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Energy Security and Resilience Benefits of ElectricEnergy Storage
Ramteen Sioshansi
Department of Integrated Systems EngineeringThe Ohio State University
40th Annual IAEE International ConferenceSingapore
18–21 June, 2017
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 1 / 16
Disclaimer
The following are my own views and notnecessarily those of the Electricity AdvisoryCommittee, the U.S. Department of Energy, oranyone else.
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 2 / 16
Overview and Agenda
1 Many potential threats to reliable and resilient electricity supply2 Energy storage can and has helped mitigate these3 Market design and regulatory barriers remain
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 3 / 16
Possible Sources of Supply Disruptions
NaturalWater availabilityEarthquakeStormsSpace weatherTsunamiVolcanic eventWildfire
Human-CausedPhysical attackCyber attackOperational error
Cross-CuttingFuel supply
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 4 / 16
More Frequent Than Expected
Figure: Dashed Line Fits an Exponential Distribution to Frequent Small-Scale Events
Source: https://www.nap.edu/read/12050/chapter/3
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 5 / 16
Terrorist Attackhttps://www.doi.org/10.17226/12050
A terrorist attack on the power system would lack the dramaticimpact of the attacks in New York, Madrid, or London. It would notimmediately kill many people or make for spectacular televisionfootage of bloody destruction. But if it were carried out in a carefullyplanned way, by people who knew what they were doing, it coulddeny large regions of the country access to bulk system power forweeks or even months. An event of this magnitude and durationcould lead to turmoil, widespread public fear, and an image ofhelplessness that would play directly into the hands of the terrorists.If such large extended outages were to occur during times of extremeweather, they could also result in hundreds or even thousands ofdeaths due to heat stress or extended exposure to extreme cold.
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 6 / 16
Cyber VulnerabilityDOE 2017 QER
The current cybersecurity landscape is characterized by rapidlyevolving threats and vulnerabilities, juxtaposed against theslower-moving deployment of defense measures. Mitigation andresponse to cyber threats are hampered by inadequateinformation-sharing processes between government and industry,the lack of security-specific technological and workforce resources,and challenges associated with multi-jurisdictional threats andconsequences. System planning must evolve to meet the need forrapid response to system disturbances.
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 7 / 16
Operational ErrorNERC Analysis of 2003 Blackout
The first sign of trouble came at 12:15, when MISOs state estimatorexperienced an unacceptably large mismatch error betweenstate-estimated values and measured values. The error was tracedto an outage of Cinergy’s Bloomington-Denois Creek 230-kV line thatwas not updated in MISOs state estimator. The line status wasquickly corrected, but the MISO analyst forgot to reset the stateestimator to run automatically every five minutes.
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 8 / 16
Natural Events
1998 North American IceStorm
4 million without power$5 billion–$7 billion in losses35 deaths
Superstorm SandyAffected over 4 million people>$40 billion in losses147 deaths
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 9 / 16
Aliso Canyon
Large natural gas storage facilityin Los Angeles basinInitially shutdown following leakdiscovered in 2015Subsequently available forwithdrawal only on an emergencybasisCalifornia desires reducing thereliance on brittle natural gasinfrastructure
California Public Utilities Commission ordered Southern California Edisonto procure energy storageResult:
I Three contracts with third parties, two completed (22 MW/88 MWh)I Two utility-owned projects (two 10 MW/40 MWh facilities built by Tesla, two
10 MW/4.3 MWh facilities built by GE)
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 10 / 16
Borrego Flood ‘Outage’
During intense thunderstorm, Borrego microgrid (including distributedenergy storage) was able to provide power to 1000 customers during‘outage’ lasting more than 20 hours
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 11 / 16
IID Blackstarthttp://www.iid.com/Home/Components/News/News/557/30
Imperial Irrigation District used a 30 MW/20 MWh battery storage systemto blackstart a 44 MW combined-cycle gas turbineBelieved to be a first for the industry
Source: Jay Calderon/The Desert Sun
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 12 / 16
Market Valuation
1 2 4 8 1010
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Hours of Storage
Cap
acity
Val
ue [%
]
Utility 1Utility 2Utility 3Utility 4Utility 5MaximumMinimum
Energy storage’sreliability/capacity value is closelyrelated to how it is operatedSignaling when energy must be instore is criticalEven without an explicitmechanism, storage providessome capacity value due toenergy and other pricesMost capacity markets are notdesigned for storage participation
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is currently looking into thisunder proposed Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated byRegional Transmission Organizations and Independent SystemOperators rulemakingDesigns are tied to signaling good operations and valuing storage’scapacity
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 13 / 16
Customer Valuation
How much are customers willing to pay for reliability?Engineers have avoided this question and set arbitrary reliabilitystandards (e.g., one day in 10 years)Implied value of lost load is probably too highPrinciple of revealed preferences may not work
I Exploding cowsI Hospitals signing interruptible-load contracts
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 14 / 16
Operational Planning
Highly inefficient to dedicate storage exclusively tobackup/reliability/resiliencyKnowing when to have energy in store and when not makes for achallenging forecasting/optimization problemOff-the-shelf models cannot handle thisState-of-the-art academic/research models (kind of) can
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 15 / 16
Co-Mingling Market-Priced and Unpriced Services
Some of these services are market-priced, others are notRegulatory paradigm assumes that an asset only provides one type ofservice and handles cost recovery and benefit valuation accordinglyEnergy storage (especially distributed) cuts across the two, breaking thecurrent regulatory mold
Ramteen Sioshansi (ISE OSU) Energy Security and Resilience With Energy Storage 40th IAEE | 18–21 June, 2017 16 / 16