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Enhancing Anti-corruption Performance in Arab Countries Reinventing the Policies and Institutions Ahmed Sakr Ashour Professor, Alexandria University Co-founder and Senior Consultant, IDRAC April 2013

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Enhancing Anti-corruption

Performance in Arab Countries

Reinventing the Policies and Institutions

Ahmed Sakr Ashour Professor, Alexandria University

Co-founder and Senior Consultant, IDRAC

April 2013

The Anti-corruption Stride over the

Last Decade and Half

Joining/ratifying the UNCAC

Legislative and constitutional reforms

Establishing ACAs

Other institutional initiatives

Issuing anti-corruption strategies/plans

Political declarations

The rising role of the civil society organizations

Corruption issues are brought under the lime light: The rising role of the media

Overall Assessment of Results and

Successes of Anti-corruption

Policies and Initiatives

Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

Global Integrity Index

Control of Corruption

Illicit Financial Flows

Corruption Perception Index

(CPI) (Out of 10)

• EGY, Morocco (3.3)

• Qatar (5.6)

• Iraq(2.2)

• Kuwait (5.3)

• KSA (4.5)

• UAE(5.2)

• Syria (3.4)

• Jordan (4.6) • Tun. (4.9)

• Alg., Yemen (2.6)

• Oman (6.3)

• Bah. (6.1)

2

3

4

5

6

• EGY (3.2)

• UAE, Qatar (6.8)

• Iraq (1.8)

• Kuwait, KSA (4.4)

• Leb. (3.0) • Leb. (3.0)

• Yemen (2.3)

• Alg. (3.4)

• Syria (2.6)

• Jor. (4.8)

• Tun. (4.1)

• Morc. (3.7)

• Oman (4.7)

• Bah. (5.1)

2012 2003

CPI

Score

Global Integrity Index

(Out of 100)

57 2011

68 2009

56 2010

55 2008

54 2011

54 2010

53 2009

53 2009

45 2008

42 2009

33 2010

29 2009

UAE

Jordan

Morocco

Kuwait

Algeria

Egypt

Iraq

Lebanon

Tunisia

Qatar

Yemen

Syria

Weak

Very

Weak

Governance Indicators (Control of Corruption)

-2.5

+2.5

0.0 JOR (0.04)

UAE(1.08)

KUW(0.07) OMAN (0.08)

BHR(0.23)

EGY (-0.39)

TUN(-0.03)

ALG (-0.95)

MOR (-0.3)

LIB (-0.73)

YEM(-0.91)

LEB (-0.41)

SYR (-0.90)

KSA(-0.29)

IRQ(-1.22)

QATAR(1.02)

JOR (0.04)

UAE(0.13)

KUW(0.84)

OMAN (0.76)

BHR(0.37)

EGY (-0.68)

TUN(-0.21)

ALG (-0.57)

MOR (-0.26)

LIB (-1.13)

YEM(-1.18)

LEB (-0.19)

SYR (-0.97)

KSA(-0.42)

IRQ(-1.47)

QATAR(0.67)

2000 2012

Illicit Financial Flows (2000 – 2008)

Country Total Flows

(in Billion $)

Rank

Country Total Flows

(in Billion $)

Rank

KSA 301,509 4 Bahrain 9,684 55

UAE 275,895 5 Tunisia 8,739 57

Kuwait 242,163 7 Algeria 4,644 71

Qatar 137,682 9 Jordan 3,429 79

Egypt 57,213 21 Morocco 3,429 79

Syria 30,348 31 Yemen 1,071 98

Oman 18,990 40 Iraq 117 122

Lebanon 11,097 53

No. of Countries 125

The Conclusion

No significant achievement is realized in the anti-corruption arena

This conclusion and the associated paradox is not unique to the Arab region. It is very common in developing regions

The Great Paradox

The achievement and performance of this

anti-corruption stride is weak

Clarifying the Paradox:

An Unconventional Diagnosis

1. The anti-corruption framework has been flawed:

Aggregation and mischaracterization of corruption

Wrong diagnosis of the roots of the problem

Lack of understanding of the problem

Wrong concept

Lack of research on the deeper factors causing corruption and on the ineffectiveness of the anti-corruption policies/institutions/initiatives

Clarifying the Paradox:

An Unconventional Diagnosis (Contd.)

2. Generic and Faulty Anti-corruption Strategy:

Faulty basis

Overly generic

Wrong strategic mix and focus

Lack of priority

Not impact or results driven

Clarifying the Paradox:

An Unconventional Diagnosis (Contd.)

3. Over-focus on Legislative and Institutional

Solution:

The serious gap between the legal framework and its implementation

The anti-corruption and oversight institutions work in isolated islands

The legal and institutional approach represents a vicious circle when corruption is rampant and widespread

Clarifying the Paradox:

An Unconventional Diagnosis (Contd.)

4. Over burdening the ACA:

Most Arab and developing countries and their corruption problems are different than the ACAs of Hong Kong and Singapore

Contradictions in the role and context of the ACAs

They mostly work in isolation from the other anti-corruption and oversight organizations

Lack of resources and expertise

They are part of the bureaucratic framework

Clarifying the Paradox:

An Unconventional Diagnosis (Contd.)

5. Weak Driving Forces

Weak political and societal will

Cultural tolerance toward corruption

Weak accountability of the anti-corruption framework

Lack of synergy with other reforms: o Administrative reform

o HR systems

o Service delivery

o Budgeting

Clarifying the Paradox:

An Unconventional Diagnosis (Contd.)

6. Absence of Evaluation of Results and

Performance Indicators

Serious problems

Is due to lack of results orientation of the anti-corruption policies

A common problem world-wide

Clarifying the Paradox:

An Unconventional Diagnosis (Contd.)

7. Weak Engagement of the Key Stakeholders

Each type of corruption and each sector/institution has its set of stakeholders

The government is monopolizing the anti-corruption framework

Clarifying the Paradox:

An Unconventional Diagnosis (Contd.)

8. In the Corruption Hierarchy: Each Layer

Tends to Reinforce the Other Layers

The principle of coexistence

Deepening the vicious circle and failure of the anti-corruption framework

Clarifying the Paradox:

An Unconventional Diagnosis (Contd.)

9. Lack of Innovation

Rigid and formalistic rules due to over reliant on the

legalistic approach

Ineffectiveness in catching up with the changes and

innovation in the corruption practices/schemes

Clarifying the Paradox:

An Unconventional Diagnosis (Contd.)

10. Lack of Transformational and Change

Management Perspective

No use of transformational strategies/approaches focused on a particular type or institution

Limited use of behavioral and managerial sciences in tackling change

Lessons Learnt from International

Experiences

Reinventing the Anti-corruption

Framework in Arab Countries

Changing the tenants and building on stronger foundations

Dealing with the multiplicity and various types of corruption

Strategic focus on crucial areas and end results

Proper mixing of prevention and law enforcement/combating

Using flexible and home-grown innovative approaches

Rethinking the institutional framework

Strengthening implementation

Empowering and engaging key stakeholders

Monitoring results and rebuilding the accountability framework of the anti-corruption programs and institutions; and gaining credibility through achieving successes