THE E'ID OF IDEOLOGY IN CHILE?

A thesis subrnitted to tlie Department of Political Skdies

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Queen's University

Kingston. Ontario, Canada

September 1997

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ABSTRACT

Since mmy important social malysts and political actors have proclaimed the end of ideolojical

politics in Chile in the context of the new political consensus which allowed for Pinochet's defeat in the

1988 plebiscite and the transition to dernocracy, it is paramount to challenge such a daim using a different

theoretical perspective. Hence it is highly appropriate that the questions raised by the end of ideology

debate be integrated into a Gtamscian analyticai frarnework in order to demonstrate that Chile has not

witnessed the end of ideology, but that it has Iived through the creation of a new historical bloc based on

the hegemony of neohberaiism. The fint chapter of this thesis establishes the theoretical context judged

necessary to an adequate study of Chile's transition to democracy. Two essential definitions of the concept

of ideology are identified in order to show that the end of ideology is also an ideology in both the positive

and negative senses of the term. The last section of the first chapter elaborates on Gramsci's major

conceptual innovations necessary to the understanding of the historical process that led to Chile's transition

to democracy and to its attainment of a political consensus on a capitalist market economy. Accordingly,

three periods, analysed successively in chapten two, three and four, are identified in the construction of the

new Chilean historical bloc. Chapter nvo deals with the period starting in 1970 with the rise to power of

Salvador Allende. This period is identified as a period of stadolatry during which the incomplete seinire of

the state apparants by the Unidad PopuIar government impeded the success of the desired socialist

tevolution. Chapter three is concemed with the establishment of the military dictatorship of General

Pinochet in 1973. which constituted a second stadolatry period dunng which the very nature of Chilean

society was drastically changed. Finally, focussing on the ideological perspective of the opposition to the

military regirne forces, the lasr chapter seeks to demonstrate that with the transition to democracy began the

hegemonic reign of neoliberalisrn which fonns the bais of the newly created historical bloc.

CONTENTS

Introduction

Chnpter 1: The Theoretical Context

The meanings of Ideology The negative sense: Marx's conception The positive meaning: Gramsci's conception The End of Ideology Debate Towards a Gramscian analysis

Chapter 2: The Organic Crisis: Ailende's Rise and Fa11

A hisoncal bloc in disintegration: the polarization of the political system The Chilean road to socialism

Chapter 3: The Organic Crisis: The Dictatorial Solution

The reactionary phase The foundational phase

Chapter 4: Transition to Democracy: Towards Hegemony

The rise of the opposition The role of the capitaiist class The opposition's acceptance of the 1 980 constitution The role of the political parties The role of the intellectuals The creation of a Schumpeterian f o m of Democracy The neoliberal historical bloc

Conclusion

Bibliography

THE END OF IDEOLOGY IN CHILE?

"II est plus facile de proclamer l'égalité que de la réaliser."' Édouard Herriot. Aux sources de la liberté.

"Socialism is deadn in our times, prodaim the "Nieasches" of the end of the Twentieth

cenmry. Liberalisrn has put an end to ideology. The "socialist god," with its inferior moral

~rinciples, could not have triumphed over the supenor creed of liberal thinking. It was assumed

that with the dismantlement of the USSR socialism died as a viable alternative to capitalisrn and

political liberalism. in the same marner that fascism, the earlier major threat to liberalism. perished

during World War II. The debate that followed the alleged defeat of socialism aroused great

intellectual interest as well as great confusion. Were ideals ousted from politics ? Were radical

political daims forever discredited? Could society ni11 be radically iransformed? What are the

new cliallenges to liberal values? Francis Fukuyama went so far as to proclaim that Western

civilization had reached the end of Hisrory: "the end point of rnankind's ideological evolution and

the univenalimtion of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human govemment."'

In order to darifi die confùsion that spread in the world of intellectual debate, Daniel Bell.

the first author to produce an extensive smdy on the phenornenon of the "end of ideolo&"', wrote

in a later article' that the term ideology is a historical word that h a s now Iost al1 its meaning. ïhe

overuse of the term. and the "elasticizationn of its definition, have penitted the integration of al1

creeds and beliefs capable of conditioning human behaviour into the debate on the end of ideology.

Put into context, what the worid has witnessed is the end of ideological politics, that is, the end of

politics which aim at a complete transformation of society based on a pre-established blueprint.

'"It is easier to proclairn equality than to achieve it." (Personal translation) 'Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest (Summer 1989). p. 4. 'Daniel Bell, The End of ldeology; On the exhoustion of Political Ideas in the Fijlies (New York, the Free Press, 1962)- 474pp. 'Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology Revisited (part 1 ) " Government Opposition 23 ($2, I988), pp. 13 1- 15 1.

The normative consensus ernerging in the posnvar years in the West held that civil politics could replace ideological politics; that the drem of organizing a society by cornpiete blueprint was bound to fail; that no cornprehensive social changes should be introduced necessary as they might seem, without some effort to identiQ the human and the social costs; and that no changes in the way of Iife (e .~. collectivization of land) be undertaken if they could not be reversed. In short, it was - and is- a view that is (mistakenly) calIed pragrnatism in politics (a word with less philosophica1 fieight would be prudence), or what Dewey would have called, ambipuously, = intelligence - the focw, within a Jiamework of liberai values, on problem-solving as a means of remedying social ilis and inadequacies.

This, then, was the political and inteIlectuaI background of the theme, 'the end of ide~logy".~

This might have been the background of the theme, but there is no doubt that Bell a, orees

with Fukuyama tliat humanity has reached a final consensus establishing "civil politics", meaning

IibemI politics supported by liberal economics, as humanity's supreme historical achievernent. The

deatli of ideological politics is seen by both authors as the triumph of liberalism over Mamism.

Hence, Bell argues that a moral order, "if it is to exist without coercion or deceit, has to transcend

the parochialism of interest and tame the appetites ofpa~sions ."~ Bell adds: "And that is the defeat

of ideolo~y."' ideolog is understood as a distorted view of the world that necessarily creates a

totalitarian society. In that sense, Bell. using Max Weber, declares his unconditional loyaity to the

"ethics of responsibility" as opposed to the "ethics of ultirnate ends".' Yet, while Bell celebrates the

end of ideolosy as a great achievement freeing huma. beings fiom the totalitarian threat of

ideological discourse, Fukuyama, going back to Weber as well, concludes that the end of history

wiiI be a very "sad time". The process of ntionalization fullfilled:

The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the woridwide ideological stniggie that called

'tbid.. p. 138. '1 bid. 'Ibid. 'Ibid., p. 137.

fonh d u i n g courage. imagination, and idealism. will be replaced by economic c;ilculation, the endless solving of technical problerns, environmental concems, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there wiil be neither an nor philosophy, just the perpetual crimaking of the museum of hurnan hi~tory-~

Is tliat what is happening in Chile? Has the process of rationalization gobbled up Chile's

Iiistory? 1s the transition to democracy a mere teflexion of the triumph of liberalism and the end of

ideology? 1s Liberal Democracy the tinal fom of human govemment to appear in that country?

The "capitalist revo~utionn which Chile underwent seems to attest to Fukuyama's thesis, hence it is

believed that Cliile. along with the West, has entered the last stage of its history. The Chilem

"capitalist revolutionn also seerns to suppon Bell's argument that ideological politics have penshed

under the realism of "prudent politics". Accordingly, there exists a consensus in Chile. argues

Edgardo Boeninger, on the inevitability of an open economy and a plunlist demo~racy.'~ It is

believed that the Lefi is no longer a challenge to pluralist democracy and that society, which has

learned under the milita- dictatorship the lessons of the devastating consequences of ideological

pol itics. agrees on the fundamental social predicament of a privately owned. market. capitalist

economy" Xccording to Felipe Larrain: "The time is ripe for the end of ideology and the

tlourisliing of pragmatism."" David Hojman adds: " ... our argument is tliat al1 the technical and

political conditions are there to solve any remaining or foreseeable problerns, and that future

zovernrnent mistakes that inevitably wiII be commiaed are likely to be small and swiftly - corrected."" Yet a fundamental question remains to be elucidated: what is the true nature of the

political consensus reached in Chi le?

Tukuyama, Op. Cit,, p. 18. 10 Edgardo Boeninger, "The Chilean Pol itical Transition to Democracy," in Joseph S Tulchin and Augusto Varas, From Dicratorsh@ to Democracy; Rebuiiding Political Consemzts in Chile (U.S.A., The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 199 1), p. 55-56. "Ibid. "Felipe B. Larrain, "The Economic Challenges of Democratic Developmentn in Paul W. Drake and Ivan Jaksic, The Stnrgglefor Demacracy in Chiie. rev. ed.. (Lincoln, University of Nebmka Press, 1995), p. 30 1. "David E. Hojman. Chiie: The Polirical Economy of Devefoprnent and ûemocracy in the 1990 5. (Hong

In order to better appreciate tlie ideologicaI forces at work in Cliile, the theoretical

problems revealed by the debate over tlie issues on the end of ideology and the end of history are

rxtremely significant to the adoption of a more adequate theontical Fnmework to approach the

case of the transition to democncy. By positing the problem of Chile's transition to democncy

from the end of ideology perspective, and inteçrating this debate into a Grmscian theoretical

framework, the pol itical nnalyst is presented with the possi bility of critically assessing the Chilean

"capitalist revolutionn without falling into either liberal or Marxian dogmatism. The essential

questions therefore are: (1) what are the ideological forces at work in Chile which ensure the

consent of broad masses to the prevailing system; and (2) how waç this transition process

l~istorically arrived at?

Hence. in order to transcend a dangerously lirnited conception of ideology, it is paramount

to integnte Gramsci's concept of hegemony into Our theoretical framework starting from tlie end of

ideology debate. As a powerful analytical tool, the concept of hegemony can be used to critically

assess the political, social and economic clairns made by the advocates of the victoq of Iibenlism,

and to discover the mechanisms of ideologicril domination. 1s Chile at the end of historv, or is it

building a new historicai bloc on liberal ideologicai grounds? Only a theoretical framework which

provides adequate conceptual tools to undentand the complexities of such a term as ideology will

permit us to clariS, the very ideological nature of the Chilean political consensus. More

specifically, such tools are provided by Gramsci's concepts of hegemony and historical bloc since

they allow the political analyst to penetrate the sacred aura shining over an apparent victory of one

particular ideology. Challenging the thesis of the end of ideology, the conceptual outlook

establisbed by Gramsci forces a thorough historical understanding of the panicularities of any

political moment. The concept of historical bloc is not a static one. I t is a dynamic understanding

of the political. social and economic forces at play. Hence, it is the objective of this thesis to

Koq, The MacMillan Press Ltd. 1993). p. 203.

demonstrate, thmugh a Gramscian theoretical reflection on the historical devetoprnent of ChiIean

politics from the rise to the presidency of the Socialist Salvador Allende to the new political

consensus, that the supposed end of ideological politics consists of a mere acceptance of an illusion

eiigendered by the creation of a new historical bloc based on the ideological hegemony of

neo l i beral ism.

As Professor Robert H. Haber pointed out: "The 'end of ideology' theorists put great

emphasis on the decrease in conflict because of consensus; they virtually ignore the more importcmr

(original emphasis) suppression ofconflict."" The hinorical process of S C C U ~ ~ ~ the consent of the

Chilean population is unique. For example, how can we explain that a poil conducted in 1985 by a

distinguished research institution of Santiago, FLASCO (Latin Amencan Faculty of Social

Sciences), indicated that Chileans ranked torture and human rights eleventh in importance on a Iist

of welve problem~?'~ To use a Gramscian terminology, what needs to be undemood in relation to

the formation of any historical bloc is the balance existing between coercion and consensus.

There is no doubt that the context in which the military took power contributed to shape the

ideofogicnffimrre of the country. The economic policies of the Allende govemment were seen by

the Right as desuoying the country. The nationalization of banks and many industries, as well as

the implementation of a land refonn program constituted a direct tlireat to private property. Facing

a debt crisis, a trade deficit and extremely high inflation, the Chilean economy could not support

the high expectations of the population in terms of economic and social development. Hence. the

militas. justifying its intemention on the ideological grounds of the "national security doctrine",

believed it necessary to Save Chile from Marxism-Leninism. Gazmuri noted that: "Pinochet finnly

believes that the military intervention of 1973 not only saved Chile from Marxism-Leninism, but it

- -

"Robert H. Haber, "The End of Ideology as IdeoIogy," in C h a h 1. W m a n , The End of ldeology Debare (New York, A Clarion Book, Published by Simon and Schuster, 1969). p. 189. '* WiIiarn F. Sater, Chile and the United States; Empires in Conflic! (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1 WO), p.204.

ais0 initiated the country's real rnodernization process and, thus, that this intervention was basically

ri beneficial act."Ib Indeed, "Pinochet became the leading fiçure in the decision to adopt a free

market economy before other Latin American countries, and this is his major historical suc ces^."'^

However. as demonstrated by Martinez and Diaz, Pinochet's intervention waç, at first. purely

reactionary since the armed forces did not have any blueprint on which to base the new ideai

Chilean sociep. [ndeed, as Gazmuri further showed, the military reacted to the refoms

implernented by the Allende government and sought to renirn to the pre-existing order, that is. 10

the econornic model that reçulated the Chilean economy prior to Allende's rise to power. 18

However. seeking legitimacy, the military soon relied on the expertise of liberal economists, known

as the "Chicago Boys", to revolutionize the country and ensure econornic growth. Neoliberalism

served as a blueprint for the new Chile.

Initiated by violence and oppression, the economic developmental process of Chile initially

proved itself to be working as the country enjoyed rapid groowth, and successfully recovered from

hvo deep economic secessions in 1975-76 and 1982-83. Thus a consensus developed as to the

superiority of the neolibenl economic model. As an example of changing attitudes, according to an

interview Wiliam Sater had with a taxi driver in Santiago. the material interests became more

important than ideological ideals in the minds of a majority of Chileans: "1 live here more or less

well. There is not much democracy, but 1 do not lack for food."'° While Fukuyama claims that

"those who believe that the future must inevitably be socialist tend to be very old, or vexy marsinal

to the real political discoune of their societies", it would be tmer to Say t h a ~ in the case of Chile,

they fend to be dead. as the Pinochet regime systematically suppressed al1 opposition. (Reponing

I6Cristian Gazmuri, "The Amed Forces in Democratic Chile," in AIan Angell and Benny Pollack, The Legacy ofDicratorshi;o: Polirical, Economic and Social Change in Pinochet% Chile (Liverpool. The hstitute of Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 1993)p. 135. 171bid. I8Ibid. 19 Sater, Op. Cit., p. 204.

vii

on the Iiuman riphts abuses commined by military regirne, the Renig Report of March 1991.

ordered by president Patricio Aylwin. documented more than ZOO0 deatlis.)" Consequently, as

demonstnted by the Chilean case there may exist a great dichotorny benveen tlie political ideals

and the economic reality of liberalism. As it imposed itself as tlie only viable economic model and

secured the consent of the Chilean population, the liberal economic model never respected suc11

political values as tolennce which constitutes the bais of liberal democracy.

In addition, as it historically developed in Chile, the neolibenl economic mode1 clearly

showed that it could not support its ideal of a totally free market economy. ln fact. during the 1982

economic crisis, the miIitary realised that the state had to intervene in tlie economy in order to Save

it frorn catastrophe. As was the case in much of East Asia, and especially in South Korea, the state

Iiad to jump in and regulate the anarchic forces of the market in order to direct the invisible h d in

a way that ensured economic growth. Thus, what has been witnessed in Cliile was the creation of a

solid ideological bloc based on the belief that macro-economic stability is the most important

aspect of a healrhy society. Sofia Correa eficiently summarised the ideological force char the

political Right enjoys in Chile, and which explains in part why only 10 percent of al1 Chileans

continue to receive around 40 per cent of the total national incorne attributable to wages, and that

around 28 per cent of tlie total population is considered to be living in poverty (3.8 million in

1994):"

FinaIIy, we should bear in mind that the right's fmt and forernost prionty is to safe~uard the economic mode! created during the military regime. Now, it is obvious that the economic rnodel is not being questioned by any politicai sector at present, and that public opinion is on the whole favourable to it. A general consensus has corne about on this issue. Apparently, the majority of the country wouId be willing to dismiss even the demands of the most postponed sectors, precisely the very victims of this economic

"'Simon Collier and William F. Sater. A History of Chile. 1808-199.1 (New York. Cambridge University Press, 1 W6), p. 3 83. "These nurnbers are taken frorn: Javier Martinez and Alvaro Diaz, Chile: The Grear Transformation (Geneva, The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, UNRISD, 1996), p. 125.

model, if this meant assuring its stability."

Likewise, the technocratie path that the Chilean decision-making appmms haç taken may

have an enormous influence on the uajectory dernocracy takes. Paaicio Silva argued that the

technocrats (the experts) have achieved a rnarked hegemony in Chilean inteilectual circles over the

humanist intellectuals who basically disappeared dunng the dictatonhip? Silva described the post-

Allende period as the 'age of the econ~mists".~~ Relying firsr on the expertise of the Chicago Boys,

the military regime imposed an elitist decision-making mechanism over a pluralist interest-oriented

po 1 itical system. Consequently, the democratic govemment of Patricio Ay lwin, the government

that inaugurated the transition to a democratic era, pursues the same economically oriented liberai

ideoIogy. Silva said:

The efficient management of the economy, and achieving sustainable devetopment have become the key objectives for the democratic government which, in itself, reinforces the economists' and fiancial experts' position in the inner comidors of power. This ernphasis on econornic performance is clearly due to the fact that the democratic administration inherited a relatively modem. successfii e~onorny .~

Silva explained that we may be witnessing the creation of a purely Schurnpeterian democracy; that

is, the mere implementation of a rnethod at arriving at political decisions, a smoke sreen of

legitimacy.

To conclude. the questions raised by the debate over the end of ideology and the end of

history integrated into a Gramscian analytical framework provide the basis for a heuristic

theoretical approach to Chile's transition to democracy. Such an approach is highly appropriate to

the study of the Chilean case since many important social analysts and political actors have

prociaimed the end of ideological politics in ChiIe in the context of the newly arrived at political

"Sofia Coma, "The Chilean Right after Pinochet", in Ange11 and PolIack, Op. Cit., p. 17 1. ?3Patricio Silva, "Technocratie Hegemony in a Post-populist Pluralist System: Towards a Shurnpeterian Dernocracy in Chile?" in Ange11 and Poiiack Op. cit., p. 198- 199.

Ibid. 'SSilva, Op. Cit., p. 2 13.

consensus which allowed for Pinochet's defeat in the 1988 plebiscite and the progessive transition

to democracy. iMoreover, this approach obliges a fundamental analysis of the meaning of ideolog

which in mm permits a bener understanding of its impact on society. The main concern of this

tliesis is to demonstrate that Chile has not witnessed the end of ideology, neither has it reached the

end of Iiistory. Rather, it has lived through a historically unique creation of a new historical bloc.

thouph still fragile. based on a neolibenl hegernony.

It is proposed to proceed in this fashion. The fim chapter of this thesis aims at establisliing

the theoretical context necessary to an adequate study of Chiie's transition to democracy. In the

first section, two meanings of the term ideology are identified. Ideology in its negative sense

consists of the conceahnent of social contradictions at the consciousness Ievel, and in its positive

sense. it represents a particular world view shaping human behaviour. The second section of that

chapter deals with the end of ideology debate in order to pinpoint the definition of ideolog used

therein. It attempts to demonstrate that the end of ideology is. in itself, an ideology in both the

positive and negative senses of the term. The last section elaborates on Gramsci's major concepnial

innovations such as the concepts of historical bloc and hegernony in order to define the necessa.

concepts used in this thesis. The second chapter begins the theoretical reflection on the historical

process that led to Chile's transition to democracy and to iü attainment of a political consensus on a

capitalist market economy. Three periods, covered successively in chapters two, three. and four,

are identified in the construction of the new Chilean historkal bloc. The first period, stadng in

1970 with the rise to power of the Unidad Popular under Salvador Allende's leadership, is identified

as the fint period of sradolaw which is a seizure of the sute apparatus aiming at revolutionizing

society, and which occurred in a context of organic crisis. Chapter three is essentially concerned

with the establishment of the rnilitary dictatorship of General Pinochet in 1973, which oficially

lasted until 1989. The dictatorship constitutes the second stadolatry period under which the very

nature of Chilean sociecy was drastically changed. Finaliy, the last chapter seeks to demonstrate

chat with the transition to democncy began the hegemonic reign of neoliberalism which foms the

basis of the newly created, but still fragile, historical bloc. This final chapter deals with the rise of

the opposition to the military regirne and the transition to democracy under Aylwin's

administration. It also highlights the continuity between Aylwin and Frei's policies. As the

anal ysis concentrates on the ideo logical perspective of the new dernocratic regime, only Frei's

initial political agenda, which shows no ideological departure from Aylwin's govemment, is

considered. The new historical bloc is considered to be still fragiIe since, even though the regirne

lias been able to secure the consent of a larse majority of the Chilean population in relation to the

econornic mode1 and the new political consensus, Aylwin's goal of "growth with equityA was not

achieved. The gap behveen the rich and the poor is nill very wide, and ideological attachments to

old parties are dormant and may be resurrected once Pinochet, the common enemy, retires and the

authoritarian barriers to liberal democncy are lifted.

CHAPTER 1

THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT

The rneonings of fdeoloa

a Car tout commence par la conscience et rien ne vaut que par elle. Albert Camus. Le mythe de Sisvphe.

[nherent to the Enlightenment project, the search for the tmth about reality and the laws

that command it has pushed human beings into an eternal fight against subjectivity. Reminiscent

of Plato's allegoy, modem philosophers thought it possible to break through the appearances that

fooled those in the cave to hlly gmp, in the bright light of the Sun. the true reality. Rationalism,

empiricism and later positivism led the way to the rvirch-hzrnr against idols. prejudices, religions.

and ideology. Attempting to transcend inappropnate understandings of the world, Antoine Destutt

de Tracy, in 1796, tried to found a new science of ideas, which he called ideology. Lamin

described this new science in the following tems: "this science has at its object the establishment

of the origin of ideas; in this task, it rnust set aside metaphysical and reli_gious prejudices.

Scientific progress is possible only if false ideas can be avoided."' Yer ideology, whicli was first

considered a science of those ideas which undenvent some sort of psychological distortion, came to

include many different and controversial meanings.

ideology became so tightly associated with those distortrd ideas it sought to dernystiQ that,

following Napoleon, who called ideologists those who held false ideas, the term ideology itself

cane to be identified with these distorted ideas. Today, scholars are still trying to find a point

outside ideology to distance themselves from false ideas in order to conduct pureh objective stidies

of the world. That is exactly what the end of ideology theorists are attempting to do. Yet, they

seem to be caught in the ignominiozcs iveb of subjective thinking. In the attempt to demonstrate the

'"Everything begins with consciousness, and nothing is valuable outside of it-" (Personal Translation) orge Lanain. The Concept o f l d e o f o ~ (Athens. The University of Georgia Press. 1979). p. 27.

ideological character of the end of ideology thesis, it is panmount to analyse first the hvo main

conceptions wiiicli distinguisli a positive and a negative meaning to the term ideology. For the

purposes of this thesis. the Marxist tradition is considered to provide a significant and suficient

analysis of the term ideology. To proceed to an e.xhaustive survey of al1 the meanings given to

ideology or to carry out a thorough analysis teaching al1 metiiods available to the contemponry

social scientist to scrutinize the complexities of the concept would largely exceed the scope of tliis

thesis without necessarily furthering Our knowledge of Chilean politics. The reaçons leading to tbis

choice are straightforward: (1 ) the evolution of the concept of ideology within the Mamist tradition

is directly linked to recent Iiistorical events (notably events covering the period starting fiom the

Russian Revolution in 1917 to the proclaimed end of ideology and the dismantlement of the

U.S.S.R); (2) Marxism itself has been called an ideology by Mmists (Bernstein was the first one

to do so): and (j), while discarding socialisrn and Marxism as beins ideological, the end of

ideology theorists use a conception of ideology which is identical to the positive iMmist definition

of tlie concept. that is, ideology consisü of a panicular world view which leads to action.'

For the sake ofclarity, a few comments on the reasons leadiiig to the adoption of a Marxist

fnrnework to analyse tlie concept of ideology need to be added. The rwentieth century bas

witnessed the ernergence of what has been called ideological politics. From the Russian Revolution

to the disrnemberment of the U.S.S.R., inciuding the establishment of fascist regimes. the world has

fought fanatically at both physical and ideological IeveIs. Whole countries were mobilized along

ciearly defined political ideais aiming at creating tlie "Good society". For bot11 tlie Soviet Union

and the United States, what becarne a "cold war" in terms of actual armed conflicts behveen the two

superpowers was in fact an extrernely "hot war" at the ideological level. [t is only fair to Say that

31t would be largely exagerated to explore al1 methods of anaiysins the concept of ideology which would necessitate covering many different fields such as, for example. psychology, linguistics, hermeneutics, sociology, and philosophy. Indeed, since the end of ideology theorists base their argument on a particularly Iimited conception of ideology, in the context of this thesis, the Mmist tradition offers al1 the necessary

Mamism. seeking to mise the working class' consciousness in order for it to break free from the

alienriting cliains of the cripitalist system, assumed a major role in world Iiistory. Indeed, Lenin

started a new chapter of human history in which ideology was consciously integated into the clriss

struggle. Consequently, one cannot seriously talk about ideoloa in relation to its political impact

on society witliout considering the evolution the concept undenvent within Mnriuism.

In addition, as previously mentioned, Mancisrn itself was detined as an ideolow by fervent

blarxists sucli as Bernstein, Lenin, Lukacs, and Gramsci. Tliis means that far from being a

monolithic social doctrine, Marxism evolved and critically redefined itself in relation to the

liistorical context. Useful conceptual tools were developed to understand better the ever changing

world. Ideology, as first understood by Ma% was established as a critical concept which, faithfiil

to the Enlightenment project. sought to distinguish between the world of appearances and true

reality. With Lenin. and Iater Gramsci, the concept passed from a negative to a positive

connotation wh ich blurred the distinction behveen appeannces and reality, and which "politicized

the wliole of e~istence"~. Tliis is precisely what is rejected by the end of ideology theorists, yet they

are unable to tnnscend tlieir own conception of ideology. [ndeed. it is possible to adequately

analyse the parochialism of tlieir position by a critical analysis of the evolution of the concept of

ideology within the Marxist tradition. Because Marxisrn possesses the conceptual tools to critique

both its own ideological position and the liberal one. it englobes the end of ideology in its own

interna1 debate, unlike the end of ideology theorists, who lack any means to critically assess the

validity of dieir thesis. To use a Popperian formula, their - science is unfalsifiable, and thus

unscienrific.' Tuming now to the evolution of the concept of ideology witliin the Marxist tradition,

theoretical tools to dari@ the use of this term. 'Expression used by Raymond Aron: Raymond Aron, 'The end of the Ideological Age?" in Chaim 1. Wauman, The End ofldeoiogy Debare (New York, A Clarion Book Published by Simon and Schuster, 1968), p.45. 'One may observe that the issue of falsifiability used to critique the end of ideology thesis may also be raised against Mmism. Without entering into the epistemological debate on the falsifiability of Marxisrn as a

it will be possible ro dernonstrate Iiow the end of ideology defeats itself by its own premises.

The rrqpivc sense: kfatx S corrccpriort

Following lorge Lamin's argument, Mmisrn provides hvo broad conceptions o f ideology:

ri negative one, reducing ideolvry to a form of distorted tiiougl~t. and a positive one, which refers to

the totality of forms o f consciousness or the political ideas of a social c ~ a s s . ~ Within these nvo

broad conceptions exists a wide variety of possible versions. Nevertheless, despite the ambiguities

whicli Marx's concept of ideology presents7, Larrain argues that Mam conceived o f a coherent

scientific endeavour, it is paramount to chrifi why Marxism is considered a superior approach to the understanding of ideology. As previously mentioned. Marxism played an imponant role in world history and evolved accordingly. ln relation to the particular case of the evolution of the concept of ideology, history shotvs that the Mmist understanding of ideology pmved to be falsifiable as later Mariuists, depwting h m Marx's own negative conception of ideology, used the tem in a positive sense. Whereas the end of ideology theorists, claimin= that the Good sociely has been reached (see section on the end of ideology debate), systematically refuse to question the validity of their premises, the historical consciousness on which Mmism is based obliges Mmists to constantly rethink their position in relation to the ever changing histoc-ïcal contest, as did Lenin and Gramsci for example. It must be remembered that Mamisrn is used here essentially to mise a lesitirnate doubt about the validity of the end of ideolosy thesis and that ~Mrirxism is not considered to be a b a l nuth explaining the whole of existence. As a matter of fach dogmatic Marxism, that is unfaitiable iMmisrn, must also be rejected. In addition, the supposed scientific character of Mamism also needs to be challenged (the section on the end of ideology debate includes a short discussion on the dificulties of discovering objective mths). Once again. Mmism is considered a tooi for the analysis of the specific case of Chile. and as such. it is a better tool than the end of ideology thesis which constirutes a final statement about the Chilean situation, and which excludes the possibility of any significant shift from the historical path Chile h a embarked on. On the concept of falsifiability, see Kari Popper, Conjecrures and Refirratiom: the Growh of Scienr$c Knowledge (3rd ed. Rsvised, London. Routledge and K. Paul, 1969), 43 1 pp. "Jorge Larrain, Mamism and /deology (London, The MacMillan Press LTD, 1983), p. 4. -For exarnple. M m seemed to equate ideology with al1 forms of consciousness when he said, in the introduction of A Conrriburion ro rhe Critique of Polirical Economy, that "the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic" were "ideological foms of consciousness in which men become conscious of this conflict [the conflict at the material tevei], and fight it out". 'Marx on the History of His opinions," in Roben C. Tucker. The Mum-Engels Reader, 2nd ed.. (New York. University of Califomia Press, 1984). p.5. Regardless of some inconsistencies. it is important to rea1ise that the ernphasis must be placed on the term ideological forms of consciousness which, put into the general context of Marx's thought, as will be demonstrated, indicates that those forms of consciousness are ideological solely as they reflect and conceai, at the superstructural level, contradictions at the material level. As is the case with many aspects of Marx's thou;ht, it is always possible to debate the exact meaning he attributed to the concept of ideology since different Mamists adopted varïed versions of the same concept. Moreover, Marx seemed to sometimes relax his terminology when it was not directly related to a specific argument. The concept of ideology has suffered Corn this lack of a systematic use on the part of M m . Nevertheless, when considering the central themes of Marx's thought there are good reasons to believe that Mm's overall use of the concept of ideology was coherent as it served to illustrate a particular aspect of consciousness which represents a form of distortion of reality. l t must be said that, in this endeavour to argue for the existence of such a coherent concept in Mm's thought. and in addition to a penonal appreciation of Mam's understanding of the concept of ideology in

conception of ideology wliich is very specific in its theoretical application.8 Larrain bases his

argument inainly on Marx's book, T/ie German Ideoiou, which was first published in 1932, and

thus t v s not available to the first jeneration of Mmists who came to equate ideology with al1

foms ot'consciousness emerging from a particular class outlook.

