METADEBATES ON SCIENCE

Volume 1

Volume 2

Volume 3

Volume4

Volume 5

Volume6

Volume 7

Volume 8

EINSTEIN MEETS MAGRITTE: An Interdisciplinary Reflection on Science, Nature, Art, Human Action and Society

Series Editor Diederik Aerts, Center Leo Apostel, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Einstein Meets Magritte: An Interdisciplinary Reflection The White Book of 'Einstein Meets Magritte' Edited by Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert and Ernest Mathijs

Science and Art The Red Book of 'Einstein Meets Magritte' Edited by Diederik Aerts, Ernest Mathijs and Bert Mosselmans

Science. Technology, and Social Change The Orange Book of 'Einstein Meets Magritte' Edited by Diederik Aerts, Serge Gutwirth, Sonja Smets and Luk Van Langenhove

World Views and the Problem o[Synthesis The Yellow Book of 'Einstein Meets Magritte' Edited by Diederik Aerts, Hubert Van Belle and Jan Vander Veken

A World in Transition: Humankind and Nature The Green Book of 'Einstein Meets Magritte' Edited by DiederikAerts, Jan Broekaert and Willy Weyns

Metadebates on Science The Blue Book of 'Einstein Meets Magritte' Edited by Gustaaf C. Comelis, Sonja Smets, Jean Paul Van Bendegem

Quantum Structures and the Nature ofReality The Indigo Book of 'Einstein Meets Magritte' Edited by Diederik Aerts and Jaroslaw Pykacz

The Evolution of Complexity The Violet Book of 'Einstein Meets Magritte' Edited by Francis Heylighen, Johan Bollen and Alexander Riegler

VOLUME6

Metadebates on Science

The Blue Book of "Einstein Meets Magritte"

Edited by

Gustaaf C. Camelis, Sonja Smets and Jean Paul Van Bendegem Brussels Free University

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

Library of congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN 978-90-481-5242-1 ISBN 978-94-017-2245-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-2245-2

Printed on acidjree paper AII Rights Reserved

1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers and Vrije Universiteit Brussel in 1999

No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,

inc\uding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

Table of contents

General Introduction vu Diederik Aerts

Acknowledgments xv

Editorial Introduction: Metadebates on Science xvii Gustaaf C. Cornelis

1. "Was Einstein a Philosopher?" Deduction vs. Induction, the End 1 of Certitude and Conventionalism A.M. Adam

2. Einstein, Ethics, and Action 17 Don Fawkes

3. Cognitive Science: Two Cultures or One? 31 Marek W. Bielecki

4. Godel's Theorem and Strong AI: Is Reason Blind? 43 Burton Voorhees

5. What about the Modernistic Concept of Consciousness? 63 Suzan Langenberg

6. Mind, Nature and the Emerging Science of Change: 71 An Introduction to Metamorphology James Wilk

7. On Cognitive and Social Dimensions of Science: Constructivism 89 & Nonlinear Dynamics William E. Herfel

8. Necessity of a New Paradigm in Experimental Research Taking 101 into Account Space and Time Carmen Capel-Boute and Andre Koeckelenbergh

9. Biomedical Applications of Magnetic Fluids as a Specific 119 Interdisciplinary Problem V.S. Lazarev, S. Roath, D.A. Yunusova and O.K. Safonenko

10. Cosmology and Proliferation 139 Gustaaf C. Cornelis

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11. Resonance as a Unifying Principle between the Observer and 149 the 0 bserved Paul J. Lewi

12. Early Greek Thought and Perspectives for the Interpretation 163 of Quantum Mechanics: Preliminaries to an Ontological Approach Karin Verelst and Bob Coecke

13. Landscapes of Sibylline Strangeness: Complementarity, 197 Quantum Measurement and Classical Physics Arkady Plotnitsky

14. Metalinguistic Views of Quantum Mechanics and Its 213 Formalizability Lars Lofgren

15. Quantum Truth, Non-Separability and Reality 225 Enrico Giannetto

16. Soliton Waves vs. the Particle Paradigm: The Elementary 237 Nature of the Physical World Geoffrey Hunter

17. "Which Side Spinoza Would Have Taken (between 243 Einstein and Bohr) If He Had Lived to See the [Scientific] Development of Our Days": An Analysis of Human Represen-tation of the Physical Reality Dan Nesher

18. General Relativity and Quantum Theory - Ontological 267 Investigations Steven Weinstein

19. From Quantal to Material Level 281 Emmanuel Hemmerlin

20. On the Origin of Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics: 291 Creative and Contextual Aspects Diederik Aerts, Bob Coecke and Sonja Smets

Index 303

DIEDERIK AERTS

THE GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF EINSTEIN MEETS MAGRITTE

The series of books 'Einstein meets Magritte' presented here originates from an international interdisciplinary conference with the same title, which took place in Brussels in spring 1995. On the eve of the third millennium, we assembled scientists and artists to reflect together on the deep nature of reality and the knowledge and skill humankind has gathered in this field. We had decided to call this meeting 'Einstein meets Magritte' because we believed that meaningful keys could be found at the place where the two meet. It is the way of the world that has made Einstein and Magritte into icons of our culture. The purpose of the conference was to reflect and debate without fear on the most profound and timeless questions.

On one of those evenings, when the talks and discussions were long and exhausting and the press were doing all they could to get Albert Ein-stein and Rene Magritte in front of the microphones and cameras, a few of my most loyal aides and myself succeeded in getting them safely and quietly to a taxi, which then carried us off into the Brussels night. We got out at Manneken Pis, since that was on Einstein's list, and we con-cealed ourselves among the many tourists who were coming and going, expressing their wonder in every language under the sun at the famous little statue. And one of us was taking pictures: Einstein and Magritte leaning against the railings, with us beside them, and one more, arm in arm, and then another in case the first was no good, when suddenly I felt a heavy slap on my shoulder:

"How you doing, mate?" It was Jacky and his inseparable girlfriends Nicole and Sylvie, and

everyone embraced everyone else. I introduced Albert and Rene, and in-terest was immediately shown, and I had my heart in my mouth, because Jacky was a painter, poet and urban philosopher. We walked together through the alleys of Brussels in dismal Belgian rain, over cobblestones that glistened in the street lamps.

When we had provided for the inner man with 'Rabbit in Beer' and 'Mussels with Fries', and finally a 'Dame Blanche' topped with warm chocolate sauce as apotheosis, Jacky enticed us to his house in the Rue Haute where we threw ourselves into deep, soft armchairs. Albert and Rene were offered the best places and as always Jacky told the story

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of his life and discussed his rightness, as he did repeatedly, with a con-fidence and suppleness that distinguished him so sharply from modern science. Albert listened enthralled and Rene was fascinated, and once more my heart was in my mouth, but Nicole winked reassuringly, and Sylvie brought us snacks on cushions of Brussels lace and sweet white wine in tall, old-fashioned crystal glasses.

The topic of discussion for the evening turned out to be 'the doubts of modern science'. In science there is not a single hypothesis for which one cannot find two groups of hard-working scientists, one of which can 'prove' the hypothesis while the other can 'prove' its negation. And the more fundamental and important the question is, the more clearly the situation turns out like this.

"It's crazy," maintained Jacky, "In fact science states that one doesn't know anything anymore."

"That's right," said Albert, "Truth is not a simple concept, and I believe that the history of science makes it clear how often erroneous hypotheses have been believed over the centuries."

"A good thing too," replied Rene, "Things can only happen as a result of the movement brought about by that constant doubt."

Meanwhile Sylvie came to join us and handed round pictures of the exhibitions of Jacky's paintings and poems. Jacky suddenly got very ex-cited, as if something had inspired him, and he leapt up and vanished into his studio. A few minutes later he returned with his palette and brush poised. Before I could stop him he had started painting violently right at the spot where Albert and Rene were sitting. A large, gossamer-thin piece of Brussels lace gradually took shape and Albert and Rene vanished. Fortunately, my young assistants, Jacky's girlfriends and my-self got away with just a few vicious daubs of paint in the face.

The series of eight volumes introduced here are not just the results of the conference, as would be the case with a record of the proceedings. The authors were invited to write with the events at the conference in the back of their mind, so that the books would form a second phase in the process of thought set in motion at the conference. A second phase more clearly crystallised than the self-organising forum that arose during the conference, but one which focuses on the same timeless questions and problems.

The whole ensemble was already streamlined at the conference into a number of main topics named after the colours of the rainbow - red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet, as well as white, the syn-thesis of all colours. This order was maintained and led to eight separate books in the series.

