envi consolidated cases

5/22/2018 Envi Consolidated Cases

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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CONSOLIDATED CASES

OPOSA VS FACTORAN, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)- YSMAEL VS DEPUTY EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, 190 SCRA 167 (1990) (no digest)

LAGUA VS CUSI, 160 SCRA 69 (1983)

FACTS: A memorandum was issued preventing the passage of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks

loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel on the national highway loading towards where the

vessel was berthed. In compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast

closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented

their passage thereof while the vehicles and trucks of other people were curiously not disturbed

and were allowed passess on the same road. It resulted that the loading of logs on the M/S

"Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued. When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming the hauling

operations of their logs towards the Japanese Vessel, again that same road, only the day before

ordered by the BFD to be opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was closed to them by

Defendant Eastcoast's security men upon a radio message order of Defendant Maglana. Even

the vessel M/S "Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by Defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary

to existing laws, rules and regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the Philippine

Coastguard.Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the road in

defiance of BFD orders to the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast through the order of

Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff Laguas had to depart postpaste to Mati, Davao Oriental, from

Baganga where the shipment and the road closure were made, to seek the assistance of the PC

thereat. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss argued that petitioner Daylinda

Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs

in the Bureau of Forestry.The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law, the Bureauof Forest Development has the exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to

determine whether their use is in violation of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Forest Development has the jurisdiction to determine first

the legality of closure of logging roads before the case be directed to the regular courts

HELD: NO. P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any

power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging

road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for

damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for

damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closurewas illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be

disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial

proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to

determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of

damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the

jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development. As we have held in Ateneo de Manila

University v. Court of appeals (145 SCRA 100, 110):


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HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, 126 SCRA 69 (1983)

FACTS: There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of

Appeals which declared the disputed property as forestland, not subject to titling in favor of

private persons, Borre and Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal

of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the landwas mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the

publicdomain.Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot

No. 885containing 117,956 square meters wasconcerned and prayed that title to said portionbe

confirmed and registered in his name.

Issue: Whether or not the lot in question can be subject of registration and confirmation of title in

thename of the private person

HELD: The opposition of the Director of Forestry wasstrengthened by the appellate court's

findingthat timber licenses had to be issued to certainlicensees and even Jose Amunategui

himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cuttimber within the area. It was only sometime

in1950 that the property was converted intofishpond but only after a previous warning fromthe

District Forester that the same could not bedone because it was classified as "publicforest.A

forested area classified as forest land of thepublic domain does not lose such

classificationsimply because loggers or settlers may havestripped it of its forest cover. "Forest

lands" donot have to be on mountains or in out of theway places. Swampy areas covered

bymangrove trees, nipa palms, and other treesgrowing in brackish or sea water may also

beclassified as forest land. The possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripeninto

private ownership. Therefore, the lot inquestion never ceased to be classified as forestland of

public domain.

REPUBLIC VS NAGUIAT, 479 SCRA 598 (1989)

FACTS: Respondent applies for registration of title to 4 parcels of land contending she is the

owner of the said land which she acquired from the LID Corporation which in turn acquired the

same from persons who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic

filed in opposition that said lands belong to the public domain and not subject to private

appropriation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the land in dispute as a forest land belonging to public domain may be

appropriated as private property.

Ruling: For a public forest land/reserves to be subject for private appropriation, it requires an

express and positive act of the government that it will become a part of alienable and disposable

agricultural lands of public domain. Occupation in the concept of an owner cannot ripen into

private ownership and be registered to as a title.

G.R. No. 32266. February 27, 1989


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THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL

Facts: The land involved in this case consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps

located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on

January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of

the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioneron behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the

Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The

Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the

land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. Both the petitioner

and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land.

Issue: Whether or not mangrove swamps, or manglares, are part of our public forest lands.

Held: Yes. Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the

public forests of the Philippines as defined in Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917.

The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy is accepted and

invoked by the executive department. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and

may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forestland and classified as alienable agricultural land.

G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983

SERAFIN B. YNGSON

vs.

THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE

GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ

Facts: A number of people, including the petitioner and private respondents, applied for a permit

to utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not granted, the

area still being considered to be communal forest. When the area was released for saidpurpose, the three private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the

Bureau of Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor of petitioner. However, the Sec. of

Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered the division of the area into three portions,

one part for each of the petitioner and the private respondents. Not satisfied with the portion

received, petitioner appealed the order.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area concerned.

Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that

until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of

Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of

these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond

leases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer

and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such

lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other

purposes. All the applications in this case were premature; therefore not one of the applicants

can claim to have a preferential right over another. The interpretation by the Office of the

President was held to be an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.


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G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR.

Facts: Petitioner seeks a declaration that respondent UP does not have the right to superviseand regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, to scale, measure and

seal the timber cut and/or to collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from

petitioner and/or impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its

concession, covered by License Agreement No. 27-A, ceded in full ownership to the UP by

Republic Act No. 3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained

of and prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as

damages and costs of the suit.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3990 empowers the respondent UP to scale, measure

and seal the timber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in said act, and collect

the corresponding forest charges.

Held: Yes. Pursuant, however, to R.A. No. 3990 which establishes a central experiment station

for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension functions, particularly by the

College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the

above "reserved" area was "ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the

Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any."

