I Nations arc formed and arc kept alive by the fact that they have a program lor tomorrow. I A revolution only lasts fihccn years, a pc"od which coincider ' with the clfcctivencss of a generation. I I From "The Revair olrhe M ~ I I c s , ~ ~ 1930 I

The mass- feel that it is easy to fleefrom realiry wtlen it is the most difficult thing in the world. I

Jose Ortega y Gasset Selections from his writings

-

Ivo Barlac

The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise

For ruhereas ruickediress is fearful, it beareth wit- ness of its condet~r~ratior~: for a troubled coizscieirce always forecastctl~ grievotrs tltitrjis.

For /ear is notl~ing else but ' I yieldhlg up o f the sltccours front tltoright.

And ruhile tlterc is less expectation from witl~iir, the preater dot17 it corort the ignorn)lce of that cause

La ciuilisatioir est rrire Pcole drr courage; elle se mesure arcx risrrltats de 19e//ort qtie I'l~o17ttne fait pour vaincre ses crabrtes cl)i1rr6riqr~es, ct portr corrnaitre /es vrais dangers qrri le nret~aceitt. llrogr?s est torrt ce qui sera 6 I'l~oitrnte orr qui l'aide d uaitrcre les perrrs imagitraires, 6 dicorrurir et 6 Pliinitler lcs urais dangers. La civilisa- tion est le risrtltat drr progrks entendu de cette

-Crrglielino Ferrero ( 1 941)

F E R H E R ~ F I N I S H I D HIS nooKoN POWER in Swiss exile, faraway from his Tuscan L'Ulivcllo, at the beginning o f the third year of the perlultimatc European war. He had it ~ublished in New York "i cause des censures qui s'y sont ~nulti~liies."' The Yugoslav. war, which to dare has been waged only briefly in Slovenia, in JU~; 1991, and ever sincc then with vengeance in Croatia, might not yct

142 Ivo llanac ~" , . . ,. . -. . ,..* .. ., . , . .

iq,Secm to be ;! successor.to' the European war'of 1939-194s;. ::LiutliC'bea&'alI..thc' e9rmarks. o f earlier-and seeds of future; 'i i;..; .+ .,,- *..I ,.. * I L..*..,"h. . ^ :,'European :.:. .. and global conflicts@his is to say that in this war, as in

thosc that prefigured i t at the time of the Ottoman and Habsburg collapse, local differences escalated at moments of vast systemic breakdowns. Brittle hierarchies tollapscd under the wcigkt of idco- logical debris. Nations sought liberation and the redress of old wrongs. The shells of old states that had lain at the bottom of imperial oceans for decades or centuries reemerged and were reforged into shape by blows of battle, in the same graving docks, moreover, as the new ships of state. At tlie same time, the majority of intellecnrally lazy and temperamentally haughty statesmen of the Great Powers (to return to nineteenth-century terminology) tended to belittle the warnings and the distress of local conflicts. This i s not because they were ill informed, but'because they were manageable wax that acknowledges the flame of power and fear-the power of old privilege and the fear of uncertainty.

The task of assessing the causes-and perhaps even the consc- quences-f the war that has destroyed Yugoslavia has become a scholarly wager of battle. Diffurent from the time of Fcrrero, censor- ship i s increasing only slowly in our academic Switzerland. What i s more noticeablc i s tlie audacity of the grand sitnplificrs. Hoary legends arc rcsurrccted and new ones launched. Media impresarios

:selm>the enragis for thciistagedSerbo-Croat gladiatorial combats. T h e winning thesis speaks to the irascible hatred that governs tlic Balkan savages. Otherwise perfcnly respectable journals print such revelations as the following:

. ~ . Ri;d~mati;.MiloJevit;:and everynne'else in Yugoslavia are victims of '. .Wq&3 For ccnrurics their forcbcars lived in a state of povcrry and illiteracy, where rumor filled the vacuum created by the abrcnce of books and documentation. Then came four-and-a-half decades o f Communist totalitarianism, when many, matiy books were puh- lished-all containing lies. Shc Serb-Croat war in Yugoslavia i s the upshor of a few million minds, all collccrively disoriented, and all finally granted free cxprcssion.~ Tliosc who arc dcstincd to colnmand are fearful of thosc \\,lie are'

dcstincd to obey; in Fcrrcro's terms, Cain fears Abcl. The Atlanticist uncase with self-deternli~intion that has attended the revolution in the

Y~cgo:lavia: 7'/?e Fearful Asyn~~?tefry of War 143

dead world of socialism is part of the fcarful asymmetry of our tinics. The Left fears the revolutionary patrimony of Mazzini and Garibilldi. T h e Right proclaims that only fools rejoice when great cmpires fall. "The symmctr). prefigured by Alexis de Tocqucville of a world divided between America and Russia i s over."J Much the same scc~l~s to obtain for small cmpires like Yugoslavia. Perhaps Ferrcro w;is right when he saw cupidity and ambition as the consequence of war, whereas fear was a t the cosmic origin of war.'

One of the hurdcns in writing about theSouth Slavs is thc onerous necessity of telling the story from the beginning. T h e knowledge of South Slavic affairs i s indeed limited in the Wcst, as i s evident from virtually al l historical references in the media, including the highbrow press. For the sake of brevity this much should be notcd:ihe currcntb conflict among the South Slavs, specifically between the Serbs and the a Croats, is not ancient, unless the term ancient encompasses the end ofp the nineteenth ccntury, and it i s not religious, although religion has3 played a part in the encounter. Thecurrent conflict i s primarily%

- . -, - .. .- - . - ideological and political? In order to understand i t one must bcgin with the continuity of individunl South Slavic national clites and, states (where they existed), with special emphasis on national and! -political ideologies, npt with "mc,dcrnization" studies and research of social structures. Serbia i s important from this point of view. With tlic fall of the mcdioval Serbian state to the Ononian! Turke thc process that commenced in 1389 with the Serbian defeat at the Battle of Kosovo and ended in 1459 with the abolition of the vassal Serbian despotate-the Serbs lost not only their independence, but also their native landed elites. National leadership passed into the hands of thc autocephalous Scrhian Orthodox patriarchate (1557- 1766), whose prelates substituted not only for the gentry, but for its tasks in national culture and historical memory. Hence, the Serbia* uprisings against the Turks (1804, 1815) were hy,dcfinition,both$ confessional and national, which translated into a lasting suspicion of& religious and national dive for'the growth of 'the 'Sc s6"ih;viid toward souther ._ ..,..>I,. . : (183l:i#j3;'1,6;18,' . . .

~crbian-indc&l ~;)uth Sla and hrouglit ahout .mi economy of peasant smallholders, intolerant of class iliffcrcnccs.

146 luo Ucrnac

either maintailling the looscncd command systcm in politics and econonlia or advancing into a "socialist" market econonly through. a gradual introduction of "democratic" and "deccntrolizitlg" poli- cies. The centr:llist forces headed by Serbian cadres (chief among them Being Alcksandar Rankovit, the Party's orgallizational secre-

Yugoslavia: The Fearfit1 Asy17t1netry of War 147

tary, respo~lsible for the security police) were opposcd to this "anarchy" of options. This meant that the reformists, who ha& adherents everywhere, but especially in the industrial republics ofd Slovenia and Croatia, opened a l l fronts in their war against central3 ism, including the scnsitivc and taboo question of equality among t h q republics and nationalities. One of the first shots in this war was the Central Comminec (CC) lettct of March 1959:to a l l Party organiza- tions, in which the Communists wcrc pointedly reminded that the equality of minorities must be maintaincd and furthered. The letter alluded to the situation of the Albanian minority, which constituted a regional majority in Kosovo."