EINSTEIN MEETS MAGRITTE

Volume 1: Einstein meets Magritte: an Interdisciplinary Reflection The White Book of Einstein meets Magritte

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The white book contains more fully developed versions of the contribu-tions made by the keynote speakers at the conference. So this white book covers various scientific topics. In his article, 'Basically, it's purely aca-demic', John Ziman asks himself what 'basic research' really is in today's world. In his contribution, 'The manifest image and the scientific image', Bas Van Fraassen analyses the considerable differences between the the-oretical scientific description of the world and the way it appears to us. He argues that most formulations of this problem may themselves be tendentious metaphysics, full of false contrasts, and that insistence on a radical separation between science and what we have apart from science, and on the impossibility of accommodating science without surrender, may be a way of either idolising or demonising science rather than under-standing it. In the 'Microdynamics of incommensurability: philosophy of science meets science studies', Barbara Herrnstein-Smith examines the bemusing but instructive logical, rhetorical and cognitive dynamics of contemporary theoretical controversy about science. In his contribution 'Subjects, objects, data and values', Robert Pirsig proposes a radical integration of science and value that does no harm to either. It is argued that values can exist as a part of scientific data, but outside any subject or object. This argument opens a door to a 'metaphysics of value' that provides a fundamentally different but not unscientific way of under-standing the world. Ilya Prigogine discusses in 'Einstein and Magritte: a study of creativity', the global transformation of a classical science which was based on certainties into a new science that takes possibilities as its basic concepts. Constantin Piron demonstrates in his contribu-tion 'Quanta and relativity: two failed revolutions' that none of the two great revolutions in physics, quantum mechanics and relativity theory, have actually been digested by the physics community. He claims that the vast majority of physicists still cling to the idea of a non-existent void full of little particles, in the spirit of Leibniz or Descartes. Rom Harre reflects on the significance of the theory of relativity. In his article 'The redundancy of spacetime: relativity from Cusa to Einstein', he defends the hypothesis that relativity theory is best interpreted as a grammar for coordinating narratives told by different observers. In his contribu-tion 'The stuff the world is made of: physics and reality', Diederik Aerts analyses the consequences of the recent advances in quantum mechanics, theoretically as well as experimentally, for the nature of reality. He anal-yses the deep conceptual paradoxes in the light of these recent data and tries to picture a coherent model of the world. In his contribution 'Da-

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sein's brain: phenomenology meets cognitive science', Francisco Varela puts forward the hypothesis that the relation between brain processes and living human experience is the really hard problem of consciousness. He argues that science needs to be complemented by a deep scientific investigation of experience itself to move this major question beyond the sterile oppositions of dualism and reductionism. In his contribution 'What creativity in art and science tell us about how the brain must work' William Calvin defends the prospects for a mental Darwinism that operates on the milliseconds to minutes time scale, forming novel ideas and sentences never previously expressed. Adolf Griinbaum in his article 'The hermeneutic versus the scientific conception of psychoanal-ysis: an unsuccessful effort to chart a via media for the human sciences' argues that the so called 'hermeneutic' reconstruction of psychoanalytic theory and therapy proposed by Karl Jaspers, Paul Ricoeur and Jiirgen Habermas fails both as a channel and as alleged prototype for the study of human nature. In his article 'Immortality, biology and computers', Zygmunt Bauman analyses the shift that postmodern society has pro-voked regarding the concept of immortality. He points out that strategies of collective and individual immortality have shifted from the modern deconstruction of death to a postmodern deconstruction of immortality, and points out that the possible consequences of this process need to be taken into consideration. Brian Arthur, in his article 'The end of cer-tainty in economics', points out that our economy is very non-classical, meaning that it is based on essentially self-referential systems of beliefs about future economic conditions. He argues that our economy is inher-ently complex, subjective, ever-changing, and to an unavoidable degree ill-defined.

Volume 2: Science and Art The Red Book of Einstein meets M agritte

And then Magritte comes in. Many obvious differences exist between science and art. But the Science and Art volume of this series addresses not only these differences but also the possibilities of crossing several of the gaps between science and art. Several contributions deal with socio-logical and philosophical elaborations of the similarities and differences between science and art, while others approach science from an artistic point of view and art from a scientific point of view. The volume also considers several approaches that attempt to go beyond the classical dichotomy between the two activities. In a special section, attention is paid to the particular role played by perception in both science and art as a regulator of human understanding. Together, these contributions strive for an intensive interaction between science and art, and to a con-

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sideration of them as converging rather than diverging. It is to be hoped that both science and art will benefit from this attempt.

Volume 3: Science, Technology and Social Change The Orange Book of Einstein meets M agritte

The major subject of the orange book is that society as a whole is chang-ing, due to changes in technology, economy and the changing strategies and discourses of social scientists. The collected articles in the orange stream discuss a range of specific societal problems related to the sub-ject of social change, the topics of the articles range from the scale of for instance sociology of health and psychohistory to more specific social problems like for instance anorexia nervosa, art academics and the infor-mation superhighway. Although the authors approach different subject matters from dissimilar perspectives and work with various methods, all the papers are related to the theme of science, technology and social change. In the orange book the reader will find a lot of arguments and hints pertaining to questions like: To what exactly will this social change lead in the 21st century? What kind of society lies ahead? She/he will be confronted to a plethora of enriching conceptions of the relationships between social sciences and social changes.

Volume 4: World Views and the Problem of Synthesis The Yellow Book of Einstein meets Magritte

A rapidly evolving world is seen to entail ideological, social, political, cultural and scientific fragmentation. Many cultures, subcultures and cultural fragments state their views assertively, while science progresses in increasingly narrowly defined areas of inquiry, widening not only the chasm between specialists and the layman, but also preventing special-ists from having an overall view of their discipline. What are the motive forces behind this process of fragmentation, what are its effects? Are they truly inhospitable to the idea of synthesis, or do they call out, more urgently than ever before, for new forms of synthesis? What con-ditions would have to be met by contemporary synthesis? These and related questions will be addressed in the yellow book of Einstein meets Magritte.

Volume 5: A World in Transition; Humankind and Nature The Green Book of Einstein meets Magritte

'A World in Transition. Humankind and Nature' is appropriately enti-tled after its aim for an intrinsic property of reality: change. Of major concern, in this era of transformation, is the extensive and profound in-teraction of humankind with nature. The global scaled, social and tech-nological project of humankind definitely involves a myriad of changes of

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the ecosphere. This book develops, from the call for an interdisciplinary synthesis and respect for plurality, acknowledging the evolving scientific truth, the need for an integrated but inevitably provisional world view. Contributors from different parts of the world focus on four modes of change: i) Social change and the individual condition, ii) Complex evo-lution and fundamental emergent transformations, iii) Ecological trans-formation and responsibility inquiries, iv) The economic-ecological and socio-technical equilibria. Primarily reflecting on the deep transforma-tions of humankind and on the relationship between humans and nature it addresses major points of contemporary concern.

Volume 6: Metadebates The Blue Book of Einstein meets M agritte

This book provides a meta-disciplinary reflection on science, nature, hu-man action and society. It pertains to a dialogue between scientists, sociologists of science, historians and philosophers of science. It covers several topics: (1) the relation between science and philosophy, (2) new approaches to cognitive science, (3) reflections on classical thinking and contemporary science, ( 4) empirical epistemology, (5) epistemology of quantum mechanics. Indeed, quantum mechanics is a discipline which deserves and receives special attention here, for it still is a fascinating and intriguing discipline from a historiographical and philosophical point of view. This book does not only contain articles on a general level, it also provides new insights and bold, even provocative theories on the meta-level. That way, the reader gets acquainted with 'science in the making', sitting in the front row.

Volume 7: Quantum Structures and the Nature of Reality The Indigo Book of Einstein meets M agritte

This book refers to the satellite symposium that was organised by the International Quantum Structure Association (IQSA) at Einstein meets Magritte. The IQSA is a society for the advancement and dissemination of theories about structures based on quantum mechanics in their phys-ical, mathematical, philosophical, applied and interdisciplinary aspects. The book contains several contributions presenting different fields of re-search in quantum structures. A great effort has been made to present some of the more technical aspects of quantum structures for a wide audience. Some parts of the articles are explanatory, sketching the his-torical development of research into quantum structures, while other parts make an effort to analyse the way the study of quantum structures has contributed to an understanding of the nature of our reality.

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Volume 8: The Evolution of Complexity The Indigo Book of Einstein meets Magritte

The violet book collects the contributions that consider theories of evo-lution and self-organisation, on the one hand, and systems theory and cybernetics, on the other hand. Both can add to the development of an integrated world view. The basic idea is that evolution leads to the spon-taneous emergence of systems of higher and higher complexity or "in-telligence": from elementary particles, via atoms, molecules, living cells, multicellular organisms, plants, and animals to human beings, culture and society. This perspective makes it possible to unify knowledge from presently separate disciplines: physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, etc. The volume thus wishes to revive the transdisciplinary tradition of general systems theory by integrating the recently devel-oped insights of the "complex adaptive systems" approach, pioneered among others by the Santa Fe Institute.

Even these books only signify a single phase in the ever-recurring process of thought and creation regarding the basic questions on the reality that surrounds us and our place in it.

