emerson social exchange

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Social Exchange Theory

Author(s): Richard M. EmersonSource: Annual Review of Sociology !ol. " (#$%&) ''. (()*(&"+u,lished ,y: Annual ReviewsSta,le -R: htt'://www.0stor.org/sta,le/"$1&2$&

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& EMERS6C

#he Scope of E&change #heory

@n setting the goals for this critiKue of social exchange theory we must understand

that it is not a theory at all. @t is a frame of reference within which many theories

*some micro and some more macro*can s'ea9 to one another whether in argu*

ment or in mutual su''ort. The sco'e condition for the exchange frame of reference

has ,een most sim'ly defined ,y Glau (#$&1a): HSocial exchange as here conceived

is limited to actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from others.H

@m'lied is a two*sided mutually contingent and mutually rewarding 'rocess involv*

ing HtransactionsH or sim'ly Hexchange.H

That ,asic 'rinci'les of reinforcement 'sychology and microeconomics might ,e

relevant in studying social exchange (Bomans #$&#) is self*evident. @ndeed the

exchange a''roach in sociology might ,e descri,ed for sim'licity as the economic

analysis of noneconomic social situations. The social situations addressed ,y Bo*

mans Thi,aut & Felley and Glau were located largely in the informal social

interaction of small grou's. Exchange theory ,rings a Kuasi*economic mode of

analysis into those situations. 8an grou' 'ressure (Schachter #$#) and mem,er

conformity (Boc9,aum #$1) ,e ,etter viewed as two sides of a transaction involv*

ing the exchange of utility or reward (See Bomans #$&# Emerson #$&1 Cord

#$&3). 8an status in a 'eer*grou' situation ,e examined through su''ly curves

and the law of diminishing returns (Glau #$&1) Should eye contact with a smile

which evo9es valued a''roval ,e studied as one transaction in an exchange rela*

tion

The convergence among Bomans Thi,aut & Felley and Glau can ,e said to

converge in turn with other im'ortant wor9. At the micro level the study of strategic interaction has strong affinities with an exchange a''roach. o we gain

anything ,y treating identity and 'resentations of self in social interaction as com*

modities of a sort su,0ect to gain or loss through im'licit ,argaining +erha's the

line of research re'resented ,y =einstein I eutsch,erger (#$&1) 5ones (#$&1)

Dergen (#$&$) =einstein (#$&&) =einstein et al (#$&3 #$&$) Stires I 5ones

(#$&$) and Doffman (#$%2) will converge with the o'erant 'sychology of Bomans

and others. 8learly o'erant 'sychology is not the only starting 'oint for the study

of exchange. Garth (#$&&) in develo'ing an ex'licit exchange framewor9 in an*

thro'ology draws u'on this line of wor9.

>urther 'romising convergence ,etween exchange theory and role theory can ,e

found in the wor9 of Doode (#$%) research ,y Emerson (#$&3) and Stolte IEmerson (#$%&).

At the macrosociological level exchange has ,een em'loyed in the analysis of

social stratification and the division of la,or (Emerson #$%",) in the study of

interorgani<ational relations (evine I =hite #$&# 8oo9 #$% ,) and ur,an com*

munity structure and decision ma9ing (8lar9 #$&3). @n some discussions exchange

theory has ,een treated as a general theory 'arallel to structural functionalism

(8lar9 #$%" Ellis #$%#). @n 'olitical science (8urry I =ade #$&3) the exchange

a''roach has ,een offered as a general a''roach to 'olitical ,ehavior.



S68@A E8BACDE TBE6R4 %

6ne line of convergence in my 0udgment is es'ecially im'ortant. As Anderson

(#$%2 'ersonal communication) has o,served Hsociological exchange theory shades

into economic anthro'ology in a rather im'erce'ti,le way.H Ever since anthro'olo*

gists ,egan to focus attention on 'rimitive economics they have ,een engaged in

continuous de,ate a,out the 'ro'er 'lace of economic theory in anthro'ological

research*from Bers9ovits (#$12) to Schneider (#$%1). Stated ,riefly neoclassical

economic theory is organi<ed so heavily around rational individual decision ma9ing

in a 'erfectly com'etitive mar9et that its a''lica,ility to tradition*,ound or norma*

tively regulated ,ehavior outside of com'etitive mar9ets is 'laced in dou,t yet

goods are 'roduced and distri,uted through exchange. Therefore social exchange

theory is needed to deal with exchange ,ehavior in non*=estern economies (Bers9o*

vits #$12 Malinows9i #$"" evi*Strauss #$&$ +olanyi et a##$% Sahlins #$&) and

also in =estern society outside of the 'erfectly com'etitive mar9et. LThis conver*gence has ,een examined recently in an unfortunately doctrinaire manner ,y E9eh

(#$%1).

+erha's @ cast too ,road a net. @ include within exchange theory items as diverse

as Gurgess & Ceilsen7s (#$%1) la,oratory study of reci'rocal o'erant reinforcement

in the dyad and +olanyi7s studies of Hreci'rocity redistri,ution and exchangeH in

com'arative economic anthro'ology (+olyanyi et al #$3:"1*%2). Bowever if @ err

it is more on the side of omissionJ for while the material is extremely heterogeneous

in mor'hological detail it is 0oined ,y analytic conce'ts*resource reward rein*

forcement cost utility o''ortunity 'rofit outcome transaction 'ayoff etc.

These conce'ts drawn from different fields and fashioned for use in different

contexts carry the 'romise of greater 'otential 'arsimony than their large num,er might im'ly.

$lan of this Criti'ue

@n this 'a'er @ first examine what @ thin9 are the central conce'ts and some of the

main research to'ics within the exchange frame of reference. S'ecial attention is

given to ma0or controversies that s'ring from those conce'ts: rationality tautology

and reductionism. @ turn then to economic anthro'ology where the same generic

controversies are seen in the inter'lay ,etween economic theory and economic

anthro'ology. Those 'arallel de,ates are used to suggest a 'artial resolution: ex'licit

ado'tion of the social relation rather than either 'ersons or actions as the unit of

analysis. S'ringing from the relation as the unit of analysis ma0or differences are

o,served ,etween economic and social exchange theory.

>inally attention is focused on the 'eculiarly dyadic character of most exchange

analysis. The transition from micro or dyadic to macro exchange theory is ta9en

u' as the final to'ic of interest in the 'a'er.

86C8E+TS AC 86CTR6!ERS@ES

Bomans (#$&$) has argued that ,ehavioral 'sychology contains the most general

laws a''lica,le to human social ,ehavior. Since society as he sees it consists of



3" EMERS6C

,ehaving 'eo'le he suggests that social theory can ,e advanced ,eyond its currently

im'overished condition if 'rinci'les of reinforcement are included in sociological

ex'lanations. Thus Bomans issued a clarion call for a ,ehavioral 'sychologicalform of exchange theory in sociology which has 'rovo9ed in reaction charges of

reductionism assumed rationality and tautological reasoning. It is essential there*

fore that we ,egin with an examination of some of the 'sychological under'innings

of social exchange theory in order to confront these im'ortant controversies. @n my

o'inion the charges of rationality tautology and reductionism have real su,stance

and warrant careful attention ,y exchange theorists. It is interesting that similar

issues have emerged in economic anthro'ology concerning the use of economic

theory in the study of 'rimitive exchange.

#he (perant !ormat

The variety of reinforcement 'sychology chosen ,y Bomans was S9innerian o'erant

'sychology. That school has two outstanding features. >irst it is characteri<ed ,y

its own methodology which evolved around the well*9nown S9inner ,ox. Second

it has assem,led a large ,ody of em'irical regularities o,tained through that

method with a minimum*if not an a,solute 'aucity****of theoretical inter'retation.

The o'erant research format ty'ically involves (a) a single su,0ect (b) studied

over an extended 'eriod of time (c) in a ,ounded environment that allows seKuen*

tial mani'ulation of stimulus conditions. That environment might ,e a nursery a

school for retarded children a hos'ital for a 'atient the S9inner ,ox for a 'igeon

or some other total institution. Thus in the ty'ical o'erant format (d) the ex'eri*

menter (or H,ehavior modifierH) en0oys real social 'ower over the su,0ect. Therefore

as we shall see o'erant 'sychology is the study of the effective use of social 'ower

in controlling ,ehavior.

