epistemological aspects of methods

8/15/2019 Epistemological Aspects of Methods

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/epistemological-aspects-of-methods 1/47

Republic of the PhilippinesPolytechnic University of the Philippines

M. H. del Pilar CampusValencia St. cor. R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta. Mesa, Manila

EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF METHODS

o pistemology

o !no"ledge

o mpiricism

o Rationalism

o Constructivism

In Partial Flfill!ent of the "e#ire!ent inPhilosophical an$ Psycho%Social Perspectives E$cation

&DEM '()*

Submitted to#$r. Beatri% &. 'ornoProfessor

Submitted by#'ee(ay $. Panganiban

$M Student

)nd Semester, S* )+-)+/

March +', +)-'

I. I/T"ODUCTIO/



pistemology derives from the &ree0 "ord, episteme, "hich translates as

0no"ledge. 'hus epistemology is the systematic study of 0no"ledge. 1mong the central

2uestions that concern epistemologists are# 3hat are the necessary ingredients for

0no"ledge4 $oes 0no"ledge have a certain structure4 3hat are the various sources of

(ustified belief4 5uestions of this sort pic0 out an important feature of traditional

epistemology6 it is centrally concerned "ith analy%ing various features of (ustified belief.

7t does not consider ho" the character and cognitive traits of persons might influence

our understanding of 0no"ledge and its function in our lives. Rather it restricts its

analysis to beliefs6 it is beliefbased.

1 number of concepts of educational import are epistemic concepts. 'hese are

the concepts of learning 8 having to do "ith an individual9s moving from a state of less

to greater 0no"ledge 8 the concept of teaching 8 having to do "ith someone instructing

another in order to bring about learning, and education 8 roughly the concept of a

process of bringing about learning in another intentionally by teaching or other means.

'hese epistemic concepts in particular play a structuring role in the philosophy of

education and, in its earliest conceptual analysis phase :associated "ith the "or0 of, for

instance, Peters, Hirst and 7. Scheffler;, philosophy of education focussed mainly on the

analysis of these three concepts. Here, "e "rite, of course, of learning, teaching and

education as epistemic concepts and an important 2uestion is "hether learning,teaching and education are firstly, or only, epistemic concepts. Some point out that, in

addition to learning, teaching and educating :for; 0no"ledge, much educational effort is

also directed at learning, teaching and educating :for;, for instance, moral or political

values, aesthetic appreciation and so forth. 'he dispute may be over "hether the

concepts learning, teaching and education belong firstly to epistemology or to ethics,

political philosophy, aesthetics, etc. <ne may allo" that the concepts in 2uestion can be

usefully studied by multiple areas of philosophy. 'his is the approach of those "ho

distinguish education9s cognitive from its moral, aesthetic, economic, etc. aims.

1lternatively, one may "ish to insist that the concepts in 2uestion are at root epistemic

concepts in that, even "hen pertaining to morals, aesthetics or economics, they still

have to do "ith the increase of moral, aesthetic or economic 0no"ledge or

understanding on the part of the learner.

2 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s



Probably the most general concept in the area is that of learning. 1 number of

sources :e.g. 7. Scheffler :=/-; and Hamlyn :=/>;; point out that one - ordinary sense

of the "ord ?learning9 is coming to 0no" truths. <ne fertile area of discussion concerns

"hether learning, properly spea0ing, re2uires more than 0no"ing truth6 Hamlyn, for

instance, is opposed to calling rote learning of facts ?learning9. 7mportant distinctions in

the area are bet"een :; learning that comes about as the conse2uence of teaching,

and learning that occurs independently and :); learning that something is the case and

learning ho" to do something.

pistemology is the study of the nature and scope of 0no"ledge and (ustified

belief. 7t analyses the nature of 0no"ledge and ho" it relates to similar notions such

as truth, belief and (ustification. 7t also deals "ith the means of production of 0no"ledge,as "ell as s0epticism about different 0no"ledge claims. 7t is essentially about issues

having to do "ith the creation and dissemination of 0no"ledge in particular areas of

in2uiry.

pistemology as0s 2uestions li0e# @3hat is 0no"ledge4@, @Ho" is 0no"ledge

ac2uired4@, @3hat do people 0no"4@, @3hat are the necessary and sufficient conditions

of 0no"ledge4@, @3hat is its structure, and "hat are its limits4@, @3hat ma0es (ustified

beliefs (ustified4@, @Ho" "e are to understand the concept of (ustification4@, @7s

(ustification internal or eAternal to ones o"n mind4@

'he 0ind of 0no"ledge usually discussed in pistemology is propositional

0no"ledge, @0no"ledgethat@ as opposed to @0no"ledgeho"@ :for eAample, the

0no"ledge that @) ) D E@, as opposed to the 0no"ledge of ho" to go about adding t"o

numbers;.

!no"ledge is the a"areness and understanding of particular aspects of reality. 7t

is the clear, lucid information gained through the process of reason applied to reality.

'he traditional approach is that 0no"ledge re2uires three necessary and sufficient

conditions, so that 0no"ledge can then be defined as @(ustified true belief@#




• truth# since false propositions cannot be 0no"n for something to count as

0no"ledge, it must actually be true. 1s 1ristotle famously :but rather confusingly;

eApressed it# "To say of something which is that it is not, or to say of something

which is not that it is, is false. However, to say of something which is that it is, or

of something which is not that it is not, is true."

• belief# because one cannot 0no" something that one doesnt even believe in, the

statement "I know x, but I don't believe that x is true" is contradictory.

• (ustification# as opposed to believing in something purely as a matter of luc0.

II. 0ac12ron$

pistemology is concerned "ith the nature of 0no"ledge and 0no"ing, and the

validity of 0no"ledge claims :Fais, )++;.

7t also deals "ith the 2uestion of discovering the truth and authenticity of

0no"ledge as "ell as limits of 0no"ledge. Recent developments in epistemology have

no" shifted from the belief that 0no"ledge is absolute and static to the current post

modern vie"s, "hich emphasise its continuous development and evolutionary nature.

'herefore, epistemology and curriculum are interrelated.

Curriculum contents eAist in order to transmit 0no"ledge and to lay a foundation

to facilitate 0no"ing or meaning construction. <rnstein and Gevine :==; consider

epistemology to be at the pillar of curriculum development. Curriculum development

entails decisionma0ing on the nature and the level of content, level of s0ills, values and

attitudes that learners should ac2uire through education :<0ello I <cheng, ==/;.

ducators9 understanding of the various forms of 0no"ledge and patterns of 0no"ing

influence their decisions concerning content selection and its organi%ation during

curriculum design and implementation. 'he curriculum implementation processes may

include teaching, learning and assessment of learning :So"ell, )++;.


EPISTEMOLOG

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_aristotle.html




pistemological assumptions are those about the nature of human cognition.

pistemology can be understood as the science of analy%ing the "ay human beings

grasp 0no"ledge about "hat is :perceived to be; eAisting :Burrell, Morgan

=>=6 Jiehaves )++E;. 7t addresses the 2uestion of ho" a person can come to true

0no"ledge, "hile simulation can be seen as a research method intending to produce

0no"ledge. 1t this (uncture, epistemology has a great effect on the enterprise to apply

simulation in order to produce @true@, @valid@, or @useful@ 0no"ledge. 7n order to analy%e

the "ay and the eAtent to "hich epistemology has such impact, "e "ill first see0 to

specify the relationship bet"een the terms @research method@ and @epistemology@ and

secondly attempt to structure and systemati%e the epistemological issues relevant to

this discussion

Reason is the process of thin0ing. 7ts fundamental attribute is clarity. 'he use of

vague notions, fu%%y feelings, or @instincts@ is not reason. Reason re2uires clear,

identifiable building bloc0s. 7t uses ideas, memories, emotions, and sensory input. 'he

ideas must be clear and definable. 'he memories must be recogni%able, and vivid. 'he

emotions are recogni%ed as emotions only, "ith no further meaning. 'he sensory input

must be identified in order to be used.Reason is organi%ed. 7t is systematic and purposeful. 7t concentrates

on fundamentals, and ma0es pertinent associations. Since clarity is the purpose of

reason, it must use clear methods, as "ell as clear tools. 7t must use logic, deduction,and induction.

Reason is the method of thin0ing in an organi%ed, clear "ay to achieve

0no"ledge and understanding. Since it is a means, its importance and significance is in

its method. 'he ends to"ard "hich it is used defines the validity of the method.

Knderstanding and 0no"ledge is the criteria for evaluating the use of reason.


"easonReason is mans tool of understanding. 7t is the method

of identifying entities through ones senses. 7t is the means of

integrating those perceptions into concepts,

gaining 0no"ledge through this integration, integrating that

0no"ledge into the rest of ones 0no"ledge, and evaluating

K E Y E L E M E N T S O F E P I S T E M O L O G Y

http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/4/1.html#burrell1979


http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/4/1.html#niehaves2004

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Emotions.html

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Fundamentals.html

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Logic.html

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Deduction.html


http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Induction.html

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Perception.html

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Concepts.html

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Knowledge.html


http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Integration.html



http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/4/1.html#niehaves2004

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Perception.html




http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Emotions.html

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Fundamentals.html

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Logic.html


http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Induction.html



7dentity. 7n a different respect, though, it re2uires focused action to conform to the

Ga" of 7dentity. 7deas have content. 'his content is generated by the thin0er from

perceptual data. Ho"ever, it may be generated incorrectly. Gogic re2uires the content

to be clear and identifiable. 7t re2uires that no contradiction eAist "ithin the idea.

