empathy basics

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the differing protections of liberty and equality in the criminal justice system. Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 24: 665

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K. Levine and M. Feeley

Prosocial Behavior and Empathy:Developmental Processes

Research on helping others in distress took off with thebrutal murder of a young woman in Queens, NewYork in the mid-1960s, which was witnessed by 30people from their apartment windows. The initialresearch on why witnesses do not help (Latane andDarley 1970) focused on the context and found thatthe presence of other bystanders can interfere with aperson helping by activating certain assump-tions—‘diffusion of responsibility’ (I’m sure someonehas called the police) or ‘pluralistic ignorance’ (no oneis doing anything, so it can’t be an emergency). There

was also research on when people do help, whichshowed among other things that the tendency of bystanders to help increases with age.

Recent research has focused more on prosocialmotivation and emotion. It highlights empathicemotion, sympathy, and guilt. This article is concernedwith developmental processes in empathic emotionsand their contribution to helping. Also covered is therole of cognition in arousing, developing, and shapingempathic emotion and enlarging the individual’sperspective on prosocial behavior. Finally, the articledeals with the contribution of socialization especiallyby parents and peers, and gender differences.

1. Definition of Empathy

Empathy has been defined in two ways: (a) thecognitive awareness of another person’s internal states(thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions); (b) thevicarious affective response to another person. Thischapter deals with affective empathy, because of itsmotive properties (see Ickes 1997 for cognitive em-pathy).

Affective empathy was initially defined as a matchbetween the observer’s and the model’s feeling. It isnow defined as it is here, more in terms of the processesthat make an observer’s feelings congruent with themodel’s situation not his own (Hoffman 1978, 2000).There may be a match, but not necessarily aswhen one feels empathic anger on seeing someoneattacked even when the victim feels sad or disap-

pointed rather than angry. Most of the research onaffective empathy as a prosocial motive focuses onempathic distress because prosocial moral actionusually involves helping someone in discomfort, pain,danger, poverty, and the like.

2. Modes of Empathic Arousal

Five empathy-arousal modes have been identified(Hoffman 1978). Three are primitive, automatic, andpreverbal. (a) Mimicry, which has two steps: onespontaneously imitates another’s facial, vocal, orpostural expressions of feeling, producing changes inone’s own facial or postural musculature; thesechanges trigger afferent feedback to the brain, whichresults in feelings that resemble the other’s feelings. (b)Classical conditioning, in which empathic distressbecomes a conditioned response to distress in othersthrough observing others in distress at the same timethat one is in actual distress. (c) Direct association of cues from others or their situation with one’s ownpainful past experience. The empathy aroused by thesethree modes is passive, involuntary, based on the pullof surface cues, and requires little cognitive processing.Nevertheless, these modes are important because (a)they show that a person’s distress can indeed resultfrom someone else’s painful experience; (b) they makeempathy arousal possible in the early preverbal yearsof childhood; and(c) they give empathy an involuntary

dimension throughout life.Two empathy-arousing modes are higher ordercognitive. (a) Verbally mediated association: languagecommunicates the other’s distress and connects theother’s situation to one’s own painful past experience.(b) Perspective-taking: one feels something of thevictim’s distress by imagining how one would feel inthe victim’s place andor trying to imagine directlyhow the victim feels by using information one hasabout him or her. These higher order cognitive modesmay be drawn out over time and subject to voluntarycontrol, but they mayalso be triggered immediately onwitnessing another’s distress. What they contribute to

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empathy is scope; they also allow one to empathizewith others who are not present.

Multiple modes are important because they enableobservers to respond empathically to whatever distresscues are available (Hoffman 2000). Cues from thevictim’s face, voice, or posture can be picked upthrough mimicry, situational cues, through condition-ing or association. If a victim expresses distressverbally or in writing, or someone else describes thevictim’s situation, one can empathize through verballymediated association or perspective-taking. Empathicdistress is thus a multidetermined hence reliablehuman response, which fits the argument that itsurvived natural selection and has a hereditary com-ponent (Hoffman 1981, Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992).

3. Deelopmental StagesMature empathy has a metacognitive dimension: oneknows one’s feeling of distress results from another’splight and how the other presumably feels. One thushas a sense of oneself and others as separate beingswith independent inner states (that are only partlyreflected in outward behavior), separate identities, andseparate life conditions. Before 6 or 7 years childrencan empathize but without this metacognitive di-mension. This suggests that empathic affect developsalong with cognitive self other development. Fivestages of empathy development have been hypo-thesized (Hoffman 1978, 2000).

