Setting himself up as Egypt’s second president, Nasser remained in office for the next fifteen years with no major domestic challenges to his power. Naguib, meanwhile, remained under house arrest for 18 years, until he was released in 1972 by Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s third president and former Army officer. When Naguib died, in Cairo in 1984, he was given a funeral with full military honours, which occasion was presided over by Egypt’s fourth president and former Air Force officer, Hosni Mubarak.

NASSER – POWER TO THE ARMY

In his book-length validation for 1952’s coup-cum-revolution, Nasser writes, “…the Army is in the vanguard of society.”5 Was this true in 1952? Is it true today? No, and not likely, but let us wait and see. In Egypt’s Liberation,

For Naguib, having overthrown the King was good enough: the Army had fulfilled its obligation to remove a corrupt regime in the national interest. From that point on, he argued, the military should work, in stages, to relinquish all political influence and power, handing the country to civilian rule.

Nasser ... said, “The vanguard performed its task and charged the battlements of tyranny. It threw out Faruq”. But having got rid of the king, Nasser continues, he looked back only to find that the people had not followed.”

5 Nasser, ibid.

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Nasser said it was necessary for the Army to lead the revolution for the sake of the country: “The vanguard performed its task and charged the battlements of tyranny. It threw out Faruq”.6 But having got rid of the king, Nasser continues, he looked back only to find that the people had not followed.

In spite of his claims to have led a popular revolution, Nasser did not believe that Egypt was ready for multi-party democracy. He understood that if an election was held it would result in victory for liberal nationalist political parties, such as Wafd, and the Islamists, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, whose support he had enlisted before the 23 July Coup, before turning on them after he was in power. Thus, for all his talk of nationalist politics and a socialist revolution,

Nasser firmly believed that the military should retain power, at the expense of everyone else.

Pushing a strictly secular, nationalist agenda, avowedly one that incorporated Arab Socialism and pan-Arabism, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for financial and technical assistance, in order to develop the Egyptian Army. This turn to the Eastern bloc gathered speed in the wake of the Suez Crisis debacle of 1956. He expanded the size of the Army, and its reach into more areas of Egyptian society, ensuring his grip on the country and, with the growth of the secret intelligence apparatus, his grip on the Army.

S A D AT – P O W E R TO T H E PRESIDENT

Nasser died of a heart attack in September 1970. A heavy-smoker and long time diabetes sufferer with a history of heart disease in his family, his death at 52 years of age was a shock to the nation, which had no prior knowledge of the state of his health. The transition to power was smooth, with Nasser’s Vice President, Anwar Sadat (1918-1981), taking power. Sadat soon showed that he was not a copy of Nasser

In spite of his claims to have led a popular revolution, Nasser did not believe that Egypt was ready for mult i -party democracy ... if an election was held it would result in victory for liberal nationalist political parties, such as Wafd, and the Islamists, notably the Muslim Brotherhood.

6 Nasser, ibid.

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though, and changed direction on many otherwise entrenched policies. On 15 May 1971, President Sadat launched the so-called Corrective Revolution, a reform program whose main purpose was to consolidate his grip on power. Early actions included the arrest and imprisonment without trial of enemies and rivals, both real and imagined, including members of the government and security forces accused of being too pro-Soviet, Nasserists and some liberals.

Sadat also introduced a multiparty parliament, while arresting many political rivals; he opened up Egypt’s economy with the infitah, or “open door” economic policy, while securing a larger percentage of the economy for the Army; and, in 1973, enjoyed leading the country to a partial military victory over Israel. In spite of this, Sadat faced challenges from within and without the Army. In 1977, having announced the removal of subsidies

on bread – the staple diet of most Egyptians then and now – a series of Bread Riots broke out from Cairo to Aswan, and Sadat was nearly overthrown by disgruntled elements within the Army. In the same year, fatally, he travelled to Israel. In Jerusalem, he addressed the Knesset, and went on to sign a peace treaty with Israel, thereby secured a lasting peace between the two countries, a large degree of economic security for Egypt, and anger at home that would eventually lead to his assassination. Of all Egypt’s post-Farouk rulers, Anwar Sadat was the one who mistrusted the Army most: in being assassinated by Islamist-radicals within the Army he headed, one can say his assessment was accurate.

