This is a petition for reviewi[1] of the Orderii[2] dated 7 November 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7 (“Manila RTC”), dismissing petitioners’ complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.The FactsOn 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe (“RED Principe”) of Region IV, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (“DENR”), issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate (“ECC”) in favor of respondent National Power Corporation (“NAPOCOR”). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.iii[3] The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR’s power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance or until 30 June 1999.iv[4]Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera,v[5] sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners’ plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Impleaded as defendants were the following: (1) NAPOCOR, (2) RED Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director for Environment Oscar Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative (“ORMECO”), which is engaged in the distribution of electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain officials of Puerto Galera.vi[6] Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to include as additional defendants the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro represented by then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia. Petitioners further prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that respondents had already built.On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial court issued a 20-day temporary restraining order enjoining the construction of the mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the same on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCOR’s manifestation that the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro was the one undertaking the construction of the mooring facility.vii[7]On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO and the provincial officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTC’s territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605,viii[8] Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,ix[9] and the provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 (“DAO 96-37”) on the documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms. In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed petitioners’ complaint.

Hence, this petition.The Ruling of the Trial CourtThe trial court’s order dismissing the complaint reads in part:After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to Dismiss tenable and meritorious.Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before taking this legal action in Court x x x.It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional Director may still be x x x elevated to the Office of the Secretary of the DENR to fully comply with the process of exhaustion of administrative remedies. And well settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that before bringing an action in or resorting to the Courts of Justice, all remedies of administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party (Pestanas vs. Dyogi, L-25786, February 27, 1978). And petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies renders his [sic] petition dismissible (Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755). And a dismissal on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action (Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr., 214 SCRA 437; Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 111 Phil. 643; Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources, L-16002, May 23, 1961; Gone, et al. vs. District Engineer, et. al., L-22782, August 29, 1975; Abe-Abe, et al. vs. Manta, et. al., L-4827, May 31, 1979) although it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter (Mun. of La Trinidad, et al. vs. CFI of Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28, 1983).Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly untenable and bereft of merits that the controverted act in question is patently illegal and there was an immediate need for judicial intervention.The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR which has jurisdiction and authority over the same x x x. And corollary to this, the issue as to whether or not the Minolo Cove is within the enclosed coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera bay and protected by Medio island is a clear question of fact which the DENR may appropriately resolve before resorting to [the] Court[s].This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction in the enforcement of Writ of Injunction. That truly, [a] writ of injunction can only be enforced within [the] territorial jurisdiction of this Court but not for acts which are being or about to be committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, in Philippine National Bank vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA 1, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled: “Regional Trial Courts can only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective designated territories. Furthermore, we find the issuance of the preliminary injunction directed against the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental a jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from Black Dictionary means jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of First Instance now Regional Trial Court[s], can only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective designated territories.And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square application in the case at bar of Presidential Decree No. 1818, Executive Order No. 380 dated November 27, 1989, and Circular No. 2-91 of the Supreme Court that the National Power Corporation (NPC) is a public utility, created under special legislation, engaged in the generation and distribution of electric power and energy. The mooring site of NPC in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro is one of its infrastructure projects falling within the mantle of Executive Order No. 380, November 27, 1989 x x x.And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power Corporation vs. Honorable Abraham P. Vera, et al., 170 SCRA 721, courts are without jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against [the] National

Power Corporation. The latter enjoys the protective mantle of P.D. 1818, (Circular No. 2-91).x x xInjunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main action itself together with the Annulment of the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC). Even assuming arguendo that the court [can] annul the ECC how can the latter enforce the same against the Provincial Government of Oriental Mindoro which was impleaded by the petitioners as a necessary party together with the Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative and the government officials of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, whose acts and functions are being performed outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court? x x x Indisputably, the injunction and annulment of ECC as prayed for in the petition are inseparable x x x.The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have failed to exhaust all the available administrative remedies and this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ prayed for in the Amended [Complaint].x[10]The IssueThe issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners’ complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The Ruling of the CourtThe petition has no merit.Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the CaseJurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.xi[11] A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners’ principal cause of action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on local government participation in the implementation of environmentally critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCOR’s ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners’ main prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners’ complaint.Petitioners’ complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The question of whether petitioners should file their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila or Oriental Mindoro then becomes a matter of venue, to be determined by the residence of the parties.xii[12] Petitioners’ main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal respondent, DENR Region IV, has its main office at the L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Regional Executive Director Principe of the DENR Region IV, who issued the ECC, holds office there. Plainly, the principal respondent resides in Manila, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. Thus, petitioners filed their complaint in the proper venue. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial region.xiii[13] Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 (“PD No. 1818”) prohibitedxiv[14] courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility in the