Brussels, July 17, 1998.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors wish to thank the Center Leo Apostel (Clea) at Brussels Free University and ORGAMED for their persistence in the organiza-tion of the Einstein meets M agritte conference, for taking the initiative to publish its outcomes, and for providing the dynamic structure and stimulating surroundings to work in.

Explicit thanks are due to Sami Amira, Jan Broekaert, and Didier Durlinger for their excellent handling of the material to be published. Meeting the final deadline would not have been possible without their flexibility that went well beyond any obligations.

We would also like to express our thanks to everyone at Kluwer Aca-demic Publishers and the VUB-Press for the practical realization of the volume.

Finally, and most important, we would like to thank the authors for their contributions, as well as for their patience and responsiveness dur-ing the editing.

Brussels, 5 June 1998.

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METADEBATES ON SCIENCE

INTRODUCTION

Through his paintings, creating astonishing, even absurd objects and situations alike, Rene Magritte evokes a poetic climate, a seemingly irrational, at least inconsistent, though wonderful dreamworld. Albert Einstein's universe, how difficult it is to grasp for the non-specialist, is not as surrealistic as one expects it to be. Einstein's world is (hope-fully) logically consistent, Magritte's world is not. So, what if Einstein would have met Magritte? Did they have anything in common, enough to exchange thoughts about? Would they have bothered to listen to each other? Probably they would, since both of them were evidently clever enough to be open-minded.

As scintillating as counterfactuals might be, they are really quite uninteresting from a historiographical point of view. However, from a logico-philosophical point of view, the possible situations implied by the counterfactual 'Einstein meeting Magritte' are plentiful, almost infinite. What would have happened? Unfortunately, the antagonists are dead. Hence, we can not make the two meet and see what happens. Therefore, we can not really know what the outcome would have been. Yet, we can speculate. Better still, we can devise an intriguing experiment: a meeting between scientists on one hand and artists on the other that could give a push in the right direction.

In May 1995, it all came to pass. On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel the international conference Einstein meets Magritte took place. Scholars, scientists and artists met each other under the best of conditions. 'Einstein' and 'Magritte' got acquainted, eventually.

The conference commenced with six plenary sessions, by Ilya Pri-gogine, Barbara Hernnstein Smith, John Ziman, Rom Harre, Francisco J. Varela and William H. Calvin, before it turned to the consideration of specific problems in science presented in the seven parallel sessions. Subjects regarding science and art, university and society, worldviews, nature of life and death, quantum structures and complexity theory were tackled in three hundred talks. In eleven other plenary sessions with Adolf Gri.inbaum, Robert Edwards, Chris Langton, Zygmunt Bauman, Bas Van Fraassen, Linda Scheele, Robert Pirsig, Julian Jaynes, W. Brian

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Arthur, Constantin Piron, and Heinz Von Foerster, the spectrum of present-day scientific research was completed. Five workshops, several exhibitions, performances, posters on all kinds of topics and satellite symposia on quantum structures and cybernetics completed the forum.

A great many lecturers linked their respective specialism to the Ein-stein-Magritte duality, while others made a straightforward presentation of their last results and conclusions. Together, through their papers, they offered a cross-section of contemporary science. This book provides a de-scription of the so-called 'blue stream' in the parallel sessions held at the conference. Other volumes in this series cover the remaining contribu-tions.

Many reactions were submitted to us, so much that, to our regret, not all those who contributed papers could be invited to participate in the conference and only a few can see their contribution published here. This volume binds together twenty papers out of a total of thirty presented at the conference as metadebates. They are divided here over five sections.

One might expect the metadebates to be the most farfetched contribu-tions to the conference. If Einstein would really have met Magritte, that encounter would very probable have resulted in a metadebate: a mosaic of ideas would have emanated from it. Nevertheless, as would have been the case with the two adversaries, the ideas presented here are far from preposterous. Evidently, it must not be thought that this book will yield immediate, internationally acceptable answers to the problems which are identified. Yet, they do provide new insights. These unpretentious articles reflect a scientific way of thinking without exception.

One might expect also the whole to be heterogeneous, but as the reader readily observes, the following overview reveals a surprising correlation between the articles, and even a relation between the sections seems to subsist.

EINSTEIN, PHILOSOPHER AND SCIENTIST

In his contribution to this volume, it is argued by A.M. Adam (Univer-site de Geneve, Switzerland) that Einstein had, indeed, a pronounced philosophy of science, without being a philosopher of science. Doing so, Adam runs counter to Pais's ideas, reasoning that Einstein's Induktion und Deduktion in der Physik (1919) was clearly a defense of hypothet-ical deductivism, hence Einstein was for sure a true philosopher. For that matter, Einstein's philosophy of science was elaborated, expanded, developed, and systematized by Popper.

Don Fawkes (Fayetteville State University, U.S.A.) goes even a little further in his "Einstein, ethics and action". He argues that relativity

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theory apparently cannot provide support for ethical relativism. Nev-ertheless, Einstein did defend certain ethics. Taking these as starting point, Fawkes makes a case for a new course between relativism and absolutism.

COGNITIVE SCIENCE: AN EVALUATION

The second section groups four evaluations of cognitive science. As an interdisciplinary study, cognitive science can be viewed as merely the combination of 'two cultures', as Marek Bielecki (California State Uni-versity, U.S.A.) puts it. Yet, it concerns here an independent discipline. On the other hand, naturalizing the philosophical element reduces cog-nitive science to an exclusively natural science. According to Bielecki, a 'naturalized philosophy' is incapable of addressing the fundamental problem in cognitive science: the problem of meaning. He proposes Luh-mann's system theory as capable of tackling the problem of intentional-ity, as well as the problem of methodological diversity.

Burton Voorhees (Athabasca University, Canada) assesses Godel's the-orem in view of strong artificial intelligence. Godel's theorem implies certain restrictions on AI. In his paper, Voorhees discusses these impli-cations and makes subsequently some philosophical considerations.

Suzan Langenberg (Belgium) presents a very intriguing view on cog-nitive science. Without question the modern concept of consciousness is very obscure and, according to Langenberg, in a sense double-faced: it gives us the confusing experience of being the center of the universe and simultaneously of being alienated from the world. She uses the Einstein-Magritte 'coalition' as a starting point to develop a synthesis of this contradiction.

The fourth paper, written by James Wilk (Brunel University, U.K.), concerns an introduction to metamorphology: the study of transforma-tion in nature. Perception of changes is fundamental for any biological complex. So is its response to the ever changing environment. Wilk points out that subsequently difficulties occur on the theoretical level. He shows that a metamorphological approach tackles these problems sufficiently, although it will change our conception of our surroundings thoroughly.

The last paper of this section is William Herfel's (University of New-castle, U.K.) contribution. In his approach, the concepts of nonlinear dynamics are used to analyse the dichotomy between the cognitive and social aspects of science. After a study of the different positions taken by several distinguished researchers like Churchland, Giere, Hacking, van Fraassen, Galison, Latour and Woolgar, Herfel concludes that non-linear dynamics indeed provide a conceptual framework for approaching

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the complex relation between cognitive and social factors as a nonlinear interaction.

EMPIRICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Different disciplines, namely physical chemistry, biomedical sciences and cosmology serve as the object of epistemological research. Carmen Capel-Boute and Andre Koeckelenbergh (Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Bel-gium) show in the first contribution to this section that the requirement of reproducibility does not hold for physical chemistry, acknowledged as a genuine science.

Vladimir Lazarev and his colleagues Roath, Yunusova and Safonenko (Walt Disney Memorial Cancer Institute, U.S.A.) concentrate on bio-medical research. Although their text is not easily accessible to non-specialists, the philosophical and historiographical conclusions are very illuminating.

The third and last paper concerns contemporary cosmology. Gustaaf Cornelis (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium) shows that in spite of the existence of an appropriate breeding ground and a suitable methodolog-ical tradition, there is no proliferation of theories whatsoever appearing in the development of modern cosmological thinking. Indeed, cosmogo-nical theories based on extragalactic magnetism were developed during the eighties, but as the only real attempt to contest standard theory, they are slowly disappearing now altogether.

REFLECTIONS ON CLASSICAL THINKING AND CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE

Two papers take classical approaches into consideration, searching for 'new' ways to tackle distinct problems in contemporary science. Both articles are highly speculative and interdisciplinary, hence difficult to class.

Paul Lewi (Janssen Research Foundation, Belgium) argues that the universal resonance phenomenon present in almost every aspect of reality can be viewed as the link between observer and the observed. Karin Verelst and Bob Coecke (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium) try to show that an 'ontological' approach of quantum mechanics based on early Greek thought can be very fruitful. This could shed new light on some hard problems in quantum physics.