Marx, tuming his back on Hegel, sought to correct the mistakes of both idealism and vulgar

materialism in relation to consciousness. Hegel. standing on his head, had to be put back on his

feet and vulgar materialism had to be purged of its stubbom deteminism. According to Larrain:

The probiem which Marx faces in buiIding a new theory of consciousness is twofold: how to reconcile matenalism with the fact that reality should not be conceived as a given object which does not include the subject's activity; and how to reconcile idealism with the fact thar being cannot be reduced to thought. While materialism makes consciousness a reflection of external reality, idealism makes reality the product of consciousness. 9

On the one hand. criticizing the idealist position, and giving prionty to being over

consciousness, Marx wrote in The German Ideology: "In direct contrast to German philosophy

which descends from heaven to earth. here we ascend from earrh to heaven."" Moreover,

"consciousness can never be anything else tlian conscious existence, and the existence of men is

their actual life process."" Thus. "life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by

life."" On the other hand. discrediting vulgar mmerialisrn, Marx argued that it had to be replaced

by hisrorical tnaterialism since it alone provided a conception of social life as practical, and

allowed to nanscend the rnaterialisü' reductionist and deterministic interpretation of histoty. In ne

Economic and Phiiosophic Manzrrcripis of l8#, Marx said: 'The whole character of a species - its

species character- is contained in the character of its Iife-activity; and free, conscious activiw is

cornparison to such hterpretations Y. for example, Althusser's. Jorge Larrain's position presented in his book. rMurxism ~ndldeology~ is accepted as a valid interpretation of Marx's thought. 'Lamin, lWarxisrn and ldeology. p. 4. 'Jorge Larrain, The Concept of Ideologv. Op. Cit., p. 38. ''Karl Marx, The German l d e o l o ~ , as quoted in Robert C. Tucker, Op. Cit., p. 1 54. "Ibid.

man's species character, ... Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his

consciousness. He has conscious life-activity. It is nota detemination in which he merges."13

AS sumrnarized by Larrain, Man distances himself €rom matenalism using the concept of

practice: "...practice is men's conscious and sensuous activiv whereby they produce their material

existence and the social relations within which they live, thus transfomihg nature, society and

themse~ves."'~ Human beings' activity is purposehi as it seeks to change the world which it

inlierited from the past. But the human wiII is to some extent determined by the material conditions

of life. In the ,Wun$iesro of the Comrnzmist Parry, Mmwro te :

When people speak of ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and bat the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even Pace with the dissolution of the oId conditions of existence. 15

Yet human beings face an open ended history in which they play the determinant role.I6 In ï71e

"Ibid., p. 155. "Karl Mm, The Econornic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Tucker, Op. Cit., p. 76. "Larrain, Marxism and Ideology, Op. Cit., p. 20. "Karl Marx. ,\.lani/esro ofrhe Cornmunisr Pany, in Tucker, Op. Cit., p. 489. 'OHere one m u t recall the fierce debate that plaged the Second International which separated 0rtfiodo.u Mmists ti-orn Reductionist Marxists. Without entering into chat sarne debate which concemed the best way to achieve comrnunism, the historicai context m u s be taken into account to explain such a chasm which, despite arnbiguities in Mm's writings, cannot be attributed to a staunch deterministic position on the part of Marx. The fact that electoral means seemed to constitute a possibIe avenue for wokers to reduce and eliminate the alienating and abusive effects of capitalism Ied some Mmists, such as Bernstein, to believe that, since communism was inevitable, the revolution was unnecessary and that universal suflhge was sufficient to progressiveiy destroy the capitalist mode of production. However, such determinism cannot be attributed to Marx. Indeed Marx considered that the contradictions inherent to the capitalist system rendered possible the attainment of a communist society, yet, the revolution had to be the result of the rising of the working class' consciousness. Without consciousness, without a purposeful and deliberate desire to create such a society based on a solid understanding of the actual histoncal context and hence social reality, communism would die as a mere historical potentiality. In that sense, Marx's cry: "Workers of the world unite!" (The Communist ~Manifesto) constitutes a conscious effort airning at changing the course of history. Marx's own life as a communist activist helps to support the argument that human subjectivity is central to the development of history. Supporting the argument for a consciaus class strugle, Rosa Luxemburg later said in The Russian Revolzrrion that bourgeois freedorns which allow for the taming of the exploitative effects of capitalism are extemely significant to the class stniggle, yet, they are not suficient. (See Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Ratohrion and Leninisrn or Mamisrn? U.S.A., University of Michigan Press, 196 1, 109pp.) Likewise, AtiIio Boron, in Srare. Capifalkm and Dernocrav in Latin Arnerica. defends the thesis that far fiom being the result of a pre-determined historical path. the rights and freedorns obtained by the working class in contemporary history are the direct consequence of that class' very struggle and revendications, and certainly not an outcome

G e r ~ ~ ~ a n Idrology, Marx also wmte that '...circurnstances make men just as much as men make

cir~urnstances."'~ Hence. it is using the concept of practice that M m atternpted to solve the

apparent dichotomy benveen consciousness and reality.

In tliis philosophical context, Marx used the concept of ideology to cla@ the problems

nised by a false conception of the relation between consciousness and reality. The most important

tiiing being a proper understanding of social reality, as mentioned in the previous quote from the

iblaiiife~t~ of rhe Cornmunisi Party, M m argued that the contradictions in material life explain the

contradictions in consciousness. Consequently, in relation to Marx's opposition to vulgar

materialism. and as shown by the concept of practice, the subject-object dichotomy reveals a

cornplex dialectical relationship within which human beings are both detemined by and

determinant on the course of their history. Thus:

The paradox of hurnan activiry is that it crystallises into objective institutions and social relations which, despite being produced by men and women themselves, escape their control. So one dimension of practice is to reproduce social relations as alien to individua~s.'~

The concept of practice is central to Marx's thought in its emphasis on the possibility of

overcorning ideology. As defined by Marx, ideology is a critical concept which serves to ciassi@

certain foms of consciousness and certain ideas as distortions or mere appearances hiding the û-ue

nature of social reality. Contrary to Freud who later claimed that ideology was the projected

of the benevolence of the capitalist class. The capitalist class accepts to compromise solely to the extent that its position of control is not threatened. (See Atilio Boron, State, Capitafism. and Democracy in Latin rlrnerica, London, Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1995,262pp.) Once again, men t history woutd seem to support the argument that the inevitability of cornmunism depends rnuch more on the ability of the working cIass to raise its consciousness and take care of its interests by itself. In that sense, it m u t be rernembered that Marx himself argued for a thorough understanding of the historïcal context in order to better appreciate the revolutionary potentiality of the exploited classes. (mis note does not daim to exhaust al1 arguments related to this debate. It only seeks to establish which understanding of Marx's position on derterminism is accepted as the most adequate to his appreciation of the concept of practice and consequently of ideology.) 17 Man, The German Ideology, in Tucker, Op. Cit., p. 165. "~arrain. IL!urxkm and Ideofogy, Op. Cit., p. 20.

coiicealinent in the extemal world of intemal contradictions inherent to human naturet9, ideology,

as defined by Marx originated in contradictions extemal to human beings which received a

distorted solution in the human mind. Accordingly, "ideology is ...., a solution in the mind to

contradictions wiiich cannot be solved in practice; it is the necessary projection in consciousness of

man's practical inabi~ities."'~ M m saw in revolutionary practice the only means to solve the

contradictions in rnaterial life which translate into contradictions in consciousness. Revolutionq

practice aims at transforming social relations so labour can be freed from relations of domination.''

"Science cotitributes to the 'theoretical collapse' of ideoIogy but cannot by itself bring about its

CO 1 Iapse in practice""; a revolution in the modes of production is necessary.

What this means is that there exist two levels of inversion, The first one consists of the

iiiverted nature of social practice which, under the particular capitalist mode of production,

objectifies relations of domination. This constitutes, according to Marx, a phenomenon of

alienation by wliicli the labourer is estnnged from the product of his labour. which in tum cornes to

control Iiirn because of his subordinate position vis-à-vis the owner of the means of production.

The otlier inversion occurs at the level of consciousness. and is identified by Man as ideology. As

Larnin points out: "Ideology conceais alienation, it consritutes an inverted reflection of an inverted

reality which results in the negation of the latter inver~ion."'~

Thus misrepresenting social contradictions, ideology serves essentially the interests of the

ruling class. Marx says: "nie ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the niling ideas: i.e., the

class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the sarne time its niiing intellecrual force.""

Yet. ideology must not be restricted to a phenomenon proper to the ruling class since it spnngs out

I9See Larrain, The Concept of Ideology, section entitled 'Freud and Pareto: the Re-emergence of a Psychological Concept of Ideology", pp. 83-9 1. 20Larrain, The Concept of Ideology, Op. Cit., p. 46. " Ibid.. p. 41. "Larrain. Marxkm and Ideology, Op. Cit., p. 35. 7 .

-'Ibid.. p. 125.

of material contradictions which are as determinant for the subordinate classes as they are for the

dominant classes. The reason why ideology serves the interests of the mling class is that, by

concealing, or offering an apparently rational interpretation of the contradictions at the level of the

niaterial conditions of life, it hides the tnie relations of domination between classes. Hence, social

relations are harmonized through a process of psychological concealment which seems to

legitimize a panicular fom of human behaviour? For e.rample, M m argued in Ccrpitd that the

material contradictions under the capitalist mode of production are hidden by the apparently logical

laws of the market. For Marx, only labour creates value. Thus, in a market economy, the value

conferred to products by human labour is hidden as a consequence of the estrangement of the

product from its producer and its integration, as a commodity to be exchangeci, into the market.

... Everything appears reversed in cornpetition. The fiai pattern of economic relations as seen on the surface, in their, reai existence and consequently in the conceptions by which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to understand hem, is very much different fiom, and indeed quite the reverse of, their inner but concealed essential pattern i d the conception componding to it.16

An error offen committed is to believe that M m identified ideology with the whole of the

"idealistic that is the whole range of ideas dissipated within the superstructure.

On the contrarv, as h a been argued earlier, bfarx's concept of ideology is quite restricted: it is

"Marx, The Germun ideoiom, in Tucker, Op. Cit., p. 172. '*~ilfredo Pareto used a different terminology to illumate a sirnilx phenomenon. According to him. human beings try to provide a logical exptanation (denvations) for their irrational behaviour (residues). Seri Vilfiedo Pareto, Saciofogicui Wrifings (Selected and Introduced by S.€ Finer, New York, Praeger, 1966), Intoduction and Part II. "Marx. Capital, in Larrain, Marxism and ideoiugy, Op. Cit., p. 33. or example, Howard Williams' position on the meaning of ideology in Mm's thought is in agreement with Lamin's understanding of the term conceming the negative sense of the concept. Williams says: "Ideology for M m and Engels comes into existence very much Iike any other natural phenomenon. It occurs because our material. productive lives are organised in such a way that it necessarily gives rise to confiisions about our mutual relations." (p.5.) Moreover, he recognises that, for Marx, ideology is unscientific because it is based on a wrong undentanding of social relations. (p.5.) Yet because he over-emphasises the roIe of the economic srmcture in Mm's thought. and because he merges Engels' later theoretical developrnents into Marx's own thought. Williams commits the emor of not distinguishing within Marx's thought between the superstructure and ideology. Howard Williams, Concepts ofldeofogy (Sussex, Wheatsheaf Books Lt4 1988), pp. 1-23.

limited to the concealment of alienation which indirectly serves tlie interests of the ruling class.

This points to the fact that not al1 errors or distortions created by the rnind are necessarily

ideological, and that not al1 ideas can be included in the concept of ideology. Moreover, "the class

character of certain ideas does not sufice to characterize them as i d e ~ l o ~ " . ' ~ In that sense.

because it is ambiguous, and because it does not cleariy identiQ its origin in real social

contradictions, Larrain argues that the concept of falsesonsciousness, as coined by Engels, cannot

be considered an adequate de finition of i d e o ~ o ~ . ' ~

Superstructure must be distinguished from ideology for both theoretical and practical

reasons. For conceptual clarity, Mam sought to limit the concept of ideoloa to a negative meaning

in order to use it to critically assess social reality. Scientific socialism, as a representative of the

Enlightenment project, claimed to discover the hidden reality on which to build the Good Society.

011 tlie pnctical side, theory has a meaning only in so far as it is a tool for the revolutionary

pncrice. Ideology, in that context becomes a theoretical tool to be used to raise the consciousness

of the working class in relation to its exploitation by the capitalist class and to provoke the

proletarian revolution. The superstructure, as a larger concept has no positive or negative

connotation: it is essentially a descriptive concept which makes the distinction berween two levels

of phenomena. Hence, it is possible For Marx to anticipate the end of ideology once social

contradictions have been solved in prüctice30, but not the end of die superstructure which consists of

the social and political organisation of society in relation to the economic substructure." To

'SLarnin, The Concept of Ideology, Op., Cit., p. 5 1. '9Lanain, &famism and Ideology, Op. Cit., p. 104. 'O~arx's understanding of the end of ideoIogy wilI be dealt with in relation to the end of ideology debate. ''There is aIso a debate on the determinant character of the stmcture over the superstructure and vice versa. Considering the nature and context of the present discussion, to enter into this discussion would largely exceed the scope of this thesis and would not significantly contribute to enhance our knowledge of Marx's concept of ideology. Suffice it to say that in its negative sense, ideology cannot be identified with the superstructure or even with the "idealistic supertrucniren, that is the whole range of ideas propagated within the superstnicnire. ldeology serves a very specific purpose in Marx's thought, and it is to identify those ideas which conceal marerial contradictions, and which serve the cause of the ~ i l i ng class.

conclude:

For M a , therefore, ideolosy does not arise as a =nntitous invention of consciousness which purposefidly misrepresents redity, nor is it the result of a conspiracy of the niling ciass to deceive the dominated classes, The distomon which ideology enails is not the exc~usive pammony of any ciass in particular, though ideology serves only the interests of the ruling class- That ail classes cm produce ideology is the consequence of the univenality of the limired mo~erid mode of ~ i c r i v ~ . ~ ~

Because "the production of ideas, of conceptions. of consciousness, is at first d irectly interwoven

with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real ~ife"'~. to be

ideolo=ical, ideas have to conceal contradictions, and to serve the interests of the ruling dass.

The positive meaning,- Gramsci's conceptiu,~

Since it was first published in 1932, Mantists associated with a positive understanding of

the concept of ideotogy, such as Labriola, Mehring, Kautsky, PIekhanov. and most significantiy

Lenin. Lukacs. and Gramsci, were not acquainted with The German Ideology, Marx and Engels'

most forceful thesis in favour of a negative concept of ideologY." Accordingly, not distinguishing

beween ideology and what was considered the "ideological superstructuren, and to avoid calling

> Ia~ i s rn an ideology because of its Napoleonic pejorative connotation, Mrimism was referred to as

a "theory" or a "science" by the first generation of Marxists. Bernstein vas the first to officially

coine to the conclusion that if al1 foms of consciousness had to be equated with ideoiogy, then

klarxism as well was an ideologY.j5 But it is with Lenin, in the context of the necessity to elaborate

an effective strategy for the proletarian revolution in Russia to succeed. that the concept of ideology

imposed itself as a crucial factor in the class stniggle. Lenin conceived of ideology as cognitions

and rheories expressing the interests of a class: if they were unscientific, it was soleiy because they

- - -. ' -Lamin . ,tlar-rism and kieology, Op. Cit., p. 28. .- "Marx. The Grrman Ideology, in Tucker, Op. Cit., p. 154. ;4 Larnin, Marxism and Ideology, Op. Cit., p. 54. "~bid. , p. 62.

were 'bourgeois" or "reliçious".36 What for Marx was an analytical tool for the class struggle

became for Lenin the terrain of the struggle at the theoretical 1evel.l' Ideology had to be defeated

by science; M m i s m thus provided the proletariat with a tmly scientific understanding of the world

in its libention crusade against the ascendency of bourgeois ideology.

However, it is with the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci that the concept of ideology, in its

positive sense", gained its rnost elaborate theoreticai application.'g The historical context in which

Gramsci developed his thought is also extremely important to the direction it took. Having

witnessed the failure of the long-anticipated world revotution, and the Rse of fascism in many

countries. such as Gemany and Italy40, Gramsci came to the conclusion that a new strategy was

vital to the triumph of the proletariat Whereas the revolution in Russia had been rendered possible

by a quick seizure of the state power, this was clearly an inappropriate strategy in the case of

Westeni societies. Comparing the East to the West, Gramsci realised that:

En o r i en~ état étant tout, la société civile était primitive et gelatheuse; En occident, entre État et société civile, il y avait un juste rappon et dans un État branlant on découvrait aussitôt une robuste structure de la société civile. é état n'était qu'une tranchée avancée, derrière laquelle se trouvait une robuste chaîne de

4 I foneresses ...

Tlius Gramsci. acknowledging that there was more to bourgeois domination than mere coercion,

sought to rnove his focus of analysis to the superstructure. The analysis aimed at understanding the

role of consciousness in the chss stmggle.

'"~bid., p. 68. "~bid. 'g~ramsci also held a negative version of the concept of ideology which simply corresponded to a r b i w individuai specuIations unrelated to real conditions of life. See Lamin, Mumikm and Ideoiogy, Op. Cit., p.79. "A more complete account of Gramsci's theoretical innovations, notably his concept of hegemony, will be presented in the Iast section of this chapter. "Gramsci himseIf was emprisoned by Mussolini under the Italian fascist regime. 41 Antonio Gramsci, Note sul Machiaveiii, sda polilica e sui10 stato rnoderno, in Jean-Marc Piotte, La Pensée Politique de Gramsci (Montréal, Éditions Parti Pris, IWO), p. 166. "In the East. the State being everything, civil society was primitive and gelatinous; In the West, between State and civiI society was a just relationship, and under a shaking State was discovered a robust saucture of civil society. The State was only an advanced trench, behind which was to be found a robust chah of fortress es..."

Gramsci's concept of ideology concerns a particular world view that serves, as a "social

cernent". to uni@ the social bloc in the interests of the social class from which it originates.

Gnmsci developed Iiis concept of ideology in close relation to his concept of hegemony, which

consists of the ability of a class to secure the consent of the broad rna~ses.~' Far from being

arbitrary speculations, the conflictuai world views held by distinctive social classes are the

consequence of their relative position within the actual mode of production. As Larrain stated, "in

contrast with Lenin, who thought the primacy of Marxism was based on its scientific character,

detaclied from class contradictions, Gramsci bases the superiority of Mmisrn on its being the

most conscious expression of contradiction^.^^ Ideology emerges as an expression of the

contradictions in the reign of necessity. Marxism is, in itself, also an ideology. According to

Gnmsci, "in acquiring one's conception of the World one always belongs to a particular grouping

wliich is that of all the social elements which share the same mode of thinking and a ~ t i n g . " ~

Cunsequently. Gramsci identified the concept of ideology with a conception of the world which is

rnanifested irnplicitly in art, in law, in economic activity, and in al1 other forms of consciousness

wliicli organize individual and collective life."

Since it is intimately linked to the position of a social class within a particular mode of

production, ideology is consistent with the interests of that class. Henceforth, ideology "must

necessarily entai1 orientations for action and must be socialised in the rna~ses".'~ Ideology, as the

worid conception of the ruling class, has to be difised into al1 secton of Society. The means by

wliich ideology is produced and difksed are complex and multiple. Accordingly, propagated

-- - - - - - - - - --

(Personal translation) "Once a;ain, the concept of hegemony will be dealt with later. For now, it is essential to concentrate solely on the positive meaning of ideology in Gramsci's thought. "Larrain, The Concept of Ideofogy, Op. Cit., p. 82. "Antonio Gramsci, Culture and Ideolugical hegemony, in Jefiey C. Alexander and Steven Seidman, Culture andsociew: Contemporary Debutes (Cambrideg, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 48. "Piotte, Op. Cit., p. 196. '"Lamin, Marxism and ideology, Op. Cit., p. 87.

mainIy by universities. research centers. political parties, the schooling system, the church and its

organisations, the media and oral communication, ideology shapes the consciousness of both the

mling and the ruled classes. Gramsci identified four levels of ideology, the highest being

pliilosophy, followed by common sense. religion and fol k10re.~' Consequently, civil society's

interna1 articulation objectified in social practice of ideological difision constitutes the essential

rnechanisms by which the ruling dass imposes its world view.

Yet a class does not become fully conscious of its position and function in a social structure

spontaneously; consciousness is gained in ideology, but through the intermediary of the

intellectuals and the political party whose raison d&e is hegemony."8 In addition, Gramsci

rejected economism which conceived of the relationship betwcen the structure and the

superstructure as mechanistic. Similar to Ma- Gramsci argued that the old could not be defeated

until there existed the material conditions for the nerv to rise up, yet, even more radically than

Marx. lie attri buted to consciousness the essential role in revo lutionary practice. Norberto Bo bbio

esplained tliat, for Gramsci, the movement of history depends on the consciousness given social

groups have of the possibility of action and struggle granted to them by the objective conditions of

life.") Once this group recognises the existence of the material conditions necessary for its action. it

becornes free to use them to create a new fom of political e t l~ i c s .~~ In this context, the intellectuals

are the agents of this acquisition of consciousness of the nature of economic and social

relationships.

The dialectic between the intellectuals and the masses entails that they do not impose an extemai theory, but rnake critical and renovate an already existing activity. This is why Gramsci cm Say that "mass adhesion or non-adhesion to an ideology is the real criticaI test of the ntionality and historicity of modes of thinkingn."

-

47 Hughes. PorteIli. Gramsci sr le Bloc Historiqtre (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1972). p. 20. "Piotte. Op. Cit., p. 193. 'qPonelti. Op. Cit., p. 57. "ibid. '' Larrain, Marxisrn and Ideology, Op. Cit., p. 85.

To conclude, Gramsci conceived of tlie superstructure as the most important temin of the class

stmggle wliere conflicting world views clashed, each airning to establish its hegemony on the

wliole of society. In its Gramscian sense, ideology is a world view shaping social behaviour and

leading to political action.

T'le End of ldeofogy Debare

"When they proclaim the end of ideology, it's like an old man proclaiming the end of sex. Because he doesn't feel it anymore, he thinks it's d isappeared." Clark ~ i s s i n ~ e r . ' ~

According to C h a h Waxman, the end of ideoIogy thesis involves two basic premises: the

absence of ideological politics in modem industrial society; and the fact that the Good Sociew has

been reached, or is on its way to being reached.j3 This is wel1 summarized by Francis Fukuyamz

wlio proclairned, on the b a i s of the end-of ideology, the end of histofl:

What we may be witnessing is not jus the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period ofpostwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evotution and the universaliration of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human governent 55

In Polirical Man, Seymour Martin Lipset said:

A BASIC premise of this book is that democracy is not only or even primarily a means through which different groups can attain thek ends or seek the good society; it is the good society itself in operation. 56

Thus, it is believed that al1 contradictions have been soIved and that there exists a

"Steven Kelman, 'The Feud Among the Radicals," in Waxman, Op. Cit, p. 372. 53Wauman, Op. Cit.. p. 5 . 54 Once again, the end of history debate is included here only as a supporter of the end of ideology thesis. There is no atrernpt to conduct a specific analysis on the validity of the Hegeiian daim that humanity has reached the end of its history. 55Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?" The Naiional intersts (Summer 1 989), p. 4. '%eymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bares of Politics (London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1983), p. 439.

consensus in the West on the superiority of pragmatic politics (which are also called civil poIitics)

as opposed to ideologicaI politics. Daniel Bell argued:

In the Western World, therefore, there is today a rough consensus amans intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of poiitical pluralism. In that sense, too, the ideological age has ended."

D. H. Wrong supported this argument by saying that cIass stniggle is no longer a major source of

social change nor is it the central issue in the political life of Western nations? More specifically,

socialism and communism are considered totally b r a n h p t since, as PhiIip Toynbee has pointed

out it has "blood on its hand~". '~ Joseph Lapalornbara added:

Thus, "the exhaustion of political ideas in the West" refers to that particular case involving the disillusionment experienced by Mmist intellecruals when it became apparent tbat many of Marx's predictions were simply not borne out, and when the o u w e s of the stalinist regime were publicly revea~ed.~

What the end of ideology means is really the fear of ideology, or, as D.H. Wrong put it, the

fear of the 'destructive mass ernotions that ideology has proved capable of un~eashin~"." For that

reason, Daniel Bell declared his unconditional faith in the "ethics of responsibility" as opposed to

the "ethics of ultimate endsn as were decribed by Weber in Politics as a vocarioriP' Yet Daniel

Bell called for the end of ideology, but not the end of utopia The distinction between the two terms

is to be made on the bais of the mûans and the manner leading to social reform. While ideology

sacrifices the present for a future goal which is uncertain, utopias, using Mannheim's

"Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology in the West," in Alexander and Seidman, Op. Cit. p. 194. Yet this consensus seems to be disintegrating in today's world where, following Reagan and Thatcher, Keynesian economics have been discreditated. Nevenheless, after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, Mmism is still considered a bankrupt ideology by die end of ideology theorists. and liberal dernocracy is believed capable of solving a11 contradictions. "D.H. Wrong, "Reflections on the End of ideology," in Waxman, Op. Cit., p. 121. ''1 bid., p. I 17. wJoseph Lapalornbara, 'Decline of ldeology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," in Waxman. Op. Cit., p. 322. 6'lbid., p. 1 18. 62 See H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, "Politics as a Vocation," From Mm: Weber: Essays in Sociolop @Jew York, Oxford University Press, 1 %6), pp. 77- 128.

t e r m i n o ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ are consequent with reality, and are thus realizable. In accordance with the "ethics

of respoiisibility". Bell forcefully argued that utopias are still useful as long as they speciw where

one wants to go. how to set there, the costs of the enterprise and who is going to pay the p r i ~ e . ~

L ikewise, for Lewis S. Feuer, to be a man is not to abandon oneself to a future goal. a promised

ideal. I t is to fight in the present time for the respect of human life and human beingsS6'

How is ideology conceptualized by the end of ideology theorists? For Daniel Bell.

ideolog is the "fusion of political formulas and passionsn which "provides a faith and a set of

moral certitudes - in the case of Marxisrn, the view that history wiII judge - by which ends are used

to justiQ immoral means".' Thus, advocating pragmatism, Bell defined ideological politics as the

dream of organizing a society on the bais of a complete "blueprintn!' I t is also 'the conversion of

ideas into social levers ... What gives ideology its force is its passion.n68 In the same way Raymond

Aron. who believed that ideological politics led to fanaticism, murder and terror, described

ideology as '?lie longing for a purpose, -...for something controlled by an idea and a will"? A more

complete and straight fonvard definition was offered by Lewis Feuer which summarizes the end of

ideology tlieorists' position:

An ideology projects wish fulfillrnents where knowledge is unavoidable; it denies those realities whose existence it would reptess, it enhances into ultirnates what it pn'zes. An ideoIogy is a world-system based on one's political and social feeIings. an attempt, conscious or unconscious, to impose one's political will upon the nature of the universe. It entangles emotions, actions. and ideas into one arnalgam, so that one does not know where the emotion ends and the idea begins; it regards every idea as a plan

"'See Howard Williams, Conceps ofldeology, Op. Cit., Chapter 2. MDaniel Bell, "The End of Ideology in the West," in Alexander and Seidman. Op. Cit., pp.290-297. b ' ~ e w i s S. Feuer, "Beyond ideology," in Waxman and Seidman, Op. Cit., pp. 64-68. &Daniel, Bell, "The End of Ideology Revisited (Part 2)," Government and Opposition, 23 (Number 3, p. 324. 67Daniel Bell, 'The End of Ideology Revisited (Part l)," Government and Opposition, 23 (Nurnber 3, p. 138. 68 Daniel Bell, "The end of Ideology in the West," in Alexander and Seidman, Op. Cit., pp. 29 1-292. 0 9 ~ R O N , Raymond, "The End of the ideologicoi Age," in Waxman, Op. Cit., p. 46.

for action. and every idea as the projection ofsome interest-"

In order to better undentand tlie nature of contemporary politics. it is paramount to analyse

the implications of such a definition of ideology on politics. Indeed. it appears that the greatest

sliortcoininp of this tlieory is that it fails to see its own ideoiogical position. But before going into

the debate on tlie ideological nature of the end of ideology thesis, it is appropriate to dari@ a Few

theoretical misinterpretations made by Bell and his followers concerning such authors as Camus.

Mannheim, and Weber in order to highlight the limited theoretical character of the end of ideology

tliesis.

First of all, the end of i d e o l o ~ theorists like to go back to Albert Camus, who first used the

expression, to support their argument against ideological politics. Indeed, Camus presented, in

L 71omrne révolté, a force fu 1 rejection of future-onented philosophies wiiic h, he believed, justified

al1 means in the accomplishment of an uncertain end." It is tue that Camus refuted both Hegel and

~Mam's deterministic theses which established history as the sole "rationain judge of Iiurnan actions.

However, Camus underlined chat Marx had been betrayed by later supposed Marxists because they

forgot the reasons for his revoit against capitalisrn, and that he did not want the further degradation

of man that occurred in his name." In that sense, Camus argued that M m reacted to the

-. irnmonlity and inhumanity of the capitalist system and that is why he wanted its destruction."

Camus understood Man's polirical endeavour as a moral quesr originating in its profound disgust

of the negation of human life on which the system was established. Consequently, while Camus

seemed to agree with the end of ideology theorists on the necessity of living in the present, and to

'%wis Feuer, "Beyond Ideology," in Waxman and Seidman, Op. Cit., p. 64. "See Alben Camus. L homme révotté. in Albert Camus. Essais, (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. Paris. Éditions Gallimard, 1965). pp.407-709. "Ibid., p. 613. 73 There is, once again, an other ongoing debate within Marxism, originated by Althusser, according to which there would be an epistemological break in Mm's thought separating the young "humanistn Marx from the old 'scientistn M m . Althusser claimed that m e Mancism is purely objective and devoid of any subjective incentives. There is no need to go into that debate.

justir the ends by the means used to reach these goals, he always left open the possibility for

Iiuman beings to revolt. The end of ideological politics, while a 'good tiiing" for Camus as long as

it allows for human life to be considered the most important value. does no< constitute a permanent

state of riffain, or the achievement of the Good socitry. For Camus, the Guud s o c k ~ ~ 1 1 s not been

reached. and probably never will be. Hence, the human condition is "plagued" by the need for a

perpetual fight for justice." As the only certain f a c ~ hurnan life is the uitimate judge. Neither the

future socieiy, nor the status quo are to be elevated to the status of an absolute, for their moral

justification has to be founded in respect for human dignity.

