Ethical Issues In Private and Public Ranch Land Management and Ownership

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Charles V. Blatz

Charles V. Blatz has taught philosophy at t .... Uni: ersity of Wyoming since 1969. His work has been primari ly in the areas of ethics, theory of knowledge and philosophy of science. He is currently writ ing in the area of rural and agricultural ethics.

"Can you manage?" "Sure, I 'ii manage just fine. " "But your rake is in ruin, your bailer is broken and the part for your stacker is out of stock." "It's all right." "I know I'll manage." Well maybe he did, but chances are he was not able to do it while exercising good management. Getting by somehow, coping, is managing in some sense. But it is not what we are concerned with here. Instead, the present purpose is to investigate some of the principles and particulars of good management of private and public ranch land. More specifically, I shall begin to explore what might be called the ethics of ranch land management. Just what all falls under this heading can be understood more clearly by looking at the management process itself.

The first task of managing private and public ranch lands is to identify and decide the relative merits of the goals we might pursue there. To do this we need two tests: one for deciding which goals are legitimate, worthwhile or justif'iable considered in and of themselves, and another for deciding which competing goals override others. Let me call these the tests of worthwhileness and relative merit. Having used these tests to identify the most important uses for our ranch lands we need to establish a way to monitor our progress toward those goals. Through this monitoring we should be able to minimize our opportunity costs, as the economists say. That is, by careful planning and by closely watching our activities we should be able to avoid practices that will limit the land's capacity to serve us in the pursui£ of our abiding goals.

stating and defending these prioritizing and progress checking procedures are tasks in ethical theory. Foundational to any management activity are ways of telling what possible resource uses are worthwhile, which are most important, and when we are making efficient progress toward these goals. Ethical theory is concerned and able to pr ovide us with just such procedures.

The first task of managing private and public ranch lands is to identify and decide the relative merits of the goals we might pur- sue there.

However, as we know, things change. The factors that go into determining the best use of public and private ranch lands are not static. Demands change, markets change, technology changes, nature itself is fickle, and so land that might have been best used primarily for grazing could come to be best used for hunting, rock hounding, and commercial mineral development. Management procedures will be incomplete without a monitoring process which periodically checks on whether ~ the best use is being made of the land.

Further, management of potential ranch land needs a structure for the decision-maki[ g that controls the actual day-to-day pursuit of our priorities. Beyond this it requires some delineation of authority over which lands are to be used for

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Thus from the perspective of normative theory the ethics of ranch manage- ment addresses several fundamental questions: how do we identify legitimate goals for the use of ranch lanc~ how do we prioritize these goals and set policy to pursue them with minimal opportunity cost; how do we remain responsive to conditions that might change our priorities and who should decide what lands they will cover.

ranching and which are not. In other words, management needs to know who should execute defensible policies and who should control which lands the policies will cover.

Thus from the perspective of normative theory the ethics of ranch land management addresses several fundamental questions: how do we identify legitimate goals for the use of potential ranch lands ; how do we prioritize those goals and set policy to pursue them with minimal opportun- ity costs; how do we remain responsive to conditions that might change our priorities; how do we determine who should carry out our policies and who should decide what lands they will cover. In my remarks, I will spend time mainly on three of these questions; those dealing with setting the priorities, determining who should carry out policy and deciding what lands are involved. In connection with the last of these questions, I shall discuss some of the pros and cons of transferring public ranch lands into private hands.

Throughout, the answer is the same. We should favor the aims of the individual free agent in setting our priorities, in assigning authority to manage the pursuit of those priorities and in deciding who should control lands with ranching use potential. Let me show you why this is so.

I . W h o s e a i m s c o u n t , a n d how m u c h ?

What goals are legitimate and how important are they? You might think that when it comes to private lands we need only respect individual rights ... a fairly simple matter. If a person's home is his castle, then the land is the domain over which there must be absolute control. There, the test of worthwhileness is simply what the deed holder chooses. Any aim of the owner is worthwhile. But only the owner's aims count on that land. And because this is so, the owner's preference is the test of relative merit. Assuming he/she is using efficient opportunity preserving means to pursue his goals, whatever he/she prefers on reflection will be the most important use.

At the same time, it mlght appear just as clear that en public lands with ranching potential we should not favor any particular individuals. This land belongs to all, at least in the sense that it is the good of all that should be served by its use. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 went much of the way to ensure that individual ranchers would be the only ones to count in public ranch land management or at least would be the ones to count themost. But those days are past. The Grazing Act has been superseded by the 1964 Classification and Multiple Use Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 which made the order of the day

multiple-use and the officer of the day the Federal Government. This has been reinforced by the execution of President Reagan' s executive order 12348 which calls for public lands inventories leading to the sale of unneeded lands, the proceeds to go toward the national debt. Adminis- trators commenting on the lands which will be retained continue to speak in terms of their Federally administered multiple-use administration. All the various competing potential uses willl be weighed somehow and only then will~ decisions be made in order to best serve the public. In making such decisions, presumably, no one individual looms larger than another; in fact it is types of uses that are weighed against each other in some way, not individual plans and aims. The ethical standard of good judgment seems to be the utilitarian one of producing as much good as possible for as many people as possible. And, the good is somehow linked to the multiple competing uses championed by ranchers, foresters, mineral developers, recreationalists and environmental preservationists.