>or a social exchange theorist o'erant research is seen to study an organism*

environment exchange system. et us illustrate as Bomans did with the 'igeon in

the S9inner ,ox. et the ,ox contain a light (Sl) that is either on or off and a disc

that the 'igeon might occasionally 'ec9 (R). @n addition the ,ox will occasionally

'rovide some stimulus we shall sim'ly la,el S" for now. Su''ose the ,ox is so

designed that: (a) if the light is on and (b) if the disc is 'ec9ed five times then

S" will occurJ after which another five 'resses will ma9e S" recurJ and so on for a

long time. Cow su''ose that 'igeons are so designed that: (c) if the 'igeon has not

encountered S" very often recently and (d) if disc 'ec9ing 'roduces S" then the 'igeon will 'ec9 the disc. -nder these conditions an e&change relation will form

,etween the 'igeon and its environment (the S9inner ,ox in this case). The 'igeon

will give out 'ec9ing ,ehavior R contingent u'on S" and the ,ox will 'rovide S"

contingent u'on R. The contingency is the one referred to ,y Glau a,ove in his

definition of exchange.

The next 'oint ,ears heavily u'on the logical structure of social exchange theory

as 'ut forth ,y Bomans. The o,served fact of disc*'ec9ing under the a,ove contin*

gencies is the defining condition wherein: Sl is la,eled a discriminative stimulus" or

S R is la,eled an operant response" and S" is called a reinforcing stimulus" or

SR. These three ,asic conce'ts are defined in terms of their relation to one another



31 EMERS6C

accordingly he defines value as Hthe degree of reward.H (#$%1:") Be then states two

'ro'ositions which @ ta9e to ,e refinements of 'ro'osition #. They are:

2. #he 3alue $roposition. HThe more valua,le to a 'erson is the result of his action

the more li9ely he is to 'erform the action.H ('. ")

#he Rationality $roposition. H@n choosing ,etween alternative actions a 'erson

will choose that one for which as 'erceived ,y him at the time the value 3" of

the result multi'lied ,y the 'ro,a,ility p, of getting the result is the greater.H

('. 1)

#he Issue of Rationality (perant $sychology 3ersus 1ecision #heory

The reader will a''reciate the fact that the terms reward reinforcement value and

utility have very nearly the same meaning in this discussion. Reward and value in

Bomans7s usage are eKuivalent to reinforcement and the magnitude thereof in

o'erant language. @n economics and decision theory (Barsanyi #$&& and others)

utility - is em'loyed where Bomans uses ! in the Rationality +ro'osition. The

element p is a su,0ective 'ro,a,ility estimate or Hex'ectationH in decision theory

and it corres'onds with the freKuency of reward in 'ro'osition #. Add to all of this

the fact that the well*9nown and im'ortant 'rinci'le of diminishing marginal utility

in economic theory ex'resses the same idea as the de'rivation*satiation 'ro'osition

and it ,ecomes very clear that o'erant 'sychology and economic decision theory

offer alternative starting 'oints for social exchange theory. @n my o'inion it ma9es

very little difference which of these traditions one chooses ,ut there are some

differences we should ,e aware of.

The first of these is the trou,lesome 'ro,lem of rationality in human social

interaction. @n one 'lace Glau defined exchange ,ehavior to mean Hvoluntary actions

of individuals that are motivated ,y the returns they are ex'ected to ,ring*.H

(#$&1a:$#) These words along with the rationality 'ro'osition a,ove seem to

descri,e 'eo'le ma9ing conscious choices ,ased u'on self*interested deli,eration

'rior to ta9ing action. Gierstedt (#$&) in his review of Glau7s ,oo9 sim'ly dou,ts

that much of human social action is ,ased u'on such considerations. @ am inclined

to agree with him. >urthermore while 'eo'le and firms sometimes act with such

deli,erate rationality @ do not want to limit social exchange theory to that narrow

class of actions. @ndeed a wide range of ,ehavior studied within exchange theory

*gift giving relations of reci'rocity and the norm of reci'rocity (Mauss #$"Sahlins #$& Douldner #$&2)*is ex'licitly not Hmotivated ,y the returns they are

ex'ected to ,ringH as Glau 'uts it.

4et we have the 'aradox that such ,ehavior usually does ,ring returns. The

reci'ient of a gift is somehow o,ligated to 'rovide a return (Douldner #$&2) even

though it is unseemly for the giver to ex'ect one. 6n this to'ic reinforcement

'sychology and economic decision theory differ mar9edly. @t is generally understood

or assumed in economic theory that an intelligent and well*informed actor formu*

lates 'ro,a,ilities and estimates ex'ected utilities for alternative actions 'rior to

deciding and acting. HRationalityH in human ,ehavior can refer to these 'redecision

cognitive 'rocesses together with the decision rule stated in the rationality 'ro'osi*



S68@A E8BACDE TBE6R4 1#

tion. Gy contrast any reader who feels that 'eo'le in their social relations with eachother act more on sentiment and ha,it than u'on such reasoned decision ma9ing

should find Bomans and o'erant 'sychology much more 'alata,le. The o'erant

a''roach to social exchange allows ,ut does not reKuire such rationality. @n 'lace

of calculation and reason in human affairs it relies u'on value as the result of 'rior

conditioning in longitudinal exchange relationshi's. A gift given to a friend without

ex'ectations of return can fail to recur over time when it is not reci'rocated. The

friendshi' might die or fail to form in a 'rocess of reinforcement that entails no

rational element at all. The issue then is not the 'rior calculation of the giver*

it is the unfolding future of the relation. Difts and 'arty invitations are not always

reci'rocated in which case they don7t get re'eated.

The a,ove inter'retation is a straightforward a''lication of the ,asic o'erantformat. @ am led to re0ect 'rior calculation of returns as a defining feature of

exchange in favor of a much ,roader ,ase*social o'erant ,ehavior.7 The latter

includes ,ut is not confined to the former. Social o'erant ,ehavior is ,ehavior

whose level or freKuency of 'erformance over time is sustained ,y reinforcing

(rewarding) activity from other 'eo'le. @f the emotion and accom'anying ,ehavior

called HloveH with all of its irrational self*denial in 'ursuit of the other7s welfare

is sustained in the long run only ,y reci'rocal love (among other su''orting re*

turns) then the love relation is a''ro'riately analy<ed within the exchange a'*

'roach.

@ ,elieve this 'osition is essentially what Bomans outlined. 6n the issue of 'rior

'lanning and deli,erate choice 'eo'le are sometimes more li9e 'igeons than li9e

entre'reneurs ,ut entre'reneurs are 'eo'le. Thus rationality inthe sense of action

,ased u'on 'rior calculation of ex'ected returns forms one 'art of a larger su,0ect

matter of social exchange.

#he Issue of #autology

Goth 'igeons and 'eo'le might ,e considered HrationalH in a less cere,ral sense

meaning only that they tend to act so as to maximi<e reward and minimi<e cost over

time or in the long run. Bere also the o'erant*,ased a''roach of Bomans differs

:mar9edly from the economic or decision theory a''roach. Bomans7s 'ro'ositions @

and @@@ agree with decision theory in asserting reward or utility maximi<ation over

the long run ,ut they assign a different logical status to this assertion.

>or economists and decision theorists rationality is either offered as an assum'*

tion for very good theoretical reasons or it is offered as a normative model for

Ha''ro'riateH ,ehavior. Gy contrast Bomans seems to offer his version*'ro'osi*

tions @ and @@@*as em'irical truths demonstrated in the S9innerian la,oratory.

7@n stating my 'reference for reci'rocal o'erant ,ehavior rather than maximi<ing decisions

as a sco'e condition @ in no way advocate or ado't HS9innerianH 'sychology or any other

,ehaviorist 'osition. The word social operant is used here sim'ly as a short and well*under*

stood way of saying ,ehavior that is formed and sustained or changed over time or through

re'eated occasions in a way that is contingent u'on valued returns (reinforcement) from other 'eo'le.



3& EMERS6C

-nfortunately neither S9inner nor anyone else has or will 'rove them through

em'irical research for they are ,oth untesta,le. As a result (a) Bomans7s scheme

has often ,een challenged on grounds of tautology and (b) with 'ro'ositions @ and@@@ removed we are left wondering what contri,ution o'erant 'sychology really does

ma9e to social exchange theory. (See Emerson #$%"a for a la,orious effort to answer

this Kuestion.)

