enterprise network security in smb environments

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Enterprise network security in SMB environments... Brian Whelton

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Page 1: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Enterprise network security in SMB environments...

Brian Whelton

Page 2: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

QUICK INTRODUCTION!

Oscar the Grouch is from Sesame Street

20 years in the IT, started by cable pulling, terminating, testing then network hardware installation

Whelton Network Solutions specialise in:

• Network design.

• Security.

• Auditing.

• Incident response.

• Vulnerability testing.

• IPv6

Owner and technical director of Whelton Network Solutions since 2004.

Brian Whelton

Passed my first CCNA in 2003, now hold multiple vendor and industry certifications.

Page 3: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Before, during and after…..

▪ No such thing as a standard network topology, no ‘one size fits all’, Cisco has Cisco Validated Designs, Juniper has Juniper Validated Solutions.

▪ Using terms like ‘it’ll work’ or ‘that’ll do’ at a design stage means you will hear ‘we have a workaround for that’ at a support stage.

▪ Business don’t like risk (ask Associated Press!), don’t introduce any unnecessary risk, this means from attackers, users, managers and from administrators!

▪ All suggestions in this presentation should be available on managed ‘small business’ switch ranges from Cisco, HP and Netgear etc. Vendors codes are not created equal, some are better and securer then others!

▪ No traffic on a Local Area Network should be unpredictable, it is under YOUR control.

▪ Not everything will be available to everyone.

Design is everything!

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21508660 Fake tweet from Associated Press crashes stocks

Page 4: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Open Systems Interconnection model

International Organization for Standardization Open Systems Interconnection https://www.iso.org/ics/35.100/x/

Physical

Data-Link

Network

Transport

Session

Presentation

Application

DATA

Bits

Frames

Packets

Segments

DSL, ISDN, Wi-Fi, ‘x’BaseT, Cabling, Hardware

ARP, LLDP, MAC addresses, CDP/EDP, DTP, MPLS, STP, VLANs, VTP, 802.1q

IPv4, IPv6, ICMP, IGMP, GRE, IPSec, EIGRP, OSPF

AH, ESP, BGP, RIP, iSCSI, TCP, UDP

L2TP, PAP, PPTP, SMB, SIP, SOCKS, SSH

SSL, TLS, ASCII

DNS, BitTorrent, BOOTP, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, SNMP, SMTP, DHCP, FTP, TFTP, NTP

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Page 5: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Layer One – Physical

▪ ONLY defence against attacks is to prevent them.

▪ Document what you have, you can’t support or defend what you don’t know!

▪ The is no defence against equipment failure, have spares!

▪ Restrict access to network equipment.

▪ Be proactive, remove all unused cables, administratively close unused interfaces.

▪ Use 802.11w Management Frame Protection on Wi-Fi networks.

▪ You can’t prevent or fix stupid.

Attacks to Layer One on a network are primarily aimed at denial of, or disruption to, service.

PhysicalBitsDSL, ISDN, Wi-Fi, ‘x’BaseT,

Cabling, Hardware1

Page 6: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Layer Two – Data Link

▪ Server guys finally get it! – Many benefits to Virtualization.

▪ VLANs - Separate traffic into scalable, identifiable, manageable, securable and logical groups.

▪ VLAN 1 – Never use VLAN 1, if you haven’t configured any VLANs, you’re using VLAN 1.

▪ Trunks – Assign a dedicated native VLAN.

Can you guess what’s coming?

VLAN – Virtual Local Area Network

Data-LinkFramesARP, LLDP, MAC addresses, CDP/EDP, DTP,

MPLS, STP, VLANs, VTP, 802.1q2

Page 7: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Layer Two – Data LinkAttacks to layer two mostly rely on the insecurity of L2 protocols, physical access is not required.

Data-LinkFramesARP, LLDP, MAC addresses, CDP/EDP, DTP,

MPLS, STP, VLANs, VTP, 802.1q2

▪ CAM table protection - Instigate Port Security limiting the number of MAC addresses allowed

on switch interfaces.