Private rights on private lands, the public good on public lands ... these might seem to be the correct tests of worthwhileness and relative merit of uses for lands with ranching potential . But that is not so ! Private lands turn out not to be completely private in their use, and appeal to the land owner's rights will not properly answer the ethical

management questions that arise there. On the other hand, ethically speaking, public lands should be viewed as private in ways that are overlooked by viewpoints favoring the public good. This needs to be reflected in our tests of who should count for how much on the public lands. Let me explain.

Consider first running private lands simply by looking to the rights and preferences of individual landholders. The problems here are clear enough. First, rightsto the various uses for private land are often divided. An operator cannot legitimately claim all the water he wants to use. In many cases the owner has no claim on the minerals lying beneath the land' s surface. And often he is required to provide others with the opportunity to cross his land on their way to other areas he doesn't control. Secondly, ecosystems are open to influence across deeded boundaries. Thus what one person does with her land can affect the well-being of her neighbor's land ... not only in its value as an agricultural resource but also in its monetary value. Wind and water erosion damage due to improper range use and animal caused damage due to lack of proper fence maintenance are examples of harmful impacts neighbors have on one another. The lesson should be clear. Private lands become embroiled in conflicts in the same ways that public lands do. The legitimate uses of particular parcels are often different and in direct competition. But even if they were not, the use of one person's lands can influence the ability of another to use his lands as he might choose.

Thus, if we say that on private lands just the rights of the deed holder count, we often shall ignore other vested rights. But suppose we only said the deed holder's rights in and of themselves count the most. Still, we would be guilty of groundless bias or special pleading on behalf of certain land owners against their neighbors and others such as mineral developers, energy consumers. How could we justify such favoritism? One person's rights are as important as another's. And, any ethical principle favoring certain rights as themselves most important will be biased against the unfavored rights holders.

Thus, our ethical tests of worthwhileness and relative merit of aims must not treat oD ' selected people's aims as important or as most important. Any individual's aims need to be taken into account, if the management of private lands---might

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adversely affect them. In so doing we need to say that they are in and of themselves no less important than the deed holder ' s goals. In that way, private ranch lands are, ethically speaking, public.

Conversely, however, public land use is private in ethically important ways. Federal managing agencies seeking the public good will not always recognize this. Let me explain the dangers.

Utilitarian or social welfare maximizing ethics are what I call "product" as opposed to "process" oriented. They askthat we maximize the public good, understood as some desirable end-state. We measure success in numbers of net dollars gained, animal units per month grazed, numbers of board feet harvested, tons of ore extracted, numbers of visitors recorded and so on. The more units of welfare, the better, up to a limit imposed by the carrying capacity of the resource for the period of use planned for. If a potential user would not respect those limits, then the user should not be allowed access to the resource; no matter why, no matter that market incentives led the user to want to overuse it or conservative personal standards of good stewardship led him to want to underuse it. Such a potential user's aims will lose out always to those of the person oriented toward optimal production. An ethic striving to maximize the public good always will discount the aims of the less than optimally productive, treating them in and of themselves as of less importance than the aims of the optimally productive.

But why should we accept such an ethic as the correct one, biased as it is against the pursuit of certain aims? To accept it is to engage in a certain form of special pleading, a practice we spoke against above. What should be ethically important is the pursuit of goals ... that process ... not a certain product.

Another problem of special pleading faces utilitarian management of public lands by virtue of certain economies of scale. Suppose, for example, that it would be less costly to administer public lands if there were fewer graze permit holders. And suppose that in the bargain the administering agencies would be better able to ensure that optimal use was made of the land by allocating it among the largest operators, corporate or individual. Suppose those are the outfits which by virtue of size are able to afford the highest fees while putting the optimal number of animals on the land year

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after year. Then, utilitarian management procedures would favor public land use by these people as opposed perhaps to even current permit holders. But such an ethic would assign the permits in what we would consider an inequitable way, overlooking the importance of the disfavored operators' aims.

Finally, this ethic would make public land administration excessively public oriented by ignoring the degre~ of impact from its policy decisions. Suppose, for example, that we could increase the wealth gained from the land, and the number of people who benefit from its development, both in jobs and, ultimately, in cost of living. The way we would do this would be to turn over to mineral development, lands previously used for grazing, watershed and recreational purposes. But also imagine that in the bargain we make it so much more difficult for certain ranchers to

pursuits of individuals affected by its policy decisions.

Now, I do not lay any of the ethical errors just catalogued at the doorsteps of the Departments of Interior or Agriculture. I point them out as some ethical lessons in how public land management should be privately oriented. At a recent conference on ranching economics I heard a Washington based BLM staff person say that her director is concerned about equity; a concern that presumably went beyond just the execution of executive order 12348, though that was what she was speaking on. Well, what I have just pointed out are some ways in which bias can be introduced into the administration of public lands. Even if cases of the sorts illustrated have not occurred, an administration interested in equity will not appeal to an ethic which will allow them to occur.

operate that they are forced to sell Out or supplement their income by work It is wrong to wipe out the way of life of at the mine. (For example, suppose t h e m i n i n g w o u l d be in a l l u v i a l v a l l e y some j u s t so o t h e r s c a n be slightly b e t t e r off areas.) We have changed the life of these people in deeply significant econo;~'~cat~y. ways, eliminating or seriously curtailing their ability to pursue their aims. On the other side, the impact we have made on the others is much more superficial, though vastly more wide-spread. The mine workers who aren't from area ranches would have been mining elsewhere. The lease holders would have developed elsewhere and the energy consumers still would have run their microwave ovens and the rest, though at slightly higher costs per kilowatt hour. We are imagining then, only a small economic gain for many at the expense of the entire life plan of some - a small economic gain with a total net loss of aims the affected people can pursue. Here the public good ethic would disfavor the aim pursuits of the agriculturalists in favor of those of others. But this preference we would consider unfair. It is wrong to wipe out the way of life of some just so others can be slightly better off economically. It amounts to favoring a relatively restricted set of goal choices, namely those of lower utility bills over the myriad goal choices that enter into pursuing a life on a working ranch. A~d so it treats the agriculturalists' aims as in themselves less important than those of the mineral developers and their customers. The social-good ethic ends up biased against those who have the most to lose because it ignores the relative impact on the aim