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EPISTEMOLOGY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS

This volume concludes with a section uniquely devoted to the episte-mology of quantum mechanics. All contributions tackle the problem of complementarity. By considering the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, Bohr's response to it, Bohm's hidden variables theory and Bell's the-orem, Arkady Plotnitsky (University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.) explores how the debate on the relation between classical and quantum mechan-ics, has implications for classical conceptions. His paper discusses the significance of the controversy for classical rather than only quantum physics, and the relevancy for traditional and postmodern philosophy (Deleuze, Serres, Derrida).

Lars Lofgren (University of Lund, Sweden) argues that as a theory of measurability, i.e. of what is measurable and is not measurable, quantum theory ought to contain decidable levels as well as less constructive ones. As a corollary, Lofgren concludes that such levels might resolve a recent challenge against Bohr's wave-particle complementarity by Ghose, Home and Agarwal.

In his contribution, Enrico Giannetto (Universita di Pavia, Italy) anal-yses the definition of logical truth in quantum physics. An 'empirical' logic and category theory are taken as a point of departure. The logical incompleteness of quantum mechanics and non-separability which im-plies the 'death of atomism' are discussed both from the physical and logico-epistemological points of view, also dealing with the problem of quantum reality.

Geoffrey Hunter (York University, Canada) reassesses the approach of de Broglie. This fitting article provides a good introductory to the non-specialist: the problem at stake is described very transparently.

The title of the article by Dan Nesher (University of Haifa, Israel), concerning the epistemological aspects of quantum physics, is a counter-factual: "Which side would Spinoza have taken (between Einstein and Bohr) if he had lived to see the [scientific] development of our days." Needless to say that this is reminiscent of the conference's title. The article elucidates the controversy about complementarity.

In his text on General Relativity Theory and Quantum Theory, Steven Weinstein compares the respective ontologies which go with these two approaches to the world. According to Weinstein, GRT's ontology is re-lated to either a particle based or a field based view. QT's ontology is essentially a field based ontology. Weinstein points out that several problems emerge when one tries to reconcile the two theories from an ontological point of view. Nevertheless, according to Weinstein, a recon-cilement remains conceivable.

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Emmanuel Hemmerlin's contribution regards his proposal to reduce the fundamental constants to even a smaller number (as far as the in-tention of the concept 'physical constant' goes). The paper ends with some old, but still intriguing philsophical questions, pertaining to holism, reductionism, dualism.

In the final and last, but certainly not the least article of this book, Diederik Aerts, Bob Coecke, and Sonja Smets (Vrije Universiteit Brus-sel, Belgium) present some intriguing results found by the CLEA-group concerning a possible explanation for the probabilities in quantum me-chanics. These probablities can now be seen as due to a lack of knowledge on the interaction between measurement apparatus and the system un-ders study, contrary to the 'classical' view that the lack of knowledge (intrinsic or not) has to do with the state of the system. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY REFLECTION ON SCIENCE,

NATURE, HUMAN ACTION AND SOCIETY

This caption was printed on the announcements of the conference early in 1994. Pointless to say that it serves equally well to describe the contents of this book. Maybe the authors justly took it as a point of departure, maybe the organizing committee merely selected the 'right' papers. Any-way, they all surely nurture the inquiring mind; as Einstein and Magritte both did by their ever so distinct but evenly prodigious and inspiring work. Brussels, May 1998.

A.M. ADAM

"WAS EINSTEIN A PHILOSOPHER?" DEDUCTION VS. INDUCTION, THE END OF CERTITUDE AND

CONVENTIONALISM

1. INTRODUCTION

Instead of a survey, a direct attention to the literature on the debate of whether Einstein was a philosopher will be offered. The question, "Was Einstein a philosopher?", may sound a strange one, since Einstein was considered as a philosopher scientist in a collection of papers published in the series of the Library of Living Philosophers [29]. Still, book reviews written by authoritative philosophers, E. Nagel [21] and G. Bergman [2] adopted H. Reichenbach's claim, who contribute to this book [29], whose thesis was that, Einstein's philosophy is by implication only. An-other contributor, who agreed with Reichenbach, was F. Frank, one of Einstein's first important biographers. His student Holton rebelled gen-tly and debated this assertion indirectly, in a series of papers, offering his deliberations on Einstein's philosophy of science as well as asserting that there was a transformation between an early Einstein and a later Einstein: the early Einstein was an empiricist and a positivist whereas the later Einstein was a rationalist and a realist [17]. An attempt to explain why in general Einstein was not discussed as a philosopher until the end of the 1960s is given by the historian of philosophy of science, S. Jaki, in a well documented argument. Holton is outstanding, says Jaki, because of his profound consideration of Einstein's philosophy. Jaki does not mention that Holton omitted a discussion on the neglect. Jaki him-self goes on to explain it, arguing that Einstein was not in line with main stream philosophy:

In all these statements Einstein denounced positivism, endorsed a realist metaphysics, and professed his belief in the objectivity of physical reality. These and other statements were so many public and empathic indications of his belief that there was something absolute beneath the relative. Yet, one would look in vain for a substantive trace of those statements in the books and articles written on relativity by Frank, Rudolf Carnap, Reichen-bach, and Herbert Feigl, all members of the Vienna Circle, who in the 1950s and 1960s captured, in the United States at least, the role of authoritative spokesman on behalf of Einstein in particular and of science in general. Their systematic silence on many relevant statements and facts was only

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1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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part of the strategy pursued by them. Instead of strategy, the word cru-sade would be more appropriate. Reichenbach himself warned that logical positivism should be looked upon as a crusade and not as an abstract phi-losophizing. Intellectual crusades have their inner logic to which logical pos-itivists were not immune. Or, as Herbert Feigl admitted well over a decade ago: 'Confession, it is said, is good for the soul. Undoubtedly we [logical positivists] made up some facts of scientific history to suit our theories'[18].

Another source of the ignorance of Einstein's philosophy is due to a lack of knowledge of physics: Einstein's physics not only overwhelm physicists such as Michelson but it overwhelmed many philosophers as well. As strange as it may sound, there are many philosophers who did not study the abc's of relativity and its epistemic, metaphysical and methodologi-cal consequences for modern philosophy, and most philosophers paid no attention to Einstein's philosophy. The merit of Einstein's contributions to philosophy was, however, loudly debated in the pages of The British Journal for Philosophy of Science and Studies of History and Philosophy of Science; the debate was led by Zahar and his opponent Feyerabend. Meanwhile, in 1982, Abraham Pais, in his first and most comprehensive biography of Einstein [22], a study which superseded most Einstein's previous biographies, suggested (the truism) that Einstein's scientific insights were both philosophical and scientific. Zahar's papers were pub-lished in a form of a book only in 1989 [30]; here the heuristics of Ein-stein's philosophical view were examined. In 1993, Michel Paty publishes his book in which he offers a reconstruction of the significant epistemical import of Einstein's philosophy to early 20th century philosophy of sci-ence [25]. Pais receives the book. Yet, in a recent book, Pais admits his difficulties to appraise Einstein's contributions to philosophy, and argues that Einstein's contribution to philosophy was, if at all, marginal [23]. Pais does not respond to Paty. Paty's book is unique in the field, in that he reconstructs the epistemic debates between the scientists. For exam-ple, the debates between Mach and Poincare and Planck on the basic questions of the epistemic status of scientific theory, scientific method-ology, etc. However, Paty doesn't explain if Einstein's philosophy is so significant, why it was kept silent. Admittedly, Einstein's writings on philosophical issues are few; it is not the quantity which counts here but the quality. My thesis is that, Einstein's epistemic, methodological, and metaphysical contributions to philosophy do not only indicate that he directly contributed to philosophy, but in evaluating these contribu-tions, it can be shown whether they were significant to early 20th century philosophy of science. Furthermore, his philosophy was in opposition to some of his own colleagues and friends' views who opposed his general relativity and cosmology (Born). This can be illustrated by the open

WAS EINSTEIN A PHILOSOPHER? 3

debates on the sources of knowledge (scientific theory) and on scientific method between the rationalists and the empiricists, and on the status of scientific theory between the conventionalists and the realists. In these debates Einstein offered new positions.

2. A CRUDE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Did Einstein talk philosophy and criticised it with philosophers? Yes. Einstein was exposed to philosophy from an early age. He was about

13 when he first read Kant's Critique of Pure Judgment. He studied the philosophies of Hume, Mill and Poincare [1902]. Einstein was directed to Mach by his friend Besso, and he corresponded with Mach and admitted Mach's crucial influence on his works. Not only the reconsideration of the concept of gravitation; in a philosophical view, the ideas of learning by trial and error as well as the significance of the idea of thought ex-periment: both are critical aspects of Einstein's epistemology: both ideas are discussed in Mach [19]. Einstein's reading included both his contem-porary philosophers and historians of science. Beside reading the works of Mach and Poincare [24], he read and corresponded with Meyerson and not only wrote a review [9] of Meyerson's philosophical work but also exchanged philosophical comments and criticisms at public confer-ences [8]. Cassirer's philosophical work [5] on relativity was closely scru-tinised by Einstein. All this is worth mentioning since all Einstein's cor-respondences with philosophers like Meyerson and Cassirer, with whose philosophies he disagreed, still await translation and publication. Fur-ther, Schlick's critical book review of Cassirer book [5], was later praised by Einstein. Schlick and Einstein studied each other works (roughly be-tween 1910 and 1920) and corresponded and exchanged philosophical views. With his friends, Einstein discussed philosophical issues as early as his period in the patent office in Bern, a period of time in which he was to become a professor of physics, a period of time in which he pub-lished his famous papers of special theory of relativity-his friend who translated most of his works to French, Solovine, discusses this in the Introduction to their correspondence [13]. Einstein read Russell, neither do I know of any evidence for the first time nor the first item he read.