present case. Republic Act No. 8975 (“RA No. 8975”), which took effect on 26 November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its violation.xv[15] Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint considering that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic. Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving petitioners’ complaint. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first avail of all the means afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of a court’s intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground.xvi[16]RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1) Presidential Decree No. 1586 (“PD No. 1586”) and its implementing rules establishing the Environmental Impact Statement System, (2) DAO 96-37xvii[17] and (3) the Procedural Manual of DAO 96-37. Section 4xviii[18] of PD No. 1586 requires a proponent of an environmentally critical project, or a project located within an environmentally critical area as declared by the President, to secure an ECC prior to the project’s operation.xix[19] NAPOCOR thus secured the ECC because the mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while not an environmentally critical project, is located within an environmentally critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, issued on 14 December 1981.xx[20]The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional Directors on the implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. Any party aggrieved by the final decision of the RED may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal with the Office of the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary shall be immediately executory.SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. The grounds for appeal shall be limited to grave abuse of discretion and serious errors in the findings of fact which would cause grave or irreparable injury to the aggrieved party. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. The proponent or any stakeholder, including but not limited to, the LGUs concerned and affected communities, may file an appeal. The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions thus:Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those relating to the issuance or non-issuance of an ECC, and the imposition of fines and penalties. By inference, the decision of the Secretary on the issuance or non-issuance of the ECC may also be appealed based on this provision. Resort to courts prior to availing of this remedy would make the appellant’s action dismissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the aggrieved party of such decision. Failure to file such appeal within the requisite period will result in the finality of the RED’s or Secretary’s decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the RED’s decision, unless the Secretary directs otherwise.The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the RED, to give the RED an opportunity to re-evaluate his decision. (Emphasis added)Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners’ omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action.xxi[21] Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in dismissing petitioners’ complaint for lack of cause of action.On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECCPetitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR Secretary because the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of existing laws and regulations. These are (1) Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2) Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), and (3) the provisions of DAO 96-37 on the documentary requirements for the zoning permit and social acceptability of the mooring facility. Petitioners’ contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies,xxii[22] this does not apply in the present case.Presidential Decree No. 1605Presidential Decree No. 1605 (“PD No. 1605”),xxiii[23] as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically threatened zone “the coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island.” This decree provides in part:Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction of marinas, hotels, restaurants, other commercial structures; commercial or semi-commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial docking within the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera; the destruction of its mangrove stands; the devastation of its corals and coastline by large barges, motorboats, tugboat propellers, and any form of destruction by other human activities are hereby prohibited.Section 2. x x xNo permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants and other commercial structures in Puerto Galera shall be issued without prior approval of the Office of the President upon the recommendation of the Philippine Tourism Authority. (Emphasis supplied) NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of “Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island”,xxiv[24] PD No. 1605 does not apply to this case. However, petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is one of the “enclosed coves of Puerto Galera”xxv[25] and thus protected under PD No. 1605. This is a question of fact that the DENR Secretary should have first resolved. In any event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR will use the mooring facility for its power barge that will supply 14.4 megawatts of electricity to the entire province of Oriental Mindoro, including Puerto Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a government-owned public infrastructure intended to serve a basic need of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a “commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or commercial docking” as contemplated in Section 1 of PD No. 1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not

violate PD No. 1605 which applies only to commercial structures like wharves, marinas, hotels and restaurants. Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the legislative concern “for the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment.”xxvi[26] These provisions require every national government agency or government-owned and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the local government unit concerned and to secure the prior approval of its sanggunian before implementing “any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species.” Sections 26 and 27 respectively provide:Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorized or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, non-governmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section x x x 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.In Lina, Jr. v. Paño,xxvii[27] the Court interpreted these provisions in this manner:Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof x x x.Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit,xxviii[28] the mooring facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring facility. It is another matter if the operation of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.Documentary Requirements for ECC Applications

Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within an environmentally critical area is required to submit an Initial Environment Examination, which must contain a brief description of the environmental setting and a documentation of the consultative process undertaken, when appropriate.xxix[29] As part of the description of the environmental setting, the ECC applicant must submit a certificate of locational clearance or zoning certificate.Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not submit to the DENR Region IV Office the documents proving the holding of consultations and the issuance of a locational clearance or zoning certificate. Petitioners assert that this omission renders the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. The contention is also without merit. While such documents are part of the submissions required from a project proponent, their mere absence does not render the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To justify non-exhaustion of administrative remedies due to the patent illegality of the ECC, the public officer must have issued the ECC “[without any] semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer has acted without jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has committed a grave abuse of discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority.”xxx[30] RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized under DAO 96-37xxxi[31] to issue ECCs for projects located within environmentally critical areas. RED Principe issued the ECC on the recommendation of Amelia Supetran, the Director of the Environmental Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with full authority pursuant to DENR regulations. Moreover, the legal presumption is that he acted with the requisite authority.xxxii[32] This clothes RED Principe’s acts with presumptive validity and negates any claim that his actions are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his discretion. While petitioners may present proof to the contrary, they must do so before the proper administrative forum before resorting to judicial remedies.On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECCLastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking judicial recourse because NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the conditions of the ECC, which requires it to secure a separate ECC for the operation of the power barge. The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR to secure the usual local government permits, like zoning and building permits, from the municipal government of Puerto Galera.The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that NAPOCOR’s ECC is subject to cancellation for non-compliance with its conditions does not justify petitioners’ conduct in ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals from the decision of the DENR Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should comply with the requirements of consultation and locational clearance prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically, petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the procedure for filing complaints and appealing decisions laid down in DAO 96-37.DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address complaints for the cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX of DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an administrative investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit his report to the EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who will then render his decision. The aggrieved party may file an appeal to the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease and desist orders. Article IX also classifies the types of violations covered under DAO 96-37, including projects operating without an ECC or violating the conditions of the ECC. This is the