The dccisive lnomer~t in the political evolution of Yugoslavia dur~ng the troubled 1960s was the point when Tito ioined the rcformists.This happened in 1962, at the Sixth Plenum of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) CC, when Tito stated that "we have to take decentralization as our point of departre."~l He increasingly sided with Edvard Kardelj, the leading Slovenc Commu- ntst and Party theoretician, who conncctcd, in the most explicit way, rhc problems of economic relorln with national equality.1' Tito became convinced that the maintenance of (predominantly Serbian) centralisr dominance, which frequently took the Inask of Yugoslav- ism, increasingly weakened the regime. Bur despite Tito's effort to bring the Serbian Party organization along to his point of view, in Serbia he encountered silence and obstruction. T h i s led to a clash. At the Fourth Plenum of the SKJ CC (July 1966), which followed the recessionary economic reform of 1965, Tito decided to strike at Rankovit's security serviccthe organizational base of centralist resistance. But the fall of Rankovit, in the words of a Serbian Titoist, had already engendered Serbian fears:

I 1 1

In Belgrade we already had various slogans that wctc launched by hostile clernents. One is, for exampic, that this is - struggle against Serbian cadres; another, what will now happen with Scrbia, who will represent Serbia's interests, etc.14 nit removal of Rankovii and the purge of the security service

signalcd greater balance in nationaliy relations. Serbian predom- inancc in the federal agencies was incrc:tsit~~l~ chnllenged. as wcrc the strongarm methods in dealing with the nonJcrbs. Cronts and Bosnian Muslin~s gained grvut~d. But the grcatest wi~~t,crs were

148 ivo Uanac Albanians, the excesses of RankoviC's police havitlg been especially notable in Kosovo. T h e province's Albanian majority (77.4 erccnt of Kosovob population in 1981) increasingly wcrc cmpowcrcd. As Scrbian fc:lrs accordingly swelled, Dobrica &sit, a lcatling Scrbian novelist, started criticizing the Party policy. In May 1968, at pn SKS plenum, he said that the I1:lrty could no longcr afford:

nor to k~luw about the widespread bclicf in Scrhia that t l l e relations bcnvecn Skipcrars [Albanians] and Scrbs are worsening, tl lar theScrI>s and hlontmcgrins fccl thro~rcned, that rhcrc are pressures few thertl to emigrate [from Kusovo], tliar the Scrl~s and Montenc~ .*~IIIS ' syste~nati-

Albanian demonstrations of ~ovcinber. 1968, whcrc thc .a

.,.. , .

. Kosovo republic" was first voiced, only increased Serbian! fears about the growing Albanian menace. - *

The same cannot be said of Tiro. His confidence in the Kosovar Albanian IJarry elite continued to grow. He co-opted and rnarginal- izcd the Belgrade student demonstrators in June 1968, thereby pushing asidc the most serious challenge by "progrcssivc" unitaris~n in his declining years. He cncouragcd the growing dccentr a I' ization of thc Yugoslav smtc ("federalizing the federation") and thc reaffirma- tion of Croatia. Despite his clash with the Croatian Party leadership in 1971, he purged, too, the creative Serbian Party lcadersllip of Marko Nikczit and Latinka PcroviC in 1972. H e thcrcby wcakened the Serbian establishment, in which the anticctltralist Scrbs (Miloi Mini? and Mirko I'opovit) became unusually prominent. The crown of Tito's discrepancy with Serbia was the constitutio~l of 1974, hich raised Scrhia's autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodi a to W the lcvel of virtu31 republics while simultaneously introducihg a system of absolute parity and proportionaljry in thc relations among the rcpuhlics and in their participation in'thc fcdcral organs. Thc wisdom of this arrangement has hccn indisputc ever sincc. The copstitution's chief structural wenknescthe fact tllat i t was predi- catcdon the pcrmancnt rule and unity of the SKI-hccamc evident

. only much later. i Serbia's ullllappincss with the constitution c~f 1974 and

graded status of thc aotonolnous provinces was noticcahlc in thcilatc . . .