Another point is historiographical-Einstein's correspondences. They throw light on his intellectual development, since with his friends Ein-stein discussed issues belonging to all the aspects of his life and in partic-ular of his intellectual interests. This is the place where some historians may find information which can be of use in the process of constru-ing different aspects of Einstein's work and life. Similar is the case as regards Einstein's contribution to philosophy. Nevertheless, in his pub-

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lications to the layman and professionals alike, Einstein's philosophical views were argued in succinct manner. Einsteinian scholars may indeed use the archives to this end; still Einstein's own published work is suf-ficient. It was in public where Einstein first offered his philosophy, in a language which is intelligible to the layman and the professional alike. Thus the neglect of Einstein's philosophy is not due to the fact that he kept it hidden and communicated it discretely. Neither is it due to the (false) view that Einstein's philosophical contributions do not merit his being discussed as a philosopher. In order to give further reasons and to answer the question, why Einstein's philosophy of science was omitted from the agenda of philosophers, a study of the sociology of early 20th century philosophers and scientists is required; a study which is beyond the scope of the present essay.

3. RAT I 0 N ALI S M V S. EMPIRICISM

According to the article "Rationalism" in the 11th edition of the En-cyclopaedia Britannica [1910], the rationalist asserts that the source of knowledge is mental, the sensationalist (the empiricist), that it is em-pirical. As regards the issue of scientific method: the rationalist says, it is deductive; the empiricist says, it is inductive. Both, the rationalist and empiricist presuppose that, in principle, if one uses the right method one should arrive at true knowledge; this I shall call the certitude the-sis. The debate between the empiricist and rationalist on the sources of knowledge and methodology of knowledge is central to the philoso-phies of Bacon, and to Descartes' responses to Bacon, and it is central to Hume's attack on Cartesian epistemology, and it is central to Kant's consideration of Hume's attack and his own response to Hume. One of the leading debates, which is traced back to the philosophies of Bacon and Descartes, was common amongst late 19th century scientists. Mach and Planck debated the sources of knowledge, Mach defended empiricism whereas Planck defended rationalism. Indeed it became an unsettled cen-tral debate, and was put again on the agenda of philosophers in Russell's classic [26].

4. INDUCT IV ISM V S. DEDUCT IV ISM

In his paper "Induktion und Deduktion in der Physik" published on 25 December 1919 amongst other articles by Planck et al. in the widely read news magazine Berliner Tageblatt Einstein made a compelling argument in a classical philosophical form, to which I have seen only three earlier references in the literature. First reference is in Don Howard [15] in which a translation of the fifth paragraph of that paper is offered (See

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below more on this context). Second reference is in Eisenstaedt [14] by passing he says that Einstein's philosophy predates Popper's (I discuss this below at the end of my essay). Third reference is most important, Michel Paty [25], the only study which discusses Einstein's philosophy in the current literature, and does not make much of this paper; so, I will not discuss Paty's book here and leave it for an essay review which is in progress.

The readership of the Berliner Tageblatt was the educated person, and by directing attention to the objective thing science, Einstein aimed to heal the political situation in Germany. This was not only published in unstable Germany with its insane political situation, perhaps the situ-ation is best characterised by George Grosz's paintings of the period. Most importantly it was published after Einstein's theory of relativity was confirmed by experience, and the results of the famous British eclipse expeditions of November 1919 were known to many. This confirmation, Sir Karl Popper confesses, consequently turned his attention, like of so many of his peers, to the study of relativity. Enough was said about this. The non-educated, and the educated people alike, were full with enthu-siasm even though they did not know what it meant, but that something big happened in physics, that Einstein created a theory which signifi-cantly changed Newton's conceptions, and thus changed our conceptions of the world.

It is also worth while to discuss Einstein's philosophical paper if only because he breaks with philosophical tradition and offers new answers to disturbing old questions such as, what is, if any, scientific method? What is the structure of scientific theory? What should be the presuppositions of the researchers who produce scientific theory?

5. IS EM PI R I CIS M TEN A B L E? N 0 .

In the first paragraph of his paper Einstein presents the standard answer of the empiricist to the question of scientific method, the development of natural science can be looked at as if it follows the inductive method:

Singular facts are chosen and grouped in such a way that the law of nature which connects them becomes evident. By grouping these laws more general ones can be derived until a more or less homogeneous system would have been created for this set of singular facts. Start-ing from these generalisations, the retrospective mind could then, inversely, arrive back at the singular facts by pure reasoning. [6]

This is an elucidation of the empiricist view. General theories are induced from singular facts. The main assumption shared by the empiricists, ever since Bacon, was (the universal judgment) that all researchers should be-

6 A.M. ADAM

gin the inquiries about nature without any prejudgment. This is where Einstein begins his argument against the standard answer of the empiri-cist to the question of scientific method. He is not repeating the Humean argument that inductive inference is invalid (he does this elsewhere [10]), but Einstein denies that the researcher begins his inquiries tabula rasa. Einstein argues that in principle the scientist cannot select singular facts unless he has prejudgments. Einstein's attack is made by a counter ex-ample, a singular case which counters (refutes) the universal judgment. Einstein's counter example is an example of Galilee's scientific work. In Einstein's opinion, the scientist has a prejudgment when he begins his inquiries of nature. Otherwise, how should we understand, the essential part of scientific discovery, the selection of facts done by the scientist?

Galileo could never have discovered the law of free falling bodies, had he not maintained the preconceived opinion that the circumstances which we really encounter are complicated by the effects of air resis-tance so that one has to focus on cases in which air resistance plays as marginal a role as possible. [6]

6. CRITICAL RAT I 0 N ALI S M IS P R 0 P 0 SED

Einstein, then, asserts that in fact the scientist begins in almost a dia-metrical way, to the inductive method. The source of scientific theory is not the singular facts by themselves but general hypothesis based on the scientist's mental intuition which evaluates ensemble of facts. Then, the scientist constructs a hypothetical theory with general laws and their logical consequences, particular statements, which can be tested against experience. Note that this is a characterization of what is known to be the "hypothetico deductive" structure of scientific theory. Einstein de-scribes it as follows:

Intuitive comprehension of the essentials about the large complex of facts leads the researcher to construct one or several hypothetical fundamental laws. From the fundamental law (system of axioms) the researcher draws as completely as possible its consequences by purely deductive logical method. These consequences, which often can only be derived from the fundamental law by extensive elaborations and calculations, can then be compared with experience yielding a cri-terion for the validity of the supposed fundamental law. Both the fundamental law (axioms) and the consequences form what we call a "theory" [6].

Einstein is rejecting the scientific outlook of the empiricist: first and foremost Galilee's main discovery cannot be understood according to that view (i.e., that scientific method is inductive), secondly, contrary

WAS EINSTEIN A PHILOSOPHER? 7

to this view, the scientist has prejudgment, otherwise how could we un-derstand his selection of facts; finally, we can better understand the way of scientific discovery by assuming that scientific theory is hypothetico deductive. Einstein illustrates that indeed all branches of physics need to be understood in that way:

Newton's theory of gravitation, thermodynamics, the kinetical theory of gas, modern electrodynamics and so forth, all arose in this way and their foundations have in principle a hypothetical character [ 6].

The question which is left open is: what is the scientific method, if not inductive? Does Einstein say that the scientific method is deductive? Or does he think that science has any particular method? Or the question we should ask is not, what is the method of science, if any, but rather how do we conjecture a scientific theory? That is, how do we arrive at scientific knowledge? Einstein, in my opinion, does not advocate that the scientific method is deductive. I doubt that he thinks that this is the case because when he arrives to describe the scientific method he begins to describe it in a metaphoric language:

But he [the researcher] doesn't arrive at his system of thought in a methodical, inductive way, he rather, snuggles to the facts by intu-itive choice among the imaginable axiomatic theories [6].

Thus, in Einstein opinion, the method of science is neither inductive nor deductive. There is no scientific method in the traditional sense. In the sense that both, the traditional rationalist and empiricist presuppose the certitude thesis. If anything, a scientific method cannot license true knowledge. Here Einstein attempted to put an end to the feeling of certainty in science (end of certitude). Nevertheless, the scientist creates a hypothetico deductive theory. What is the truth value of a scientific theory? Can we know, in principle, whether a scientific theory is correct? Every student of early 20th century philosophy of science knows that these are all central issues to heated debates between philosophers. These are the questions Einstein was considering.

