eu paper on rohingya by chris lewa

7/30/2019 EU Paper on Rohingya by Chris Lewa

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Conflict, discrimination and humanitarian challengesin Northern Arakan State

By Chris Lewa, Forum Asia, Bangkok

Delivered at the EU Burma Day 2003 Conference

Brussels, 8 October 2003

Unlike the Thai-Burma border, there has been much less international attention on theBangladesh-Burma border, and, consequently, Arakan State has remained a largely ignoredregion of Burma. Awareness is generally limited to the cycle of exodus and repatriation ofRohingya refugees.

But Arakan is no less than a microcosm of Burma with its ethnic conflicts and religiousantagonisms, and is by far the most tense and explosive region of the country. The refugeeoutflow to Bangladesh does not result from counter-insurgency strategies to undermineethnic armed resistance, as it is the case for the Shan, Karen and Karenni along the Thai-Burma border, but is the outcome of policies of exclusion against the Rohingya community.

BRIEF OVERVIEW

Arakan State is a long strip of land stretching along the Bay of Bengal to the West andflanked by a high mountain range to the East, which cuts it off from the rest of Burma. Itsnarrow northern side borders Bangladesh. Through its geopolitical position, Arakan finds

itself at the crossroads of two continental entities, South Asia and South-East Asia --between Buddhist Asia and Muslim-Hindu Asia and between the Mongoloid and the Indo-Aryan races.

Two major communities inhabit Arakan State. No reliable demographic data are availablebut it is estimated that about two-thirds of the population are Rakhine Buddhist, close tothe Burman in terms of religion and language, while one-third is Muslim. This group,known as Rohingya, is ethnically and religiously related to the Chittagonian people ofsouthern Bangladesh and is mostly concentrated in the northern part of the State adjacentto Bangladesh. Other small ethnic groups also live predominantly in the hill areas.

According to UNHCR, Northern Arakan State, which includes the 3 townships ofMaungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung, has a total population of 850,000. The Rohingyarepresent 94% of the population of Maungdaw and 88% of Buthidaung, less in Rathedaung.More than 30% of the Muslim population of Maungdaw and Buthidaung fled toBangladesh during the last refugee exodus of 1991/92.


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HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Arakan was an independent kingdom until 1784, encompassing at times the southern partof todays Bangladesh, and was famous as a land of economic opportunities, on themaritime shipping routes between the Persian Gulf and Asia. Buddhist kings ruled, butMuslims played an influential role in the court, defence and administration of the kingdom.In 1784, Arakan was invaded by the Burmans and in 1824, following the first Anglo-Burmawar, it was incorporated into British India.

During the British colonial period, a large number of people of Indian origin settledthroughout Burma as administrators, merchants and moneylenders. Arakan also witnesseda massive immigration, mostly of seasonal agricultural workers from the Chittagong area.Resentment against this Indian immigration fuelled the emergence of Burmese nationalismbut no distinction was made between Indians in general and the indigenous Muslims ofArakan.1

Muslims and Buddhists co-existed in the Arakan region for many centuries, and untilWWII, the two communities did not show any sign of strong animosity. However, in 1942,the Japanese conquest and the withdrawal of the British created a political vacuum, whichgave room for accumulated tensions sparked by this Indian immigration to explode and thefirst major communal riots broke out in Arakan.

After Independence, some Rohingya leaders formed a Mujahid movement and demandedautonomy. The Rohingyas claim to be an ethnic group of Burma was neverthelessrecognised during the parliamentary era of U Nu in the 1950s, a move consideredpolitically motivated. But it has been denied consistently following the military take-overin 19622.

Ruthless campaigns and discriminatory policies against them prompted two massiveexoduses of more than 250,000 Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh in 1978 and 1991/92. Eachrefugee crisis was followed by mass repatriation, whose voluntariness had been seriouslyquestioned. Today, about 19,000 Rohingya refugees remain in two camps in Bangladeshand, in 2003, renewed attempts to repatriate them led to coercion, intimidation and forcedrepatriation. In addition to the refugees in the camps, hundreds of thousands of Rohingyaalso fled to Bangladesh, as well as Malaysia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where they live asirregular migrants.

EXCLUSION FROM THE NATION-BUILDING PROCESS

The military regimes monolithic concept of nation building promotes assimilation, ratherthan integration of all ethnic minorities, within a primarily Burman Buddhist nation. InArakan, the junta has implemented policies of exclusion against the Muslim population,

1 Martin Smith, The Muslim Rohingyas of Burma, Paper delivered at the Conference of Burma CentrumNederland, 11 December 1995 (draft)

2 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, Zed Books1991.


