ETA IN SPAIN: EXPLAINING BASQUE VIOLENCE

2017

By Jenny Kern

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion

Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies

Croft Institute for International Studies

Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College

The University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi

May 2017

Approved:

Advisor: Dr. Miguel Centellas

Reader: Dr. Oliver Dinius

Reader: Dr. Cristina Delano

Kern 1

ABSTRACT

My thesis focuses on Euskadi ta Auskatasuna (ETA), a terrorist group in País Vasco, Spain

and attempts to determine the causes behind ETA’s violence. I focus on three areas of study: the

political situation of País Vasco, the public opinion, and the economic situation of País Vasco.

Data is collected from the Basque government, the EuskoBarómetro, and World Bank, and

showed in correlation with ETA attacks to discern patterns. Due to limited data, my area of

study focuses mainly on ETA’s later years, when they were less active. This allows me to focus

on the periods of the ceasefires in contrast to active years, to determine if one factor played more

of a role in violence than the others.

While the Basque case is unique in Spain, it has similarities to other cases of ethnic

violence. As such, if the cause of Basque violence and their motivations towards reaching a

ceasefire can be discovered, they may be implemented in other cases of ethnic violence, such as

that of the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey.

Through my research, I concluded that neither nationalist representation in the Basque

Parliament or public opinion correlates with ETA attacks; however, increased economic

prosperity led to decreased violence. While I found that political representation and public

opinion were not consequential, it is possible that they played a small role which I was not able

to discern through my research. As such, my research is inconclusive and I suggestive further

study into looking into the causes of Basque violence and its demise. One such area for further

study that I suggest is the internal structure of the group and how increased action from the state,

including imprisoning leaders, may have led to the downfall of the group.

Kern 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF GRAPHS………………………………………………………………………………..3

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………...……………………4

CHAPTER 1: THE BASQUE COUNTRY AND ETA…………………………………………..7

CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL SITUATION……………………………………………………….18

CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC OPINION OF ETA……………………………………………………..31

CHAPTER 4: ECONOMY OF PAIS VASCO…………………………………………………..46

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………..55

WORKS CITED…………………………………………………………………………………58

Kern 3

LIST OF GRAPHS

Graph 2.1 Nationalist Representation in Basque Parliament (Total and by Party) 24

Graph 2.2 Basque Parliament: Number of Seats Held 25

Graph 2.3 Nationalist Representation in Basque Parliament vs ETA victims 27

Graph 3.1 National Identity of Basques (1999-2016) 32

Graph 3.2 Average Desire for Independence (1999-2016) 34

Graph 3.3 Principal Preoccupations of the Basques (1999-2016) 35

Graph 3.4 ETA Victims and Basque Preoccupation with Violence (1999-2013) 36

Graph 3.5 The Evolution of the Problem of Violence from the Previous Year (1999-2010) 37

Graph 3.6 Basque Attitudes Toward ETA (1999-2016) 38

Graph 3.7 Image of ETA Operatives in Euskadi 40

Graph 3.8 Opinion on an Eventual ETA-Government Ceasefire Negotiation (1999-2015) 41

Graph 4.1 Comparison of GDP per capita (PPP): Euskadi and Spain (1990-2015) 48

Graph 4.2 GDP Growth Per Year: Euskadi and Spain (1980-2015) 49

Graph 4.3 Number of ETA victims and GDP per capita in Euskadi (1980-2015) 50

Graph 4.4 Correlation Between ETA victims and GDP per capita (1980-2012) 50

Graph 4.5 Opinion of the Basque Economic Situation 52

Graph 4.6 Comparison of Economic opinion of Euskadi and Spain (1999-2016) 53

Kern 4

Introduction

My thesis focuses on Euskadi ta Auskatasuna (ETA), a nationalist terrorist group in País

Vasco, Spain active from 1959 to 2011. While I originally sought to explain how ETA was able

to reach a ceasefire, this turned out to not be feasible, due to lack of available information.

Instead, my topic evolved to explore possible causes for ETA’s violence. To this extent, I

focused on three main areas: the political situation, the role of public opinion, and economic

conditions. To a lesser extent, I will also examine the relationship between these three factors.

Learning the cause of Basque violence is important, as it could be used to predict the emergence

of ethnic violence in other areas, as well as help to explain how ethnic violence initially emerges

as a course of action.

The Basque case is significant as it is unique in its approach to nationalism. While

Catalonia is another region similar to País Vasco in its desire for independence from Spain, how

they have gone about achieving their goals is completely different. Both regions possess a

distinct language, Catalan in Catalonia and Euskera in País Vasco, and specific cultural

traditions. Catalonia emphasized its language and cultural ties in order to bring its people

together. However, Euskera and Basque cultural traditions were not as prevalent as those of

Catalonia, forcing Basques to find a different avenue towards unification. The Basques’ radical

form of nationalism relied on mobilization and violence. As a result, the Basque case is singular

within Spain in its attempt to use of violence to inspire nationalist sentiment.

As the Basque case is unique within Spain, its lessons may not be universal. Although

the Basque case is one of ethnic nationalism tied to violence, it is not linked to economic

oppression, as the Basque region is wealthy and does not face economic pressures. This stands

Kern 5

in contrast to issues of violent ethnic nationalism in which violence is related to economic

hardship. Since País Vasco, and ETA by extension, do not face this pressure, the reasons behind

ETA’s ceasefire are not likely to be able to be applied to cases in which economic oppression is

present.

I analyze various sets of data, including election results, public opinion polls, and

economic data, to try to determine other factors that were key in leading to a ceasefire. I use the

incidence of violence, measured by deaths, injuries, and attacks, as a baseline from which to

measure the other factors. Using public opinion data, I assess the opinion towards ETA, Basque

independence, and the Spanish state. I then compare this with the voting data to examine the

percentage of vote that each party received, and whether they have ties to ETA or the Spanish

state. In regards to economic data, I examine the GDP per capita and compare it throughout the

different regions of Spain. Ideally, I will explore data from the onset of ETA in 1939 to 2011,

when the ceasefire was enacted. I will collect data from a wide variety of sources, including

EuskoBarómetro and the World Bank.

The first chapter will provide an overview of the history of the Basque country, the rise

of ETA, and the process of negotiating a ceasefire. This brief history of the situation is essential

to understanding why ETA formed as well as why the Basque case is unique in using violence as

a form of resistance. Additionally, it will provide a brief examination of ceasefire negotiations

that failed, as well as the one that ultimately proved successful.

Nationalism portrayed through politics will be examined in the second chapter. A brief

overview of the important nationalist and non-nationalist Basque political parties will be

provided before examining the composition of the Basque Parliament from its beginning in 1980

Kern 6

to current times. Parties will be examined divided between nationalist and non-nationalist, with

their representation compared to ETA activity to see if there is a correlation.

Public opinion of the Basques will be covered in the third chapter. In regards to

identification and nationalist sentiment, preoccupation with violence, opinion on ETA, and views

on ceasefire negotiations, this chapter will seek to discover links between various variables and

the activity of ETA. However, as the EuskoBarómetro was not conducted until 1999, there is no

data prior to this. As such, the conclusions will be relatively limited and focused more on the

periods of peace. Due to this major limitation, a clear sense of public opinion regarding ETA,

especially during their most active years, is not possible to obtain. This will severely limit this

section, making the conclusions unable to be widely applicable.

The fourth chapter will cover the economy of País Vasco. By using the GDP per capita

(PPP), the economic status of Euskadi will be compared to that of Spain. Additionally, the

opinions of Basques regarding the economic climate will be taken into account and compared

with the economic realities. ETA violence will be compared to the GDP per capita to see if

attacks had any effect on the economic prosperity of the region.

Through my research, I have concluded there is not a correlation between ETA violence

and nationalist political representation, Basque identity, desires for independence, or nationalist

sentiment; however, the Basques preoccupation with violence and economic prosperity showed a

correlation with ETA attacks.

Kern 7

Ch. 1: The Basque Country and ETA

País Vasco, the community divided between Spain and France, has a long, unique

history. It is said that “the Basques are one of the unique people-islands to be found on the face

of the earth, completely different in every sense from the peoples around them, and their

language… forms an island somehow comparable to those peaks which still surface above the

water in a flood zone” (Kurlansky 1999, 1). As the Basque people possess their own language

and culture, they are very proud of their heritage and singularity among the Spanish population.

The history of the Basques helped lead to the formation of Euskadi ta Auskatasuna (ETA), a

terrorist organization formed to fight for Basque rights and independence.

From its formation in 1959, ETA has been responsible for approximately 832 deaths

(Sánchez-Cuenca 2007, 292). Through violence, the Basques were able to advocate for Basque

freedom from Spain. In order to accomplish this, ETA targeted political leaders and public

figures in order to advance their cause. ETA reached their peak in the 1980’s during Spain’s

transition to democracy, before beginning their decline in power and effectiveness.

Numerous attempts were made at negotiating a ceasefire with ETA; however, the

majority only lasted a few months. In 2006, a ceasefire was seen as plausible, but crumbled when

ETA attacked Madrid’s airport. Finally, in 2011, ETA called a ceasefire that was verifiable by

international observers. This ceasefire has held to this day, effectively ending ETA’s terrorist

activities.

Kern 8

Historical Background and Uniqueness of the Basque Region

País Vasco and the Basque people have a history that is unique from the rest of Spain.

From living in harmony with the Romans, to fighting off the Moors and Visigoths, the Basques

have fought against outsiders and their influence to preserve their way of life. Even after they

were incorporated into the Spanish monarchy, the Basques were able to preserve a degree of

autonomy through their fueros, ancient laws that protected the right to self-rule by the traditional

Basque laws (Collins, 1986, 256). However, this ability to self-rule was destroyed in the Civil

War, when General Francisco Franco prevailed over the Republican forces. As a result, Basque

culture was repressed, leading to backlash.

País Vasco is divided into seven provinces, four in Spain and three in France, and has

been the home of the Basques for centuries, although the exact origins of the Basques are

unknown. The singular defining trait of the Basques is their language: Euskera. Although the

first texts written in Euskera only appear in the Middle Ages, references to the language predate

the written form by at least a millennium (Collins 1986, 9). Euskera is the only surviving

language in Europe that is not Indo-European, suggesting that Euskera may be the oldest

European language (Collins 1986, 11-12). This provides evidence that Basques are among the

oldest European cultures. Basques lived in a relatively remote part of the Iberian Peninsula, so

were able to peacefully coexist with the Roman Empire, as evidenced by the lack of military

conflict in the Basque region “up to the final collapse of centralized Roman government in the

area in the early fifth century AD” (Collins 1986, 47). After the Roman Empire fell and the

Visigoths invaded Spain, the Basques were forced to fight to preserve their way of life (Collins

1986, 69).