When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely

removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the

timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of

its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the

latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. An owner has the right

to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. The rightto enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces, and the

jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use. In the instant case, that exception is

made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the

license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until I

February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or

royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The

charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of

Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated. Consequently, even

the Bureau of Internal Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to measure the

timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees due thereon.

Tan vs. Director of Forestry (2009)

Facts: The Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract ofpublic forest land situated in Olangapo, Zambales. One of the bidders is petitioner Tan who waslater then awarded such lot. On April 22, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64, in the nameof Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernalwithout the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6,


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1964, the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry. It was not signed by theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60. And because ofthis, that Timber license was declared void ab initio and directed to stop the logging operationsof Wenceslao Vinzons Tan. Petitioner averred that the respondents-appellees unlawfully,illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction,and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just

cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving him ofhis constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing theobligation of contracts.

Issue: Whether or not the timber license was valid or not.

Held: No. Court fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timberlicense was signed and released without authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernalof Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in general memorandum order No.46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timberlicense only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract ofpublic forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420. In the second place, at the time it wasreleased to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any

license. However, granting that the timber license was valid, still respondents-appellees canvalidly revoke his timber license. As pointed out, the rules and regulations included in theordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change atthe discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at anearlier date, when public interests so require". A timber license is an instrument by which theState regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare ispromoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it isonly a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interestor public welfare as in this case.

People vs. Que (1996)

Facts: The accused, being the owner of an Isuzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No.

PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have inpossession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chainsawnlumber (Species of Tanguile) without any license or authority to do so from the properauthorities causing damage and prejudice to the government. Thus violating Section 68 ofPresidential Decree (P.D.) 705. However, accused-appellant denied the charge againsthim. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legalsource. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of violating Section 68, PD705 for possessingtimber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existingforest laws and regulations.

Held: Yes, accused was guilty. Accused-appellants possession of the subject lumber withoutany documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705. There are two(2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: (1) Cutting,gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timberfrom alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (2)Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required underexisting forest laws and regulations.


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In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued bythe DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering,collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest productswithout the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes froma legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other

forest products without the proper legal documents as malumprohibitum.

Aquino vs. People

Facts: On behalf of Teachers' Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environmentand Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees withinthe Teachers' Camp in Baguio City were to be used for the repairs of Teachers' Camp. Pre-issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the Community Environment andNatural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the ForestSection of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conductedan inspection of the trees to be cut. The Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permitallowing the cutting of 14 trees under terms and conditions. However, an information forviolation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 was filed against petitioner, Cuteng,

Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, andwithout any authority, license or permit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniouslycut trees at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as required underexisting forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and NaturalResources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law. Petitioner thusaverred that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers' Camp. He allegedlyinformed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit.However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity mapused in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent theovercutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompaniedby three other men.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.

Held: No. Petitioner cannot be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he isnot an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, orcollection, or is in possession of the pine trees. There are two distinct and separate offensespunished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit: (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removingtimber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposablepublic land, or from private land without any authority; and (2) Possession of timber or otherforest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or otherforest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or fromprivate land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervisethe implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed

the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession ofthe cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers' Camp for repairs. Petitioner could notlikewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused wereacquitted of the charges against them.

Merida vs People GR no. 158182 12 June 2008

Facts:


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Merida has been charged with the violation of Sec 68 of PD 705 for cutting, gatheringand transporting the lone nara tree inside the property of Tansiongco. Upon confrontation,Merida said that he cut the tree upon the orders of Vicar Calix who supposedly bought theproperty from Tansiongco.

Issue:

a. Whether or not Merida can be prosecuted for violation of PD 705 Sec 68 forcutting trees in a private land

Ruling:

a. Yes, Merida can be prosecuted for violation of PD 705 Sec 68 for cutting trees in aprivate land. . Sec 68 of PD 705 has stated that Any person who shall cut, gather,collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber fromalienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, orpossess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as requiredunder existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penaltiesimposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx . The law didnot distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts undep[;r

the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material indetermining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity involvedor charged with its violation possesses the required permit, license or authorizationfrom DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forestproducts.

ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al. [G.R. No. 152989. September 4, 2002]

Facts:

Madrona is an owner of a parcel of land that is about 60,000 square meters. In 2009,

Merida applied for a Private land transfer permit for him to be able to create a road and a poultry

farm in his property. He was then informed that he can proceed with the cutting of the trees

even while his application was still pending. After 3 weeks, representatives of CENRO raided

his property without a search warrant and the woods were confiscated and were turned over to

a baranggay kagawad. After a few days, CENRo returned with a search warrant and

confiscated the logs. Petitioner filed a case against CENRO, however, he was then prosecuted

for finding a probable cause for violation of PD 705 Section 68.

Issue:

Whether or not the owner of a private property can be prosecuted for violating Sec

68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property

Ruling:

Yes, the owner of a private property can be prosecuted for violating Sec 68 of PD705 for cutting trees within his own property. Sec 68 of PD 705 has stated that Anyperson who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from anyforest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legaldocuments as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punishedwith the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code


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xxx . The law did not distinguish whether or not the person who commits thepunishable acts under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for whatis material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person orentity involved or charged with its violationpossesses the required permit, license orauthorization from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or otherforest products.