Gogic is used in integrating ideas as "ell. 1gain, it is the process of conforming to

the Ga" of 7dentity. 3hat this means in practice is combining information clearly, and

"ithout contradiction. 7t must be combined into a specific, identifiable pac0age, that

doesnt contradict itself.

Gogic is the art of noncontradictory identification. 7t is the mental tool that sets

the standard for proper thought. 7t is the foundation of 0no"ledge. 7t is the means of

understanding and clarity. 3ithout logic, "e could not distinguish bet"een the true and

the false. 3e could not thro" out bad ideas because "e could not (udge them as bad.

3ithout logic, our minds "ould be cluttered "ith so many absurdities and falsehoods

that if there "as some truth, it "ould be lost in the garbage of contradictions, fu%%y

thoughts, and nonintegrated mental images.

0no"ledge on reality, and ma0ing ones thoughts and ideas conform to it.


• Gogic

Gogic is the art of conforming ones thoughts to

the Ga" of 7dentity. 7n one respect, thoughts have to

conform to the Ga" of 7dentity, as does everything else. 'his

has to do "ith the nature of thoughts. 7deas have a different

• <b(ectivity

<b(ectivity is the recognition of reality as the

ultimate standard of evaluation. 7t is the acceptance that

all 0no"ledge is 0no"ledge about reality. 7t is the only

means of determining the truth. 'he concepts of true and

false are only meaningful in reference to reality.


http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Metaphysics_Identity.html


http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_StandardOfEvaluation.html




http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_StandardOfEvaluation.html




'o be ob(ective, reality must be an eAplicit standard to be compared to.

<b(ectivity is the process of actively comparing ones thoughts to reality, and this can

only be accomplished if the purpose of the comparison is identified. 'he purpose, of

course, is to set the standard for validity.

7t is a common mista0e to believe that one cannot be ob(ective if one has a

personal sta0e involved in something. 'he implication is that the emotion or motivation

Philosophy is a necessary product of mans rational mind. 'o live, man must gain

0no"ledge of the "orld. Jecessarily prevents one to be accurate. Since ob(ectivity is

the act of conforming ones thoughts to reality, it should be clear that this is possible

regardless of any influences.

'o understand the "orld, man must form conclusions about its very nature. Lor

instance, to gain 0no"ledge of particular ob(ects, man must recogni%e that ob(ects

have identity. He must recogni%e that conclusions are possible because the "orld does

eAist, and eAists in a particular "ay.

Philosophy provides the frame"or0 for "hich man can understand the "orld. 7t

provides the premises by "hich man can discover truth, and use his mind to support his

life. very man has an understanding of the "orld. very man must have a philosophy,even if it is never made eAplicit.


• Philosophy

1 philosophy is a system of beliefs about reality. 7t

is ones integrated vie" of the "orld. 7t includes an

understanding of the nature of eAistence, man, and his role

in the "orld. Philosophy is the foundation of 0no"ledge. 7t

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Reason.html


http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Ethics_ReasonIsMansMeans.html










7f someone says @He is a better gambler than 7 am@, the criteria is ho" "ell each

person gambles, or more specifically, ho" much money each person ma0es "hile

gambling. 7f someone says @She is shorter than 7 am@, height is the standard by "hich

they are compared.

7ts impossible to ma0e a comparison "ithout some criteria. 'here can even be a

combination of criteria. Lor instance, one might say @Michael ordan is the best

bas0etball player.@ 'he standard could include a specific combination of traits or

statistics, including points scored, championships "on, and endorsements sold. 7ts not

important "hich criteria, and ho" they are combined, but only the fact that there must

be some standard by "hich an evaluation can be made.3hen communicating to others or trying to thin0 clearly, it is important to ma0e

the standard or standards eAplicit. Since there can be various criteria or combinations of

criteria, there can be confusion about "hat eAactly is being compared. 7f 7 tell you that

some car is the best available, you "ouldnt 0no" if 7 meant best performance per dollar,

best performance total, best gas mileage, etc. <nly by ma0ing the standard eAplicit can

the statement be (udged to be true or false. 'his is true for thoughts as "ell. ach

thought needs an eAplicit standard in order to (udge its validity.


• Standard valuation

'he concepts of true and false are dependent on

an important idea# a standard of evaluation. 3henever a

comparison is made, "henever an opinion is stated,

"henever a (udgment is made, there must be a standard

• Perceptions

Perception is the automatic integration of sensory

stimulus. 7t is not a form of thin0ing, in that ones ideas do

not affect the process. Perception is automatic and







combines different sensory effects over time into a single unified "hole. 'he result is the

a"areness of entities. 3e dont see a mass of different colors and brightness. 7nstead

"e see a computer monitor, a boo0, or a cup of grape !ool1id.

'his is different than 0no"ing "hat "e see, though. 'hat 0no"ledge is not

automatic. 1n eAample is a scientists laboratory. 7f you "al0ed in, you "ould see

ob(ects of different si%es, shapes, colors, etc. *ou may have no 0no"ledge about "hat

they are, or "hat they are used for, but you "ould perceive them as ob(ects as

integrated "holes.

Perception is the base of all 0no"ledge. 3e ac2uire ra" information about the

"orld around us through perception. 3e can then ta0e that information and integrate

and try to understand it. 1ll 0no"ledge, though, is derived from this common root. 3hat

"e perceive. 7t is our lin0 to the outside "orld.

'here is never a 2uestion that "hat "e perceive is accurate. 'he only 2uestion is

"hether "e accurately interpret "hat "e perceive. 'he "ay to do this is through reason.


• !no"ledge

!no"ledge is the mental grasp of the facts of

reality. 7t is the a"areness of the identity of particular

aspects of reality. 7t is not (ust an a"areness of reality,

but an understanding of it. 7t is a successfully formed

conclusion about some aspect of reality. 1n eAample of 0no"led e is the identification of the la" of ravit . 7t is a

T h e o r i e s o f K n o ! e " # e









'H<R* <L !J<3G$& is a product of doubt. 3hen "e have as0ed

ourselves seriously "hether "e really 0no" anything at all, "e are naturally led into an

eAamination of 0no"ing, in the hope of being able to distinguish trust"orthy beliefs from

such as are untrust"orthy. 'hus !ant, the founder of modern theory of 0no"ledge,

represents a natural reaction against Humes scepticism. Le" philosophers no"adays

"ould assign to this sub(ect 2uite such a fundamental importance as it had in !ants

@critical@ system6 nevertheless it remains an essential part of philosophy. 7t is perhaps

un"ise to begin "ith a definition of the sub(ect, since, as else"here in philosophical

discussions, definitions are controversial, and "ill necessarily differ for different schools6

but "e may at least say that the sub(ect is concerned "ith the general conditions of

0no"ledge, in so far as they thro" light upon truth and falsehood.

7t "as concerning respectively :; belief, :); truth, :; (ustification

. . 'he person 3elieves the statement to be true

). 'he statement is in fact tre.

. 'he person is 4stifie$ in believing the statement to

be true

0elief

Ksually, a @belief@ is a state of mind of a certain sort. But the behaviourists denythat there are states of mind, or at least that they can be 0no"n6 they therefore avoid

the "ord @belief@, and, if they used it, "ould mean by it a characteristic of bodily

behaviour. 'here are cases in "hich this usage "ould be 2uite in accordance "ith

common sense. Suppose you set out to visit a friend "hom you have often visited

before, but on arriving at your destination you find that he has moved, you "ould say @7

thought he "as still living at his old house.@ *et it is highly probable that you did not thin0

about it at all, but merely pursued the usual route from habit. 1 @thought@ or @belief@ may,

therefore, in the vie" of common sense, be sho"n by behaviour, "ithout any

corresponding @mental@ occurrence. 1nd even if you use a form of "ords such as is

supposed to eApress belief, you are still engaged in bodily behaviour, provided you

pronounce the "ords out loud or to yourself. Shall "e say, in such cases, that you have

a belief4 <r is something further re2uired4

$% | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s



'he above account of truth is clearly satirical since no one "ould seriously grant

that the truth of all statements is grounded in the assertions of one individual person.

But "hat are the more serious alternatives for definitions of truth4 1s usual in

philosophy, theres much disagreement about "hat the correct definition is. 3e "ill

consider the three leading candidates here.

'he first and most famous definition of truth is the correspondence theory # a

statement is true if it corresponds to fact or reality. 'his is the most commonsensical

"ay of loo0ing at the notion of truth and is ho" standard dictionaries define the concept.