Kern 9

During the Middle Ages, the Visigoths and Franks fought for control of the regions. The

Basque people resisted militarily and culturally, maintaining their own language and religion.

Situated between the Visigoth and Frankish kingdoms, the Basques were a contested area

claimed by both kingdoms (Collins 1986, 99), which forced the Basques to fight invaders from

all sides in order to preserve their way of life. After the fall of the Visigoth rule due to the Arab

expeditions, the Basques remained free from outside control. Although the Arab armies passed

through the Pyrenees without resistance, the Basque region clashed with them when they

invaded; the Basques successfully defended their land from invasion (Collins 1986, 117-119).

When the Basque region was incorporated into the Spanish kingdom of Castile, the

Basques retained their fueros, ancient laws that protected the right to self-rule by the traditional

Basque laws (Collins 1986, 259). The Basque fueros originated in the fourteenth century, when

Don Juan, the Castilian King who united the provinces, swore that he and his successors would

“maintain the ‘fueros, customs, franchises, and liberties’ of the land” (Strong 1893, 325-326).

Fueros encompassed a variety of rules, both written and unwritten, but the major points included

exemption from taxation by the state, import duties, and military services outside their province

(Kurlansky 1999, 66). Each king or queen of Castile swore allegiance to upholding the Basque

fueros, including Queen Isabel, who, along with King Ferdinand, united the Iberian provinces

into modern day Spain (Strong 1893, 326).

Due to the fueros, the Basque claim for self-determination was stronger than that of other

regions. Basque autonomy statues were proposed in various instances throughout history, but

were not granted until 1936. Formed in alliance with the Second Republic forces against General

Francisco Franco, the Basque government only lasted during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939);

upon the Republic’s defeat, Franco abolished the Basque statute of autonomy.

Kern 10

Franco’s repression of all expressions of Basque pride created the environment from

which ETA was born. During Franco’s regime, which began in 1939, Basque nationalism was

fiercely repressed. With the goal of unifying Spain into one nation, Franco declared Castellano,

Castilian Spanish, the official language and banned all minority languages, including Euskara,

the Basque language. Additionally, nationalist symbols, such as the flag of Euskal Herria (the

Basque World), and other elements of Basque culture were prohibited. Leaders of the Basque

nationalist party (PNV) were either imprisoned or forced into exile; many fled into the Basque

region of France. On July 31, 1959, the feast day of St. Ignacius Loyola, patron saint of País

Vasco, Basque students formed Euskadi ta Auskatasuna (ETA) in Bilbao. Meaning Basque

Homeland and Freedom, ETA struggled to define its ideology for roughly a decade, but members

shared the common goal of creating an independent Basque state.

The Rise of ETA

Due to the repressive policies that General Franco imposed on the Spanish section of the

Basque country, ETA formed in the Spanish section, as the French portion did not face heavy

repression. However, the Basque case is singular, as it is the only region that responded to

repression with violence. By attacking mainly political figures, ETA showed that their grievance

was with the Spanish state, both under General Franco and throughout the transition to

democracy.

While other regions of Spain, such as Catalonia, were culturally repressed, the Basques

were the only region that used violence as a form of resistance, making it a unique case. Due to

the strong cultural and linguistic ties of the Catalans, they were able to avoid violence in their

efforts for nationalism. However, in Euskal Herria, relatively few people spoke Euskera due to

Kern 11

the repression of language by Franco, the difficulty of the language, and various other factors. As

a result, the Basque populace did not share strong cultural and linguistic ties, like the Catalans.

The lack of cultural cohesion between the Basques made the use of continued violence by ETA

necessary. Through violence, the people were able to band together to form a cohesive front. In

describing the use of violence, Carr and Fusi stated, “It was [the Catalans’] cultural self-

confidence that made terrorism superfluous, a terrorism that perhaps suited the more racist

nationalism of the Basques and their emphasis on physical prowess and exuberant youth”

(Conversi 1997, 2). Due to the lack of widespread culture throughout Euskal Herria, the Basques

created an antagonistic identity, or an identity formed through the exclusion of those dissimilar,

by focusing on borders instead of culture (Conversi 1997, 5). By pitting Euskal Herria against

Spain, ETA was able to gain traction and support for its use of violence in order to form a

Basque nation.

ETA began an armed struggle against those it viewed as the repressive symbols of the

state in 1968. When the police killed a respected ETA leader, ETA retaliated by killing the police

chief of San Sebastian. This, in turn, provoked a swift response from the government—the

imprisonment, torture, and exile of thousands of Basques. However, ETA was not deterred and

continued its fight by kidnapping and ransoming foreign officials, industrialists, and other

prominent people.

While these acts increased ETA’s presence, ETA is most well-known for the

assassination of Spain’s Prime Minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, who was Franco’s right

hand man and chosen successor. By assassinating Franco’s successor, ETA inadvertently played

a role in Spain’s transition from a dictatorship to a democracy, creating space for Juan Carlos de

Borbon, the grandson of King Alfonso XIII, to come to power. Juan Carlos supported reforms,

Kern 12

such as the Constitution of 1978, that helped Spain transition to a constitutional monarchy. As

Spain transitioned to democracy, ETA lost the sympathy of the international community. ETA

“was no longer seen as a group of freedom fighters opposing a detested fascist regime, but a

bona fide terrorist group attacking a fledgling democratic state” (Corrado 1997, 573). Hoping to

regain public favor, ETA assassinated members of the Civil Guard and the military police, as

well as their families. Although they expected a retaliation, one never came. Instead, the situation

for the Basques gradually improved.

As democracy took hold in Spain, and the relationship between País Vasco and the

central state improved, ETA began to split into political and violent factions. Spain released

political prisoners, allowed many exiles—including ETA members—to return, and supported a

more open relationship with País Vasco. This led to the Statute of Guernica, whereby the

Spanish government gave the Basque regional parliament increased powers. Due to the

agreement, ETA-PM, the political branch of ETA, negotiated an amnesty agreement with the

government and, in return, renounced violence to pursue their goals politically; however, ETA-

M, the branch of ETA that favored violent action, remained active.

Although ETA-M1 continued its campaign, they had softened their demands. ETA

demanded, “general amnesty for all Basque prisoners; substitution of Basque police for Spanish

police in Basque regions; Basque government control of the Spanish army in the Basque country;

and the right to self-determination of the Basque people” (Corrado 1997, 575). The Spanish

government did not meet these demands, and the terrorist attacks continued, with ETA

assassinating officials and bombing public places.

1 From this point forward, ETA-M will simply be referred to as ETA. ETA-PM negotiated a separate peace

with the government and renounced violence, leaving ETA-M the only operating branch.

Kern 13

In the mid 1980s, the French and Spanish governments collaborated on an operation

against ETA. The joint effort led to the arrest and imprisonment of 500 members, including the

majority of the leaders. Following these massive arrests, ETA attacks became less frequent.

During this time, ETA attacked Prime Minister José María Aznar, the leader of the Partido

Popular (PP), a conservative party, that promoted the idea of a single, centralized Spain. In this

1995 attack, ETA bombed Aznar’s car, destroying two nearby buildings, 15 cars, and injuring 16

people (Nash 1995). Aznar emerged from the attack with only minor head injuries, but, through

this attack, ETA showed that politicians continued to be targets for terrorism.

All of Spain’s main political parties, with the exception of ETA’s political wing, spoke

out against the attack, calling it an “threat to the country’s young democracy” and stating that,

had the attack succeeded, “we would have gone back to 1936,” the start of the Civil War (Nash

1995). ETA continued violent attacks, despite public opposition; however, political parties began

to work towards peace.

Efforts to Negotiate a Ceasefire

Numerous attempts were made at negotiating a ceasefire with ETA; however, ETA

proved to be untrustworthy in holding the ceasefires. After countless ceasefires that lasted only a

few months, the ceasefire of 2006 seemed promising, until ETA attacked Madrid’s airport due to

postponed and unsuccessful negotiations. As the 2006 ceasefire did not hold, the Spanish

government closed off all further attempts at negotiations with ETA. However, ETA leaders

worked with international actors to call a ceasefire that was verifiable by an international

committee. Called in 2011, this ceasefire has held until the present day.

Kern 14

The first attempts to reach a ceasefire with ETA were unsuccessful, with truces lasting

only a month or two, as ETA was unwilling to compromise on core demands. In the wake of the

9/11 attacks in the United States, Prime Minister Aznar and the Spanish government cracked

down on terrorism, increasing cooperation with France and the European Union. Police action

against ETA strengthened and in 2002 Parliament outlawed Batasuna, the political wing of ETA.

While the Spanish government was cracking down on ETA, other Basque political parties were

searching for a route towards peace. Arnaldo Otegi, the spokesman of Batasuna, and Jesús

Eguiguren, the president of the Basque Socialist Party, met in secret to discuss the failures of

previous ceasefires and how to move forward politically.

As the Basques were willing to progress towards peace, Elkarri, a social group focused

on the peaceful solution to the Basque conflict, invited international experts from the US and

members of Sinn Fein who participated in the Northern Ireland peace process, to visit the Basque

country and assist in the peace process (MacDonald and Bernardo 2006, 189). Seeing progress,

in late 2003, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre), based in Geneva, Switzerland,

offered its assistance. Nevertheless, Aznar and the Spanish state refused to begin talks with ETA

and declared them responsible for the 11-M train bombings in Madrid in 2004, despite

overwhelming evidence that the attacks were carried out by Islamic terrorists. Distrust of the

government followed and Aznar and the PP were voted out of power. As the 11-M attack

prompted a strong reaction against terrorist violence, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and the

Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) were voted into power, as they were willing to

negotiate with ETA to end violence (Esser and Bridges 2011, 64).

Zapatero’s government advocated for dialogue with ETA, receiving approval from

parliament in May 2005. The peace process was created around the proposals that Otegi, the

Kern 15

spokesperson of Batasuna, and Eguiguren, the president of the Basque Socialist Party, agreed on

in their secret talks and presented to the Spanish state when the talks began in May 2005. Held in

Geneva and Oslo with the assistance of the HD Centre, discussions allowed ETA to negotiate

with the Spanish state about technical issues, including the return of prisoners and disarmament,

while Batasuna and Basque political parties would negotiate on political issues (Esser and

Bridges 2011, 65). Basque political parties, including the Basque Socialist Party (PSE),

Batasuna, and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) met confidentially to further discuss the

politics of an agreement and agreed on proposals that granted Basques the “‘right to decide’ their

future” (Esser and Bridges 2011, 65). In light of future talks with the Spanish state, ETA

announced a permanent ceasefire in March 2006.