(a) Global empathic distress: newborns show a

vigorous, agitated distress response to another infant’scry. (b) Egocentric empathic distress: one responds toanother’s distress as though oneself were in distress.This occurs when children can be empathicallyaroused by the three preverbal modes but still lack aclear self-other distinction. (c) Quasiegocentric em-pathicdistress: one knows the other is in actualdistressbut confuses the other’s inner states with one’s ownand tries to help by doing for the other what wouldcomfort oneself. (d) Veridical empathic distress: one’sfeeling is closer to the other’s because one realizes theother has inner states independent of one’s own. (e)Empathy for another’s experience beyond the im-mediate situation (e.g., chronic illness, economichardship, deprivation): this high empathy level is

possible when children realize that others have anidentity and a generally sad or happy life condition;and empathy with an entire group (homeless; Okla-homa City bombing victims).

4. Causal Attribution’s Shaping of EmpathicAffect

Humans spontaneously attribute causality to events(Weiner 1985) and they presumably do this whenwitnessing someone in distress. If they blame thevictim, empathic distress is of course reduced. Other-

wise, depending on the attribution, empathic affectmay be shaped into four empathy-based moral affects

(Hoffman 2000). (a) Sympathetic distress, when thecause is beyond the victim’s control (illness, accident,loss). (b) Empathic anger, when someone else is thecause. (c) Empathic feeling of injustice, when adiscrepancy exists between the victim’s character andthe victim’s fate (a good person fares badly). (d)Empathy-based guilt over inaction, when one does nothelp or one’s efforts to help fail and the victim’sdistress continues; here one’s empathic distress com-bines with blaming oneself not for causing the victim’sdistress but allowing it to continue.

5. Empathy as a Prosocial Moti e

Empathy correlates positively with helping. There isalso experimental evidence that arousal of empathicdistress leads to helping; and that observers help morequickly the greater the victims’ pain and the higher theobservers’ empathic distress. Furthermore, observers’empathic distress becomes less intense and they feelbetter if they help, but not if they don’t help or if despite their best efforts and through no fault of theirown, the victim’s distress is not alleviated, whichimplies that the main objective of empathy-basedhelping is to alleviate the victim’s distress. There is alsoevidence that empathy reduces both aggressive andmanipulative (Machiavellian) behavior. It thus seemsclear that empathic distress is a prosocial motive. Seereviews by Hoffman (1978, 2000) and Eisenberg

and Miller (1987).Empathy has limitations, however (Hoffman 1984,

2000). (a) Egoistic motives may intervene and onemay not help, even at the price of feeling guiltyafterwards. (b) Empathic distress increases with thelevel of victims’ distress, but empathic distress canbecome aversive enough to shift one’s attention fromthe victim’s to one’s own personal distress (empathicoverarousal).(c) People empathizewith almost anyonein distress (the victims in research are usually strang-ers), but they empathize more with kin, in-groupmembers, friends, and people who share their personalconcerns (familiarity bias)—which may not be aproblem except when intergroup rivalry contributes tointense empathic anger (hatred, ethnic cleansing)

toward outgroup members. (d) People empathize morewith victims who are physically present (here-and-nowbias), probably because most empathy-arousing pro-cesses require immediate situational and personalcues.

6. Socialization by Parents and Peers

The role of parent as socializer has three facets: model,disciplinarian, nurturer. Each contributes to children’sempathy and prosocial behavior, although disciplinehas been the most studied (Hoffman 2000). The

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discipline method most likely to contribute to em-pathy, helping, and guilt over harming others is a type

of reasoning called induction, often used by educatedmiddle-class American parents when children harm orare about to harm someone. Inductions direct thechild’s attention to the victim’s distress and may thusengage the empathy-arousing modes noted above.They also highlight the child’s role in causing thevictim’s distress, which may lead to empathy-basedtransgression guilt. Power-assertive disciplines (physi-cal force, threats, commands) are associated with lowempathy, low helping, and low guilt, although somepower assertion may be needed at times to get childrento attend and process an induction’s message.