▪ Port Security - Set static devices MAC addresses

▪ DHCP protection - Disable user interfaces from sending DHCP responses (DHCP Trust).

▪ Private VLANs/Isolated interfaces – Force communication from Layer 2 to Layer 3.

▪ Spanning Tree Protocol (STP). Configure STP Root, on user interfaces configure BPDU

Guard and on non Root switches, configure BPDU Root Guard.

▪ Link Local Discovery Protocols – Disable LLDP on user facing interfaces.

Page 8: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Layer Three – Network

▪ IP Address Schemas - Avoid using 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 if you want to use VPNs!

▪ Implement Access Control Lists – More on this is a bit!

▪ Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). IPSec anything that requires access from outside your

LAN to your LAN.

▪ Routing Notification Protection – EIGRP, OSPF and RIP all can be secured via MD5.

L3 protocols, it’s all about maths! Physical access is not required.

NetworkPacketsIPv4, IPv6, ICMP, IGMP, GRE,

IPSec, EIGRP, OSPF3

Page 9: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Perimeter Protection – External

▪ Anti-spoofing – Deny RFC1918 IP addresses 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12 and 192.168.0.0/16.

▪ Prevent reconnaissance - Deny ICMP time exceeded, Unreachables and Echo-Reply.

Access rules for ISP/Partner facing devices.

Inbound

Inbound and Outbound

▪ Deny NetBIOS, SMB and RDP - Deny UDP and TCP 135, 137, 138, 139, 445, 3389

▪ Deny Management traffic, SNMP and Syslog - Deny UDP 161,162 and 514.

▪ Deny data exfiltration using FTP, SSH and TFTP - Deny TCP 20, 21, 22, 23 and UDP 69.

Ensure you log any violations so that you can proactively fix any issues.

Page 10: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Perimeter Protection – Internal

▪ Anti-spoofing – Deny VLAN IP address range from entering VLAN.

▪ Prevent reconnaissance - Deny ICMP Echo-Reply from servers to user and wireless VLANs.

Internal access rules, block from any IP source to any IP destination.

Inbound on VLANs

Outbound on user VLANs

▪ Deny FTP, SSH, Telnet and TFTP, and access to iLO/DRACs and network management,

especially if you have BYOD (Bring Your Own Disaster) policy, from user and Wi-Fi VLANs.

▪ Remember the need to know principle! - Only allow what needs to communicate, to

communicate.

▪ Not a one time thing – Access Lists should be reviewed on a periodic basis to ensure that

they are working for you, not against you.

▪ Deny or Permit first – A decision only you can decide! Don’t forget to log violations!

Page 11: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Logical Traffic Flow

Web Server VLAN 100172.16.0.16 255.255.255.0

Database Server VLAN 101192.168.0.2 255.255.255.0

Users VLAN 1010.0.0.53 255.255.255.0

TCP 443

TCP 443

TCP 1433

TCP 1433

Protecting a database server

Page 12: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Further Reading!

▪ Larry Zeltser – How To Suck At Information Security.

https://zeltser.com/media/docs/suck-at-security-cheat-sheet.pdf

▪ Computer Network Defence Ltd Cyber Threat Intelligence Page.

http://www.securitywizardry.com/radar.htm

▪ Jeremy Stretch - Packet Life Cheat Sheets on various topics.

http://packetlife.net/library/cheat-sheets/

▪ SANS Internet Storm Centre

https://isc.sans.edu/

Page 13: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Badger Badge – brianwhelton

This deserves a BADGER BADGE!!!!!!

Page 14: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Badger Badge – Ste Maunder

This deserves a BADGER BADGE!!!!!!

Page 15: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Badger Badge – craig_of_snyde

This deserves a BADGER BADGE!!!!!!

Page 16: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Badger Badge - Andy8633

This deserves a BADGER BADGE!!!!!!

Page 17: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Badger Badge - Samricharduk

This deserves a BADGER BADGE!!!!!!

Page 18: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

I know you want another cat picture!

© Lemmy the cat

Page 19: Enterprise network security in SMB environments

Thank you for listening!

@brianwhelton

brianwhelton

brianwhelton

[email protected]

Any questions?