applicable procedure to address petitioners’ complaint on NAPOCOR’s alleged violations and not the filing of the instant case in court.A Final WordThe Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and maintain the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the utmost importance of protecting the environment.xxxiii[33] Indeed, we have called for the vigorous prosecution of violators of environmental laws.xxxiv[34] Legal actions to achieve this end, however, must be done in accordance with established rules of procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and efficient administration of justice.WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

The case is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the Court of Appealsxxxv[1] affirming the Ombudsman’s dismissal of petitioner from the government service for gross neglect of duty in connection with the collapse of the housing project at the Cherry Hills Subdivision, Antipolo City, on August 3, 1999.The FactsThe facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:“August 28, 1990- Philjas Corporation, whose primary purposes, among others are: to own, develop, subdivide, market and provide low-cost housing for the poor, was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).“February 19, 1991 - then City Mayor Daniel S. Garcia, endorsed to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) the proposed CHS.“Thereafter, or on 07 March 1991, based on the favorable recommendation of Mayor Garcia, respondent TAN, issued the Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance (PALC) for the development of CHS.“On July 5, 1991, then HLURB Commissioner respondent TUNGPALAN issued Development Permit No. 91-0216 for “land development only” for the entire land area of 12.1034 hectares covered by TCT No. 35083 (now TCT 208837) and with 1,003 saleable lots/units with project classification B. P. 220 Model A-Socialized Housing (p. 96, Records), with several conditions for its development.“Three (3) days thereafter or on July 8, 1991, respondent JASARENO, allowed/granted the leveling/earth-moving operations of the development project of the area subject to certain conditions.“On November 18, 1991, then HLURB Commissioner AMADO B. DELORIA issued Certificate of Registration No. 91-11-0576 in favor of CHS, with License to Sell No. 91-11-0592 for the 1,007 lots/units in the subdivision.“Eventually, on December 10, 1991, respondent POLLISCO issued Small Scale Mining Permit (SSMP) No. IV-316 to Philjas to extract and remove 10,000 cu. meters of filling materials from the area where the CHS is located.“Thereafter, or on January 12, 1994, Philjas applied for a Small Scale Mining Permit (SSMP) under P. D. 1899 with the Rizal Provincial Government to extract and remove 50,000 metric tons of filling materials per annum on CHS’ 2.8 hectares.“Thus, on January 17, 1994, respondent MAGNO, informed ELIEZER I. RODRIGUEZ of Philjas that CHS is within the EIS System and as such must secure ECC from the DENR. Philjas was accordingly informed of the matter such that it applied for the issuance of ECC from the DENR-Region IV, on February 3, 1994.“On March 12, 1994, an Inspection Report allegedly prepared by respondent BALICAS, attested by respondent RUTAQUIO and approved by respondent TOLENTINO re: field evaluation to the issuance of ECC, was submitted.“Consequently, on April 28, 1994, upon recommendation of respondent TOLENTINO, Philjas application for ECC was approved by respondent

PRINCIPE, then Regional Executive Director, DENR under ECC-137-RI-212-94.“A Mining Field Report for SSMP dated May 10, 1994 was submitted pursuant to the inspection report prepared by respondents CAYETANO, FELICIANO, HILADO and BURGOS, based on their inspection conducted on April 25 to 29, 1994. The report recommended, among others, that the proposed extraction of materials would pose no adverse effect to the environment.“Records further disclosed that on August 10, 1994, respondent BALICAS monitored the implementation of the CHS Project Development to check compliance with the terms and conditions in the ECC. Again, on August 23, 1995, she conducted another monitoring on the project for the same purpose. In both instances, she noted that the project was still in the construction stage hence, compliance with the stipulated conditions could not be fully assessed, and therefore, a follow-up monitoring inspection was the last one conducted by the DENR.“On September 24, 1994, GOV. CASIMIRO I. YNARES, JR., approved the SSMP applied for by Philjas under SSMP No. RZL-012, allowing Philjas to extract and remove 50,000 metric tons of filling materials from the area for a period of two (2) years from date of its issue until September 6, 1996.”xxxvi[2]On November 15, 1999, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner Principe administratively liable for gross neglect of duty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from office. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:“WHEREFORE, premises considered xxx

xxxx x x the following respondents are hereby found GUILTY as charged and meted the respective penalties provided under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules, Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, viz,:1. xxx5. Antonio G. Principe - Penalty of Dismissal from the Service for Gross Neglect of Duty.xxxSO ORDERED.”xxxvii[3]On January 4, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review assailing the decision of the Ombudsman.xxxviii[4]On August 25, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the petition and affirming the decision of the Ombudsman.xxxix[5]Hence, this appeal.xl[6]The IssueThe issue raised is whether the Ombudsman may dismiss petitioner from the service on an administrative charge for gross neglect of duty, initiated, investigated and decided by the Ombudsman himself without substantial evidence to support his finding of gross neglect of duty because the duty to monitor and inspect the project was not vested in petitioner.The Court's RulingRepublic Act No. 6770, Section 15, prescribed the powers of the Ombudsman, as follows:“Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:“(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