Parents’ behavior outside discipline encounters mayprovide prosocial models that reinforce children’sempathic proclivity and legitimize helping (Eisenberg

and Fabes 1998, Hoffman 2000). Examples areexpressing compassion toward people in difficultstraights such as the homeless; linking a televisionprotagonist’s feelings or situations with the child’sown experience; pointing out similarities among allhumans such as sadness due to separation and loss.Parent models may thus reinforce children’s empathicdispositions especially when they are bystanders andsomeone needs help. Parent models may also makechildren more receptive to inductions, and, along withinductions, make children more receptive to claims of their peers (Hoffman 2000).

Piaget suggested in the 1930s that interaction withpeers (not parents, who are too powerful) fostersprosocialmoral development in children (Piaget 1932).Cognitive-developmental psychologists have recentlyelaborated this view (Turiel 1998), briefly as follows:children ‘co-construct’ and discover moral norms inthe give-and-take of peer interaction (disputes, argu-ments, negotiations). These peer conflicts put pressureon children to take different points of view and toconsider and coordinate the needs and rights of self and others (for example, regarding claims to own-ership and possession of objects). This is a compellinghypothesis that merits research. Hoffman (2000)suggests that the peer interaction processes involvedcan serve to add the finishing touches to the prosocialoutcomes of having inductive, nurturant, prosocialmodels as parents.

7. The Role of Cognition

Though we deal with empathic affect, cognition’simportance is evident in two empathy arousal pro-cesses (verbally mediated association and perspective-taking): in the key role of self other differentiation inempathy development; in the production of empathicanger and empathy-based guilt through causal at-tribution; and in children processing the informationin inductions. Beyond that, cognitive developmentenables humans to form images, represent people and

events, and imagine themselves in another’s place; andbecause represented people and events can evoke

affect, victims need not be present for empathy to bearoused in observers. Empathy can be aroused whenobservers imagine or read about victims, discuss orargue about economic or political issues that involvevictims, or make moral judgments about hypotheticalmoral dilemmas (see Moral Reasoning in Psychology)in which there are victims. See Hoffman (1987, 2000)for discussion of the importance of cognition, in-cluding the cognitive dimension of moral principles,in empathy’s development and prosocial function-ing.

8. Gender Differences

Girls are socialized more than boys to be kind and feelresponsible for others’ well-being. Girls are thusexpected, increasingly with age, to be more empathicand prosocial and less likely to harm others. Theresearch supports these expectations but in varyingdegrees (Eisenberg and Fabes 1998). Girls show morekindness and consideration for others and, to a lesserextent, are more likely to help and share. They are lesslikely to harm others and more apt to feel guilty whenthey do. They are also more empathic than boys, butthis is clear only with self-report, especially ques-tionnairemeasures, in which it is obvious what is beingassessed and responses are under the subject’s control.It is not clear with unobtrusive naturalistic obser-vations or physiological indices of empathy. Theempathy findings may thus reflect subjects’ con-ceptions of what boys and girls are supposed to be like.Whether they reflect gender differences in actualbehavior is a matter for future research to decide.

See also: Adulthood: Prosocial Behavior and Empa-thy; Altruism and Prosocial Behavior, Sociology of;Antisocial Behavior in Childhood and Adolescence;Moral Reasoning in Psychology; Social Cognition andAffect, Psychology of; Social Support, Psychology of

Bibliography

Eisenberg N, Fabes R A 1998Prosocialdevelopment. In:DamonW (ed.) Handbook of Child Psychology: Social, Emotional, and Personality Deelopment, 5th edn. Wiley, New York, vol. 3

Eisenberg N, Miller P A 1987 The relation of empathy to pro-social and related behaviors. Psychological Bulletin 101:91–119

Hoffman M L 1978 Empathy, its development and prosocialimplications. In: Keasey C B (ed.) Nebraska Symposium onMoti ation, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NV. Vol.25, pp. 169–218

Hoffman M L 1981 Is altruism part of human nature? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40: 121–37

Hoffman M L 1984 Empathy, its limitations, and its role in acomprehensive moral theory. In: Kurtines W, Gewirtz J (eds.)

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Morality, Moral Behaior, and Moral Deelopment. JohnWiley, New York, pp. 283–302

Hoffman M L 1987 The contribution of empathy to justice andmoral judgment. In: Eisenberg N, Strayer J (eds.) Empathyand its Deelopment. Cambridge University Press, New York,pp. 47–80

Hoffman M L 2000 Empathy and its Deelopment: Implications for Caring and Justice. Cambridge University Press, NewYork

Ickes W 1997 Empathic Accuracy. Guilford Press, New YorkLatane B, Darley J M 1970 The Unresponsi e Bystander: Why

Doesn’t He Help? Appleton-Century Crofts, New YorkLennon R, Eisenberg N 1987 Gender and age differences in

empathy and sympathy. In: Eisenberg N, Strayer J (eds.)Empathy and its Deelopment. Cambridge University Press,New York, pp. 195–217

Piaget J 1932 The Moral Judgment of the Child . Harcourt, NewYork

Turiel E 1998 The development of morality. In: Damon W (ed.)