People vs Dator 344 SCRA 222 (2000)

Facts:

On October 29, 1993, Dator feloniously possessed 1,560 board feet of assorted lumberflitches valued at 23,500 php without any legal document. The lumber was boarded to a Isuzucargo truck. He was then charged and pleaded not guilty. The lower court, after trial, found theaccused guilty of violation of Sec 68 of PD 705.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in finding Dator guilty of violation of the said lawbeyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

No, the lower court did not err in finding Dator guilty of violation of Sec 68 or PD 705.The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipoloand Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as requiredunder existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of PresidentialDecree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[22]Section 68 of the code.

MONGE VS PP

548 SCRA 42 (2008)

FACTS: On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan and

Molina in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay

Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be shown the

requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any. Petitioner fled the scene in

that instant whereas Potencio was brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter,

to the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO). The

DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber indicating that the items,

totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized from Potencio. Later

on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencios whereabouts had been unknown since the time of

the seizure until he surfaced on 3 January 1998. An information was filed with the Regional Trial

Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of Section 68 of

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of1997.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated Sec 68 of PD 705

HELD: Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct

and separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber

or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public


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land, or from private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest

products without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations. DENR

Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the

transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 thereof materially requires that the

transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of lumber origin duly issued by the DENR-

CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removingtimber or other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In

the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting

and removal of forest products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products

without the requisite documents consummates the crime.

It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany

lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together,

has already given rise to criminal liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the

second act punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as

a state witness on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioners

liability. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber

found in his possession nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio to

provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal

statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As such, in prosecutions under its

provisions, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as defenses because the offense is

complete and criminal liability attaches once the prohibited acts are committed. In other words,

mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even

absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. It would therefore make no difference at all whether it

was petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber.

TAOPA VS PP

571 SCRA 610 (2008)

FACTS: The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes

seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber (113 pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany

Group and Apitong species without any authority and/or legal documents as required under

existingforest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest) and arrested its driver,

Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On

investigation, Cuison pointed to Petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the

owners of the seized lumber. Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were charged with violating Section

68 of Presidential Decree(PD) No. 705 as amended, in the RTC Virac, Catanduanes. Taopa,

Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, RTC foundthem guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and Cuison appealed to CA,

Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed. The dispositive portion of the CA

decision read: In this petition, Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him alleging

that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he

was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705


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HELD: Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopas alibi because Cuisons

testimony proved Taopas active participation in the transport of the seized lumber. In particular,

the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopas house

and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the

truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopas (and Ogalescos) exercise ofdominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-

accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the

required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere

sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt.

We are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code

(RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as

amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and

possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and

equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized

lumber was P67,630. Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty

should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14

years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the

excess of P47,630. The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall

be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be

anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its

maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

PAAT vs CA

266 SCRA 167 (1997)

FACTS: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR

personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required

documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,

CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private

respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director

Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugans action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the

truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private

respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan.

RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private

respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trialcourt denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the

trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under

administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.


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Whether or not the petitioners contention is correct that the administrative officers of the

DENR allegedly have no power to perform seizure and forfeiture of the truck under the

law

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty for violating Sec 68-A of PD 705

HELD:

The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a

party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should

have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a

remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the

administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes

within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial

power can be sought. The premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to ones

cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and

uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded

(1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal

question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative

agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a

department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and

assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative

remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9)

when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule

does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there arecircumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken

and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections

68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in

view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have

been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over

the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

SECTION 68-A.Administrative Authority of the Department or His DulyAuthorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code orother forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorizedrepresentative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, wateror air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance withpertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.


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It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorizedrepresentatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyancesutilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase todispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances infavor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance withpertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it

must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in thestatute.[33]Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and theevil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as willadvance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishableunder Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided forunder Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily privaterespondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. Wedisagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment byE.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned

Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:SECTION 68.Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products withoutlicense. -Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forestproducts from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, orfrom private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license orpermit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx.(Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before itsamendment by E.O.277 )

SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is herebyamended to read as follows:

Section 68.Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without

license. -Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forestproducts from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or fromprivate land, without any authority, or possesstimber or other forest products without thelegal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shallbe punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised PenalCode xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, theact of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products withoutauthority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under

Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that

provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear fromthe language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guiltyof qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the RevisedPenal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposedunder Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . When the statute is clear andexplicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of thelaw.


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MUSTANG LUMBER, INC. VS CA- MOMONGAN VS OMIPON (NO DIGEST)

G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000

FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURALRESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners,

vs.COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA,respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment

and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR caught two motor vehicles carrying

illegally sourced lumber , where the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents

and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load

of lumber. DENR filed a criminal complaint against the two drivers for forcibly taking the vehicles

from their custody. Complaint was dismissed. One of the two vehicles were again seized by

DENR loaded with illegal lumbers, but the drivers were again acquitted. A copy however of the

decision was furnished to the Secretary of Justice for filing of a case of violation of the Revised

Forestry Code. The vehicle owner and the driver filled an action for replevin where the trial

court granted the application for replevin. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied

by the trial court. Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari,

Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary

Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting

further proceedings in the civil case for replevin. Court further instructed the petitioners to

secure the confiscated properties, being in custodia legis and referred the case to the appellate

court. Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit, and denied petitioners' claim that

private respondents' complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Respondent court

brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles

were validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia

legis.

(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an

application for replevin, is a suit against the State.


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HELD

Yes, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in

accordance with law, the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. The

seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of

the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice

and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances Property that

is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit, for it is

property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the

law, and not otherwise.