“(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;“(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21xli[7] of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;“(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;“(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;“(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided, further, that any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balance, fair and true;“(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;“(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;“(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein;“(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;“(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.”xlii[8]The Ombudsman without taking into consideration the lawfully mandated duties and functions attached to petitioner’s position, immediately concluded that as the signing and approving authority of the ECC issued to PHILJAS, it was incumbent upon petitioner to conduct actual monitoring and enforce strict compliance with the terms and conditions of the ECC.The applicable administrative orders provide that the function of monitoring environmental programs, projects and activities in the region is lodged with the Regional Technical Director, not with the Regional Executive Director, the position occupied by petitioner. Under DAO 38-1990, the following were the functions attached to the office of petitioner, to wit:“I. REGULATORY MATTERS“D. REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR “1. Forest Management

“2. Land Management“3. Mines and Geo-Sciences Development“4. Environmental Management“4.1 Issues authority to construct and permit to operate pollution control equipment/devices including the collection of corresponding fees/charges.“4.2 Issues accreditation of pollution control office of industrial firms and local government entities.“4.3 Hears/gathers evidences or facts on pollution cases as delegated by the Pollution Adjudication Board.“4.4. Approves plans and issues permit for mine tailings disposal, including environmental rehabilitation plans.”xliii[9]Clearly, there is no mention of the responsibility of a regional executive director to monitor projects. More apropos is the description of the functions of a regional technical director, to wit:“E. REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR “1. Forest Management

“2. Land Management“3. Mines and Geo-Sciences Development“4. Environmental Management“4.1 Issues clearance certificate to vehicles which have passed the smoke-belching test.

“4.2 Issues pollution clearance and temporary permit to operate pollution control devices including the collection of corresponding fees/charges.

“4.3 Conducts monitoring and investigation of pollution sources and control facilities.

“4.4 Supervises, coordinates and monitors the implementation of environmental programs, projects and activities in the region.”xliv[10] [emphasis supplied]Furthermore, monitoring is defined in DAO No. 21, Series of 1992, as the activity designed to gauge the level of compliance with the conditions stipulated in the ECC,xlv[11] and in the EISxlvi[12] or PDxlvii[13] submitted.xlviii

[14] This is the function of the PENR and CENR offices as mandated in DAO No. 37, Series of 1996.xlix[15] Particularly, it provided that:“Section 10. Compliance Monitoring

“x x x“b. Monitoring of compliance with the proponent’s ECC issued pursuant to an IEE,l[16] and applicable laws, rules and regulations, shall be undertaken by the concerned PENRO and CENRO with support from the Regional Office and/or EMB whenever necessary.”Hence, how could petitioner be guilty of neglecting a duty, which is not even his to begin with? Administrative liability could not be based on the fact that petitioner was the person who signed and approved the ECC, without proof of actual act or omission constituting neglect of duty.In the absence of substantial evidence of gross neglect of petitioner, administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command responsibility.li[17] The negligence of petitioner’s subordinates is not tantamount to his own negligence.It was not within the mandated responsibilities of petitioner to conduct actual monitoring of projects. The principles governing public officers under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 clearly provide that a head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.lii[18]The investigation conducted by the Ombudsman refers to the tragic incident in Cherry Hills Subdivision, Antipolo Rizal, where several families lost lives and homes. Despite the fact that what was involved was a housing and land development project, petitioner, as the Regional

Executive Director for Region IV, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, was found negligent because he was the one who signed and approved the ECC.As heretofore stated, the responsibility of monitoring housing and land development projects is not lodged with the office of petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987 spelled out the mandate of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the agency that has authority over petitioner, which reads:“Section 1. Declaration of Policy.- (1) The State shall ensure for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.“(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.“Section 2. Mandate.- (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.“(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country’s natural resources.”liii[19]However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 90,liv[20] the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which became the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), is the sole regulatory body for housing and land development.lv[21]The FalloWHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals.lvi

[22] In lieu thereof, the Court annuls the decision of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-09-661, dated December 1, 1999, dismissing the petitioner from the government service, and orders his reinstatement with back pay and without loss of seniority.

On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber.Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,1 as amended, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information against them read: That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a truck bearing Plate No. EAS 839 and have in their control forest products, particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume of One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine

Currency, without any authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.3 Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.4 The dispositive portion of the CA decision read: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect to accused-appellant Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on reasonable doubt, and MODIFIED with respect to accused-appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.SO ORDERED.5

In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.We deny the petition. Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on Taopa. Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft.8 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.Articles 309 and 310 read:Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied)2. xxxArt. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.9 Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630. The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium period11 of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008 decision and July 28, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for by law. ===================================================MongeThis is a Petition for Reviewlvii[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court whereby petitioner Galo Monge (petitioner) assails the Decision lviii[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 2005 which affirmed his conviction as well as the discharge of accused Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a state witness.