Bowever the a,ove assertions must ,e ex'lained. Bomans has ta9en great care

to defend his scheme against charges of tautology ,oth in #$&# and #$%1 yet the

charges 'ersist. =hy And does it really matter

The 'ro,lem lies at the heart of exchange theory with the most im'ortant

conce'ts of all: reward and value. Bomans feels that the success 'ro'osition (#) is

safe from this challenge ,ecause res'onse freKuency and reinforcement (reward)

freKuency can ,e inde'endently measured (#$%1:*1). They can ,e ,ut that is not

the 'oint. They do not have inde'endent meaning: a reward is ,y definition a

stimulus conseKuence that increases or maintains res'onse freKuency. Therefore

'ro'osition # cannot ,e wrong. It cannot ,e tested. All we can do is use itJ use it

in logical chainsJ use it to determine what is and is not a rewarding stimulus. @f the

'igeon in the S9inner ,ox did not 'ec9 the dis9 when the dis9*'ec9 'roduced food

the 'igeon might die ,ut 'ro'osition @ would live on in good health. It is a logically

useful ,ut untesta,le formulation. As =al9ins (#$%2: #%"*%$) has so elegantly

shown we as social scientists cannot logically organi<e our wor9 without some

'ro'osition lin9ing value to action.

Thus if we need 'ro'osition # or something li9e it does it matter whether its

truth de'ends on fact or u'on definition @f we are not clear a,out which form of truth to assign to it then our thin9ing gets muddled. >or exam'le we might design

ex'eriments intending to HtestH a 'ro'osition that is true ,y definition. 8ros,ie

(#$%") conducted such an ex'eriment. Coting that Hfew if any attem'ts have ,een

made to directly test Bomans7 original 'ro'ositionsH 8ros,ie set out to test the

eKuivalent of +ro'ositions # and 1 a,ove. Be conducted an ex'eriment in which

su,0ects could either com'ly with reKuests or not com'ly when rewarded for com*

'lying. HThe reward selected was Tandem note,oo9s*. It was felt that these would

have an initial reward value to the student su,0ects.H

Thus with note,oo9s assumed to ,e rewarding the ex'eriment 'ur'orted to test

certain general hy'otheses. It was found that su,0ects com'ly more when given

note,oo9s than when not given anything (the success 'ro'osition)J su,0ects com'lymore for two than for one note,oo9 (the value 'ro'osition)J and the increment of

increased com'liance goes down with additional note,oo9s accumulated (the de'ri*

vation*satiation 'ro'osition). Gut su''ose the results had ,een different: @ su,mit

that if su,0ects had not com'lied in the a,ove 'attern the initial assum'tion*that

note,oo9s were rewarding*would have ,een re0ected. Su''ose further that the

ex'erimenter had some other inde'endent evidence that note,oo9s were rewarding

to those su,0ects yet failed to get com'liance in exchange for note,oo9s. =ould we

then ,e forced to re0ect +ro'ositions @ and @@@ as false Co we would then conclude

that the value of noncom'liance is greater than the value of note,oo9s to those



S68@A E8BACDE TBE6R4 3%

su,0ects. @n fact +ro'ositions @ and @@@ are not at issue in this ex'eriment. They are

true. They are useful not testa,le.

The utility of such 'ro'ositions in the logic of ex'lanation is well discussed ,y

=al9ins (#$%2). That there are uses (as well as misuses) for tautologies is shown ,y

is9a (#$&$). Their value in ex'erimental research can ,e illustrated with a study

that was organi<ed on a logical structure very different from the a,ove ex'eriment.

8o<,y (#$%") set out to discover whether or not intimate revelations are valua,le

to receive and costly to give ,y o,serving the reci'rocation of intimacy in the social

exchange 'rocess.

#he Issue of 4E&planation4 3ersus $rediction

Gut the issue of tautology has other facets to it. The fact that Bomans7s 'ro'ositions @

and @@@ are not testa,le im'lies only that they should ,e em'loyed as assum'tions

rather than as em'irical contri,utions from o'erant 'sychology. @t does not im'lythat Bomans7s current use of those 'ro'ositions is circular or tautological. As

Mee9er (#$%# :13&) has o,served

... rationality can easily ,ecome tautologicalJ if we 'redict that 'eo'le choose what they

value and find out what they value ,y o,serving what they choose we have not accom*

'lished much exce't to descri,e choice ,ehavior.

@n formulating his 'ro'ositions Bomans was fully cogni<ant of the danger de*

scri,ed ,y Mee9er and he devoted several 'ages to discussing it (#$&# :1"*1

#$%1:*). If one has inde'endent 9nowledge of what a 'erson finds rewarding

then 'ro'ositions # or can ,e em'loyed in ex'laining or 'redicting a 'erson7s

,ehavior. Some exam'les will hel':

#. =hy does grou' mem,er A HconformH to grou' norms

(a) +ro'osition (assumed):

(b) mem,er A is 9nown to value a''rovalJ and

(c) mem,ers G 8 ... C give him a''roval when he conforms.

(d) Therefore A conforms.

". =hy does 'olitician advocate the 'olicies he does


(b) needs cam'aign contri,utions and

(c) grou' 4 contri,utes heavily contingent u'on the 'olicies he advocates.

(d) Therefore advocates certain 'olicies.. =hy does 5ohnny mis,ehave when com'any is in the house


(b) 5ohnny is 9nown to value his 'arents7 attentionJ

(c) his 'arents attend to him when he mis,ehaves in front of com'anyJ

(d) Therefore 5ohnny mis,ehaves around com'any.

The reasoning is not circular so long as our 9nowledge of (b) is not derived from

our 9nowledge of (d). Bomans was himself careful on this 'oint. 4et des'ite his

caution Bomans7 critics accuse him of tautological reasoning (See eutsch #$&1).



33 EMERS6C

If one must ,e so careful to avoid circular reasoning when using the reward*cost

framewor9 and is li9ely to ,e accused of circularity des'ite such care then there

must ,e still other flaws of some sort hidden within reward*cost analysis. @ sus'ect

that the charge of tautology s'rings from two other 'ro,lems ,oth of them more

su,tle and illusive in nature. The first involves ad hoc ex'lanation*the difference

,etween hindsight and 'rediction. The second relates to controversies a,out 'sycho*

logical reductionism.

The a,ove exam'les of ex'lanation ,ased on rewards will hel' us see the issue.

The logical seKuence from (a) to (d) is not circular ,ut unfortunately it does not

follow as a relia,le 'rediction either. =hile all 'oliticians value cam'aign money

and while all might have their 'rice we do not 9now whether or not the H'rice is

rightH until after the fact of (d). =hile most 'eo'le value social a''roval we can

seldom measure that value along with the cost of conformity well enough to 'redict

that one will conform in exchange for a''roval. The same a''lies to the child in

exam'le and in any other exam'le one cares to mention. =hile we must have

evidence of (b) inde'endent of (d), (d) is almost always the ,est evidence we can

o,tain. And we have it first in the context of ex'lanation rather than 'rediction. To

'redict exchange ,ehavior from values 'oses 'rofound measurement 'ro,lems in

the situational assessment of relevant values. Bowever Hex'lanationH is a9in to

hindsight and this is far less demanding 'recisely ,ecause we can assess values from

the conseKuent exchange ,ehavior. @f we do however the ex'lanation is circular.

#he Issue of Reductionism

@n addition to the a,ove logical and em'irical grounds for sus'ecting ex'lanations

couched in terms of reward there is another source of dou,t relating to the commoncharge of reductionism. The exam'les listed a,ove ta9e as given an exchange 'rocess

,etween two 'arties. They then em'loy the ,ehavior of one 'arty to ex'lain the

,ehavior of the other. Gut the actions are reversi,le: why do fellow grou' mem,ers

a''rove of mem,er A (a) +ro'osition (b) they are 9nown to value conformityJ

(c) mem,er A conformsJ therefore (d) he is a''roved of. =e now ta9e as given

(conformity) what was 'ro,lematic in the a,ove exam'le.

Sociologists who are s9e'tical of the 'ossi,ility or desira,ility of 'sychological

reductionism would have reason to as9 at least three Kuestions at this 'oint. >irst

when two actions are Hex'lainedH each ,y the other have we ex'lained anything

or have we sim'ly descri,ed a reci'rocal social 'henomenon Second ,y what right

can we*or for what reason should we*se'arate a single social event (the exchangeof conformity for a''roval) into two Kuasi*inde'endent individual acts each to ,e

ex'lained And third if we view the social relation as ex'lained when the contri,ut*

ing actions of each 'arty have ,een Hex'lainedH as a,ove what other features of

the social relation are li9ely to ,e overloo9ed or left unexamined due to our 'ossi,ly

'remature sense of com'rehension This @ ,elieve is the 'oint 'osed ,y Glau

(#$&1) in warning us to ,e alert always to 'ossi,le emergent 'henomena in the study

of social exchange.

The warning issued ,y Glau is worth heeding if only for the 'ractical reason that

'sychology has not yet attained ,ehavioral omniscience.



3$S68@A E8BACDE TBE6R4

S68@A E8BACDE REAT@6CS

@n +art @ @ suggested that four disci'lines contri,ute to the exchange a''roach.