But before we turn to Einstein's answers to these questions, it is worth-while to dwell on their opposition as represented by Born in particu-lar since Born's assertions are in straight contradiction with Einstein's. Twenty years later, in his book on philosophy of nature, Born asserts that relativity illustrates that the scientist begins from hard facts rather than preconceived ideas [3, pp. 141-142]. Born is not referring to Ein-stein's philosophical views on this question. Prima facie it is quite strange that Born argues that the empiricist way to describe relativity is bet-ter. Born followed Einstein's publications and activity ever since 1915 and closely in the 1919-1920s from Gottingen where he held a post until

8 A.M. ADAM

1933. This is clear to every reader of the correspondences between them [4]. Born did not approve of the philosophical changes made by the later Einstein. This change of philosophy of science was in the public domain since 1919- 1920. Not to mention Einstein's rejection of empiricism in his famous Herbert Spencer Lecture [10]. Einstein illustrated his counter examples against empiricism and inductivism by discussing how deduc-tively he arrived at Relativity. Born knows of these differences between his philosophy and Einstein's, and still Born suggests that the scientists employ inductive method without considering Einstein's opposing views; he says it in many places in his philosophical study of science. I further would like to focus on Born's discussion of the issue of probability since this issue was the kernel of scientific debates between Einstein and his colleagues the physicists. I will not dwell here, however, on its scientific or on its philosophical aspects. I consider Born's philosophical views not only as the opposing views to Einstein's but also to show the relevance of a discussion on Einstein's philosophy which is omitted even by his close friend. Born then subscribes to the view that the inductive method is the method of science. It is important to say that Born does not bother to argue for his position; his convictions are so strong that any argument seems, in reading his treatment of the issue of scientific method, to be superfluous [3, p. 47].

7. THE END OF CERTITUDE

As regards the question of whether a scientific theory is erroneous, this can be detected only if there is a logical error in its deduction. A scientific theory needs to be evaluated first on its logical grounds, the question is whether a scientific theory is consistent. The second test of a scientific theory is, whether a fact is in accord with its consequences, that is, if the theory is not in accord with experience, then the theory is false. In Einstein's words:

A theory can thus be recognised as erroneous if there is a logical error in its deductions, or as incorrect if a fact is not in agreement with its consequences [6].

As regards the question whether a scientific theory can be proved to be true, Einstein asserts in a long sentence that it cannot.

But the truth of a theory can never be proven. For one never knows that even in the future no experience will be encountered which con-tradicts its consequences; and still other systems of thought are al-ways conceivable which are capable of joining together the same given facts [6].

WAS EINSTEIN A PHILOSOPHER? 9

In this point Einstein's argument is that a scientific theory in principle cannot be proved to be true, for he argues, we do not know if any future experience will contradict its predictions.

This is where Einstein gives la coup de grace to the thesis of certitude by directing our attention to the hypothetico deductive structure of a scientific theory. A theory, in principle, cannot be proven to be true, be-cause future experience may counter its consequences. This is the kernel of the philosophical view which came to be known as critical rationalism. What is said so far is the least one can say on the context of Einstein's philosophical paper, and its contributions to philosophy.

8. EINSTEIN'S ALLEGED C 0 NV EN T I 0 N ALI S M

Consider what is to be done in the case when two scientific theories "are capable of joining together the same given facts". This is where Einstein cannot give a criterion for choice between the two theories. In this case, the choice of the scientist then depends on the scientist's intuition, says Einstein, where he attempts to explain why bright scientists hold contra-dictory theories. Einstein, however, did not hold contradictory theories:

If two theories are available, both of which are compatible with the given factual material, then there is no other criterion for preferring the one or the other then the intuitive view of the researcher. Thus we may understand how sharpwitted researches, who have command of theories and facts, can still be passionate supporters of contradictory theories. [6]

Interestingly enough the last three quotes from Einstein's paper serve a respectable Einsteinian scholar, Howard, to argue that (I shall number the sentences for the sake of convenience):

(1) What is significant [says Howard] is Einstein's claim that a the-ory can never be proven true, not only because new discoveries might overturn it, but also because alternative theories are "always conceiv-able" which can account for the same evidence. (2) Einstein is saying that in addition to the old Humean problem of inductive uncertainty, we also have to acknowledge the radical underdetermination of the-ory by evidence. (3) But this latter is just Schlick's point that "under certain conditions several theories may be true at once, in that they provide a different but in each case perfectly univocal designation of the facts." [15, pp. 620-621]

Howard's statement (1) is true to the text, but his statement (2) is not. If you recall, Einstein's attack on the inductive method is on the as-sumption that the scientist begins tabula rasa in his inquiries of nature. Einstein did not attack the invalidity of inductive inference, which is

10 A.M. ADAM

known to be the "old Humean problem of inductive uncertainty". Fur-ther, and most crucial, Einstein does not say what (as Howard seems to think) Schlick says. Einstein does not state Schlick's possible conditions under which "theories may be true at once". Recall that Einstein asserts that a theory can never be proven to be true and that when he says any-thing about two theories which agree with the same set of facts, he does not say that they are both true. Einstein rather says that the choice of the scientist in this case depends on his own intuition. It is very bizarre that Howard is off the mark because from Einstein [6] the translation of the fifth paragraph only appears in Howard's paper.

Worse, Howard alleges that Einstein believes in conventionalism:

Einstein and Schlick both believed then that experience does not uniquely determine a correct theory, from which it follows that one's choice of a theory has the logical status of convention [15, p. 621].

I will not say a thing about Schlick's beliefs. As regards Einstein's, he offers arguments and assertions. He does not use the verb "to believe" at all in his paper of 1919. So I do not know what is the source of Howard's observation. Further, Einstein in fact does not assert positive criteria, that is, neither does he assert how we do recognise a theory free of errors (a logically consistent), nor a correct theory (a theory which agrees with experience). Einstein, rather, argues that: "A theory can thus be recognised as erroneous if there is a logical error in its deductions, or as incorrect if a fact is not in agreement with its consequences." Thus Einstein offers negative criteria. From this does not follow Howard's claim "that one's choice of a theory has the logical status of convention".

I should elaborate here. In a (misleading) footnote in his [16], Howard references Einstein [7] as a supporting source to the (false) claim that Einstein subscribes to conventionalism. According to Howard, Einstein "concludes : 'In my opinion, Poincare is correct sub specia aeterni, in this conception' " [16, p. 380]. There is no contradiction here. Einstein seems to hold that conventionalism in mathematics is right. But Einstein says no to conventionalism in science. How was Howard led astray? It begins with his presentation of Einstein's argument which is not true to the text since Einstein does not "conclude" with this remark. The truth is that in his [7], Einstein after suggesting that Schlick's descriptions of the axioms of mathematics as "implicit definitions" is "apt", then Einstein was suggesting "that mathematics as such cannot predicate anything about perceptual objects or real objects" [7, p. 30]. Then Einstein turns to describe his philosophy of science in contrast with Poincare's. Einstein goes on to describe how geometry can do this job, i.e., to predict, with the addition of the hypothesis: "Solid bodies are related, with respect to

WAS EINSTEIN A PHILOSOPHER? 11

their possible dispositions, as are bodies in Euclidean geometry of three dimensions" [7, p. 32]. Then Einstein goes on to assert that geometry with this added hypothesis should be distinguished from "purely ax-iomatic geometry" and he baptised his version by the name: "practical geometry" . The latter is characterised in the following: "The question whether the practical geometry of the universe is Euclidean or not has a clear meaning, and its answer can be furnished by experience". Then Einstein says that he attaches special importance to his view of geometry since otherwise he would not be able to arrive at relativity. Thereafter he suggests that if we do not agree to his (Einstein's) understanding of practical geometry, that is if we deny the connection between geometry and reality, then we arrive at Poincare's conventionalism. This is the pretext to Einstein's statement "Poincare is correct sub specia aeterni, in this conception" [7, p. 35]. Yet, Einstein continues with his consider-ation and assessment of Poincare's views, and he says "but" [7, p. 36], and after it, he objects to Poincare's view by arguing that we are yet to posses certain knowledge of theoretical principles [of scientific theories]; and Einstein then tackles a further objection to his realistic interpreta-tion of physics, i.e., relativity, and then he extends his claim to other geometries [7, pp. 37-38]. Einstein therein suggests that experience in-deed serves the scientist in his assessment of his given theory, and hence the choice of the axioms of scientific theory is not a matter of conven-tion. Einstein only then arrives at a conclusion before illustrating it by ample examples. His conclusion begins with these words: "Therefore the question whether the universe is spatially finite or not seems to me a decidedly pregnant question in the sense of practical geometry. I do not even consider it impossible that this question will be answered before long by astronomy" [7, p. 41]. I elaborated on this point elsewhere [1] like Paty who argues that Einstein was not a conventionalist with a sim-ilar argument [25]. Einstein repeats the same in his replies to criticism [12]. I will turn back to Einstein's paper of 1919.