Accepting Mannheim's definition, the end of ideology theorists assert that "ideological

thought means at least that such ideas are disrorted, in the sense that they lack congruence rvirh

realiy ".' They are "emotionally determined, and therefore the result of subconscious forces, or

conscious deception, where ideology is to be interpreted as a purposeful Nevertheless. what

tliese writers fail to see is that in the distinction bebveen ideoloey and utopia ~Mannheim

acknowiedged that there could be no criterion on which to distinguish tliem prior to their

realization. He said: "If we look into the past, it seems possible to tind a fairly adequate criterion

-- of what is to be regarded as ideological and what as Utopian. This criterion is their realization.""

It is thus estremeiy difficuit to determine how the status quo can be refomed. The end of ideology

tlieorists say that piecemeal change is adequate. They praise the virtues of incrementalism and

technocratisrn; lience tl-iey never challenge the virtues of the whole system. This allows them to

overlook al1 demands wiiich are unable to find their way into the workings of the poliricul machine,

and which are not important since they do not exert suficient pressure on the system to force its

"This is also the source of anorher quite diffised misinterpretation of Camus' philosophy according to which Camus wodd be an advocate of the status quo. This was the onsin of the Sartre and Camus well-known quarrel. "Joseph Lapalomban. "Decline of Ideotogy: A Dissent and an Interpretation" in Wa~man. Op. Cit.. p.3 19. -61bid. 77 Karl Mannheim, kcieology and utopia, in Williams, Op. Cit.. p. 34.

reappraisal. This constitutes a return to David Easton's "black boxn, but in tliis case, there is a

stauncli unwillingness to look inside the box. As a matter of fact, if that box is itself the Guod

Society at work; why would anyone want to change it?

Another author lias been used in support of the end of ideology thesis without considering

the aspects of his thought that couId challenge this theocy. Bell made clear, as mentioned eartier,

tliat he unconditionally advocated an "ethics of responsibility". While he was keen on elaborating

this aspect of Max Weber's thought, he totally forgor to expand on the other dimension of ethics

anaIysed by Weber, namely, the "ethics of ultimate endsn. By a fortunate slip of memory, Be11 was

able to deny an important aspect of the nature of politics as conceived by Weber in Politics as a

~oca~ion.'~ The "ethics of ultimate ends", which served to balance the boredom and lack of vision

of a pure "etliics of responsibility" was, according to Weber, as important as an "ethics of

responsi bi lity" which prevented the excesses of passionate politics. Far from being opposed to each

other, they were complementary and interdependent.

To corne back to the nature of contemporary politics as they are conducted in the West,

what the end of ideology theorists have proclaimed is the the triumph of Iiberalisrn over Marxisrn

and over al1 forms of socialism. The pluralist liberal dernocra~~ '~ is supposed to have solved (if not

yet, it is able to) al1 contradictions present in political life. As shown by Keynesianism, capitalism

tvas able to adapt to new situations and to adopt a more "human facen. This belief in the superiority

of liberalisrn goes back to its philosophical origins. A child of the Enlightenment, iiberalism was

founded on the conviction that progress, leading to final perfection, could be achieved by means of

free institution^.^^

However, as the particular case of Chile will show, liberalisrn cannot in itself be considered

"Sec H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, Op. Cit. 79 A discussion on the nature of dernocracy will be conducted later in the thesis in relation to the new political consensus in Chile. 80[rene CoIIins, LiberalriSm in Nineceench-Cenfury Europe (London, Published for the Historical Association by

a universally valid political creed wliich lias rernained unchanged tlirougliout Iiistory. For that

reason. it is dificult to discriminate "tnnscendental" elements which would give a clear account of

wfiat a "aliistorical" or "atemponl" Iiberalism would consist OF. As a matter of fact wliat has been

crilied libenlism evolved differently depending on its geographicai and historical context. For

example. criticizing the Engfish, the French in the 19th Century ciaimed that they did no:

understand the true nature of liberty. Al1 they wanted, the French argued was a coilection of

liberties and priviieçes for e ~ e r ~ b o d ~ . ~ ' Likewise, for any one who claims to be a Liberal today in

Canada it seerns almost impossible to think of someone like Constant or Guizot as Liberals. Yet

they called themselves Liberals and saw no contradictions in their being against universa1 s u f i g e

and denouncing democracy as the wom govemment of all."

What remains is thus a liberal tradition, by which is meant an epistemological continuity.

In the context of this thesis, it is thus important to understand wliat are tlie philosophical and

epistemological justifications for the. end of ideology theonsts to proclaim the triumpli of

libenlism. First of all, tlie end of ideology advocates believe in the scientific character of their

approach to politics. In a Pascalian way, they assume that since we only have partial knowledge of

reality, pragmatism in the conduct of politics, espousin_o a strict scientific methodology, is the only

possible way of avoiding the rnurderous effect. of passionate politics. This fight against ignorance

is at the heart of libenlism as an epistemological atternpt at understanding reality. When Descartes

concluded: "Je pense, donc je suis", he affirmed not only his existence and that of hurnanity, but he

asserted that knowledge. even moral knowledge, was possible through an adequate methodology.

Tlius, as Tliornas A. Spragens Jr. has argued, Locke, Descartes and their followers

introduced an intellectual revolution which was tlioroughly practical in both its motivation and its

Routledge and K. Paul, 1962). 26pp. "Ibid., p. 7. "See for example François Guizot, De fa Démocrafie en Fance (Leipzig, Brockhaus. 1 849). 7Spp.

presumed consequences.s3 Erron in politics wvere caused by errors in pliilosophical inqui- because

rnonlity was considered a part of scientific tmth. Ignorance was die main enemy to be defeated.

and a true knowledge of reality was necessary to contml nature and thus to be free. For example.

for Hobbes, reason properly used would allow Iiuman beings to undentand tliat it was best for thein

to agree on an absolute d e r in order to free themselves from the "nasty. brutish and short" Iife of

the state of nature. Hence, knowledge, scientific knowledge, had practical implications since it

served to dictate the way to the attainment of the Good Sociefy. Moreover, this longing for

knowledge cannot escape a value judgernent, which takes fom in the desire to create this Gooci

Sociey, as well as in the aspiration to free human beings from the deterrninistic effects of ignorance

and passion.

Tlie end of ideology theorists' faith in pragmatism, and specifically in technocratism in the

case of Chile, is an offspring of the liberal tradition. As Spragens put it. the technocratic vision of

politics. starting with Helvétius, maintained that "society should be rationalized by the strategic

application of scient; fic knowledgen." Technocratism shares with liberalisrn an objective

conception of knowledge, a fear of dogmatism. a belief that mon1 sciences are possible. and a

conviction that scientific advance is the principal source and guarantor of political progress.g5 It is

tlius possible to understand the split betsveen what has been called economic liberalism and political

liberalism, which do not necessarily go hand in hand as demonstrated by the Pinochet regime in

Chile. Yet both are rooted in the same epistemological belief that knowledge is the source of

liberty. According to economic liberalism, the scientifc ossurnption is that individuals are rational

optimizers and that, pursuing their interest, they are presented with an equal access to information

which alIows them to compete freely in the market place. On the other hand, political liberdism

"See Thornas A. Spragens Ir., The h n y of liberal Rearon (Chicago. The University of Chicago Press. 198 1 ). 443pp. '"Ibid., p l 15. "Ibid. see 1st section of chapter four, 'Liberalisrn and Technocracy: Continuity and Change," pp. 12 1-

assumes tliat the construction o f the Guod Sociey is feasible given an appropriate understanding of

Iiuman nature and society. [t is beiieved that provided with proper institutions. and given equal

rights. individuals will be free to punue their own inter est^.^^

How is tlie scientific and pragmatic claim made by the end of ideology theorists to be

undersrood? According to them, science is supposed to be pure1y objective and completely

detaclied from value judgernents. On the other hand, ideology is mere rfiecoric, a subjectively

motivated discourse aiming at imposing one's will on society. Tiiere is no need Iiere to dig into the

postmodern debate and discredit the very epistemologica1 b a i s o f science, o r even the possibility o f

the scientific endeavour. What is essential is to mise a doubt concerning the objective character o f

science in order to demonstrate that science ceases to be science in its ideai-type format once it

stops constantly re-evaIuating its own premises. that is, when knowledge crytallizes into an

unc tiallengeable and in fallible body of certainties and becomes a dogma.

There esists an enormous amount of iiterature on the objective nature of science as weII as

127. %e end of ideology theorists do not make clear the distinction existing benveen economic libenlism. political liberalism and Iiberal democncy. Thus they blur the conceptual peculiarity distinguishing between a negative understanding of Libeny and a positive one. Freedom From oppression and freedom to act according to one's will are seen as an undifferentiated conceptual whole. Hence, the market is praised because it permit5 the individual to punue his interests while protected by a minimal state (freedom tiom) wl~ich guarantees his persona1 security and property and which enforces the "niles of the garnen. At the same time, the end of ideology theorists consider it to be the state's role to promote the common good, that is. the state is responsible for creating the proper environment (freedom to) for al1 individuals to prosper through equal access to the market place - the common good is understood as the greatest happiness for the greatest number. On top of this confusion between individual liberty and common good emerges a clear tension at the political level benveen liberty and equality in a democratic contelit; liberalism's promotion of Iiberty inescapably enters into conflict with democracy's advocacy of equality, Indeed, full liberty destroys equality, and vice versa. Political liberalism (state guardianship), which merely seeks to ensure the propzr hnctioning of the market (economic libemlism), faces pressure h m society's democratic forces claiming for more equality. Liberal democracy, which is associated with the promotion of the common good and which endorses keynesianism as the ultimate solution to al1 social contradictions created by the capitaiist mode of production, is thus seen as the "Good socieryn by the end sf ide0103 theorists because it reduces to a minimum that tension existing between liberty and equaliry. Therefore, the failure to distinguish between political libenlism and liberal democracy allows for the more hndamentaI probiem of tension between democracy and libenlism to go unnoticed. Hence, as it will be shown, this enables analysts to c l a h the end of ideological politics in Chile without examining the nature of the political consensus that has been reached. In fact the end of ideology in Chile, or the triumph of neoliberalisrn, has not been achieved through the establishment of a liberal democncy, but throught the erection of a Schumpeterian form of democracy. (See chapter four.)

on the distinction between iàcts and values. it lias often been argued that the realm of fac l is

totally detached from the realm of values and that there exists an unbridgeable epistemological gap

behveen the two realrns. For example, the advocares of the naturalistic fallacy condemn any

attempt at deducing values from facts. As there can be no Iogical link benveen facts and values.

and because they are of a totally different nature, the subject-abject dichotomy is c~rn~lete .~ ' But it

would seem tliat facts do have an impact on value judgements. As Christopiier J. Berry argued,

facts cannot be so detached from the subject as to not condition to a certain extent his behaviour,

tliat is, the morality of human behaviour is intimately related to the factual conditions of life of

human beings." A fact, by definition, imposes its reaiity on the subject who has no choice but to

bare with it. Value judgements may be considered subjective interpretations of objective fucrs.

bloreover, one must acknowledge that there could be no scientific research without a

subject motivated to undertake ka9 Whatever the reason for human curiosity, ail that becomes

valuable - that includes the quest for objective knowledge - is the resuIt of a human interest in it.

Science for science means nothing. The Enlightenrnent project is not one of understanding the

world for contemplative purposes (even then, contemplation is in itself a subjective motivation), but

a moral project aiming at understanding the world in order to control it. The sarne can be said of

Plata's quest for ultimate knowledge. The philosopher who forced himself out of the cave lias to go

back inside in order to become the King of those who are still in the darkness and lead them in the

creation of the ideal sociey. Even starting from a materialist conception of history, 1Vm

forcefully afirmed the subjective character of hurnan existence. Thus according to Marx, "labor is,

in the first place, a process in wliich both man and nature participate, and in which man of his o w

"Sec Christopher J. Berry, Human Nature: Isszres inpoiiticaf rheory (Hong Kong, MacMiIlan Education Lrd, 1986). pp. 46-47. "Ibid. 89 Chapter three deals witiï the normative character of the Chicago School econornics exponed to Chile.

accord stam, reçulates, and controls the material reactions behveen Iiimself and nature ..." Science

and technology cannot be undentood differently than for the sake of human beings' benement.

Lastly. sven Pascal in his quest for certainty could not escape moral incentives. [f he urged to bet

on the existence of God. lie was convinced that it would force human beings to d o p t a proper

moral behaviour in the course of their eardily life in order to prepare for the last j~d~ernent .~ ' Even

though we keep arguing about the possibility of finding a point outside subjectivity, the fact that we

keep arguing seerns to Iead to one conclusion: objectivity may just be a point of intersection

between conflicting subjectivities, in other words. objectivity may partly be a subjective agreement

on how to interpret reality.9'

The problern with the end of ideology theorists is not that they believe in the necessary

cliancter of science as an objective human endeavour. The problern resides in the way they take

science for gnnted. If there is a cornmon frame of mind amongst those wlio are considered our

greatest scientists. it is tliat they are conscious of the limits of human knowledge, and that they are

willing ro re-evaluate constantly the very bases of this knowledge. End of ideology theorists are

conscious of this lack of certainty, though they do not question the validity of actual knowledge.

According to them. there c m be no more paradigrnatic shifts as Thomas Kulin explained t11em.~'

Hence they endorse a certain behavioural pattern which tlts their convictions and does not

challenge tliem. Liberal democracy is the Good Sociep, there is no need to challenge its validity.

Yet they do not see that Bell's:

%arl Marx, The Economic und Phifosophic itlanrrrcriprs of !W. in Erich Fromm. :Vam 5 Concept of Man (New York, The Ungar Publishing Company, 196 l), p. 40. "See Blake Pascal, Pensées (Paris, Éditions Bordas, 1984). 252pp. "There is a significant distinction benveen saying that there exists no objective reality and saying that objectivity is the point of agreement where confiicting subjectivities htersect. That means reality is a mediated experience which gains significance in human affairs only through its subjective interpretation. Reality is not denied, but it is meaningfbl solely through its subjective mediation, and thus may suffer from a sort of psychological distortion. For example, objective knowledge testified, before the geat discoveries, chat the earth was flat; now the earth is a sphere. Moreover. that does not mean it is htile to try to understand reality objectively. 93See Thomas Kuhn, The Srmcrure of Scienrific Revolrrrions, 2nd ed.. (Chicago. University of Chicago

pngmatic approach and his ethic of responsibiliry u n afso conceal a faith. not perhaps a faith in the future, but a faith in the smnis quo which assumes the same dogmatic character as chat attributed to the ideologists. Bell's end of ideology is aIso the end of the possibi l ity of radical chanse in society.'"

file end of ideology theorists' position is highly moral as they w n t to avoid the

"murderous" effects of passionate politics. Contrary to Camus who made clear that he considered

Iiuman life to be the most valuable fact of existence. at the bais of the end of ideology thesis is a

strong value judgement which those theorists try to hide behind a scientific rhetoric; a scientific

discourse which is conndicted by modem philosophers of science such as Karl Popper and

Thomas KU Hence their pragmatism and technocratism embl ish a mode1 of acceptable human

behaviour which rejects revolutionary change. " 8 y jwctaposing 'explanation', which is what

science can objectively fumish, with 'endorsement', which is a subjective decision, this entire

teclmical approach is ide~lo~ical." '~

To conclude tliis paR the end of ideology thesis must also be considered an ideology in

both positive and negative senses. Moreover, this theory defeats itself by its own definition of

ideology. But first. if we accept the negative ~Mariuist conceptualization. there is no doubt that the

end of ideology theory is ideological. In its critical denotation, ideology is the concealment of

material contradictions at the conciousness level. Since private property has not yet been abolished,

and since the economy still works on the bais of the laws of the market, the end of ide0103 is just

anotlier illusion created in the mind which serves to hide the alienating consequences of the

capitalist mode of production, and to secure the interests of the ruling class. The end of ideology

theorists believe that al1 contradictions have been solved, but this belief is founded on a superficial

solution at the superstructural Ievel - the creation of the Liberal democracy - which has yet to solve

Press, 1 974). 2 1 Opp. 'FI Lamin, Mamisrn and Ideology, Op. Cit., p. 226. "Sec Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. Op. Cit. 96 Berry, Op. Cit., p. 109.

contradictions at the structural level. The end of ideology theorists still beiieve that "heaven

descends to earth", while what is needed is a revolution in pnctice. For Marx, the end of ideology

kvas possible only in so far as contradictions were solved at the stnicturril level.

More important is the fact that, according to its own de finition. the end of ideology thesis is

also ideoloçical. The end of ideology t h e o r i ~ attribute a Napoleonic negative sense to the tenn in

order to disquali@ certain "visions of the world" as unscientific. Nevertheless, as was

demonstrated, the end of ideology thesis cannot escape from its uwn moral justifications; therefore,

it cannot be totally objective. In addition, since it foms a natic body of knowledge which refuses

to enter into self-criticism, it can be said to constitute a rigid doctrine or a dogma Michael Novack

summarized the ideological character of the end of idedogy theonsts well:

Pragmatists seem blind to the fact that they, too. are ideologues. They neither defend nor cnticize their own presuppositions, value judgements, predilected standards (like quantification), and political biases. They have tried so hard to be 'objectiven that they have failed to examine their own subjectivity - including economic s t a t u and professiona1 cornrniûnenü - for sources of di~tonion.~'

Altliough the end of ideology theorists give a pejorative connotation to the term ideology,

they use the concept in a positive sense. In accordance with Gramsci's positive understanding of

ideology, Daniel Bell defined ideology as a world view arousing passions and leading to action.

(Gramsci's concept of ideology concerns a particular world view that serves, as a "social cernentn,

to uni@ the social bloc in the interests of the social class fiom which it originates. Ideolou rnust

be distinguished from personal speculations which are disconnected From actual social practice.)

However, because the end of ideology theorists deny the need for self-criticism, and also because

they deny the validity of the Marxist explanation of the material basis of ideology, they fail to

realise that their vision of the world is closely related to their sociaI position in the actual mode of

production. They are the organic intellectuals of the Western capitalist ruling class who try to

97 Michael Novack, "An End of Ideology," in Waxman, Op. Cit., p. 39 1.

universalize the intetests of that particular class in order to secure the consent of the broad masses

and create a solid historical bloc, that is, a stable equilibrium between stniciural and supertnictural

forces. (The notion of historical bloc will be analysed further in the next section.) Liberal

democracy, the Good Sociery, lias solved aIl contradictions, it is in the interest of a11 to maintain it.

They daim that passionate politics have had devastating effects, yet they have not

destroyed passion in politics; they have merely redirected it The new political faith, which

demands total cornmitment, is grounded in a world view promoting the virtues of the status quo.

The end of ideology leads to reactionary action, a merely defensive attitude which nonetheless

shapes and models human behaviour according to liberal values. Since there is nothing to change

in the system. pragmatisrn is an intmrnent for protecting i t Ernest Mandel said of the ideology of

technical rationality:

This ideotogy proclaims the abiiity of the existing social order gradualIy to eliminate al1 chance of crises, to find a "technical" solution to al1 its contradictions, to integrate rebelliou social classes and to avoid -political expIosions. Curiously enough, this ideology is shared by those, like Daniel Betl, who talk about the

98 end of ideology.

Lastly, the end of ideology theorists, who fight at the superstructural level, provide the theoretical

weapons for the mling class to keep its privileged position. When thinkers such as Bell hold that

civil politics must replace ideological politics, that is the dream of organizing a society by complete

"blueprint", they seern to forget that the "Liberal bluepnnt" has roots in a long philosophical

tradition, and that pragmatism, while it accounts for geographical and national differences, has

never fimished an essentially new "text".

Towardr a Gramscian analysis

The final section of this chapter deals with the Gramscian concepts necessary to analyse the

Chilean transition to democracy in the contest of the new political consensus. Essential to

Gramsci's thouçlit was Iiis "emphasis on the cornplexity of any moment, a complexity which m&es

impossible any simple cause and effect relationsiiip between the economic and the other levels of

social rea~ity."~' In that sense, supponed by the studies of Pilar Vergara, Manuel Antonio Garretbn,

Alejandro Foxley, A. Canitrot and Juan Corradi, Alex E. Fernindez Jilberto argued that GuiIlenno

O'Donnell's farnous mode1 o f bureaucntic-authoritarian regime was too econornistic to adequately

represent the cornplexity of the changes undergone in chile.lw Sirnilarly, in the context o f this

tliesis, a Gramscian approach is believed to provide a better understanding o f how a new historical

bloc was created in chile.''' The accent is thus put on the advent of neoliberalism as a new

ideological force.

The notion of historical bloc serves to comprehend the "disjuncture between the dominance

on the economic levei of one mode o f production and the dominance at the political level o f one or

a combination of forces which may o r may not directly reflect this economic d~rninance". '~ ' The

Iiistorical bloc is not a monolith. TIie compiexity of reality has to be understood as an intncate

interplay of multiple forces at both structural and superstructural ~ e v e l s . ' ~ ~ The contradictory nature

of social relations marked by the simultaneous existence of different modes of production is

''~rnest Mandel, in Larrain, The Concept of Ideoiogy, Op. Cit., p. 208. 99 Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Potitics (New York, St. Martin's Press, !980), p. 180. 'M)~ lex E. Femhdez JiIberto. "Chile: The Laboratory experiment of International Neo-Liberalism," in Henk Overbeek. Restrrlcruring Hegemony in the Global Political Econom-v; the riss of Transnational neo- liberalism in the 1980 5 (London, Routledge, 1993), p.59. '''In relation to the issue of falsifiabiliry and scientificism previously raised, a Gramscian approach is judged supenor to the end of ideology thesis because it offers a dynamic analysis of the social forces at work in Chiie. Contnry to the end of ideology thesis which provides a static understandhg of society, a sort of "atemporaln picture of social relations, a Grarnscian approach pennits to penetrate the social structure and discover the nanire of social relations. Once again, a Gramscian approach is used as an analytical tool revealing the compiexity of a given historical moment and, as such, it does not daim to establish an irrefutable ûuth Gramsci's concepts are usefiil only as they serve to highlight relevant aspects of Chilean politics, and thus force the anaiysis to mise important questions concerning the performance of the political system. Lo'Sassoon, Op. Cit.. p. 122. losThe definitions of structure and supertmcture used by Gramsci are faithtiil to these of Marx. The structure is the realm of the materia1 conditions of life, and the supertnicture the realm of consciousncss.

retiected in the contndictory nature of the superstructure where different visions of the world

compete for dominance. The historical bloc is a moment of relative stability whereby a class,

coiitrolling the means of production, manages to secure the consent of a rnajority of the population.

Tliiis. "tlie Iiistorical bloc represents the dominance of one class which /rads its allies, and is

dominant over its enernie~." '~

More specifically, the concept of historical bloc is an analytical tool which renden possible

a description of the relationship, at the theoretical level, between two areas of abstract reality, the

structure and the superstructure, and the linking of these two areas in real s~ciety.'"~ A historïcal

bloc is thus identified by a stable equilibrium established on the basis of an organic link between

the structure and the supermicture. This link is organic, as opposed to mechanistic, because it

constitutes a dialectical relationship between the concrete and the abstract reflecting the limits

irnposed on the nature of the superstructure by the relative development of the structure.'06 The real

problem is not one of determining which one of the structure or the supentructure is primary, but

Iiow tlic nvo are organically ~inked.'~' This link is explained. Gramsci asserted, by the role of the

intellectuals wliich establisli the contact behveen the evotution of the structure and that of the

superstructure.

The role of the organic intellectuals is one of ensuring the hegemony of a class. By

hegemony. Gramsci meant: "political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is

secured by the difision and popularization of the world view of the ruling c l a ~ s . " ' ~ ~ As

demonstrated earlier in relation to Gramsci's concept of ideology, which serves as a "social

cernent". Gramsci's basic premise is that hurnan beings are not ruled by furce alone. He noted:

Not that ideas were powerfd enough to eiiminate class stnrggle,

IW Sassoon. Op. Cit., p. 132.

'Os1bid., p. 12 1 . '06Ponelli. Op. Cit.. p. 50. '"'Ibid.. p. 47. 'OThomas R. Bates, "Gramsci and the Theoy of Hegemony," Journal of Hisroty of Ideas (No 2, 1975). p.352.

but they were obviously capable of muting it suficiently to allow class societies to hnction. Without this ideological factor it wouid be difficult to explain how western civilization had survived at all. I O9

The concept of hegemony was developed by Gramsci to explain the modes of domination of the

bourgeoisie, and to establish the theoretical foundations for a proletarian counter -~t ra te~~. ' '~

The intellectuals are those social actors who elaborate and difise ideologies, and who give

to classes homogeneity and consciousness of their position and function in sociecy."' Gramsci

broadened the conventional definition of intellechial, which corresponded solely to the highest

intelIectuals, "to enable it to comprehend the unity of theory and practice, of mental and physical

labour so that intellectual and moral reform of the masses can be c~nce~tualized"."~ Gramsci said

in the Prison Morebook

By "inteilectualsn m u t be understood not those strata commonly described by this term, but in general the entire social stratum which exercises an organizational hnction in the wide sense - whether in the field of production, or in chat of culture, or in that of political administration. They correspond to the NCOts and the junior officers in the army, and also partIy to the higher officers who have risen from the rank~."~

The intellectuals cannot be conceived of as passive social agents observing the worId from

the corn fort of their ivory tower. Gramsci affirmed:

The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practica1 Iife, as constntctor, organiser, 'permanent persuader", and not just a simple orator.'

Gramsci distinguished bettveen two kinds of intellectuals. On the one hand, the organic

intellectuals, as previously described, are those identified by their position and hnction within a

'OgGnmsci in Bates, Op. Cit., p. 35 1. "OSassoon. Op. Cit., p. 15. "'Piotte, Op. Cit., . 70. ''Sassoon, Op. Cit., p. 229.

"'Gramsci. Selecrions From the Prison Notebooh, in Sassoon, Op. Cit., p. 134. "'lbid., p. 140.

given social stnictt~re."~ On the other hand, the traditional intellectuals are defined according to

tlieir position and function within the historical process, that is, they are those intellecnials

organically linked to disappeared or disappearing social c~asses.''~

Once again, the intellectuals' function is to mise the consciousness of the class to which

tliey are organically linked, and to provide it witli an autonomous and hornogeneizing world view

(ideologY).l" Consequently, the intellectuals' activities necessarily reflect the interests of the class

to which they belong. Their perceived autonomy is rnerely a consequence of the specific nature of

tlieir functions as organisers, educators and uhomogeneizers" of their class' consciousness at the

economic. social and political ~evel."~ Being the critical self-consciousness of their class, the

intellectuals are, so to speak, in advance on their social class since they tmly understand where its

interests are.'I9 In the exercise of their ideological leadership, the intellectuals are able to

"~tniversalize" their class' interests in order to render them acceptable to subordinate classes.

Hence. their hegemonic function gives. them a universal outlook which is necessary to the creation

of a solid historical bloc. Indeed, once in power, the intellectuals, as the fimctiorzaries of the

dominant class, must sacrifice certain immediate economic interests of their class in order to

prevent the dominated classes from becoming conscious of their class character, and thus to

preserve the long term interests of the fundamental cla~s."~ However, this must not be undemood

as a conspiracy of the ruling cIass led by the intellectuals trying to impose their world view on

society for it is more a result of their very inclusion in a particular social structure which shapes

their consciousness by presenting them with a historically given worid view (which they will

contribute to transform and tiirther deveIop according to the imperatives of a new historical

'I5For example, chapter three argues that the 'Chicago Boysn became the organic intellectuals of the military resime in Chiie. Il6Piotte, Op. Cit., p. 35. II7 Ibid., p. 24. "'~bid., p. 36. 119~ortelli. Op. Cit., p. 105.

But the intellectuals, besides their hegemonic hinction which they exercise in civil society

through a variety of cultural and diffusinç organizations such as the school system, newspapen,

magzines, radio, television and political parties, also assume a coercive hnction. In that sense,

they are integrated into the state apparatus as ministers, deputies, senators or as bureaucratie

administrators, including the judiciary and the rnilitary.12' Gramsci used two definitions of the

state: one restricted, and one extended. In its extended version, the state constitutes the dialectical

union of civil and political societies, of hegemony and coer~ion. '~ The state is 'hegeemony

protected by the m o u r of coerci~n". '~ "According to Gramsci's theory, hegernony and

dictatorship are rnutually dependent phenomenan'24 There exists no social system where consent

serves as the unique basis for hegemony or a State within which a group can indefinitdy maintain

its domination through coercion a~one.''~ Portelli noted:

I t was no surprise t a Gramsci that the beginning of every socio-politicat transformation, be it bourgeois or proletarian, is characterized by a period of dictatorship, the length of which depends precisely on the abiIity of the dictatorship to promote general acceptance of the change occuring in the economic s r n c ~ r e . ' ~ ~

in its restricted definition, the state is identified with the political society which

corresponds to the function of direct domination over the subordinate classes. It consists of the

political govemment, that is, the coercive apparatus which legafly ensures the disciplining of those

rebellious groups which refuse to consent actively or passively to the rule of the fundamental class

(the class owning the means of production).'" The state, in this restricted forrn, serves to prevent

'"Piotte, Op. Cit., p. 233. I2'Ibid., pp.22-23. "?Ibid., p. 233. '23Gramsci, Sefectiomfiom Prison Notebook, in Sassoon, Op. Cit., p. I 13. E4Bates, Op. Cit., p. 354. "5Portelli, Op. Cit., p. 32. '261bid., p. 355. "'Gramsci, in Portelli, Op. Cit., p. 29.

crises when sponmeous consent breaks down."' Those intellectuals controlling the coercive

apparatus, including the military, the judiciary, and the police, are the bureaucrats. The other

constitutive eiement of the state, undentood in its eaended sense, is civil society. Civil society is

"the ensemble of organisms commonly called prhore " and whose function is hegemony.'w> This

covers the whole spectrum of organisms such as political parties, schook, media, etc. wliicli are

concerned with culture and ideology. While Gramsci's distinction between the state in both its

extended and restricted versions and civil society may become blurred in a context of liberal

democncy. when applied to the analysis of a dictatorial regirne such as Pinochet's military regime

in Chile, the theoreticai separation between the state and civil society pemits a better

understanding of the interaction beween the principal social forces at w ~ r k . ' ~ ~ It also allows one to

comprehend the nature of existing relations of power within society. Indeed, in Chile, the pervasive

invasion of civil socieîy by the military"' necessitates such a clear theoretical distinction between

the state and civil society in order to appreciate truly the changing nature of social relations under

military rule. Nonetheless, for a clearer appreciation of the nature of social relations in the political

conte'ct of Cliile. the restricted definition of the state is preferred to the extended one. As it will be

demonstrated in cliapters bvo and three, both Allende and Pinochet considered the state, in its

resrricted sense. to be the ultimare source of power and sought to use it in order to revolutionize the

wliok of society. As will show the iast chapter of this thesis, political focus on civii society re-

emerged only in the context of transition to democracy.