MUBARAK – … WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS

Using the assassination of Sadat as his starting point, Hosni Mubarak (b.1928) focused on combating Islamist influence in the military and in the society at large, with a brutal crackdown against Islamist insurgency in the 1990’s. He also continued to de-politicize the military, mainly through trading economic privileges for overt political control. One way he kept possible rivals at

Of all Egypt’s post-Farouk rulers, Anwar Sadat was the one who mistrusted the Army most: in being assassinated by Islamist-radicals within the Army he headed, one can say his assessment was accurate.

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bay was by not appointing a Vice President, until he was forced to do so after the occupation of Midan Tahrir. He chose General Omar Suleiman (1936-2012) as his VP, head of the General Intelligence Service (GIS). Commonly known in Arabic as the Mukhabbarat, the GIS is Egypt’s national security agency, with responsibility for both domestic and international affairs, including counter-terrorism.

In the face of a major, popular uprising, as opposed to a military or palace coup, all

dictators are confronted by a notion that has become known as the “dictator’s dilemma” when deciding whether or not to call upon the Army to crush the protests: without military participation a dictator is vulnerable to being overthrown by the masses, but a military intervention then makes the leader more vulnerable to challenges from within the Armed Forces. Mubarak was caught out in just this scenario, and lost out to the Army.

the “dictator’s dilemma” ... whether or not to call upon the Army to crush the protests: without military participation a dictator is vulnerable to being overthrown by the masses, but a military intervention then makes the leader more vulnerable to challenges from within the Armed Forces.

Using the assassination of Sadat as his starting point, Hosni Mubarak (b.1928) focused on combating Islamist influence in the military and in the society at large, with a brutal crackdown against Islamist insurgency in the 1990’s.

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TIME IN

28 A

pril

1936

- 26

July

195

228

Sep

tem

ber 1

970

- 6 O

ctob

er 1

981

23 Ju

ne 1

956

- 28

Sep

tem

ber 1

970

18 Ju

ne 1

953

- 14

Nov

embe

r 195

4 Muhammad Naguib (1901-1984) - Egypt’s 1st presidentAppalled by Farouk’s unwillingness or inability to stand up to the British, Naguib believed the Egyptian Army had a duty to overthrow what he saw as a corrupt regime, after which, he said they should relinquish political influence in favor of civilian rule.

“The Military’s role was not to rule the country, but to protect those in power.” (1955)

Naguib ... POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Nasser ... POWER TO THE ARMY

17 Months

14 Years

Sadat ... POWER TO THE PRESIDENT

Farouk ... POWER FROM LONDON TO CAIRO

11 Years

Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) - Egypt’s 2nd PresidentNasser had Naguib arrested on trumped up charges of treason, and placed him under house arrest. In spite of his avowed support for and power to the people, Nasser was not a genuine democrat, instead preferring to maintain his - and the Army’s - grip on power.

“The Army is in the vanguard of society.” (1953)

Anwar Sadat (1918-1981) - Egypt’s 3rd PresidentNasser’s sudden death of a heart attack propelled his Vice President into power. Sadat moved quickly to consolidate his grip on power, arresting many Nasser loyalists, and reaching out to the USA. Although an Army man, he didn’t trust their loyalty to him. “Russians can give you arms, but only the United States can give you a solution.” (1977)

16 Years

King Farouk I (1920-1965) - Egypt’s penultimate kingAn unpopular King, corrupt and venal, following his overthrow in July 1952, his infant son, Fuad (b. 16 January 1952) was appointed king until the monarchy was abolished a year later.

”The whole world is in revolt. Soon there will be only five Kings left: the King of England, the King of Spades, The King of Clubs, the King of Hearts, and the King of Diamonds.” (1948)

POWER

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Morsi ... PLAYING WITH DEMOCRACY

1 Year

Mubarak ... THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA

29Years

Mansour ... WAITING FOR SISI?

?

Tantawi ... MILITARY OVERREACH

16 Months

Hosni Mubarak (b.1928) - Egypt’s 4th PresidentSadat’s assassination propelled his Vice President into power: Mubarak refuses to appoint his own VP until 16-days before his ouster. Mubarak depoliticized the military, mainly through trading economic privileges for overt political control.