But what is the alternative? Surely, in some way, a public good should figure into public land administration. Surely, private rights are important in private land use decisions. Well, as you might expect, I have an answer to those questions . As we noted above in administering private lands, we need tests of worthwhileness and relative merit which treat as equally important every aim affected by policy and which do not discount any aim in favor of others. Now we just saw that in ethically managing public lands we need to favor the process of aim pursuits on these lands, not the product of it. This amounts to not ignoring the management goals of any potential users; even if they do not coincide with the aims of those seeking optimal production. Also we noted that smaller producers should not be sacrificed by larger producers at the altar of optimal production and with the dagger of economies of scale. Finally, we noted that the public good is not sensitive to relative degrees of impact on aim pursuers except in so far as coincidentally those who stand to lose the most also are those pursuing an optimal use of the public lands. The way to avoid this bias is once again to take each aim pursuit seriously and not discount it in favor of any other. If this is done, then

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the person who is hurt most by public land policy decisions will count appropriately more than others and not be overlooked in the search for a faceless or impersonal public good.

All of this suggests the following: (i) The test of worthwhileness of an aim is simply whether or not someone has that aim and whether_policy decisions could thwart its pursuit; each and every policy__aaffected aim counts. The test of relative merit assumes that each and every policy affected aim counts as much as every other. In an ideal world, of course, we would let all aims flourish and not have to decide their relative merit, but in the real world, aims conflict and we do need to weigh them one against another. However, in the spirit of not playing favorites, all we can do is favor that policy which will allow for as much pursuit of the conflicting aims over the long haul as possible. We shall decide against those aims whose pursuit reduces the diversity of competing aim pursuits. Otherwise, we would be biased in favor of certain kinds of pursuits or the pursuits of certain individuals and Pnot others. Also, we shall decide against those aims whose pursuit reduces below its maximum the yield time the resource is capable of sustaining. Otherwise, we would be biased in favor of present and against future resource users. In short, (2) we should always seek to employ the resource in favor of allowing as many of the conflicting aim pursuits as we can for as long as we can.

This approach brings together private and public land management concerns into a single ethical principle according to which the private operator and public good are no longer seen as contestants for the same prize. Instead, it is always the individual goal seeker who counts and the ones with the most to lose will be the ones to count the most. I might add this usually will be the agricultural businessman. Let me call this the "individual goal pursuit (or just, IGP) approach."

Where will this approach take us? In all likelihood it will lead to agricultural uses of private and public ranch land that develop and protect the resource so that it is capable of sustaining yields at levels sought by it owner. This, of course, would involve protection against such things as wind and water erosion, unnecessary watershed and forage loss, as well as ensuring good stock containment practices thereby protecting neighboring lands. Such management does not seem to have had a

negative impact on a ires the game hunters pursue. Nor is it clear that it need have negative impact on wild ranch lands, such management apparently would be compatible with almost all forms of mineral develop- ment. (The major sort of exception seems to be strip mining where climatic and soil conditions militate against quick recovery and the morphology of deposits requires sprawling mines operating on pasture land needed because other sources and types of feed would be uneconomical. But with proper respect for reclama- tion and water supplies, even such development need not preclude stockgrowing.) In fact, the Powder River Country of Wyoming can provide cases where oil and gas wells and in situ uranium mines seem to coexist peacefully and productively with ranching on private land. Conse- quently, managing either private or public lands according to the IGP approach seems generally compatible with the ranch owner's aims being served along with any others he might affect in the bargain. There will be instances where this is not so; cases, for example, where mineral development would maximize the competing aim pursuits, and so, that is what should be done. But this determination would come only after the rancher's aims and the degree of impact on him had been considered. Ethically speaking, beyond that, each of us can ask no more.

The IGP approach then, rejects any distinction between the ethics of managing private and public lands. It rejects seeking maximal yield or a diversity of uses beyond what potential users want. It does not favor multiple use just to give all a piece of the pie. And it tries to tell us when, ethically speaking, we face one of those times when a single all-consuming use would be justified. What I have not spoken about is who should have the management responsi- bilities of applying this ethical approach, making and carrying out policy so as to maximize disputed and conflicting uses of ranch land. I turn to that now.

II. P u b l i c and P r i v a t e Land M a n a g e m e n t R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s

Just who has responsibilities for privately owned resources is clear ; either the owner or his duly appointed agent. The obligations of the private manager are to undertake such policies as seem likely on good evidence to reach the owner's aims (avowed or projected) taking advantage of

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available opportunities. The opportunities of the private manager are those afforded by technology, operating capital, applicable statues, general ethical considerations of the sorts explained above, skills of potential employees, and the land itself. Disputes between private managers, if not resolved by the parties themselves, will need to be taken before whoever can settle them in favor of a maximum of competing goal pursuits. Generally, though not necessarily, this job could be left to the courts. But whoever adjudicates such disputes, the policies on trial will be those of the individual private managers, not those of someone else.