''81bid. "91bid., p. 1 13. ''Olt must be said that despite any possible conhion in Gramsci's thought concerning his defmitions of the State and civil society, Gramsci's concepts, as defmed in this thesis, are considered to provide an important analytical insight in Chilean politics. For fiirther detail on the lack of consistancy in some of Gramsci's uses of concepts. see Peny Anderson, "nie Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," N m Lefr Ratiew (no 100, November 1976-January 1977), pp, 5-8 1. '"Such penetration of civil society exceeded the scope of normal governrnent functions as it sought to extend military control over the school system, mainly the universities, and the media. In order to further neutrdize civil society, political parties were also deciared illegal.

Again. Gramsci noted hvo situations leading to the use of coercion: to control those social

groups wiiich do not consent to the direction of the fundamental class; and in exceptional situations

of organic ct-ises where the rulinç class loses control over civil society "' The organic crisis is a

break between the structure and the superstructure; it is the consequence of the aggravation of

contradictions as a result of an evolution of the structure which is not paralleled by a simiIar

evolution of the ~u~erstnicture."~ The resolution of the organic crisis implies a combined usage of

hegernony (over allied classes) and coercion (over enemy classes). Depending on the success of

both means. the system will keep hegemonic or become dictatorial.lY

In his quest for dominance"' Gramsci, using a rnilitary terminology, identifid two forms

of ivurs accessible to social classes: the war of position which conesponds to hegernony and which

is a more adequate stntegy in the context of western societies where civil society is more

developed and ought to be ideologically won over first; and the war of movement which

constitutes a quick seizure of the state apparatus in societies where civil society is still heterogenous

and uncon~olidated.'~~ "To sumrnarize, what Gramsci lias asserted ... is that in any concrete social

formation where there is a modem state, a revolutionary strategy must be based on a war of position

witliin whicli there can be a tactical moment when the war of movement is appropriate.w13'

As was the case in Russia because of the gelatinour nature of its civil society, a period of

stadolac may be necessary. A period of stadolaüy is thus cliancterized by a quick seizure of the

state apparatus by a class allowing for its control over civil society through an extensive use of state

"'Ponelli. Op. Cit., p. 30. I j ; Ibid.. p. 127. It is extremely interestinp to note that the organic crisis that led to the faIl of Allende in Chile was not a consequence of a too fart evolution in the structure, but the opposite. The political system allowed for the rising to power of a socialist govemment which found itself limited by a highly defcient economy. Consequently, social demands could not be adequately satisfied The next chapter deals esentially with the issue of Allende's rise and fall. I3"Ibid., p. 136. "'lt is important to remember that Gramsci was most concem by the strate= necessary for the working ciasâ to revolutionize society. '"Robert Cox, 'Sramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay in Method" Millenium. Vol 2 ( l983), pp. 164- 165.

power. Civil society is ternporarily estranged fiom political society as a mechanistic relationship of

domination is established between the hvo entities, which situation permits the state to

systematically impose its worid view over the whole of society, hoping thus to create a new

hegemony . Nonetheless, Gramsci expressed his concem about an extended period of stadolatry :

"...this kind of sradoiarry must not be abandoned to itself, must not, especially, become theoretical

fanaticism or be conceived asperpetuol'!"' Gramsci also explained that a stalemate between equal

and opposed social forces may lead to the intervention of a strong man: this corresponds to

caesari~rn."~ (When defining caesarism, Gramsci had Napoleon Bonaparte in mind.) Caesarisrn

may be reactionary or progressive: it is "reactionary when it stabilizes existing power", and

"progressive when strong rule presides over a more orderly development of the new tat te".'"^

Chapten two and three will dernonstrate that a stadolatry period was considered necessary by both

Allende and ~inochet.'"

Yet, if revolutionaries have .net constructed a strong political Party, hornogeneous.

centralised and conscious of its class character, revolution will fail as the dominant ciass will resist

its loss of l~egernon~.'~' The very function of the political Party is hegemony. Accordingly.

Gramsci claimed that there could be no revolution without organizing the masses. Because "the

active man-in-the-mas has a pnctical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness", by

157 Sassoon. Op. Cit., p. 202. '38Gramsci, Selecrionsfrorn Prison Notebooks, in Sassoon, Op. Cit., p. 223 ''9Cox, Op. Cit., p. 166. I4OIbid. I.( 1 The reason why the concept of stadolatry is preferred to that of caesarism in the case of Chile is that, at fmt, Pinochet did not daim power personally. but as a member of the military junta Pinochet did not intervene in Chilean politics as a strong man seekinp to resolve the stalemate between equal and oppoxd social forces, the military did. This does not change the fact that Pinochet later cenüalized a11 power into his han&. but this was done in the context of a stadolatry p e n d whereby the state was considered the determining social agent. Whereas caesarism recognises a suong man as the p ~ c i p a l sociai actor, stadolatry identifies the whole state apparatus as the ultimate source for power. Hence, the concept of stadolatry includes the concept of caesarism since persona1 rule is an aspect of the total power structure. "'Piotte, Op. Cit., p. 190.

themselves, die masses are passive and apathetic, said ~ramsci."' Similady, Gramsci descnbed

the necessary relationship between the intetlectuals and the masses:

The popular elernent "feels" but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element 'knows" but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel,.. [the intellectuals rnust feel] the elernentary passions of the people. understanding them and therefore explainhg and justiQing them in the particular historical situation and comecting them dialectically to the laws of history and to a superior conception of the world, scientifically and coherently elaborated - i.e. knowledge. One cannot make politics-history without this passion, without this sentimental c o r n d o n between inteliectuals and people-nation. In the absence of such a nexus the relations beween the intellectual and the people-nation are, or are reduced <o. relationships of a purely bmaucratic and format order.'*

The "Modem Princen, or the "collective intellectual" must exercise its hegemonic fiinction

on the popular masses pol itically, intellectually and morally. Gramsci explained that:

the politicaI party ... is precisely the rnechanism which carries out in civil society the same function as the state carries out more synthetically and over a iarger scaIe, in political society. In other words it is responsible for welding together the organic intellectuals of a $ven goup - the dominant one- and the traditional intellectuals. The party carries out this function in strict dependence on its basic fiinction. which is that of elaborating its own component parts - those elements of a sociaI group which has been bom and developed as an "economic" group - and tuming h e m into quali fied political inteIlectuals, leaders and organ isers of al1 the activities and iünctions inherent in the organic developrnent of an integral society, both civil and poiitical.'J5

To conclude. it is believed that it is possible, from a Gramscian approach, to transcend the

parochialisrn of the end of ideology thesis in order to better understand the historical particulmi@ of

the Chilean transition to democracy and the creation of a ne01 iberal bloc.

- - - --

143 Gramsci, in Alexander and Seidman, Op. Cit., p. 5 5 . "'Gramsci, Selectionsfrorn Prison Notebooh, in Sassoon, Op. Cit., p. 176. '4sIbid., p 147.

THE ORGANIC CLUSIS: ALLENDE'S RISE AND FALL

"The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government at a time when society is not yet ripe for the domination of the class he represents and for the mesures which that domination implies ... He who is put in this awkward position is irrevocably lost." Frederick Engels. The Peasant War in Germanv.

"One has to piough wirh the oxen one has ... We will change the constitution by constitutionai means." Salvador Allende. First Message to Conoresst

The objective of this cliapter is to establish the historical bases for an adequate

understanding of the ideological nature of Chile's transition to democracy. It will be argued thât the

rise to power of president Allende took place in the context of an organic C ~ S ~ S which destroyed the

old historical bloc, and which the UP (Unidad Popular) aggravated and could not soIve. As a result,

the Allende regime is considered a penod of stadolatry during which the regime could neither

secure its Iiegemony nor impose its dictatorship. [n this task, it is necessary to analyse Allende's

intented attempt at pacifically revolutionizing the country, "la via chilena al socialisme". in parallel

with a study of the Chilean political system which allowed for the increasing polarization of the

politicai system.

A hisforical bloc in disintegration: the polarkation of the political system

Those events that led to the electioo of the Unidad Popular (Popular unity)' mua be

undentood as a process of disintegration of the previous historical bloc: a bloc which was

'The Unidad Popular was forrned in October 1969. It consisted of a broad coalition of Leftist parties dominated by the Socialist and Communist parties. Also members of the alliance were the Radicals and three srnalier parties: MAPU (Movimiento de Acci6n Popular Unitaria), the new Social Democnt Party (PSD) and the Accion Popular Independiente (API). For more details on the formation of the UP, see Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A HIStory of Chile, 1808-1993 (New York. Cambridge University Press, 19961, pp. 327-328.

cliancterized by a strong consensus on the democratic rules of rhe game (constitutionalism), and

the acceptance o f the capitalist developmental model. As observed Amiro Valenzuela, Chile, up to

the rni1itai-y coup in t 973, was known as one of the most stable democracies in Latin America:

Afier 1530 and a turbulent period of anarchy and dictatorship, the ballot box (albeit with a restncted electorate) becarne the sole mechanism for determinhg presidential and congressional leadership positions. The only deviation h m this pattern carne in the crisis years of 189 1, 1924, and 1932, when unconstitutionai governrnents held office for periods ranpinp up to five months.'

In terms o f its econornic model. Chile offered a mixture, though prominently capitalist, o f different

modes of production which was dominated by the "mraI latifundia, an extemal sector based on the

production and export of one or hvo primary commodities, witli investment in the export sector

being tïnanced Iârgely by foreign capital."' Likewise, the refomulation of the development model

ensuing after the grerit crisis o f 1929 seemed to establisli a certain compatibility benveen

industrialization and the incorporation into the socio-economic and political life of large social

sectors.' Manuel Antonio Garreton described the Chilean sociopolitical system prior to 1973 as

Three elements were uniqueiy interrelated in Chiie: import- subtintting industraiization with increasing state intervention in the economy; substantive democratization that was pdua l ly incorpomting diverse social sectors into the political system and improving their standards of living; and a democratic potitical regirne. 5

As described by Gramsci, an organic crisis constitutes a break between the structure and

the superstructure as a consequence o f the aggravation of social contradictions. This break is the

result o f an unequal evolution between the structure and the

'~rn i ro Valenzuela, 'Party Politics and the Cnsis of Presidentialism

superstructure in w hic h

in Chile: A Proposal for a

the stnicture

Parliarnentary Fom of Governrnen~" in juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 169. 'David E. Hojman, Chile: The Polirical Economy of Development and Democracy in the 1990 S (London, The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1993), p. 6. 4Manuel Antonio Garretdn, The Chilean Political Procas. (Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 2 1.

developed more npidIy. However. in the case of Chile, its very position in the world systern as a

peri phenl country (a situation Gnrnsci could not adequately appreciate) allowed for its

superstructure to develop fater than its structure. That is, an elaborate political system. based on a

pervasive penetntion of the political parties into civil sociev, moulded social relations in

accordance with a strong tradition of respect for legaliq and constitutionality while at the same

time a deficient economy undermined its very responsiveness to the needs and demands of the

popular secton. Indeed, it can be argued that dependent development greatly resticts the capacity

of a peripheral country to adequately respond to the demands aniculated at tlie superstructural level

by different social actors influenced by the economic and political achievements of the core

coun tries.

Consequent to the inability of tlie econornic structure to alleviate the misery of a large

proportion of the population. the Iiistorical social contradictions undermining Cliile's sociopolitical

system increasingly tlireatened the stabiiity of what constiruted an already frai1 Iiistorical bloc. For

cxample. in 1968, 71 -5 per cent of the population shared 26 per cent of total personal income while

the richest 4.4 per cent sliared 15.5 per cent of that sarne income. In addition. malnutrition was

responsible for the death of approximatively 7000 chiidren a year in tlie 1960's. and in 1970, 26.8

per cent of city dwellings lacked drinking water. In rural areas, this figure was 87.3 per cem6 In

such a conte* it is only undersbndable that, as Stephan De Vylder explained: "Behind its

institutional stability and tranquility Chile's history has always been fui1 of class confrontations, full

of violence, massacres and concentration campsn.' The sarne author noted that, between 1900 and

1970, 5000 workers were shor dead by the police in approximately 20 major massacres.'

Contradictions were also clearly present at the supersûucturai level. Chile's multi-party

- - - - - - -

'Ibid., p. 3. %tephan De Vytder, Allende S Chile: The Political Economy ofthe Rise und Fafi of rhe Unidad Popular (Cambridge, Cam bridge University Press, l976), pp. 7-8. 'Ibid., p. 23.

systern was characterized by a three-pole ideological spectrum which included 'a conservative

Riglit mainly based among économic elites. a refomist Centre rooted in the middle strata, and a

Mamist Lefi anchored in the working class"'. "There were no giants in Chilean party politics. no

party or tendency with a clear majority. In the pend 19324973, forty-five different parties

managed ro elect at l e m one representive to the lower house of parliament.n'O Each ideological

tendency historically gathered behveen a fourth and a third of all the votes.'' This highly volatile

conjuncture of economic dificuities and highly unequal distribution of incorne would eventually

lead to increasing popular unrest.

The existing tension behveen the structure and the superstructure became apparent with the

élection of Christian democrat president Eduardo Frei in 1964. Frei's electoral victory. and his

promotion of a "Revolucion en Libertad" (Revolution in Freedom), rnarked for the Chilean

government a conscious move to the left. Although not a socialist or a comrnunist inspired lefi, but - a left aroused by Christian values. Frei gave his p a q . the PDC (Partido Democrata Cristiano). the

mission of resolving the contradictions behveen the economic base and the process of

democntization which threatened the stability of the country. This would be accomplished. it was

believed. by a judicious application of a set of policies that would partially incorporate the peasants

and the urban poor into the economic and political system."

Favoured by a relativeiy promising penod of rapid economic expansion, (unlike Jorge

'[bid. 'Paul W. Drake and 1 v&n Jaksic, The Stmgglefor Democracy in Chile (Lincoln, Universi~ of Nebraska Press, 1988). p. 2. However, as Amro Valenmela pointed out, one rnust be careh1 in attributing a class-character to a specific party since clientelistic and personalistic appeals to voters often blurred the ideological issues and created a heterogeneous base of support for the parties. A. Valenmela, "Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in chi le,"^. 18 1. 'OValenzuela. 'Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile," Op. Cit., p. 177. "See Ronald H. McDonald and J. Mark Ruhl, Party Politics and Elecrions in Latin America (Boulder, Westview, 1989), 386pp., and Federico Guillenno Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston, Houghton Miffm, I966), 323pp. I2Garreton, Op. Cit., p. 2 1.

Alessandri in 1958 and later Salvador Allende in 1970 who had inheritated a weakened economy),

Frei could sincerely hope to si@ ficantly clianse the nature of the Cliilean socio-economic system.

Tlirough state intervention in the field of economic policy, the 'Revolucion en Libertadm essentially

called for the improvement of the conditions of life of the Chilean masses. In order to correct the

discorted pattern of grotah cliaracterizing Chile's economy, Frei sought to implement a radical

redistribution of income through an increase of the legal minimum wage. He also wanted to

improve the social security system, and to ensure for the underprivileged poors massive access to

the educational ~ ~ s t e r n . ' ~ Al1 these rneasures, and especially the land reforms, contributed to reduce

clientilist links between tlie masses and political leadership, hence conceding a greater autonomy to

the masses.'' Likewise. there was an attempt by Frei (although, according to De Vylder, far from

being an anti-imperialist)" to reduce foreign dependence. This was mainly carried out by a partial

nationalization of the United States copper interests.

The pressure esercised on tlie economic structure by the political system seemed to be too

great for the economy to adequately respond to the Christian Democrats' attempt at reforming

Chile. Wiat Manuel Antonio Garreton called the backbone of Chilean society, that is, "a system

linking social subjects and actors to the state and a network of relationships between the

organizations of civil society and political p a q structure~"'~, and which corresponds to the

superstructure, or the state in Gramsci's extended version, could not restructure the Chilean

economy. Indeed, after 1966, the goods-producing sectors experienced a serious recession which

became a sign of the increasing difficulty for the PDC to implement its program.'' Moreover, these

populist rneasures soon wom'ed the representatives of large capital and national business

"For example, 3000 new schools were huilt duhg Frei's term and 95 per cent of Chilean children could receive a primary education by 1 970. Collier and Sater, Op. Cit,, p. 3 12. '%ee Arniro VaIenzueIa, The Breakdown of Democraric Regimes: Chile (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), Chapter 2. I50e Vylder. Op. Cit., p. 70. '*Gameton, Op. Cie., p. 13.

iiianagernent some of wliotn. as e d y as 1967. envisioned an authoritarian alternative." "Afier six

y è m of RrvoZutiorr NI Fredonz d l the government's major promises rernained unfulfilled.,. The

government Iiad. in short. proved unable to change the fundamental behaviour of the econorny."19

Hance. Frei's "Revoftrcibtr et7 Libmad ultimately failed after provoking social unrest among those

wliose expectations had been raised but not ~ul f i l led"~~

In tum. the "unfulfillmentn of these promises made to the population led to an ideological

polarization of the Chilean political system. Since the main political parties representative of the

tliree ideological tendencies. the UP for the Left , the PDC for the Centre and the RN (Renovacion

Nacional) for the Risht. came to believe that they alone possessed the solution to Chile's problems,

the breakdown of traditional coalition making eventually allowed for the eiectoral victory of a

minority governnient led by Salvador Allende and the Unidad Popular. Although economic

problems were obviously an important factor provoking social unrest, it was a political crisis which

precipitated the desintegration of the Cliilean Iiistoricai bloc. Even though the economy was weak

and vitiated by many structural deficiencies, there was no drarnatic economic crisis as such before

.Alleiide took power. Indeed. the economy was better in the 1960's than it Iiad been in the 1950's.

Yet tlie 1960's marked an intensification of social mobilization manifested in strikes and new

labour moveinents." As it lias been forcefully argued by Stephan De Vylder, Arturo Valenzuela,

Ignacio Walker, and Timothy R. Scully, a crystallization of the positions on the bais of ideological

unwillingness to compromise impeded the historical politics of coalition-making necessary for tlie

govemment to exercize power. 22 Valenzuela asserted that the breakdown of democracy in Chile

- .- . - - . - - - - . . - .

" ~ e Vylder. Op. Cit., p. 22. '3Garreton. Op. Cit.. p. 72. 19 De Vylder, Op. Cit., p. 22. See also Collier and Sater, Op. Cit., p. 3 19. "Hojman. Op. Cit., p. 9. "Ibid.. p. 25. "See De Vylder, Op. Cit. Arturo Valenmela, The Breukdoivn of Democratic Regimes: Chile, 140pp. Also Timothy R. Scully, Rerhinking rhe Center: Pars, Politics in Nineteenth - and Tiventieth-Century Chile (Stan ford.. Stanford University Press. 1 W?), 287pp. Ignacio Walker, "Political Alliances and the Role of the

Iiad to be understood in broader terms: "It must be understood as the faiIure to structure a viable

center in a highly polanzed society with strong centrifuga1 tendencies."=

In this context o f social discontent the adoption by the centnst Christian Democratic Party

(PDC), wliich thought of itself as an alternative to liberal capitalism and Marxisrn, of an

uncompromising attitude (camino propio) has been c o n s i d e ~ d the major factor in the disintegration

of the Chilean traditional politics of accomodation and the breakdown of d e m o c r a ~ ~ . ' ~ The

adoption of such a rigid attitude was clearly stated by Eduardo Frei in 1964. He declared: "Not for

a million votes would I change a line of my program."" As a result, the PDC abandonned

praynatism as a political strategy which historically served as a centripetal force bringing together

in viable coalitions the exmrne poles of the Chilean ideological ~~ectrurn. '~ In a country like

Cliile, where no party since the adoption o f the 1925 constitution received more than 30 per cent of

the votes in either a congressional or a municipal election, coalitions were essentiaf to the operation

of any 3ovemment." As Valenzuela pointed out:

Chilean party politics was thus characterized not oniy by sharp disagreements in ideology and program, but by compromise and coopention to achieve joint policy objectives and respond to dernands From constituents, both organized and un-oqpized. This pattern of political give-and-take can be atributed to three factors that are rnutually reinforcing: the imperatives of electoral politics, the existence of a pragmatic center, and the viabiiity of

Center: The Chilean Christian Democratic Parry," in Alan AngeIl and Benny Pollack, The Legacy of Dictutorsliip: Polilical. Economic and Social Change in Pinochet f Chile (Liverpool, The institute of Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 1993). pp. 175- 1 SS. This polarization thesis is obviously defended also by al1 those analysa such as E. Boenhger, A. Foxley, F. Larrain. and D. Hojman, who proclaimed the end of ideology in Chile in the context of the new political consensus. They argue that Chile has leamed its lessons and that ideological politics, which led to the polarization of the political system and the destruction of democracy, m u t be avoided. Moreover, to eliminate ideological politics was also a key justification for the militay to take conwl of what was considered a degenerated political system. 23~alenzue1a, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile, p. 59. "See especially Valenzueia, Op. Cit., and Scully, Op. Cit. "Eduardo Frei. in Jefiey M. Puryear, Thinking Politics: Inrellectuals and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1994)- p. 27. '%is was the traditional strategy of the centrist parties such as the Radical Party. "~alenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile, p. 3.

represenrative insriturional arenas for decision rnaking.'s

Tire Chikm road ru socidis~n

Allende's rise to p o w r in a minorie govemment in 1970 with only 3 6 1 per cent of the

votes (3,J per cent less than wliat he received in the election he lost to Eduardo Frei in 1964) was a

direct result of the split within the non-mmist opposition.'9 Whereas the 1963 election was

essentially a hvo-way contest benveen Allende and Frei. the 1970 election was a totally different

story. ldeological politics opposed three irreconcilable camps in a fierce cornpetition: the Left was

represented by Salvador Allende (UP). the Centre supported Radomiro Tomic (PDC), and Jorge

Alessandri, an Independent. was championed by the R i g h ~ mainly by the National P a q (PN).

Because the Right was fearf'l of the anti-capitalist rhetoric used by both Christian Democrats and

Socialists, the Rightists coutd tiot accept to enter into an alliance with the PDC to defeac Allende.

Perliaps they would have accepted Eduardo Frei as an acceptable candidate as opposed to Radomiro

~otnic". but the constitution impeded the president to run for a second term in office.

Névenlieless. the PDC did try to negociate some arrangements wiih the Right: the most notorious

one was known as the .-flesscm&i Fornlrda. According to that formula, the PDC would have

supported Alessandri. but once elected, he would have resigned and called for new elections so

Eduardo Frei could have confronted Allende again in a hvo-man race. But this would have

provoked a fatal splir in the Party as well as a possible civil war. 3 1 The leaden of the PDC, f e a h l

of an explosion of violence. decided to discard the Alessandri Formiila. In addition. the PDC could

not, without losing its popular appeal, and without avoiding the decomposition of its pare,

'SValenzuela. "Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile,*p. 200. '9~esults of the 1970 presidential election: Salvador Allende: 36.2% of the votes. lorge Alessandn 34,9%. and Radomiro Tomic 27.8%. Source: Direction GeneraI del Registro Electoral, Santiago Chile. See Scuily, Op. Cit..Table 4.16, p. 164. ">Tomic was considered a populist by the Right. "De Vylder, Op. Cit.. p. 30

;i w itlidraw its candidate; this would have been perceived as a sign of weakness.--

The ekction o f a declared Mmis t govemment was a fint in Latin America However, tlie

clrctoral victory did not directly lead to Allende becoming president. Before he could accede to

oftïce. Allende's victory Iiad to be ntified by the National Congress. Although it was custorn to

select the candidate with the Iiighest percentage of votes, in the case where no candidate received

more than 50 per cent of' the total of votes, the National Congress could appoint to the presidency

tlie candidate of its choice behveen the bvo who gathered the greatest percentage at the universal

suffnge. Consequentiy, as "the Chilean Right - and here we must include President Frei and liis

followen - refused to reco_onise Allende's unconclusive victo~y"'~, much plotting was secretly

pursued to prevent Allende from taking office. However, AI these rightist plots elaborated before

or after die election. suc11 as the Alessandri Formula, faiIed. Indeed, fearing a violent social crisis -

the leti Iiad tlireatened to resort to arms to protect its victory if necessary, and the ex-General

Roberto Viaux attempted a rnilitary coup which led to the assassination of General Schneider - the

National Congress opted for the respect of the democratic process.'' But again. this was not easily

ricliieved since Allende had to agree to a constitutional amendment. "El Estatuto de Ganntia".

requiring Iiim to respect civil liberties. elections. and the freedom of the press.'5

.Allende's rise to power and tenure in office must be understood as a period of stadolatry

during wliich the state sought a complete revolution in the nature of the social relations. But fint of

d l . it is important to undentand the revolutionary character of the program of the Unidad Popular.

The UP based its prognm on a platforni of popular democratization which aimed at thoroughly

transfonnin_e Chilean society in order to destroy capitalism and implement socialism. Assessing

the problems of Cliile. UP's electonl prograrn (Programa de la Unidad Popular) stated:

"lbid.. p. 25. "ibid., p. 29. "For more details on the "Tancazo" (Viaux's attempted military coup) and the mumph of Allende, see Collier and Sater. Op Cit.. pp. 325-329.

What failed is a systern which does not correspond to the necessities of our tirne. Chile is a capitalkt counuy, dependent on imperialisrn. domuiated by the sectors of the Bourgeoisie which are smcturally tied to foreign capital, and which c m o t solve the country's fundamental probiems which derive precisely fiom its class priviIeses which wil1 never be given up voluntarily. (Persona1 trans~ation)'~

The prograrn also stipulated that, as opposed to a merely reformist ajustrnent, the revolutional

transformation which the country needed would be possible only if the Chilean people possessed

political power and used it e~c ien t l~ . " This required a complete restructuring of the economy:

The united popular forces pursue as a the central objective of their policy to replace the actual econornic sauchire, to end the monopolistic power of national and foreign capital and of the latifiindia in order to initiate the construction of socialism. (Personal translation^'

To sum up, UP's program was one of popular democratization and radical socio-economic changes

to be camed out through extensive reforms such as the nationalization of key areas of the economy

(es: banks and the copper mines), in-depth agarian refoms, a radical redistribution of incorne.

worker participation in management, and direct popular participation in govemment.

Wliat made the Allende regime a period of stadolatry is explained by the nature of the

Cliilean political system as defined by the 1925 constitution and later amendrnents. Once again, a

Iiistorical consciousness obliges one to reaiise that the concept of stadolauy, as elaborated by

Gramsci, must be contextualized to fit the particuiarities of Chile's situation. As an analytical tool,

the concept of stadolatry penniü one to isolate a peculiar aspect of the Chilean politics under

Allende. that is. the government's incapacity to expand its hegernony or to impose its dictatonhip

through state power alone (the state being the whole of the political society, the executive. the

legislative, the judiciary, the rnilitary and the police). Contrary to what Gramsci conceived of

'5~alenzuela. The Breakdorvn of Democratic Regimes: Chile, p.49. j6Salvador Allende, rviiesrro Camino al Socialho - L a via Chilena (Buenos Aires, Ediciones Papuo, Coleccion Politica. 197 1 ), p. 152. s-8

"lbid.. p. 157. "1bid.. p. 163.

stadolatry, even though the "Chilean road to Socialisrn" aimed at transfoming society through the

seizure of the state appantus, this was to be done without violence and in full respect of the Chilean

law and constitution. Hence. Allende's seizure of power was reseicted to the executive power and

hiled to dominate al1 branches of the state apparatus. As a rnatter of fact, the UP was a minority in

Congress and could not control the legislative body. As well, the traditionally conservative

judiciary and the "Controlaria ~ e n e r a l " ~ were highly suspicious of Allende. At fint the rnilitary

was not seen as a threat to the UP government because of its great respect for the constitution and

its poiicy of non-involvement in politics; in facf the pmsianized Chilean military was considered

one of the most professional in Latin ~ m e r i c a ~ h o w e v e r , as subsequent events showed, respect

for the constitution could be a two-edge sword. Because the armed forces saw themselves as the

guanntor of the constitution, non-intervention was conditional to the performance of the

politicians. (In 1967, a survey revealed tliat 84 per cent of retired generals considered the armed

forces to be the guardian of the constitution.")

The UP's strategy was clear. To revolutionize the country, the UP would rely on two

sources for power: the executive and the popular power arisinj out of various mass organizations,

mainly the tnde unions. It was believed that by exercising pressure frorn above and from below,

the "fundamental enemies" would ultimately crurnble." Since 1925, the executive had been

strengthened by a series of constitutional refoms. These amendments to the constitution aimed at

providing the executive with more authority vis-à-vis the Congress in order for it to adequately

address the country's persistent econornic problems. These impressive powers conceded to the

' 9u~he General controlIership was created in 1927 to watch over the bureaucracy and the constitutionality of fiscal measures." ColIier and Sater, Op. Cit, p. 2 16. "Garreton argued that faiIing to have a clear policy regarding its relations to the military was one of the UP's major error. Garreton. Op. Cit., p. 27. " Hansen, Milira~ Cirlture and Organizaiional Decline, p. 2 54. In Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile, p. 2 I . "De Vylder, Op. Cit., p. 38.

executivç won the constitution the epithet of "legal caesarisrnn? Once in office, the president

(even in a minority governrnent) gained almost absolute control over the administration of the

couiitp. "He appointed ministers and high-mking officers - he was, of course. generalkimo of

the armed forces. He appointed govemors (intendentes) ... he also appointed al1 high-and middle-

nnking oficials within the entire public administration. including state-owned enterprises."" m e

president was also provided with important economic powers. In tliat sense, arguing for the

creation of a parliamentary system in Chile, Amiro Valenmela concluded that: "The Chilean

system was a semipresidential one; it lacked the formal garantees provided by parliamentary niles

and procedures aimed at generating executive authoriy from major@ support.ds

However. despite the apparently unrestncted autonomy of the emcutive, the legislative had

the upper Iiand in taxation and had to approve the national budget- Moreover, the Congress alone

\vas entitled to legislate. For example, the president could veto bills passed by the Congress, but

presidential veto could be ovenidden by a hvo-thirds majority in Congress. As well, the Congress

could remove rninisters and intendentes with a simple majority and impeach the president with a

t~vo-tliirds majority. Witliout a rnajority in Congress, the president could not generate new laws.

(Allende Iiad hoped to achieve a majority in Congress in the Marcli 1973 parliamentary elections.

Althougli the UP gained a few scats in that election, it remained a minority.) Nonetheless. the

opposition never secured a hvo-thirds majority in Congress neither before nor after the

congressional elections of March 1973. This allowed Allende to pursue his program, but he

remained extremely limited by the constitution since he did not possess the majority necessary to

amend it. and thus to hndamentally transfonn Chilean society.