Bowever our discussion so far has drawn largely u'on wor9 in 'sychology and

sociology. There we have seen that when reinforcement 'sychology is a''lied to

social situations certain controversies emerge concerning issues of rationality tau*

tology and reductionism.

Turning to the other two fields we find an interesting and informative 'arallel.

@n economic anthro'ology where economic theory encounters anthro'ological

data the same issues emerge and have ,een even more vigorously de,ated. >or

instance 8ohen (#$&%: #21) 'oints out that there are several modes of economic

analysis ,ut the one most dominant the one Hwhich some economists now consider

the ,asic method of their science*rests on the assum'tion*that men will see9 to

maximi<e their gains ,y o,taining the highest 'ossi,le return for any given re*

sources. Gut when this assum'tion is a''lied in many anthro'ological settings

8ohen o,serves (#$&%: #2&) that it

... ,ecomes little or nothing more than a self*defeating tautology. Any action can ,e

said to maximi<e sorneone7s gainJ if a man fails to o,tain the highest 'ossi,le 'rice for

his goods ,ecause of his im'atience to Kuit the mar9et then he could ,e said to have

maximi<ed his gain since the 'ros'ect of additional monetary gain is inadeKuate to

outweigh some other advantage such as attending a ceremony. Since he is maximi<ing

his gain whatever he does the conce't can hardly have ex'lanatory value. (This difficulty

has ,een noted ,y >irth #$$:"*"2.)

=e need not re'eat our earlier analysis of rationality and tautology. The im'or*

tant 'oint is sim'ly the 'arallelJ ,etween economics and anthro'ology and ,etween

sociology and reinforcement 'sychology the same issues emerge. =e should ,e a,le

to learn some lesson from these 'arallel de,ates.

Social Relations as 5nits of Analysis

Much of the controversy a,out rationality tautology and reductionism is easily

resolved. @t only reKuires that we ado't ex'licitly the social exchange relation as the

,asic unit of analysis. This is dictated in 'art ,y the nature of the conce't of

reinforcement. The a,ove discussion ,egan with the o,servation that Rand SR the

reward and the o'erant ,ehavior rewarded are defined in terms of each other. They

form a single conce'tual and o,servational unit the 'arts of which are only analyti*cally se'arate. Since these two elements s'an ,oth sides of the exchange relation (e.g.

R;conforming ,ehavior ,y a grou' mem,er and SR;social a''roval from the

grou' 'rovided in exchange for conformity) it seems essential that we ta9e the

social relation as an integral o,servational and conce'tual unit. @t is my contention

that the a,ove confusion concerning the issues of rationality tautology and reduc*

tionism s'rings directly from a failure to honor the integrity of the social relation

as a unit of analysis.

To ma9e this 'oint as clear as 'ossi,le consider three different units of em'irical

o,servation: actions or decisions ,y individualsJ transactions ,etween individualsJ



$2 EMERS6C

and exchange relations as series of transactions ,etween the same individuals. 6n

a 'hiloso'hical 'lane no one of these units can claim to ,e more real than another.

The fact that 'ersons can ,e 'inched ma9es them no more su,stantial than social

relations. That exchange relations are com'osed of actions gives actions no em'iri*

cal 'rimacy over relations. >or exam'le the act of giving a gift ta9es 'lace within

a social relation and such an act evolved as 'art of a social relation. Most o'erant

acts evolve within such relations. As >irth (#$&%:1) has 'ut it:

There is in social anthro'ology an understanda,le view that it is the social relation

which is 'rimary which dictates the content and form of the transaction.

>irth Kuotes Sahlins (#$&: #$) on the same 'oint:

A material transaction is usually a momentary e'isode in a continuous social relation.

The social relation exerts governance: the flow of goods is constrained ,y is 'art of a

status etiKuette.

There is a long tradition in sociology and anthro'ology that inclines us to focus u'on

social relations viewing individuals and actions as 'urely analytic elements within

such relations. Rather than studying the actions of leading 'eo'le we study leader*

follower role relationsJ rather than s'ea9ing of the 'ower of 'ersons we s'ea9 of

'ower*de'endence relationsJ etc.

=hen the relation is ex'licitly ado'ted as the unit of analysis the 'ro,lem of

tautology dissolves and the closely related 'ro,lem of value measurement is signifi*

cantly eased. Recall that the o'erant ex'eriment outlined in +art @@A does not

ex'lain the 'igeon7s ,ehaviorJ rather it descri,es it as 'art of an organism*environ*

ment exchange. @n so doing it 'rovides a ,asis for measuring the value of SR to the

'igeon. Similarly if we descri,e the social exchange relation in which a grou' gives

a 'erson a''roval or status in return for his conformity (exam'le # in our discussion

of tautology a,ove) this gives us ,y far the ,est handle we now have on the

measurement of the value attached to a''roval (and to conformity). 6f course in

ta9ing the relation as the em'irical and conce'tual unit we forego the right to

ex'lain the individual7s ,ehavior in terms of his own values. Gut what im'ortant

insight do we lose when we give u' this sort of Hex'lanationH

#he Social E&change Relation

Gased on the a,ove discussion of the 'rimacy of the social relation it is now clear

that Bomans should have included the ,ehavior of S9inner along with that of the

'igeon. Sociologists should find the 'igeon7s ,ehavior interesting only when viewed

within the integral exchange relation which in fact the 'igeon shared with +rofessor

S9inner. 5ust as the 'igeon develo'ed and re'eated his 'ec9ing ,ehavior under

continuing reinforcement from S9inner so S9inner develo'ed and re'eated his style

of ex'erimentation under continuing reinforcement in the form of 'atterned 'igeon

,ehavior. The S9inner Gox 'rovided the interaction medium through which a

reci'rocal social relation develo'ed over time ,etween the su,0ect and the ex'eri*

mentor. That social relation minimal as it might ,e in some res'ects is a good

exam'le of what will ,e called an exchange relation meaning sim'ly that in studying



$#S68@A E8BACDE TBE6R4

the relation we 'ay s'ecial attention to the reci'rocal flow of valued ,ehavior

,etween the 'artici'ants. =ords such as transaction and e&change im'ly*Kuite

correctly*that the flow is inherently reci'rocal. "

Elsewhere @ have recommended (Emerson #$%",) that we ado't the ex'ression

AiJ Gy as a notation for identifying exchange relations where A and G are actors

(either 'ersons or cor'orate grou's) and where x and yare HresourcesH introduced

into exchange ,y A and G res'ectively. =e understand that x is o'erant ,ehavior

on A7s 'art which means nothing more than the defining fact that its continued

'erformance is contingent u'on (at least occasionally) 40 from G which is simulta*

neously the defining fact esta,lishing 40 as a reinforcer or reward for A. =hile a

symmetrical relation (in which 40is also an o'erant reinforced ,y x.) is not logically

reKuired theory suggests that em'irical instances of 'urely unilateral reward will

,e extremely rare and transitory in nature. (See Emerson #$%", on social 'ower.)

The ,asic elements of the o'erant research format listed a,ove should ,e reexam*ined now for they 'oint u' some of the features of exchange relations ta9en as units

of analysis. They entail a longitudinal series of transactions ,etween two identified

'arties. The conce't of reinforcement defined a,ove reKuires a series of x and y

transactions. This longitudinal feature of social exchange relations is im'ortant as

we shall see s'ecifically ,ecause most economic theory systematically ignores itN

Basic Concepts

@ have 'ost'oned a review of ,asic conce'ts in order first to esta,lish the relation

as the unit of analysis. =e may now examine ,asic conce'ts with the ex'licit

understanding that most of them are em'loyed as analytic tools within such ex*

change relations.

The voca,ulary of social exchange theory today*reward reinforcement cost

value utility resource com'arison level transaction 'rofit outcome etc*is an

unconsolidated ,lend of ordinary s'eech and the technical voca,ularies of research

disci'lines nota,ly 'sychology and economics. Gut des'ite the redundant array of

words the ,asic conce'tions are few in num,er and their meaning is fairly sta,le.

Reinforcement" as defined in +art @ is clearly the most sim'le and fundamental

'oint of de'arture for most of the other conce'ts.

#. >or exam'le a reward is virtually synonymous with a 'ositive reinforcement ,ut

with the added connotation of ,eing socially administered.

". Similarly a resource is an a,ility 'ossession or other attri,ute of an actor giving

him the ca'acity to reward (or 'unish) another s'ecified actor. Any a,ility

"The character of the contingency involved in the exchange of x and y differs in different

modes of social interaction. 6n one extreme is the seemingly noncontingent HgiftH of x

occurring as a se'arate act ,y A which has no easily a''arent connection either in time or

in intention to any s'ecific reci'rocating act ,y G yet is 'erformed within a social relation

that is sustained ,y YI' or normatively 'rescri,es that y will occasionally occur. This is the

'attern of social reci'rocity discussed at length ,y Sahlins (#$& #$&) Douldner (#$&2) and

others. At the other extreme is overt negotiation ,argaining or other 0oint*decision 'rocess

that lin9s x and y in a one*to*one 'airing to form concrete transactions.