While the 2006 negotiations presented an opportunity to end violence, the peace

ultimately failed. During the peace process, there was distrust on both sides. While ETA began

by offering a ceasefire, the Spanish state used this period to continue to pursue and prosecute

ETA operatives instead of opening negotiations; additionally, weapon caches were discovered

and seized (Esser and Bridges 2011, 69). By not reciprocating ETA’s goodwill gesture, the

Spanish state put peace negotiations on an unsteady base. This led to an increase in violence,

including kale borroka, street violence, and the attack on Madrid’s Barajas airport in December

of 2006, which killed two. In the wake of the attack, the government declared that peace

negotiations were finished. Nevertheless, ETA maintained that the ceasefire was still in effect

until June 2007, when they officially ended it.

Although the Spanish government declared that no further negotiations with ETA would

occur, some ETA leaders still hoped for peace. They realized that continued violence was

contrary to public opinion. As the government was unwilling to negotiate, Otegi and later Rufi

Kern 16

Etxeberria, another prominent leader of Batasuna, worked with international actors who

participated in the 2007 peace talks to reopen peace negotiations. Internally, Otegi and

Etxeberria worked to obtain an alliance between the nonviolent, pro-independence Basque

groups, while internationally the Brussels Declaration called on ETA to declare a “permanent

and internationally verifiable cease-fire” (Woodworth 2010). In response, ETA halted its

offensive armed actions in September 2010, and declared a permanent ceasefire in January 2011.

The following month, Batasuna presented statutes for a new political party, Sortu, that

rejected violence of any kind, and, although the government was opposed to any party that held

ETA’s goals, the Basque Country began to press Spain for recognition of the changes made. In

May, the nationalist Left, made up of parties in favor of Basque nationalism and separatism, was

allowed to return to politics and Bildu, a coalition of legal nationalist left political parties, won

25% of the Basque vote, a much higher percentage than before; Bildu’s success signified the

resurgence of nationalism in politics (Whitfield 2015, 9). By July 2011, Batasuna concluded that

no more could be achieved without the government’s involvement, as ETA demanded

government guarantees to end violence, including the legalization of Sortu and measures to

benefit its prisoners (Whitfield 2015, 9).

While direct talks between ETA and the government did not take place, a form of virtual

peacemaking, between ETA, the nationalist Left, and the government, via international

facilitators, occurred. Through these talks, an International Verification Commission (IVC),

limited to verifying ETA’s ceasefire, was created. Finally, in October 2011, an international

conference was held in San Sebastián, where international leaders issued a declaration for ETA

to end all violence. Three days after the conference, ETA declared the “definitive end to its

armed activity,” which Spanish and French security forces soon confirmed (Currin 2012, 30).

Kern 17

While ETA hoped to move forward from this point, the election of Mariano Rajoy and

the PP in November 2011-- due to factors unrelated to relations with ETA-- prevented further

progress. In June 2012, Sortu was legalized, but this was the only concession made. International

contact with ETA was halted; ETA did not retaliate. Despite the Spanish government’s lack of

involvement, ETA continued to uphold its side of the deal by decommissioning or destroying

caches of weapons. The IVC reported in February 2014 that ETA had destroyed arms,

explosives, and ammunition, while ETA confirmed that it would continue to destroy its arms “‘to

the end, to the last arsenal’” (Whitfield 2015, 10). Although the peace process between ETA and

the Spanish government would have been accomplished more quickly and more successfully had

the ruling party not changed halfway through negotiations, Batasuna and the nationalist Left

carried out the decommissioning of ETA with the assistance of international actors to verify the

authenticity of disarmament. Despite skepticism among Spaniards and the Spanish government’s

refusal to acknowledge the ceasefire, the 2010 ceasefire that was internationally brokered has

lasted until today, successfully ending the activities of a nationalist terrorist group. Furthermore,

the last at large ETA leader, Mikel Irastorza, was arrested as of November 2016, effectively

imprisoning all of ETA leadership.

Kern 18

Ch. 2: Political Situation

The political situation in Spain inspired the formation of ETA during the dictatorship of

General Franco. Due to regional repression, ETA fought against Franco, reaching a high point in

public opinion with the assassination of Prime Minister Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, removing

Franco’s chosen successor from the picture. This led Franco to choose Juan Carlos as his

successor, and Juan Carlos was responsible for the transition of Spain to democracy. As a result,

the group helped to influence the future of the Spanish government. Thus, ETA’s formation

resulted from the political situation in Spain, and helped to influence the course of politics.

This section discusses the various political parties, both Basque nationalist and those

aligned with the ruling national parties, including their formation and current standing in the

Basque region as well as within Spain. Following the discussion of Basque political parties, I

will examine election results from País Vasco, including the Basque Parliament elections from

1980 until the present. In examining the election results, I will focus on the representation of

nationalist parties in key periods of time throughout the history of ETA.

Basque Nationalist Political Parties

While ETA was indirectly involved in the political sphere through attacks on political

figures, Basque political parties defended nationalist ideas within the political system. A variety

of nationalist parties, both with and without ties to ETA, were present in Basque politics. This

section provides a brief description of the nationalist parties discussed throughout this chapter.

This includes the only pre- Civil War Basque nationalist party, the centrist Basque Nationalist

Party (PNV) and its splinter party Eusko Alkartasuna (EA); left wing opponents of ETA,

Kern 19

Euskadiko Eskerra (EE) and Aralar; the political wing of ETA, Herri Batasuna (HB), and its

offshoot Euskal Herritarrok (EH); and, finally, Bildu, a far-left coalition. Understanding the

background of the various nationalist political parties is important in understanding how they

view issues, including violence. Despite all being nationalist parties, each takes a different

position on topics, notably violence and ETA.

Formed in 1895, the Partido Nacionalisto Vasco (PNV, Basque Nationalist Party), was

created with the purpose of restoring fueros to País Vasco. As a centrist party, PNV attracted

approximately one-third of the vote within País Vasco from the 1910s to the 1930s, electing

several members to the Cortes in Madrid. Through joining forces with the Second Republic,

PNV was successful in restoring political autonomy to the region in 1936. However, when the

Second Republic lost the Spanish Civil War to General Franco, the statute of autonomy was

revoked and Basque nationalism was repressed. This forced PNV to operate clandestinely within

Spain or through exile in the Basque region of France. Once General Franco’s dictatorship

concluded and democracy was restored, PNV returned to activity in Spain; however, as a

regional party, the PNV only operated within País Vasco. Despite its limited reach, PNV became

the largest regional party within País Vasco (Pedahzur 2003, 82). While the PNV supports

Basque nationalism, it condemns using violence to achieve goals, making the party an opponent

of ETA’s violent actions. Nevertheless, the party has dominated Basque politics from the

granting of the regions autonomy statute until 2009, when the Basque Socialist Party (PSE)

gained control. However, PNV returned to power in 2012, the year after ETA’s ceasefire, and

remains in power today.

While the PNV is the traditional Basque nationalist party, the majority of Basque, and

Catalan, nationalist parties are leftist. As nationalist parties are usually rightist, this represents a

Kern 20

notable difference to the Basque and Catalan cases. Basque nationalist parties, the majority of

which emerged during or immediately following Franco’s rule, are grouped under the category

of “abertzale left.” However, within the abertzale left, there is a schism on the issue of violence,

with some supporting ETA and others not. While Euskadiko Eskerra (EE) and Aralar are against

ETA, Herri Batasuna (HB), Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), and EH Bildu are pro ETA.

Euskadiko Eskerra (EE), a left wing nationalist party opposed to ETA, was founded in

1977 as part of a coalition of Basque and Marxist parties. Many EE members eventually

separated from the party to join Herri Batasuna (HB), after it adopted its non-violent stance. EE

later formed coalitions with Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), a splinter party of the PNV. In 1991, part

of EE merged with the Socialist Party of the Basque Country (PSE), to form PSE-EE, while the

other segment joined with EA. This splinter effectively ended the party’s original ideology of left

wing nationalism, as the group changed its ideology to one of social democracy.

Founded in 2000, Aralar is another leftist party that supports Basque independence,

although it is opposed to the violence of ETA. The party is a splinter group of HB that broke

away when ETA broke the 2000 truce. Unlike many Basque separatist parties, Aralar has a

presence in both País Vasco and Navarre. While Aralar has run independently, it has also joined

in a coalition with Zutik, a party originally part of the EH coalition.

Herri Batasuna (HB), which became ETA’s political wing, was formed in 1978 as a

coalition of left, nationalistic parties who worked to further Basque independence. Originally

brought together to advocate for “no” in the referendum held on the Spanish Constitution, the

party did not achieve its goal, but continued to work for Basque independence. To further its

fight, when the party won seats in the Cortes in Madrid, it would not take its seats, as a pledge to

uphold the Spanish Constitution had to be made. As the government was concerned about ties

Kern 21

between HB and ETA, in 1998 HB helped to form Euskal Herritarrok (EH), a leftist coalition

which HB became a part of. EH, Basque for “We, the Basque citizens,” absorbed HB, as well as

including other leftist Basque parties including Zutik and Batzarre. However, Zutik and Batzarre

left the coalition in 2000, after the end of the ETA truce of 1999. This meant that EH was

essentially HB by a different name. For this reason, in 2001, the group changed its name once

again to Batasuna. However, in 2003, HB, EH, and Batasuna were banned, as it was considered

part of “the ‘terrorist network’ of the armed separatist group ETA;” HB was the first political

party banned since the reign of General Franco (“Batasuna Banned Permanently” 2003). That

same year, Batasuna, EH, and HB made it onto the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, as they

have “supported ETA’s acts of terrorism” while the “leadership and membership have included a

number of people convicted of ETA-related terrorist acts” (Boucher 2003).

Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), meaning Basque Solidarity, was created in 1986 when it split

from PNV-EAJ. EA operates in both the Spanish and French Basque country working toward

achieving the creation of an independent Basque state. Additionally, EA and the PNV formed a

coalition in Navarre to maximize Basque nationalist interests.