Just who has what responsibilities for publicly owned resources is not so clear , however . What is the government' s role, and what is the role of the private manager on public lands? To sort this out, let me ask first what are the ethically justifiable roles for governmental agencies at any level. Wha'£ ---'__in ~eneral, should government managers be authorized or obligated to accomplish; what sort of end results should they be responsible for? Once we get straight on that, then the management role of private users of the public lands can be made clear.

If we take seriously the claims that public land management should be for the public good, then we might think that it is governmental managers who should identify what that good is and how to achieve it, and then work toward that end. On this view: government managers are agents with goals and aims of their own. They work toward these by allocating public land resources to private individuals or commercial ventures. Proper allocation and agency assistance will then result in the agency's success in reaching its aims, what it considers the public good. The individual users presumably have benefited along the way. But, if it was the government manager ' s plans or aims that determined what was done on the public lands; users whose aims did not coincide with those of the government would have been denied access. And it is the government manager who was the executive officer in the operation, deciding for all intents and purposes: what in particular was to be done, when it was to be done, by whom, for how long , and why. The agency manager, not the private user, was in every important sense, the controlling influence in the project. And whatever success there is is the success that the manager has in

fulfilling his plans. Success is not measured on this view, by the private users carrying out their plans.

We should be suspicious of this view now that we have seen how public lands are private, ethically speaking. But still, I need to address it. Clearly it is often the view of people within controlling agencies, as well as people outside these agencies. Recent statements by Interior and Agriculture often present exactly the perspective above. This may be seen, for example, in policy explanations concerning present land management initiatives. Bob Burford, BLM director illustrates the point.

Most of the Federal property within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management is public domain land and the resources within that land. (sic) These are our public assets and we manage them for the public good ... at public expense. If one of those assets is so isolated that it cannot be properly or effect- ively managed at public expense, then common sense dictates that it be turned over to the private sector or to local governments. That's not 'privatization;' that's 'asset management' and that's what BLM calls this program.

Basically, that's what the asset management program is all about. It's the first attempt in many years to make government answer- able to the taxpayer in a manner that will manage that taxpayer's property and dollars efficiently and effectively.

The same story is told by FLPMA. As Catherine England, Policy Analyst for the Heritage Foundation explains, this act

called for the long-run management of the range for sustained yield and multiple-use, and outlined the functions of BLM as a permanent regulatory agency. FLPMA made allotment management plans, issued by BLM, mandatory. Formal directives and timetables were included in the legislation. The Interior Secretary was required to specify the number of animals to be grazed and season of use. Furthermore, harvesting practices were ordered modified to restore the range and meet multiple-use criteria. Grazing advisory boards were made optional by FLPMA and multiple-use advisory boards replaced them with representatives of various potential users in addition to livestock producers. The result, many ranchers have claimed, is that the federally

owned Western lands were safer for coyotes than the livestock. In short, a new age w{th new power groups had arrived.

(But remember, at the center of these groups is the Federal managing authority to which the other groups are advisory.)

The same perspective is presented by groups outside of government. Recently, for example, the Intermoun- tain Society of American Foresters applauded the Supervisor of Bridger- eton National Forest commending his efforts to "actively pursue and assist with the advancing of the science, technolog~ and the practice of forestry."- This man's solutions to "many major resource issues provid(ed) for the ' greatest good for the greategt number of people in the long run ' . "-

Thus many, including highly placed managers themselves, seem to think that government's role, at least at the Federal level, is to decide the best use of lands under their authority, make plans to achieve that use and implement these plans aiming all the while at the maximum profit the land can generate, at the satisfaction of multiple-use demands or other forms of that ethical chameleon, the public good. But, this is confused thinking, where the cart is put before the horse.

The error here becomes clear if we recall two things. First, humans are not born able to live with only one form of government. For that matter, we are not born able to live only with some government or other. That we have a government, let alone any particular form of government, is something we can decide for ourselves. Nature does not settle these issues. Thus, the questions we face are, should we live under the sway of public authority and if so what form should it take? No answer that says some particular form of government is right in and of itself will be acceptable. If we just assert this as our special insight or if we try to argue it on the basis of self-evident or otherwise unsupported foundations, those who disagree can legitimately accuse us of special pleading. But if the answer is not in terms of what government, if any, is justified in and of itself, then what is the alternative?

Nature has left us with the task of picking our public authority system. If we cannot justify our selection on its own intrinsic merits, the alternative clearly is to make o[ir decision on the instrumental merits of possible governments. That is, we need to justify our choice of having

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any government and of having one of a particular sort on the basis of its being an effective means to our ends; the ends, presumably, we are justified in pursuing. Forms of public authority do not come justified in and of themselves. They become justified in so far as they are good tools for the job at hand; for assisting with the legitimate aim pursuits of the governed.

What are those pursuits? Well, as we now know, anyone's pursuits need to be treated as legitimate and a maximum of conflicting interests needs to be allowed as legitimate in the face of competition for limited resources. Anything short of this will be biased, resting on a foundation of special pleading, not equitable tolerance or mutual respect.