Yugoslavia: T l ~ e Fearfil Asyn~nrctry of War 149 1970s. Dragoslav Drain Markovii-, the prcsidc~lt of Scrbia, initiated a commission chargcd with the ways and tneans of "constitutillg SR Scrbia as 3 single state and socio-political cotn~nu~lity." The commis- sion's materials, known as the "Blue Book," wcrca source of conflict in the Scrbian Icadcrship in July 1977, as was M:lrkovii-'s notion that thc "cqu:llity of a l l ltllc constituent parts of Yugoslavia] cannot be rcalizcd u~tdcr conditivns of inequality for the Scrbs."'Wcvcrthclcss,, the wholcsalc Scrbian campaign against Tito's constitution corn-,; mcncid %tirTiti?sdc;lth in 198d:Serbian lcadcrs found thcir prctcxt in the m:lssivc Albanian dcmot~stratiolls that shook Kosovo and pro~nptcd the usc of firearnis in March-April 1981. Thcir calls for the dinlirn~tion of autonomies could only be accomplished by cxag- gcrating tllc Albanian menace, and incrc:lsingly that of the Vojvodina $ 8 autononlists," who were themsclvcs not ncccssarily membcrs of Hungarian, Croat, Slovak, or Romanian communities, but who wcrc most ohcn indigenous Serbs. This mobilizatio~l was innately anti- Alhanian, but also anti-Titoist, and anti-Yugoslav. :The elite of Scrbian intelligentsia lent a hand to this vociferous campaign4

Gojko Djogo's 1981-1982 poetic cyclc Vur~crta vrenlora (Wooly Times), which was banned and contrihutcd to the author's impris- onmcnt, was one of the first direct attacks against the late Tito ("the old rat from Dedinie").l7 There followed bcwildcrcd revisionist histories of Vladimir Dediier, the chief function of which was to rcmove Tito frotn the pedestal of infallihility,'n and the tllinly veiled

" fictions of Dobrica &sic, in which Scrbian Communists of the prewar pcr-iod were cast in the role of executors of Comi!ltern's anti-Serbian conspiracics. "How could YOU," says one of Cosii's protagonists to 3 ranking Conlml~nist, "how could you, man, f()llow the orders of the Kremlin and of the cos~no~olitan knaves from the Co~nintcrn, and proceed to tear down Yugoslavia, your fathcrland, for \vhich you made war over a number of years and for whicll half of your [Serbian] people died? Explain to me, what kind of meningitis seized you. . . and so many Serb Communists that you are thick with the darkest enemies of your peopl~!" '~

The spiritual ccntcr of Scrbian intcllcctual renationalizatior was the Scrbian Acadcrny of Scicnces and Arts (SANU). In May 19x5, at SANU's annual mccting, rnernhcrs dccidcd to organize a commission for rhc writing of n ~ncniorandum that would express SANU's thinking on thc current situation in Yugoslavia. A draft vcrsioll of

, .

150 luo nanoc this memorandum was "blown" in a countercampaign by orthodox Titoists that c~mtnenccd in September 19116. I t was this alternately condonned and glorified draft that has subsequently acquired altnost legendary proportions as Tile Mentorrr~tdtrnl of SANU. Rctrospcc- tivcly, this curiotls document was a child of self-restraint. Written at a time whcn political discourse was still i~tarxismrtc, i t studiously minced away the whole of Tito's edifice. A summary passage isworth noting:

'Ilie economic reform of 1965 was in essence a change in the hasio strategic direction of social development: the project of politicnl dcniocrntiration was s~~bstitutcd for a project of economic libcraliza- tion. 1.11~ iden of sclf.management, whose essence is the disalienation of politics, wassubstirutcd for the idea of decentralization, which brought ahout the establishment of regional centcrs of alienated power. The ethics of solidarity and social iustice were substituted for the spirit of posscssivc individualism and apology d l group interest. Political vol- untarism, which was daring and dynamic in the first p~stwar decades, \r.hcn i t could count on the mass support of the pcopl'c, now hecame static and dctcrlnincd in the defense of thcsystcm, c v e l ~ whcn it liccamc evidcnt that the system is inconsistent and inclfectivc.'?