As previously mentioned, the UP sought support from the popular masses. In order to

'3~bid., p. 44. On the reassertion of the authority of the executive over the legislature and the 1925 Constitution. also see Scully. Op. Cit., p. 85. "De Vylder. Op. Cit., p. 44. For more details on the nature of the 1925 Constitution, see Collier and Sater, Op. Cit.. p. 2 13.

iricrerise its popularity, the UP based its s t n t e g on a rapid econornic recovery which, it was

believed. would convince the population of the superiority of Socialism. in its first year in power,

the UP managed to increase the GDP (Gross National Product) by 5,6 per cent and to lower

sigiiiticantly the level of unemployment (employment increase 11,7% in construction, 7,6% in

public utilities, 7.1% in manufacturing, 5,l% in service). Wages were raised by 66,6 per cent and

the basic monthly salary by 35 per cent. By July 1971, the ernployee saw his salary increased by

54.9 per cent. The povemrnent also pursued an intense campaign of nationalization of industries

(by December 197 1, state-owned companies increased from 32 to 62 while 39 more were under

zovernment seizure). In total, the government seized over 1300 properties (mainly f m s ) in its - tirst year in office. By the end of 1972, one fourth of the total industrial production vas in the

Iiands of the statcJ6

As demonstrated by the municipal elections of 1971, in only one year the UP had

significantly broadened its popular suppon. The parties making up the UP at the time received 49.7

prr cent of al1 valid votes.4i But this npidly achieved popularity soon staned to evaporate. The

CP's populist reforms of radical income redistribution had been possible only at tlie cost of a 70 per

cent increûse in government tiscal expenditures. (Government spending concentrated on social

services such as housing, education. health and ~anitation.)~' As the Minister of the Economy,

Pedro Vuskovic, noted in October 1971. tlie government's policies provoked a severe cut in

investment and the almost complete exhaustion of foreign reserves." In addition, inflation passed

frorn 22.2 per cent in December 1971 to 163,1 per cent in December 1972 to reach a peak at 323.2

per cent in July 1973 .'O

'SValenzuela. "Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile," p. 196. "Figures obtained from Vaienzuela, The Breakdown of Democracic Regimes: Chile, pp. 50-59. 17 Collier and Sater, Op. Cir., p. 333. 48 Valenmela, The Breakdown of Dernocrutic Regimes, p. 5 I . 4 9 Ibid., p. 54. "'Instituto Nacional de Estadistica mirneographed reports. Ibid-, Table 19, p. 55.

Tliese mounting economic dificulties, although explained to a fair extent by the UP's own

rcoiiom ic po l icies, were exacerbated by the extremely anwgonistic attitude of the opposition to

Allende's government. Indeed. the opposition embarked on a determined obstruction crusade

agairist the resime. The Rielitists as well as the Christian Democrats sought to force Allende to

resign or the military to intervene by bringing to a halt al1 vital econornic activities: for esample.

the slogan during the October 1972 crisis was "Paniize chile!"?' Foreign capital also played an

important role in this attempt at pmvoking an econornic catastrophe in chile." In that sense, the

United States. fearful of an otlier Cuba, drastically cut economic aid to Cliile, but increased its

financial support to favorable political parties and to the military." As already noted, the Congress.

the judiciary. and the Connalaria GeneraZ were h m the start anti-AIIende. Hence, the strategy

the' adopted was to try to change the constitution in order for the legislature and the judiciary to

impose their will on the executive. In short, they wanted al1 power to rest in the legislative body.

Tlieir effow culminated on the 2 n d of Augusr 1973 with the adoption of a resolution, the "Sense

of House". by the Charnber of Deputies supported by the PDC, dedaring unconstitutional the

co\.ernrnent of President Allende. This "Sense of Housen Iiad a clear objective: to justify a military

iiiten~ention.'~ Moreover. the armed forces and the national police (los canbineros) increasingly

despised Allende's government as the constitutionalist mentality of non-involvement in politics

rapidly lost ground arnong the oficers. On the sarne day the "Sense of House" was adopted, m y

"De Vylder. Op. Cit., p. 84. "For more details on the October Crisis, see Gabriel Smirnow, The Revolution Oisarmeci Chile 1970-1973 ( N e w York, Monthly Review Press, 1979, Chapter 5, "October 1972: The First Bourgeois Insurrection," pp. 65-8 1. '' Wi 1 1 iam I. Robinson, Pronioring Pol'archy: Globalkation, US Intervention and Hegemony (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 159. For a more detaiied analysis of US-Chile relations during this peridod see William F. Sater, ChiIe and the C'nired Siutes: Empires in ConJicr (Athens. î h e University of Georgia Press, 1990), Chapters 8 and 9, and Paul E. Sigmund, The Unired Srares and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1993), Chapter 3. ''Valen zuelri. The Breakdorvn of Democratic Regimes: Chile, p . 1 04.

Genenl Prats. the last conrririr~ionaIis~, was forced to re~ig,n.'~

Beside its failure to exercize absolute control on the state apparatus, neither could Allende's

covernment penetrate and direct civil society. In fact, popular suppon for Allende's govemment - (rven amongst workers) rapidly decreased after its fim year in office. Ironically, the popular

secton' rising expectations which had led to the polarkation of politics permitting Allende's

victorv, also contributed to his downfall. Indeed. facilitated by a regime ideology favourable to

social mobilization. the people protited from the governrnent's openness to popular demands to

solicit more. As Valenzuela noted: " Wliereas in 1969 there were 977 strikes, in 1972 the figure

had jumped to an all-tirne hieh of 3,287."56 This incapacity on the part of the UP to generate

consensus on iü policies is indubitably related to its radical class position. As a tme organic party

of the working class, the UP could not universalize its interests. As it sought to overthrow the

capitalist ruiing class, it always claimed to be the representative of the proletariat in the class

stmggle. Allende, asked to elaborate on the nature of his government in relation to the Marxist

theon, of the dictatorship of the proletariat. deciared that the "Chilean road to Socialism* rejected

die idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat wliich would not respect the Chilean democratic process.

but tllat, without a doubt, his govemment was one of the workers. He said: "...este es un gobiemo

de los trabajadores. Y dentro de los trabajadores, indiscutiblemente. el factor mis importante es el

Even tough the UP did try to form an alliance with the rniddle class, its focus on the

S5For more historical details on how the rnilitary came to reject the constinitionalist position as offices got directly involved in politics (Allende had inuoduced military officers in his cabinet in order to legitirnate his rule), see Collier and Sater, Op. Cit., pp. 346-358. Also Genaro Amagada, Pinochet: the Politics of Power (Boston, Unwin Hyrnan, 1988)- Part II, Chapter 9, pp.8 1 - 102. '6ValenzueIa, The Breakdown of Dernocratic Regimes: Chile, Op. Cit., p. 61. See Table 2î for a detailed account of the number of strikes by sectors of economic activity between 1964 and 1972, and the increase in the number of nade unions. '7~llende. Op. Cit, p. 56. "This is a government of the workers. And among the workers, indisputably, the most important factor is the proletariat." (Personai translation)

proletariat forced the governrnent to relegate the middle sectors to an insignificant role in the

reconstruction of the Chilean society. Hence, the UP failed to appreciate the moderate character of

the middle class which highly pnised stability and order, and thus could not accept tlie socialist

rlireat to the status Likewise. in order to convince the lower stnta of the bourgeoisie of its

cominon interest with the "popular forces", the UP distinguished between the monopolitic sector

and the non-monopolistic sector of the bourgeoisie. WhiIe the monopolistic sector was the enemy

to be fought and expropriated, the non-monopolistic sector was considered an ally which should not

feel threatened by the UP's program.'9 In reality, the numerous pmperty seizures were enough to

tiigliten die whole of the bourgeoisie, regardless of what the rhetoric said.

Also related to the domination of civil society issue was the Church's reaction to Allende's

zovernment. First of all, the anti-religious character of Mmism was obviously totally - unacceptable to the Chilean Catholic Church. And, since approximatively 99 per cent of the total

Cliilsan population was Catholic. the Cliurch constituted a prime social actor in Chilean politics, an

actor which could not be easily discarded. Although the Church had rernained remarkably quiet

and tolennt towards Allende's government. the issue of the Unified National Scliooling System

(Escuela Nacional Unificada) brought it to the forefiont of political activism.

Ximing at providing a greater access to education for children. the reforms pursued by the

CP Iiid a much more pervasive ideological objective. Consequent to the creation of Socialism in

Chile was tlie need to change the very mentality of the population. In other words. the essence of

the educational reforms was to create a "nuevo hombre" (new man) "free to develop himself in a

non-capitalist society" and " conscious of and in solidarity with the revolutionary process. who is ...

techn ically and scientifically able to develop the economy in a society in transition to so~ia l i s rn"~~.

;9 Garreton. Op. Cit., p. 27. "De Vy lder. Op. Cit., p . 8 4 M'Joseph P . Farrell. The Narionui Unfled School in Allende5 Chile (Vancouver, 1986), p. 96. in Collier and Sater. Op. Cic,, p. 352.

Seen as a socialisr national indoctrination system, the educational reforrns sought by the UP were

considered highly inadmissible by the Catholic Church which. for the fim tirne, openly criticized

tlie government. Many parents objected as well. Notably, 800 rnilitary officers broke silence and

cane out criticizing the government as "worried fathers"!' This was a clear sign of the decline in

tlie iieutnl mentality within the amed forces. Student demonsuations. both for and against the

reforms, also erupted. Wliile the opposition would not accept the ideologicat indoctrination of

Chilean children, the Lefi accused the opposition of protecting its class privileges. Finally,

approaching the March Congressional elections, and facing a political crisis. Allende decided, at the

cost of weakening his position in his own coalition, to abandon the project.

Another factor in Allende's downfall was the existence of a sharp division within his own

nnks. Indeed. the Unidad Popular was divided into two camps unable to agree on the strategy to

adopt to achieve socialism. This chism was articulated by the two main parties forming the Unidad

Popular coalition: The Socialist Party (PS) was essentiaily committed to an insurrectionary strategy

jtistiF,iq violence and amis struggle, whereas the Communist Party (PC) favoured apeaceful route

to socialism respecting tlie democratic process. Even though .4llende was a rnember of the

Social ist Party, he aiways promoted a peaceful path and, after rnany years of efforts, he was able to

hm a coalition of lefiist parties, the Unidad Popuhr, committed to a "Cliilean road to socialism".

Yet. as the UP increasingly faced a more determined opposition to the implementation of its

program. the tension within the coalition intensified. While the moderates called for a

consoIidation of the gains already made by the UP, the radicals urged tliat it was now time to

accelerate the revolutionary process.62

ln tliat context of radicalization, the miIitary becarne concerned about the possibility of a

"Collier and Sater, Op. Cit., p. 352. "'For a good analysis of the chism within the Chilean Left both before and after the military coup, see Lois Oppenheim, "Democracy and Social Transformation in Chile: The Debate Within the L e k n Latin Arnerican Perspeçrires. issue 46. Vol 12 (no 3, Summer 1985), p. 59-76.

complete desintegntion of Cliilean society and a vioient civil war. Adopting a stntegy of

"opposition at al1 costs". the Right mainly srnall business associations (grernios), organized

numerous strikes and demonstntions while the Lefi moved to organize "comandos cornunales,

comandos campesinos. and cordones indu~triales".~~ Although the radical Left was not as strong

and organized as it claimed to be, the radical nature of its discourse was sufficient for the

opposition ro ~ l l ende to conclude that Chiie \vas on the brink of civil war, and to justim a miiitary

intervention which finally occurred in a bloody military coup on Septernber 1 lh 1973." For

ssample. Miguel Enriquez, the Head of the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria)

declared:

The working cIass is today a stnic~red army bent on fighting for its interests and resisting the onslaught of the reactionaries. The working class and the people ... have given notice to their political leadership that the stmgle has left the corridors of parliament and thar they will not pennit setback; or concessions.65

However. as Valenzuela argued: "Throughout the Allende period radicalized sectors of the

\vorking class remained a minority, and the most significant destabilizing and uncontro1Ied

mobiIization would continue to be the counter-mobilization of the rniddte-c~ass."~~

The ideologicai \var between Allende and his opponents became IiighIy rhetorical, hence

the media assumed a determining role in the inability of the UP to penetrate civil society. Stephan

De Vy ider reported that:

The parties which were later to form the anri-UP coalition Confederacion Democratica controlled, by 1970, hvo of the three main TV-stations, 95 per cent of Chile's radio stations(În total about 150). 90 per cent of the newspaper circulation and close to 100 per cent of al1 weekly magazines!'

"Vaienzuela, The Breakdown of Demucrutic Regimes: Chile, p. 79. w The next chapter, chapter 3, deals essentialIy with the motives underlying the military coup and the nature of Pinochet's dictatorship. 'SCliile Hoy, ( 1 3- 19 July, 1973), p. S. in Valenzuela, The Breakduwn of Democraric Regimes: Chile, p . 1 O 1. "61bid.. p. 79. " ' ~ e Vylder, Op. Cit.. p. 47.

The messages propagated by the media were highly hostile to the govemment, and inevitably

contributed to the radicalization of positions. Moreover, they greatly constrained al1 efforts at

reconciliation and accomodation undertaken by the moderate forces in government and in the

opposition. For example, the newspaper EI Mercurio featured an article in July f 973 directly

calling for a military intervention:

tt is the categoric duty of sensible people to put an end to looting and disorder stimulated by an inept and crazy government which srnothers us ... In order to accornplish this task of political salvation, we have to renounce a11 political parties, the masquerades of elections, the poisoned and deceitful propaganda, and turn over to a few select rniIitary men the task of puning an end to political anarchy. 68

To conciude this chapter, Allende could not solve the organic crisis created by rising

popular expectations and political polarkation. The seinire of the state apparatus by Allende's

Unidad Popular through etectonl rneans did not provide him with enou& power to implement his

radical program. Indeed, the Congress, the judiciary, the ControIuria General, the Arrned Forces

and the national police remained outside the executive's control. Moreover, the UP was unable to

penetrate civil society to secure i t s hegemony. An inadequate strates focussing on the proietariat

aloiie. the inability of the UP to refonn the Chilean mentality, and the lack of control over the

media al1 converged to prevent the UP from revoiutionizing the Chilean society. Since neither

dictatonhip nor hegemony could be achieved, this stadolatry period of Chilean history dramatically

failed to estriblish the working ciass as the ruling class. An incornpiete seizure of the state,

combined with a lack of hegemony, seemed to prove Engels right: "The worst thing that can befall

a leader of an extrerne party is to be compelied to take over a govemment at a tirne when sociev is

not yet ripe for the domination of the class he represents and for the mesures which that

domination irnplies ... He who is put in this awkward position is imvocably ~ o s t . " ~ ~

'%hile Hoy (6- 12 July 1 973). p. 1 1. in Valenmela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile, p. 93. 69 Frederick, Engels, The Peasanr War in Germany, in De Vylder, Op. Cit., p. 2 19.

CHAPTER 3

THE ORGIUVIC CRISIS: THE DICTATORIAL SOLUTION

"A person's actual freedom c m only be ensured through an authoritarian regime that e'tercises power by implementing equal rules for everyone." Sergio De Castro. L 5 February 1976.'

I 1 September 1973, the military storrned the presidential palace. An abrupt and violent

end was put to a long tradition of democratic stability. Even those who had caIIed for the military

intervention were disconcerted by the Ievei of repression unleashed by the rnititary. The

supposedly temporary military regime which they thought would eliminate the communist threat

and then quickly re-establish democracy proved to be far more ambitious. It is the aim of tliis

chapter to identie the ideological nature of the rnilitary regime which inaugiirated a second petiod

of stadolatry in Chilean politics.' At the apogee of ideological politics. the dictatorial solution was

seen as necessary to restore order and stabiiity in a society tom apart by contndictions. While

Mende had enjoyed an extremely restricted control over the state apparatus, the dictatorship's

absolute command over coercive means allowed it to totally disregard the necessity of creating

concensus or hegemony, and thus to impose its will on civil society. Hence, to use Garreton's

vucabulary, in order to establish the ideological nature of the military dictatorship, îwo periods

rn ust be distinguished: after an initia1 reacrionary phase, the m ilitary adopted a foundational

project in order to complerely reshape the nature of Chilean politics. 3 The emphasis will be put on

the second period. especially on the advent of the Chicago Boys in CliiIean econornic policy

making. It will be argued that the Chicago Boys fomed the tme organic intellectuals of the

- - - - -- - - - - --- -

'Quoted in Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinocher 3 Econornists: The Chicago Schoof in Chile (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). p. 30. 'Once again, the concept of stadolany is preferred to the one of caesarism for the simple reason that Pinochet did not take power as art individuai, but as a rnember of a military junta. The concept of stadolatry inchdes the concept of caesarism since persona1 rule is an aspect of the total power structure. See foornote 141, p. 26. Chapter 1 . ' ~anue l Antonio Garreton. The Chdean Political Process (Boston. Unwin Hyrnan. I989), pp. 38-49.

ini1ita-y regime.

But fint, a short paragnph on the stadolatry nature of the Pinochet regime is necessary.

There are nvo essential aspects to the concept o f stadolatry: one is the apparent seizure of the state

appantus, and tlie otlier is the underlying ideologicaI incentive requiring such a seizure. Whereas

tlie concept of stadolatry was necessary to identi@ crucial aspects of Allende's failure to implement

Socialism in Cliile in terms of "real political" power, the stadolatry nature of the Pinochet regime is.

in rliat sense. so obvious that it does not need to be thoroughly investigated here.' Indeed. the

anaiytical focus must be moved to the very motivations inspiring the military regime to make such

unprecedented use of coercion.' For example. Chile's Commission of Human Rights reported that

during the seventeen years of military rule at Ieast 1,500 activists were executed, exiles arnounted

'~fccrr accepting to join the rebellious generals to foment a miIitary coup to overthrow the government of Salvador Allende, General Pinochet soon discarded ai1 his opponents as he centralized al1 power into his han& and established himseIf as President of the republic. Under the direct leadership of General Pinochet, the military exercised an extensive control over the state apparatus: between 1973 and 1986, alrnost half of the 1 18 cabinet ministers were mernbers of the m e d forces (the other were supporrers of the regime); 46% of rhe four legislative organs of the dictatorship were military; by August 1986, al1 13 intendants were miIitary officers on active duty as well as 42 out of 50 governon; by August 1986. 63% of the rectors of the eight most important universities were retired officen and 23% were officers in active dury: again. by August 1986. 33% of the heads of diplomatic missions were military; and by June 1986, 38% of the directors of state enterprises were members of the armed forces. in addition. through an extensive use of force orchestrated by the DINA (Direction Nacional de Inteligencia), and later the CNI (Central Nacional de Informaciones), Pinochet sliminated ail threatening opposition as he sought to neutralize civil society. A state of permanent terror was created and justified by a "state of interna1 waf against the 'pervasive" communist rhreat. It would take und die rise of popular protests in 1983 for civilian society to be reactivated. Yet Pinochet, through more repression. managed to secure his position and to impose his wilI on Chilean society. The 1980 constitution. which established a clear process for a transition to an authoritarian dernocracy, would be followed. As a result of the popular protests, politica1 parties re-emesed to the surface of Chilean political life, but they rernained too weak to oppose Pinochet in any significant ways. The opposition realized that it had no other choice but to obey by the rules imposed by Pinochet and to beat him at his own game; which it did in the 1988 plebiscite. (The rise of the opposition will be analysed in the next chapter.) For a more detailed analysis of the rise to power of General Pinochet and the concentration of political power in his han& see: Genaro Amiagada, Pinochet: The Polirics of Power (Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1988), I96pp.. also Arniro Valenniela, " The Milirary in Power: The Consolidation ofone-man rule, * in Paul W Drake and Ivan Jaksic, The Struede for Democracv in Chile (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 199 l), pp. 2 1-73. or example. in 1985 the OAS Repori on the Siluarion of Human Righrs in Chile stated: "The practice of torture has been neither the result of individuai excesses cornrnitted by members of security agencies nor a phenornenon tolerated out of indifference or weakness by other Chilean institutions; on the conuary, torture has been and continues to be a delibente poiicy of the Chilean government canied out during the entire period that began on 1 1 September 1973. Amagada, Op. Cit., p. 25.

to 15.000 persons, and thousands more were imprisoned, tortured. assassinated or d i ~ a ~ ~ e a r e d . ~

Wliereas the concept of stadolatry was necessary to elucidate the shortcomings of Al tende's attempt

at iinplementing his ideological program. it is now vital to illustrate tlie ideological nature of a

" S U C C ~ S S ~ U ~ ' ~ use of state power. The concept of stadolatry serves to Iiigfilight a paiticular aspect of

Chilean politics dunng the dictatorship, tliat is, it permits one to identi@ the ideological nature of

the regime as it sought to impose, through an extensive use of coercion, a particular vision of the

world on civil society.

The reucriona~y pltase

The military intervention arrived as a necessity for capitalism to survive. By 1973, the

Chilean society was ideologically polarized and capitaiism was disintegrating.' As the socialist

alternative proved unabte to construct a new system capable of solving social contradictions, tlie

wliole political system Iost irs legitimacy. "Rightist political movements and parties.

rntrepreneurial associations. some white-collar unions, as well as groups representing both

commercial interests and tliose of srna11 businessn determined that: "the government of Allende

waas incompatible with tlie survival of freedom and private enterprise in Cliile. [and] that the only

way to avoid their extinction was to overthrow the govemment-"8 Accordingly, it was essential to

avoid a civil war wliich would have totally destroyed the existing economic structure. n i e most

favourable alternative envisaged by the upper bourgeoisie and by foreign capital was thus a r n i i i ~ q

coup. It was believed that only a military regime would create the political and institutional

conditions indispensable for the immediate rebuilding of a capitalist socie~y.'

At first, clairning to protect Chilean traditions and institutions. the militaiy sought its

61ames Petras and Fernando ignacio Leiva, Democras, and Povery in Chile: The Limifs ro Elecroraf Polirics (Boulder, Westview Press Inc., 1994), pp. 20-2 1. 'Garreton, Op. Cit., p. 15. 'Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, The Politics of Antipolitics, rhe ~MiIitary in Latin America (Lincoln. University of Nebraska Press, l989), p. 426. 'Gameton, Op. Cit,, p. 38.

legitirnacy in a purety reactionary project. Indeed, "in no case was the construction of a new

political and socioeconomic order presented as the tark of the rni~itary".'~ General Gustavo Leigh.

air force commander and rnember of the junta, declared later that: 'The army had no program, no

plans. nothingn." The military presented itself solely as the saviour of Chiiean traditions and

justitied its action on the basis of the illegitimacy of the Allende government. In Order of the Day

No. 5, revealed to the public immediately after the coup, the junta explained the reasons that led it

to intervene in politics. The two first articles are exaemely revealing:

1. The Allende governent has exceeded the bounds of legitirnacy by violating the fundamental rïghts of liberty, of speech, and of education; the ri@ to congregate, to strike, and to petition; the ri&t to own properey and, in general, the right to a worthy and stable existence; 2. the government has destroyed national unity, encomged sterile and, in many cases, cruel class wranglings, disdained the invaluable hetp which every Chilean could give to preserve the country's welfare, and engendered a blind fratricidal stniggle based on ideas afien to our nationat heritage which have been proven false and ineffective."

Ironically, the military understood its political intervention as its professional duty.I3 By

the late 196O's, the Chilean military was considered one of the most professional in South America.

Faithful to its principles of subordination to civitian authority, adherence to military hierarchy, and

non-intervention in politics, the military had for f o q years categorically refused to set invoived in

politics.'" Yer when the social crisis reached a point where no compromise could be agreed upon

by poIiticians, the military saw its role as one of guarantor of the constitution, and k l t it was its

mission to intervene. In this first reactionary phase, two interrelated ideological elements

- - - - - - - -

"~magada, Op. Cit., p. 5. "Valenzuela, 'The Military in Power: The Consoliciarion ofone-man ntle," Op. Cit., p. 26. "Loveman. Op. Cit., p. 238. "In his thorough analysis of the centralization of power in Pinochet's hands, Arriagada highlighted that Pinochet made use of the m e d forces' professionaiism in a distorted marner. What he called "distorted professionaiism" is essentially the unconditional obedience of the m e d forces to an illegetimate governnent. That is, Pinochet rnanaged to secure the absolute loyalty of the anned forces to his rule. The traditional values of respect for the rnilitary hierarchy, and non-involvernent in politics thus served Pinochet to consolidate his power. See Amagada, Op. Cit., Especially p. 107, 1 1 1,112.

dominated the discoune of the military: the national security doctrine, and ami-cornmunism.

The national security doctrine gave the military a perception of itself as the ultimate trustee

of tlie destiny of the nation as well as the illusion of a political project." At the hem of this

doctrine was the promotion of order and stability which, in turn, was intejrated into the prevailing

military pandigrn dominated by the established discipline of geopolitics.'6 n i e vision of the state

as a living organism allowed tlie military to believe it acted for the common good of the nation. In

Iiis speech for the second anniversary of the military coup in 1975, Pinochet made it clear that

nothing was supenor to the common good of the nation. The whole was necessarily greater than

the sum of its parts.

Human rights, in the measure that they are tmly such, are universal and inviolable. but they are certainly not unrestricted or of equal hieratchy. As outward manifestations of liberty, they are, without exception, subject to the restrictions imposed by the common

17 good.

In order for the national security doctrine to be invoked, there needed to be a profound

crisis. which without a doubt there was, but most importantty, there needed to be an identifiable

tlireat. As tlie military intervention could not be justified by any direcr exremal menace to its

territorial integriîy, communisrn assumed the role of the "cornmon enemy". In his presidential

message of 1976. Pinochet declared that: "Chile has ceased to be an ideological neutral state, as

was advocated by philosophical liberalism, and has resolutely adopted a clear, soi id, and vigorous

d~ctrine."'~ Hence. as the adoption of the national security doctrine achieved unchallenged

dominance within government circles, the component of this doctrine which survived in the long

run was anti-cornmunism. Ten years afier the 1976 presidential message, Pinochet was stiIl

IJ Arriagada, Op. Cit., p. 8 1. ISGarreton, Op. Cit., p. 74. I6Pinochet himself wrote a book on geopolitics in 1968: Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, Geopolitica (Santiago. Editorial Andres Bello, I974), 252pp. "Pinochet, in Loveman, Op. Cit., p. 240. "~rriagada. Op. Cit.. p. 22.

empliasising the theme of anti-comm~nisrn.'~ According to Pinochet cornmunism was a form of

"social cancer" which had to be fought and destroyed. He said:

Communism promotes al1 types of disorder. Material disorder through Street agitations. Economic disorder through demagogic and inflationary pressures. SociaI disorder through constant strikes. Moral disorder by encouraging dmgs, pomography, farnily divisions. Spiritual disorder tfirough cIass hatred- And as an aberrant synthesis of al1 of these. termrisrn arises and ~~reads . '~

But with the 1975 economic crisis, the nationaI security doctrine as well as its anti-communist

component became insuficient to Iegitimize the military regirne. The regime needed to adopt a

real constructive societal project.

The foundational phase

There exists only a subtle distinction between the absence of a foundational project, or a

blueprint for society, and the implicit presence of a 'yet-to-be-articulated" societal project. Indeed,

the reactionary nature of the military intervention was pregnant with a foundational project, but a

project initiaily based on a past vision of the Chiiean society. Indeed, the distinction between

reactionary and revolutionary became bluny as soon as the military sought legitimacy in Chilean

traditions. That is, it did not praise the status quo, but a past social order. What needed to be

protected by the military was not the dernocratic process, but conservative values respecting the

farnily, order. authority, and private propcrty. The reconstmction of the old order could not simply

be a reconstruction, for the old order was an ideal present in the Chilean memory of 19th cenniry

Chilean society and the authoritarianism of Diego portales." Hence, there was only a small step to

be made behveen reacting to the degeneration of Chilean society and deciding to reshape the whole

of society in a revolutionary manner.

What this means is that ChiIe had gone wrong somewhere along the way, and that society

19 Ibid., p. 25-26. 'O~inochet. 'Discurso en el Tercer Anivenario del Gobiemo. 1 1 Septiembre, t 976," in Amagada Op. Cit-, p. 24. "Gameton, Op. Cit., pp. 143-144.

Iiad to be revotutionized. As early ris October 1973. the junta deciared in the Drclaracibrr de

principios del Go bierno de Chile:

The armed forces and the forces of order are not sening a fixed term for the conduct of their government because the task of moral. institutional. and material reconstmction of the c o u n q requires profound and prolonged action. In definitive terms, it is

? 7 impentive to change the menmlity of Chileans.--

It added that its mission was:

reconstnicting the country monlly and rnaterially towards economic development and sociai justice. giving life to new intitutional forms which would permit the reestablishment of a modem democracy deansed of the vices that favored the actions of its e n e m i e ~ . ~

Distrusrful of democracy. the rnilitary regime blamed the crisis essentially on "politics" and

" politicians who had betrayed the nation. engaged in demagogy, and allowed Soviet-inspired

Marxists to gain control of the Chilean state"." mie military's reaction to the crisis implied thar the

democtritic process liad to be purged of its deficiencies. The creation of an "autlioritarian

democntic regirne" was considered essential to the stability of Chilean society. Therefore. the

irony of the reactionary attempt at protecting Chilean traditions and institutions by the milita- was

that within this reactionary project was an implicit foundational projecr. Tlie military considered

itself a necessary histoncal interlude to build the future authontarian political order."

Tlie rnilitary saw the integration into the govemment of the Chicago ~ o y s ' ~ as a measure to

establish society on strong smctural grounds. Indeed, whereas the national security doctrine was

.-, --&-riagada. Op. Cit., p. 12. "Valenzuela. 'The Military in Power: The Consolidation of one-man nile." Op. Cit.. p. 28. "Loveman, Op. Cit.. p. 427. "~ r ru ro Valenzuela, "Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentiafisrn in Chile: A Proposa1 for a Parliamentary Forrn of Government," in Juan Linz and Amro Valenzuela, The Failtire of Presidentiai Dernocracy (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 166. Also Garreton. Op. Cit., p. 98. 'me narne 'Chicago Boysw was given to the Chilean students who went to study under Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger at the Economics Deparnent of the University of Chicago. It is also given to their followers at the Cathoiic University of Chile. In the context of this tfiesis, the name "Chicago Boys" is used only as a descriptive term serving to identify a particular group of important social actors in Chilean politics. it shouid be noted that no polemical intention or negative connotation underiy the use of this name.

inadequate as an ovenll ideology of legitirnation or as a political project with a specific program,'7

the Chicago Boys presented the government with a coherent program of r e m s which easily

merged into a conscrvative view of society.

The expectation of Chile's miiitary rulers was that a dictatorial interlude of indeteminate length would forge a wholly diferent country. Market forces and an open, export-onented econorny would unleash entrepreneuriai skiIls and boost production and economic growth. In the political arena, Chile would become a society of loyal and obedient subjects, no longer nven by class or ideo log."