$" EMERS6C

'ossessed ,y +erson A is a resource only in relations with s'ecific other 'ersons

who value it. Therefore strictly s'ea9ing resources are not 'ossessions or at*

tri,utes of individual actors ,ut rather they are attri,utes of the relationshi' ,etween actors.

. Co conce't is more im'ortant or more confusing than value. 4et again its ,asic

meaning is fairly clear and can ,e stated ,est in terms of reinforcement. The

value of a unit of some stimulus (x or y) is the magnitude of reinforcement

affected ,y that unit. =e use the term value when dealing with reinforcement

as a scalar varia,le.

@ ta9e this conce'tion of value directly from Bomans (#$&#). Economists have

em'loyed the conce't of utility in referring to essentially the same notion: the

su,0ective 'sychological value (i.e. amount of reinforcement) an individual derives

from a good or service. Aside from the su,0ective status of utility a9in to some unitof satisfaction as com'ared with the 'urely o'erational meaning assigned through

the o'erant format @ 9now of no im'ortant difference ,etween utility and value as

the latter is em'loyed here.

The value of a unit of SR has ,een further ela,orated resulting in four derivative

conce'tions worth mentioning: )a* value thresholds or standards called comparison

levels ,y Thi,aut & FelleyJ )b* the 'henomenon of satiation*de'rivation and the

related economic conce't of diminishing marginal utilityJ (c) 'reference orders and

value hierarchiesJ and (d) the conce't of costJ nota,ly rewards foregone or the

notion of o''ortunity costs from economicsJ and aversive stimulation.

86M+AR@S6C .E!E.S (8) The amount ofSR

o,tained 'er transaction over aseries of transactions with a given environmental source ,ecomes over time a

neutral 'oint on the scale of value for SR. (>or exam'le a child7s wee9ly allowance

from his 'arents for s'ecified duties or general good ,ehavior might ,e dollars.

The child after value ada'tation to that level will act as though de'artures from

carry greater value 'ositive or negative than itself).

The ada'tation level for valued stimuli has ,een recogni<ed ,y different authors

in different ways. Garon (#$&&) writes a,out a standard of social reinforcement

formed as an internal norm or frame of reference for res'onding to the ,ehavior

of others. Bomans (#$&#) s'ea9s of the ex'ression of anger when SR occurs ,elow

the ex'ected level. 6ne of the ,est 9nown and most fully develo'ed discussions was

offered ,y Thi,aut & Felley (#$$) under the name of comparison levels (8). Theconce't 'lays a crucial role in their discussion of the evaluation of the dyad ,y its

mem,ers.

H@M@C@SB@CD MARD@CA. -T@.@T4H The value of a unit of any ty'e of rein*

forcer SO is a decreasing function of the num,er of units recently received (or #

currently 'ossessed). This 'rinci'le called satiation*de'rivation in ,ehavioral 'sy*

chology is an em'irical generali<ation descri,ing every rewarding stimulus as 'art

of a feed,ac9 system a cy,ernetic or self*regulating system. The organism acts in

such a way as to avoid ,oth under* and overeating*or drin9ing 'laying or stimula*

tion in general. ur9ing ,ehind this em'irical 'rinci'le is the interesting conce't



S68@A E8BACDE TBE6R4 $

of need*a conce't that in my o'inion we should develo' rather than derogate.

Meanwhile the em'irical generali<ation is extremely general. >or exam'le social

a''roval is considered ,y Bomans and others to ,e an im'ortant generali<edreinforcer. It has ,een shown to ,e more reinforcing to 'ersons relatively de'rived

of it than to 'ersons more satiated with a''roval (Eric9son #$&") des'ite the fact

that generali<ed reinforcers are thought to ,e less su,0ect to satiation effects. @n the

ex'eriment ,y 8ros,ie descri,ed a,ove it was shown that note,oo9s for students

are su,0ect to diminishing utility. Students HneedH some ,ut not many.

86ST @f reward is the most common word cost is the most trou,lesome word in

the exchange voca,ulary. It has two ,asic meanings:

#. 8ost in the form of aversive stimuli encountered in a social transaction (e.g.

'ainful or ,oring Hwor9H 'erformed)

". H8ostH in the form of rewards foregone (e.g. time and effort that could have ,een

s'ent otherwise for some other valued return).

@n economic theory the analysis of cost is fairly sim'le ,ecause in 'ractice only

meaning (") is involved through the conce't of o''ortunity costs. Gut social ex*

change theorists with their concern for 'sychology add another trou,lesome layer

of meaning.

8onsider an ordinary exam'le. A 'erson hurries six ,loc9s through a heavy

rainstorm to meet a friend in a tavern. Be enters wet and laughing s'ends an hour

or so and then goes home ,y ,us to dinner. Be could have ta9en the ,us straight

home avoiding the rain and en0oying a ,oo9 and a solitary glass of wine ,efore

dinner. Cow most exchange theorists in social 'sychology (Thi,aut & Felley

Bomans may,e Glau) write as though such an e'isode involved a choice ,etween

the two 'aths of action which can ,e analy<ed in some hedonistic calculus. Thus

rl * 8l * 8"< 2J where rl is the reward of a friend in a tavern 8l is the aversive

cost of running in the rain and 8" ; r" the reward (foregone) of a ,oo9 with wine.

=e cannot re'eat the discussion of rationality tautology and reductionism ,ut

all of those issues rise again with the conce't of cost. @f we assume that social life

'roceeds as a flow of choices made ,y individuals (Hshall @ go straight home to my

,oo9 or shall @ meet my friend or ... or ... H) then our theory is tra''ed into

the a,ove hedonistic calculus. @f we assume instead that social life consists of longitudinal social relations forming changing and maintaining over time then

every feature of the a,ove exam'le can ,e seen in a different slant. @s a run in the

rain HcostlyH when it is ex'erienced within a long*term friendshi'7f @f a driving rain

H=hen a rat 'resses a lever a 'igeon 'ec9s a dis9 or a man runs in the rain is that HcostlyH

effort or is it rewarding exercise It has ,een shown that ,oth rats and 'igeons 'refer to Hwor9H

for their food rather than eat free food (Ceuringer #$&$ 8arter I Ger9owit< #$%2). Similarly

'u<<ling ,ehavior a,ounds at the human level. 8ognitive dissonance theory has develo'ed a

line of research around a similar 'henomenon calling it effort 0ustification. My 'oint is sim'ly

this: we are 'rofoundly ignorant a,out the nature of rewards and costs*and we shall remain

so until value is studied as a de'endent varia,le.



$1 EMERS6C

forces me to cancel a 'lanned meeting has much reward ,een foregone when the

friendshi' continues through other meetings oes the ,oo9 and wine foregone add

HcostH to the friendshi' when the ,oo9 and wine has its own long*term time and 'lace7

=ith the exchange relation as the unit of analysis we see an actor engaged

simultaneously in numerous exchange relations each com'eting with some of the

others for a commitment of resources. @ sus'ect that a value hierarchy forms to

regulate such commitment of resources.

E86C6M@8 AC S68@A E8BACDE TBE6R4

=e already have in economic theory a fairly well*develo'ed theory of exchange.

Ceed anthro'ologists and sociologists formulate another one @s social exchangetheory sim'ly ,orrowing conce'ts from economics*changing the words 'erha's

and a''lying them in different situations ,ut ma9ing no fundamental theoretical

contri,utions

=hile it is too early to offer definitive answers to these Kuestions @ ,elieve that

a 'rofound difference is ,eginning to emerge clearly se'arating social from eco*

nomic exchange theory. The difference @ will argue stems from the conce'tual units

of analysis em'loyed*longitudinal exchange relations versus ahistorical individual

decisions. The difference can ,est ,e seen however in that most im'ortant invention

of economics the conce't of the com'etitive mar9et as a theoretical construct.

#he 4Mar6et4 as Simplifying Concept As >irth (#$&%:) has o,served Hmar9etH is used in three ways: the mar9et'laces

where many 'eo'le assem,le to engage in transactionsJ the mar9et for some s'ecified

good or serviceJ and the mar9et 'rocess

... im'lying the allocation of resources ,y references to im'ersonal criteria which

disregard 'ersonal ties and social ends in favor of an immediate maximi<ation 'rinci'le

of 'rofitma9ing. It is this conce't which has ,een selected 'articularly for distinction as

the criterion se'arating the ty'es of economic systems studied ,y economists from those

studied ,y anthro'ologists.