, . ' 1: i i

~~ '~ ; fu ' f idan~eat~~~~dsi t i~nf :o f~~the~~m~ntorat tdutn~ was tltat Tito 5~p~p~edrsonsistcnt~discriminjtion:against'thc'Scrbs pnd Serbia. The. yc;rrot i~~~l issupposed dependence on Comintern's~anti~Serbianism . ~ ~ ~ l i c ~ ~ n c m p t ~ ~ t o ~ r C i I i i e e ~ i t s " w o r l d ~ wide strate$c atid tactical. ~ ~ r i t y s ~ [ t h c " C d m i n t e r n ] ~ t c n d e d ' toward the breaking up of sYlrgoslj~i@ It found its ideological justification in the confrontation bcwccn the 'npprcssing' Serb, nation and the rcniaining 'oppressed' natiotis").~~t.'conkqucn~& - . . u . . ,L!. . . . .. were -c4.,,+,fm the. .+...-. "eco"omic' . ., subjugation" of "

"Scrbilhy .Slovcbin d.>.s.w.. 'and Croatin; .... ~. , the '~policical and 'econotni~ domi- . . .

~?*h~X~'ibythc~~~cr~~tK~'~i~ision.of:~erbiail.bF -*-*'.... *. .i.i.~~~v+...-r ..-.+.+rrLu. .,. #. .# the.constitution of ,*& .4*",."~,. ... Tf.974; , ~t~~ncqu~l~~:in:~the~feder'aj~~e~noctde'"'~iinst : . : :,.,,. ~,.+.,yYa:~:j,...--. I)Ul--... - - . . , .. , . the %rbs tn:l

, -

152 ivo Uat~nc Scrbia does not seek to be morc of a republic than other'republics, hut, it i s certain, she cannot perniit to be less of a republic tha11 tlic otI1crs. The fact that Serbia has two socialist autonomous piovi~~ces in her composition cannot be 3 reason for her to be reduced to her inner territory. . . . I

,I But because he was awarc that Serbia's control o\.er the provinces would make her "more of a repqblic than the others" (hcr representation in the federation would bcniarly tripled hy a slci$ht of legal mind), hc predicted that:

the changes that I have nienrioned will be difficult t r ~ ncliicvc. l'hkse arras and individuals whose interests arc being imperiled (rrgro:u~t2;rr] will be against [chnngc].l6 !

Since the Yugoslav constitution could be chnngcd only' by unanihous agreement of all six republics and two autonomous provi,nces, MiloZcviC could only prevail by putsch.

MiloieviC's intentions could be realized only by a i l l political and national homogenization of Serbs. H e announced his illtentions in the night brnvcen April 24 and 25, 1987, when he delivered a passion:tte speech to the Serb reprcscntativcs on thc Field of Kosovo, sortle hours aher their mcctit~g was marred in a clash with the

.. prdominantly Albanian Kosovar police. Miloicvii- took a qtand -- gainst the police and absolved the Serbs of any ideological dpvia-

tions in their attenipts to undo the autonomy of Kosovo. ':;\'cry briefly," he said, "meetings like this are not the meetings of natiotr- alists. These meetings are not hostile meetings."i7 But in order to upset the years of Titoist policy in Kosovo, MiloSevii- needed first to purge thc SKS of any waverers. This was accomplished it1 Septcn~bcr 1987, at the Eighth Session of the SKS CC, when he purged Dragiia Pavlovi2 and Ivan Stambolii-, thercprescntatives uf 3 solnewhat morc moderate wing of Scrbian Communists, from the leadership.