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while attempting to forcibly assimilate the Rakhine Buddhists through Burmanisation.This divide-and-rule tactic is very effective as, by denying all rights to the Rohingyapopulation, depriving them of citizenship and labelling them as illegal immigrants fromBangladesh, the military can demonise them as the enemy from outside, and presentthemselves as protectors of the Buddhist community, which further exacerbates communaltensions.

The conflict in Arakan State is primarily about ethnicity and numbers. The starting point oftodays problems can be dated to the beginning of British rule. The Burmese governmenthas identified 135 national races as indigenous to the nation. The Rohingya do notfeature among them, even though the Kaman, also an Islamic group, have been recognisedas one of the 36 national races of Arakan State. Disregarding historical facts, theRohingya are treated as foreign residents who had only settled in Burma during the Britishcolonial period3.

Recognition as an ethnic nationality of Burma would entitle the Rohingya to citizenship,

but also to political participation and, by extension, to territorial claims. Viewed as illegalimmigrants from Bangladesh, their loyalty is questioned and they are deemed a threat tothe territorial integrity of the Union.

In addition, emphasis is also given to the Islamic faith professed by this population. Theconsensus of Burmese opinion is that the Muslims can enjoy religious freedom but they willbe relentlessly barred from obtaining political representation on the basis of their religion.

POLICIES OF DISCRIMINATION AND ITS HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES

Policies of exclusion and discrimination imposed on the Rohingya by successive Burmese

military regimes have prevented them from developing socially and economically, and aredeliberately designed to encourage departure to Bangladesh. These policies, which amountto ethnic cleansing, are creating push-factors for forced migration and therefore constitutethe root causes of the ongoing refugee exodus. They can be summarised as follows:

1) Denial of citizenship:The Rohingyas have been rendered stateless through Burmas Citizenship Law of 1982,which states that citizens are those belonging to one of 135 national races, amongwhich the Rohingyas do not figure, or those whose ancestors settled in the countrybefore 1823, the start of the British colonisation of Arakan. This Law was promulgated

shortly after the repatriation of 1978, and was clearly aimed at excluding them fromcitizenship rights. Their present legal status amounts, in international law, to de factostatelessness.

3 In response to UNHCR, Secretary-1 wrote in 1998, "this issue is essentially one of migration, of people seekinggreener pastures" [...] "these people are not originally from Myanmar ... they are racially, ethnically, culturallydifferent from the other national races in our country. Their language as well as religion is also different.


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2) Restrictions on freedom of movement:The Rohingya are subject to strict restrictions of movement. They are virtually confinedto their village tracts. They need to apply for a travel pass even to visit a neighbouringvillage, which they have to pay for. Since February 2001, Sittwe has remained off-limitsfor the Rohingyas of Northern Arakan. Their lack of mobility has devastatingconsequences, limiting their access to markets, employment opportunities, healthfacilities and higher education. The issue of travel passes is also used as a system toprevent those who have overstayed their validity from returning to their village as theirnames are subsequently deleted from their family list.

3) Obstacles to family developmentA series of measures has been imposed to control birth and to limit expansion of theRohingya population. Unlike other people of Burma, the Rohingyas must apply forpermission to get married, which is only granted in exchange for high bribes and can

take up to several years to obtain. Polygamy has been prohibited, and widows mustwait at least 3 years to remarry. To register their childrens birth, parents are chargedfees that have significantly increased over the last year. In several areas, womensdignity is greatly offended, as they have to declare their pregnancy to the NaSaKa4 andsometimes show their belly. Moreover, building a new house, extending existingdwellings and even maintenance and repair also require authorisation, resulting inovercrowded and precarious living conditions.

4) Construction of model villagesThe establishment of model villages to resettle Buddhists (Rakhine and Burman) onto

Muslim land has been going on since the 1950s. Such demographic engineering isdesigned to alter the ethnic composition of the region. There are already 26 such modelvillages of about 100 houses each in Northern Arakan. Rohingyas are compelled tobuild houses for the new settlers. In addition to land confiscation and forced labour,these programmes contribute to the exacerbation of inter-communal tension.

In addition to these policies of exclusion specifically targeting the Rohingya, economicpolicies are being pursued to maintain underdevelopment. These are also practised inother ethnic areas, but considering that 60% of the Rohingya population are landless anddepend on a hand-to-mouth existence, the related loss of income greatly contributes to foodinsecurity. It appears as a deliberate attempt to induce starvation and trigger departures.

The main elements are:

4 The NaSaKa is the Border Administration Force and comprises five different government agencies: thepolice, military intelligence (MI), Lone Htein (riot police), customs, and immigration.


