electoral dynamics: the role of campaign context in voting

Incumbency Partisanship Campaign Resources Collective Responsibility

Electoral Dynamics: The Role of CampaignContext in Voting Choice

Carlos [email protected]

July 10, 2017

Carlos Algara Introduction to American Politics: Meeting 7

mailto:[email protected]


Agenda

1 Incumbency

2 Partisanship

3 Campaign Resources

4 Collective Responsibility


1/26


Models of Electoral Control

Vote-Choice Implications for AnalyticalHeuristic Model Representatives Purposes

Ideology Spatial/Proximity Responsive to Representation &Voting Median Voter Candidate

Positioning

Partisanship Michigan Responsive to Explaining voteModel Partisan Base choice/partisan

bias

Valence Retrospective Develop reputation, Explaining electoralModel/Valence (honesty/integrity), outcomes, pres.

Rule monitor economy forecasting

Note: Partisanship & ideology are generally prospective models.

I Opening Question: Which model of electoral choice do you think reducesthe information cost of voting the most? What is one potential pitfall forthe model of your choice?


https://www.polleverywhere.com/free_text_polls/TKEggSCazUjDSKB?preview=true



2/26


Decline in Competition in House Elections


3/26


Decline in Competition in Senate Elections


4/26


High Re-election Rates by Seat-Type

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U.S. House U.S. Senate

1952−1956

1958−1962

1964−1968

1970−1974

1976−1980

1982−1986

1988−1992

1994−1998

2000−2004

2006−2010

2012−2016

1952−1956

1958−1962

1964−1968

1970−1974

1976−1980

1982−1986

1988−1992

1994−1998

2000−2004

2006−2010

2012−2016

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

Incu

mbe

nt R

e−le

ctio

n R

ate

● Marginal seat

Out−Partisan Seat

Safe Seat

Smoothed lowess regression curve illustrated to show trend in incumbent re−election by seat−type over cycle.


5/26


Importance of an Incumbency Advantage

I Why do you think American elections are so noncompetitive?

I Abramowitz et al.: Decline in competition in House electionsin last 50 years

I What is the puzzle Abramowitz et al. want to explain andhow does incumbency factor in?

I Interested in evaluating three hypotheses explaining decline:redistricting, incumbency, and partisanship.

I Sources of an incumbency advantage (direct & indirecteffect):

I Name recognition (constituency service, past campaigns, etc.)I “Perks of office” such as service & committee membershipI Ability to scare potential quality challengers


5/26



I Why do you think American elections are so noncompetitive?I Abramowitz et al.: Decline in competition in House elections

in last 50 years

I What is the puzzle Abramowitz et al. want to explain andhow does incumbency factor in?





5/26




in last 50 yearsI What is the puzzle Abramowitz et al. want to explain and

how does incumbency factor in?





5/26





how does incumbency factor in?I Interested in evaluating three hypotheses explaining decline:

redistricting, incumbency, and partisanship.




5/26






redistricting, incumbency, and partisanship.I Sources of an incumbency advantage (direct & indirect

effect):



5/26







effect):I Name recognition (constituency service, past campaigns, etc.)

I “Perks of office” such as service & committee membershipI Ability to scare potential quality challengers


5/26







effect):I Name recognition (constituency service, past campaigns, etc.)I “Perks of office” such as service & committee membership

I Ability to scare potential quality challengers


5/26







effect):I Name recognition (constituency service, past campaigns, etc.)I “Perks of office” such as service & committee membershipI Ability to scare potential quality challengers


6/26


Declining Worth of Incumbency in Congressional Elections

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0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016

Est

imat

ed In

cum

benc

y A

dvan

tage

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U.S. House

U.S. Senate


7/26


Incumbency Continued

I What do Abramowitz et al. find with respect to therelationship between incumbency & decline in competition?

I Non-open seats more competitive than incumbentre-elections, why?


8/26


Open Seats & Variation in Campaign Spending


9/26


Incumbency Continued

I What do Abramowitz et al. find with respect to therelationship between incumbency & decline in competition?

I Non-open seats more competitive than incumbentre-elections, why?

I Experienced quality candidates more likely to emerge in openseat races

I Why are experience candidates desirable for parties & why arethey strategic?

I What about support for gerrymandering hypotheses (i.e.redistricting)?


10/26


Lack of support for the Redistricting Hypothesis


11/26


Salience of Redistricting as an explanation

I No support for the hypothesis: redistricting → ↓ competitive

I David Broder (The New York Times, 2004):

“both parties have succeeded in drawing district lines in ways thatcement their current power by eliminating contested elections . . .most states were drawn to protect incumbents from theinconvenience of competition”

I Why would redistricting not have an effect on competition inHouse elections?