NO, State may not be sued without its consent, and a suit against a public officer for his

official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State

ultimately liable. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to

account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in

question are clearly official in nature, there was no malice nor bad faith on their part.

Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State.

It cannot prosper without the State's consent.

G.R. No. 93540 December 13, 1999

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and NaturalResources, VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW, as, Judge, Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents.

FACTS

Two police officers of the Marikina intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with narra lumber along the

Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck and brought its cargo to the Personnel

Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR

Office in Quezon City. Discovering the discrepancies in the documentation of the nara lumber,

petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra

lumber and the six-wheeler truck.Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the

narra lumber and the six- wheeler truck. Having no action from the private respondent, the

confiscated narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government.

Private respondents filed for the issuance of writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or

temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated lumber and six-wheeler truck,


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and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the subject narra lumber. Trial court issued an Order

directing petitioners to desist from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the

hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Private respondents filed an Ex-

ParteMotion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin). Trial court issued a

writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply and filed with the Court of Appeals a

Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the Orders of the trial court but

was dismissed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision.

However, that motion was denied by the Court of Appeals , hence this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents can validly be restored possession of their trucks and lumber

based on the writ of replevin.

HELD

No, in order for replevin to prosper, the wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties

sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic

averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued. In the case at bar, the subject narra

lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A

of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277. Property lawfully taken by

virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a thing is in official custody of a

judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to

recover it. Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of law

had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Sec. 80 of P. D. No.

705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within 6 hours from the time of the

seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations

applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative

confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628 November 20, 2009

APEX MINING CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., the mines adjudication board, provincial

mining regulatory board (PMRB-DAVAO), MONKAYO INTEGRATED SMALL SCALE MINERS

ASSOCIATION, INC., ROSENDO VILLAFLOR, BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING


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COOPERATIVE, DAVAO UNITED MINERS COOPERATIVE, ANTONIO DACUDAO, PUTING-

BATO GOLD MINERS COOPERATIVE, ROMEO ALTAMERA, THELMA CATAPANG, LUIS

GALANG, RENATO BASMILLO, FRANCISCO YOBIDO, EDUARDO GLORIA, EDWIN ASION,

MACARIO HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO CARUBIO, ROBERTO BUNIALES, RUDY

ESPORTONO, ROMEO CASTILLO, JOSE REA, GIL GANADO, PRIMITIVA LICAYAN,

LETICIA ALQUEZA and JOEL BRILLANTES Management Mining Corporation, Respondents.

FACTS

Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was granted an Exploration Permit(EP 133) by the

Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG) which assigned all its rights to EP 133 to the

respondent, Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which

is alleged to be a 100%-owned subsidiary of MMC. Subsequently, BMG registered SEMs

Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)application and the Deed of Assignment.

Several oppositions were filed. The Courts Assailed Decision held that the assignment of

Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the

permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of Marcopper Mining

Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Since SEM did not claim or submit evidence

that it was a designated agent of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as an agent of the

former that can use EP 133 and benefit from it. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated

Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right be made with

the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since

it was not renewed before or after its expiration.

SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments.

Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision. Camilo Banad, et al.,

likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to

them.

ISSUES

Whether or not the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to

SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions set forth in

Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.


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Whether or not the DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO 66 declaring 729

hectares of the areas covered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-

forest lands and open to small-scale mining purposes.

HELD

No, it was invalid. One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is: That this permit shall

be for the exclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his duly authorized agents and

shall be used for mineral exploration purposes only and for no other purpose. While it

may be true that SEM is a100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, there is no showing that

the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter. As such, the assignment is null and

void as it directly contravenes the terms and conditions of the grant of EP 133. Also, PD

463 (Mineral ResourcesDevelopment Decree), which is the governing law when the

assignment was executed, explicitly requires that the transfer or assignment of mining

rights, including the right to explore a mining area, must be with the prior approval of the

Secretary of DENR. Such is not present in this case. Although EP 133 was extended for

12 months until July 6,1994, MMC never renewed its permit prior and after its

expiration.With the expiration of EP 133 on July 6, 1994, MMC lost any right to the

Diwalwal Gold RushArea. SEM, on the other hand, has not acquired any right to the said

area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM

have not acquired any vested rightover the area covered by EP 133

NO. The DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest

reserves. Such power is vested with the President. The DENR Secretary may only

recommend to the President which forest reservations are to be withdrawn from the

coverage thereof. Thus, DAO No. 66 is null and void for having been issued in excess of

the DENR Secretarys authority.

Miners Association of the Philippines vs. FactoranJanuary 16, 1995

Facts:Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise ofher legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing andapproval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant toSection 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary tonegotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for theexploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources.The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the


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effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreementswithin one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing

Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after theirrespective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an

organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file theinstant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue:Whether or not the two Department Administrative Orders valid.

Ruling:Yes, AO Nos. 57 and 82 are both constitutional and valid. This is due to the fact that

EO279, in effect, gave the Secretary of Natural Resources the authority to concludejointventure, co-production, or production sharing agreements for the exploration, developmentand utilization of mineral resources. Furthermore, the constitutionality of these administrativeorders goes to show that the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain is not merely done

through license, concession or lease since the options are now also open to the State throughdirect undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharingagreements. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not beprecluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifyingand amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, asamended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with thenecessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs.The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 providedlegal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 ofthe 1987 Constitution.