Einstein, in this paper [6], offers to the general public, for the first time, to the best of my knowledge, his philosophical outlook. And since in this Einstein's philosophy differs greatly from his earlier philosophical outlook, I will not follow Howard's discussion which goes to an earlier phase of the correspondences between Schlick and Einstein. I am reluc-tant to do this because of another reason which is external to this issue. Howard observes that Einstein dissents from the neo-Kantians philos-ophy. But he does omit mentioning that Einstein corresponded with Meyerson and Cassirer. Howard also omits mentioning that Cassirer's philosophical manuscript on the philosophy of relativity was scrutinised by Einstein. And that Cassirer and Einstein corresponded. This is impor-

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tant because Howard mentions that in Schlick's review of Cassirer's book in which Cassirer attempted to reconcile relativity and neo-Kantianism, this attempt was rejected by Schlick as untenable. Further, Einstein praised Schlick's review. Question: Why did Einstein work on a philo-sophical work, make corrections and comments, but not tell Cassirer that Cassirer's views are untenable? Did Einstein need to be enlightened by Schlick? This is a question at which Howard does not arrive? Why? Be-cause, to begin with, Howard omits mentioning the exchanges between Einstein and Cassirer.

The last issue I shall mention here in passing is that Einstein in fact discussed the method used by the researcher earlier in his address to Max Planck of 1918, and Einstein later continued to discuss the issues of his published paper in his address to the Prussian Academy of Sci-ences in which he comments directly on Schlick's conventionalist view that the axioms of mathematics can be considered as "implicit defini-tions." This is in the domain of philosophy of mathematics not in the domain of philosophy of science. This, Howard omits to mention as well. Einstein, as is indicated in the above, argues in this paper [7] against the conventionalism of Poincare in science and finds it appropriate in math-ematics. In this Einstein elaborates on the view presented in his paper [6] with ample examples in the literature. The third philosophical paper in which Einstein repeats these views with further elaboration is in his famous Herbert Spencer Lecture in 1933 [10]. Einstein's other published philosophical reflections are scattered all over his writings, for example, in some of his contributions to Russell's Festschrift [28] and in several introductions he contributed to books on history and philosophy of sci-ence. He also mingled his philosophy with some popular and scholarly presentations of his physics.

9. C 0 N C L US I 0 N

I primarily aimed in my paper to indicate that Einstein has a philosophy and that his philosophy is a breakthrough in the debate between the ra-tionalists and the empiricists, and that he considers the conventionalist view and rejects it. His philosophy of science is critical rationalist and is in opposition to the empiricist philosophy of Born who advocates quan-tum physics. I also made here an attempt to show that Pais's scepticism regarding Einstein's contributions to philosophy is untenable; and that Einstein's contributions were significant.

I should perhaps mention that Jean Eisenstaedt asserts in a sweeping claim that as regards the main points of Popper's philosophical pro-gram: (whatever it means) it is predated by a philosophical argument

WAS EINSTEIN A PHILOSOPHER? 13

by Einstein: It is certainly not by chance that Einstein stated the main points of the Popperian program many years before the publication of Logik der Forschung [1935], as early as 1919: 'But the truth of a theory will never be proved. Because one can never know if, in the future, some experience will become known that would contradict its conclusions (Einstein 1919)'[14].

It is regrettable that Eisenstaedt neither pauses to elaborate once he made an explicit strong historical comment, i.e., Einstein's philosoph-ical view predates Popper's; nor does he say how significant Popper's philosophy was, if at all. Nor does he say, If Einstein contributed so much to an acknowledged philosopher's philosophy of science, how come Einstein's philosophy of science is rarely discussed or why he himself does not discuss it but reference to by passing. I shall discuss Eisenstaedt's important observation in another essay.

AFFILIATION

The author is currently at the Edelstein Centre for Philosophy of Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel.

Earlier versions of this paper were read on 2 February 1995 in Dort-mund University: I am thankful to Professors, J. Stolz and A. Hirshfeld, for comments and the latter also corrected some errors in the translation of [6]. On 1 June 1995 it was presented in a short version to the Congress: Einstein meets Magritte. On 14 July it was presented in Geneva Univer-sity. On 21 November 1995 it was presented in Tel Aviv University. I am indebted to extensive criticisms given by my friend Mr. Douglas Gardner of York University and for comments given by Professors Max Jammer and Menachem Fish and Yemima Ben Menachem. The translation of [6] was done by my friends Bernd Fleischman, Derek Lutterbeck and my-self. I am the sole responsible for the views and mistakes presented in this essay. While writing this essay I was appointed as a Research Asso-ciate in Geneva University and benefited from the Swiss Israeli Cultural Exchange Grant.

14 A.M. ADAM

REFERENCES

[1] Adam, A.M., "Einstein, Michelson, and the Crucial Experiment Revisited", Methodology and Science, 25, 1992, pp. 117-228. [2] Bergman, G., "Book review" of [29] in: The Philosophical Review, LX, 1951, pp. 268-274. [3] Born, M., Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1949. [4] Born, M., Albert Einstein/Max Born Briefwechsel1916-1955, 1969. [5] Cassirer, E., Zur Einstein'schen Relativitiitstheorie, 1921. [6] Einstein, A., "Induktion und Deduktion in der Physik", Berliner Tageblatt, (Suppl. 4),1, 25 December 1919. [7] Einstein, A., Geometry And Experience Sidelights On Relativity London, Methuen & Co., 1921. [8] Einstein, A., Conseil de Physique Brussels Bulletin de la Societe franr;aise de philosophie, 22, 1922, p. 112. [9] Einstein, A., "A propos de La deduction relativiste, de M. Emile Meyerson", in: Revue philosophique de la France et de l'etranger, 105, 1928, pp. 161-166. [10] Einstein, A., "The Herbert Spencer Lecture" which was titled "On the Method of Theoretical Physics" Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1933. [11] Einstein, A., "Remarks on Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowl-edge", in [28]. [12] Einstein, A., "Replies To Criticism", in [29]. [13] Einstein, A., Lettres A Maurice Solovine, Paris, Gauthier-Villars 1956. [14] Eisenstaedt, J ., "Low Water Mark In General Relativity", in: Howard, D. and Stachel, J. (eds.), Einstein and the History of Gen-eral Relativity, Einstein Studies, 1, Boston, Birkhauser, 1989, pp. 277-292. [15] Howard, D., "Realism and Rationalism in Einstein's Philosophy of Science", Philosophia Naturalis, 1984, pp. 617-629. [16] Howard, D., "Einstein and Duhem", Synthese, 1990, pp. 363-384. [17] Holton, G., Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought, 1973. [18] Jaki, S.L., "The absolute beneath the relative: reflections on Ein-stein's theories", in: Ryan, D.P. (ed.), Einstein and the Humanities, New York, Greenwood Press, 1987, pp. 5-18.

WAS EINSTEIN A PHILOSOPHER? 15

[19] Mach, E., Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung, 1905. [20] Meyerson, E., The Relativistic Deduction, 1925. [21] Nagel, E., a book review: "Einstein's Philosophy of Science", on [29] in: The Kenyon Review, XII, 1950, pp. 521-531. [22] Pais, A., Subtle is the Lord: The science and the life of Albert Einstein, Oxford, UP, 1982. [23] Pais, A., Einstein Lived Here, Oxford, UP, 1994. [24] Poincare, H., Science and Hypothesis, 1902. [25] Paty, M., Einstein philosophe: La physique comme pratique philoso-phique, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1993. [26] Russell, B., The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford, UP, 1912. [27] Russell, B., The Scientific Outlook, London, Allen, 1931. [28] Schilpp, P.A., The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Evanston, Illi-nois, 1944. [29] Schilpp, P.A., Albert Einstein Philosopher Scientist, 1951. [30] Zahar, E.G., Einstein Revolution, New York, Open Court, 1989.