1 true statement simply reflects the "ay things really are. 'a0e the statement @My car is

"hite.O 'his statement is true if it conforms to ho" the "orld actually is, specifically

"hether my car is in fact painted "hite. 1s compelling as the correspondence theory of

truth seems, s0eptics immediately see one ma(or fla" "ith it# "e don9t have access to

the "orld of facts. 7n spite of my best efforts to discover the "ay things really are, 79m at

the mercy of my five senses, "hich, "e9ve seen, are unreliable. 3hile my senses tell

me that my car is "hite, the color receptors in my eyes may not be "or0ing properly and

my car may be a shade of yello". Lor that matter, 7 may be living in a "orld of

hallucinations and don9t even o"n a car. 'he sad fact is 7 can never reach beyond my

perceptions and see the "orld as it really is. 3ith trivial issues, such as the truth concerning the color of my car, 7 may be

"illing to simply pretend that 7 have direct access to the "orld of facts and blindly trust

my senses. 'his may serve my immediate needs perfectly "ell. 7t isn9t so easy to

pretend, though, "hen 7 investigate the truth of more serious statements, such as

"hether NBill murdered Charlie.O ven if 7 have a mountain of evidence that implicates

Bill, such as fingerprints and eye"itness testimony, it9s impossible for me to turn bac0

the hands of time and directly access the scene of Charlie9s murder. 7 only have hints

about "hat the reality is. Similarly, if 79m investigating the truth of the statement N&od

eAists,O 7 can9t directly access the reality of an infinitely po"erful deity, even if &od did

eAist and stood right in front of me. 'he best 7 "ould have is some imperfect evidence

that the mysterious being standing before me "as indeed &od. 'hus, the

$2 | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s



correspondence theory "ould not permit us to say either that N7t is true that Bill

murdered CharlieO or N7t is true that &od eAists.O

1 second famous definition of truth is the coherence theory , "hich aims to

address the shortcomings of the correspondence theory. 1ccording to the coherence

theory, a statement is true if it coheres "ith a larger set of beliefs. Rather than

attempting to match up our statements "ith the actual "orld of facts, "e instead try to

see if our statements mesh "ith a larger "eb of beliefs that support them. Lor eAample,

the statement Nmy car is "hiteO is true if it coheres "ith a collection of other beliefs such

as Nmany cars are painted "hite,O N7 perceive that my car is "hite,O and Nother people

invariably report that my car is "hite.O 3ith the coherence theory, "e avoid s0eptical

obstacles such as the unreliability of our senses and the possibility that "e are

hallucinating. 3hat matters is our "eb of beliefs, "hich "e all have access to in

contrast "ith a hidden "orld of facts that is blurred by the limits of our sensory

perceptions. 3e also can even investigate statements such as N7t is true that Bill

murdered CharlieO or N7t is true that &od eAists.O 3hat matters here is "hether these

statements consistently fit "ith other beliefs that "e have beliefs about the pieces of

evidence against Bill and beliefs about the evidence regarding a divine being.

Knfortunately the coherence theory faces serious criticisms, the most important

of "hich is that it is relativistic. 'hat is, it grounds truth in the changeable beliefs of human beings, rather than in an unchanging eAternal reality. 1ccording to the coherence

theory, the standard for all truth is the larger "eb of beliefs that people hold 8 beliefs

about "hite cars, criminal evidence, evidence for &od9s eAistence, and countless other

issues. 'he problem is that belief systems come and go. 'a0e beliefs about criminal

evidence as (ust one eAample. Many cultures throughout history based criminal

convictions on the evidence of supernatural omens# prophetic visions, the flight path of

birds, patterns in the guts of sacrificed animals. 'hat "as their belief system "hich they

relied on. 7n other cultures the testimony of one eye "itness is sufficient to prove guilt. 7n

our culture today "e have fingerprints, $J1 samples and psychological profiles "hich

all contribute to our belief system about criminal guilt. 'he statement NBill murdered

CharlieO could cohere "ith some belief systems, but not "ith others. 3e typically thin0




about truth as being absolute# either Bill murdered Charlie or he didn9t. 7f truth hinges on

a changeable belief system, though, truth is no longer absolute.

'he problems "ith the correspondence and coherence theories are so serious

that many contemporary philosophers have abandoned both. 7n fact some philosophers

have even abandoned the concept of NtruthO as being completely unnecessary. 'his

brings us to our third theory, the deflationary theory of truth# to assert that a statement is

true is (ust to assert the statement itself. Compare these t"o statements#

• My car is "hite.

• It is true that my car is "hite.

3hat is the difference bet"een the t"o4 Jothing of substance. 'he phrase Nit is true

thatO seems to be (ust repeating something that is already assumed in the phrase Nmy

car is "hite.O 7n that sense, 7 am being redundant if 7 use the phrase Nit is true that.O 1t

times it may be rhetorically helpful to use the phrase Nit is true thatO in an effort to

convince someone of my belief. Suppose you say to me N7 don9t believe that your car is

"hite.O 7 might respond by saying, N*ou9re "rong# it9s absolutely true that my car is

"hiteO. 1gain, 79ve not added anything of substance by in(ecting the notion of truth into

my response6 79ve (ust stood up to you more forcefully. 7n short, according to the

deflationary theory, the 2uest for a clear conception of truthQsuch as correspondence

or coherenceQ"ill not succeed because it is ultimately a 2uest for something that

doesn9t really eAist.

But the deflationary theory also faces problems, one of "hich is that the notion

of truth is built into our normal eApectations of "hat "e assert. 3hen 7 say that Nmy car

is "hiteO you have an eApectation that "hat 79m saying is true. <ccasionally 7 do say

something that is false, but "hen that happens "e all recogni%e that 79m doing

something that is incorrect. 'he normal eApectation, then, is that my assertion "ill be

truthful. 1nd this creates a problem for the deflationary theory# by eliminating the notion

of truth, it cannot ade2uately account for our normal eApectation of truthfulness.




5stification

7f the seed of 0no"ledge is belief, "hat turns belief into 0no"ledge4 'his is

"here (ustification comes in . 1 person 0no"s something if they9re (ustified in believing it

to be true :and, of course, it actually is true;. 'here are do%ens of competing theories of (ustification and there is little consensus about "hich is the right one. 7t9s sometimes

easier to describe "hen a belief isnt (ustified than "hen it is. 7n general, philosophers

agree that a person isn9t (ustified if their belief is#

a product of "ishful thin0ing :e.g. 7 really "ish you "ould love me so 7 believe you

love me; a product of fear or guilt :e.g. you9re terrified of death and so form the belief in an

afterlife; a product of guess"or0

formed in the "rong "ay :e.g. you travel to an area you 0no" nothing about, see

a "hite spot -++ yards a"ay and conclude it9s a sheep; a product of dumb luc0 :e.g. you randomly form the belief that the neAt person

you meet "ill have ha%el eyes and it turns out that the neAt person you meet has

ha%el eyes;

ustification is hard to pin do"n because beliefs come in all shapes and si%es

and it9s hard to find a single theory that can account for everything "e "ould "ant toclaim to 0no". *ou might be (ustified in believing that the sun is roughly = million miles

from the earth much differently than you "ould be (ustified in believing &od eAists or

that you have a minor bac0 pain. ven so, (ustification is a critical element in any theory

of 0no"ledge and is the focus of many a philosophical thought.

Philosophy9s history of reflection upon 0no"ledge is a history of theses and

theories6 but no less of 2uestions, concepts, distinctions, syntheses, and taAonomies. 1ll

of these "ill appear in this article. 'hey generate, colour, and refine these philosophicaltheses and theories about 0no"ledge. 'he results are epistemological Q philosophical

attempts to understand "hatever is most fundamentally understandable about the

nature and availability of 0no"ledge. 3e "ill gain a sense of "hat philosophers have

thought 0no"ledge is and might be, along "ith "hy some philosophers have thought

0no"ledge both does not and could not eAist.




on the support it receives from the surrounding "eb of beliefs that relates to it.

Coherentism is closely associated "ith the coherence theory of truth. 3ith truth "e

determine that a proposition is true if it coheres "ith a larger "eb of beliefs. 3ith

(ustification, "e determine that a belief is (ustified if it is supported by a larger "eb of

beliefs. 'o use another metaphor, it is similar to ho" each entry in the dictionary

consists of "ords that the dictionary also defines. 7t is a selfcontained system of

definitions that isn9t reliant on foundational notions outside of itself. Coherentism9s

similarities "ith the coherence theory of truth ma0e it vulnerable to the same

fundamental charge of relativism# not everyone9s belief system is the same, so a

particular belief might find (ustification "ithin your larger "eb of beliefs, but not "ithin

mine. *our belief system might (ustify the belief that NBill 0illed Charlie,O that N&od

eAists,O or that Nabortion is immoral,O "hile my belief system might not (ustify any of

these. 3e9d li0e to thin0 that (ustification is a bit more universal and not dependent on

the peculiarities of a particular person9s belief system.

*ou9re 0no"ing a person, it seems, involves

direct interaction "ith him or her. <ther"ise, at

most, you should claim only that it is almost as if you

0no" him or her# ?79ve seen and heard so

much about her that 7 feel li0e 7 0no" her. 7

"onder "hether 79ll ever meet her Q "hether 7 "ill ever actually 0no" her.9 3ithout that

meeting, you could "ell 0no" facts about the person. Jonetheless, could you 0no"

facts about a person "ithout ever meeting him or her4 7f so, there could "ell be a 0ind

of 0no"ledge "hich is different to 0no"ing a fact6 maybe 0no"ing a thing or entity :such

as a person; is distinct from 0no"ing a fact about that thing or entity.


K i n " s o f K n o ! e " # e

Bertrand Russell :=-=; famously distinguished

bet"een 0no"ledge by description and a 2uite particular

0ind of 0no"ledge by ac2uaintance. He allo"ed there to be

a form of ac2uaintance that "as immediate and

un2uestionable, lin0ing one "ith such things as abstract

properties and momentary sensory items passing before

one9s mind# you can be ac2uainted "ith the abstract

A. 6no7in2 3y Ac#aintance

Bertrand Russell



property of redness, as "ell as "ith a specific patch of redness briefly in your visual

field.

!no"ledge by description "as the means by "hich, in Russell9s vie", a person

could proceed to 0no" about "hat he or she had not eAperienced directly. 3e formulate

definite descriptions :?the third man listed in the current Sydney residential phoneboo09;

and indefinite ones :?a man listed in the current Sydney residential phoneboo09;. 3ith

these, "e can designate individuals "ith "hom "e have not interacted. 'hen "e can

formulate claims using such descriptions. Some of these claims could be 0no"ledge.

'hus, "e may open up for ourselves a "orld of 0no"ledge beyond "hat is revealed by

our immediate eAperiences.