T h e Serbian communist opposition to MiloicviC was awarc of how Miloievit fined into the gallery of Serbian fears, but also of i t s own marginalism. Bogdan Bogdanovit, former mayor of Belgrade, archi- tect-builder, and the conscicncc of rlic Serbian Lcft, sctit n lcncr to h l i loLr i t in \vliich l i e said tliat Scrbia was tircd of l ~c r 1c:rdcrs a~ id Ircr misdircctcd history:

I Scrbia is tired of hrr fear of abstrncrion, of higher ahstrartions. allove all, she is tired of her simplified reasoning. of her eoncrctisni-the lnost

Y~rsoslavia: 'r11c Fearfit1 Asylnmetry of War 153

concrete in tilc worltl. . . . Serbia on the East, Serbia on the margins of civilization, tired of [ l ie civilization t l iat has never really ~OUCIIL.~ her. . . . SerI,ia is tired of her wrangle with Europe, which S ~ C does riot know understand, of her wrangle with Central Europe, which belinlcs 2nd disdains, she is tired of hcr inexplicable and co~nicnl Austropllobia . . . tired of her Eastern option, of her mini-Messiallist panlil>crnrio~iist obsession, tired of her all.populnr and all-progressive I'ronirtlicuso. of hcr ercrnnl orthodoxy, political and every other.. . .