ALVAREZ VS PICOP RESOURCES- APEX MINING CO, INC. VS SMGMC (NO

DIGEST)

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. VENERACIONFacts:

Respondent applied with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development Services, DENR,Region IX, Zamboanga City for a Declaration of Location (DOL) over Block 159 of the MalangasCoal Reservation, situated at Barangays Payongan and Kauswagan, Alicia,Zamboanga del Sur.On 18 May 1989, the Office of the Regional Executive Director (RED) of the DENR informed therespondent that his DOL cannot be registered since Block 159 was part of the Malangas CoalReservation, as provided under Proclamation No. 284, issued by the President on19 July 1938.With the endorsement of the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA) and the DENR Secretary, therespondent petitioned the Office of the President for the withdrawal of Block 159 from the coal

reservation and its conversion into a mineral reservation. The petitioner applied for a mineralprospecting permit over Block 159 with the OEA, which the latter granted on 4 September 1989.On 18 October 1991, petitioner submitted to the DENR an application/proposal for a MineralProduction Sharing Agreement (MPSA) over Blocks120, 159 and 160 of the Malangas CoalReservation. On 21 February 1992, the Officer-In-Charge Regional Technical Director Dario R.Mioza of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Developmental Service (MGDS) advised the petitionerto amend its application for MPSA by excluding Block 159 as the same is covered by theapplication of the respondent. Nevertheless, the petitioner did not exclude Block 159 from itsMPSA. Records also show that it had not applied for nor was it able to obtain an Exploration


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Permit from the BMGS over Block 159.On 13 April 1992, Presidential Proclamation No.890 wasissued, which effectively excluded Block159 from the operation of Proclamation No. 284,anddeclared Block No. 159 as government mineral reservation open for disposition to qualifiedmining applicants, pursuant to Executive Order No. 279. Respondent immediately filed, on 28May 1992, a protest to the petitioners inclusion of Block 159 in its application for MPSA beforethe RED of the DENR Office in Zamboanga City. After the parties were heard, the RED, in an

Order, dated 12 April 1993, ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered the petitioner to amendits MPSA by excluding there from Block 159.On 30 July 1993, petitioner filed an appeal with theDENR Secretary questioning the Orders issued by the RED. While the case was pending,respondent applied for a MPSA. On 31 July 1992, he paid the processing fee for a MPSAcovering Block 159 and was able to comply with all other requirements of the MPSA application.The MAB ruled that the petitioner filed its appeal beyond the five-day prescriptive periodprovided under Presidential Decree No.463, which was then the governing law on the matter.The MAB also decreed that the respondent had preferential mining rights over Block 159. Itruled that the proper procedure with respect to the mining rights application over Block 159when it was still part of the Malangas Coal Reservation required the following: (1) application forprospecting permit with the OEA or other office having jurisdiction over said reservation;(2)application for exploration permit; (3) application for exclusion of the land from such

reservation;(4) Presidential Declaration on exclusion as recommended by the Secretary; and(5)application for Lease thereof with priority given to holder of exploration Permit. The MABnoted that petitioner did not file for an exploration permit nor applied for the exclusion of Block159. Moreover, petitioner filed a MPSA on18 October 1991, or almost six (6) months prior to theissuance of Proclamation No. 890 excluding Block 159 from the Malangas Coal Reservationand allowing its disposition. Thus, the application for a MPSA over Block 159, while it was stillpart of a government reservation other than a mineral reservation, was erroneous and improperand could not have been legally accepted. And, since the records show that only one MPSAwas filed after the issuance of Proclamation 890that of the respondents, the preferential rightover Block 159 was acquired by the respondent.Issues:

Whether or not the petitioner acquired preferential right on mining rights over Block 159.

Held:

No, in the instant case, petitioner failed to state any compelling reason for not filing itsappeal within the mandated period. Instead, the records show that after failing to comply withthe period within which to file their motion for reconsideration on time, they again failed to filetheir appeal before the Office of the DENR Secretary within the time provided by law. Naturalresources, mines: as a general rule, prospecting andexploration of minerals in a government reservation is prohibited under Sec.13 of PD 463 -

However, the same rule provides an exception involving instances when the governmentagency concerned allows it. Section13. Areas Closed to Mining Location.No prospecting andexploration shall be allowed: (a)In military, and other Government reservations except when

authorized by the proper Government agency concerned. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.463 reiterates the rule and clarifies it further by stating that prospecting, exploration andexploitation of minerals on reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertakenby the proper government agency. As an exception to this rule, qualified persons may undertakethe said prospecting, exploration and exploitation when the said agencies cannot undertakethem.

Atlas Consolidated Mining vs. CA (1990)


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Facts:

ATLAS entered into an operating agreement with the heirs of Manuel Cuenco and JoseP. Velez (collectively referred to herein as CUENCO-VELEZ) the former was granted the right toexplore, develop and operate twelve) mining claims belonging to the latter located at ToledoCity, Cebu. ATLAS entered into a similar agreement with the Biga Copper Mines Exploration

Company (BIGA COPPER), a partnership composed of Pablo B. Gorosin, Francisco B. Gorosin,Pedro B. Gorosin and Vicente T. Garaygay (collectively referred to herein as the BIGAPARTNERS). Subject of this Operating Agreement are thirty-one (31) mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. It appears, however, that of the total miningclaims "leased" by ATLAS from both the CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, nine (9) miningclaims overlap. These nine (9) overlapping mining claims became the subject of Mines