0no"ledge;, declarative 0no"ledge :the 0no"ledge9s ob(ect is represented by a

declarative sentence# ?Suchandsuch is so9;, or 0no"ledgethat :the 0no"ledge is

represented in the form ?that suchandsuch is so9;.

!no"ledge by description "ould be one form that could be ta0en by 0no"ledge

that# some 0no"n propositions include descriptions6 but not all do. 7n principle,0no"ledgethat is the 0ind of 0no"ledge present "henever there is 0no"ledge of a fact

or truth Q no matter "hat type of fact or truth is involved# 0no"ledge that ) ) D E6

0no"ledge that rape is cruel6 0no"ledge that there is gravity6 and so on. 3hen

philosophers use the term ?0no"9 un2ualifiedly, 0no"ledgethat is standardly "hat they

mean to be designating.


Most philosophical discussion of 0no"ledge is

directed at 0no"ledgethat Q such as 0no"ledge that0angaroos hop, 0no"ledge that 0oala sleeps most of the

time, 0no"ledge that 0oo0aburras cac0le, and the li0e.

'his is generally called propositional 0no"ledge :a

proposition that such!and!such is so is the ob(ect of the

0. 6no7le$2e%That



0no"ing whether it is ) p.m.6 0no"ing who is due to visit6 0no"ing why a visit is

needed6 0no"ing what the visit is meant to accomplish6 0no"ing how that

outcome is best accomplished6 and so forth.

Ho" should these be understood4 'he usual vie" among epistemologists is that

these are specific sorts of 0no"ledgethat. Lor eAample, 0no"ing "hether it is ) p.m. is

0no"ing that it is ) p.m., if it is6 and 0no"ing that it is not ) p.m., if it is not. !no"ing "ho

is due to visit is 0no"ing, for some specified person, that it is he or she "ho is due to

visit. !no"ing "hat the visit is meant to accomplish is 0no"ing, for some specified

outcome, that it is "hat the visit is meant to accomplish. !no"ing ho" that outcome is

best accomplished is 0no"ing, for some specified description of ho" that outcome could

be accomplished, that this describes the best "ay of accomplishing that outcome. 1nd

so on.

Still, not everyone "ill assess these eAamples in 2uite that "ay. Jote a variation

on this theme that is currently being developed. Called contrastivism, its basic idea is

that :perhaps al"ays6 at least sometimes; to 0no" is to 0no" this rather than that. <ne9s

0no"ing, understood contrastively, is eAplicitly one9s 0no"ing one from among some

understood or presumed bunch of possible alternatives. 'he "ord ?eAplicitly9 is used

here because one "ould 0no" "hile ac0no"ledging those alternatives. Consider the

eAample of 0no"ing"ho. <n contrastivism, you could 0no" that it is Lred rather

than 1r(una and $iego "ho is due to visit6 and this might be the only "ay in "hich you

0no" that Lred is due. ?3ho is due49 ?Lred, as against 1r(una or $iego.9 *our 0no"ing

2% | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s

But should 0no"ledgethat receives such sustained

and uninterrupted focus by philosophers4 1fter all, there is

a far "ider range of "ays in "hich "e tal0 and thin0, using

the term ?0no"9. Here are some of them :collectively

referred to as 0no"led e"h #

0. 6no7le$2e%8h



"ho "ould not be simply your 0no"ing, of Lred, that it is he "ho is due to visit. *our

0no"ing"ho "ould be your 0no"ing that it is red as against #r$una or %iego "ho is

due to visit. 'his remains propositional 0no"ledge, nonetheless.

a particular meal, and so forth. 'hese seem to be s0ills or at least abilities. 1re they not

simply another form of 0no"ledgethat4 Ryle argued for their distinctness from

0no"ledgethat6 and often 0no"ledgeho" is termed ?practical 0no"ledge9. 7s one9s

0no"ing ho" to coo0 a particular meal really only one9s 0no"ing a lot of truths Q having

much 0no"ledgethat Q bearing upon ingredients, combinations, timing, and the li0e4 7f

Ryle "as right, 0no"ingho" is someho" distinct# even if it involves having relevant

0no"ledgethat, it is also something more Q so that "hat ma0es it knowledgeho"

need not be 0no"ledgethat . Might 0no"ledgethat even be a 0ind of 0no"ledgeho"

itself, so that all instances of 0no"ledgethat themselves are s0ills or abilities.

2$ | E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l A s p e c t s o f M e t h o d s

&ilbert Ryle made apparent to other philosophers the

potential importance of distinguishing 0no"ledgethat from

0no"ledgeho". 'he latter is not :thought Ryle; one9s 0no"ing

ho" it is that something is so is 2uite li0ely a form of

0no"ledgethat. 3hat Ryle meant by ?0no"ing ho"9 "as one9s

0no"ing ho" to do something# 0no"ing ho" to read the time

on a cloc0, 0no"ing ho" to call a friend, 0no"ing ho" to coo0

0. 6no7in2%Ho7

&ilbert Ryle :=>;

S o & r ' e s o f K n o ! e " # e



E9periential 6no7le$2e

&a posteriori * Aperiential 0no"ledge is of many types, the most obvious of "hich

involves perception. ach of our five senses is li0e a door to the outside "orld6

"hen "e thro" them open, "e are flooded "ith an endless variety of sights,

sounds, teAtures, smells and tastes. 3hen 7 loo0 at a co" in front of me and say

@7 0no" that it is bro"n,@ the source of this 0no"ledge rests upon my visual

perception of the bro"n co". 3hile perception is perhaps the dominant source of

eAperiential 0no"ledge, it immediately raises a critical 2uestion# "hen 7 loo0 at a

co", do 7 perceive the actual co" itself, or (ust a mental copy of it that is

processed through my visual system4 1 theory called direct realism holds that "e

see that actual co" itself. 'his is "hat "e ordinarily assume "hen "e open our

eyes and perceive anything around us# 7 perceive the real table, chair, car, or

"hatever. 3e have a natural confidence in our senses, and "e simply assume

that "hat "e see is "hat is actually there. But, according to a rival theory

called indirect realism, this could not possibly be true, since there are countless

instances "here "e 0no" that the actual ob(ects do not match "hat "e perceive.

<b(ects appear to get larger as 7 move closer to the ob(ect, "hile the ob(ect itself

clearly remains the same si%e. 'here are optical illusions, such as a stic0 "hich

appears bent "hen in "ater6 there are mirages, such as the appearance of "ater

puddles on hot roads. 1ccording to indirect realism, then, 7 do not see the actual

co" itself "hen 7 loo0 at it, but only a copy or visual representation of it, almost

as if 7 am vie"ing the co" on a television screen. 'here is, then, a big gapbet"een "hat the co" itself and the image of it that appears to me, and for all 7

0no" the real co" may be vastly different than ho" it is represented. 'hus, as

much as "e rely on perception to gain 0no"ledge, uncertainty is built into the

very act of perception.


/on% E9periential 6no7le$2e

&a priori *

E9periential 6no7le$2e

&a posteriori *



cheap, and "ere often sloppy in the accounts that "e convey to others.

'estimonies from "ritten sources are usually more reliable than oral sources, but

much depends on the integrity of the author, publisher, and the methods of fact

gathering. 3ith oral or "ritten sources, the longer the chain of testimony is, the

greater the chance is of error creeping in.o Religious Experiences. Consider neAt religious eAperiences. Believers

sometimes say that they receive prophecies from &od, or are guided by him, or

0no" something through faith. Christian theologian ohn Calvin even spo0e of a

sense of the divine that "e all have, "hich informs us that &od eAists. Might any

of this count as eAperiential 0no"ledge4 'he 2uestion is a compleA one

considering the "ide range of religious eAperiences that believers report. Gets

narro" the 2uestion to t"o representative types# 0no"ledge through faith andprophetic 0no"ledge. Regarding faith, as typically understood, faith involves

belief "ithout evidence, such as faith that &od eAists, or that the bodies of the

dead "ill be resurrected in the future, or that our souls "ill be reincarnated in

different bodies. 'hese faith beliefs may important for in our personal religious

lives, but there is a problem "hen "e to claim to know something through faith.

<ne of the chief re2uirements for something to count as N0no"ledgeO is that there

is evidence to support itQas "ell see more clearly in the neAt section. But since

faith is belief "ithout evidence then, technically spea0ing faith "ouldnt 2ualify as

0no"ledge. Prophetic 0no"ledge faces the same challenge as SP# are

prophecies any more successful than educated guesses4 7magine an eAperiment

that "e might conduct in "hich half of the sub(ects "ere prophets, and the other

half nonprophets. 3e then as0ed both groups to ma0e predictions about the

upcoming year6 at the end of the year "e then chec0ed the results. Ho" "ould

the prophets do4 'he odds are slim that "e could even conduct the eAperiment

since prophets "ould say that they cant prophesi%e on demand# its a uni2ue and

unpredictable revelatory eAperience. 'hey might also say that their revelations

from &od are not the sort of things that can be confirmed in the ne"spaper. 7f

prophetic eAperiences are genuine sources of 0no"ledge, the burden of proof




seems to be on the believer. 7n the meantime, it "ould be premature to include it

among the normal sources of eAperiential 0no"ledge.

Non-Experiential Knowledge

(a priori)

'urning neAt to noneAperiential 0no"ledge, this source of information is much

more difficult to describe. Some philosophers depict it as 0no"ledge that flo"s from

human reason itself, unpolluted by eAperience. 3e presumably gain access to this

0no"ledge through rational insight. Ksual eAamples of noneAperiential 0no"ledge are

mathematics and logic. 'a0e, for eAample, ))DE. 7ndeed, one might learn from

eAperience that t"o apples plus t"o more apples "ill give four apples. Jevertheless,

one can grasp the concept itself "ithout relying on any apples6 one can also eApand on

the notion in "ays that could never eAperience, such as "ith the e2uation ),+++,+++

),+++,+++ D E,+++,+++. Gogic is similar6 ta0e for eAample the follo"ing argument#

1ll men are mortal.