=hat >irth says for anthro'ology is true for sociology as well. Economic theoryis heavily organi<ed around a set of assum'tions*the 'erfectly com'etitive mar9et

*which social exchange does not ma9e. Those assum'tions as stated ,y +erroux

(#$2: #$2) reKuire that

... goods and services exchanged are homogeneous and 'erfectly and indefinitely divisi*

,leJ if they move without resistance or friction within one industry or from one industry

to another under the influence of an alteration in the level of their remuneration ...

1My concern here is that conce'ts such as o''ortunity cost or reward foregone ,orrowed

from a science of decisions (economics) might reKuire ma0or modification when im'orted into

a science of longitudinal social relations (social exchange theory).




The ma0or source of resistance or friction disallowed in this mar9et construct are

the very 'ersonal ties and social ends referenced ,y >irth as features of the exchange

'rocesses studied ,y anthro'ologists. Those 'ersonal ties are of course attri,utesof longitudinal exchange relations that can hardly ,e set aside or assumed away ,y

social exchange theory ,uilt as it is u'on relations as the ma0or conce'tual unit.

The conseKuence of this difference is fairly 'rofound. HRealH social structures that

deviate su,stantially from the 'erfect mar9et*and most structures do*constitute

trou,lesome im'erfections in economic analysis. =hen economic analysis attem'ts

to incor'orate those im'erfections economic theory loses much of its 'ower and

elegance. Gy contrast social exchange theory seems to ,e forming s'ecifically to*

ward the analysis of such real ,ut im'erfect social structures*that is social struc*

tures involving fairly long*term relations ,etween 'eo'le in which 'ower is neither

diffuse nor eKually distri,uted as 'erfect com'etition im'lies (see Rothschild #$%#

on the a,sence of 'ower in neoclassical economic theory).

If economic and social exchange theory se'arate on the conce't of mar6et" we

must address two Kuestions. >irst what does the conce't do for economic theory

Second what might social exchange theory incor'orate in its 'lace

6n the first Kuestion the economist 8oddington (#$&3:") gives us a fine analysis:

@n the theory of mar9ets it has ,een 'ossi,le to deal theoretically with the interaction

of many economic actors ,y su''osing that each one acts in an HenvironmentH character*

i<ed ,y some re'resentations of the aggregate ,ehavior of all remaining actors ... This

a''roach to micro*economics has ,een 'articularly enlightening in circumstances involv*

ing a large num,er of economic units. @t is well*9nown however that 'rocesses involving

only a small num,er of economic units 'ose many theoretical 'ro,lems which arise fromthe much stronger interde'endence of the actors ...

@n the economic theory of com'etitive mar9et 'rocess theoretically managea,le

sim'licity is achieved ,y conceiving a de'ersonali<ed other 'arty called a mar9et.

The analytic virtues achieved through the sim'lifying mar9et assum'tion come

at a high cost: the theory cannot deal with exchange ,etween interde'endent actors.

Two immense fields of study are left for other theories to contend with: (#) the

'rocess of interactive exchange ,etween interde'endent actors (called an e&change

relation here)J who are located in (") im'erfect social structures among larger

num,ers of interde'endent actors.

E&change in Bilateral MonopolyIt is a 'aradox of economic theory that it fails to handle the most sim'le social

structure the dyad. This is a 'aradox only ,ecause the dyad is too im'ortant in

economics to ,e ignored and therefore has ,een given a lot of attention. It is treated

as isolated exchange or ,ilateral mono'oly.

=hen the mono'olist faces a mar9et involving many actors he may regard the re*

s'onses ... as Kuite adeKuately re'resented ,y a demand curve ... Bowever when the

mono'olist is faced with a mono'olist he is no longer concerned with an aggregate

res'onse to his decisions ... the mono'olist faces another decision ma9er. =e have

arrived at the old economic 'ro,lem of the theory of ,ilateral mono'oly or Hisolated

exchange.H (8oddington #$&3:1).



S68@A E8BACDE TBE6R4

attri,utes of exchange relations. >or exam'le Hrationality is an exchange rule that

assigns to + the outcome that maximi<es his total 'ayoff.H or again ... HDrou'*gain

is an exchange rule that assigns the maximum value to the sum of +7s and 67s total

'ay*offs.H (This corres'onds to +arsons7s Hcollectivity orientation.H) 6ther ex*

change rules discussed ,y Mee9er are altruism com'etition reci'rocity and status

consistency. The latter two have features in common with eKuity and distri,utive

0ustice. Ber list is not meant to ,e final or exhaustive.

@n my o'inion through the general idea of an exchange rule Mee9er has made

a real contri,ution to social exchange theory. =hether or not 'eo'le are rational

needs no longer ham'er our discussions. Rather rationality (and altruism and eK*

uity) are seen as orientations 'eo'le sometimes ta9e de'ending u'on the social

relation they have with each other. She has ,rought the time*honored notion of the

definition of the situation into the framewor9 of exchange theory. @n doing so an

im'ortant line of research is o'ened u': what are the factors that generate s'ecificexchange rules as normative attri,utes of exchange relations

The single most heavily researched to'ics in this field*eKuity and distri,utive

0ustice*are the two that ,ear most directly u'on x/y. The research is far too

extensive to 'ermit a review or a summary here. Bowever @ thin9 it well to assert

that eKuity should ,e viewed at least tentatively as one exchange rule among others

as 8oo9 has suggested.

SAB.@CS 6C TBE H@+.6MA84H 6> TRAE 6ne might o,0ect to the a,ove

discussion. oes not Mee9er7s exchange rule or 8oo97s distri,ution rule change the

whole 'ro,lem of economic determinacy If an eKuity rule is o'erating ,etween A

and G then A is not trying to maximi<e y as was assumed in the economic 'ro,lemof ,ilateral mono'oly.

True we are dealing with a different game ,ut the difference is little more than

the longitudinal as'ect of exchange relations versus the cross*sectional game of a

single mar9et transaction. Short*run versus long*run gains se'arate the two.

@nteresting wor9 ,y Sahlins (#$&) illuminates the 'oint dee'ening our under*

standing of distri,ution rules as develo'mental normative attri,utes of social ex*

change relations. Bis first 'oint (#$&:$&) concerns ethnogra'hic o,servations of

x/y:

... most exchanges*whether as gift*giving mutual aid sale ,arter coercive 'resents

or whatever*do not ta9e 'lace at uniform rates. There is a wide indeterminacyJ similar goods move against each other at different ratios in different transactions. This indeter*

minacy of rates is the characteristic fact of 'rimitive exchange.

Since most of these transactions ta9e 'lace in grossly im'erfect mar9ets Sahlins

o,serves that such variation might reflect the indeterminacy mentioned a,ove*the

indeterminant outcome of ,argaining.

-nfortunately however ,argaining is too marginal an exchange strategy among 'rimitive

'eo'les to ,ear the ex'lanation of rate variations. @t is un9nown to most of them. Among

societies that do 'ractice it haggling is ty'ically a marginal transaction restricted to

inter*community deals ,etween com'arative strangers and considered disre'uta,le in the

inner social s'heres where exchange is most intense.



$3 EMERS6C

Se'arating in*grou' exchange from external trade Sahlins sees two clear ,ut

different 'atterns descri,a,le as one of 8oo97s distri,ution rules. The rule o'erative

,etween 'ersons close in 9inshi' and residential distance is called reci'rocity in

economic anthro'ology. @t is in that s'here where exchange rates vary widely under

the rule Hto each according to need from each according to ca'acity.H

Meanwhile in external trade transactions under a distri,ution rule of eKuality are

o'erative. Each transaction is one of a series ,etween mem,ers of a trade friendshi'

or 'artnershi'. -nder such conditions (descri,ed more fully ,y Sahlins) each

transaction must 'reserve the solidarity ,uilt ,y 'revious transactions and 're'are

the ground for future transactions. As a result strictly economic relations develo'

an ethic and a di'lomacy as 'art of a ,argaining 'rocess. Thus

The economic ratio is a di'lomatic maneuver. "It reKuires a good deal of tact on the 'art

of everyone concernedH as Radcliffe*Grown wrote of Andamanese inter,and exchangeHto avoid the un'leasantness that may arise if a man thin9s that he has not received things

as valua,le as he has given ... H (#$13:1") The 'eo'le must literally come to terms. The

rate of exchange ta9es on functions of a 'eace treaty.

Cot to say that intergrou' exchange sim'ly serves the Hmoral 'ur'oseH of ma9ing

friends. Gut whatever the intent and however utilitarian it will not do to ma9e enemies.