So then, government is justified instrumentally, not intrinsically. And ethically speaking, its proper end is to aid us, the governed, in the pursuit of our aims, the realization of our plans, the gaining of our successes. Further, this clarifies the best form of government, namely, whatever will aid the most in the achievement of a maximum of citizens' conflicting aim pursuits. At the least, this means that government and its public land managing agencies should be representative. Aid cannot be afforded the resource users in their pursuits unless their aims are known. For the same reason, public land assistance will be most effectively afforded at the level closest to all the affected users. Many questions about public lands committed to grazing, for example, should be dealt with by a local range region or forest review board, if they cannot be considered answered by the original user's plan for the land and the determination of what use will maximize affected goal pursuits. Questions of animal unit carrying capacity of the range and season of use are included. It is the local review board or even better the user himself aided by available expertise who will know the range and the user's goals and so be best able to carry out the favored aim pursuits. FLPMA's regulation has all this just backwards. But if we do follow the IGP approach instead of FLPMA, private operations on public lands will be in the hands of the user to the greatest extent possible. Her aims are central, and to her will come the fruits of success or the famine of failure, not to the managing agent. It is her efforts, her style, her plans that government managers should assist with, not the other way around.

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So then, government is justified instrumen- tally, not intrinsically. And, ethically speak- ing, its proper end is to aid us, the governed, in the pursuit of our aims, the realization of our plans, the gaining of our successes.

Still government managing agencies play three important roles in the ethically defensible management process. Land use patterns will have to be determined in the first place in a process resolving the conflicts between the various potential users. If they are functioning in an ethically defensible way, without bias toward any aims, government agencies will serve to identify and facilitate whatever uses will maximize competing pursuits in the long run. But to ensure that government does not impose its own will on the use of the lands in question, they should act only in the role of adjudicator of the dispute; sitting in the place of judges deciding a civil dispute.

To ensure that their aims are adequately represented, individuals should be required to present and defend a use proposal in which they detail their plans. This would outline their proposed use over time, the expected impact on the resource yield capacity, and their plans to maintain the resource for sustained yield. Further, and very importantly, the kinds and amounts of other aim pursuits the user views compatible with his own plans, as well as kinds and amounts of alternative uses incompatible with his own should be stated. Insofar as the conflict ~resolving agency is trying to maximize competing aim pursuits, plans for innovative, cooperative and diverse uses can be expected from each applicant. Also, as part of the user's attention to other demands on the resource, his proposal should specify the extent to which he can aid in keeping the land in a condition favorable for those other demands. This would serve to show how a proposed use would be minimally consumptive of the land's diversity of uses.

Single users could file such proposals for certain parcels. Groups of individuals could file joint single use proposals for groups of contiguous parcels . Private special use organizations with open membership up to the proposed use capacity of an area could file single proposals for say hunting or fishing privileges in a

certain public land section and these proposals could include plans for habitat improvement or maintenance to be conducted by the group at its own expense. And so it could go.

Clearly, such use proposals could aid greatly in keeping the management of the land in the hands of the users. Government managing agencies would use these proposals only to resolve conflicts of demands upon the resource, striving to maximize the competing aim pursuits. In the integration process they, in effect, would be ranking the proposed uses in order of priority and use S user applicants in order of autonomy and authority. Those plans with fewer constraints on them, where, in effect, the applicant has a freer hand to carry out his management plan, would have been given a higher priority. Always, the user that will hurt others the least but can be hurt the most by others will be given the greatest freedom where there are several users. For example, the rancher who would use the land for grazing without preclading recreational uses or oil and gas development would be given the most freedom, the others being required not to interfere with the rancher's operations or improvements. In those head-on collisions as, for example, between range use and strip mining, the government managers would have to decide which use really would maximize the conflicting aim pursuits. These managers will have to make some difficult determinations.

While deciding between use proposals, managers should consider the history of use on the parcel in question. There is good evidence that a history of use of public land along with deeded land, increases the value of the deeded land. Also, in many cases, use of public land has led the rancher to make capital improvements bettering 8 the land as a ranching resource. The facts will be relevant in two ways to use proposal decisions.

They will justify compensation for loss of deeded land value and loss of capital improvement investment when the permit holder loses the land to a nonagricultural use. After all, the loss of that land value and improve- ment investment is a loss of the permit holder's ability to engage in his chosen aim pursuits. The alternative use plan that maximizes conflicting aim pursuits thus will minimize his losses.

At the same time, if the present user is being responsible, transfer- ring her permit to another agricul- tural user would represent no net gain in ranching aim pursuits. But in

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light of the economic impact on the present user it would represent a net loss of aim pursuits. (The new applicant cannot lose in this way as she is not using the land now herself.) Thus, if we maximize aim pursuits, we will not transfer public lands from one responsible agricul- tural user to another. On the other hand, if the present user is being irresponsible and we could increase agricultural aim pursuits in the long run by a transfer, then the IGP approach would say it is justified; again with compensetion for the actual (decreased) land and improvement value lost.

In all these ways, the IGP approach would enable government managers to equitably settle conflicts in determining justifiable land use. But the government also has another management role to play.

Government agencies can serve justifiably in an oversight capacity, conducting periodic reviews of the activities of the individual users. The only legitimate purpose here would be to determine whether the user is conducting his activities in such a way that the merits of his proposal are merits of his actual operation. The question always and only should be, were we correct in judging this user the best steward of the land in order to maximize conflicting goal pursuits? This planning and review work should be conducted at the level most efficient for maximizing aim pursuits. In all likelihood this will occur at a level more local to the resource in question than removed. That is usually where the most detailed user and resource information can be obtained and digested for the least cost.

Here again, recent trends in land management seem to be going in the wrong direction. At least this is so at the Federal level if critics are right that the Classification and Multiple-Use Act of 1964 and FLMPA have the result of removing local authority and executive responsibili- ties to the Federal level. By com- parison the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 seems to have been much more in line with ethically defensible management schemes. It at least tried to leave much of the planning and review of use in private and so more locally accountable hands . As England explains, once again, with the passage of the original Act in 1934" ... The Interior Department was ordered to cooperate with the local livestock associations and state officials in establishing regulations." All these

could be considerations in review or use proposals conducted at as local a

level as possible to maximize conflicting aim pursuits.