Administrative Cases Nos. V-727 and V-750 whereby under date of February 12, 1974, theDirector of Mines resolved the same in favor of CUENCO-VELEZ. BIGA COPPER appealed thisdecision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, in a decision affirmed thedecision of the Director of Mines. This later decision was appealed to the Office of the Presidentunder O.P. Case No. 0435. During the pendency of this appeal in the Office of the President,the parties, namely, CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise

agreement. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim overthe nine (9) overlapping mining claims. Earlier, ATLAS alleged that when it started the operationof its Carmen Project, which includes some of the mining claims subject of the aforestatedOperating Agreements with BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ ATLAS received numerousletters from third- parties claiming that they were assignees of BIGA COPPER and the BIGAPARTNERS over the mining claims. ATLAS allegedly conducted a verification of the saiddemands and later on confirmed that before the registration of the Articles of Partnership ofBIGA COPPER, the BIGA PARTNERS sold and/or assigned some of their respective shares,rights, interests and participations over the mining claims to third parties and that BIGACOPPER, acting separately from the BIGA PARTNERS, likewise sold and/or assigned itsundivided shares, interests and participations over the mining claims to third parties. On theother hand, a certain Alejandro T. Escano wrote ATLAS informing the latter that he is anassignee of CUENCO-VELEZ with respect to the three (3) mining claims which CUENCO-VELEZ retained under the compromise agreement with BIGA COPPER. Escano, alleged thatCUENCO-VELEZ had assigned to him fifty percent (50%) of their rights, interests andparticipations in the said mining claims. In turn, CUENCO-VELEZ advised ATLAS that theirassignment to Alejandro T. Escano was already revoked or rescinded for failure of the saidassignee to fulfill the conditions contained in their deed of assignment. In the light of theforegoing situation, ATLAS instituted a petition for declaratory relief with the then Court of FirstInstance of Cebu, Branch 8, and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 16669-R. Cited asrespondents therein were BIGA COPPER, BIGA PARTNERS, CUENCO-VELEZ and somethirty-one (31) assignees.

Issue:Whether or not a person who is not a party to a contract can file a petition for declaratory

relief and seek a judicial interpretation of such contract.

Held:No, the contention of Atlas that it has interest is without legal ground. ATLAS cannot be

considered as an interested party under the deeds of assignment and, therefore, has nostanding to institute the declaratory action. It cannot be disputed that ATLAS, being one of theparties to the operating agreements, has an interest therein. A review of the record, in fact,reveals that ATLAS purports to be seeking a judicial interpretation of its operating agreements


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with BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ But after evaluating the lengthy arguments itpresented to justify the declaratory action this Court arrives at one logical conclusion theambiguity is not in the operating agreements themselves but in the validity of the assignments ofmining rights made by BIGA COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ to third parties.

Asaphil Construction vs Tuason Jr. 488 SCRA 126 (2006)

Fatcs:

In 1975, Respondent Tuason entered into a Contract for sale and Purchase of Perlite ore with

Induplex wherein the latter agreed to buy all the perlite ore that may be found and mined in

Respondents mining claim, then Induplex will assist Respondent in securing and perfecting his

right over the mining claim.

Respondent then, executed in 1976 an agreement in favor of the Petitioner Asaphil. In 1990,

Respondent filed with the Bureau of Mines of DENR a complaint against Petitioner and Induplex

for declaration of Nullity of the two contracts for Sale and Purchase of Perlite ore. Respondent

alleged that the stockholders of Induplex formed and organized Ibalon who in fact been mining,extracting and utilizing the perlite ore in Ibalons mining claim, that such is a violation of the

condition imposed by Board of Investments. Also, that Induplex acquired majority stocks of

Asaphil and majority of Ibalons share were transferred to Romero who is also a stockholder of

Asaphil and Ibalon. Respondent claim that said acts adversely affected his interests and the

government as well.

Issue:

Whether or not DENR has jurisdiction over Respondents claim, namely the Annulment of the

Contract for sale and Purchase of perlite ore?

Ruling:

The Court upholds the findings of the DENR Regional Executive Director (RED) that the DENR

does not have jurisdiction over the Respondents claim. At the time (1990) of the filing of the

complaint, the jurisdiction of the DENR over mining disputes and controversies is governed by

P.D no.1281, particularly vesting the Bureau of Mines (now Mines and Geosciences Bureau) of

the DENR with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or

applicants for and or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof,

including mining service contracts as their mining activities are concerned.

La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association vs Ramos 445 SCRA 1 (2004)

Facts:

In 1987, President Aquino issued E.O 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept,

consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for

contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale

exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which upon appropriate recommendation

of the Secretary the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In 1995, Pres. Ramos


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approved RA 7942 which defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations

outlines the procedure for their filing and approval , assignment, transfer and withdrawal, and

fixes their terms .Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. While

in 1997, counsels for Petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding to stop the

implementation of R.A 7942 and DAO (no.96-40), giving DENR fifteen days from receipt to act

thereon. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted with or in excess of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A 7942 valid?

Ruling:

The Court finds the provisions of R.A 7942 to be violative of Sec.2 Art XII of the 1987

Constitution namely the Regalian and Filipinization of Natural Resources . When the parts of the

statute re so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or

compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a

whole, and that it all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue

independently, then, if some parts are Unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus

dependent, conditional, or connected must not fall with them. Petition is granted.

Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation vs Balite Portal Mining Cooperative 380 SCRA

145 (2002)

Facts:

Case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve

known as the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area, the land has been embroiled in controversy since the

mid 80s due to its gold deposits. From then, thousands of people flocked, to stake theirrespective claims. In 1988, Marcopper was granted Exploration Permit (E.P No.133) which

included the hotly contested area.

In 1991, Congress enacted R.A 7076 establishing a Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be

implemented by Secretary of DENR and also to authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside

small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts

to small-scale miners under certain conditions. Then, Sec,Factoran issued Dept.Administrative

Order (No.60) declaring hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale

mining.

Subsequently, a petition for cancellation of E.P (no.133) and the admission of a MineralProduction Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal was filed before the DENR Executive Director

docketed as Mining Case (no.8-8-94) Marcopper while case is pending assigned E.P (no.133)

to Petitioner SEM which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the

permit. Mines and Geosciences Bureau registered the application.

Several entities including respondent Balite Communal Portal Mining Corporation filed their

oppositions. In 1997, Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed a Resolution (no.26)


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authorizing the issuance of Ore Transport Permits (OTPs) to small -scale miners operating in

the Diwalwal area. Then, petitioner filed a complaint for damage before RTC alleging the illegal

issuance of OTPs allowed the extraction and hauling of gold per truck load from SEMs mining

claim. RPA dismissed petitioners claim.

In 1997, Petitioner file before the CA against PMRB Davao, DENR Secretary and Balite whichrepresent all OTP grantees. It prayed for the Nullification of Memorandum Order 97-03 on the

ground that the direct state utilization espoused therein would impair its vested right under E.P

(no.133).

Issue:

Whether or not the Memorandum Order adopt the direct utilization scheme in resolving the

dispute over the area?

Ruling:

No. The challenged Memorandum Order (97-03) did not conclusively adopt direct stateutilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the Memorandum clearly

indicate that what was directed there under was merely a study of this option and nothing else.

Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any management/operating or by profit-

sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, has simply instructed

the DENR Officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.

Consequently, the petition was premature, the said M.O did not impose any obligation on the

claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to the dispute. At

this stage, petitioner can show no more than a mere apprehension that the State through the

DENR, would directly take over the mines after the studies point to its viability. But until the

DENR actually does so and Petitioners fear turn into reality, no valid objection can beentertained against M.O 97-03 on grounds which are purely speculative and anticipatory.

DIDIPIO EARTH- SAVER'S MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOC. VS GOZUN- TATAD VS

SECRETEARY OF DoE (NO DIGEST)

G.R. No. 159149 June 26, 2006

The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of theDepartment of Energy, Petitioner,vs.

LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent

FACTS

Batasang Pambansa Blg. 33 as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,

adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for

trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)


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cylinders. The said law imposes a penalty that is monetary for violators. The respondent

association asked the DOE to set aside the circular for being contrary to law. However, the said

department denied the request for lack of merit. The respondent then filed before the trial court

a petition and the trial court nullified the said circular on the ground that it introduced new

offenses not included in the law.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Circular issued by DOE is valid

RULING

Yes, For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force ofpenal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by thedelegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statuteitself.

The Circular satisfies the firstrequirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal

trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Thesespecific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks tocurb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.

As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P.Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the actsaforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular,the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowedby law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to anymaximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of theaforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties ona per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribesare the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.

Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involvingpetroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the correspondingpenalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximumpecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes thelaw.

G.R. No. 161113 June 15, 2004

FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, ANA MARIA NEMENZO, as President of FREEDOMFROM DEBT COALITION, MA. TERESA I. DIOKNO-PASCUAL, REP.LORETTA ANNROSALES (Party-ListAkbayan), REP. JOSE VIRGILIO BAUTISTA (Party-List Sanlakas), REP.RENATO MAGTUBO (Party-List Partido Manggagawa),petitioners,vs.ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY(MERALCO), respondents.

FACTS

MERALCO filed with the ERC anApplicationfor an increase in rates. MERALCO also prayed ex

partefor the grant of a provisional authority to implement the increase according to the schedule


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attached to itsApplication.The National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc.

(NASECORE), in a Letter addressed to then ERC Chairman Manuel R. Sanchez (Sanchez),

informed him of its intention to file an Opposition to MERALCOsApplication. Petitioner

Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) also expressed its intention to file an opposition to

MERALCOsApplication. However, the ERC, without first resolving the Motions for Production

of Documentsof NASECORE and FDC and apparently without consideringLualhatisOpposition,issued an Orderprovisionally approving MERALCOsex parteapplication

for rate increase. FDC argues that the Orderof the ERC is void for having been issued without

legal or statutory authority. It also contends that Rule 3, Section 4(e) of the Implementing Rules

of the EPIRA is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. FDC further

asserts that the said Order is void for having been issued by the ERC with grave abuse of

discretion and manifest bias. In support of its prayer for the issuance of injunctive relief, FDC

claims that the implementation by MERALCO of the provisional rate increase will result in

irreparable prejudice to FDC and others similarly situated unless the Court restrains such

implementation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate adjustments.

RULING

Yes, The OSG contends that ERC has statutory authority to issue provisional orders, including

provisional rate increases. It points out that the EPIRA expressly states that the powers of the

Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) under E.O. No. 172 shall be exercised by the ERC. ERC

authority is found inSecs. 44 and 80 of the EPIRA.

The ERC is endowed with the statutory authority to approve provisional rate adjustments underthe aegis of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. The sections read, thus:

SEC. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. The powers and functions of the EnergyRegulatory Board not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby transferredto the ERC. The foregoing transfer of powers and functions shall include all applicablefunds and appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel as may benecessary.