Bildu, later changed to EH Bildu, was created in 2011 and is a coalition of Aralar, EA,

Alternatiba, and Sortu. Viewed as a far-left party, the pro-independence party is active in País

Vasco and Navarre. As a coalition, EH Bildu combined members of the center left, the far left,

and independent members of the left wing, including many former supporters or members of

Batasuna. While originally banned due to ties with Batasuna, the Constitutional Court of Spain

lifted the ban in time for the 2011 campaigns, allowing Bildu to participate (Bourne 2010, 5-6).

Kern 22

Non-Nationalist Parties

While Basque politics is dominated by nationalist parties, specifically PNV, non-

nationalist parties have a presence in the region. The most important of these parties, the Popular

Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), are discussed in this section. These

non-nationalist parties are popular throughout Spain and have been the governing parties in

Spain during negotiations with ETA.

Classified as a conservative, Christian democratic party the Partido Popular (PP, Popular

Party), is one of the main political parties in Spain. Although PP was not founded until 1989, it

was a splinter group of the 1976 People’s Alliance, which joined the Democratic Coalition and,

later, the People’s Coalition (CP). As the party was closely aligned to Franco’s ideology and

regime, the group started to lose popularity, and they reformed as the Popular Party (PP) and

rebranded as a typical conservative party. As the party continued to rebrand and paint itself as a

centrist-right party against terrorism and exorbitant public spending and taxation, José María

Aznar, a former Premier of Castile and León, became the chairman of the party. By 1996, PP

was the largest party in Spain, and Aznar became Prime Minister, with the support of the Basque

Nationalist Party. As PP transformed to a more centrist party that advocated harsher punishment

for terrorism, the anti-violent PNV came to support PP. It was under Aznar’s government that

the first truce with ETA was met in 1998 when Aznar agreed to move ETA prisoners to prisons

closer to the Basque region, easing the burden on Basque families who wished to visit relatives.

Although the truce did not last much longer than a year, it was the first attempt at negotiating

with the group. While PP remained in power in Spain until 2004, their loss was partially due to

PP candidate Mariana Rajoy blaming ETA for the 11-M train attacks in Madrid prior to the

elections, despite evidence that Al-Qaeda perpetrated the attacks. The PP did not return to power

Kern 23

until 2011, when Rajoy beat the Spanish Workers Party (PSOE) candidate. Rajoy and the

People’s Party are currently in power in Spain.

Founded in 1879, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Spanish Workers

Party), was formed as a typical European social democracy party. After being banned in 1939 by

Franco, PSOE was re-legalized in 1977 after facing heavy persecution at the hands of Franco.

PSOE abandoned its Marxist roots in 1979, similar to most European social democratic parties,

and now is defined as center left, social democratic, and progressive. PSOE gained power in the

1982 general election and Felipe González remained Prime Minister until 1996, when PP took

power due to a decrease in public support. This decrease was partially due to state terrorism

against ETA. The PSOE government illegally formed Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación

(GAL), or Antiterrorist Liberation Groups, to fight against ETA; however, PSOE officials never

acknowledged responsibility for GAL or condemned the crimes they committed. The GAL issue

plagued PSOE during the election, leading to PP winning control. PSOE and Prime Minister José

Luis Rodriguez Zapatero regained power in 2004, after the 11-M attacks. The Zapatero

government favored negotiations with ETA, which led to the 2006 ceasefire, ending with an

ETA attack on Madrid’s Barajas Airport. Despite the ceasefire failure, Zapatero remained in

power until 2011, when PP defeated PSOE.

Basque Parliament Elections

Established by the Statute of Basque Autonomy of 1979, the Basque Parliament, the

legislative body of País Vasco, first met in 1980 and is composed of 75 members elected by the

citizens of País Vasco. Each of the three provinces of País Vasco has 25 deputies, despite

differences in the populations of each province. Elected deputies then vote to elect the

Kern 24

lehendakari, or president. According to the Basque Statute of Autonomy, Euskera, like

Castellano, is recognized as an official language in Euskadi (“The Statute of Autonomy of the

Basque Country”). As such, Euskera is a language for governmental, academic, and cultural

documents, proceedings, or correspondence. Due to this, sessions of the Basque Parliament are

conducted in both Spanish and Euskera.

Within this section, I will examine the composition of the Basque Parliament, with

special attention paid to the nationalist parties and how their presence has changed over time. I

will focus specifically on key points in ETA’s history, including the 1980s when the group was

most active, 2000 and 2006 when the group broke ceasefires, and 2011 when a permanent

ceasefire was reached.

Graph 2.1: Nationalist Representation in Basque Parliament (Total and by Party)

Since the creation of the Basque Parliament, Basque nationalist parties have received a

majority of the vote, with notable exceptions in 2005 and 2009, where they received 41% and

48% of the vote, respectively. It is interesting to note that within the 1980s, when ETA was the

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1980 1984 1986 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2009 2012 2016

% o

f vo

te

Nationalist Representation

EAJ-PNV HB/ EH EH Bildu

EE EA Nationalist Total

Kern 25

most active, nationalist party representation was at its highest, gaining 64% of the vote in 1980

and 1984, 68% in 1986, and 66% in 1990 (Departamento de Seguridad). Additionally, within this

period, PNV, the moderate nationalist party that condemns violence, received the highest

proportion of the vote. However, Herri Batasuna, the political extension of ETA, received the

second highest number of votes.

Nationalist representation in the Basque Parliament reached a peak in 1986, with 67.9%

of seats belonging to nationalist parties. However, in 2005, nationalist representation reached a

low of only 41%. While this corresponded with a decrease in ETA attacks due to ceasefire talks,

generally, nationalist representation does not correspond with ETA actions. Representation for

Basque nationalist parties in the Basque Parliament has typically remained above 50%.

Graph 2.2: Basque Parliament: Number of Seats Held

1980 1984 1986 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2009 2012 2016

Nationalist Parties

PNV/

EA

33 29

PNV 25 32 17 22 22 21 30 27 28

EH

Bildu

21 18

HB 11 11 13 13 11

EH 14 7

EE 6 6 9 6

Aralar 1 4

EA 13 9 8 6 1

Non- Nationalist Parties

PSE-

PSOE

9 19 19 16

PSEEE/

PSOE

12 14 13 18 25 16 9

PP 6 11 16 19 15 13 10 9

Other 9 7 4 3 11 4 3 12 2 1 11

Kern 26

Graph 2.2 shows the composition of the Basque Parliament by political party and how it

has changed over time. Due to the amount of political parties and the frequency of renaming and

dissolution, only the major Basque nationalist and nationwide parties are included in the table.

The other category encompasses the seats that political parties not included in the chart held each

year. Although parties have appeared and disappeared throughout the years, PNV has remained a

constant presence in the Basque Parliament, steadily maintaining the largest number of seats. As

a centrist party, PNV ensures that more radical nationalists, who support the use of violence, do

not control País Vasco.

Another notable portion of this chart is the popularity of Herri Batasuna (HB). HB and its

subsequent party, EH, steadily received the second highest number of seats in Parliament when

looking at the nationalist parties. As the political wing of ETA, this stands in sharp contrast to

PNV, which condemns the use of violence. This implies that a significant segment of the Basque

population supported ETA’s violent tactics to achieve their goals, as representatives of the group

steadily composed about 15% of Parliament. Until the groups were banned from politics, they

fought to further the interests of ETA politically, while ETA continued its violent attacks.

However, the popular nationwide party PSOE maintained higher representation in

Parliament than all nationalist parties, with the exception of PNV. Although, in 1986, PSOE

gained control of Parliament for the first and only time, with 19 seats as opposed to the 17 seats

held by PNV. During 1987-1990, the Basque Parliament president was from PSE-PSOE. This is

significant because during the reign of PSOE, nationalist parties received roughly 67% of the

overall vote. Although ETA was active at this point, in the 1986-1990 period, ETA only

maintained an average of 32 victims per year, down from its most violent period of 1978-1982

where they achieved an average of 60 victims per year (Ministerio del Interior). Despite the

Kern 27

decrease in ETA attacks, HB representation remained constant while PNV representation fell to

PSE-PSOE.

The reign of PNV was only interrupted by PSOE from 1987-1990 until 2009-2012, when

a PP candidate became president. These are the only two periods in the history of the Basque

Parliament that a party other than PNV held power. However, in 2009 when PP won control, the

nationalist parties combined only won 48% of the vote. This was also during a period of low

attacks from ETA, with only three victims in 2009 and one the following year (Ministerio del

Interior).

Graph 2.3: Nationalist Representation in Basque Parliament vs ETA victims

Conclusions

Overall, nationalist representation in Parliament does align with periods of high ETA

violence. However, once HB and EH were banned as political parties in 2003, the number of

ETA victims almost disappears, with only 15 victims from 2003-2010. This represents the lowest

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

197

0

197

2

197

4

197

6

197

8

198

0

198

2

198

4

198

6

198

8

199

0

199

2

199

4

199

6

199

8

200

0

200

2

200

4

200

6

200

8

201

0

% o

f n

atio

nal

ist

rep

rese

nta

tio

n

ETA

vic

tim

s

Nationalist Representation vs. ETA victims

ETA victims Nationalist Total

Kern 28

period of ETA activity since their formation, when they only had 4 victims between 1968-1972

(Ministerio del Interior). However, this period was before the transition to democracy, so it was

not considered in this analysis.

While I hypothesized that increased nationalist representation in the Basque Parliament

would lead to decreased violence, this turned out to be incorrect. There could be various

explanations for the lack of correlation between nationalist representation and violence. Not all

nationalist parties promote violence by ETA, or any group, to reach their goals. PNV is a prime

example of this. As the controlling and largest party in País Vasco, PNV does not support the use

of violence and would not help ETA to achieve their goals. It is plausible that ETA may have cut

back on its violent attacks if it believed that it would be able to accomplish its goals politically.

However, since most nationalist parties did not represent their specific interests, and the ones that

did, namely HB, only controlled about 15% of Parliament, it makes sense that violence did not

decrease as nationalist representation in Parliament increased. In fact, nationalist representation

was highest while ETA was still very active.

The amount of nationalist representation during ceasefire negotiations is intriguing.

During efforts to reach a 2006 ceasefire, nationalist parties only received 41% of the vote, while

when the 2011 ceasefire was achieved, nationalists received 59% of the vote in 2012

(Departamento de Seguridad). It is possible that representation for the nationalist parties

decreased immediately before the 2006 ceasefire, as the populace did not believe it was likely

that ceasefire negotiations would be successful with the PSOE government, as they had been

with the PP government. However, nationalist representation may have risen in the aftermath of

the 2011 ceasefire, as a peaceful solution had been reached, and ETA and their violence was no

longer an issue that nationalist parties had to defend or revoke during elections.