Finally, government managers would have to be empowered to enforce their use proposal decisions. Again this would appear to work best if set up to be more local than regional or national. It is easier to police your own back yard where the legitimate uses were adjudicated in the first place. Still policy on broader planning concerns like water tables, will require broader enforcement authority.

How complex the government review, oversight and enforcement agencies need to be, will depend upon what lands are to be included in the public resource pool, and, on who declares them a public resource. After all, if most of the public lands that presently qualify were transferred into private hands , governmental management could be minimal . If transfers on such a scale are not justified, then we shall need larger governmental management. Thus before the full details of an ethically defensible public land management scheme can be given, we need to know the extent to which public lands should be moved into private hands. Also then, we need to know how, ethically speaking, this is to be decided. I will close with a few remarks on these issues.

III. Alternatives for Private Management and Disposition of Public Lands

According to the Federal government, it is they who should decide on the public or private status of federal lands. Also they sing a familiar ballad telling us that the decision will be guided by what serves the public good. Bruce Selfon speaking as Acting Executive Director of the Property Review Board explains it this way •

Lands in the National Park System, Wildlife Refuge System, and Indian Trust Lands will not be considered

for sale in the Asset Management program, nor will wilderness areas or wilderness study areas. In general, the retention category will include land and mineral resources with environmental and/or economic assets or national significance. Our policy will be to retain all these lands in the Federal system. Lands which will be placed in the sale category include :

12 A g r i c u l t u r e a n d H u m a n V a l u e s - F a l l 1 9 8 4

...Lands proximate to cities, towns, or development areas not under application for recreation or other public uses;

...Scattered non-urban tracts so located as to make effective and efficient management impractical;

...Lands designated for agricultural, commercial, or industrial development as highest value or otherwise most appropriate use;

...Other types of lands and minerals identified forl~ale in an existing land use plan.

And in case you have any questions about such terms as "highest value," "most appropriate use," and "national significance," Selfon also says the following:

We expect that the sale of these properties can help stimulate local economic development. They will be put to more productive use in private hands and increase the local tax base. When we dispose of these properties we will seek their highest and best use to maximize the benefits to the taxpayer. We intend that the proceeds from the sale of property be placed in a special account in the Treasury to be used.only to reduce the national debt. l±

That reduction, the government has determined is what will be of maximal benefit to our citizens in so far as we are taxpayers. The best and highest use of the land is, then, whatever brings the largest price thereby making the greatest contribu- tion to the public good of debt reduction.

As you can predict by now, I think there are some serious flaws in views such as those expressed by Selfon. In the first place, the public lands are not government's to dispose of as they see fit. The government's role, we just saw, is not that of deciding the best use for these areas according to what suits its plans. Rather, it is to allocate and assist in the use of these lands in a way that best serves the competing demands upon them over the long haul.

Second, the lands beleng to all, at least in the sense that each potential user's aims must be taken into account in allocation decisions, and the final conflict resolution should favor a maximization of these competing pursuits.

Furthermore, reducing the national debt is important to us all in so far as tax payments impinge on our ability to pursue our individual aims. But, it is as goal seekers, not as

taxpayers, that we count in the disposal of public lands. Once again, the presently controlling agencies have things turned around, the cart before the horse.

Finally, some critics have claimed that the currently controlling government agencies are not going to jeopardize their own authority and size. If this is so, these bureaus are not the ones who can be counted upon to do an ethically justifiable job, since they will act in self- serving ways. In that case, the disposal decision should be taken out of the hands of current controlling agencies and given over to, for example, the judiciary or even to whatever ad hoc local or national review boards will do a thorough unbiased job. Maybe, this is correct. But we cannot say just yet.

In the first place, we do not know enough about what agency structure would be able to maximize competing aim pursuits while d~ciding what

public lands to dispose of. Yet that is the bottom line in assigning the disposal decision to some agency or group of individuals. In the management of the public lands, maximizing goal pursuits is the only legitimate guide and public land disposal is just one case in point.

Also, it is just not clear whether any public lands with agricultural value should be disposed of. Once the various arguments are marshalled it seems that there is more in favor of government retention. But not all the facts are in. Let me explain.

The arguments in favor of transfer seem to fit into three categories, those concerned with: resource productivity and protection; user benefits of an intangible kind; and monetary gains for the user, local tax district, national budget and taxpayer.

Under resource productivity and protection fall the following claims. If public lands were in the hands of private agriculturalists, they could be managed in ways reflecting the different styles of different operations. These styles would be suited to getting the most out of the land because there would be market incentives to do so. Also, since the resource would have to benefit the rancher over the years, there would be an incentive to keep the land in its best usable state having sustained yield capabilities.

But the fact is that not all ranchers will suit their style of operation to maximal productivity opportunities and, as we have seen,

ethically there is no clear reason to always do so. Further, some ranchers have turned land speculators , converting grazing lands into crop lands for relatively high priced quick sale. There is no market incentive guarantee of good land stewardship. In addition, on some disposal plans, such as Selfon's, the range could go to the highest bidder, and so it is not at all clear that agriculturalists would have a shot at working the land at all, as good or bad stewards.. But more importantly, with the use proposal and user management scheme I sketched above, individual style could be imprinted on public land use and all that could be done would be done to guarantee good stewardship in the proposal review and oversight activities of government managers.