The history of the Chicago Boys is extremely revealing- In order to truly appreciate the

impact they had on ChiIe, it is paramount to examine the ideological context of their insertion into

the country. The establishment of the Chicago School in Chile represents a deliberate process of

ideological transfer." What became known as the "Chile Projectn was an expenence rooted in the

purest Enlightenment phiIosophical tradition embodied in its latest theoretical form: the

Modernizacion theory. It was believed that, if presented with adequate knowiedge. the

underdeveloped nations would eventuaIly foliow in the footsteps of the developed countries and

reach the ranks of modern States. Emerging from World War II as the greatest world power and the

most forcehl representative of capitalism and democracy, the United States saw it as its

responsibility (which was also in its interests) to promote the development of "Third World

countries". In 1950, the US Congress announced, in the Act of International Development. that:

it is declared to be the policy of the United States to aid the efforts of econornically underdeveioped areas to develop their resources and improve their working and living conditions by encouras& the exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of investment capital.30

The basic assumption was that the international transfer of knowledge would lead to the

inescapable bettement of the living conditions of the poorer countries. This. in tum, was

"Garreton, Op. Cit., p. 76. :aValenmela, "Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialisrn in Chiie," p. 166. "See Valdés, Op. Cit., pp.48-5 1.

ideologically supponed by the perceptioii tliat the United States was a 'unique combination of

rconomic power. intellectual and pnctical pnius. and moral rigoor"".

To use a more generic term which pemits tlie integration of a Sreat variety of

developmental theories sharing the same belief in universal knowledg and progress, the 'ideology

of developrnentalisrn" also called for the end of ideology.j2 The marc11 towards the 'Good societyn

was seen as the ntionalization process of politics. Hence. "democratic progress" was understood as

emanating from 'the application of science to human affairs."" Once adequate knowledp was

made available to the local elites of an underdeveloped country, it was assumed that al1

contradictions could easily be resolved. In that contexf the United States' pluralist type of

democncy, wh ic h was considered the highest human ach ievement in terms of political govemment.

had to be exponed to the world. and especially to Latin America wliere class politics polanzed

societies and impeded tlieir development. But before this was possible, Larin America had to adopt

a capital ist developmental model which, it was supposed, would inescapably lead to democncy.

Iiideed. since bot11 capitalism and democncy are theoretically founded on individual freedom,

democracy was considered the political system that naturally ensured the proper working of tlie

capital k t mode of production.''

'Ohid.. p. 83. "Michael Kent O'Leary (1967) in Valdés, Op. Cit., p. 85. "What is important here is not to identiQ the technical differences between cornpeting development theories. but to appreciate their epistemological pretension, that is, their believe in unidirectional progress. The expression "ideology of deveIopmentalisrnn, borrowed tom Susanne j. Bodenheimer, serves to single out the Enli~htenment beIief that univenal knowIedge is possible and that it frees human beings fiom al1 foms of determinisrn. See Susanne .J. Bodenheimer, "The Ideo logy of Developmen ta1 km: American Polit ka1 Science's Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies." Berkelq Journal ofSocîoiogy 15 ( 1 970): pp.95- 137. 3'Bodenheimer. Op. Cit., p. 110. 3'For a thorough discussion on the relation benveen capitalism and democracy. see Atilio Boron. Atilio Boron. State, Capitalism and Democracy in Larin rimerieu, (London, Lynn Rienner Publishers. t 995),262pp. Boron aryes, using the case examples of South Korea Taiwan, the Philippines, Iran and Brazil, that the coexistence of dernocncy and capitalisrn is unlikely and conflictive at both theoretical and pnctical levels. See especially pp. 24-27. For a discussion on the market and individual tieedom. see section: "An Idealized Reconstruction of the Market*, pp. 35-42.

Thus. once the fundamental problems of indusa-ialization have been solved. as the continuum theory assumes they will be. the ideological politics which have made instability chronic in Latin Arnenca can be replaced by a "rational". consensusdirected politics in which technical solutions may be devised for hitheno po titical problems, and in which the nature of politics itself wiIl be ~ransformed.'~

In Chile, this was precisely the aim of the military regirne, that is, to undertake profound stmctural

transformations in order to rid society of ideological politics and establish a "new democracy*. A

discussion on Chilean democracy is integrated in chapter 4; for the moment, in the context of the

dictatorship, it is paramount to look at the ideological basis for the stmctunl revolution camed out

by the Chicago Boys in order to identifi the historical roots of the end of ideology thesis in Chile.

The introduction in Chile of Chicago-like economics were seen as necessary to counter the

influence of Marxism. but most importantly to offset the influence of Keynes and Prebisch who

favoured a statist approach to econornics. The scientificism of the Chicaeo Scliool of economics

was to oppose the ideologically minded lefiist theories prevailing in the Chilean business and

oovernment circles. For example, it was argued that only a scientific approach to economics could - salve Cliile's problem of rampant inflation which Keynesian-type of economics systematically

amplified.'6 Senator William Benton clearly expressed this need to counter leftist economics in

One observer reported to us that a grave problem in Chile has been posed by the Mamist, lefiwing oriented economists who have corne t?om the university econornics departments and who have infiltrated into the Chilean government and economy. Another close srudent of Latin America reports that University of Chile economists have been followers of Keynes and Prebisch more than of Marx, and thar the Chicago influence at the Catholic University will introduce a third basic viewpoint, that of conternporary 'market economics". Ail these reports show the importance of University trziinin~ applied to a country's political as well as its

. - .- - . - - - . - - -. . . - -

"~odenheimer, Op. Cit., p. 108. 36 See Valdés, Op. Cit., pp. 105-108. For a historical discussion on the decline of Keynesianisrn, see James W. Dean, 'The Dissolution of the Keynesian Consensus." in Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol (eds.), The Crisis in Economic Theory, O\lew York, Basic Books. 198 t), p. 38.

econornic orientation.''

At the basis of the "Cliile Project" was the "human capital thesis" which was most

forcefully articulated by Chicago professor T.W. Schultz It was believed that by inuoducing into

Cliile's acridernic circles economists im bued with the values of American economics, the

destructive influence of socialist tendencies could be reversed. According to the Chicago Reporrs.

the hypothesis leading to tlie agreement signed in 1955 behveen the Universidad Catolica and

Chicago University by which chosen Chilean students would pursue graduate studies at the

Cliicago University depanment of economics was nvofold: first tlie scientific and professional

training offered at Cliicago University would necessarily put into obsolescence certain ideas

prevaiIing in Chilean society, which were seen as prejudices resulting from ignorance or

"ideologyn: second, it was assumed that the application of scientific principles in policy making

would stimulate development."

As explained in cliapter 1. applied objective principles are most likely to be resulting frorn

some form of subjective appreciation of any situation. The passage frorn objectivity to subjectivity

is a subtle transfer between passivity and ac t iv i~ . Once a scientific observation becomes a

"scientific nom", it is still at the origin an objective fact. but an objective k t loaded with a

subjective intention; that is, it values a certain form of behaviour. In the case of the Chicago

attempt at introducing "objectivity" into the Cliilean policy making apparatus, moral incentives

were obvious.

Chicago oconomics is a "normative sciencen, that is. an ideas system whose interna1 articulation attempts no demarcation of its scientific elements from its nonnative mIes and politicaI precepts. The second is that "Chicagon carries with it an artirudej%arnervork of knowledge. a conception of rhe economisr a "a radical reformer: or a partern of ~optilar artitrrdes" which had ro be comidered as the vanguard of %conornic penerrarion" into

"Senator William Benton, The Voice of Latin .-lrnerica (New York, Encyclopaedia Britannica. 196 1 ), p. 16 1. ''Valdés, Op. Cit,, p. 128.

political rhought. (original e~n~has i s ) ' ~

Fol lowing the agreement benveen the Catholic University and the Econom ics Department

of Chicago University, more than 150 Chileans went to Chicago to study under Miiton Friedman

and Arnold Harberçer (as iioted previously, the name "Chicago Boysn was later given to these

students and their f o ~ l o w e r s ) . ~ ~ The "Chile Project" was tinanced rnainly by the Ford Foundation,

USAID, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Organization of Amencan tat tes." These snidents,

recruited mainly from the upper class, and who were drawn from conservative ideological

backgrounds, would retum to Chile to becorne the organic intellectuals of the military regime.'*

Upon their return to Cliile. the Chicago Boys did not acquire instant hegemony. On the contrary,

prior to the military coup, both the governrnent and the business community were hostile to the

radical free morket ideas promoted by the Chicago Boys. [ndeed, the business community had for a

long time benefited from state intervention in the economy and was highly sceptical about the

stabilizing capacities of the "invisible har~d".~' Moreover, the idea of an "economic science"

equivalent to the exact sciences was totally foreign to Chilean society."

'9[bid.. p. 63. W il liam Robinson, Promoring Pobarchy: Globalkarion. US lnrervenrion and Hegernorty (Cam brîdge,

Cam bridge University Press. 1 W6), p. 165- 166. "Valdés, Op. Cit., p. 186. "~obinson, Op. Cit., pp. 165-166. For details on the recminnent ofthe Chicago Boys and their funding by the US agency AID (Agency for international Development), see Parnela Constable and Arturo VaIenzuela, -4 Nurion of E m i a : Chife Under Pinochet(New York, W.W. Norton, 1991), p. 166-168. "'Collier and Sater, Op. Cit, p. 365. Also, lavier Martintz and Alvaro Diaz, Chife: The Great Tranrformation (Geneva The United Nations Research [nstitute for Social Development, IMRISD, 1996), pp. 86-87. uvaldés, Op. Cit, p. 6. David Hojman, on the other side, argued that the ideas promoted by the Chicaso Boys had been present in Chilean history since the colonial times. To make his claim, Hojman affmed that expott- Ied growth has always been an important part of Chilean econornic policy and that the project of capitalist modemization of Frei's government coincided with that of the Chicago Boys. While it is me that capitalisrn has been present in Chile probably since colonization, the ideas of economics as a scientific discipline was definitely new. As they sought to re-organize society along technocratic lines, the Chicago Boys rniiy revolutionized the country. As Martinez and Diaz explained, it was certainly not a bourgeois revolution, but obvioudy a capitalist one. See David E. Hojman. Chile: The Political Economy of Development and Democraq in the 1990 Ir (London, n i e MacMillan Press Ltd., 1993), p. 26. Also lavier Martinet and Alvaro D i a Chile: The Great Transformation (Geneva. The United Nations Research Institute for Sociai Development, 1 W6), p. 1.

As seen in chapter i . the organic intektual is defined according to his organizational

activity. In tliat sense. the Chicago Boys were organic intellectuals of the international capitalist

class as tliey aniculated ideas consistent with the interests of that class (notably the opening of the

national market to the global market forces). The international capitalist class is that particular

class wliicli interests transcend national boundaries according to the logics of capital accumulation.

Yet in the context of the military regime, the Chicago Boys became the true organic inteHectuats of

the Chilean capitalist class as they sought, in accordance with the rnilitary, to restructure Chilean

society on the basis of a pure market economy. Since the interests of the rnilitary and those of the

capitalist class merged into one particular societal project, the Chicago Boys were at the same time

the organic intellectuals of bot11 the military and the capitalist class. The transfer of ideas to which

tliey participated sought to harmonize the interests of the Chilean capitalist class as it elevated i ts

conciousness to a class-conciousness in confonnity with the interests of the international capitalist

c~ass.~'

The organic link beween foreign capital and local capital was established when the

Xgustin Edwards Group. one of the most important entrepreneurial groups in Chile, saw the

Chicago Boys as a vanguard in economic poli~y.46 Concerned by the iack of ideas in rightwing

sectors. the Edwards Group enabled the Chicago Boys to becorne true organic intellecmals by

providin; them with an infnstnicture and a nebvork of connections necessary for the diffusion of

their ideas." As a result, beside the Chicago Boys' impressive control over the economic

department of the Catholic University, the Centre for Social and Economic Studies (CESEC) was

'S~etras and Leiva argue that the economic program elaborated by the Chicago Boys and adopted by the rnilitary reghe was in accordance with the international capitalist ciass and its neoliberal agenda as formulated by the econornists at the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the WorId Bank. See James Petras and Fernando Ignacio Leiva, Democracy and Poverfy in Chile: The Limits of Electoral Politics, pp.2 1- 23. "For more details on the private economic conglomerates (gremios), see Martinez and Diaz, Op., Cit, pp.76- 8 1, and pp. 87-94. "valdés. Op. Cit.. p. 225-

created. and links established with the press, notably with the newspaper Ei i~ercu~iib.'~ The

Cliicnp Boys also becme economic advisors to business organizations such as SOFOFA

(Sociedad de Fomento ~ a b r i l ) . ' ~

In terrns of the Chicago Boys' relation to politics, they totally abhored politicians and

ideological pol itics. Hence, they wholeheartedIy despised Allende's regime which represented al1

tliey condemned, notably a statist approach to economics and an unscientific understanding of

politics. In a pure Grarnscian way, as CESEC was formally closed during Allende's regime due to

Agustin Edwards' departure to the United States (Allende's socialist policies were in direct conflict

with his interests), some of its members, sponsored by SOFOFA, went underground in order to

prepare a new economic program for the new government.50 The economic cnsis provoked by

Allende's socialist economic policies were seen as a threat to freedom and private property.

Consequently, the Chicago Boys believed that the onIy solution to Save the country from

catastrophe was to ovenhrow the govemment.s'

Sectors of the Centre and of the Right, who were previously opposed, realized that the tirne

Iiad passed when rnere disagreement on economic policies was the mie, the crisis was so

fundamental that the economic principles underlying societyJs structural organization had to be

defended." In this context of growing discontent towards Allende's government, the Chicago

Boys. who until then had been marginalized, imposed themselves as eminent political figures.

However, it is only when Pinochet decided to include them in his cabinet that the Chicago Boys

tmly became influential figures at the national level. As a matter of fact, the expertise of the

'*Hojman noted that, since the 19501s, the Chicago Boys had the suppon of the grupo Edwards, owners of the newspaper El mercurio. Hojman, Op. Cit., p. 26. '9For more details on the links behveen the Chicago Boys and the business cIass, see Philip O'Brien, "The New Leviathan: The Chicago School and the Chilean Regime, 1973-1980," Bulletin of The Imiiute of Developmenr Studies, Vol 13 (no 1 , 198i), pp. 38-50. '"etras and Leiva op. Cit., p.41. Note 10. AIso Constable and Valenmela, Op. Cit, pp. I66ff.

Op. Cit., p. 247-252. "lbid.. p. 244-245.

Chicago Boys truiy impressed Pinochet and his advisers. A former minister noted thah in a

meeting with tlie junta, tlie Cliicago Boys dazzled the members with their technical brilliance. The

iniiiister said: "n ie economic team made the rest of us feel like insectsn.j3 Moreover. as the

national security doctrine \vas losing its legitimating force, the military govemment realized that a

true social project had to be adopted. Hence, the neoliberal project became the blueprint of the

rnilitary reçirne. By 1975, the Chicago Boys, foming the govemrnenr's new "economic teamn, had

gained control over ODEPLAN. the state planning office. and led the way to the country's capitalist

restru~tuntion.'~

The logic of their economic model corresponded highly with the military's views on

society, especially tlieir emphasis on the cornmon good, their opposition to Marxism, and their

Iiostility towards the politics of patronage and populists appeals.5s According to the newspaper EI

.bferczvio. the rnilitary was charged with ensuring "order, security and confidence" whiIe the

economists provided "the new ideas needed to lifi Chile from its current dejection and to tiberate

tlie energy needed to begin the swift coune towards econornic growth."56 Distrustful of politics.

Pinochet considered the introduction into the govemment of a technocratie team relatively

autonomous from social pressures. Iike the Chicago Boys, to be an eficient measure to strenghten

the autonomy of the state acton in their task of radically restructuring Chilean society."

To sum up, Pinochet was led to adopt the neolibenl model for a variety of reasons: first, it

espressed the interests of the capitalist class. especially the financial sector (centrality of private

property and free entreprise); second, in order to boost economic recovery as well as control

"~alenzuela " The Military in Power: The Consolidation of one-man d e . " Op. Cit., p. 56. "~rriagada, Op. Cit., p. 19-20. For a list of the Chicago Boys who occupied key positions during the military government see Patricio Silva, "Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Mon ks." in Paul W. Drake, ed.. :tfonw Dociors. Foreign Debrs. and Economic Reforms in Latin Americafrom the 1890 5 to the Presenr (Wilrnington, Scholarly Resources Inc., I994), Table 1, p. 210. "Valenzuelri. "The Militas, in Power: The Consolidation of one-man nile," Op. Cit., p. 56 'bEI Mer-curio. "La Sernana Politiccl" 23 July 1978. In Valdés, Op. Cit., p. 28. "Valenzuela. " The Military in Power: The Consolidation of one-man rule." Op. Cit., p. 58.

society, the mediation of a technocntic group \vas seen as vital; third. sectoral interests could be

bener accomodated by a scientific and univeml logic: fourth, the infiow of private international

capital could be secured by the arbitntion of a technocratic group who promoted the "general

interest"; and lasrly, neoliberalisrn permined the destructionof ideological politics by creating a

new s o ~ i e t ~ . ' ~ Likewise, the Chicago Boys entirely suscnbed to the military politica agenda. Pablo

Baranoa described the fù ture democracy :

The new democracy, imbued with me nationalisrn, will have to be authoritarian, in the sense that the rules needed for the systern's stabitity cannot be subject to political processes, and that compliance with these measures c m be guaranteed by our armed forces; impersonal, in the sense that the regulations apply equally to everyone; libertarian in the sense that subsidiarity is an essential principle for achieving the common go04 technifieci, in the sense that political bodies should not decide technical issues but restrict themselves to evaluating results, leaving to the technocracy the responsability of using logical procedures for resolving problems or offering alternative s~lutions.'~

The revolutionary nature of the Chicago BoysJ ideas was merely a consequence of the

Chilean context. Indeed, these ideas are inscribed in the purest epistemological liberal tradition

(see cliapter 1). The term neoliberalism essentiaily marks a return to the classicai economic

doctrine of Adam Smith. Nevertheless, the context in which these ideas were introduced shaped

the very ideological nature of the regime. Chi te became a "laboratory" for neoliberalism. Indeed,

Chile was the first country in South Arnerica to adopt a neoliberal structura1 adjustrnent and

stabilization p r o - m - Moreover, as it anticipated by ten years the great transformations introduced

by Thatcher and Reagan in Great Britain and in the ünited States, nowliere was the neoliberal

prognrn adopted "so completely and with as much doctrinal purity".w

The aim of the Chicago Boys and the military regime was to create "new citizensn who

wouid be sanitized from past ideologies and who would be more like consumers than political

' 8 Garreton, Op. Cit., p. 124. 59 Pablo Bannoa, Direccibn de presupuesro, 1978, p. 305. in Valdés, Op. Cit., p. 33. 'fipetras and Leiva, Op. Cit.. p. 2 1.

in i li tanu.'" Once again, the Chicago Boys considered that science should be absolutely dominant

over ideologies, and that politicians should be replaced by economists in order to systematically

discard value judgements frorn the policy making process. These neolibeni ideas had no

antecedent in the Chilean history. As a matter of fact, in its insistance on science and free market

suc11 an economic prognm Iiad never appeared in the development programs presented by political

parties: it also drastically differed t'rom the capitalist class and rightwing ideologies of the past.6'

In its purest doctrinal form, Chilean neoliberalism reached back to Adam Smith's

unconditional belief in the liberating force of the market Accordingly, only the market could

cnsure freedom. and freedom was possible because the market ~o rked .~ ' This implied three

features: "( I ) the private ownership of capital and productive assets; (2) the private management of

eccoiiomic enterprise: (3) and competitive enterprisen? In a sense. Friedman's book, Copit~iisnt

tard Freedom. a modem adaptation of Smith's economic theory, served as the blueprint for the

Chicago Boys' economic model. In that book, Friedman argued that competitive capitalism also

prornoted po iitical freedom precisel y because econom ic power was separated frorn po litical

power."' Accordin: ro Friedman, the market is the source of freedom wliereas the state is

totalitarian and infringes on individual liberties. Hence. the state should be reduced to a sort of

"veilleur de nuit" whicli makes sure that the system keeps working and that everybody follows the

mies of the grime. Friedman established that:

a government which rnaintained law an order, defined property rights, served as a means whereby we could modiQ property rights and other rules of the economic game, adjudicated disputes about the interpretation of the d e s . enforced contracts, promoted cornpetition. provided a rnonetary Framework, enga;ed in

"'Valenzuela. ' The Militas, in Power: The Consolidation ofone-man mie." Op. Cit.. p. 57. " ~ a l d ~ . Op. Cit.. p. 13. Also Martinez and Di= Op. Cit., p. i. "For a discussion on individual fieedom and the market, see Boron , op. Cit.. pp. 35-42. "Valdés. Op. Cit., p. 69. See also Ezra J. Mishan, 'The Folklore of the Market: An Inquiry into the Economic Doctrine of the Chicago School," in Warren J. Sarnuels (eds.), The Chicago School of Political Economy (University Park, Association for Evolutionary Econornics, 1976). pp. 95-97. or or on. Op. Cit.. p.6.

activities to counter techiml monopolies and to overcome neigh bottiood e ffects widely regarded as su ficiently important to justiQ govemment intervention, and which supplemented private chariry and the pnvate famiiy in protecting the irresponsible, wfiether madman or child - such a govemment would cleariy have important hnctions to perform. The consistent liberal is not an anarchist, 66

Ironically, in Chile, in order for the state to become a true "veilleur de nuit" under a "new

authoritarian democncy". a true neoliberal revolution had to be pursued under the tight control of a

dictatonhip!' The Chicazo Boys identified hvo phases on the road to the creation of a neoliberal

society: the fim was an authoritarian phase creating the basis for a prosperous market economy,

and the second would be a penanent one corresponding to the construction of a stable democracy

"supponed by pragrnatic citizens, fully satisfied and devoted to their own personal success and

enrichment"." The distinction behveen economic liberalism and political liberalism became

apparent as the priority was given to economic liberalism. Political liberalism, which was

coiiceived as a simple set of rules regulating free cornpetition amongst individuais, was postponed

to a later stage of Chile's political development.

The economic mode1 established by the Chicago Boys in Chile was characterized by the:

"liberalization of the price system and the market; an open regirne on foreign trade and externai

financing operations; and reduced government involvernent in the econ~rn~ . ' "~ The main

objectives of the military regime were: (1) to reduce the magnitude of the public sector by

drastically cuttins state spending; (2) to rely on monetarist policies to minimize the state's

*MiIton Friedman, Capitalisrn and Freedom, in Boron, Op. Cit., p. 4 1. "'The irony rem on the neoliberal conception of the state's Iimited roIe in the economy and on the necessity for the state to create in Chile a social, political and economic environment enabiing the state to renounce involvement in economics. In that sense, the state was required to proceed to the neoiiberal adjustments advocated by the economic tearn. The military saw its role precisely as one of reconsûucting the country which had fallen victim of the Mmis t "heresy". For a discussion on neoliberalism and the role of the state, see Boron. Op. Cit., Section "The State as Scapesoat," pp. 169-174. " s ~ l e x E FernAndez Jilberto, "Chile: The Laboratory Experiment of international Neo-Liberalism," In Henk Overbeck. Restnrctzrring Hegemony in the Global Poiitical Economy: the Rise of Transnational ma- liberalism in the 1980 f (New York. The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999, p. 72.

regulatory influence: and (3) to teminate the state's direct involvement in production as a social

agent responsible for promoting development through a large-scale privatization of the means of

production.'0 In addition, the Chilean economy was to be totally opened to the workings of global

capital. In that sense. national production had to be reoriented towards the worid market and export

agriculture." Finally, al1 these structural adjustments required the brutal pression of the working

class and its ~r~anizations.~'

[t has been said that the implementation of the neolibenl mode1 in Chile led to an

economic "miraclen behveen the years 1978 and 198 1. This perceived miracle created by the

structural transformations of the Cliicago Boys has been highIy pnised by the international

community. Export-led growth provoked impressive rates of growth in overall production.

especially in nontraditionai e'tports. Growing at an annual rate surpassing 10 per cent, exports in

rliis sector accounted for 32 per cent, over four years, of the overall growth. In addition, the

economy g e w at an average 6.6 per cent per annurn behveen 1976 and 1980.'~ However. as was

lacer sliown by the severe economic crisis of 1952, this "miracle" rested on an illusion created by

Iiigli growth and low inflation (carefully controlled by rnonetary policies). In fact. high interest

rates. speculation. and the accumulation of an enourmous public and private debt undermined the

wliole economic strucrure."l Moreover, an analysis of the GDP during the military dictatorship

demontrates that the GDP grew in reality at an average of 0.1- 0.2 per cent per year compared to an

average 1.8-2.0 percent in the 1960's. "For the entire pendod of military rule (1974- 1989) only five

33 El Merclrrio (28 March 1983), in Valdés, Op. Cit., p. 3 I . 'valdés, Op. Cit., p. 23. For an overlook of the snuctural changes implemented by the Chicago Boys, see Table I . p. 22. Also Peuas and Leiva, Op. Cit., Table 3.1, p. 22. 7 1 Petras and Leiva, Op. Cit., p. 17. :Sec Alan Angell, "Unions and Worken in Chile during the 19801s," in Drake and laksic, Op. Cit., pp.188- 189. Also see John Dinges, "The Rise of the Opposition," IVACLA Report on the Americas, Vol XVIi (no 5, September/October 1983), pp.22-24. "These statistics are taken frorn Petras and Leiva, Op. cit., p. 27. "Ibid.

Latin American countries had a worse record,"ï5

The economic transformations did not have the same impact on al1 sectors of sociey. In

fact. the poorest sectors suffered a much more drastic deprivation under the militas. regime than

other sectors of the sociery. Two phenomena serve to explain the funher impovenshment of the

popular sectors: the monopolization and the de-industrialization of Chile. The massive

privatizations'6 of the military regime (while there were 533 state enterprises in existence in 1973,

only nvelve remained in 198 1)" led to an increasing monopolization of capital in the han& of the

so-called "economic groups". By the end of 1978, these groups "controlled the Iargest 250 firms in

the country, 82 per cent of bank loans and 64 per cent of loans made by non-banking int i~t ions".~~

Likewise, the uncontrolIed opening up to the international market and the reduction in the public

sector engendered a process of de-industrialization in Chile. In 1980, "the industrial working class

accounted for 16 per cent less of the economically active population that it had in 1952 and 18.7 per

cent less tlian it had in 1960".'~

But more importantly, the rnilitôry policy of repressing the labour force in order to secure

macroeconornic stability provoked a grave deterioration in the conditions of living of the workers.

and a widening of the gap behveen the rich and the poor. In the years following the military coup,

the unions suffered from severe labour legislation, brutal repression, and high levels of

~nern~loyment .~~ The state benefited essentially fiom a "superexploitation" of the labour force. that

is, unions were repressed and salaries kept under their market value. The system was able to profit

from an enormous "reserve army of workers" without capital having to pay for the ful l costs of its

"1bid.. p. 32. ' m e most notorious privatizations were those of retirement funds and health insurance. "Fernando Jilberto, Op. Cit.. p. 62. ?'lbid., p. 67. 79~bid., p. 64. BO Alan Angell, "Unions and Workers in Chile during the 1980'sw, in Drake and Jaksic, Op. Cit., p. 188.

reproduction.s' Nor was the state required to bear the costs of "labour reproductionn: by 1980. the

scate Iiad reduced its spending on liealth by 17.6 per cent compared to 1970: education's budget had

bern cut by I 1.3 per cent: and the salaries had decreased by 16.7 per cent? While 3 . 5 per cent

Cliileans lived in poverp in 1969, by 1989. 42 per cent were considered to be living in Foverty."

in terms of consumption, the richest 5 per cent of households increased their share from 44.5 per

cent in 1970 to 5 1 percent in 1980 to reach 54.6 per cent in 1989. At the same tirne, the poorest 30

per cent of the population saw their share of consumption decrease fiom 7.6 per cent in 1970 to 4.4

per cent in 1989."

To conclude this chapter, the 1982 economic crisis forced a shift in economic orientation

on tlie pan of the military regime from a sbcalled "radical neoliberalism" to a "pragmatic

neoliberalism". According to the Chicago Boys. the crisis was to be short-lived: tlius it was

unsound for tlie state to intervene. The market forces would eventually re-stabilize the system. Yet

tliis long-lasting crisis proved the Chicago Boys wrong in their dogmatic belief in the automatic

regiilatory forces of the market. Consequently, the aggravation of the crisis and the rise of social

protests i i i 1983 allowed the "pragmatic capitalists". organized by the Confederation of Production

and Commerce. to gain control over economic policy making. thus discardine the radical Chicago

Boys. Tlie adoption on the pan of the military regirne o f a more flexible neoliberalism was pan of

a double-stmtegy: to manage the economic crisis fin but also to divide the political opposition by

creating a favounble electoral environment in prepantion for the upcoming 1988 plebiscite. "That

meant less zeal in the application of onhodox stabilization and a sensitivity to sectoral needs, within

3 I Petras and Lçiva, Op. Cit., p. 36-38- aldé dés. Op. Cit., p. 26. 33Carhy Schneider. "Chile: The Underside of the Miracle," NACL4 Report on the Americas XXVI (no 4. February 1993), p. 30. Pilar Vergara's statistics slightly differ from those of Schneider. According to her. 44 per cent of the population lived in poveny by 1989. Pilar Vegan, 'In Pursuit of 'Gmwth with Equity,' The Limits of Free-,Market Social Reforms," NACU Report on the .-fmericas. Vol XXiX (no 6, May/June 1996). p. 37. ''Perm and Leiva Op. Cit., p. 34.

the confines of a free-market e c ~ n o m ~ . " ' ~ The next chapter deals essentially with the rise of the

opposition and the transition to democracy. Hence, this shifi From radicalisrn to pragmatism, which

was integrated into the ethicd approach of president Aylwin, the fint elected president since the

military coup, wiII be further anatysed.

gS~duardo Silva, 'The Political Economy of Chile's Regime Transition: From Radical to 'Pragmatic" Neo- Iibenl Policies," in Drake and Jaksic, Op. Cit., p. 1 17.

CHAPTER 4

TRANSITION TO DEMOCMCY: TOWARDS HEGEMONY

"How c m wealth persuade poverty to use its political freedom to keep wealth in power?" George Novack. Dernocracv and Revolution.

On the 9th of July 1977, Pinochet announced, for the fim tirne, a political project airning nt

restmcturing Chilean political institutions. Yet it took three years after the so-called "Chacarillas

speech" for the military regirne to sketch out a complete msition process to an "authoritarian

democncy". As a result the 1980 constitution, adopted through a deceptive plebiscite, served as a

political blueprint for the military rejirne to legitimize its rule, thus complementing the neoliberal

econornic model.' Following the victory of the "No" in the 1988 plebiscite and the inauguration of

a first democratic government afier seventeen years of rnilitary regime, a new balance between

hegemony and coercion bas been attained in Chile. Since a consensus on the fundamentals of a free

market economy and a democratic process has been reached among the political elites. it has been

said tliat a shifi to political pragmatisrn has pmvoked the end of ideological politics in Chile. Yet

this very political consensus. that is, pragmatic neoliberalism, must be considered an ideology in a

Gnmscian sense. The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate how the hegemony of

neoliberalism was secured through elite accomodation. Moreover. this chapter aims at showing

Iiow the organic crisis provoked by the rise of popular expectations in the late 1960's was finally

"solved" by the creation of a new, though still fragile, historical bloc. In order to appreciate the

ideological nature of this new historical bloc, it is paramount to examine the rise of the opposition

to the military regime in relation to the role played by the capitalkt class, the intellectuals, the

masses and the political parties, as well as to analyse the nature of the new dernocracy.

'Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile. 1808-1994 (New York, Carnbridse University Press, 1996), p. 364.

TJw t-ise of rhe opposirioir

Surprisinç al1 sectors of society, spontaneous social protests emerged in May 1983.

Originally planned as a strike by the CUT (Copper Worken Union). this wave of protesrs initiated

by tlie copper workers provoked a new form of social mobilization whicIi. for the fim tirne.

tlireatened the stability of the mi l i t q regime. These peaceful demonstntions of social discontent

took the form of "National Days of Protests" which aimed essentially at pressuring the government

to abdicate power. As the opposition to the rn i l i tay regirne gained momentum. great optimism

arose among the population. During those peacehll Street manifestations, people tirelessly chanted

"Y va a mer! Y va a caer!" (And he is going to fall!).' The opposition sincerely believed tliar the

mil itary regime would eventually collapse, and hat democracy would be estabtished.

But the dicratorship did not collapse and Pinochet responded with increased repression.

The military bluntly reaffirmed that the transition process established by tlie 1980 constitution

would be strictly respected. and that no precipitated transition to democracy would be accepted.'

As a result. by September 1983, protests became highly sectoralized. that is. no clear strategy could

iini- tlie whoIe of society. As the city's marginal groups gained ascendency over the protest

rnovernent. the middle class began to disappear from the mobilization. "Tliat ... clearly marked the

stnteg's failure as a national strategy of democratic ~onstruction.''~ However, while tliese protests

did not succeed in bringing down the rnilitary regime or, for that maîter, create a tme social

movernent based on a concrete social project, they did make sorne siginificant political advances.

Indeed. "by losing its fear of the regime, the opposition passed a psychological milestone that was

'Luis Marcinel a resident of Quilicura, a poor cornmunity of Santiago, told me that these times were ones of great hope. Every evening, the people would bang pots, make al1 kinds of noise. and sing rebel songs to demonsnte their opposition to the rnilitary regime. 'The 1980 constirution must be understood as an attempt by the military to 1e;itimize its mle. Accordins to the constitution, a plebiscite wodd be held in 1988 and would initiate a transition to an authorirarian fom of democncy. Then, people would decide benveen the continuation of military rule for eight more yean or the immediate transition to a "democratic regimen through elections a year later. 'Javier Martinez in Je e e y M. Puryear, Thinking Politics: lntellectuals and Democracy in Chile, 19 73- /988

cssential for successhl confrontations later on. It also established zones of autonomy, in t ems of

public expression and political activity, that the regime was never able to completely revoke.*' In

addition, it allowed for the political parties to reintegrate Chilean political life as important social

acton. This necvly obtained autonomy gave the parties the "political space" to begin ''the process of

talks across party lines that would culminate in the Concenacion of 1988,"~ and the victory of the

"No" on 5 October which initiated the transition to democracy.'

According to Manuel Antonio Garreton, the evolution of Cliilean opposition to the

dictatorship constituted a fonn of learning process about the stntegy to adopt to terminate the

8 military regime. This process led the opposition to accept the inevitability of the 1988 piebiscite

whicli it saw as a unique opponunity to defeat the regime on political go und^.^ However, althou*

Garreton was right in underlying the fact that the opposition evolved dong a certain leming patli

which altowed it to fight on a unified front against Pinochet, the cornmon enemy, this particular

front I~ad been carefiilly set up by the military regime. itself in accordance with the interests of the

capitalist class. Hence. it was oniy because the capitalist class felt confident that the popular

secton would not constitute a threat to the neoliberal econornic model. because the economy Iiad

been growing since 1985, and aIso because the 1980 constitution ensured protection of its

(Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.8 1. 'Puryear, Op. Cit.. p. 83. "Ibid. ' ~ o t until Febmary 1988 was the 'Conce~acion por el Non formed as a result of a consensus on the straregy to adopt to end the military re~ime. The Concertricion was originally composed of 13 opposition politicai parties, but grew to include 17 by the end of 1988. It was essentially dominated by the PDC (Christian Democratic Party), the largest parry of the coalition, the Nuiiez fiaction of the Socialist Party and the newly constituted Partido por la Democracia (PPD). See Philip Oxhorn, "The Popular Response to an Authoritarian Regime: Shantytown Organizations since the Military Coup," Latin rfmerican Perspectives, Issue 68. Vol 18 (no 1, Winter 1991),p. 55. 'Manuel Antonio Garreton, "The Political opposition and the Party System under the Military Regime," in Paul W Drake and I v h Jaksic, The Stmggie for Democracy in Chife (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press. 1988), p. 21 I . 'Ibid., p. 226.

privileges. that it accepted the results of the 1988 plebiscite and tlie defeat of ~inocliet.'"liat die

opposition leamed. as will be funher shown, is to obey the rules establislied by the military regime

in order to defeat Pinochet at his own game. Obviously. tliis implied the risk of legitimizing the

miiitary regime, but most irnportantly, it meant the acceptance that the dictatorship Iiad played a

key foundational role in reshapinz Chile.

The role of ilte capiralisr clms

In order to understand the ideological nature of the new liistorical bloc, it is paramount to

esarnine first the role of the capitalist class in the transition process to democracy. The capitalist

class becarne a major actor in the economic policy shifi effected by the military regime, which led

it tiom radical neoliberalisrn to pragrnatic neoliberalism. At first. because of the socialist threat

posed to society by Allende's regime, the capitalist class wholelieartedly supported the economic

policies of the Chicago Boys (see cliapter 3). As a radical restructuring of Chilean society was

needed to defeat al1 forms of socialist tendencies as well as to secure the existence of capitalism. the

capitalist class accepted both radical neoliberalism and the dictatorship as necessary measures.

ffo~vever. when it becarne clear that the radicalism of the Chicago Boys was no longer necessap.

and most irnportantly that it further aggravated the economic crisis that had been entèebling

Chilean economy since 1982, the capitalist class sought to oblige the government to adopt a more

praynatic neoliberalisrn allowing for the =te to intervene in key sectors of the economy. it was

ctear that the "invisible hand" had failed to secure a sustained economic growth.

Concemed with the severity of the 1982 economic crisis and the rise of popular protests in

May 1983, a coalition of Chile's six major business associations emerged under the leadership of

the CPC (the Confederation of Production and Commerce). This coalition published in June 1983,

a plan for economic recovery entitled 'Recuperacion economica: Ana[[ l]lisis y proposiciones".

"'Eduardo Silva. 'Capitalist Reg ime Loyalties and Redernocntization in Chi le," Journal of Inreramerican Stucfies, Vol 34 (no 4, 1994), p. 8 1.

This plan callad for: "( 1) Iiigh real eschange rates to stimulate exports and protect against impow.

(2) hiçher across-the-board tariffs with protection against unfair cornpetition. (3) a reflationary

rnonetary policy, (4) low interest rates. (5) debt relief, and ( 6 ) policies that targeted specitic

sectors"." But the militas. did not accept these propositions immediately. Hence the capitalist

coalition threatened the m i l i t q regimr with joining forces with the political opposition if its

refonn prograrn was not considered." As a resu l~ in August 1983, the government began to rnake

concessions to the CPC and its afiiiates. These concessions translated into both cabinet and policy

13 changes. The pragmatist Sergio O. Jarpa was nominated Minister of the interior and Modesto

Collados made Minister of Public ~ o r k s . " Although at first Finance Minister Caceres remained in

post, Pinochet forced hirn to adhere to pragmatic poIicies more in line with the CPC demands.

Hence, Caceres increased deficit spending up to 5% of the GDF (Gross Domestic Product), lowered

real interest rates from 22 per cent in 1982 to 16 per cent in 1983, expanded housing and public

works p rogms . and also cut taxes on. businesses to stimulate the e c ~ n o r n ~ . ' ~ Al1 these measures

were present in the CPC's "Recuperacion economica".

This sliifi tiom radical neoliberalism to pragmatic neoliberalism allowed Pinochet to secure

the firm support base necessary for the regime to keep political liberalization within the confines of

the 1980 con~titution.'~ Indeed, by accepting the CPC's recommendations, the rnilitary regime

deprived the opposition of a powerfùl ally. Consequently, a similar shift occurred in the political

strategy of the opposition which felt it had no choice but to comply with pragmatic neoliberaIism.

As the left-wing Asamblea de la Civilidad (Civic Assembly) Iost ground, the AIianza Democratica

- -

"Ibid., p. 84-85. "ibid., p. 88-92. AIso Javier Martinez and Alvaro Diaz., Chile: The Great Transformation (Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Developrnent IMWSD, 1996), p. 98. "Afier four consecutive Finance Ministers. Hernan Bilchi, who symboiized "intelligent pragmatism", was appointed in 1985. See Collier and Sater, Op. Cit., p. 37 1 . "For hrther detaiis on cabinet changes. see Martinez and Diaz, Op. Cit., p. 96-97. "Eduardo Silva, 'Capitalist Regime Loyalties and Redernocratization in Chile," p. 9 1 . "Ibid., p. 92.

(Dernocntic Alliance) gradually irnposed its strategy over the opposition forces. The consolidation

of the pngmatic neoliberal coalition as well as the economic successes of tlie regirne between 1986

and 1988 led the "Concenacion de Pnnidos por el No" to wholly accept the neoliberal econornic

model." In fact, "the democncic opposition traded away broad economic refom in rehim for

political derno~ratization."'~

Tlte upposifion 5 acceptance of the 1980 consriturion

What had started as a spontaneous protest against the dictatorship in 1983 culminated in

July 1986 witli the formation of a large coalition of over 200 social orgaiiizations, the "AsambIea de

la C ivi lidad" (AC). This newly consituted organization represented the " highest level of social and

political unity achieved by the opposition forces since the military coup in 1973".19 In a document

entitled "Demand of Chilen, the AC presented an ultimatum to Pinochet requiring the regime ro

respond within 30 days to the demands articulated by the opposition (they essentially asked for an

immediate return to democracy). If no satisfactory response was given by May 31. the AC

tlireatened to paralyze national activities in a general strike on July 2 and 5. The ensuing success of

July's m a s protests led the opposition to think that it Iiad sliaken the regime and tliat victory was

near. But once again, Pinochet answered with renewed repression. The discovery of a large anns

cache belonging to the Communists in August 1986, and the assassination attempt on Pinochet in

earIy September gave the president the oppominity to impose a state of siege. and to harshly repress

the mass movemenrs. Again, reference to the "imminent communist tlireat" was made by the

military to justify its occupation of the shantytowns as well as its repression of the lefi-wing sectors

of tlie opposition. Notably, these harsh actions had the effect of securing the support of the affluent

- --

"Ibid.. p. 97-98. For a discussion on the effects ofpragmatic neoliberalism, see Collier and Sater. Op. Cit.. pp. 27 1-276. I8Eduardo Silva. 'Capitalist Regirne Loyalties and Redemocratization in Chile." , p. 99. '9fames P e m and Fernando Ignacio Leiva, "Chile: The Auhoritarian Transition to Electoral Politics, A Critique," Lacin American Perspectives, Issue 58, Vol 15 (no 3, surnmer 1988). p. 98.

The violence surrounding the mas protests created a ctimate of uncertainry and fear, panicularly among the middle class. which only helped strengthen the miIitary regime. The military regime was afforded a cenain legitimacy in atternpting to restore "law and order", even though the sme security apparatus was responsible for the bulk of the violence."

In this context, the Alianza Democrittica (AD), a conglomention of seven opposition

parties grouping centrist, rightist, and social democrats broke away from the left-wing coalition, the

Movimiento Democratico Popular (MDP), and also from the more moderate AC? The AD came

to the conclusion that it would be impossible to defeat the m i l i t q adopting the comrnunist strateg

of' promoting "al1 forms of struggle" (the MDP's strategy) or the AC'S strategy of denying the

legitirnacy of the dictatorship. Hence, what was needed was to accept the terms of the 1980

constitution in order to concentrate on winning the 1988 plebiscite. which was considered the only

possible avenue to defeat Pinochet. This strategy was not al1 that recent since Patricio Aylwin, the

former president of the Christian Democratic Party proposed, in a I984 seminar sponsored by

ICHEH (The Chilean Institute of Humanistic Studics), that the opposition accept the legitimacy of

the 1980 constitution and explore ways to work within it." This proposition had almost no

repercussions on the opposition's strategy at that time. but with the failure of the mass protests. it

increasingly gained popularity arnongst centrist, nghtist and even lefiist sectoa. In that sense, on

76 September 1986, J.J. Brunner, a distinguished socioIogist and member of the Nufiez fraction of

the Socialist ~artv.'' reiterated this view in a mernorandum published by the pro-govemrnent

"Ibid., p. 100. " Phi1 ip Oxhom, Organizing Civil Society: The Popdar Sectors and the Stmggle for Democracy in Chile (University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 244. "Petras and Leiva, 'Chile: The Authoritarian Transition to Electoral politics, A Critique," , p. 97. 3~uryear, Op. Cit., p. 79. ' '~fler 1973, the Sociaiist Party splintered into numerous fractions. The rnost important are the Nuiiez fraction adopting a position closer to the center and rightist parties, and the Almeyda fraction which accepted the position of the Communist Party regarding the legitimacy of the use of violence in the smggle against the military regirne. For more details see Lois Oppenheim, 'Democracy and Social Transfomation in Chile: The Debate Within the LeRn Latin American Perspecflves, Issue 46, Vol 12 (no 2, Summer 1985), p.59-76.

newspaper L a Segunda. In tliis article, Bmnner argued for a negotiated transition to democracy

witli the amied forces. He said:

The Asarnblea de la Civitidad which represented the most recent effort to unify nvo oppositions on the social terrain, has corne out of this experience weakened.._ Pinochet has had success above 311 in demonsmting to the country that the opposition is in fact subordinated to the actions of its most radicalized sectors ... Pinochet in the first place and the armed forces in the second have the key to the political situation: they cm force the cype of play that most suits them and maintain, till the end, the possibility of cutting off the opportunities of opposition interventions ... Social mobilization has k e n weak occasionally Fragmentary.,, For the opposition (AD) that rejects the use of al1 forms of stniggle and that looks for an exit via negotiated aansition there exists a basic goal which is to produce conditions in which they can work out an agreement with the m e d forces. We cannot aspire therefore to politically defeat the m e d forces?

Hence were discredited at the same time both the communist stratety of promoting "a11

forms of stm&en, and the spontaneity thesis according to which spontaneous mass uprisings

would eventuaily bring down the dictatorship. As show by the AD'S involvement in opposition

politics, since the masses had failed to provoke the collapse of the rnilitary regime, nvo important

categories of social mors emerged and took control over the opposition forces, narnely the poiitical

parties and the intellectuals who increasingly imposed their views on politicians. Lndeed, many

scholars became actively involved in

I S ~ . ~ . Brunner, La Segunda, (26 September Electoral politics, A Critique," , p. 10 1.

politics.26 In that context, an analyis of the

1986) in Petras and Leiva, "Chile: The Authontarian

rote of the

Transition to

'"The new democratic govemment of president Patricio Aylwin, inaugurated in March 1989, amibuted key positions to large numben of intellectuals. 'In March 1990 Ricardo Lagos, a Duke University Ph. D. in ~onornics who taught for nearly nventy years at the University of Chile, became Chile's minister of education. Alejandro Foxley, a Ph. D. in economics fi-om the University of Wisconsin and founder of one of Latin America's most prestigious research institutes, was named fuiance minister. Edgardo Boeninger, a former rector of the University of Chile, became minister of the general presidential staff - and the president's chief poiitical süategist. E ~ q u e Correa, a former professor of philosophy at the State Technical Univenity, was named to head another key minisüy. René Corn, a Ph. D. h m the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and pmlific researcher, was named minister of labor. Carlos Ominami, a former member of the radical Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), who had completed doctoral studies at the University of Paris, was chosen to be minister of economic affairs. Berkeley-trained sociologist German Correa becarne minister of transponation. Francisco Cumplido, a lawyer who headed up a research program on the sociology of law at the Latin Amerïcan Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) during the 19701s, became minister of justice. José Antonio Viera-Gallo. a fonner professor of political theory at Chile's Catholic University and director of a

intellectuals and the policical panies in relation to tlie masses is essential ro further illustrate this

sliift in the opposition's nntegy from rejecting the terms of the transition forced on them by the

mil itriry to a voluntary acceptance of the 1980 constitutional imperatives. Indeed, these pol itical

panies. which joined forces under [lie "Concertacion de Panidos por el No". as welI as tlieir

intellectuals, became the organic representatives of the capitatist class.

Tïzr ro le of rhe polirical parties

Whereas the political panies totally dominated al1 aspects of Chilean political life before

the m ilitary coup. they vinually disappeared during the military regime. Indeed. only the nghtist

parties were not declared illegal, but decided to disolve voluntarily in a syrnbolic gesture of suppon

for the government. On the other hand. left-wing panies were systema~ically repressed and

prrsecuted as activists were often killed. imprisoned or exiled. In tliat sense. the repressive

objectives punued by tlie military consisted essentially in disciplining the labour force and in

destroy ing the Left as a political and ideolo~ical alternative. z7 [ronically. the "repressive pol icies

of the milita. regime led to tlie emergence of a rich set of participatory and dernocntic

orsan izational esperiences among Cliiie's poor that helped them to cope witli tlieir most pressing

problems."'s The disintegration of the political parties'9 obliged the popular sectors to develop a

new collective identity and to re-organize~themselves in order to suwive under a military regirne

wliich proved itself not to be a transitory phenornenon. Accordingly. since they did not rely on

Party leaders. who were systematically purged by the regime, and because they had developed their

own "organic leaders". the adaptation process to this new situation was faster and more coherent in

"po blaciones" which had been organized democratically by the Cornmunist ~arty." Yet this re-

.- -

private resevch center. was elected president of the Charnber of Deputies." Puryear. Op. Cit.. p. 1. "Philip Oxhorn. Op. Cit.. p. 66. "Ibid.. p. 5 . 'gPolitical parties still existed. but their underground activities concenrnted on survival as opposed to active promotion of their politicai programs. >O See Cathy Schneider. 'Mobilization at the Grassroots: Shanryrowns and Resistance in Authoritarian Chile."

orpatiization of civil society ar a gmsroots level accordinç to democntic principles did not lead to

coherent social movements. In k t . mainly preoccupied with survival. the upoblaciones" never

formulated a clex social project which would have semed as a blueprint for the reconstruction of

Chi Iean society. The pol iticai parties alotie possessed the necessary experience to organize civil

society at the national level.

The opportunity the political parties needed to regain their predominance over national

politics came with the obvious failure of tlie rnass protests. Indeed, the cornpliance by the

opposition in following tlie transition process established by the rnilitary regime allowed political

parties to regain command over civil society. In that sense, the electoral measures imposed by the

military regirne in preparation for the 1988 plebiscite - for example. political parties had to gather at

Ieasr Z.000 signatures in a petition in order to become legal - fomed the political parties to assume

responsibility for the success of the transition process. However, this was not done without

tensions witli the newly formed popular organizations which demanded to be actively integnted in

the process. It must also be noted tliat Marxist panies were still considered illegal. and that political

repression played a significant role in resliaping the Chilean ideological spectrum dong centrist

lines. Analysing the causes of the breakdown of democncy in Cliile, most political parties felt it

necessary to adopt a more pngrnatic and less ideological attitude. Hence. ironically, the acceptance

by the opposition of the institutions and the economic mode1 established by the military regime

served as the bais for the opposition consensus." Nevertheless, this consensus could be reached

only by focusing on Pinochet as tlie common enemy. To sum up, in order to defeat the military

regirne. the opposition. now under the leadership of tlie political parties. Iiad managed to overcome

three major obstacles: ( 1 ) the absence of a consensual and coherent political strategy to end the

dictatorship; (2) the consequent ideological gap separating political organizations which impeded

Latin American Perspecrn?es, Issue 68, Vol 18 (Winter 199 1). p. 92- 1 13. "Philip Oxhom. "The Popular Response CO an Authoritarian Regime: Shanrytown Organizacions since the

tlirrin addressing the problrm of unity in terms of the specific forms of struggle needed to terminate

the regirne: and (3) the weakening of the relations behveen the political and social reairns."

TÏle ro fe of rhc. inrellecrz~uls

The conversion of political parties to neoiiberalism and pragmatism can only be understood

in relation to tlieir penetntion by organic intellectuals of the capitalist class. that is, intellectuais

imbued witli Western liberal, tectinocntic, and scientific values. First, the Chilean universities

uiider the military regime were ideologically neutralized. As part of the military's fight to purse

politics of ideologies, the new intellectuals bred by Chiiean universities adhered to the "ethics of

responsibilityn and concentrated on scientific problem-solving as opposed to envisioning the

possibility of restructuring society according to a revolutionary world-view. Students were victims

of radical purges as well as restrictions in tems of' admissions and activities. Student organizations

were tightly controlled by a rigid Iiierarchy attaclied to ot'ficial circles, cumculum carehlly

dssigned. and rectors carefully chosen to exchde any form of leftist influence- tn addition, the

state's reductions in welfare expenditures as well as affirmative mesures promoting self-financine.

in lirie witli the cornpetitive free-market rnentality of tlie regime. had the effect of restricting access

ro Iiigiier education to students of poorer backgrounds. thus limiting the univenities' ideological

realin to a more conservative attitude consistent with tlie class character of the universities's

- - cl ientele."

AS a consequence, opposition intellectuals were unlikely to emerge from universities, but

from the multiple private research centres which grew during the military regirne. Protected by the

Cliurch and funded by foreign agencies. intellectuals found in these centres a refuge where they

Military Coup." Op. Cit.. p. 53. ''Gameton. Op. Cit.. p. 246. i 1 Daniel L e w argues that the Pinochet regirne conducted a centnlized revolution in higher education policy consistent with the nature of a bureaucntic-authoritarian regirne.Daniel C. Levy. 'Chilean Universities under the lunta: Regime and Policy." Larin .Inwrican Resecrrcl~ Review, Vol 2 1 (no 3 , 1986), p. 95-138.

could pursue their work in a relatively autonomous rnanne~~' Because of their technocratie outlook,

and their adoption of scientific metliods, these centres were tolerated by the dictatonhip; this was

rspecially the case in economics. In fact, as a result of the govemrnent prioritizing the economy.

thé intellectuals seized this newly created 'space" for criticisrn to oppose the regime. Yer althougli

economists used their expenise to condernn the inequality of income distribution existing in Chile,

on the whole, they truly accepted the basic wonh of a market economy. For example. the

economic recovery from the 1982 crisis convinced the economists at CIEPLAN (Corporation for

Latin American Economic Research) that the refoms imposed by the Pinochet regirne were

basicdly "good". Alejandro Foxley, a member of CIEPLAN who later became Minister of Finance

under Pauicio Ay lwin's administration, deciared that: "You'd have to be awfully hard-headed and

jt~ibbom not to accept the facts as they were."" Fven Socialists adhered to the free-market

economy, the validity of understanding the economy in tenns of macroeconomic stabiiity, growth

and low inflati~n.'~

This ideological shift is mostly attibutable to the very ideological context of Chilean

socieo;. tvliicli lias been shaped by the dictatorship's purges of lefiist groups, but also by the further

penerntion of Western tiberal ideas. In tliat sense, Chilean intellectuals were transfotmed by their

conditions of Living. That is, most of the intellectuals who considered themselves in opposition to

the military regirne, and who played a major role in the re-orientation of politics in Chile, had

received graduate degrees in Europe or North America, or, once in exile. had corne to embrace

"The most imponant ones, that is, the centres which played a sigificant role in the re-orientation of ChiIean politics were: FLACSO (The Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences), CIEPLAN (Corporation for Latin Amencan Eccnornic Research), CEP (Centre for Public Studies), and CED (Centre for Development Studies). Typical of FLACSO, intellectuals jumped back and forth from the acaderny to politics. CIEPLAN emphasized consensus among social and economic actors on vital policy issues. CEP sought to legitimise neoconsemative political and economic thinking by distancing it fiom the dictatorship. CED favoured a more empirical. policy-centered intellectual approach. See Puryear, Op. Cit., p. 88-9 1. 3S~lejandro Fodey, in Puryear, Op. Cit., p. 1 15. I6See Eduardo Onit. "Chilean Socialism and Transition," in Alan Angell and Benny Pollack, ed., The Legacy ofDictatorship: Political. Economic and Social Change in Pinochet S Chile (Liverpool, The lnstitute of Latin American Studies, University of Lierpool, 1993), p. 185- 198.

Euro pean social dernocncy and fundamental elements o f free-market capitalism." In addition.

funded by foreign agencies suc11 as USAID, the Ford and Rockefeller foundations and the

Oqanization of the American States (OAS), these private research cenves adopted both the

scientific and technocntic outlook of their donors." In cornparison to the intellecnials o f the past.

intellectuals becarne, afier 1973, more specialized. empincal and te~hnocratic.'~ Influenced by

Tl~atcherism, Reaganism, Glasnost and Perestroika, a great number of intellectuals lost their faith in

"pure Socialism", and sought instead to establish a "capitalism with a human f a ~ e " . ' ~ The socialist

Ricardo Lagos noted that a market economy could be more equitable, and that technocratic

discussion conceming economic policies would lead to a more just and egalitarian society?'

S ince political parties were illegal and in dissaray, intellectuals expanded into the po 1 itical

\.ricuum created by the militas. regime. Soon those pnvate think-tanks becarne a source of new

political thinking and discourse: "politics in Cliile becarne intellect~alized."~' There developed

ainongst the intellecnials a strong sentiment o f superiority over past "ideologues". T l~e i r newly

. - "Puryear, Op. Cit., p. 73-77. .- '"James Petras argues that the tundin; by foreign agencies of multiple private research centres was one of the most important factor in the establishment of Western liberalism in Latin Arnerica In order to receive funds. intel Iectuals had to cany out researches judged pertinent by the fitnding agencies. chat means. they also had to adopt their scienti fic standards. See James Peuas, 'The Metamorphosis of Latin America's Intellectuais." Luin -4merican Perspectives, Issue 65, Vol 17, (no 2, Spring 1990). p. f 02-1 12. Also see Panicio Silva, " Intellectuals. Technocrats and Social Change in Chile: Past, Present and Future Perspectives." in Alan Angell and Bonny Pollack. ed.. The Legucy of Dictarorship: Political, Economic and Social Change in Pinochet S Chile (Liverpool, The [nstinite of Latin American Studies. University of Liverpool, 1993), p. 198- 224. In this article. Silva argues that, since 1973, technocrats have achieved a marked hegemony in Chilean intellecrual circles over the humanist intellectuaIs. Whereas the period beween 1960 to 1973 was the "age of the sociologistsn. the period from 1973 up to the present constitutes the "age of the econornists". "For a more detailed analysis of the technocratization process of politics in Chile, see Patricio Silva "Technocnts and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monk," in Paul W. Drake, ed., Money Doctors. Foreign Debts. und Economic Reforms in Latin Arnerica from rhe 1890's to the Presenr (Wilrnington. Scholady Resources Inc., 1994), p. 205-230. In this article, Silva argues that, since the 1973 military coup, politics embarked on a pure technocratization path. Technocrats were present in Frei's and Allende's administrations, but the populist programs of these governments forced hem to back-stage policy- making. This changed drasticaIly dunng the military regime. Indeed, the military sou@ legitimacy through the technocrats' expertise. in addition. the re-institutionalized democracy of president Aylwin also reIied on technocrats, mainIy economists. 10 See Puryear. Op. Cit., pp.73-74. 4 I Ricardo Lagos, in Puryear, Op. cit., p. 1 19.

acquired science allowed tliem, they beiieved to transcend the parochialism of partisan politics in

order to tmly understand how sociecy worked. Blaming the breakdown of democracy essentially on

ideological politics. they concluded that it was necessary to adopt a more flexible and pragmatic

anitude. Alejandro Foxley described the interaction between the intellectuals and the p o l i t k i ~ s

prior to 1973 :

The intellectual becarne, ofien, a reaffmer of ideologies and a sharpener of of ideological conflicts between distinct political forces. The intellecntai was, aimost aiways, a factor of rigidity, dogmatisrn and sometirnes even arrogance and exclusion ... Moderation was always interpreted as a sign of weakness. Anyone who was maderate was presumed to have some kind of ~ o r n ~ l e x . ~ ~

José Antonio Viera-Gallo, a former professor at the Catholic University and director of a private

research center who was later elected president of the Chamber of Deputies also considered the

ndicalisrn of intellectuals to have iargely contributed to the democntic breakdown. He said:

ln this eagemess. we did not pay attention to the problem of methods or rneans; we were interested in the ends. Even though we never proposed dictatorship as the proper path or insaurnent for acheiving real democratization, in fact by insisting onIy on objectives and giving them absolute character, we contributed to

4 4 weakening democratic practices.

During the period preceding the 1988 plebiscite, the intellectuals achieved their greatest

influence on poiitics. According to the socialist Ricardo Lagos, intellectuals "introduced elements

of reason" into politics.'s As their fint task. the intellecniais sought to understand the revolutionary

changes that had occurred in Chile. Hence, they came to the conclusion that the only way to defeat

tiie rnilitaiy regime was to reject the rnobilization sûategy. The intellectuals claimed that the

Chilean people held moderate rather than radical political attitudes, and that they strongly supported

democntic procedures to solve conflicts as they despised vio~ence.'~ Surveys conducted by

"Puryear. Op. Cit., p. 60. 4 3 Alejandro Foxley, in Puryear, Op. Cit., p. 20.

UJosé Antonio Viera-Gallo. in Puryear, Op. cit., p. 21. '5Ricardo Lagos, in Puryear, Op. Cit., p. 13 1. '"Puryear, Op. cit.. p. 137.