*As it turns out the safe and sane 'rocedure is not 0ust measure for measure*exactly

,alanced reci'rocity. The most tactful strategy is economic good measure a ,a9er7s

do<en of which there can ,e no com'laints. The tendency ,ecomes over+reciprocation

('. #21).

There emerges in longitidinal relations*if the 'arties en0oy a ,alance of 'ower

**eKuity and even a touch of altruism as exchange rules. >or ex'erimental studieson a similar 'oint see Ger9owit< I aniels (#$&1) and 5ones (#$&$).

F-BC +EC AC EMERS6C 6C +6=ER =ithin economics 'ro'er much dis*

cussion of indeterminacy in the x/y ratio concludes that it is a 'ro,lem of 'ower.

Fuhn (#$&) formulated a clear and very general conce'tion of ,argaining 'ower

in the A*G relation showing further that his formulation is similar to my own theory

of 'ower*de'endence relations and similar also to other formulations in economics.

Some time earlier +en (#$$: ##") writing on la,or*management negotiation (which

he sees as a 'ro,lem in ,ilateral mono'oly when la,or is organi<ed) was also moved

to formulate the 'ro,lem as a 'ower 'rocess:

Cow the sacrifice which G ma9es ,y retaining the good is o,viously nothing more than

the de'endence of G on A. Therefore economic 'ower is ,ased on the extent to which

the su,0ect to ,e overcome is de'endent on the H'owerfulH su,0ect and on the extent to

which the H'owerfulH su,0ect is inde'endent of the su,0ect to ,e overcome.

Gargaining 'ower li9e social 'ower in general is the 'otential to influence others7

action (e.g. yield more y or acce't less x 'er unit of y). Gut again our concern is

the series of transactions that com'rise an ongoing social relation. 6ur hy'othesis

would ,e: @f the relation is un,alanced in 'ower to A7s advantage then x/y will

decrease across continuing transactions until either 'ower is ,alanced or x/y has

decreased to the su,sistence level for G. (Gy the su,sistence level @ mean the 'oint



S68@A E8BACDE TBE6R4

at which G de'arts from the relation whether ,y migration starvation or loss of ca'acity to 'roduce more y.) The rationale for this hy'othesis includes two 'oints:

(a) changes in x/y after relative de'endency (and 'ower) in a 'redicta,le wayJ and

(b) if A has the 'ower to reduce x/y ,ut does not do so he will derive less reward

and/or more cost from the A*G relation than will G. Therefore eKuity and distri,u*

tive 0ustice do not stand in o''osition to 'ower use or ex'loitation. As a result

self*righteous moral 0ustifications for the use of social 'ower are easily fashioned*

the Hwhite man7s ,urdenH and similar rationales.

@n an ethnogra'hic context E'stein (#$&%) gives us a fine analysis of the famous

5a0mani village system of @ndia showing how it ha''ens that x/y (the 'ro'ortion

of agricultural yield turned ,ac9 to landowners ,y tenant farmers) evolved to a

near*su,sistence level for tenant farmers. >or an ex'erimental study of a similar 'rocess see Stolte & Emerson (#$%&).

STRATED@8 @CTERA8T@6C >inally there is a large and rather scattered ,ody of

theory and research that deals in one way or another with the social interactive

'rocess relating to the x/y ratio. =here the a,ove to'ics deal more with attri,utes

of exchange relations**decision rules 'ower*de'endence etc*this wor9 deals with

internal interactive 'rocesses. =e can list ,ut a few: com'liance*gaining techniKues

(Gandura #$&$ Marwell & Schmitt #$& Schmitt #$&1 Schmitt & Marwell #$&$)

altercasting (=einstein #$& #$&& #$&$J =einstein Gec9house Glumstein & Stein

#$&3J =einstein & eutsch,erger #$&J =einstein & =iley #$&$)J ingratiation

(5ones #$&1 #$&J 5ones Dergen Dum'ert & Thi,aut #$&J 5ones Dergen & 5ones#$& avis #$&J 5ones Stires Schaver & Barris #$&3 Stires & 5ones #$&$)J

self*'resentation and im'ression management (Doffman #$%2J Dergen & Taylor

#$&$J Garth #$&&).

>inally a to'ic of es'ecially high interest concerns the emergence of norms and

contracts from the ,argaining 'rocess. It entails the transition from strategic in*

teraction to normatively regulated exchange. See Thi,aut & Felley (#$$) on social

norms along with Thi,aut & >aucheux (#$&)J Thi,aut (#$&3)J Thi,aut & Druder

(#$&$)J Murdoc9 (#$&%)J Murdoc9 & Rosen (#$%2)J and Michener Driffith &

+almer (#$%#).

>R6M M@8R6 T6 MA8R6 E8BACDE TBE6R4

6ur discussion of exchange theory dwelling as it has u'on 'sychological and utility

theory foundations has em'hasi<ed microsco'ic social analysis. @ndeed the litera*

ture identified with Thi,aut & Felley Bomans and Glau is almost exclusively the

social 'sychological analysis of elementary social 'rocesses. Bowever des'ite this

recent concentration at the micro level social exchange theory has origins in and

is now returning to the macro level of societal analysis. Ellis (#$%#) in his recent

examination of the Bo,,esian 'ro,lem of order refers to exchange theory as an

a''roach on the same level with structural*functionalism and conflict theory. Simi*

larly 8lar9 (#$%") discusses functionalism and exchange theory as 'arallel*andcom'lementary*a''roaches to macro level social analysis. 8oleman7s wor9 (#$%"

#$%) 'uts forth a macro*level form of exchange and 'ower analysis as does Gurt



#22 EMERS6C

(#$%&). 8oo9 (#$%,) has ,egun an exchange a''roach to interorgani<ational re*

search.

The ga' ,etween Boman7s elementary 'rocesses and say ens9i7s (#$&&) descri'*tion of 'ower and resource distri,ution in total societies cannot ,e ,ridged in a single

s'an. Even so the ste'*,y*ste' extension of exchange theory to more macrosco'ic

levels is clearly the most im'ortant line of continued theory construction.

4Elementary4 Social Behavior

The transition from micro to macro theory must ,egin with an ex'licit recognition

of features distinguishing the two levels. There a''ear to ,e three. >irst Bomans7s

HelementaryH social ,ehavior is su,institutional in that it*the ,ehavior.......Psiesen

as governed ,y the 'references of individuals as distinct from the 'rescri'tions

or mandates of envelo'ing social grou's or social structural forms. (See Ceedham

#$&" for an analysis of micro versus macro exchange of women in terms of 'reference versus 'rescri'tion.) @f an individual7s actions in an exchange 'rocess are

institution* ally reKuired one might as9 how reward/cost analysis can inform us

a,out the 'rocessJ yet if valued resources are exchanged through 'rescri,ed

,ehavior some* thing resem,ling reward is surely involved.

The a,ove 'ro,lem*exchange through 'rescri,ed ,ehavior*might come down

to the Kuestion of who is rewarded. This leads to the second feature of elementary

exchange: the actor involved is usually treated as an autonomous individual as

distinct from cor'orate grou's and from social 'ersons (i.e. role occu'ants). =hen

a woman is exchanged for goods in the institution of marriage local lineages as

cor'orate grou's are the actors involved (each #$#). Those collective actors

reali<e rewards and ex'end 'ooled resources through negotiations carried out ,y

role*'laying agents of the grou'. Thus in some measure we already have conce'ts

availa,le to us (in role theory) to deal with 'rescri,ed exchange and collective

actors.

It is the third feature of micro exchange theory that is most trou,lesome: it is

dyadic. =hile the elementary social 'rocesses under study ,y Bomans are not

necessarily dyadic the theory**the conce'ts and 'ro'osition introduced*move us

to the analysis of two*'arty transactions. The same is true of Glau7s (#$&1a) ma0or

contri,ution. =hile o,viously concerned with the analysis of exchange among

'otentially large num,ers of 'eo'le the ,asic conce'ts he em'loys including those

drawn from economics (e.g. indifference curves) incline one to reduce the socialsituation to a set of dyadic transactions. Economic theory offers aggregated analysis

of such a set of socially se'arate two*'arty transactions.

8learly social exchange theory needs a set of conce'ts and 'rinci'les that de*

scri,e the lin9age of exchange relations into larger social structures*structures that

will do for social exchange theory something similar to what the com'etitive mar9et

does for economic exchange theory.