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5) Forced labourAs documented by the ILO in early 20035, forced labour is far from being eradicated inNorthern Arakan State. Compulsory labour continues to be exacted by the army and theNaSaKa for construction and maintenance of their camps, portering, sentry duty, theestablishment of villages for new settlers, for military-owned shrimp farms andplantations, for brick-baking, for collection of wood and bamboo, etc. In NorthernArakan State, non-Muslims are usually exempt from this duty. The poor cannot paybribes to avoid it and are thus compelled to perform not only their own stint of work,but also that of those who had paid off the authorities.

6) Arbitrary taxationArbitrary taxation and other forms of extortion are common practices. These informaltaxes range from cattle registration fees to a multitude of ad-hoc donations to be madeto the authorities in kind or in cash6. An increase in monetary contributions appears to

compensate for a slight decrease in forced labour. The tactic of arresting people forminor offences and demanding high bribes in return for their release is also widespread.

7) Control of the economy through a monopoly systemBusiness monopolies are granted in exchange for licences obtained against high bribes.All economic sectors are controlled through a monopoly system based on licences,which totally forbids any free-enterprise initiative. Anyone engaging in an economicactivity must either sell his production to the licence holder below market price or payhim a tax. As soon as a new income-generating endeavour appears, a new monopoly isinstalled. The authorities grant or revoke licences annually and always guarantee the

monopoly to the highest bid.

8) Paddy procurementThe paddy tax is based on a pre-set quota of baskets per acre rather than on yield and issold directly to the government at a price well below market rates. It can represent upto 50% of small farmers paddy production. In April 2003, the SPDC announced thescrapping of its paddy procurement policy. Starting from the next harvest in late 2003,farmers would be allowed to sell their production through local rice trading committees.Many observers are sceptical about this reform and believe that a new monopoly systemwill soon be put in place.

5 In relation to ILO Liaison Officers visit to Northern Arakan State in January 2003, the ILO Governing Bodyreport GB.286/6 of March 2003 stated in paragraph 7: While it is her impression that there is probably less use offorced labour in central parts of Myanmar, the situation in areas near to the Thai border where there is continuinginsecurity and a heavy presence of the army, as well as in northern Rakhine State, is particularly serious and appearsto have changed little.

6 UNHCR, Myanmar Reintegration programme at a crossroads, Note on Issues of Concern to UNHCR,1997.


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The distressing realities in which the Rohingyas live in Arakan are the outcome of thepolicies listed above, and demonstrate that there is no willingness on the part of theBurmese government to integrate this population. As long as these policies remain inplace, attempts to develop these communities are bound to fail, and the cycle of exodus willnot be stemmed.

HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES IN ARAKAN STATE

In 1994, after considerable international pressure to repatriate the 250,000 Rohingyarefugees who fled to Bangladesh during the exodus of 1991/92, UNHCR gained access toNorthern Arakan State. With its NGO partners, it set to rehabilitate and reintegrate thereturnees and assist in anchoring the local population to prevent future outflows ofrefugees. Despite the presence of UNHCR and international agencies, conditions havehardly improved. As one NGO representative in Rangoon recently stated: The presence ofUNHCR and some international NGOs has only provided limited relief, but not a structuralchange.

UNHCRs intervention to address the Rohingyas status of statelessness prompted thegovernment to issue them with a temporary registration card (white card), which clearlystates that it does not constitute evidence of citizenship. To date, only a third of theMuslim population has been issued with this card, which does not grant any legal status,merely residency already acknowledged through the system of family lists. This initiativedoes not change the nature of the citizenship problems.

UNHCR and WFP have managed to significantly reduce the amount of compulsory labourby taking over responsibility for building local road infrastructure, but the practiceis stillwidespread when it comes to activities for the direct benefit of the military.

Moreover, UNHCRs protection mandate has been seriously hindered by restrictions ofmovement making access to UNHCR problematic for the Rohingyas.

Efforts have been directed at improving educational and health services by rehabilitatinggovernment-run schools and health centres, and providing training to teachers and healthworkers. However, obstacles were encountered, as Rohingyas cannot apply for anygovernment posts. The majority of staff are thus Rakhine, generally not attracted to servein isolated, rural areas dominated by Rohingyas. Some of the newly built facilitiestherefore remain unused7.

NGOs have been attempting to tackle the food security situation of the poorer strata of thispopulation by implementing income-generation projects and other development activities.However, food security continues to deteriorate steadily. Over the last year, increasedpressures through arbitrary taxation, tighter control of the local economy as the licencesystem extends to new commodities and activities, as well as restricted access to forest

7 Lisbeth Garly Andersen, Analysis of the livelihood situation of the Muslim population in Northern RakhineState, Consultant UNHCR, 31 July 1997.