The factual antecedents follow. On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be shown the requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any.lix[3] Petitioner fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio was brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO). lx[4] The DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber indicating that the items, totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized from Potencio.lxi[5] Later on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencio’s whereabouts had been unknown since the time of the seizurelxii[6] until he surfaced on 3 January 1998.lxiii[7] An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of Section 68lxiv[8] of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,lxv[9] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of 1997. The inculpatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 20th day of [July 1994], at about 9:30

o’clock in the morning, in Barangay Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with each other, without any authority of law, nor armed with necessary permit/license or other documents, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,

transport and have in their possession three (3) pieces of Mahogany of assorted [dimension] with a[n] appropriate volume of seventy-seven (77) board feet or point eighteen (0.18) cubic meter with a total market value of P1,925.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the DENR in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.lxvi[10]

At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea.lxvii[11]

Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the circumstances of the apprehension but for failing to appear in court for cross examination, his testimony was stricken out.lxviii[12] On 16 January 1998, Potencio was discharged to be used as a state witness on motion of the prosecutor.lxix[13] Accordingly, he testified on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed that for a promised fee he was merely requested by petitioner, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same down from the mountain. Potencio’s testimony was materially corroborated by Molina.lxx[14] Petitioner did not contest the allegations, except that it was not he but Potencio who owned the lumber. He lamented that contrary to what Potencio had stated in court, it was the latter who hired him to bring the log from the site to the sawmill where the same was to be sawn into pieces.lxxi[15]

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner was imposed nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and ordered to pay the costs.lxxii[16]

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he challenged the discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the ground that the latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was no absolute necessity for his testimony. lxxiii[17] The appellate court dismissed this challenge and affirmed the findings of the trial court. However, it modified the penalty to an indeterminate prison sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor as maximum.lxxiv[18] His motion for reconsideration was denied, hence the present appeal whereby petitioner reiterates his challenge against the discharge of Potencio.

The petition is utterly unmeritorious. Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto

transporting, and thus in possession of, processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR. Petitioner has never denied this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate himself from liability, he claims that it was Potencio, the owner of the lumber, who requested his assistance in hauling the log down from the mountain and in transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The contention is unavailing.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations.lxxv[19] DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 thereof

materially requires that the transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of lumber origin duly issued by the DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products without the requisite documents consummates the crime.lxxvi[20]

It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together, has already given rise to criminal liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioner’s liability. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber found in his possession nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio to provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As such, in prosecutions under its provisions, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as defenses because the offense is complete and criminal liability attaches once the prohibited acts are committed.lxxvii[21] In other words, mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal.lxxviii[22] It would therefore make no difference at all whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber.

Considering the overwhelming body of evidence pointing to nothing less than petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged, there is no cogent reason to reverse his conviction.

Petitioner’s challenge against Potencio’s discharge as a state witness must also fail. Not a few cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness is left to the exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion lxxix[23] limited only by the requirements set forth in Section 17,lxxx[24] Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being competent to resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect this highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion. lxxxi

[25] No such grave abuse is present in this case. Suffice it to say that issues relative to the discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court as they cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal.lxxxii[26]

Moreover and more importantly, an order discharging an accused from the information in order that he may testify for the prosecution has the effect of an acquittal. lxxxiii[27] Once the discharge is ordered by the trial court, any future development showing that any or all of the conditions provided in Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect the legal consequence of an acquittal. lxxxiv[28] Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution, therefore, in moving for the discharge and of the court in granting the motion—no question of jurisdiction being involved—will not deprive the discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and of his right against double jeopardy. A contrary rule would certainly be unfair to the discharged accused because he would then be faulted for a failure attributable to the prosecutor. It is inconceivable that the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal policy of

placing the fate of the discharged accused at the mercy of anyone who may handle the prosecution.lxxxv[29] Indeed, the only instance where the testimony of a discharged accused may be disregarded is when he deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in accordance with his commitment,lxxxvi[30] as provided for in Section 18, Rule 119. Potencio lived up to his commitment and for that reason, petitioner’s challenge against his discharge must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision and resolution, dated March 6, 2000 and August 23, 2000, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20864 entitled “People of the Philippines v. Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy,” acquitting Nestor Ong for insufficiency of evidence, while convicting Rodolfo Tigoy for violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

The facts of the case are as follows: On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the

trucking business in Iligan City since 1986, was allegedly introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his intent to rent the trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered into between Ong and Bertodazo, the salient portions of which state:

That the party of the First Part is an owner of Cargo Trucks with place of

business at Iligan City; That the party of the Second Part is a businessman dealing in buy and sell

of General Merchandise, dry goods and construction materials; That the party of the Second Part will engage the services of the two (2)

cargo trucks of the party of the First Part; That the services agreed upon should be rendered by the party of the

First Part on August 3, 1993 from Larapan, Linamon, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City for an agreed amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos per truck or a total of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency for the carriage of cement and other merchandise owned by the party of the Second Part;