Kern 29

Over time, there appears to have been little if any correlation between nationalist

representation and ETA violence. Nationalist representation has remained relatively constant in

the Basque Parliament despite highs and lows in ETA victims.

While looking at the data is important, it is also vital to examine the ideological positions

of each party. As a rightist party, PP continues to be the political party most associated with the

Franco regime, while PSOE, a social democrat party, represents a continuation of the Second

Republic. Within this context, the Basque nationalist parties have fallen into an awkward

position as to whether or not they were going to cooperate with a democratic, Spanish

government. While the majority took the seats that they won in the Cortes, some parties, such as

Herri Batasuna (HB) and its subsequent rebirths, would not take their seats, as an allegiance to

the Spanish Constitution had to be pledged. As a centrist party, PNV was willing to cooperate

with the Spanish governments, especially PP, as it was also a centrist-right party. However, as

evidenced by the actions of HB, the position that the abertzale left held was more precarious.

While the abertzale left was frequently more willing to work with the PSOE government, due to

their leftist ideology, this did not always function well. Nevertheless, it was during Zapatero’s

PSOE government that a ceasefire between ETA and the Spanish state was closest to being

reached. Similarities in ideology lent the PNV to supporting PP and the abertzale left to

supporting PSOE, while the ruling parties’ relations with ETA have prompted change in power,

as evidenced by the GAL situation and 11-M attacks.

Currently in País Vasco, nationalist parties do not face the same support that they enjoyed

in the 1980s. However, nationalist representation has continued to increase since 2005. This may

be a result of diminished ETA activity. As the group is now in a permanent ceasefire, Basques

can profess a more nationalist sentiment without fear of being grouped with the ETA terrorists.

Kern 30

As such, I believe that nationalist parties in Basque Parliament will continue to hold a minimum

of half the seats, but likely more. Additionally, the pacifist position among the abertzale left will

continue to grow, as the main supporters of violence have been illegalized and using violence to

meet goals is no longer a trend since ETA’s ceasefire. While the centrist PNV is likely to remain

in the majority, the abertzale left will continue to have a presence in the Basque Parliament.

Kern 31

Ch. 3: Public Opinion of ETA

Maintaining public support is vital to both terrorist groups and the governments that

combat them. If either group has public support on its side, it is able to justify its actions as the

will of the people. Public support for ETA has risen and fallen over time, reaching a high point

after the assassination of General Franco’s chosen successor, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco.

However, public opinion towards ETA later fell, as it was attacking a young democratic state.

Within this section, I will use the EuskoBarómetro, a study on Basque public opinion, to

examine opinions related to ETA and their use of violence. Conducted by the University of País

Vasco, the EuskoBarómetro surveys Vizcaya, the Basque region of Spain, while leaving out

Navarre and the Basque region of France. However, as Navarre is its own autonomous

community, these limitations will not be detrimental to conclusions drawn from this data. The

EuskoBarómetro survey began in 1999 and is conducted twice a year, except for 2015, when it

was only conducted once. While this does not measure public opinion during the peak years of

ETA, it is possible to see public opinions from the time when ETA began negotiating its first

unsuccessful ceasefire.

Within this chapter, I examine various EuskoBarómetro surveys to evaluate public

opinion towards ETA, violence, the possibility of a ceasefire, and the possibility of independence

for Vizcaya. I examine the data from 1999-2016 to see how trends changed over time. The year

1999 marks the year in which ETA attacks was at its lowest point since the formation of the

group and provides a baseline on opinion of ETA, violence, and ceasefire negotiations.

Furthermore, I examine current surveys to see how Basque opinions towards violence and

independence have changed since ETA’s ceasefire and disarmament.

Kern 32

Nationalist Sentiment of The Basques

This section discusses how the Basques define themselves, their opinion regarding

nationalist sentiment, as well as their desire for independence. I focus on averages based on the

18 years included in the EuskoBarómetro and use specific years only as reference points of

noticeable highs and lows, as the overall sentiment does not vary considerably between years.

Graph 3. 1: National Identity of Basques (1999-2016)

Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum

Only Basque 30.56 2.7 25 35

More Basque Than Spanish 21.3 1.89 18 25

Equally Basque and Spanish 34.5 1.98 31 38

More Spanish than Basque 4.3 1.45 2 7

Only Spanish 5.3 1.45 3 8

No Answer 3.9 1.54 2 8

In each EuskoBarómetro Survey, the Basque participants were asked which national

identity they identified with the most. Instead of being asked to choose between Basque and

Spanish, this survey allowed for nuanced categories, which is out of the norm. As expected, a

large portion of the surveyed population identified as either completely Basque (31%) or more

Basque than Spanish (21%). However, the importance of a duality as both Basque and Spanish

represents the largest percentage of the population (35%). When added to the people who self-

identify as primarily or completely Basque (52%), the percentage of people who identify as

Basque climbs to 87% of the population. This stands in sharp contrast to the 9% of the

population that identify as primarily Spanish. In fact, even when Spanish sentiment was at its

highest (2000), only 14% of Basques identified as completely or mostly Spanish. Thus, from this

graph, it is obvious that most Basques feel a special connection with their Basque roots and feel

their Basqueness is important to note. However, regional identity throughout Spain is very

Kern 33

strong, so this is not necessarily a unique aspect. As this is true, it would seem plausible to

assume that nationalist sentiment among Basques would also run high; however, this is not the

case.

Although the majority of inhabitants of Euskadi identify as Basque, nationalist sentiment

is not high. In fact, on average, only 43% of Basques self-identify as possessing nationalist

sentiment, with 51% reporting none, while 6% abstained from answering. Within this context,

nationalist sentiment was not necessarily defined as pro violence; rather, the majority of those

who said they were nationalist were affiliated with the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) with a

smaller proportion reporting association with EH Bildu (EHB). Nationalist sentiment among

Basques reached its peak in 1999, 2013, 2015, and 2016 with 46% of Basques representing

nationalist views.2 Within these dates, 1999 is the only year in which ETA was active and

nationalist sentiment was high. This could mean that nationalism could not flourish while ETA

was active; however, this does not hold. While nationalism increased during the 2006 ceasefire

(to 43% as opposed to 40% the previous year), and the 2011 ceasefire (to 45%, up from 39% in

2010), nationalist sentiment increased in other years when a ceasefire was not in effect. This is

noticeable in 2001 (to 45% from 42%) and 2009 (from 39% to 44%), when ceasefires were not

in effect, so ETA activity did not decrease. While an increase in nationalist sentiment in times of

high ETA activity would seem plausible, as ETA embraced their Basque heritage and fought for

independence for País Vasco, this was not the case. Conversely, periods of ETA inactivity are

correlated with an increase in nationalist sentiment. However, ETA inactivity is not the only

cause for increased nationalist sentiment, as evidenced by periods where nationalist sentiment

increased but ETA activity did not decrease.

2 As the survey did not explicitly define what it meant by “nationalistic” sentiment, I assume that they use the

standard definition of advocating political independence for País Vasco.

Kern 34

Graph 3.2: Average Desire for Independence (1999-2016)

Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum

Large 33.06 3.19 29 40

Small 26.1 4.08 20 33

None 27.61 5.21 17 37

Indifferent 7.89 2.98 2 14

No Answer 5.33 2.54 1 12

Although less than half of the Basque population held nationalist sentiments, those who

possessed a desire for independence were greater. Of those surveyed, 33% had a great desire for

Basque independence, while an additional 26% had small desires for independence, making 59%

of Basques holding a degree of desire for independence. In contrast, only 28% of Basques have

no desire for independence. Desire for independence was highest in 1999, when 73% of Basques

had had some desire for independence- 40% large and 33% small. Consequently, this was also

the year in which desire to remain a part of Spain was the smallest at only 17%. Other than 1999,

the wish to separate from Spain was highest in 2005 and 2006 at 68% and 62% respectively.

Interestingly, this was the period of an ETA ceasefire. However, after the permanent ETA

ceasefire of 2011, the desire for a Basque state did not rise, remaining at an average of only 54%

from 2011 to the present. It can therefore be concluded that ETA actions did not influence the

Basques desire for statehood, as the 2005-2006 ceasefire resulted in increased demand for

independence while the permanent 2011 lessened this demand.

However, while many people desired independence, a much smaller percentage actually

believed that independence was possible to achieve. Only four percent of Basques thought that

independence was certain while 27% thought that there was a high probability of Vizcaya

gaining independence; however, 45% thought there was a slight possibility. While this figure

was only available in the 1999 EuskoBarómetro, it is not possible to determine how it changed

Kern 35

over time, especially in the periods where the push for independence was greatest. As such,

while Basques were in favor of independence, they realized that chances of actually achieving

independence were small and unlikely to occur.

Basque Preoccupations and Opinions on Violence

As an autonomous region, the principal problems of Euskadi were not always the same as

the rest of Spain. This section examines the preoccupations of the Basque populace as well as

their opinion on the problem of violence.

Graph 3.3: Principal Preoccupations of the Basques (1999-2016)

This survey had the most changes in answer choices from year to year; in order to

account for these changes, I have grouped the various options into four main categories:

economic situation, violence/drugs, social welfare, and the political situation3.

3 Economic situation includes unemployment and overall economic health. Social welfare includes living,

health, education, inequality, and overall welfare. Political situation includes data on immigration, peace

attempts, and the overall political situation.

0

20

40

60

80

100

% o

f re

spo

nd

ents

Preocupations of Basques

Economic Situation Violence/Drugs

Social Welfare Political Situation

Kern 36

It is noteworthy to point out that violence has never been the main preoccupation of the

Basques. The economic situation, mainly unemployment, has always held the top spot,

throughout 1999-2016. While violence was consistently second, in the periods of 2005-2007 and

2009-2013, inequality and welfare were considered more worrisome. Within these time periods,

ETA activity was low due to the 2006 and 2011 ceasefires.

Graph 3.4: ETA Victims and Basque Preoccupation with Violence (1999-2013)4

Graph 4 shows the relationship between the number of ETA victims and the Basque

preoccupation with violence. While Graph 3 showed the average percentage of Basques listing

violence as a worry, Graph 4 shows the breakdown by year. From this graph, it is evident that

Basque preoccupation with violence rose and fell in comparison to ETA victims. The 2005

ceasefire has zero ETA victims and only 35% of Basques listed violence as a concern. This

represents a low point in concern for violence that is not reached again until 2008. From this

4 The first data point for ETA victims is part of a larger trend of high numbers of ETA victims. It was during

the period shown that ETA victims were in decline. I began the graph in 1999 as that was when the

EuskoBarómetro data was first available.