Socrates is a man.

'herefore, Socrates is mortal.

3hen "e strip this argument of all its empirical parts 8 men, morality, Socrates 8

the follo"ing structure is revealed#

1ll are *

F is an

'herefore F is a *

'his logical structure is something that "e 0no" independently of eAperience. 7n

addition to math and logic, there are other truths that "e 0no" noneAperientially, such

as these#

T 1ll bachelors are unmarried men.




T 1 sister is a female sibling.

T Red is a color.

7n each of the above cases, the truth depends entirely on the concepts "ithin

these statements. 7n the first, @unmarried men@ is part of the definition of @bachelor@6 the

statement is thus true by definition, irrespective of our eAperiences.

'"o concepts have been important in fleshing out the notion of noneAperiential

0no"ledge. Lirst is necessity : noneAperiential truths are necessary in that they could

never be false, regardless of ho" differently the "orld "as constructed. )) "ould

e2ual E in every conceivable science fiction scenario of the universe. ven if no human

being ever eAisted, it "ould still be true that @1ll bachelors are unmarried men@ based on

the meaning of the "ords themselves. Aperiential 0no"ledge, though, is different in

that it is contingent, as opposed to necessary# it could be false if the "orld had

unfolded differently. 'a0e the statement @&eorge 3ashington "as the first K.S.

president,@ "hich is an item of eAperiential 0no"ledge. 7t is of course true as things

stand no". But "e can imagine a thousand different things that might have prevented

3ashington from becoming president. 3hat if he "as sent to an orphanage for

chopping do"n the family cherry tree4 3hat if he cho0ed to death on his "ooden teeth

prior to his inauguration4 'he truth of all eAperiential 0no"ledge hinges on the preciseconstruction of the "orld as it currently is.

'he other concept embedded in the notion of noneAperiential 0no"ledge is that

of an analytic statement # a statement that becomes selfcontradictory if "e deny it.

'a0e, for eAample, the statement @1ll bachelors are unmarried men.@ 7ts denial "ould be

this#

7t is not the case that all bachelors are unmarried men.

'his is clearly selfcontradictory since it "ould be li0e claiming that there eAists

some bachelor "ho is married, "hich is impossible. Many traditional philosophers have

held that noneAperiential 0no"ledge is analytic in the above sense. $enying math or

logic "ould produce a selfcontradiction. Aperiential 0no"ledge, on the other hand,

is synthetic # denying it "ont produce a selfcontradiction. 'a0e again the statement




@&eorge 3ashington "as the first K.S. president,@ "hich "e 0no" is true from

eAperience. 7ts denial "ould be this#

7t is not the case that &eorge 3ashington "as the first K.S. president.

3hile this statement is false as things actually stand, it isnt selfcontradictory since, if

the "orld had unfolded differently, the K.S. might "ell have had a different first

president.


E ( i s ) e * o ! o # + , n " L e , r n i n # T h e o r i e s



mpiricism is the theory that the origin of all 0no"ledge is sense eAperience. 7t

emphasi%es the role of eAperience and evidence, especially sensory perception, in the

formation of ideas, and argues that the only 0no"ledge humans can have is a

posteriori :i.e. based on eAperience;. Most empiricists also discount the notion of innate

ideas or innatism :the idea that the mind is born "ith ideas or 0no"ledge and is not

a @blan0 slate@ at birth;.

7n order to build a more compleA body of 0no"ledge from these direct

observations, induction or inductive reasoning :ma0ing generali%ations based on

individual instances; must be used. 'his 0ind of 0no"ledge is therefore also 0no"nas indirect empirical 0no"ledge.

mpiricism is contrasted "ith Rationalism, the theory that the mind may

apprehend some truths directly, "ithout re2uiring the medium of the senses.


EMPE"ICISM

http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_rationalism.html




'he term @empiricism@ has a dual etymology, stemming both from the &ree0 "ord

for @eAperience@ and from the more specific classical &ree0 and Roman usage

of @empiric@, referring to a physician "hose s0ill derives from practical eAperience as

opposed to instruction in theory :this "as its first usage;.

'he term @empirical@ :rather than @empiricism@; also refers to the method

of observation and eAperiment used in the natural and social sciences. 7t is a

fundamental re2uirement of the scientific method that all hypotheses and theories must

be tested against observations of the natural "orld, rather than resting solely on a

priori reasoning, intuition or revelation. Hence, science is considered to

be methodologically empirical in nature.

'he doctrine of mpiricism "as first eAplicitly formulated by the British

philosopher ohn Goc0e in the late >th Century. Goc0eargued in his "#n &ssay

oncerning Human (nderstanding" of /=+ that the mind is a tabula rasa on "hich

eAperiences leave their mar0s, and therefore denied that humans have innate ideas or

that anything is 0no"able "ithout reference to eAperience. Ho"ever, he also held

that some 0no"ledge :e.g. 0no"ledge of &ods eAistence; could be arrived at through

intuition and reasoning alone.

o HISTO";

o H7S'<R*


'he concept of a @tabula rasa@ :or @clean

slate@; had been developed as early as the th

Century by the Persian philosopher 1vicenna, "ho

further argued that 0no"ledge is attained

through empirical familiarity "ith ob(ects in this"orld, from "hich one abstracts universal concepts,

"hich can then be further developed through a

syllogistic method of reasoning. 'he )th

Century 1rabic philosopher 1bubacer :or 7bn 'ufail#

+- U-; demonstrated the theory of tabula rasa

as a thought eAperiment in "hich the mind of a feral

child develops from a clean slate to that of an adult,

in complete isolation from society on a desert

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_locke.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_avicenna.html



http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_avicenna.html



Sir Francis 0acon can be considered an early mpiricist, through his

populari%ation of an inductive methodology for scientific in2uiry, "hich has since

become 0no"n as the scientific method.

7n the >th and Uth Century, the members of the British mpiricism school,

5ohn Loc1e, Geor2e 0er1eley an$ Davi$ H!e7ere the primary eAponents of

mpiricism. 'hey vigorously defended mpiricism against

the Rationalism of $escartes, Geibni%and Spino%a.

'he 7rish philosopher Bishop &eorge Ber0eley, concerned that Goc0es

vie" opened a door that could lead to eventual 1theism, put forth in his "Treatise

oncerning the )rinciples of Human *nowledge" of >+ a different, very eAtreme form

of mpiricism in "hich things only eAist either as a result of their being perceived, or by

virtue of the fact that they are an entity doing the perceiving. He argued that

the continued eAistence of things results from the perception of &od, regardless of

"hether there are humans around or not, and any order humans may see in nature is

effectively (ust the hand"riting of &od.Ber0eleys approach to mpiricism "ould later

come to be called Sub(ective 7dealism.

'he Scottish philosopher Davi$ H!e brought to the mpiricist vie"point an

eAtreme S0epticism. He argued that all of human 0no"ledge can be divided into t"o

categories# relations of ideas :e.g. propositions involving some contingent observation

of the "orld, such as @the sun rises in the ast@; and matters of fact :e.g. mathematical


http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_bacon_francis.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/movements_british_empiricism.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_berkeley.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_hume.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_descartes.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_leibniz.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_spinoza.html



http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_atheism.html



http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_idealism.html#Subjective


http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_skepticism.html












http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_atheism.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_idealism.html#Subjective


http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_skepticism.html



and logical propositions;, and that ideas are derived from our @impressions@ or

sensations. 7n the face of this, he argued that even the most basic beliefs about the

natural "orld, or even in the eAistence of the self, cannot be conclusively established

by reason, but "e accept them any"ay because of their basis in instinct and custom.

ohn Stuart Mill, in the mid=th Century, too0 Hume and Ber0eleys reasoning

a step further in maintaining that inductive reasoning is necessary for all meaningful

0no"ledge :including mathematics;, and that matter is merely the @permanent possibility

of sensation@ as he put it. 'his is an eAtreme form of mpiricism 0no"n

as Phenomenalism :the vie" that physical ob(ects, properties and events are

completely reducible to mental ob(ects, properties and events;.

7n the late =th Century and early )+th Century, several forms

of Pragmatism arose, "hich attempted to integrate the apparently mutually

eAclusive insights of mpiricism :eAperiencebased thin0ing; and Rationalism :concept

based thin0ing;. C. S. Peirce and 3illiam ames :"ho coined the term @radical

empiricism@ to describe an offshoot of his form of Pragmatism; "ere particularly

important in this endeavour.

'he neAt step in the development of mpiricism "as Gogicalmpiricism :or Gogical Positivism;, an early )+th Century attempt to synthesi%e the

essential ideas of British mpiricism :a strong emphasis on sensory eAperience as the

basis for 0no"ledge; "ith certain insights from mathematical logic that had been

developed by &ottlob Lrege, Bertrand Russell and Gud"ig 3ittgenstein. 'his resulted in

a 0ind of eAtreme mpiricism "hich held that any genuinely synthetic assertion must be

reducible to an ultimate assertion :or set of ultimate assertions; "hich eApresses direct

observations or perceptions.