That any legal controversy involving the cargo or of and when the cargo trucks are not actually used for the purpose herein stipulated, it is agreed that the same is the sole responsibility of the party of the Second Part without any liability of the party of the First Part.lxxxvii[1]

In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy who had been employed by him as truck drivers for two (2) years and ten (10) years, respectively, to bring the two trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte which is about fifteen (15) minutes away from Iligan City. He instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks in Larapan for the loading of the construction materials by Lolong Bertodazo, and to go back at dawn for the trip to Dipolog City. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang and petitioner Tigoy allegedly went home to return to Larapan at four o’clock in the morning the next day. When they arrived, the trucks had been laden with bags of cement and were half-covered with canvas. lxxxviii[2] Before departing, they allegedly checked the motor oil, water, engine and tires of the trucks to determine if the same were in good condition.

That same morning of October 4, 1993, Senior InspectorRico Lacay Tome (then Deputy Chief of Police of Ozamis City),

while escorting Provincial Director Dionisio Coloma at the ICC Arts Center

in Ozamis City, along with the members of the Special Operation Group, received a dispatch from the 466th PNP Company situated at Barangay Bongbong, Ozamis City, informing him that two trucks, a blue and green loaded with cement, that were going towards Ozamis City did not stop at the checkpoint. Upon receiving the report, Tome, along with PO2 Peter Paul Nuqui and PO3 Bienvenido Real, boarded their patrol vehicle, a mini cruiser jeep, to intercept the two trucks at Lilian Terminal, Ozamis City. lxxxix

[3] At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who was the only one in

uniform among the police officers, flagged down the two trucks but the same just sped away and proceeded towards the direction of Oroquieta City. Aboard their patrol vehicle, they chased the trucks and overtook the same at Barangay Manabay. They blocked the road with their vehicle causing the two trucks to stop.

According to Senior Inspector Tome, he asked the driver who had alighted from the green truck why he did not stop at the checkpoint but the latter did not answer. When he inquired what was loaded in the truck, the driver replied that there is “S.O.P,” which means grease money in street parlance.xc[4] This raised the suspicion of Tome that the trucks were loaded with “hot items.”

Meanwhile, the blue truck which had been speeding behind the green truck and was being driven by Sumagang was intercepted by PO3 Real. Upon inspection, the police officers discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in both trucks. Tome inquired if the drivers had a permit for the lumber but the latter could not produce any.

The drivers were brought and turned over to the investigator at the City Hall in Ozamis City. The truckmen, namely, Felix Arante and Doro Lopez, and another passenger whom Tigoy identified as Lolong Bertodazo, who were riding with them in the trucks, were not investigated. According to Nuqui, they did not notice that the group had left. It was later learned that they were instructed by Sumagang to inform Nestor Ong of the incident.

Afterwards, the group of Tome proceeded back to the ICC Arts Center and informed the Provincial Director of the apprehension. Meanwhile, the drivers, Tigoy and Sumagang, were detained at the Ozamis City Police Station while Arante and Lopez were released.xci[5]

Meanwhile, Ermelo delos Santos, Chief of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources – Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO),xcii[6] after receiving a call from the Ozamis City Police Station that two trucks were apprehended transporting sawn lumber without a permit and were brought to the City Hall, sent Rolando Dingal, Forester of the DENR, together with Teodoro Echavez, Juanito Taruc and Lucio Penaroya, to investigate.

Petitioner Tigoy and Sumagang presented to Dingal the registration papers of the two trucks and appearing therein was the name of Nestor Ong as the owner. After ascertaining that the sawn lumber loaded on the two trucks did not have supporting documents, Dingal and his companions scaled the subject lumber and prepared a tally sheet. Loaded in the blue Nissan ten-wheeler truck were 229 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 6,232.46 board feet; and, in the green Isuzu eight-wheeler truck, 333 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 5,095.5 board feet.xciii[7] Consequently, the lumber and the vehicles were seized upon the order of the DENR Regional Executive Director.xciv[8]

On October 6, 1993, an Information was filed against Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for possession of forest products without legal permit, thus:

That on or about the 4th day of August, 1993 at Barangay Catadman, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, for a common design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally possess and transport without the necessary legal documents nor permit from the lawful authorities, sawn dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany), in the following manner, to wit: accused Nestor Ong, being the owner of 2 ten wheeler trucks with Plate Nos. GDA-279 and PNH-364 facilitated and allowed the use and transport of above-stated sawn [lumber] from Larapan, Lanao del Norte, but intercepted by the PNP authorities in Ozamiz City; while the accused Lolong Bertodazo facilitated the loading and transport of said sawn lumbers, while accused Nestor Sumagang y Lacson drove the Nissan 10 wheeler cargo truck bearing Plate No. GDA-279 which was loaded with 333 pieces of said sawn dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of assorted sizes equivalent [to] 5,095.5 board feet which was concealed under piled bags of cement, which lumbers [were] valued at P134, 242.36; while accused Rodolfo Tigoy drove the 8 wheeler Isuzu truck bearing Plate No. ONH-364, which was loaded and transported with 229 pieces of sawn dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of assorted sizes equivalent to 6,232.46 board feet which was concealed under piled bags of cement which lumbers [were] valued at P92,316.77 or total value of P226,559.13, without, however, causing damage to the government, inasmuch as the aforestated lumbers were recovered.