DON FAWKES

EINSTEIN, ETHICS, AND ACTION

1. QUESTIONS OF ETHICS ARE RELATIVE, AREN'T THEY?

On the 26th of February 1979, Time magazine [5] ran an advertisement describing its coverage of the Einstein Centennial. With a magnificent picture of Einstein's thoughtful, sensitive face covering most of the page the lead read, "Everything is relative. In the cool, beautiful language of mathematics, Einstein demonstrated that we live in a world of rela-tive values." (p. 53) This claim must have come as quite a surprise to those who have read Einstein's published works on ethics, because it is contrary to them. (See, e.g., [1]) "Everything is relative" is a misun-derstanding that infects popular accounts of Einstein's work in physics no less than accounts of his views on morality. The Special and Gen-eral Theories of Relativity produce objective laws of nature, confirmed true for any reference frame. Reference frames (or "bodies"), of course, can move in relation to each other, and when they do move, this affects measurements of distance and time from one body to another; hence, the name "Relativity." But the laws are quite objective, and confirmed by experience. Einstein's view of morality is rather similar:

It is the privilege of man's moral genius, impersonated by inspired individuals, to advance ethical axioms which are so comprehensive and so well founded that men will accept them as grounded in the vast mass of their individual emotional experiences. Ethical axioms are found and tested not very differently from the axioms of science. Truth is what stands the test of experience. [1, p. 115]

We will return to this general approach below. But before doing so we need to build a little groundwork to show that both moral relativism and moral absolutism are intellectually bankrupt. Interestingly, quite similar arguments show both of these somewhat popular doctrines to be faulty. We begin with the most popular form of absolutism, that which is based on commands from authority.

2. COMMANDS

We will deal with the view that morality is based on authority in its most persistent form: That God is the authority. If we can show the

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flaws in this position, it is unlikely that "lesser" authorities will have much chance of standing as the foundation of morality. We will not discuss nor question the existence of a supreme being or supernatural entities; consideration of those topics is properly left to metaphysics and theology. Rather, we simply ask, "If there is a deity, what bearing can this have on morality?"

There seem to be three possible relationships between a deity or deities and morality (For ease of expression we will employ the singular term "deity" from here forward; however, what follows applies equally, with very minor modifications, to a multiplicity of deities or supernatural beings). The three possible relationships are as follows: DET: The deity wills right acts because these acts are right. (Divine

Expert Theory) DCT: Right acts are right because the deity wills them. (Divine Com-

mand Theory) NDRT: The deity wills nothing concerning people's actions. (No Divine

Relation Theory) NDRT is consistent with deism, the opinion held by many, perhaps

most, of the "founding fathers" of the United States. Deism holds that although a deity began the universe at a time long past, the deity has no dealings with it now, and certainly no concern for human beings; whatever it is that "began" the universe is the deity, the Creator. In other words, there is no relationship between the deity and morality. This, of course, is possible but we will have little further to say about it, since our primary interest is to discuss the possible bearing of a deity on morality.

This leaves us to consider Divine Expert Theory and Divine Command Theory. If there is a deity, does the deity will that we do right acts because these acts are right, or are these acts right simply because the deity wills that we do them? What kinds of reasons could be given to answer this question?-We can approach this question in two ways: (a) We can give reasons to believe that one of the views is true; and, (b) we can reason by finding grounds for believing that one of them is false.

An Argument in Favor of DET and Against DCT

The most obvious consideration in favor of DET is that it is compatible with the concept that most believers have of the deity. Most believers hold that the deity is the most good (most loving), most knowing, and most powerful being. Many believers hold that the deity is somehow infinite in these ways. It seems obvious enough that a most good and

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most knowing deity would know the right acts from the wrong ones, and would will that we do the right ones (DET). But it does not seem to be likely that a deity like this would command a set of acts saying that these acts are "right" just because the deity says so (DCT); in fact, believers often refer to a supernatural being who acts in this way by a name other than "deity". Thus, it is compatible with this notion of the deity that the deity would make decisions on the basis of goodness and knowledge; but Divine Command Theory is incompatible with this concept of the deity.

Ways to State Divine Command Theory and its Consequences

Before we proceed further, we should state some of the alternative ways in which Divine Command Theory can be expressed, and consider what are its consequences. As it is expressed above, DCT is a "metaphysical" claim; it is a claim about reality, about the way things are. Now this metaphysical claim also can be expressed "linguistically"; expressed as a claim about the meaning of words. In linguistic form, DCT could be rendered by some such words as: "The word 'right' simply means 'what the deity commands.' "; or, "The entire meaning of 'Act X is right' is 'the deity commands that we do X.' " There may be some who would wish to make a great fuss over this technicality, but our primary purpose in bringing it up is to make sure that we are able to recognize DCT if it is raised. We will continue to discuss DCT in both forms, and everything that we say about it will apply (with perhaps very minor modification) to either form. As for the consequences of DCT, they are the following: (a) If DCT were true then no acts would be right unless a deity existed; if there is no deity, then there is no morality. And, (b) no matter what the deity commanded us to do, it would be right. For instance, if the deity commanded that we slowly torture-to-death a two-year-old child, or commit genocide, then these acts would be right just because the deity commanded them.

Arguments Against Divine Command Theory

We can now turn to the problems with DCT. There are four major arguments of this kind, and we can label them the problems of meaning, autonomy, variety, and interpretation.

a. Meaning. If right actions are held to be what the deity commands, then the result is a curious emptiness in the meaning of the term "right". For now it has no meaning apart from whatever is commanded. Perhaps "right" in this setting is a way to remind us that the deity has power;

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"right" is just a word that refers to a command backed-up by a threat. We may be reminded here of the politician who says he or she favors "family values" without bothering to tell us that by "family values" he or she means the "values" that he or she happens to like. In short, we cannot identify the meaning of a claim merely by finding its source, or who likes or commands it. And the difficulty actually is worse for DCT than it is in the politician's case. For we can at least ask the politician to clarify what he or she means by "family values." But in the case of Divine Command Theory, the meaning of "right" is supposedly as clear as it can get! DCT simply makes the use of the word "right" a verbal flourish with no meaning at all; it amounts to the command, "Do what the deity says."

b. Autonomy. Closely related to the problem of meaning is the problem of autonomy. The autonomous person is one who is (1) free to choose, and (2) who "knows the options." Hence, autonomy can be eliminated either by deprivation of freedom or by ignorance. (Being autonomous usually is a matter of degree. So we can describe a person as being more or less autonomous in a given situation; or, as being more or less increased or reduced in autonomy by circumstances or choice.) Autonomy seems to be necessary for praise or blame. For instance, we would not usually praise or blame a person for an act performed under coercion or out of ignorance. There are, of course, exceptions to this, but it is important to note that these exceptions involve showing that an appropriate degree of autonomy (freedom and knowledge) is present. But perhaps the most serious practical consequence of believing Divine Command Theory to be true is that the moral agent who does so simply surrenders moral autonomy. For, such a moral agent has given up the possibility that he or she can choose or "reason-out" standards of right and wrong: The freedom to choose is at least limited by the command-backed-up-threat; but more importantly, there is nothing to reason about (the problem of meaning). The agent can only try to find out (at his or her own peril) what the commands are.

c. Variety. This leads to a third problem with DCT. It is obvious that there are many groups in the world today, and throughout history, who have claimed to have the true commands of the deity. It is notorious that these groups differ widely over the nature of the deity as well as the content of the commands. Thus, we are faced with a variety of possible deities. Which shall we obey? Suppose that someone reasoned as follows:

The Bible (or Koran or Bhagavad-Gita, etc.) is the true source of the deity's commands to people. I know that the Bible is the true source because it is the word of the deity revealed through the prophets. I

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know that these prophets are the true prophets because it says so in the Bible.

This is a case of circular reasoning (begging the question). Wherever we enter the circle we find that the very thing for which we need evidence is simply assumed. This leads to the following considerations: When we make a judgement concerning which possible set of commands we ought to follow we are, in effect, making a moral judgement. But if Divine Command Theory is true, no moral judgement can be made without first having the deity's commands. Divine Expert Theory does not lead to this situation, but Divine Command Theory does. And this is the case no matter whether our "judgement" is based on reason, or sentiment, or "upbringing," or emotion, or intuition, or ... and so on. Now we should note that such a judgement is in effect a moral one because, once made, it determines the rest of our "moral duties." Some may wish to say that the judgement itself is not a moral one. But even granting this, if we must somehow decide which claims to divine revelation are genuine and which are false, then reason, or intuition, etc. is the final authority in the decision. This is contrary to the notion that a particular revelation provides knowledge that is absolutely certain just because it comes from the deity. (We should not need here to take one more turn around a circular reasoning track by introducing a notion of "divine guidance" or "divine inspiration," etc.)

d. Interpretation. Even if we could solve the variety problem for DCT, we would be faced with interpreting the commands. Some of the most troublesome moral issues have to do with interpreting alleged commands. We can find, for example, (in the U.S.A.) members of the Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference marching, carrying Bibles, and each claiming to have the true interpretation of the deity's commands. (But these inter-pretations arc contrary to each other.) Even people who are members of the same sect and who have a shared tradition often disagree concern-ing how to interpret the set of divine commands that they believe are genuine. Now this is also a difficulty for those who accept Divine Expert Theory, but at least they can try to reason things out or consult their in-tuitions, etc. But if we adopt Divine Command Theory, then how can we interpret the commands? To interpret requires making moral decisions. But to do that requires further divine commands, and so on for as long as we need to interpret ... Here again we are reminded, as we were when we considered the problem of meaning, that according to DCT "things are already as clear as they can get."- At least they are as clear as commands can make them.

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Consequences of Divin