0

5

10

15

20

25

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

ETA

Vic

tim

s (a

ctu

al n

um

ber

)

Pre

ocu

pat

ion

ith

Vio

len

ce

ETA victims and Preoccupation with Violence

preoccupation ETA victims

Kern 37

point, violence continues to diminish as a primary concern. By the time of the 2011 ceasefire,

only eight percent of Basques listed violence as a concern, and further dropped to only two

percent in the following years.

This same trend is evidenced when the EuskoBarómetro survey asked respondents if they

believed the issue of violence had improved or worsened from the previous years.

Graph 3.5: The Evolution of the Problem of Violence from the Previous Year (1999-2010)

The evolution of violence in a large way depended on the actions of ETA. As the number of

victims of ETA fell, respondents believed that the problem of violence was lessening. This is

specifically evidenced from 2001 to 2005, when an ETA ceasefire was called. However, when

the ceasefire was called off, this corresponded with the populace believing that the problem of

violence was more severe. Nevertheless, people never believed that the problem was worse than

in 2000, when the number of ETA victims was the highest within this selection of data at 23.

This is a limited conclusion, as data from earlier periods, where ETA was more active, is not

available. It is plausible to assume that Basques would have considered violence to have

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Evolution of Violence

gotten better gotten worse stayed the same

Kern 38

continually worsened through ETA’s peak in the 1980’s. This graph represents the period of

ETA’s decline where they were no longer as imminent of a threat as they had previously been.

Opinion of ETA

Within this section, I present how the Basque people viewed both ETA and ETA

operatives. The portion of the EuskoBarómetro that deals with views on operatives was only

conducted in 1999; however, it includes references to 1996, so it is possible to show how opinion

changed over time. Nevertheless, this data is limited, as it only represents the opinions of

Basques regarding ETA in a time when ETA was already in decline.

Graph 3.6: Basque Attitudes Toward ETA (1999-2016)

Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum

Total Rejection 58.5 6.77 35 66

Fear 3.83 1.07 2 6

Indifference 4.39 2.16 1 8

Support but now rejection 14.89 3.6 7 20

Support ends, not means 11.5 1.77 7 15

Critical justification 3.06 1.87 1 9

Total support 0.94 0.7 0 3

No answer 2.89 1.63 0 7

Overall, the Basque reaction towards ETA is one of complete rejection (58.5%). After

this significant portion of the population, it is important to note that additional 15% of the

population that formerly supported ETA now rejects the group, while 12% support the goals of

ETA but not the means to which they went to achieve them. Only one percent of the population

of Euskadi totally supported ETA in 1999. However, it is interesting that only four percent of

Basques admitted to fearing ETA. While the averages help to present a tidy image of Basque

public opinion, it is important to look at the various years to see trends.

Kern 39

Basque attitudes towards ETA in 1999 represented a high of support between 1999-2016;

however, a decline in overall opinion towards ETA is evident. Only two percent of Basques

totally supported ETA, and although this is the highest amount of support for ETA in the given

range, except for 2002, it is likely that support for ETA was higher previously. Twenty percent

of Basques who formerly supported ETA now does not accept the group, while 15% support the

goals of ETA but not the methods used to achieve them. Both represent the highest level of

support for ETA between 1999 to 2016. However, what is most telling of 1999 is that only 35%

of Basques completely rejected the group. This is the lowest level of rejection that the

EuskoBarómetro reports. Nevertheless, while 1999 represented the highest amount of support for

ETA, it is also the year in which the highest percentage of Basques (6%) reporting fearing the

group. Thus, while ETA was most popular in 1999, its high level of fear corresponds with the

high in the victim count between 1999-2016. While it is not surprising that the group was most

feared when it had the most attacks, it is interesting that support for the group was also highest

then, during the high point of attacks.

The two ETA ceasefires, in 2006 and 2011, represent another interesting time. In 2006,

only half of Basques totally rejected ETA, the lowest since 1999. While total support remained

constant (1%), 14% supported the ends but not the means of ETA and 19% of former supporters

now rejected the group. The numbers in 2011 are similar to those in 2006, with the exception of

the percentage of Basques who rejected ETA completely (60%) and the former advocates of

ETA (13%). Only 12% supported the ends of the group; however, in both years only four percent

of Basques reported feared the group. This low amount of fear is likely due to the ceasefire

negotiations and tentative peace which occurred in both 2006 and 2011.

Kern 40

In regards to the Basques opinions surrounding ETA, it would be more beneficial to have

data from the years of ETA’s main activities to see how reactions varied during periods of high

activity and relative quiet. In the EuskoBarómetro data set, the only year of relative activity for

ETA is in 1999. The rest of the data provides data on periods of low activity and peace.

However, it can be concluded that fear of ETA was highest when the group was most active and

remained relatively steady the rest of the time. Additionally, while ETA was moderately active

(in 1999) it received the least amount of total rejection, although other forms of rejection were

higher (former supporters and those who support the ends, not the means).

Graph 3.7: Image of ETA Operatives in Euskadi

Although support for ETA decreased, the Basque populace also began to see it in a new,

better light. Between 1996 and 1999, the public came to see ETA as patriots and idealists instead

of terrorists and assassins. Graph 7 shows that the image of ETA activists as idealists more than

doubled, from 16% in 1996 to 36% in 1999. As the positive image grew, the negative shrank. In

1996, 32% of Basques saw ETA as terrorists and 21% saw the group as assassins. This stands in

remarkable contrast to the figures from 1999 that show that 23% saw the group as terrorists,

while only 8% saw them as assassins. Thus, while support for ETA and their actions declined,

816

12

32

21

1113

36

11

23

8 9

PATRIOTS IDEALISTS FANATICS TERRORISTS ASSASINS DON’T KNOW/ NO

ANSWER

Image of ETA Operatives in Euskadi

1996 1999

Kern 41

their overall image transformed from one of terrorism and violence to one of patriotism and

freedom-fighters. It is unknown how ceasefire attempts affected its image throughout Euskadi, as

data on how ETA was viewed was only available in the 1999 EuskoBarómetro. However, it is

likely that the image of operatives as terrorists continued to decline, as large scale terror

activities were discontinued. The possible exception to this is in 2006 when the group attacked

the Madrid Barajas Airport in the midst of negotiations, effectively ending the 2006 peace.

Opinion on an ETA Ceasefire

This portion of the paper focuses on people’s opinion towards an eventual negotiation

between the Spanish state and ETA. Despite ETA’s successful attempt at negotiating a ceasefire,

it is not recognized by the Spanish state, which still considers ETA an active terrorist group. The

ceasefire was brokered by international actors, who continue to hold ETA to the agreed upon

standards. Nevertheless, I examine Basque public opinion toward a government recognized

ceasefire, as well as opinion towards the continued use of violence to reach political ideals.

Graph 3.8: Opinion on an Eventual ETA-Government Ceasefire Negotiation (1999-2015)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

% o

f re

spo

nd

ents

Opinion of an Eventual ETA-Government Negotiation

yes, without conditions yes, if ETA disarms no, in no circumstance

Kern 42

In regards to attempts at negotiating with ETA to reach a ceasefire, Basques were

overwhelmingly in favor and expected ceasefire negotiations to begin between ETA and the

Spanish government in 1999. Sixty-two percent of Basques believed that negotiations would

begin without any conditions being met. However, 29% admitted that negotiations would not

commence until ETA laid down their arms. Only five percent of Basques did not expect

negotiations to occur in 1999. While peace talks did begin in 1999 between ETA and the

government, there would need to be conditions. Ceasefires only lasted a month or two at the

beginning, as ETA was unwilling to compromise on its core demands, leading negotiations to be

unsuccessful.

Basque sentiment towards negotiations continued to be positive, with only an average of

14% of Basques believing that negotiations would not occur under any circumstance. While for

those in favor of eventual negotiations, more believed that negotiations would only occur if ETA

disarmed (42%) in contrast to those who thought talks would begin without conditions (39%).

Those who believed that the government would only negotiate if ETA disarmed were

highest a year before ceasefires were called, 49% in 2005 and 50% in 2010. Additionally, in

these years, 33% of Basques believed that negotiations would occur without conditions, with

only 12-13% believing that negotiations would not occur.

In looking at the actual years of the ceasefires, 2006 and 2011, there is great difference in

how Basques perceived negotiations. In 2006, those who believed that negotiations would not

occur was only 8%, the lowest except for 1999. This is likely due the fact that negotiations

between ETA and the government were already in session, and it was assumed they would

continue. In contrast, in 2011, 18% thought that negotiations would not occur, likely a result of

Kern 43

the government’s stance on not negotiating with ETA and negotiations with international actors

that were ongoing.

Opinion regarding ETA-government peace talks has always been overwhelmingly in

support of peace, regardless of the level of violence. However, when violence was more

prevalent (1999), more Basques believed that they would only occur if ETA disarmed.

It is important to note that an average of 13% of Basques did not believe negotiations

would occur in any case. While it may be assumed that this percentage of the population were

diehard ETA supporters, that is not the case. Nationalists made up part of this number, however,

members of the Partido Popular (PP) composed the majority.

Despite the fact that a negotiation between the Spanish state and ETA has not occurred,

the ceasefire holds. As such, from 2011 on, EuskoBarómetro survey participants were asked if

they believed that it was possible to defend all political ideas without the need for reoccurring

violence. The answer to this question was a resounding yes. An average of 83% of Basques

agreed that this was likely in the coming years. Only seven percent disagreed while a further

seven percent remained neutral.

Conclusions

This chapter has covered public opinion of the Basques regarding a variety of topics,

including nationalist sentiment, opinions on violence, views on ETA, and thoughts on ceasefire

negotiations. While some analysis was possible, the conclusions are limited as data was not

available for the peak years of ETA activity. As such, the comparisons made only apply to the

periods of relative peace in Euskadi, with 1999 representing the only year where violence was at

a moderate level.

Kern 44

ETA activity did not influence how Basques regarded their identity, nationalist sentiment,

or desire for independence. Most Basques identify themselves as either completely Basque or

more Basque than Spanish. However, while 52% characterize themselves as Basque, only 43%

of Basques admit to feeling a nationalist sentiment. While most Basques expressed desire for an

independent Basque state, this was not influenced by ETA actions. This is evidenced by the

ceasefire attempts; while 2006 resulted in an increased demand for independence, the 2011 peace

led to a decrease. Despite a desire for independence, Basques were more realistic about the

ability to actually achieve independence. Only roughly a third of Basques believed that Basque

independence was certain or highly probable. ETA actions proved to be uncorrelated with how

the Basques identified themselves, expressed nationalist sentiment, or influenced independence

demands.