l*

111 a sciisc. Bokdanovit anticipated MiloSevit's next step. the crcntio~l of ncw mass org:inizations that ~ o u l d try to destabilize 3s much (I( Yugoslavia as was possihlc tllrough cxtralcgal violence. .Tlicsc "meetings of solidariry" were thc spearhead of what hliloScvi?'s controlled mcdia increasingly cal led "the antibureau- cratic rc\~olution." The "return of the pcople" to politics meant mass demonsrrations organized by various Serbian nationalist leaders, and ultimntcly by Milojcvit's police, against the co~istinrted leadcrships of KO~OVO, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, al l of which were ousted under pressure in 1988 and early 1989, only to be replaced by the offjciak that were devoted to MiloScvii-. But these were areas vulnernblc to Miloscvit's bullying. The real obstacle lay clsewhcrc, in

~~~

the northwest-in Slovenia and Croatia. 'Serbia's relations rvitli the "northwest" wen always tenuous.?

More exactly, during the interwar ptriod,Cr.oatia.was the lender o h resistance to Scrbinn supremacy, and was treated accordindy~This rGlc co~itinucd in the postwar period, but with n differcnce.werca~

".tlic intcnvar Croat struggle, led hy the Croat Peasant Parry of S iepa~ Radii- (who was mortally wor~nded on the floor of the Belgrade parlinnlcnt in 1928) and Vladko Matck (who was jailed and exiled by the dictatorial rcgirnc of King Alexander in the early 1930s),'waG morally clear and unblentished, Croat natiotialism becalne stained b~ the of UstaJas (1nsurgents);a militant independence orbanlza-i, tion that graduated into fascism.:.ltaly and Gcrmany nurtured this organization in tire 1930% alternately promoting or demoting the Ustagn role to fir the frosty or balmy weather in relations with Brlgr;lde. After the Axis attack on Yugoslavia in 1941, Mussolini and Hitlcr installed thc Ustaaas in power in Zagrcb, making them the nilclnls of ;l Jcpclldc~lt rcgitnc of the newly created lndcpcndcnt Statc of Cr~~;itin, an [t;l[c~-Gemmatt ccrrtdornir~i~tm predicated on the aboli-

154 Iuo Banac

'Had the Croats been asked in 1941 whether thcy favored inde. pcndencc, most of them probably would have rcspondcd affirma- tivcly.'Berlin and Rome capitalized on this scntin~cnt to impose pseudo-iridependcncc onto a strangely'lopsidcd Croatia, which was simultaneously reduced in the areas of solid Croat n~ajoritics (DaI. maria) and enlarged where the Croats constituted a minority (Ilosnia- Hercegovina). Morcover, they also i~nposcd an ideological dici.itorship of the mit~usculc Ustiin organization, whose extint military units ill Italy did not exceed more than some 500 men .in April 1941. Had the UstaSas simply minded thc wartime Axis st~;;c. thcir notoriety probably would not have surpassed tlrar of thk Vlaamschc Nationaalverbond in Belgium or the ~ationnal-Socinlis- tischc Bcwcging in the Nethet1ands:But their rccortl was so appalli~~g (violent persecution of the Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, antifascist Croats) that i t became an irresistibleargument for anybody opposc(l11ot only to Croat independence, but to Croat individuality itself. Hcnccforth, Croat self-intcrcst of whatever provenance (includi~lg rcform c o n munist and liberal) could easily be tarrcd with thc brush of fascis~ll, by thc help of innuendoes, critninally construcd. I t was a temptation that no embanlcd Serbian or centralist tende~~cy failcd to i ~ t i l i z e aftcr the war. Morcover, the tendency was to exaggerate Usta3:l crin~cs. So, for example, rhc notorious UstaSa concentratio~l camp at Jascn- ovac, which claimed the lives of some 60,000 to 80,000 inmatcs, not all of then1 Serbs, was recklessly routed as the "third largcst extcr- mination camp in Europe," in which 700,000 "Serbs al(~nc" wcrc murdered by the Ustaias.'o

Thcexn~era t i o~~ of Ustaia crimes was mcant to buttress the thcsis about the vastncss of thcir support. In fact, only a minority of tllc Croats sided with the Ustagas. In the abscnce of a Croat noncommu- nist resistance movcment, Croats massively participatqd in r l~c om Ci . - : ~n~nist-led Partisans and thcrcby gave ample testimony to thc~r anti-UstaEism. In the second half of 1944 the Partisan nlovcmcnt of Croatia coi~nted some 150.000 combatants under arm* 100,070 in operative units made up of Croats (60.703 or 60.66 pcrccnt). Scrhs (24,528 or 24.5 1 percent). Slovenes (5,113 or 5.1 1 pcrcc~lt), and. othcrs.Jl (The participatiot~ of Scrbs in Croatian Partisat] units was llighcr than thcir pcrcclltage ill the population of Croatia-14.5 perccllt in 1948-and can bc cxplaincd by the harsllncss of Usraja anti-Scrb terror.) Yet all.thr evidence of Croat antif:~scisr~~ did not

Yugoslnvin: .l./~e Fearfir1 Asyttttltctry of War 155

seem to rchabilitatc the Croat n:ltional movcmcnt. Outsidc of Yugoslavia, Tito, Ivan I

9-continued Croat tendency.dTlic first explicit st;ltcmcllt on this topic was an essay by the historian Vasiliie Krestii. ill 1986. Basing i t on