“Egypt has gone through difficult times and we cannot allow these to carry on.” (10 Feb 2011)

Mohamed Tantawi (b.1935) - Acting President Head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Force (SCAF), and Mubarak’s Minister of Defence for 20 years, Tantawi’s time as Egypt’s Acting President was marked by heavy-handedness on the part of the military authorities.

“Everyone who criticized the role of the armed forces and its Supreme Council at one given time must revise his stand.” (2012)

Mohammed Morsi (b.1951) - Egypt’s 5th PresidentRegrettably, Egypt’s first democratically elected and first non-military President seemed to take his lead from his predecessors. Self-interest stopped him working for the best interests of all citizens, as a President ought to do.

“The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt is the Commander of the Armed Forces, full stop.” (2012)

Adly Mansour (b.1945) Acting PresidentIn place since the coup that overthrew Morsi, Mansour will step down after the 2014 elections, which are sure to be contested and won by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

“The June 30th [2013] revolution took place in order to put the January 25th revolution back on the right track after some forces tried to hijack it for personal gain.” (2013)

TIME IN POWER

18 | Egypt’s Army Back in Charge

PART THREE - TERRORISM AND OTHER MILITARY BYPRODUCTS

FROM SCAF TO THE MB

Ostensibly guiding the post-Mubarak t rans i t ion process towards c iv i l i an democracy, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) ruled, clumsily, by fiat for almost a year. In the sixty years from 1952, and rule by the military’s 18-member strong RCC, to 2013, and military rule by the 21-member strong SCAF, Egypt has not made great strides in the direction of representative democracy. It would be asinine to imagine that 2014’s putative presidential and parliamentary elections will necessarily evince great strides forward in this regard.

Garnering a great deal of criticism from secular and religious parties alike, SCAF under the leadership of General Tantawi (b.1935) was heavy-handed and too obviously self-interested. Its activities included strenuous efforts to safeguard privileges built up by the military over decades, including their privileged position in the country’s constitution. SCAF opposed any political and economic reforms that might be used to target their interests, as well as repressing continued protests against military rule: roughly 12,000 civilian protesters were arrested and put on trial in extrajudicial, military courts during their tenure. They also, using spurious claims,

barred numerous legitimate candidates from the 2012 presidential election, and were even alleged to have been plotting to assassinate Morsi before having their powers rescinded by Morsi in August.

In spite of SCAF’s barely veiled efforts to manipulate the transition of power in their favour, after the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood dominated the political landscape, with a decisive victory in the parliamentary elections and with former member Mohammed Morsi ascending to the presidency, with 51 percent of the vote, in late June. From the downfall of Mubarak, in February 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood was careful to praise the SCAF for saving the country. However, when the Brothers reneged on an earlier promise not to field a candidate for the Presidency, their days in power were numbered, even before they won the election.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Army knew that the Islamist candidate would likely win, but only the Amy knew they would not allow such a result to stand.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Army knew that the Islamist candidate would likely win, but only the Amy knew they would not allow such a result to stand.

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Throughout the summer of 2012, the SCAF still appeared to dominate Egyptian politics, moving quickly to try and neuter Morsi’s powers. But Morsi was not going to be as easily outmanoeuvred as the military men imagined. Wielding, even overstepping, his newfound legitimacy as the first freely elected president in the Arab world, Morsi swiftly dismissed the two top military leaders and dislodged the SCAF from power. In August, the new President appointed General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to both the posts of Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Egypt.

In part because of certain outward signs, which are supposedly indicative of religiosity – Sisi’s wife wears the niqab, and he is said to attend mosque prayers more often than many of his contemporaries – Sisi was accused of being a Muslim Brotherhood plant, put in place by SCAF. Rumours about Sisi’s Brotherhood sympathies were swiftly

scotched in light of the July 2013 coup and subsequent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo and elsewhere, a crackdown in which the Egyptian Armed Forces killed more than 1,000 largely unarmed civilian protestors.

After Morsi, what can one say about the three main power blocks in Egypt? The Islamists

are dissolved and discredited; the secularists are divided and disgusted by events; the Army is delighted, having for the time being completely eliminated any possible rivals.