CONTRARY to Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.xcv[9] Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during the arraignment. Sumagang died after the case was filed while the other co-accused, Lolong Bertodazo, was not arrested and has remained at large.

On October 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy [GUILTY] beyond reasonable doubt of possession of dipterocarp lumber [VALUED] at more than P22,000.00 without the legal documents as required by existing laws and regulations, penalized as qualified theft, this Court sentences them to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to eighteen (18) years and three (3) months of reclusion temporal. The lumber and the conveyances used are forfeited in favor of the government. With costs. The DENR is ordered to sell/dispose of the lumber and conveyances in accordance with the existing laws, WITHOUT DELAY. Let the Court of Appeals, Fourteenth Division, before which accused Ong’s appeal of this Court’s denial of his action for replevin relative to his trucks is pending, be furnished with a copy of this judgment. With costs. SO ORDERED.xcvi[10]

Declaring that “constructive possession” of unlicensed lumber is not within the contemplation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, and for failure by the prosecution to prove the complicity of Ong, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 6, 2000 modifying the ruling of the lower court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Nestor Ong is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence and his two (2) trucks are ordered returned to him. The conviction of Rodolfo Tigoy is upheld and the decision dated October 11, 1996 is AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.xcvii[11]

On March 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration praying for his acquittal but the same was denied on August 23, 2000. Hence, this petition, with the following assignment of errors:

ITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING “COLLUSION”

BETWEEN LOLONG BERTODAZO AND PETITIONER TIGOY; II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE AFFIDAVIT OF LOLONG BERTODAZO AGAINST HIS PENAL INTEREST;

IIITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER TIGOY

TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE LUMBER HE WAS TRANSPORTING; AND, IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER TIGOY HAD ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE UNDOCUMENTED LUMBER.xcviii[12]

Stated otherwise, the core issue presented is whether or not petitioner Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber without the necessary permit in violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, provides:

Section 68.Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. – Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . .

There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the required legal documents.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68 of the Code. He, Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police officers in flagrante delicto as they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City.

Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as he did not know about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. He believed that what he was transporting were bags of cement in view of the contract between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not around when Bertodazo loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement.

This contention by petitioner, however, was not believed by the lower court. In declaring that petitioner connived with Bertodazo in transporting the subject lumber, the court a quo noted:

x x x The evidence of the prosecution established that the two drivers of accused Ong refused to stop at a checkpoint, a fact admitted by both in their affidavit, Exhs. “E” and “E-2”. Likewise, the two drivers refused to stop on the national highway near a bus terminal when required by a uniformed policeman. When finally accosted, one of the drivers, whom witness Tome identified as the driver of the green truck, Sumagang, but who actually was Tigoy (as he was the driver of the green truck and who came to the road block first, being the lead driver) offered

“S.O.P.” which to witness Tome meant that the trucks were carrying “hot items.”

Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did they fear inspection of their cargo? Why would “S.O.P.” (which in street parlance is grease money) be offered to facilitate the passage of the trucks? The only logical answer to all these questions is that the drivers knew that they were carrying contraband lumber. This Court believes that the drivers had knowledge of the fact that they were transporting and were in possession of undocumented lumber in violation of law.xcix[13]

In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law such as in the present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously.c[14]

Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy.ci[15] Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence.cii[16] It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.ciii[17] It is not even required that the participants have an agreement for an appreciable period to commence it.civ[18]

Petitioner’s actions adequately show that he intentionally participated in the commission of the offense for which he had been charged and found guilty by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Finding that petitioner’s conviction was reached without

arbitrariness and with sufficient basis, this Court upholds the same. The Court accords high respect to the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of the witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of the evidence of the parties as well as its conclusionscv[19] especially when these are in agreement with those of the Court of Appeals, which is the case here. As a matter of fact, factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally final and conclusive.cvi[20]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution, dated March 6, 2000 and August 23, 2000, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20864 are hereby AFFIRMED.

his is a petition for review of the decisioncvii[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of lumber in violation of §68cviii[2] of the Revised Forestry Codecix[3] (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.The facts are as follows:Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and trading.DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended.