"ATIO/ALISM

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_mill.html





http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_phenomenalism.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_pragmatism.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_peirce.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_james.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_logical_positivism.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_frege.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_russell.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_wittgenstein.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_mill.html






http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_peirce.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_james.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_logical_positivism.html


http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_frege.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_russell.html




Rationalism is any vie" appealing to intellectual and deductive reason :as

opposed to sensory eAperience or any religious teachings; as the source

of 0no"ledge or (ustification. 'hus, it holds that some propositions are 0no"able by us

by intuition alone, "hile others are 0no"able by being deduced through valid arguments

from intuited propositions. $epending on the strength of the belief, this can result in a

range of positions from the moderate vie" that reason has precedence over other "ays

of ac2uiring 0no"ledge, to the radical position that reason is the only path to 0no"ledge.

Rationalism relies on the idea that reality has a rational structure in that all

aspects of it can be grasped through mathematical and logical principles, and not simply

through sensory eAperience. Rather than being a @tabula rasa@ to be imprinted "ith

sense data, the mind is structured by, and responds to, mathematical methods of reasoning.

Rationalists adopt at least one of three main claims#

• Intition=De$ction: Some propositions are 0no"able by us by intuition alone,

"hile others are 0no"able by being deduced from intuited propositions. Some

rationalists ta0e intuition to be infallible, claiming that "hatever "e intuit must be

true6 others allo" for the possibility of false intuited propositions. Some claim thatonly mathematics can be 0no"able by intuition and deduction6 some that ethical

truths can also be intuited6 some more radical rationalists maintain that a "hole

range of metaphysical claims :li0e the eAistence of &od, free "ill and the duality

of mind and body; are include "ithin the range of intuition and deduction.

• Innate 6no7le$2e: 3e have 0no"ledge of some truths as part of our innate

rational nature. Aperiences may trigger a process by "hich "e bring this

0no"ledge to consciousness, but the eAperiences do not provide us "ith

the 0no"ledge itself, "hich has in some "ay been "ith us all along. Some

rationalists claim that "e gained this innate 0no"ledge in an earlier eAistence,

some that &od provided us "ith it at creation, and others that it is part of our

nature through natural selection.




• Innate Concepts: Some of the concepts :as opposed to actual 0no"ledge; "e

employ are part of our innate rational nature. Some "ould argue, ho"ever, that

innate concepts are entailed by innate 0no"ledge, because a particular instance

of 0no"ledge can only be innate if the concepts that are contained in the

proposition are also innate.

Some rationalists also claim, in addition to the claims above, that the 0no"ledge

"e gain by intuition and deduction, as "ell as the ideas and instances of 0no"ledge that

are innate to us, are indispensible and could not have been gained through sense

eAperience, andor that reason is superior to eAperience as a source of 0no"ledge.

Rationalism is contrasted "ith mpiricism, the vie" that the origin of all

0no"ledge is sense eAperience and sensory perception. 7t is usually associated "ith the

introduction of mathematical methods into philosophy during the 1ge of Reason and

the nlightenment by the ma(or rationalist figures, $escartes, Geibni% and Spino%a. 7t is

commonly referred to as Continental Rationalism because it "as predominant in the

continental schools of urope, "hereas British mpiricism dominated in Britain.

'he distinction bet"een Rationalism and mpiricism, ho"ever, is perhaps not

as clearcut as is sometimes suggested, and "ould probably not have evenbeen recogni%ed by the nlightenment philosophers involved. Lor eAample, the three

main rationalists "ere all committed to the importance of empirical science, and in many

respects the empiricists "ere closer to $escartes in their methods and metaphysical

theories than "ere Geibni% and Spino%a. Both Geibni% and Spino%a asserted that, in

principle, all 0no"ledge, including scientific 0no"ledge, could be gained through the use

of reason alone, though they both observed that this "as not possible in practice for

human beings, eAcept in specific areas such as mathematics.

o HISTO";


RenW $escartes is one of the earliest and best

0no"n proponents of Rationalism. He believed that

0no"ledge of eternal truths:e.g. mathematics and the

epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the

sciences; could be attained by reason alone, "ithout the

need for any sensory eAperience. <ther 0no"ledge :e.g.

the 0no"ledge of physics;, re2uired eAperience of the

"orld, aided by the scientific method a moderate

rationalist position. Lor instance, his famous

dictum "ogito ergo sum" :"I think, therefore I am" ; is a

conclusion reached a priori and not through an inferencefrom eAperience.

-ENE .ES/0-TES

http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_empiricism.html






























$escartes held that some ideas :innate ideas; come from &od6 others ideas arederived from sensory eAperience6 and still others are fictitious :or created by

the imagination;. <f these, the only ideas "hich are certainly valid, according

to $escartes, are those "hich are innate.

Baruch Spino%a eApanded upon $escartes basic principles of Rationalism. His

philosophy centred on several principles, most of "hich relied on his notion that &od is

the only absolute substance :similar to $escartes conception of &od;, and that

substance is composed of t"o attributes, thought and eAtension. He believed that all

aspects of the natural "orld :including Man; "ere modes of the eternal substance of

&od, and can therefore only be 0no"n through pure thought or reason.

&ottfried Geibni% attempted to rectify "hat he sa" as some of the problems that

"ere not settled by $escartes by combining $escartes "or0 "ith 1ristotles notion

of form and his o"n conception of the universe as composed of monads. He believed

that ideas eAist in the intellect innately, but only in a virtual sense, and it is only "hen

the mind reflects on itself that those ideas are actuali%ed.

7mmanuel !ant started as a traditional rationalist, having

studied Geibni% and Christian 3olff :/>= >-E; but, after also studying

the empiricist $avid Humes "or0s, he developed a distinctive and














http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_kant.html












http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_kant.html





very influential Rationalism of his o"n, "hich attempted to synthesi%e the traditional

rationalist and empiricist traditions.

Rationalism and Empiricism. 1n important philosophical "ar too0 place in the

>th and Uth centuries bet"een t"o schools of thought. Most briefly, first there

"ere rationalists from continental urope "ho "ere critical of sense eAperience and felt

that genuine 0no"ledge "as ac2uired noneAperientially through reason. 'he leaders

on this side "ere RenW $escartes, Benedict Spino%a, and &ottfried Geibni%. Second

there "ere empiricists from the British 7sles "ho felt that noneAperiential reasoning

"ould give us nothing, and eAperience "as the only path to 0no"ledge. ohn Goc0e,

&eorge Ber0eley and $avid Hume "ere the leaders on this side. 'he "ar finally ended

"hen 7mmanuel !ant proposed a compromise# true 0no"ledge depends on a miAture of

eAperiential and noneAperiential 0no"ledge. 3e need both, !ant argued, other"ise our

"hole mental system "ill not operate properly.

Gets return to the rationalist position, particularly the version championed by

$escartes. Sense eAperience, he argued, is seriously fla"ed and cannot be the sourceof important ideas that "e have. 'a0e, for eAample, the idea of a triangle. Goo0 around

the "orld and youll never see a perfect triangle, "hether its a shape that "e dra" on a

piece of paper or the side of a pyramid in gypt. <n close inspection, theyll all have

irregular lines. 'he fact remains, though, that "e do have conceptions of perfectly

shaped triangles. Rationalism, according to $escartes, offers the best eAplanation of

ho" "e get those perfect ideas. 'here are t"o central components to the rationalist

position# innate ideas and deductive reasoning. Innate ideas, according to $escartes,

are concepts that "e have from birth that serve as a foundation for all of our other

ideas. 3hile they are inborn, "e only become a"are of them later in life 8 "hen "e

reach the @age of reason@ as one philosopher called it. 7nnate ideas are in a special

class of their o"n# "e 0no" them "ith absolute certainty, and its impossible for us to

ac2uire them through eAperience. 3hile rationalists "ere reluctant to offer a complete


"ATIO/ALISM A/D EMPI"ICISM



list of innate ideas, the most important ones include the ideas of &od, infinity, substance

and causality. Regarding deductive reasoning , $escartes held that from our innate

ideas "e deduce other ideas. 7ts li0e in geometry "here "e begin "ith foundational

concepts of points and lines, and deduce elaborate propositions from these about all

0inds of geometrical shapes. $escartes "as in fact inspired by the deductive method of

geometry and maintained that "e deduce ideas in the same "ay. 'hrough deduction,

the certainty that "e have of innate ideas transfers to the other ideas that "e derive

from these. Mista0es creep in only "hen our deductions become so long that they rest

on memory. 1ll 0no"ledge, he argued, including scientific 0no"ledge, proceeds from

innate ideas and deductive demonstration.

'urn no" to empiricism, particularly Goc0es version. Goc0es first tas0 "as to

challenge the theory of innate ideas# none of our concepts, he argued, are inborn. <ur

mind is from birth li0e a blan0 sheet of paper, and it is only through eAperience that "e

"rite anything on it. <ne problem "ith innate ideas is that "e can eAplain the origin of

each one of them through eAperience. 'he idea of &od, for eAample, is not innate as

$escartes supposed, but comes from our perceptions of the "orld around us. 'heres

thus no reason to put for"ard the theory of innate ideas "hen eAperience eAplains

these notions (ust fine. Goc0e also found fault "ith the rationalist position that "e dont

become a"are of innate ideas until later in life. 7ts not clear ho" such ideas can linger in our minds for so many years before "e can be conscious of them. 1nd by that time

our minds have been flooded "ith eAperience, and a lateblooming innate idea "ouldnt

contribute anything to our 0no"ledge of the "orld. mpiricists also challenged the

rationalists emphasis on deductive demonstration. 3e dont eApand our 0no"ledge by

deducing ne" concepts from foundational ones, as mathematicians do. &eometry is the

"rong role model to follo". 7nstead, "e ac2uire ne" 0no"ledge through induction, such

as ma0ing generali%ations from our eAperiences. 7 hit ten light bulbs "ith a hammer and

each brea0s6 7 generali%e from this that all similar light bulbs that 7 hit "ith a hammer "ill

also brea0. 3e first perceive, then "e generali%e. 3e perceive some more, then

generali%e some more. 'hats ho" "e push 0no"ledge for"ard.