Sec. 80.Applicability and Repealing Clause. The applicability provisions ofCommonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the "Public Services

Act;" Republic Act 6395, as amended, revising the charter of NPC; Presidential Decree269, as amended, referred to as the National Electrification Decree; Republic Act 7638,otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992;" Executive Order 172, as

amended, creating the ERB; Republic 7832 otherwise known as the "Anti-Electricity andElectric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994;" shall continue to have fullforce and effect except insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act.

The provisions with respect to electric power of Section 11(c) of Republic Act 7916, asamended, and Section5(f) of Republic Act 7227 are hereby repealed or modifiedaccordingly.

[G.R. No. 141314. April 9, 2003] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BYENERGY REGULATORY BOARD,petitioner, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondent.


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FACTS

MERALCO filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for revised rates, with

an average increase. Then, he ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that

in the event the ERB determines that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all

excess amounts collected by MERALCO shall be refunded to its customers or credited in theirfavor. The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination of the books of accounts and

records of MERALCO and thereafter recommended, among others, that: (1) income taxes paid

by MERALCO should not be included as part of MERALCOs operating expenses and (2) the

net average investment method or the number of months use method should be applied in

determining the proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year.

COA submitted its "COA Report" which contained, among others, the recommendation not to

include income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating expenses for purposes of rate

determination and the use of the net average investment method for the computation of the

proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the

determination of the rate base. Subsequently, the ERB rendered its decision adopting the above

recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment. The ERB heldthat income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be borne by the

stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their

business.

ISSUE

Whether in ruling that income tax paid by MERALCO should be treated as part of its operating

expenses and thus considered in determining the amount of increase in rates imposed by

MERALCO

RULING

No. American decisions and authorities are notper se controlling in this jurisdiction. Atbest, they are persuasive for no court holds a patent on correct decisions. Our laws must beconstrued in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may bededuced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto.More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-alland the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct anddifferent from others.

Rate regulation calls for a careful consideration of the totality of facts and circumstancesmaterial to each application for an upward rate revision. Rate regulators should strain to strike abalance between the clashing interests of the public utility and the consuming public and the

balance must assure a reasonable rate of return to public utilities without being unreasonable tothe consuming public. What is reasonable or unreasonable depends on a calculus of changingcircumstances that ebb and flow with time. Yesterday cannot govern today, no more than todaycan determine tomorrow.

Prescinding from these premises, we reject MERALCOs insistence that the non-inclusionof income tax payments as a legitimate operating expense will deny public utilities a fair returnof their investment. This stubborn stance is belied by the report submitted by the COA on theaudit conducted on MERALCOs books of accounts and the findings of the ERB.


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Republic vs. Medina 41 SCRA 643 (1971)

FACTS:

Manila Electric Company (hereinafter termed MERALCO) filed an application with thePublic Service Commission seeking approval of revised rate schedules, with increased charges,

claiming that the floating exchange rate and economic conditions resulting there from increasedits operating and maintenance expenses by more than 40%, and likewise increased the pesocost of servicing its foreign debts, causing it to incur an operational deficit and net loss of overone million pesos a month. The proposed new rates, applicant contended, would give it areasonable return of below 12% of the present value of its properties devoted to the publicservice, and implicated no additional burden to small consumers (of 100 KWH or less permonth) constituting around 52% of petitioner's customers.

The Republic and other oppositors filed an opposition to respondent MERALCO's mainapplication for increase in rate charges on the ground that the floating rate of exchangenotwithstanding, the applicant's sound financial condition is still capable of maintaining efficientservice and meeting due payments on its obligations, with a reasonable rate of return on itsinvestment; that the applicant's cash reserves accumulated and realized from its huge netannual profits over the past years is capable of sustaining itself without resorting to borrowings,despite the alleged increase in operating expenses; that the proper basis of rate fixing is the fairvalue of its property useful and being used in the service of the public, without regard toencumbrance or indebtedness; that the increase in rate sought is excessive and unreasonableand will bring about greater hardship to the people, as well as directly cause increase in the costof production which will have to be unduly borne by the consuming public; and that the rate ofincrease prayed for cannot be supported by the evidence to be presented in justification thereof,apart from other grounds that may become apparent in the course of the proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order on May 20 170, authorizing the provisional rates is valid.

HELD/RULING:

No. It having been agreed that the evidence submitted in connection with, or in supportof, the provisional rates should be taken as evidence submitted on the merits of the petition, anda decision on the merits having been rendered by the Commission, after consideration of all theevidence submitted by the parties, the review of the Public Service Commission order of 20 May1970 (authorizing the provisional rates) would serve no practical purpose, since the decision onthe merits superseded said order, and the moneys collected there under by Meralco would haveto be returned or credited to customers in so far as they exceeded the rates authorized by theultimate decision. Anyway, the brief of petitioner Gonzalez in the Case L-32464 discusses thepropriety of the authorization of provisional rates. It is contended by petitioner Gonzalez,

however, that the provisional rate proceedings were void for want of jurisdiction, because thenotice of hearing was first published in two newspapers of general circulation beginning 9 May1970, and continued for 10 consecutive days

envi consolidated cases

Documents

road closure

use of logging road

unlawful closure

bureauof forest development

alleged illegal closure

bureau of forestry

bureau of customs

forest area