What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator. Joä sppedThe team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted 29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day, September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE stockyard in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure ordercx[4] was served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of the company, but he refused to acknowledge it.On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber. Company president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension of the operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion was denied.cxi[5] Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized. As before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders issued by the DENR officers (Exhs. E, F & G).On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of §68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended. The Information alleged:cxii[6]That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior thereto at the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation Compound, municipality of Valencia, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally possess 2,115 pieces [of] lumber of different dimensions in the total volume of 29,299 .25 board feet or equivalent to 69.10 cubic meters with an estimated value of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR PESOS AND 45/100 (P488,334.45) Philippine Currency, without any authority, license or legal documents from the government, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of P488,334.45.Contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277.As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27, 1994, judgment was rendered as follows:cxiii[7]WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Perfecto Pallada and Francisco Tankiko guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having in their possession timber products worth of P488,334.45 without the legal documents as charged in the information in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended and are, therefore, each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion temporal as maximum. The lumber subject of the crime are confiscated in favor of the government. Sppedä joAccused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence against them.Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for lack of proof of his participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized lumber.cxiv[8]Hence this petition which raises the following issues:cxv[9]I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER PALLADA.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN WAS NOT THE PROPER DOCUMENT TO JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF THE SQUARED TIMBER OR FLITCHES.III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PRESENCE OF ERASURES IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN RENDER THEM VALUELESS AS EVIDENCE.First. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents, as summarized by the trial court, to establish that Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was legal:cxvi[The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin.cxvii[11] For indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83cxviii[12] states in pertinent parts: Maniâ kxIn order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers. . . .5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of the company's possession of the lumber.cxix[13] In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.cxx[14]The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products.cxxi[15] As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter. According to the trial court:cxxii[16]Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of flitches, the supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the Delivery Receipt from the lumber dealer and the Cash Voucher describe 463 pieces of lumber. . . . Maniksâ In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420 pieces of log, respectively. But the supporting documents describe the forest product[s] as lumber.

The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions 678 pieces of hand-sawn lumber. Its Auxiliary Invoice also states the same load of lumber. Someone may have noticed the "mistake" of mentioning lumber in the Auxiliary Invoice and so the words "flitches 87 pieces" were written down and enclosed in parenthesis.The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic) Cagayan de Oro", but its Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "6-A") mentions Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation as the consignee. Moreover, the CTO states (at the back page) that the same is covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in fact, the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has invoice number 000488.In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name of the consignee was clearly erased and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon". In the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "7-A") the blank space for the name and address of the consignee was smudged with a typewriter correction fluid (the better to erase what was originally typewritten in it?) and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon".The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked Exh. "9-A" [were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh. "[7]" and Exh. "[7-A]".cxxiii

[17]Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly accomplished: the data required to be filled are left in blank. Manikanä Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7 bears no date, the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the sizes and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when the company bought the forest products, they were still in the form of flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company.cxxiv[18]These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same.cxxv[19]It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be taken against petitioner because the documents came from lumber dealers. In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being public documents, should be accorded the presumption of regularity in their execution.cxxvi[20]This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete.cxxvii[21]The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public documents are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished.cxxviii[22]Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, §68, provides:ART. 309. Penalties.- Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: Oldmisâ o1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000 pesos but does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter

amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. . . .As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,cxxix[23] the penalty to be imposed should be six (6) years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1997, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705cxxx[1] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277.cxxxi[2]The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.cxxxii[3]On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.cxxxiii[4]There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.cxxxiv

[5]SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs.cxxxv[6]SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargo’s supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents. All he could show was a certificationcxxxvi[7] from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.cxxxvii[8]SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.cxxxviii[9]At 10:00 o’clock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber.cxxxix[10] When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted two

hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50.cxl[11]On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.cxli[12]Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosacxlii[13] and Elpidio Sabal.cxliii[14] The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by th PLTP’s of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.cxliv[15]Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decisioncxlv[16] states:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.Costs against the accused.SO ORDERED.cxlvi[17]Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors:cxlvii

[18]1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as

amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and regulations which required certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest products.

2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused against unlawful searches and seizures.

3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused under custodial investigation.On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.Appellant’s argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. – Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (emphasis supplied)Appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to refer to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides:Section 3. Documents Required.Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.xxx

3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.xxxWhen apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:xxx

xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a single document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. xxxSignificantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut. (Exhibit "F")It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:“THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson Que on board truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut palms gathered inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its final destination, whichever comes first.”It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did not need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibit “8”, “8-A”)While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4, 1994, the court has doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber because the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and “x x came from PLTP.” (Ibid) The letter-request was returned to him.The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any document to a government agency, the agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-examination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the person “x x but they were already reshuffled.”

(TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did not know if that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request, to wit:“x x xPlease consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the fact that I am hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own needs.”Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source.cxlviii[19]xxxAccused-appellant’s possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.We also reject appellant’s argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being “fruits of a poisonous tree”. Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel.We do not agree.The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court in People vs. Bagista,cxlix[20] thus:The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, “be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant’s truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber’s supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellant’s truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellant’s right to counsel under custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant.G.R. No. 184300 July 11, 2012MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, vs.PHILIPPINES FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC. and REPUTABLE FORWARDER SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 171591 25 June 2012ACE NAVIGATION CO., INC., petitioner, vs.FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION and PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, G.R. No. 13983 September 1, 1919LA RAZON SOCIAL "GO TIAOCO Y HERMANOS," plaintiff-appellant, vs.UNION INSURANCE SOCIETY OF CANTON, LTD., defendant-appellee.G.R. No. 84507 March 15, 1990G.R. No. 102253 June 2, 1995SOUTH SEA SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs.G.R. No. 119599 March 20, 1997

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