FLXCSO (The Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences) and CERC (Centre for the Study of

Cliilean Reality) demonstrated that, in fact, a third of the population supponed the mili~ry, and that

ailotlier third was undecided." Hence to win the piebiscite, the intellectuals promoted a new

strategy closer to the state of mind of the people. In contrast to the fear campaign of the 'Yes" side.

tlie "No Campaignn appealed to the people's desire for peace and stability. This positive approach

aimed at convincing the population that a 'Non vote would permit the creation of a new democratic

and more egalitarian society. This was clearly expressed by the slogan: "La Alegria ya viene"

(Happiness is now ~orn in~) ) .~ '

Being more than mere think-tanks, the research centres jumped head on into politics. They

believed it to be their mission to convince politicians to accept the validity of their new techniques

of studying society and politics, and thus sought to influence policy-making. By promoting

personal contacts, technical exchange, debates, and dialogues through seminars. the private centres

brouglit together poli tical actors and intel lectuals of divergent political parties.'9 For examp le,

reflecring on CED programs, Manuel Antonio Garreton declared that: "It made the Christian

Dernocrats realize that tlie Socialists. at least at the technical level. weren't brutes; and made the

lefi realize that the Christian Dernocrats weren't fascists."" To surn up, many reasons led the

pol iticians to y ield to the intellectuals in order to "modemizen political parties: first, political

panies had been forced to struggie for mere survival for more than tifteen yean and their

orgnizationai capacity had greatly suffered from this experience: second, their campaigning

experience was anachronistic in the sense that it was blind to the new Chilean reality; third, since

1983. tiiey had systematically failed to provoke the collapse of the military regime; fourth, several

politicians were themselves academics; and finally, political leaders were uncertain as to how to

"Ibid. "For a more detailed analysis of the climat of terror preceding the 1988 pIebiscite, see Fernando Villagt-dn, "Me or Chaos." NACLA Reports on the rlrnericus, Vol XXII (no 2, MarcfvApd 1988), p. 14-20. "Puryear. Op. Cit., p. 97.

<ipproncli the plebiscite and were thus rvilling to listen to modem and technical advices."

The ci-eririon of a Schurnpeterh form of detnocrncy

The victor). of the "No" on 5 October 1988. forced a change of regime in Chile. EIections

lvere Iieid on December 14, 1989, and the new govemment of tlie Concertacion led by Patricio

Aylwin took otEce on iLilarch 14. 1989. Y e i as was show, the context in which the transition took

place revealed the establishment of a very elitist democracy." As intellectuals and political parties

assumed the leadership of the transition, democracy demanded modention from al1 sectors of

society. but especiall y from the marginalized sectors whose hopes and expectations were extremely

fiigli. Tirnotliy R. Sculty noted that in Chile: "The reappeannce of strong parries capable of

clianneling and expressing diverse social and political interests has provided a powerful

imtitiitional buffer. at Ieast in part protecting policymakers from populist temptations."53 Hence.

cri tic izing [lie new pol itical consensus, Patricio Silva argues tliat Cliile lias witnessed the

establisliment of a Scliumpeterian forrn of democracy which rnerely serves to ensure a proper

circulation of elites in power.'J Moreover, the elitist character of the Chilean democncy is

i-einforced by the neolibeml economic rnodel. Indeed. as Atilio Boron demonstrates. neoliberdism,

\vhicIi promotes fiee-market economic policies and a minimal intervention of the state in tlie

econom).. goes Iiand in Iiand with the Schumpeterian view of democracy adopted by most

governments of Latin Arnerica because it "reduces democracy to a political rnethod, and as such

- -

"'Garreton, interview with Puryear (8 March 199 l), in Puryear, Op. Cit., p. 97. " Puryear. Op.. Cit., p. 1 54. <* -.L\ian Angel! and Benny PoIlack argue that the 1993 presidential and congressionai etections, which brought to power the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei - replacing the previous Concertacion leader Patricio Aylwin - contirmed the elitist nature of the new Chilean democracy. Indeed, as there exists in ChiIe a broad policy consensus between al1 major political parties, the elections were totally devoid of heated ideological debates. See Alan Angell and Benny Pollack. "The Chilean Elections of 1993: from Polarisation to Consensus," Brillerin of Laiin American Research, Vol 14 (no 2, 1995), p. 105- 125. "Timothy R Scully, "Chile; The Political Underpinings of Economic Liberalization," in Jorge 1. Dominguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Constnlcting Dernocrutic Governance; Soiiih America in the 1990 9 (U.S.A., The John Hopkins University Press, l996), p. 1 16. "Silva, "Intellectuals. Technocnts and Social Change in Chile," Op. Cit., p. 3IS.

tliis metliod is indifferent to the pnctical performance of the political regirneW." By linking the fear

of democracy, or tlie fear of the masses. to tlie logics of capital accumulation. Boron funher

rsplains t h Dalil's famous distinction bebveen democracy and polyarchy, that is, democratic

procedures allow the e1ites to neglect the demands of the popular sectors which are considered

detrimental to the interests of the mling class. clearly applies to Latin Arnerican democracies,

especially in Argentina and in ~ l i i l e ? Hence, as opposed to popular democracy, which is

concerned with both process and outcorne, polyarchy is constrained to the sphere of methods. The

rissumption is, as notes William Robinson, chat the mling eiites will respond to the general interest

of the majority.j7 But how well can the majority be served when, as it is the case in Chile, the

general interest is restricted to avoiding another military coup?

The fear of the masses led the Aylwin government to promote "justice within the limits of

tlie possible". that is, the promotion of the general interest came down to correspond to avoiding a

new intervention of the army in politics. According to Edgardo Boeninger, one of the leading

irirellectuals who influenced the opposition's change of strategy. the main threat to democracy is

popiilisiii by which is meant "the danger of responding to widespread social demands by making

promises that outstrip the resources available to fulfill them."j8 In that conte* the pursuit of

"Grouth with equity", the electoral theme of the govemment. served as an ethical justification for

the neoliberal cconomic model. Constraints on democratization came from nvo interrelated poles

of power: the 1980 constitution under the "guardianship" of the army; and the neolibenl economic

model wliich serves the interests of the capitalist class. The contradictory nature of Aylwin's

regime precisely resided in the fact that while its development strategy aimed at social equity, it

5 5 At ilio Boron. Srare, Capilalisrn, and Democracy in Latin America (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 191. '" I bid., p. 192-203. "See William 1. Rob inson, Prornofing Polyurchy: Globalkarian. US htrervention and Hegemorty (Cam bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1 W6), p. 49-6 1. '"rian Loveman. "The Transition to Civilian Government in Chile," in Drake and Jaksic, Op. Cit., p. 305.

was "committed to di ffusing and en forcing the values, aninides, and pol itical pmctices compatible

witli export-oriented capitalist accumulation.""

There exist many different positions conceming the nature of the transition to democracy in

Chilr. Two lines of arguments can be identified: on the one hand, the continuiry between the

econornic policy of the rnilitary regirne and that of the Aylwin governrnent is emphasized. On the

otlier Iiand. elements differentiating behveen the economic and social policies of both regirnes are

underlined? Not surprisingly, both supporters and enemies of the former military regirne, though

for opposing reasons, share the continuiv thesis. Whereas supponers daim that no substantive

changes have been made to the economic model, and that the rniIitary regime was necessary to

perfom the required econornic reforms. enemies criticize both the military regime and the

Concenacion for having adopted a capitalist accumulation mode1 which. it is argued keeps people

in poveq- "Supporters" are those people identified as rightists and radical neoliberals; the

"enemies' are to be found among the radical Left which has becorne electonlly in~i~nificant." The

differentiation thesis, which is supported by centrist political forces, that is. the same political actors

n.110 permittéd the victory of the "No" by prornoting a strategy of consensus building, stresses the

di fferences ratlier than the similarities behveen the military regirne and the democratic govemment.

However. "tliose that share this differential perspective recogiiize the continuity inherent in the two

u,ovemmentys acceptance of the same economic structure, in rigorous fiscal discipline, and in the -

management of other macro-economic variablesnb' What they highlight though is the ethical

approach of the Aylwin government. Whereas Pinochet's govemment seemed indifferent to the

ethical, politicai and social repercussions of its economic measures, the Concertacion members and

59 James Petras and Fernando Ignacio Leiva, Democracy and Poverty in Chile: the Limits of Electoral Politics (Boulder. Westview Press, Inc.. 1994). p. 135. 60 See Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, l995), p. 256-260. "'lbid.. p. 258. "'lbid., p. 260.

tlieir supporters argue that Aylwin's govemment sought to create consensus on the econorny by

avoiding political decisions undermining social justice and social c~hesion.~'

if compared. the economic policies of bath Aylwin and Pinochet's govemments are v e p

simiiar. In facb Ay lwin's economists closely respected the economic mode1 esrablished by the

inilitary regime. Notably, the highly symbolic agreement between the Concertacih and the

military regime to appoint a joint candidate as the head of the national bank prior to the 1989

elections confirmed the acceptance by the opposition of the econornic policy of the d ic ta t~nhi~ .~ '

Likewise. Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley distinguished three piilan supporting the Aylwin

government's development strategy which are essentially extensions of Pinochet's economic policy:

an "unbreakable cornmitment" to macroeconomic stability; a "fuller and improved commercial and

tïnancial integration with the world economy"; and the enhancement of social services "within the

constnints of a balanced fiscal expendinire program".66 This respect for neoliberal econornics on

rlie part of' Aylwin's economic team led Jaime Guzmih, the chief ideotogue of the military regime,

ro declare tiis satisfaction with the democratic governrnent's preservation of "the centrai lines of the

developmcnt strategy supported by the previous government ... and [its adlierence to] serious and

onliodoa macroeconornic rnanagementJ'P7 Both ri@-wing organizations and the business

comrnunity were extremely pleased with the government's management of the economy. Eduardo

"'[bid.. p. 759. 64 Reference to the actual president Eduardo Frei are used to support the argument that no significant changes were made to the economic mode1 by the new democratic reghes. Althouph f i e r study would be required to proceed to a detailed comparaison of the two regimes, it is still possible to make ideological links between Ay lwin's govemment and that of Frei based on Frei's political program and, as wiI1 be noted, certain of his shortcomings in terms of social and political initiatives. For a discussion on the 1993 presidential elections, see Alan Ange11 and Bemy Pollack, "The Chilean Elections 1993: from Polarization Co Consensus," Op. Cit- On "Frei's political stylen and on his governrnent's technocratie and economic character, see also Rodrigo Baiio, *La Tranquilidad de un gobiemo que descansa en la economia," Chile 96, Analisis y Opiniones (Santiago, FLACSO-Chile, 1997), p. 19-28. " ~oaquin Fermandois and Michael A. Morris, Democracy in Chile. Transition and Conrolidation 198 7-2000 (London, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorisrn, 1995), p. 6. "GPetras and Leiva, Democracy and Poverty in Chile: the Limits of Electoral Politics, p. 106. "ibid.. p. -16.

iMane, president of Cape Hom Methanol stated:

During that luncheon, which took place six months before the elections. they (Aylwin and Foxley) gave us al1 sorts of guarantees that economic policy would continue to be the same as had been known before: an open market, favorabIe investment terms, in sum. al1 the good things that we inherited from the military govenment. And a year later, there is no doubt in my rnind that the grand w a m t y chat this country has, in fact, is precisely Alejandro Foxley as Minister of ina an ce-^'

Andres Al lamand, president of the right-wing political party Renovacion NacionaI (RN) intimated

that Christian Democratic Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley and Socialist Carlos Orninami "could

perfectly well have been rnernbers of Pinochet's

As a result, despite Aylwin's ethical concerns, and afier him those of president Frei, the

stnictural reforms made by the military regime impeded the implementation of mie social

democntic measures necessary to create a more egalitarian society. in that sense. the successes of

Aylwin's ta. and labour reforms were due principally to the boorning of the e c o n ~ r n ~ ' ~ nther than

to an effective new social policy." This is especially showed by the impossibility of tlie second

democratic govemment Eduûrdo Frei's administration", to advance these social gains. While it is

[rue tliat tlie proportion of Chileans living in poverty declined from 44.6% in 1989 to 33% in 1992

'' Eduardo kt am. in Petras and Lciva, Democracy and Poveq in Chile: the Limirs of Electoral Polirics, p.46. 93 Andrés Al tamanci, in Petras and Leiva, Democracy and Povers, in Chile: the Limits of Electoral Polirics, p. 47. 70 David Hojman argues that 'most of the usual economic indicaton suggest that the Chilean economy is extrernely healthy ... Output (GDP) g e w by 6. 10 and 6 per cent per annurn in 199 1, 1992 and 1993, respectiveIy." See David Hojman, "Chile Under Frei (Again): The First Latin American Tigre - or just Xnother Crit?" Brillerin of Latin Arnerican Research, Vol 14 (no 2, 1995), p. 127. Also see, Thothy R Scully, Op. Cit., p. 100. "~ i l a r Vergara "In Pursuit of 'Growth with Equicyn, The Lirnits of Chile's Free-Market Social Refoms." :VACLA Reports on the Americas, Vol XXiX (no 6, MayIJune 1996), p. 40. David Hojman also says that "most progress in the fight against povew comes and will continue to come fiom econornic growth." See Hojman. Op. Cit., p. 133. ? ~ p o n assurning the Chilean presidency, Eduardo Frei, who is also president of the PDC, the Concertacion's largest Party. adopted the economic mode1 inherited from the previous regirne. Indeed, according to hititial statements made by the president, Frei's economic team accepted to foIlow Aylwin's economic policies in tems of domestic and foreign policies, especially in its promotion of the intemationalbtion of the economy. See Joaquin Femandois and Michael A. Morris, Op. Cit, p. 17.

and 75% in 1994. by 1995 inequalities of incorne distribution had increased again.'' For e m p l e ,

wliile rhe average Chilean family saw its per capita income auçmenting by 5% between 1994 and

1995. the poorest IO% suffered a fall of 43% of tlieir incorne.'' Also, Frei's anernpt to extend the

1990 t a c retorm. which was only approved for a fout year period, failed as it faced staunch

resistance on the part of the business community as well as from right-wing opposition parties.

Likewise. the furthering of the labour reforms initiated by Aylwin have yet to be approved by the

parliment (as of 1996). Lastly, in addition to the still insuficient resources (as of 1996) directed to

social programs, the extensive privatization of public assets (including pension funds, education

and health services) undertaken by the miIitary regime created a dual welfare system within which

coexist a high-quality private system, which benefits to the nchest rninority of the population, with

an underîinanced public system."

At the same time, political liberalization is still constrained by the authoritarian rernnants of

the 1980 constitution. Despite some significant political gains, by the end of Aylwin's tenure in

oficr. few of the promised institutional and lepl refonns were accomplislied. For example. tlie

constitutional amendment procedure was lightly softened, the National Security Councii's veto

power wâs reduced, the presidential term was shortened from 8 to 1 years. and the number of

elected senators increased from 26 to 38 (thus reducing the relative importance of the 9 appointed

senators).-' et the armed forces still enjoyed a privileged position in Chilean politics. Indeed. the

institutionalization of the National Security Council under the authority of the 1980 Constitution

(article 95-96) entrusted the military with the responsibility for preserving "Chilean values". This

guardianship role assumed by the anned forces implies that the military has the right and the duv

73Vergara. Op. Cit., p. 39. "~bid.

a consequence of the governrnent's social budget transfer to the private social-service sector, the rvealthiest tifth of the population received, in I993, close to twice the amount of social spending received by the poorest fifih. ibid., p. 394 1 . "Sec Brian Loveman, 'The Transition to Civilian Govemment in Chile," in Drake and Jaksic, Op. Cit., p.

to intemene in political affairs in order to protect society from the imposition of values deemed

foreipn to the Chilean c~l ture . '~ Hence the National Secunty Doctrine (article 90 of the

Constitution) remains above individual riglits since the military may impose, if necessarv, i t s own

conception of the "common goodn.'8 In addition, Article 93 of the constitution conferreci on the

armed forces a certain degree of autonomy by strictly limiting the president's capacity to remove

service ~ommanden. '~ As well, it has been established that defence spending cannor fa11 below the

1989 floor and that 1 O per cent of copper revenues mua be anributed to national defence." Lastly.

to further tie the hands of future governments, Pinochet, upon leaving office, made Iast-minute

privatizations, ensured the permanence of the tenure for chi1 servants, and secured his own position

as Commander-in-chief of the m y until 1998."

The liberalization constnints established by the 1980 constitution are especially significant

in regard to social justice. Indeed. Pinochet clearly stated that the 1978 Amnesty Law, wliich

impedes any legal procedure against the rnilitary regarding human right violations. would be

unfailingly respected. Pinochet declared: "They will touch none of rny menn.'' For example.

wlien. in December 1990, top rnilitary officers (incIuding Pinochet's son) were accused of misuse of

government funds, Pinochet had his troops ready to rnove. Again in May 1993. a new court

interpretation of the 1978 Amnesty Law allowing legal investigations of Iiuman right violations as

well as ~ y l w i n ' s persistence in denouncing the autonomy of the armed forces and his insistence on

the need for the constitution to be amended provoked the anger of the military which surrounded

30s. "Cristian Gazmuri, "The Arrned Forces in Dernocratic Chile," in Alan Ange11 and Benny Pollack, ed.. The Legacy ofDictarorship, Op. Cit., p. 132- 133. '"Steven Volk. 'The Right to Coup." IVACLI Reports on ~ h e Americas, Vol XXII (no 5, SeptemberlOctober, 1998). p. 4. "Rhoda Rabkin, "The Aylwin Government and Tutelary Democracy: A Concept in Search of a Case?" Journal of Inferamerican Studies and World Afairs, Vo i 34 (no 4, 1 992). p. 1 3 4. "Ibid., p. 157. SI Collier and Sater, Op. Cit, p. 38 1 . "Loveman. "The Transition to Civilian Governrnent in Chile," in Drake and Jaksic. Op. Cit., p. 3 15.

public buildings with soldiers in downtown santiago? Also, when in February 1991 the Rettig

Commission (the Commission For Tmth and Reconciliation) handed in its alarming report on

human right vioiations committed dunng the military regime, the armed forces totally rejected its

conciusions claiming that the deaths had occurred during 'confrontations"." For example, General

Manuel Contreras justified the murder of Orlando Letelier in Washingon in September 1976, the

attack on Bernardo Leighton in Rome in October 1975, and the assassination of General Carlos

Prats in Argentins in September 1974 along the same Iines. He said that this al1 happened in a

context of a declared war. He added: "When the militaxy wins wars, they dont go to jail. They

receive rneda~s . "~~

Following the assassination of Jaime Guzmin in September 1991 there ensued a general

unwillingness on the part of the political actors to pursue with the human rights investigttions of

the Rettig Commission. Indeed. after Aylwin. Eduardo Frei decided to bury the human right issue

in order to secure the stability of Chilean society, but also not to pernirb the existing political

consensus. Hence. Frei never mentioned the issue in his inaugura1 address to Congress on May

2 1 S'. 1 994. 86 Ay lwin himself realized, at the end of his term, thar Chilean democracy had yet to

be consolidated. He dectared in the newsparer El Merczrrio that: "events have cleariy shown that

key institutional aspects

coercion and hegemony

in potitics.

have yet to be resolved in the Chilem ~ransit ion."~~ The balance between

in ChiIe rests on a painful reminiscence of the dictatorship's involvement

a'ScuIly, Op. Cit., p. 108. 84 Rabkin, Op. Cit., p. 147. SS Loveman, "The Transition to CiviIian Government in Chile," in Drake and Jaksic, Op. Cit, p. 3 15. 86 Conceming the political pogram of the second democratic administration, President Frei made clear in his f i t major address to Congress (May 21, 1994) that the fm Concertacion govement's emphasis on constitutional and political reforms would be abandonned and that, instead, the new goverment would focus on fighting povercy and corruption continuing economic modemimtion. The priority became infrasmctural invesrments, modernizing the public sector and consolidating economic development. See Loveman, " R e Transition to Civilian Govertment in Chile," in Drake and Jaksic, Op. Cit., p. 323. a 7 ~ l Mercurio, June 17. 1993, in Scully, Op. Cit., p. 108.

Thus, the fear of another militan, coup impedes Further social enhancement precisely

becnuse it serves the political class to ensure the stability of the system by providing the

governrnent with a justification for postponing the demands of the popular sectors. Edgardo

Boeninger declared that the armed forces might contribute to the stability of Cliilean democracy

because:

the threat of a military backlash will help keep the demands of the groups and the political expectations of cornpetitors in balance. The victims of any backlash wilI always be at the Le fi... That possibility creates a certain tension but also ~ t a b i i i r ~ . ~ ~

Likewise, the nominated senators, Pinochet himself as commander-in-chef of the army, the central

bank. and the right-wing bias of the electoral systema9 seem to all give the government a good

excuse to be tough against political pressures coming from al1 secton of s~ciety.~' Hence, since the

tiegemony of neolibenlism principally rests on the economy's capacity to grow and to reduce

p o v e q tlirough trickle-down effects, and since the common good has been identified with avoiding

a new military intervention. Chile's stability cannot yet be considered an accomplished fact.

The neoliberni historicai bloc

As X m r o VaIenzuela demonstnted, even though a consensus has been reached among the

political dites, and even if both the radical Right and the radical Left are eiectonlly insignificant,

tliere remain in Chile strong ideological amclirnents to old political orientations. As of March

"Edgardo Boeninger, in Rabkin, Op. Cit., p. 143. 391n early 1989, the military govenunent adopted a new electoral law largely favoring the Right First, current ministen, govemors and mayors were allowed ro ntn for office, and a new drawing of the electoral districts pemitted a rural over-representation (the Left has been traditionally weaker in rural areas). Moreover, a binomial electoral system, replacing the historical proportional representation system, was established. This means that, since each districts sends to Congres both candidates with the highest percentage of votes, a candidate can win a seat with an insignificant number of votes. Hence, the fm-pIace party m u t receive at least twice the number of votes of the second-place parcy in order to win both seats. The system thus "favors the second largest vote geîtef. See Amro Valenzuela, "Party Politics md the Crisis of hesidentialism in Chile: A Proposa1 for a Parliâmentary Forrn of Goverment," in Juan J. Linz and Arniro Valenzuela, ed., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 994), p. 1 88. Also Rabkin, Op. Cit, p. 139. And Scully, Op. Cit, p. 108-109. 90 See David E. Hojrnan, Chile: The Politiccd Economy of Developmenr and Democracy in the 19905 (London, The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1993), p. 190.

1993.12.8 per cent of Chileans continued to identi@ themseives as Right or Centre-Right, 24.6 per

cent as Centre, 33.7 per cent as Lefi or Centre-Le4 and 19.0 per cent considered thernselves as

independents or refused to identiQ with a political tendency" There is no doubt, as was shown by

tlie rernarkable absence of ideological debates in the 1993 electoral campaiçn, diat there exists a

political consensus in Chile among the elites on the fundarnentals of a free-market economy?? If

tliis Iiegemony is possible, it is essentially because neoliberalism, as an ideology whic h pnontizes

the structure, allows i t . superstructure to adapt. Hence, as long as capitalist accumulation is not

threatened. the neoiiberai superstructure remains flexible: neolibenlism can be radical or

pragmatic as the Chilean case demonstntes. Yet neoliberal structural imperatives cornbined with a

Scliumpeterian form of democracy may not be enough to keep under controi the centrifuga1

ideological forces present in the Chilean masses. Moreover, in a sort of vicious circle. because the

dites are afraid of the masses imposing unbeanble pressure on the political sysrern - as happened in

the 1960's - the enduring inequality of income distribution and the stili large portion of the

population living in poverry impede further democntization. In a conten of important

constitutional Iioldovers from the dictatorship. the baiance benveen Iiegeriiony and coercion still

leans in favor of coercion. The new historical bloc is an unconsolidated one based on an ideoiogy

wliich necessitates high growth rates to become uuly hegemonic. but an ideology which can aiso

abandon ethical considerations and fall back on pure coercion if the interests of its fbndarnental

class are threarened.

91VaIenzuela. Op., Cit., p. 186. See table 6.10. ?3ee AIan Angeil and Benny Pollack, 'The Chilean Elections 1993: from Polarization to Consensus," Op. Cit.

CONCLUSION

"If you have a soiid and enduring State you must see that it contains no esremes of wealth. It rnust have neither miIIionaires or be,, o='ars.

They are inseparable from one another, and both are fatal to the cornmon good ... Where they exist public liberty becomes a ccmmodity of barter. The rich buy it. the poor sel! it." Jean-Jacques ~ousseau. '

The proclamation of the end of ideological politics in Chile reveals a superficial

understanding of the historicat process leading to the transition to democracy. The defeat of

Marxism and socialism in Chile has led some analysts to believe that the "Good society" has been

reached and that a pragmatic approach to politics allows the governrnent to resolve all existing

conrradictions. However. when analysed from a Gramscian theoreticai approach. the supposed

Chilean road to the end of ideolog seems to lead to a new historical bloc and the victo- of one

particular ideology as opposed to the senuine termination of the ideological era

AS was demonstrated. the end of ideology theory defeats itself by its own conception of

ideology. According to both Mmis t negative and positive understandings of ideology, the end of

ideology thesis must be considered itself an ideology. If ideotogy is the concealment of material

contradictions at the consciousness level as Marx argued (the negative sense), then as long as

private property exists and as long as the economy works on the ba is of the Iaws of the market, the

end of ideology is just another creation of the mind hiding the alienating consequences of the

capitalist mode of production and securing the interests of the mling class. Despite the fact that the

end of ideology theorists give a Napoleonic pejorative connotation to ideology in order to discredit

particular visions of the world as unscientific, they use the concept in a positive sense. That is,

- - - - - -

'Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract and Dkcowse on the Origin and Fottndation of Inequality Among Mankind (New York, Washington Square Press, 1 967), p. 2 1 7.

ideology is conceived of as a world view arousing passions and leading to action. In that sense, the

end ofideology theorists' new political faith, wliich demands total cornmitment, is rooted in a world

view promotinç the virnies of the statu quo. The "Good societyn has been reached, therefore

nothing must be clianged in the prevailing system. Wliereas Gramsci explained tliat ideology was

rooted in a c lass' particular position in a mode of production, the end of ideoiogy theorists are blind

to their own subjective character. Hence. taking science for granted. and praising a pragmatic

approach to politics, they endorse a position which is highly moral. Condemning the 'rnurderous"

effecü of passionate politics, they refuse to question their own premises.

The context in which the new political consensus on the superïority of the privately owned,

market. capitalist economy2 has been reached in Chile is exrrernely revealinp. The organic crisis

caused by the rise of popular expectations in the 1960's led to the disintegntion of the previous

IiistoricaI bloc. Undermined by an econoiny unable to respond to the demands of die population.

the clabonte Cliilean political system. characterized by a pervasive penetntion of civil society by

political parties. becarne polarized. This allowed for the socialist minority govemment of Salvador

Allende to take power whithout either Iiegemony or full control over the coercive appantus. Tlie

Congress. the Controlaria General, the Arrned Forces and the national police remaining outside the

executive's power. the elec;oral victory of the Unidad Popular did not provide the govanment with

enoiigh power to impiement its radical program of social reconstruction. Moreover, UP's focus on

the proletariat, its inability to reform the Chilean mentality according to its world view and its lack

of control over the media irnpeded the govemment from adequately penetmting civil society and

securing its hegemony. Failing to achieve either dictatonhip or hegemony, this stadolatry period of

Chilean Iiistory could not establish the working class as the ruling class.

- -

'Edgardo Boeninger, 'The Chilean Political Transition to Dernocracy," in Joseph S. TuIchin and Augusto Varas, From Dictatorship fo Democraq Rebuilding Pofiticaf Consem~s in Chik (Boulder, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for SchoIars, 199 l), p.56.

On I 1 September 1973. tlie milita- staged a coup ending the long Cliilean democntic

tradition. This inaugurated a second penod of stadolatry in Chilean history in which hepmony was

sacrificed to the profit of coercion. At first. the rnilitary intervention, justified by the National

Security Doctrine, was purely reacrionary. As capitalisrn was disintepting Allende's govemment

was seen as a direct threat to Chilean traditions and institutions, hence, the military believed it was

its duty to intervene. But soon the National Security Doctrine became insufficient to legitmize the

prolonged milita- rule. Integnting a new economic team known as the Chicago Boys in the

government. the m ilitary regime entered a foundational phase, The Chicago Boys quickly became

the organic intellectuals of the military regirne and of tlie capitalist class. Promoting a complete

restructuration of Cliilean economy based on the neoliberal project. the Chicago Boys. in

accordance with tlie militap. sought to estabiish a new technocntic and authoritarian dernocncy.

However. the econornic crisis of 1982 and the social protests of 1983 forced Pinochet to

adopt a more pragmatic neoliberalism wliicli was more in Iine witli the interests of the business

class. Tl1 is translated into signi ficant cabinet and policy chanses whereby the radical Chicago Boys

were evicted h the government. Xccordingly. the following economic recovery and the failure

of the social protests led the opposition to the rnilitary regime to reject tlie communist strategy of

"ail forms of struggle". Hence, it was assumed by the opposition forces that the only way to defeat

Pinochet was to accept the niles established by the 1980 constitution and to win the 1988 plebiscite.

But this strategy of focussing on Pinochet as the common enerny also meant that the opposition

accepted the legitimacy of the I980 constitution and that a new consensus had been reached on the

superiority of a market economy. Indeed, to be hegernonic, the political ciass realized that it

needed a universal appeal. Hence democracy and pragmatic neoliberalism fomed the ideological

ba i s on which the opposition established its political agenda. Pragmatic neoliberaIism served to

secure the consent of the business class, and the democntic project aimed at securing the consent of

the broad masses.

This new political consensus, wliich permitted the defeat of Pinochet and which secured the

transition to dernocracy, took place in a panicular ideological context of repression of leftist

organizations and of intellectuaiization of politics in accordance with Western liberal values. As

Social isü and Commun ists were systematically repressed and pol itical parties dec lared illegal,

intellrctuais penetrated the political vacuum created by the m i l i w repressive policies and became

the organic intellectuals of the new democntic regime. Wliile it is true that the opposition

undenvent a certain Iearning process which allowed it to conceive of a successful opposition

strategy, this learning process also consisted of a form of ideological indoctrination by which

iiitellectuals were convinced of the superior value of teclinocntism and pngmatic neoliberalism.

As a result, the hegemonic cliancter of the new Chilean dernocracy, inaugurated by the

Concertacion government of Parricio Aylwin. rests on a political consensus among the elites who

ka r tliat excessive demands tiom the popular sectors may provoke another milit- coup. Hence.

the newly creared histoncal bloc based on the neoIiberal ideolosy is a fragile one. Indeed, since

ideolo$al attachrnents to oId political parties still rernain in the population in general and since the

cap benveen the rich and the poor is still wide, the existing baiance benveen hegemony and - cosrcion largely depends on the performance of the economy. In addition. the limitations imposed

by the neoliberal econornic mode1 and by the authoritarian hoIdovers of the 1980 constitution

undermine the capacity of the democratic govemments (fint Aylwin's and later ~rei's)' to reduce

?ove- and to adequately address questions of social justice. Finally the absence of ideological

debate in the 1993 presidential elections, seen as a sign of political consensus, hides the domination

of one particular ideology, namely, neoliberalism. Once again, while the end of ideology theory

provides a superficial view of society according to which the "Good society" has been reached and

ideological politics put to an end, in the Chilean case, a Gramscian approach permits one to

penetnte the social structure and to discover that different ideologica1 forces were at work in the

creation of the new historical bloc. The end of ideology serves only as a politicai argument

legitimizing die new political anangement and hiding the complexity of the historical process

leading to the new political consensus.

'AS previously noted, only Frei's earlier political initiatives are considered.

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