Handbook of Child Psychology: Social, Emotional, and Per-sonality Deelopment. Wiley, New York, Vol. 3

Weiner B 1985 ‘Spontaneous’ causal thinking. Psychological Bulletin 97: 74–84

Zahn-Waxler C, Emde R N, Robinson J L 1992 The devel-opment of empathy in twins. Deelopmental Psychology 28:1038–47

M. L. Hoffman

Prosopagnosia

Prosopagnosia is a neuropsychological condition in-volving loss of ability to recognize familiar faces.Prosopagnosic patients instead rely on voice, context,name, or sometimes clothing or gait to achieverecognition of people they know. The problem in facerecognition is not due to blindness (the person withprosopagnosia can still see) or general intellectualimpairment (people are still recognized from nonfacialcues). Yet even the most familiar faces may gounrecognized: famous people, friends, family, and theperson’s own face when seen in a mirror.

Face recognition impairments are socially disabling,and most patients develop strategies for tackling theproblem. They may note carefully what clothes some-oneis wearing, askrelatives always to wear a particular

distinctive item, or become adept at initiating ormaintaining a conversation whilst they work out whothey are talking to. These strategies are not completelyeffective. One prosopagnosic patient lost a legal actionwhen he discussed his case with his opponent’slawyer—he thought it was his own advocate becausehe was wearing similar court clothes.

Prosopagnosia should not be confused with othertypes of impairment that can compromise face rec-ognition (Young 1992). In prosopagnosia, recognitionfrom other cues than the face is usually possible. Incontrast, cases of inability to recognize people fromface, voice, and name have been described—these

seem to reflect loss of semantic information about theidentities of individuals. There are also reports of

problems of name retrieval (anomia), in which familiarpeople are successfully recognized and appropriatesemantic information is accessed, but their namescannot be recalled. Face recognition impairmentstherefore reflect damage to an underlying systemwhich can break down in different ways.

Although reports of problems affecting face rec-ognition after brain injury can be traced back to thenineteenth century, prosopagnosia was identified as adistinct neuropsychological problem by Bodamer in1947 (Ellis and Florence 1990). Whilst it is generallyconsidered a rare deficit, there arenow several hundredcase descriptions in the literature. These include caseswhere brain injury early or late in life has led toinability to recognize previously familiar faces, and

developmental cases where the disorder is presentfrom birth. People with prosopagnosia know whenthey are looking at a face, and can describe its features,but the loss of any sense of overt recognition is oftencomplete, with no feeling of familiarity. In contrast,other aspects of face processing, such as the ability tointerpret facial expressions, or to match views of unfamiliar faces, can remain remarkably intact insome (though not all) cases. The ability to recognizeeveryday objects other than faces may also remaingood, and many prosopagnosic patients are able toread without difficulty. In one of the cases of earlyacquired deficit, a child who had remained unable torecognize any faces since suffering meningitis andsubsequent complications in infancy was nonethelessable to learn to read (Young and Ellis 1989); thisunderlines the implication that reading and facerecognition depend on different types of visual analy-sis.

Deficits commonly associated with prosopagnosiainclude a visual field defect in the left upper quadrant,achromatopsia (loss of color vision), and topogra-phical disorders (inability to find one’s way about).These are useful clinical pointers, but they are thoughtto be due to anatomical proximity of otherwiseunrelated processes rather than having any directfunctional significance; cases of prosopagnosia with-out each of these associated deficits have been de-scribed, and they have also each been reported in the

absence of prosopagnosia.Studies of prosopagnosia initially concentrated onthe location of the lesions responsible, and to whatextent the problem is specific to face recognition. Morerecent work has asked whether there exist differentunderlying forms of deficit, and has explored theimplications of findings of covert recognition.

1. Lesions Causing Prosopagnosia

The underlying pathology involves lesions affectingventromedial regions of occipitotemporal cortex; theseinclude the lingual, fusiform, and parahippocampal

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Copyright 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd.All rights reserved.

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences ISBN: 0-08-043076-7

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