!rom 2- to 9+$arty E&change Corporate %roupsand E&change 9etwor6s

@ have suggested elsewhere (Emerson #$&$ #$%",) that two very different yet

com'lementary distinctions hel' to extend systematic analysis from exchange in



S68@A E8BACDE TBE6R4 %

dyads to larger social structures. 6ne of these is 'roductive exchange useful in

discussing grou' 'ro,lem solving the division of la,or (Emerson #$&3) and cor'o*

rate grou's. The other is the conce't of connections among exchange relationsleading to the analysis of exchange networ9 structures.

DR6-+ +R68ESS AS H+R6-8T@!EH E8BACDE The economist Fuhn (#$&)

has made the claim that most organi<ed social grou's ,oth small and large*e.g.

families ,usiness cor'orations committees legislative ,odies etc*are ,ased u'on

the single generic 'rocess that in economics is called 'roduction. To examine the

character of this 'rocess Fuhn7s own exam'le is worth re'eating:

Su''ose that 'erson A has ,read as resource and 'erson G has cheese as

resource Y. et ,oth A and G value Q where Q is a cheese sandwich. -nder these

conditions exchanges of x for y will occur in a ty'ical exchange relation Ax:Gy.

After the exchange ,oth A and G might fashion and eat their res'ective sandwiches.8all this familiar 'rocess sim'le exchange to distinguish it from the following

'roductive exchange. @nstead of exchanging # x for " y and se'arately ma9ing

sandwiches A and G might 0ointly manufacture Q sandwiches and then divide u'

the 'roduct Q. Some "Z" can only ,e collectively 'roduced. >or exam'le in village

@ndia 'rior to the introduction of modern agricultural technology grain could ,e

'roduced most effectively ,y a total village community including several classes of

cultivators and several categories of artisans all coo'erating in an exchange system

9nown as the :agmani system. The village o'erated as a cor'orate grou' its mem*

,ers ,ound together in a s'ecial form of exchange.

That ty'e of exchange can ,e called 'roductive exchange. -nli9e the direct

transfer of valued items in sim'le exchange here items of value are 'roduced

through a value*adding social 'rocess. @n general the se'arate resources of two or

more 'ersons A G 8 ... C are com,ined through a social 'rocess involving a

division of la,or. The result is a valued 'roduct that might ,e divisi,le (li9e grain)

among all 'roducers or that might ,e converted through sim'le exchange to a

divisi,le medium (money) and distri,uted among mem,ers ,y some distri,ution

rule (see 8oo9 a,ove.)

E8BACDE CET=6RFS The idea of 'roductive exchange readily accommodates

large num,ers of actors there,y freeing exchange theory from its dyadic format.

Bowever 'roductive exchange is uniKuely addressed to resource distri,ution withincor'orate grou's. Such grou's can ,e 'ro'erly viewed as HactorsH in sim'le ex*

change 'rocesses. Exam'les are each7s local lineage grou's in the exchange of

women cor'orate villages in the land revenue system of the Mughal em'ire (Emer*

son #$%&) etc. Therefore it is essential in macro exchange theory that sim'le

exchange also ,e analy<ed ,eyond the dyad.

Thus we come to the notion of exchange networ9s involving three or more actorsJ

structured exchange systems that are not to ,e confused with grou's. Cetwor9s tie

together ,oth grou's and individuals as actors. Some of the earliest social exchange

theory dealt with such networ9s*Malinows9i (#$"") and others since on the HFula

ringHJ evi*Strauss (#$&$) and others on matrilateral cross*cousin marriage in Hcir*

cles.H



#2" EMERS6C

These two exam'les of networ9 structure are worth descri,ing. The Fula is an

intertri,al exchange of nec9laces for armlets ,etween communities inha,iting a ring

of islands. If one 'arty does not give to another what the other has given to him*li9e not returning a 8hristmas gift to its sender one year laterJ and if the item is

not 'erisha,le or consuma,le then it follows of necessity that: (a) the exchange

system will ,e HclosedH or cyclicJ and (b) one item will flow always in one direction

counter to the direction of another item. So it is with the Fula Hring.H

Similarly in matrilateral cross*cousin marriage a lineage cannot receive women

from a lineage it gives women to. The origins or functions of this marriage rule have

,een hotly de,ated*in a de,ate of great relevance to our interest in micro versus

macro theory (see Ceedham #$&"J Bomans & Schneider #$ E9eh #$%1). Gut

whatever its origin some of its structural im'lications are clear: marriage networ9s

will form circles with women flowing in one direction. (As an exchange item

women cannot ,e HconsumedH ,ecause of incest and exogamy rules.) Gut what other

item flows against women Ceed there ,e one

E9eh (#$%1) would li9e to ,elieve that social exchange is not grossly utilitarian

and therefore that gifts (nec9laces women etc) that flow in a circle need not*

indeed should not*have o,0ects of material worth flowing the other way. @n fact

he would 'refer that nothing flow the other way ,ecause if it does the favored

generali<ed exchange of the extended networ9 might dissolve into the restricted

exchange of two*'arty mutual reward with a loss of grou' solidarity and other*

directed morality.

@n fact however such networ9s tend to ,e com'osed of lin9ed two*way exchange

relations. 6,0ects of great material value are often exchanged for wives ,oth itemsflowing around the circle. The im'ortant studies in alliance theory do not de'end

u'on non utilitarian exchange and they do involve the exchange of honor status

and 'ower (each #$#).

=ith such networ9s as the a,ove to illustrate the idea the general to'ic of

networ9 forms and structures stands o'en as a most fruitful line of research. A lot

of research on exchange networ9s is now going on. @n the la,oratory Stolte &

Emerson (#$%&) have shown 'ower to ,e a function of 'osition in networ9 structures

S>ar more common than the rings and cycles descri,ed a,ove are centrali<ed tree structures.

>or exam'le Sahlins (#$&) descri,es the ty'ical H,ig manH 'attern in anthro'ology as a

networ9 for the 'ooling and redistri,ution of resources. Garth7s (#$$a) study of 'oliticalleadershi' in Swat could ,e analy<ed as such a structure.

Sahlins7s notion can ,e viewed as a centrally organi<ed system of what ethologists study

under the la,el of Hreci'rocal altruismH in lower animal s'ecies. A gives hel'* to G when G

is in need and at cost to A. If and when A needs hel' and 8 ... C is around one will

'rovide it*again with no assurance of return. Bowever the genetic line common to A

through C is given a survival advantage through such Hreci'rocal altruism.H

@n Sahlins7s discussion reci'rocity as a human exchange system functions the same way

,ut it occurs only among 'ersons with close 9inshi' distance. It might ,e a ,ac9u' or regulated

,y 9in grou' authority structures. =hen the grou' is larger a centrally managed system of

taxation and relief may emerge as outlined in Sahlins7s 'ooling and redistri,uting networ9

structure.




of various sha'es. Gurt (#$%&) gives us mathematical models of 'ower and 'osition

in community structure viewed as an exchange networ9. Be utili<es data 'rovided

,y auman & +a''i (#$%&). Emerson (#$%"a) has suggested directions that su,stan*tive exchange networ9 theory can ta9e in examining such to'ics as social class

stratification and division of la,or.

=aiting for such su,stantive theory to catch u' is a ,ody of availa,le mathematics

in the form of gra'h theory and networ9 theory.

86C8-@CD 86MMECT

HExchange theoryH is not to ,e ta9en as a theory. Rather it is a frame of reference

that ta9es the movement of valued things (resources) through social 'rocess as its

focus. As @ see it its sco'e is defined ,y an assum'tion: that a resource will continue

to flow only if there is a valued return contingent u'on it. +sychologists call thiscontingent return rein;orcement+economists sim'ly call this reci'rocally contin*

gent flow e&change.

@n reviewing the recent literature on social exchange one finds conce'tual confu*

sion and de,ate concerning issues of tautology rationality in social ,ehavior and

reductionism in the strategy of ex'lanation. This confusion has @ ,elieve seriously

retarded em'irical research. The confusion stems again in my o'inion from the use

in sociology of conce'ts ,orn in the analysis of individual actions and decisions. @

recommend that longitudinal social relations**exchange relations in this case*,e

consciously em'loyed as the unit of analysis.

=ith such a unit it is then 'ossi,le to deal develo'mentally with structures of

continuing interaction ,etween 'arties****cor'orate grou's and their role*occu'ying

mem,ersJ and networ9s involving many actors ,oth cor'orate grou's and individu*

als. It is 'recisely social structures of this sort that violate the assum'tions of

neoclassical economics (e.g. Hvertical organi<ationH and oligo'oly in the oil indus*

try). Thus @ li9e to thin9 of social exchange theory as develo'ing the conce'tual

tools needed (longitudinal exchange relations and networ9 structures) to deal with

exactly those to'ics that economics theory has trou,le with: mar9et im'erfections.

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