1nd then comes along !ant, the great mediator in the rationalismempiricism

debate. !ant "as sympathetic "ith empiricism but thought that it suffered from a serious




problem# it doesnt offer a good eAplanation for ho" "e ac2uire noneAperiential

0no"ledge, such as mathematics and logic. CompleA mathematical formulas in

particular could not come from sense perception. 'here is a 2uality of selfevidence and

certainty that they have, "hich fallible eAperience could never produce. !ants solution

"as not to resurrect the old theory of innate ideas. 7nstead, he argued that there are

innate organi%ing structures in our minds that automatically systemati%e our ra"

eAperiences 8 sort of li0e a s0eleton that gives shape to flesh. Lor eAample, as 7 "atch

someone hit a light bulb "ith a hammer, ra" sensory information rushes in through my

eyes. My mind immediately reconstructs this information into a threedimensional image

and puts it on a timeline. My mind then imposes other organi%ational schemes on the

sensory information. 7t ma0es me see the hammer and light bulb as separate things,

rather than (ust a single blob of stuff. 7t then ma0es me see the hammer as the cause of

the light bulb brea0ing. My eAperience of the "orld, then, is a fusion of innate structures

and ra" eAperience. 'he innate part is a concession to rationalism, and the eAperience

part a concession to empiricism.

Rationalism and empiricism in their original forms are outdated theories today, in

part because of !ant9s insights. Jevertheless, they still are useful for depicting t"o

fundamentally different "ays in "hich "e assess the sources of 0no"ledge. Rationalism

"ill continue to be attractive "henever "e have 0no"ledge that cannot be easilyeAplained by eAperience. mpiricism "ill be attractive "henever the claims of

innateness loo0 fishy.

Constructivism :also 0no"n as Constructionism; is a relatively recent perspective

in pistemology that vie"s all of our 0no"ledge as @constructed@ in that it is contingent

on convention, human perception and social eAperience. 'herefore, our 0no"ledge

does not necessarily reflect any eAternal or @transcendent@ realities.

7t is considered by its proponents to be an alternative to

classical Rationalism and mpiricism. 'he constructivist point of vie" is

both pragmatic and relativistic in nature. 7t opposes Positivism and Scientism in that it


CO/ST"UCTI<ISM

http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_epistemology.html




http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_relativism.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_positivism.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_scientism.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_epistemology.html




http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_relativism.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_positivism.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_scientism.html



maintains that scientific 0no"ledge is constructed by scientists, and not discovered from

the "orld through strict scientific method, and it holds that there is no single valid

methodology, and that other methodologies may be more appropriate for social science.

'he common thread bet"een all forms of Constructivism is that they do not focus on

an ontological reality :@realityasitisinitself@, "hich constructivists regard as is utterly

incoherent and unverifiable;, but instead on constructed reality. 'hus, they re(ect out of

hand any claims to universalism, realism or ob(ective truth, and admit that their position

is merely a vie", a more or less coherent "ay of understanding things that has thus far

"or0ed for them as a model of the "orld.

o HISTO";

1lthough the roots of Constructivism can be traced bac0 to the &ree0

philosophers Heraclitus, Protagoras and 1ristotle, it "as only in =E that the Lrench

philosopher &aston Bachelard :UUE =/); claimed that @Jothing proceeds from itself.

Jothing is given. 1ll is constructed@, and only in =/> that ean Piaget :U=/ =U+;

first used the eApression @constructivist epistemology@.

'he doctrine is indebted to late =th Century $ar"inian theory, as it is claimed by

constructivists that human understanding, as the product of Jatural Selection, can be

said to provide no more @true@ understanding of the "orld as it is in itself than is

absolutely necessary for human survival.

o T;PES OF CO/S"UCTI<ISM

pistemological Constructivism is the philosophical vie", as described

above, that our 0no"ledge is @constructed@ in that it is contingenton convention, human perception and social eAperience.

Social Constructivism :or Social Constructionism; is the theory in

Sociology and Gearning 'heory that categories of 0no"ledge and reality

are actively created by social relationships and interactions. 1 social

construction :or social construct; is a concept or practice "hich


http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_heraclitus.html

http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_protagoras.html



http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_heraclitus.html





may appear to be natural and obvious to those "ho accept it, but in reality

is an invention or artifact of a particular culture or society. Gud"ig

3ittgensteins later philosophy can be seen as a foundation for Social

Constructivism, "ith its 0ey theoretical concepts of language

games embedded in forms of life. Psychological Constructivism theori%es about and investigates ho"

human beings create systems for meaningfully understanding their "orlds

and eAperiences. Personal Construct Psychology is a theory of personality

developed by the 1merican psychologist &eorge !elly in the =-+s that a

persons uni2ue psychological processes are channelled by the "ay he or

she anticipates events. &enetic pistemology is a type of Constructivism established by ean

Piaget :U=/ =U+; "hich studies of the origins :genesis; of 0no"ledge.

7t purports to sho" that the method by "hich the 0no"ledge "as obtained

or created affects the validity of that 0no"ledge. Lor eAample, our direct

eAperience of gravity ma0es our 0no"ledge of it more valid than

our indirect eAperience of blac0 holes. 7f holds that change only occurs if

the sub(ect engages "ith eAperiences from outside its "orldvie". 'he

theory also attempts to eAplain the process of ho" a human being

develops cognitively from birth throughout his or her life, through

four primary stages of development. Mathematical Constructivism is the vie" in Philosophy of Mathematics that

it is necessary to find :or @construct@; a mathematical ob(ect to prove that it

eAists. 7ntuitionism is a 0ind of Mathematical Constructivism, "hich

maintains that the foundations of mathematics lie in the individual

mathematicians intuition, thereby ma0ing mathematics into an

intrinsically sub(ective activity.

Constructivism is also the name of a movement in )+th Century

Russian art and architecture, as "ell as a discipline of international

relations and "orld affairs.

III. AIMS




http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_intuitionism.html



http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_intuitionism.html



pistemology is the branch of philosophy that eAamines the nature of 0no"ledge,

the processes through "hich "e ac2uire 0no"ledge, and the value of 0no"ledge. 'he

fundamental aim of pistemology to education is to ensure that students learn the

specific s0ills and processes that eAperts employ in their discovery or construction of

0no"ledge.

1 2uic0 survey of the 0ey issues and ideas in epistemology reveals an important

implication for educators# although it is important to teach students the specific

0no"ledge that eAperts in various fields have discovered or constructed, it is also

important, perhaps more so,

7t "as evident in the education of Singapore "ho essentially eAercise in ma0ing

sure that students absorbed necessary informationQspecific facts, data, theories,

methods, formulaeQin time for the eAaminations at the end of each year. Some

students understood "hat they "ere learning, but many did not :and hence could not be

said to have actually learnt anything, even though a good number of them passed the

eAaminations in the end;. Aaminations "ere li0e so many other obstacles that must be

overcome on the "ay to a decent (ob and a nice salary. &enerally spea0ing, the more

eAaminations one cleared and the better one "as at clearing them, the more decent

ones (ob and the nicer ones salary "ould be.

Lor a "hile, this "or0ed. 'hen, employers started to complain that local school

graduates did not seem to be very competent critical thin0ers and problem solvers. 'his

"as in spite of the many #s that students "ere scoring in the various eAaminations.

'hey seemed unable to thin0 for themselves and appeared to lac0 initiative. 7n short,

they apparently lac0ed the basic process s0ills needed to perform the (obs they had

been hired to do. 7n the end, many employers had to devote much time and resources

to train the fresh school graduates they had hired so that these young people could do

the (obs they "ere supposedly 2ualified to do.

'he main reason for this situation "as that, although sub(ect 0no"ledge and

information "as eAplicitly taught, the s0ills and processes necessary for ac2uiring the




0no"ledge and information "ere not. ducation "as conceived as the transmission of

0no"ledge from those "ho 0ne" to those "ho did not, and 0no"ledge "as thought of

as fiAedQunambiguous, une2uivocal and unmysteriousQand nonoverlapping bet"een

disciplines. Students "ere supposed to ac2uire 0no"ledge by stoc0ing their minds "ith

information. 1s a result, genuine understanding, if it occurred at all, "as more often than

not an incidental outcome.

1lso the aims of education are often characterised in terms of certain 0inds of

epistemic goods. But "hat particular goods an education should aim to foster remains

an important area of debate in the epistemology of education, and one "hich has

attracted the interest of epistemologists "or0ing on the closely connected issue of "hat

epistemic states :and cognitive abilities or virtues; are the most epistemically valuableones to achieve, and "hy. Perhaps the most famous discussion of the epistemic aim of

education features in Plato9s classic discussion in the Republic of the 1llegory of the

Cave, an aimpursued by metaphorthat might be best understood as an epistemic

process. By contrast, &oldman :===; characterises the aim of education in terms of,

and by comparison "ith a traditional line of thin0ing in the philosophy of science, the

production of 0no"ledge. 7t follo"s, on &oldman9s approach, that the educational value

of the cultivation of certain dispositions or traits are al"ays only of instrumental

educational value, relative to the goal of 0no"ledgeproduction.. <n Siegel9s vie",

critical thin0ingQand, more generally, reasoningQis an ability an education should aim

to foster independently of any connection bet"een critical thin0ing and truth or

0no"ledge. <n Siegel9s vie", critical thin0ing can be vie"ed as supplanting 0no"ledge

as "hat is fundamental or basic visavis the aim of an education. Baehr :)+; departs

from the 0no"ledge account by, li0e Siegel, focusing on the value of cultivating

disposition as opposed to states. Lor Baehr :)+;, ho"ever, the aim of education

ought to be articulated, specifically, in terms of intellectual character virtues, virtues that

are individuated in part in terms of their characteristic motivations :e.g. open

mindedness, intellectual courage;.