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resources, have led to a crisis, which can only be stopped if direct food assistance isimmediately delivered to the most vulnerable segment of the population, estimated at onethird of the total population of Northern Arakan State.

Despite these shortcomings, the presence of international NGOs and UN agencies has beencrucial in providing some degree of protection to the Rohingya, and somewhat alleviatestheir conditions. UNHCRs presence is vital since it is the only international agency with aprotection mandate. Without the programmes of UN agencies and international NGOs, itis likely that a new exodus of refugees could no longer be contained.

CURRENT REPATRIATION EXERCISE IN BANGLADESH

The Bangladesh government has always been adamant that all Rohingya refugees mustreturn to Burma. Following improved relations and enhanced economic ties with itseastern neighbour, Bangladesh has recently persuaded the SPDC to lift all restrictions forthe remaining 20,000 refugees to return to Burma. Starting in October 2002, the repatriation

exercise was reactivated. Concurrently, UNHCR announced its plan to promote self-sufficiency pending return, including the phasing-out of its care and maintenanceresponsibilities in the camps. In May 2003, the number of refugees being repatriated rosedramatically, and so did the number of complaints denouncing coercion, intimidation andforced repatriation. Mental and physical pressures were used to induce repatriation suchas threats of jail, arbitrary arrest, beatings, deprivation of food, destruction of housing andtransfer to other sections of the camp. At that time, UNHCR did not appear to provide anyeffective protection against involuntary repatriation

In July 2003, high-level officials from UNHCR headquarters in Geneva were dispatched toBangladesh to investigate these allegations, which resulted in the appointment of

additional international protection staff. Strengthened UNHCR intervention has led tosignificant improvements. Camp officials are now avoiding the use of physical violenceagainst refugees, and incidents of forced repatriation have decreased considerably.However, refugees continue to be harassed, as psychological pressure and fear are still usedto encourage repatriation, and have now persuaded many reluctant refugees to return toBurma without opposing repatriation. As a result of the poorly managed streamliningprocess, MSF and Concern8 have had to leave the camps. Refugees have now stated that:The situation in Bangladesh is now worse than in Burma. Perhaps it is better to go backrather than staying here!

Repatriating refugees when the conditions at home have not improved and when a return

in safety and dignity cannot be achieved raise many questions. The probability that theymay soon come back to Bangladesh is very high. We have evidence that both repatriatedrefugees as well as new arrivals have continued to enter Bangladesh illegally. The ongoing

8 Concern only handed over their medical and nutritional programmes. They are still providing education,sanitation and social counselling in the camps.


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repatriation turns visible refugees into invisible refugees, now labelled as economicmigrants.

CONCLUSION

The root causes of the humanitarian crisis in Northern Arakan State and the driving forcebehind refugee exoduses to Bangladesh lie in the SPDC policies of exclusion anddiscrimination against the Rohingya. The combination of abuses -- from the denial of legalstatus, to restriction of movement and economic constraints -- creates food insecurity andmakes life in Arakan unbearable. The military regime uses food as a weapon, and theirstrategy has proven effective in compelling Rohingya to leave Arakan. The poor are themain target, while the more wealthy enrich the authorities through bribes and taxes, andact as agents to oppress the poor in exchange for personal benefits.

The solution to the Rohingya problems entails that new policies be put in place thateradicate their statelessness and respect their fundamental human rights. Political will isrequired to end these policies of exclusion and discrimination and to improve the lot of theRohingya people for, as long as they are considered illegal immigrants from Bangladesh,there is little hope of a significant betterment of their status and living conditions.

While it is doubtful to expect any positive move from the military junta, there is also noguarantee that discriminatory policies would be repelled with the emergence of ademocratic government. The Rakhine Buddhist population, the general public opinion inBurma, as well as the pro-democratic movement, are not disposed toward recognising theMuslim population of Arakan as peoples of Burma. Rohingya organisations have beenconsistently blocked from joining umbrella groups. Opposition leaders, both inside andoutside Burma, hold views that the communal situation in Arakan could only improve with

a transition to democracy, but they suggest that, under a federal system of governance,ethnic States would enjoy self-determination and, therefore, the fate of the Rohingya wouldbe decided by the peoples of Arakan State. This implies that Rakhine Buddhists alonewould be expected to determine the future of the Rohingya community.

The intransigence of all protagonists makes it so difficult to find a solution, but until then,providing assistance and protection to the Rohingya population is both a moral and a legalobligation of the international community.

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eu paper on rohingya by chris lewa

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