So much for resource productivity and protection arguments. Let me turn now to arguments based on disposal's supposed intangible benefits. Sometimes you hear that individual users lack freedom or autonomy (and accompanying satisfactions) in their use of public lands. Transfer of those lands into private hands would ensure user freedom and thus fit with the spirit of our country's founding documents. But again, this assumes what is far from clear, namely that agriculturalists will end up with the land they now work. Also it assumes that once the land is in the private sector, local zoning and use laws will be less restrictive than present use regulations. Once again, though, the point to remember is that the problem might not be due to public ownership, but to the present attitudes and policies of public managers.

The use proposal and management scheme I have outlined will allow for what is, ethically speaking, the maximum of user freedom. This includes, of course, a guarantee of tenure for a time during which the use proposal would maximize conflicting aim pursuits. It should be expected that these tenure periods will be quite extensive since agriculturalists would find management and economic advantages in proposing an integration of public land use into the long-term operation of their spread. And , government management, aiming at maximizing conflicting aim pursuits over the long haul would be seeking to assign public lands to long term users to the greatest extent possible. Also, as pointed out, in most cases the management scheme I have urged would give agriculturalists the most

B l a t z : E t h i c a l I s s u e s 13

executive power of all users because they are the ones whose responsible use would interfere with other users the least, while itself being most vulnerable to other uses. A defensible management scheme would give ranchers personal freedom and accompanying satisfactions on the public lands.

Finally, we should consider the main economic arguments for disposal. We are told that transfer to private lands will: increase the local tax base benefiting the region; allow the user to manage the land in ways taking full advantage of market conditions; recognize the present user's economic interests in the public land (those tied to past fee payments increase in value of the user's associated deeded lands and capital improvements he has placed on the public lands). In the bargain, it will cut down Federal agency management costs as well as generate income to be used to reduce the national debt and so reduce taxes.

But wait a minute! We do not know what tax increases there would be or whether they could be paid until we know the assessment procedure by which the land is valued for sale. What we do know is that if many public lands in agricultural use are transferred at a rate that will maximally benefit the taxpayers and the local tax districts, agricultural uses of these lands will not pay for them. Appeal to local tax benefits is just premature at best.

Further, on the scheme I supported, users could have more freedom to suit land use to market incentives consistent with sustained yield and their vested interests would be recognized as explained. Perhaps my scheme would not give the previous user a vested interest in the land equal to the fees he has paid. But then, when I pay a road toll on a business trip I do not get an equivalent amount of monetary interest in the turnpike I travel.

Finally, there is no guarantee that transfer of public lands will reduce current management agency funding as opposed to just shunting all present levels of spending in different directions. As well, there is no guarantee that land transfer fees will be great enough to help the taxpayers or even be used on the national debt. But, the management scheme I have advocated would allow governmental management of public lands at a reduced cost. In fact it would encourage it as part of the means to maximizing affected aim pursuits. And, secure meaningful tenure might

14 A g r i c u l t u r e a n d Human V a l u e s - F a l l 1984

allow higher use fees which could go toward the national debt or to local tax regions. Thus, once again, a supposed advantage turns to be gained without transfer, if we change the management scheme.

Beyond this, governmental retention has two advantages which cannot be gained by transfer. First, retention of lands whose aim-pursuit-maximizing use is agricultural, provides the country with a much needed future flexibility. Responsible agricultural uses are not going to reduce the land's diverse potential. Thus the opportunity cost for maximizing conflicting aim pursuits over the long run are slight on public lands kept in agricultural uses . This will be recognized as vitally important to a desirable future unless we are so foolish as to think we can anticipate future goals and opportunities, or else so biased as to take on the job of deciding those things for our children's children. Second, public ~doma in retention provides the government with the kind of freedom of responsiveness it needs to carry out its role of resolving conflicts in a long term aim pursuit maximizing way.

Transfer of public ranch lands to private lands will not have an opportunity cost advantage unless the terms of transfer guarantee that the land stay in agricultural use until the government says otherwise. And it will not allow government the responsiveness it needs unless transfer is made in terms whereby £he government can redefine permitted uses of the transferred lands. Obviously a transfer with constraints of these two sorts is a transfer in name only.

Keeping the future open and being best able to take advantage of it speaks against transfer of public lands. Retention will enjoy the clear benefits of transfer, if government management is directed to maximizing conflicting aim pursuits over the long run. It seems then that retention should get the nod.

Whether this is really so deserves our further attention. I do not presume to have settled this or the other questions I have discussed. Perhaps, though, I have provided a useful introduction to the ethics of ranch land management. In the issues arising there, it is each individual conflicting aim which to count equally with every other. The government' s role is to facilitate a maximum pursuit of conflicting aims. It is to do this through a consideration of individual user plans for public lands and through such transfer of public lands to private operators as will

maximize conflicting goal pursuits. Private management decisions involving no conflicts of aims are entirely up to the individuals themselves, but where there are private land use conflicts, once again the ethical decision will be the one maximizing all the conflicting aim pursuits.