Basque opinions on violence were slightly more correlated to ETA actions, even though

violence was never the principal concern of Basques. The evolution of violence depended on

ETA actions and was correlated to Basque worry. As ETA violence decreased, the preoccupation

with violence decreased; however, due to the unreliability of ETA ceasefires, a degree of worry

always remained until the present, now that the 2011 ceasefire has been held and attacks stopped.

Thus, ETA attacks and the Basques perception of violence are correlated, as expected.

Public opinion on ETA was vastly negative in the studied period. A majority of the

population (60%) rejected the group while only 1% supported ETA. The portion of the Basque

population that regarded ETA with fear corresponded with ETA violence. In the years in which

ETA was more active, a greater percentage reported fear toward ETA, while peaceful periods

resulted in fewer fearful individuals. However, other than this category, the other perceptions of

ETA did not correlate with ETA actions.

Kern 45

Finally, the Basque public was overwhelmingly in support of negotiations between ETA

and the Spanish government; however, the conditions needed to negotiate were debatable.

Opinions regarding ceasefires were not correlated with ETA activity, except for 2006, when

ETA and the government were in the middle of negotiations. As the final 2011 ceasefire was not

brokered with the Spanish state, this did not affect results regarding a government negotiation,

which Basques are still in favor of. However, in light of the 2011 ceasefire, Basques began to be

asked if they believed it was possible to defend political ideas without the use of violence.

Basques responded with a vehement yes, clearly showing their opposition to ETA tactics.

Kern 46

Ch. 4: Economy of País Vasco

País Vasco is typically considered one of the more affluent regions of Spain, along with

Catalonia. In 2014, the most recent year on record, the GDP per capita (PPP) of Euskal Herria

was €31,600 (this number includes all seven Basque territories); this exceeded Spain, at €25,000,

and the European Union rate of €27,500 (“Economy”). The Basque economy first gained

prominence through its industrial capacity, but it later changed to a service based economy,

which remains today. Currently, services make up 58.8% of GDP; industry is responsible for

24.66% (21.14% manufacturing, 7.03% construction, 0.65% agriculture and fisheries (“Basque

Country”). Through the evolution of the economy, Basque society also changed, through early

industrialization and immigration.

Basques have a strong history of industry, which dominated its economy until the recent

shift to a service based economy. An abundance of iron ore was present in Euskadi and, while

used in Euskadi, was also transported to Britain for industrial processing; this fueled the

economy and the development of industry at home. Mining, steel, and shipbuilding industries

came to dominate Euskadi, especially Bilbao. The developing economy required a large work

force, drawing immigrants from around Spain and other countries, notably from France. This

influx of foreigners led to an expansion of cultural difference and languages. Immigration to

Euskadi to fuel industrialization continued throughout Franco’s regime. It was not until recently

that Euskadi moved away from industrialization.

In the 1980s, Bilbao officials began to see tourism as a solution for the declining

industrial market. While travel to the industrialized center for business was common, there was a

shift towards appealing to leisure tourism. In an effort to appeal to leisure travels, the city began

Kern 47

development of new transportation systems, notably a metro system and airport, parks, apartment

complexes, and stores. The Guggenheim Museum is considered the crowning jewel of this

period of revamping (Plaza 2000, 267). The region, already transitioning to a service based

economy, increased the number of hotels, restaurants, bars, and shops to accommodate the

growing number of tourists that the Guggenheim attracted. From the opening of the museum in

1997, attendance was higher than anticipated. In the first year alone, a million visitors patronized

the museum, a figure which the Guggenheim has maintained since; this allowed for the museum

to pay for itself within five years (Franklin 2016, 80). By embracing tourism as a growing outlet

for economic growth, Euskadi was able to revitalize their economy, largely due the success of

the Guggenheim museum.

As an autonomous community, País Vasco has more control of its finances, as it retains

control of its tax system. Instead of the Spanish state levying taxes, the process of levying taxes

is held by Basque regional tax authorities. As such, Basques have the power to levy various

taxes, including direct income tax, company tax, wealth taxes, inheritance taxes, gift tax (Ruiz

Almendral 2008, 58). Furthermore, Basques are in charge of indirect taxes such as VAT,

property transfer taxes, special taxes, and regulate local taxes. While the Basque authorities are

responsible for levying taxes, País Vasco still pays taxes to the Spanish state, as it provides

services such as defense, the armed forces, international relations, customs and tariff agreements,

and other similar services (Ruiz Almendral 2008, 59). Through a complicated system, the

amount of taxes that País Vasco pays to the state is determined; however, this amount is

generally small, less than one percent of total taxes collected in Euskadi (Ruiz Almendral 2008,

47). The computation method for determining taxes owed to the state is controversial, as

opponents feel it favors the Basque regional government (Ruiz Almendral 2008, 49).

Kern 48

Within this chapter, I explore the economy of País Vasco. My primary standard for this

measurement will be GDP per capita (PPP). I will compare the GDP per capita (PPP) of País

Vasco with that of Spain to determine if economic trends within Spain in general impacted that

of País Vasco. Next, I will compare the GDP per capita of each region to the number of ETA

victims to look for a relationship. Then, I look at the Basque peoples’ view of the economy, both

within País Vasco and Spain as a whole. By doing this, I seek to determine if there is a

relationship between ETA violence and economic conditions. I hypothesize that the economy

lagged when ETA was most active, as well as if the people’s perception of the economy matched

with how it actually performed.

País Vasco Economic Performance

Within this section, I discuss the actual performance of the economy of País Vasco,

measured in GDP per capita (PPP) in euros. I compare País Vasco with Spain and the European

Union, and, later, with the record of ETA incidents.

Graph 4.1: Comparison of GDP per capita (PPP): Euskadi and Spain (1990-2015)

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

GDP per capita (PPP)

Spain Euskadi

Kern 49

Graph 4.2: GDP Growth Per Year: Euskadi and Spain (1980-2015)

For Euskadi and Spain, the net GDP per capita (PPP) steadily increases from 1990-2016,

with the exception of the 2008 economic crisis. Examining the recovery from the 2008 crisis in

interesting, as it shows that País Vasco’s economy bounced back from the crisis quicker than that

of Spain. While both regions experienced a decline, Spain’s decline began in 2008 and lasted

through 2013, with 2014 showing the first net increase. Meanwhile, Euskadi’s economy declined

in 2009, showed a short recovery, and an additional drop from 2012-2013. Nevertheless,

Euskadi’s initial decline in 2009 (-5.4) was greater than that of Spain (-4.4). However, the

reverse is true in 2012, when Spain’s decline of -2.7 exceeded that of Euskadi’s -2.0. While this

supports that the 2008 economic crisis did not affect Euskadi as much as Spain or the EU, this

could be because Euskadi’s economy is based in services and industry. As such, it was not as

affected by the burst of the housing bubble as regions with a strong basis in construction or as

affected as regions that depended on tourism, which was also greatly affected. This allowed the

economy to recover quicker than that of Spain as a whole.

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

GDP Growth Per Year

Spain Euskadi

Kern 50

Graph 4.3: Number of ETA victims and GDP per capita in Euskadi (1980-2015)

Graph 4.4: Correlation Between ETA victims and GDP per capita (1980-2012)

From 1996 onwards, Euskadi surpassed Spain in terms of GDP per capita (PPP). Even in

periods of economic decline, País Vasco maintained a higher economic status than Spain. ETA

violence does not appear to affect the Basque region, as it remained affluent, despite attacks. In

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

198

01

981

198

21

983

198

41

985

198

61

987

198

81

989

199

01

991

199

21

993

199

419

95

199

61

997

199

819

99

200

02

001

200

220

03

200

42

005

200

62

007

200

82

009

201

02

011

201

22

013

201

42

015

Victims v. GDP per capita

Euskadi GDP per capita ETA Victims

y = -23.08ln(x) + 238.19R² = 0.6767

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000

ETA

vic

tim

s

GDP per capita

Victims v. GDP per capita

Kern 51

fact, Euskadi faced some of its largest growth during high periods of ETA violence. The highest

growth rate of 14.1% was in 1988 when there were 21 victims attributed to ETA. Throughout the

1980s, when ETA violence was at its peak, País Vasco had its highest amounts of economic

growth. Growth continued throughout ceasefires, although at a slower rate: 8.3% in 1999, 7% in

2005-2006, and 0.4% in 2011.

While this suggests that ETA violence and GDP per capita are not related, Graph 4.4

shows and inverse relationship between the two variables. Pearson’s R shows a value of 0.76,

showing that there is a relatively strong relationship between the two variables. Furthermore, the

trend line, produced by a logarithmic function, provides an R squared value of .6767, meaning

that approximately 68% of the number of deaths by ETA can be explained by looking at the

GDP per capita of Euskadi. This shows a strong relationship between the two variables.

Opinion of Economy

In the EuskoBarómetro surveys from 1999-2016, participants were asked to evaluate the

economic climate in both País Vasco and the whole of Spain. Respondents were given four

choices: good, regular, bad, and no answer. This section examines the responses regarding País

Vasco and compare them to the answers regarding Spain. As ETA activity was relatively low in

this period, it is not correlated to the number of ETA victims; however, the times of the

ceasefires are discussed.

Kern 52

Graph 4.5: Opinion of the Basque Economic Situation

Until immediately before the 2008 economic crisis, most Basques believed that the

economic situation they occupied in País Vasco was good. Beginning in 2007, however, the

number of Basques who believed their economic situation dropped and stayed low until recently.