ISLAMIC JIHAD AND OTHER POSSIBLE FUTURES

Since 1952, and the rise of Nasser, Islamists have not been welcome in the Egyptian Army. Against this background, the March 2013 announcement that members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties would

The I s lamis t s are d i s so lved and discredited; the secularists are divided and disgusted by events; the Army is delighted, having for the time being completely eliminated any possible rivals.

Rumours about Sisi’s Brotherhood sympathies were swiftly scotched in light of the July 2013 coup and subsequent c r a c k d o w n a g a i n s t t h e M u s l i m Brotherhood ...

20 | Egypt’s Army Back in Charge

be allowed to enter the country’s military academies spread alarm and fear throughout the ranks and among senior officers: since Morsi’s ouster, these plans appear to have been dropped.

Since 1976, and Sadat’s attempts to consolidate power, soldiers have not been permitted to vote, or as the law states it, they are “exempt from their duty to vote.” In May 2013, Egypt’s highest court announced that servicemen would now, once again, be permitted to vote. The announcement has

been vociferously condemned by secularists and Islamists alike, as both groups view it as an attempt by the Army to secure or rig future elections, with the votes of soldiers in barracks being entered en masse for the Army’s favoured candidate. Although, in elections that are already routinely rigged, the addition of another layer of deceit hardly seems worthwhile: if, as is widely predicted, Sisi hangs up his uniform and stands as a civilian presidential candidate, one can safely assume that Egyptian soldiery and officers

will decide to vote en bloc, regardless of the quality of his campaign speeches.

Sadat was assassinated by Egyptian soldiers who were also members of an Islamist t e r ro r i s t o rgan i sa t ion ded ica t ed to overthrowing the regime, which act, they anticipated would unleash a popular, anti-secular, pro-Islamist uprising. The co-founder and first emir of Egyptian Islamic Jihad was not a religious scholar, but an Army Colonel of Military Intelligence, Abboud al-Zumar. Born in August 1947, into a wealthy Cairo family, after Sadat’s murder he was sentenced to life in prison. He was succeeded in the leadership of Islamic Jihad by Ayman al-Zawahiri, who after his release from an Egyptian prison in 1984, joined forces with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

Al-Zumar was released from prison after nearly 30 years, in March 2011, aged 64. He had, he said, not only renounced violence, but also supports equal rights for Copts, and respects the rights of all tourists who come to Egypt. In the first days of the uprising, he released two statements from prison. The second statement was, “addressed to the Egyptian military and my army colleagues,” and in it he warned the Army, “not to fight against the people.”7 In an interview on

Since 1976, and Sadat’s attempts to consolidate power, soldiers have not been permitted to vote.

7 Asharq al-Awsat, 28 January, 2012: http://www.aawsat.net/2012/01/article55243421 Accessed 2 November, 2013.

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Egyptian television after his release, and after the downfall of Mubarak, al-Zumar said with respect to his assassination of Sadat, “I’d like to apologise to the Egyptian people.” Why? “… because we did not intend to bring Hosni Mubarak to power.”8

Having renounced anti-state violence, al-Zumar says his past militancy was the result of state repression; this does not bode well for Egypt in the face of a continuing lack of democratic freedoms and repression. In June 2011, he joined the newly formed Building and Development Party, headed by his cousin and brother-in-law, Tarezk al-Zumar, another member of Islamic Jihad imprisoned with him in 1981. Building and Development was part of the Islamist bloc of parties, headed by the Salafist an-Nour (Eng. The Light) in 2011-2012 parliamentary elections. They secured 13 seats of 123 for their bloc, out of a total 508 seats in parliament.

Another former Egyptian Army officer made the headlines more recently. Ex-Major Waleed Badr carried out a failed suicide attack against the Minister of the Interior, detonating a car bomb in central Cairo, in August 2013. Badr was thrown out of the Army in 2005 for his extremist Islamist views, which were apparently manifest in his berating his fellow officers for not being Islamic enough: how to win friends and influence people. Once out of uniform, Badr went to war, travelling to Afghanistan and Iraq, before being arrested by Iranian authorities in Syria, and spent a year in prison in Iran, after local authorities caught him trying to enter Iraq. It is worth remembering,

once again, behind the uniform one finds a face, and each one is distinct from all others.

al-Zumar said with respect to his assassination of Sadat, “I’d like to apologise to the Egyptian people.” Why? “… because we did not intent to bring Hosni Mubarak to power.”