I<. So!e I!plications for Pe$a2o2y an$ Evalation

Input Process Output


pistemological 1spects of Methods

• mpiricism

• Rationalism

• Constructivism

Knderstanding,

constructed as anepistemic state

:e.g. as "hen one

understands "hy

something

occurred, or "hen

one counts as

understanding a

sub(ect matter;

&reater emphasis

on the process of

teaching andlearning s0ills

:critical thin0ing,

creative thin0ing,

"riting, oral

presentation,

data analysis,

data collection in

school



<. CO/CLUSIO/S A/D "ECOMME/DATIO/S

!no"ledge and information can become obsolete or irrelevant after a time, and it

"as becoming so faster "ith the increasingly rapid pace of technological development

to"ards the end of the t"entieth century. Conse2uently, many fresh school graduates

discovered that the 0no"ledge and information they had learnt in school "as not al"ays

applicable to the (obs they had been hired to do. 'o ma0e matters "orse, they had not

learnt ho" to deal "ith these rapid changes. 'his meant that the learning curve "as

usually very steep at the initial stages of their "or0ing life. Had they been eAplicitly

taught the s0ills and processes needed for ac2uiring 0no"ledge and information in

various disciplines "hen in school, they "ould have had a much easier time.

'here should be greater emphasis on the teaching and learning of process s0ills

:critical thin0ing, creative thin0ing, "riting, oral presentation, data analysis, data

collection, etc.; in the school curriculum. Schools and organisations that "ill specialise

in teaching critical and creative thin0ing s0ills, as "ell as in training teachers to teach

these s0ills, "ill also sprung up for the neAt school years.

pistemology is the clarification of ho" "e thin0. 7t is essential in order to be ableto determine the correct from the "rong, by determining a appropriate techni2ue of

evaluation. 7t is needed in order to use and obtain 0no"ledge of the "orld around us.

3ithout epistemology, "e could not thin0. More specifically, "e "ould have no reason to

believe our thin0ing "as productive or correct, as opposed to random images flashing

before our mind. 3ith an incorrect epistemology, "e "ould not be able to distinguish

truth from error. 'he conse2uences are obvious. 'he degree to "hich our epistemology

is correct is the degree to "hich "e could understand reality, and the degree to "hich

"e could use that 0no"ledge to promote our lives and goals. Lla"s in epistemology "ill

ma0e it harder to accomplish anything.

1 philosophy is a system of beliefs about reality. 7t is ones integrated vie" of the

"orld. 7t includes an understanding of the nature of eAistence, man, and his role in the


http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Irrational_Main.html

http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Irrational_Main.html



"orld. Philosophy is the foundation of 0no"ledge. 7t is the standard by "hich ideas are

integrated and understood.

Philosophy is a necessary product of mans rational mind. 'o live, man must gain

0no"ledge of the "orld. 'o understand the "orld, man must form conclusions about its

very nature. Lor instance, to gain 0no"ledge of particular ob(ects, man must recogni%e

that ob(ects have identity. He must recogni%e that conclusions are possible because the

"orld does eAist, and eAists in a particular "ay.

Philosophy provides the frame"or0 for "hich man can understand the "orld. 7t provides

the premises by "hich man can discover truth, and use his mind to support his life.

very man has an understanding of the "orld. very man must have a philosophy, even

if it is never made eAplicit.

Knderstanding, construed as an epistemic state :e.g. as "hen one understands

"hy something occurred, or "hen one counts as understanding a sub(ect matter; has

en(oyed increased attention in mainstream epistemology, especially over the past

decade. 3hile the thought that understanding is (ust a 0ind of :propositional;

0no"ledgevi%., propositional 0no"ledge of causeshas en(oyed some popularity in the

philosophy of science, this vie" is increasingly falling out of fashion in epistemology.

1nd, in fact, one reason this is so, highlighted by Pritchard :)+; is that achieving

understanding plausibly involves a greater eAercise of cognitive agency than does the

attainment of 0no"ledge. Pritchard9s :)+; o"n rationale in defence of this suggestion

is that understanding, though not 0no"ledge, essentially involves cognitive

achievement, "here cognitive achievement is understood as cognitive success :e.g.

true belief; that is primarily creditable to the agent9s eAercise of cognitive ability or virtue.

3ith reference to this point, Pritchard argues that it is ultimately cognitive achievement,

and thus understanding, "hich is the epistemic goal of education. Pritchard :)+E; has

eApanded on this rationale and has suggested ho" eAtra agential factors can in fact be

eAploited in order to facilitate, in pedagogical settings, the attainment of understanding.

Gi0e Pritchard, lgin :===; and Gynch :)+E; have reached the conclusion that

understanding is by comparison "ith 0no"ledge an especially "orthy aim. lgin9s

insight is that teaching should aim to foster not merely positive epistemic standings to













true propositions, but that education should see0 to bring it about that the student9s

commitments mesh to form a mutually supportive, independently supported system of

thoughtan aim that is better understood as one of promoting understanding than

promoting 0no"ledge. Gynch :)+E; reaches the vie" that understanding is especially

valuable by appealing to a 0ind of ?neuromedia9 thought eAperiment6 suppose that the

functions of your smartphone are miniaturi%ed to a cellular level and accessible by your

neural net"or0. <n such a hypothesis, even if it is conceivable that our 0no"ledge can

be ?eAtended9 through technological means in such a manner, Gynch suggests

understanding by contrast "ould not come so easy. / Linally, Smith I Siegel :)++E;

locate understanding, as an educational aim, in a pedagogical setting by eAploring the

matter of "hat teachers ought to do "hen understanding is achieved in the absence of

belief, as "hen students purport to understand a theory "hile not believing the theory.

1 recent trend in mainstream epistemology, especially over the past decade, has

been a 0ind of ?revisionism9 about the value of 0no"ledge. 'he 0ey strand, put for"ard

most notably in !vanvig :)++; and pursued further in Pritchard :)++=;, submits a

negative and positive thesis. 'he negative thesis that 0no"ledge is not as epistemically

valuable as ordinarily assumedthat is, that 0no"ledge is not :contrary to pretheoretical

intuitions; epistemically valuable in a "ay that mere true belief :or mere &ettiered true

belief that falls short of 0no"ledge; is not6 the corresponding positive revisionist insight

is that "hat is distinctly epistemically valuable is understanding, rather than 0no"ledge.

<I. 0I0LIOG"APH;

1c%el, . :)++);. %oes &pistemological +atter for &ducational )ractice Retrieved

March ), )+/, from http#oro.open.ac.u0>>=

Bec0er . et. al. :)++-;. # ramework for &pistemological )erspectives on -imulation.

Retrieved March )+, )+/, from http#(asss.soc.surrey.ac.u0UE.html

Chin C. :)++=;. &pistemological eliefs. Retrieved March ), )+/, from

http#""".education.comreferencearticleepistemologicalbeliefs


http://oro.open.ac.uk/7179/

http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/4/1.html

http://www.education.com/reference/article/epistemological-beliefs/

http://oro.open.ac.uk/7179/

http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/4/1.html

http://www.education.com/reference/article/epistemological-beliefs/



Harman &. :)++-; &pistemology as +ethodology . Retrieved March )), )+/, from

https#""".princeton.eduXharmanPapersProfile.pdf

Hic0s S. :)++;. )hilosophical oundations of &ducation. Retrieved March ), )+/,

from http#""".philosophyne"s.compost)++=))3hatis!no"ledge.aspA

Gaunder . and Ro"lands .:)++; Importance of )hilosophy. Retrieved March =,

)+/, from https#""".princeton.eduXharmanPapersProfile.pdf

Morgan S. :)++>; &pistemology and /ntology. Retrieved March )+,)+/, from

http#""".stmorgan.co.u0epistemologyandontology.html

Pardi P. :)+;.The *nowledge )roblem. Retrieved March )+, )+/, from

http#""".philosophyne"s.compost)++=))3hatis!no"ledge.aspA

<rt"ein, Marc0. :)+);. 0irtue &pistemology and &ducation. March ),)+/, fromhttp#eepat.netdo0u.php4idDvirtueYepistemologyYandYeducation

Siegel,H. :)++E;. pistemology and ducation# 1n 7ncomplete &uide to the Social

pistemological 7ssues. March )+, )+/, from

http#scholarlyrepository.miami.educgivie"content.cgi4

articleD+EIconteAtDphilosophyYarticles

<I. 0IO/OTES

'ee(ay $. Panganiban is a Ph. $ student and a

:Position sa pesca 0eme; at Batangas State Kniversity,

PGPC Malvar Campus. He has been a contract

Professor of Physical ducation from )+) up to date.

He received his Masteral $egree at Polytechnic

Kniversity of the Philippines. His recent researches

include :thesis nung collge at thesis nung nagmastral.;

His research interests include :topic ng thesis. ;

(picturemo mhl) formal

White background

Digital photo if kaya

https://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/Profile.pdf

http://www.philosophynews.com/post/2011/09/22/What-is-Knowledge.aspx


http://www.stmorgan.co.uk/epistemology-and-ontology.html


http://eepat.net/doku.php?id=virtue_epistemology_and_education

http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=philosophy_articles





http://www.stmorgan.co.uk/epistemology-and-ontology.html


http://eepat.net/doku.php?id=virtue_epistemology_and_education



epistemological aspects of methods

Documents