While those who believed the economic situation to be normal remained relatively constant, the

classifications of good and bad are inversely related. In 2012-2013, the most people classified the

economy as bad, contrasting with the low of the good category. This matches the period when

the GDP per capita (PPP) of Euskadi was at its lowest in recent times, 30,627 and 30,289

respectively. As such, it is clear that perception of the economic situation in País Vasco matched

actual occurrences.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70%

of

resp

on

den

ts

Opinion of Basque Economic Situation

good regular bad no answer

Kern 53

Graph 4.6: Comparison of Economic opinion of Euskadi and Spain (1999-2016)

While the Basques were able to correctly judge their economic situation, they always

viewed the situation in País Vasco to be better than that of Spain as a whole. The opinions

regarding the economic situation in País Vasco and Spain have the same highs and lows, but to a

different extent. Bad economic times in País Vasco were always slightly better than the bad

times for Spain, while the good times where better in País Vasco than for Spain. For example, in

2012, the year where economic opinion was lowest, in País Vasco 66% of respondents thought

that the economic situation was poor, in contrast to 94% saying Spain’s situation was bad. As

ETA’s ceasefire was already in effect by this time, the economic downturn was in no way

correlated with ETA violence. Similarly, the best economic time in País Vasco does not

correspond in any way with violence. In 2001, 52% of Basques thought that the economic

situation was good; however, in this year, there were 15 victims of ETA attacks.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

% o

f re

spo

nd

ents

Economic Opinon Comparison of Euskadi and Spain

Spain: good Basque: good Spain: bad Basque: bad

Kern 54

Conclusions

The economic situation in País Vasco is one of the best in Spain, surpassing the GDP per

capita (PPP) of Spain in every year beginning with 1996. Additionally, due to the fact that the

Basque economy is not dependent on construction, the 2008 economic crisis did not affect País

Vasco as much as the rest of Spain and they were able to recover quicker. People’s perceptions

of the economic situation more or less mirrored the actual progression of the economy for both

País Vasco and Spain; however, Basques consistently viewed their own situation as better than

that of Spain, even if the actual data does not fully support their perceptions.

I expected to find an increase in violence during times of economic hardship, and this

was found to be true. Within the studies’ time period, there was a correlation between the GDP

per capita (PPP) and violence contributed to ETA, higher GDP per capita led to lower violence.

However, the Basques were not a poor people revolting against their wealthy oppressors,

suggesting that their violence was not expressly related to economic conditions.

Despite this correlation, the economy was not explicitly tied to violence. While ETA

targeted businessmen to hold for ransom, violent actions were not the deciding factor as to

whether the economy would be good or bad. The largest impact on the economy was from the

burst of the housing bubble that resulted in the economic crisis of 2008. Thus, while decreased

violence was linked to increased economic conditions, factors outside the realm of violence

impacted the economy in a more direct fashion.

Kern 55

Ch. 5: Conclusion

My thesis examined whether political, public opinion, or economic factors were related to

increases or decreases in ETA violence. Through my research, I concluded that neither

nationalist representation in the Basque Parliament or public opinion correlates with ETA

attacks; however, the economic situation and violence show a correlation.

At no point does ETA violence correlate with high periods of nationalist representation.

The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) has controlled the Basque parliament since 1980, with the

exception of 1987-1990 and 2009-2012. Even in these periods, nationalist representation

remained high. This may be because not all nationalist parties represented the interests of ETA,

or supported violence. Only Herri Batasuna (HB) and Euskal Herritarrok (EH) were closely

aligned with ETA, and both were both banned in 2003. As pro-ETA parties only controlled 15

percent of parliament at their peak, ETA likely did not believe that it could achieve its goals

politically. Because most nationalist parties did not support ETA, it follows that nationalist

representation and ETA violence would have little to no correlation. ETA’s ceasefire makes it

now likely that admitting nationalist sentiment is more acceptable, as it is no longer tied to

violence. Nationalist parties are likely to continue to maintain control of the Basque Parliament,

especially the moderate, non-violent parties, such as PNV.

ETA activity during 1999-present also was not influenced by public opinion regarding

identity, nationalist sentiment, and desire for independence. Although most Basques identified as

either completely Basque or as more Basque than Spanish, less than half professed a nationalist

sentiment, regardless of ETA attacks. Similarly, Basque desires for independence were not

affected by violence, as evidenced by increased desire for independence during 2006 ceasefire

Kern 56

negotiations and decreases during the 2011 peace. Basque perceptions of violence were related to

the actions of ETA: when ETA was more active, the public reported violence as a major

preoccupation, while in times of peace, the opposite was true. Finally, the public rejected ETA

while supporting peace negotiations between ETA and the government. The public also

overwhelmingly supported negotiations, but disagreed on the conditions needed to negotiate.

There was little correlation between activity and the need to negotiate, with the exception of

2006, when ETA and the Spanish state were in the midst of ceasefire talks.

País Vasco surpassed Spain’s GDP per capita (PPP) in every year; the wealth of the

region showed an inverse relationship with ETA activity. However, as the Basques remained

relatively wealthy throughout, the economic situation likely was not a large contributor to

violence. The economy was affected by global events, such as the bursting of the housing

bubble. While ETA targeted businessmen as subjects for kidnapping, ransom, and, occasionally,

assassination, these activities did not affect Euskadi’s overall economy.

After conducting research, I learned that ETA’s violence was not affected by the political

climate or public opinion of Euskadi, and, while economic conditions were inversely related with

violence, they are likely not a driving force, as Euskadi remained wealthy. Instead, I propose that

the cause of ETA’s violence lies outside of structural and institutional factors, or even public

opinion. Further research is needed to determine what factors, internal or otherwise, led ETA to

violence and contributed to their eventual ceasefire.

Failures in leadership and thinning ranks are likely to have had more to do with the

dissolution of the group, although disappearance of public support and lack of political

representation may have played a small role. Internal issues are likely to provide further insight

into the true reasons that ETA violence slowed and the group finally agreed to a ceasefire.

Kern 57

This shows that external factors and institutions are not always the cause for ethnic

violence. Other factors, such as repression of ethnic culture, are likely to lead to the outbreak of

violence, while internal factors of the group may lead to their continued use of violence. Similar

to the Basques, the Kurds are unified by a distinct culture and language. Although there is a

semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq, the Kurds do not possess their own state; instead,

their population is spread throughout five nations: Turkey, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

Brutally repressed by their host countries, the Kurdish language, culture, and identity was

restricted. This led the Kurds to establish the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to advocate for an

independent state; an armed struggle ensued. After breaking a ceasefire, the struggle between the

PKK and the Turkish state continues today. The story of the Kurds is eerily similar to that of the

Basques, showing the same roots of ethnic repression, provoking the outbreak of violence, and

breaking of ceasefires. If the lessons regarding ETA’s use of violence are to be applied, it can be

assumed that the cause of Kurdish violence is not tied to the political condition, public opinion,

or the economic climate. While they may play a small role, it is more likely that internal factors

within the group led to the perpetuance of violence, and will to the group’s eventual end.

Although my thesis suggests that the political situation, public opinion, and economic

situation of País Vasco did not correlate with ETA violence, there can be further study conducted

regarding the reasoning behind continued use of violence and the eventual decline. I propose

that internal structures of the group may play a role. Due to similarities regarding the outbreak of

violence among ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds, the causes of violence in ETA may be

applied to other groups who find themselves in similar situations.

Kern 58

Works Cited

Atlasa.net. 2017. “Economy.” Accessed February 22, 2017.

http://www.atlasa.net/en/economy/europe.

BBC News. 2003. “Batasuna Banned Permanently.” Last modified March 17.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2857437.stm.

Boucher, Richard. 2003. “Designation of Batasuna, Euskal Herritarrok and Herri Batasuna under

Executive Order 13224.” U.S. Department of State Press Statement. Last modified May

7. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20292.htm.

Bourne, Angela K. 2010. “Political Parties and Terrorism: Why ban Batasuna?” Paper presented

at the Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties Annual Conference. University of Exeter,

September 9-11.

Collins, Roger. 1986. The Basques. New York: Basil Blackwell.

Comunidad Autónoma Vasca. 1979. “The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country.”

http://www.basquecountry.eus/t32-

448/en/contenidos/informacion/estatuto_guernica/en_455/adjuntos/estatu_i.pdf

Conversi, Daniele. 1997. The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to

Nationalist Mobilization. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Corrado, Raymond R. 1997. “Basque Nationalist Terror: ETA.” Encyclopedia of World

Terrorism. City: Publisher.

Currin, Brian. 2012. “Why did ETA call it off?” Socialist Lawyer 60: 30-33.

Economy Watch. 2016. “Spain GDP Per Capita (PPP).” Last modified June 2016.

http://www.economywatch.com/economic-

statistics/Spain/GDP_Per_Capita_PPP_US_Dollars/

Kern 59

Esser, James K. and Christine M. Bridges. 2011. “Negotiating with Terrorists: The Case of the

Basques and Spain.” Peace and Conflict 17 (1): 60-76.

European Commission. 2017. “Basque Country.” Last modified March 6.

https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/regional-innovation-monitor/base-

profile/basque-country.

EuskoBarómetro. “EuskoBarómetro: Estudio periódico de la opinión pública vasca.”

Universidad del País Vasco. 199-2016.

http://www.ehu.eus/es/web/euskobarometro/oleadas.

Franklin, Adrian. 2016. “Journeys to the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao: Towards a Revised

Bilbao Effect.” Annals of Tourism Research 59: 79-92

Kurlansky, Mark. 1999. The Basque History of the World. New York: Walker & Company.

MacDonald, Ross B. and Monica C Bernardo. 2006. “The Politics of Victimhood: Historical

Memory and Peace in Spain and the Basque Region.” Journal of International Affairs 60

(1): 173-196.

Nash, Elizabeth. 1995. “Spanish Party Leaders Survives ETA Car Bomb.” The Independent,

April 19.

Open Data Euskadi. “GDP per capita of the Basque Country by province.” Last modified

September 17, 2015. http://opendata.euskadi.eus/gdp-per-capita-of-the-basque-country-

by-province-current-prices-euros-and-variation-rate-1980-2014-a/w79-contdata/en/

Pedahzur, Ami. 2003. Political Parties and Terrorist Groups. City: Taylor & Francis.

Plaza, Beatriz. 2000. “Evaluating the Influence of a Large Cultural Artifact in the Attraction of

Tourism: The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao Case.” Urban Affairs Review 36 (2): 264-

274.

Kern 60

Ruiz Almendral, Violeta. 2008. “The Asymmetric Distribution of Taxation Powers in the

Spanish State of Autonomies: The Common System and the Foral Tax Regimes.”

Regional and Federal Studies 13 (4): 41-66.

Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. 2007. “The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA.”

Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (3): 289-306.

Strong, WM. T. 1893. “The Fueros of Northern Spain.” Political Science Quarterly 8 (2): 317-

334.

Whitfield, Teresa. 2015. “The Basque Conflict and ETA: The Difficulties of an Ending.” The

United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 384.

Woodworth, Paddy. 2010. “When is a Cease-fire not a Cease-fire?” The New York Times.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/opinion/09iht-edwoodworth.html

World Bank. “GDP per capita growth (annual %).” Accessed March 4, 2017.

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?view=chart