Behind the uniform one finds a face, and each one is distinct from all others.

8 Al-Mehwar (Ar. The Axis), TV interview from March 2011: accessed, 12 September 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_Zwxb6USkg.

22 | Egypt’s Army Back in Charge

CONCLUSION

Today aged 91, Khaled Mohieddin (b.17 August 1922) is the sole surviving member of the Free Officers Movement that toppled King Farouk in the coup that has become known as the 23 July Revolution. In a 2004 interview with Egypt’s al-Ahram (Eng. The Pyramids) newspaper, Mohieddin said that the Free Officers had the wrong attitude towards democracy, a flaw in their thinking that he believed was still haunting Egypt. “My main focus,” Mohieddin said, “was that the revolution should come first but then be reinforced by democracy”, in which opinion he was in lock-step with General, later President, Naguib.

Mohieddin went on to say he still regretted not being able to persuade enough of his co-conspirators of the importance of the restoration of parliamentary life, and the move towards full democracy. One wonders if the current members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces have learnt anything about the diversity that exists within their ranks and, beyond them, the range of opinions vis-à-vis the role of the Army in ruling Egypt.

In his memoir, I Was President of Egypt, Naguib said of the man who pushed him aside to take power, “at the age of 36, Abdel Nasser

felt that we could ignore Egyptian public opinion until we had reached our goals, but with the caution of a 53-year-old, I believed that we needed grassroots support for our policies, even if it meant postponing some of our goals. I differed with the younger officers on the means by which to reach our goals, never on the principles.” 9

There may have been a united front among the Free Officers, but that is all it was: a front. Similarly today, while in public there are more points of agreement than disagreement among members of the Egyptian Armed Forces, in reality there are differences of

There may have been a united front among the Free Officers, but that is all it was: a front.

“at the age of 36, Abdel Nasser felt that we could ignore Egyptian public opinion until we had reached our goals, but with the caution of a 53-year-old, I believed that we needed grassroots support for our policies, even if it meant postponing some of our goals.”

9 Muhammad Naguib, Kanat ra’is li-Misr (I Was President of Egypt) (1984). English translation entitled, The Fate of Egypt.

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opinion just below the surface, just as there have been for the past 60 years.

In late 2013, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary the 6 October War, General Sisi, made a speech saying that Egyptians would remember who stood by them and who did not. Among others, this was an obvious dig at the American government, in spite of the annual USD 1.3 billion that it makes available to the Egyptian military. Sisi likened the Egyptian Army to the pyramids, saying that they cannot be broken.10 He was right to highlight the seeming solidity of the pyramids, whose strength and resilience is well known, but few metaphors have a single face. Sisi might also do well to remember that not only does every pyramid consist of tens of thousands of individual stones, but also that as one wanders through Egypt’s deserts, one can find without effort numerous pyramids that have collapsed.

In 1952, younger officers, majors and colonels, led the coup: in 2013 it was the turn of the Generals, those who have already reached the top of the military pile. However, the possibility of another coup, one led by disaffected young officers, perhaps with an older, frustrated general as their figurehead, is not beyond the realm of possibility, indeed, it

is a distinct possibility with strong domestic roots.

And now, because the thought racing through your minds is “When?” I would suggest that marrying the lessons of history with the continuing demands for genuine political participation, after taking the reins of power, the next president – shall we call him Sisi? – might have as little as a year to make a difference. Will whatever administration is put in place in 2014 have learnt from history? It is impossible to say. If it has not though, and it ignores the country’s dire economic problems, the increasing breakdown in security, the diminution of the rule of law, and calls for real democratic freedoms, and neglects these in favour of a self-interested consolidation of power and self-interest, the ghosts of 1952 may be raised even sooner.

“In 1952, younger officers, majors and colonels, led the coup: in 2013 it was the turn of the Generals, … the possibility of another coup, one led by disaffected young officers, perhaps with an older, frustrated general as their figurehead, is not beyond the realm of possibility…”

10 Daily News, Egypt, 7 October 2013: accessed 3 November 2013. http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/10/07/egyptian-people-will-never-forget-who-stood-with-them-or-against-them-al-sisi/

24 | Egypt’s Army Back in Charge

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