Notes

(i) This paper is virtually identical to one presented to the First Ucross Foundation Conference on the Future of Wyoming. See: Ranching and Wyoming's Future: "Land Management and Ownership," Proceedings of the First Conference On wyoming's Future, Ucross Foundation, September 23-25, 1983 (Ucross, Laramie and Cheyenne, Wyoming: Ucross Foundation; University of Wyoming, The Wyoming Agricultural Extension Service and The Wyoming Department of Agriculture, 1984) pp. D-19-37. (2) Within the class of owners, this

sort of view turns out to be a form of egoism in ethics or the theory of what is rational. For an influential sketch of such a view of rationality see: W. M. Sibley, "The Rational versus the Reasonable," Philosophical Review Vol. 62 (1953), pp. 554-60. (3) The main argument brought here

against owner hegemony, namely that this theory is question begging ("biased") in favor of one of the competing rights holders or landown- ers, can be generalized and brought against Sibley's view of rational conduct. The complaint would be that Sibley's view will end up favoring only certain individuals over others for no good reason and so be ethically biased. Sibley's theory might seek to avoid that complaint by saying that no one would be favored over any other by his view; just anyone's claim is as strong from her perspective as is any one else's, and there is never any reason for favoring one over another conflicting party.

The problem here, however, is that now we have lost the baby with the bathwater. Sibley's view (and egoism in general, as is well known) ends up in a kind of relativism which allows no defensible resolution to conflicts between interests or people. When two incompatible courses of action aimed at by conflicting parties are considered, Sibley's view (and other egoisms) cannot name one as justifia- ble, all things considered; at least not without an indefensible bias. The reason is simply, that such a view makes an act justifiable, ethical, rational conduct. Since this one is picked as the source of the test of

B l a t z : E t h i c a l I s s u e s 15

what is justifiable, her or his selection is beyond defense. (It cannot be defended by appeal to any other more basic norms, since there are none. ) And yet, from that standpoint, competing goals and interests will always be unjustifia- ble. Thus, from the viewpoint of the disfavored party that standpoint would incorporate a merely assumed bias.

The extent of the prejudice should be emphasized. From the perspective of the favored party, we cannot even say there is a conflict of legitimate pursuits every side of which deserves serious consideration or has some ethical standing. The only way we could even recognize such a substan- tial ethical conflict would be from the standpoint of an ethical principle according to which each of the conflicting goals has ethical standing or would be pursued justifiably. But to take up such a common ethical perspective would be to give up favoring the agent's (or landowner's) preferences. It would be to give up egoism in ethics including Sibley's view of rationality. But why couldn't someone just tough it out, claiming in some absolutist way that the agent (landowner) is always right and in conflicts other people' s goals are ethically devoid of significance? To do so without argument would be question begging. To offer an argument for the point would involve reliance upon some principle favoring the party in question and so would only push back the question begging. I have developed this argument further in a number of places. In The Conference Proceedings volume, see my paper, "Conflicts Facing Western Agriculture: A Proposal for their Resolution," above. (3) I outline how to measure depth of

impact upon someone's aim pursuits in my paper, "Conflicts Facing Western Agriculture: A Proposal for Their Resolution. " (4) Robert F. Burford, "BLM's Asset

Management Program," in James H. Smits

(ed.), Privatizin@ the Public Lands: Issues Involved in Transferring Federal Lands to Private Owners, (Washington D. C. : Public Lands Council, 1983) p. 98. (5) Catherine England, "Background of

Privatization Issues," in Smits, op. cir., p. 12. (6) As reported in an article in the

Jackson, Wyoming newspaper, January 4, 1983. (7) Ibid.

(8) For both of these points see, Gary D. Libecap, "Economic Interests of Grazing Permittees," in Smits, o i~. cir., pp. 53-58. Libecap's study is most interesting, arguing for private holding of what are now public lands in order to assure a production maximizing private-right based land tenure system. His arguments are flawed, however, in that they do not take seriously tenure and management schemes different from what we now have and from what he proposes. As I argue a few pages below, maybe the problems have been due not to public ownership, but to current management schemes. In fact, Libecap's Chapter 5 seems to provide excellent evidence for this hypothesis. See note 10. (9) Catherine England, op. cit. , p.

ii. Chapter 5 of Libecap's study (cited in the preceding note) makes clear how powerful were the local and national Advisory Boards and how range conditions improved significantly under their control. This evidence speaks strongly on the ethical view outlined here, in favor of the individual user management scheme I suggest, or short of that a return to the Taylor Grazing Act days (as amended 1937-1960) and away from the government use decisions and administration we currently have as a result of FLPMA and the Classification and Multiple-use Act of 1964. (10) Bruce I. Selfon, "President Reagan's Property Sale Program," in Smits, op. cit., pp. 16-17. (Ii) Ibid., p. 16.

1 6 A g r i c u l t u r e and I - t u m a n V a l u e s - F a l l 1 9 8 4

Letter~ continued from p. 56

Kentucky Constitution which states that all property shall be taxed and not exempted. This suit is being heard in the Franklin County Circuit Court (State Court). A decision is expected in March, 1985.

In the first suit the attorneys are Ira Burnam and Joe Childers. They are joined in the second suit by Phillip Shepherd of Frankfort. For further information contact Joe Childers, P.O. Box 782, Frankfort, Kentucky 46692 (phone 592-223-2338).

E d i t o r .

There is a correction that needs to be made (in Vol. I, No. 2) . There were two courses attributed to me (in the BIBLIOGRAPHIES section). However, the one on nutritional anthropology was developed by Lynn Thomas, and I joined him later in the presentation of the course. The credit belongs to him for the course as it is presented. My contributions were minor. His name was on the handouts from the course but may have been lest in all the processes that handouts go through. Lynn is a very nice person and is not upset, but I want the record straight and credit given to the deserving - certainly not me in this case.

Jerry Moles The Institute of Su~tainability Box 2063 Davis, California

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