I Increased salience of the partisan model in congressionalelections

I Similar trends in the Senate, fixed districts


11/26


Salience of Redistricting as an explanation

I No support for the hypothesis: redistricting → ↓ competitiveI David Broder (The New York Times, 2004):

“both parties have succeeded in drawing district lines in ways thatcement their current power by eliminating contested elections . . .most states were drawn to protect incumbents from theinconvenience of competition”

I Why would redistricting not have an effect on competition inHouse elections?

I Increased salience of the partisan model in congressionalelections

I Similar trends in the Senate, fixed districts


12/26


Flexing the Muscle of Partisanship

I Do Abramowtiz et al. find support for the “partisanpolarization” hypothesis?

I Less ticket splitting in contemporary congressional elections


13/26


Decline of Split-Ticket Voting in Congressional Elections


14/26


Decline of Split-Ticket Voting in Congressional Elections


15/26




I Less ticket splitting in contemporary congressional electionsI What are the implications of increased partisanship for the

voting models discussed?

I More weight on candidate partisanship & ideologicalpreferences

I Is there are a trade-off between partisanship & incumbencyeffects in congressional elections?

I Potential implications of ↑ partisanship effect in electionoutcomes on valence model of vote choice?


15/26





voting models discussed?I More weight on candidate partisanship & ideological

preferences

I Is there are a trade-off between partisanship & incumbencyeffects in congressional elections?



15/26






preferencesI Is there are a trade-off between partisanship & incumbency

effects in congressional elections?



15/26






preferencesI Is there are a trade-off between partisanship & incumbency

effects in congressional elections?I Potential implications of ↑ partisanship effect in election

outcomes on valence model of vote choice?


16/26



17/26


Growing Strength of Partisan Explanation


18/26


Campaign Spending

I Consider the following Prisoner’s Dilemma

I What’s the logic behind the game? Can you apply this tocampaign spending generally?


19/26


Campaign Spending Cont.

I Campaign funds from individuals & PACS allow candidates toinvest in campaign infrastructure, boost name recognition(ads), project policy positions, and define opponent (valence& policy positions)

I Campaign spending in election dynamic, both sides adhere tothe “arms-race” model

I Minimal (if any) independent on election outcomesI Post Citizens United campaigns are getting more expensive on

both sides but differential still approaching 0.I Campaign resources used primarily for mobilization rather

than conversion given precancel of partisan & spatial modelsin explaining vote-choice


19/26





I Minimal (if any) independent on election outcomes

I Post Citizens United campaigns are getting more expensive onboth sides but differential still approaching 0.

I Campaign resources used primarily for mobilization ratherthan conversion given precancel of partisan & spatial modelsin explaining vote-choice


19/26






both sides but differential still approaching 0.

I Campaign resources used primarily for mobilization ratherthan conversion given precancel of partisan & spatial modelsin explaining vote-choice


19/26






both sides but differential still approaching 0.I Campaign resources used primarily for mobilization rather

than conversion given precancel of partisan & spatial modelsin explaining vote-choice


20/26


Distribution of Campaign Spending, U.S. House


21/26


Distribution of Campaign Spending, U.S. Senate


22/26


Independent Effect of Campaign Spending on Elections


23/26


Increased Nationalization of Congressional Elections

I What evidence that congressional elections are becoming lesslocal and more nationalized?

I Partisanship explaining more & more variation in electionoutcomes

I However, midterm slump for president’s party still a consistentpattern. Why?

I Out-party partisans more likely to vote & motivated by lowpresidential approval, thermostatic response to policy change& incumbents forced to take tough votes (ACA)

I Testing the relationship between presidential approval &president’s party (in-party) election performance

I If correlated, evidence for collective accountability & increased‘presidentialization’ of congressional elections


24/26


Punishing the President’s Party in Congress


25/26


Punishing the President’s Party in the Senate


26/26


Key Points:I Congressional elections becoming less competitiveI Safe & marginal seats are becoming safer for parties while

seats that favor other party are becoming more precariousI Incumbents still hold an advantage, but shrinking as elections

become more partisanI Redistricting plays very marginal role in shaping campaign

contextI Partisanship effect on electoral outcomes increasing in

congressional electionsI Campaign spending dynamic in nature, thus canceling out as

effect on election outcomesI President’s party generally fares poorly in midterm elections,

function of approval.I Consider if Madison would have a problem with role of

campaign context in vote-choiceCarlos Algara Introduction to American Politics: Meeting 7

electoral dynamics: the role of campaign context in voting

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