Yicgoslavia: The Fearfitl Asytt~tttetry of War 157 faulty intcrpretntions, ten quotes (spanning the period from 1700 to 1902), four incidents (only one of them serious), and ex post facto jottings of Ival i Rihar, Kresti? concluded that the:

gcnocidc. against rhc Scrbs in Ustaja [Croatia1 is a specific phcnomengn in our [Scrh] centuries-old common l i fe with tllc CroatqThe protracted dcvelop~~~cnt of the genocidal idea in certain centers of Cront society, which, ;IS Dr. Ribar wi~ncsses, did not necessnrily liavc some narrow- bur rarllcr a hrond-base, took deep root in rhc consciousness of many gcncrnrions:16

Less sophisticntcd writers reduccd thcsc conclusions to a simple assertion about the "genocidal nature" of the Croats, or, less cumbcrs~~mcly. to a statclnent that all Croats wcre really UstaCas.

In 1989 the Croats wcre only slowly regaining their grip after the period of great "Croat silence" that had obtained since December 1971, whcn Tito removed the reformist leadership of the SKH headed by 5avka Dnbzcvit-Kutarand Miko Tripalo. Thcse moderate Communists pursucd a course of reforms very sin?ilar to Dubzek's reform inovcmcnt in Czcchoslo\*akia. Thc Croat reformers, like all the East Eurupcnn "revisionists" of the 1960s and early 1970s, fell because they sought to loosen thc command system in politics and economy. Tito would not permit this coursc of action. "I tell you opcnly," he said in Deccmbcr 1971, "Yugoslavia would fal l apart wcrc i t not for the League of Communists-if [the league] rushed Iicndlong into dcclinc."J7 As 3 rcsult, the removal of Croat reformers was justified as ;I nxtsurc in tlic strugglc against divisive nationalism, \r*Iiicli tlic ref(lr1ncrs nllcgcdly used as a base for pressure against the fcdcral center. But, as so oftcn happens, the scope of the purgc bcsatnc uncontrollnblc and profoundly offended the Croat national $ sc~~siriyities, especially when i t took the form of'rev~nihism by the$

,.<

~e t , b~ ino r i t y in Croatia:The SKH, which only recently (for the first time since the war) regained a modicum of respectability as an ilistitution that was uncmharrasscd by its Croat trappings, once again hccamc the p;lrty of repression and careerism. Its dubious national loy;iltics wcrc ~~n~ lc rsso r~d by t l i ~ redefinition of Croat nationalism as the pri~~cipal h3stio1i of ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ r r c ~ ~ I ~ t i o ~ ~ . " In l'ito's words, "for as Ion1: as we havc nn opponent hcforc us, we must strike at him, we must hit him. If reasonin): rlc)cs~~'t work, there arc other mcans."~"

In 1972 Tito's handpicked group of new SKH I C ~ ~ C ~ S , the Husiks and Bil'aks of Croatia, used the "othcr means" to strike at thousands of Croat political and cultural figures, lmprison~ncnts and show tria!s, firings and purges in the univc "$ties and tllc news nicdia, massive political and "economic" emig tlon, , and !he exalta Ion of 1' suborrlcd witncsscs and corrupt police agents a'cconipanicd the suhmission of Croatia.,ThcIcddi"~ fig";&of pdstco~munist kroatia ~R~~n;&pdi~a;~Vlad~:~Cotov~~;Mark~~Vesclica,Franjo Tudjman, tocmcn~io~;onlysomcof.the lcaders'of thc~new'pariies) wercarnong ~ I ic l~pr isoneQ The Gtholic Church, whosc hierarchy was reviled, bur not prosecuted, became the only vehicle for cdntrary opinio~~s. The real effect, at least for the Croats, was the lasting dcleb' v~t~rnation ' of Yugoslavia. The quiet putsch of 1971-1972, which the \Vestern reporters played down in the inteiest of maintaining Tito's pro- Western onal alignment, made Croatia an extra in the politics of high Titnism:Croatia's leadership from 1972 to 1989 was fundamentally illegitimate. I t mattered little whether this cast included corrupt dogmatists like Stipe Suvar, the penultimate head of the Federal Party, or the opportunistic operators like Ante Markovit, tllc last premier of Yugoslavia. Nor could the marginalization of Croatia be improved by the fact that Serbia, too, became marginalizedin the purge of i t s liberal leadership in 1972, nor by the (con)fcdcralist gains in the constitution of 1974.

Tllc imposed leadership of the SKH bungled along in rhc late 1970s as the vaumurc (but not the squire's hall) of Fortress Tito. lnurcd to the method of political disqualification, thc Croatian Titoists felt that thcy could easily silence the nationalist Serbian intelligentsia aftcr the death of Tito. And, indeed, Stipe Suvar tried to put pressure on the Scrbian lcad~rship withhis role of "dcviationists" ("The White Book" of 1984), which was always bulkier in its Belgrade part than in the sections for his well-patrolled Zagreb. But thisstratagcm became useless thc moment the SKS joined forces with the nationalist dissidents and started encouraging thc obloquy of "Red Ustaias" for the denationalized Croat Titoists, Tllc irony of this predicament nlusr have escaped the Croatian leadership, which took some tinie to get i t s bearings. Morcovcr, i t was gcnuincly difficult to adjust to an iconoclast like Miloicvi?, who was hcndi~ig or clcstroying al l of Tito's rulcs. As a result, the Croat Titoists ,k>trghr amorrg themselves ahout rhc best way to stop MiloCcvii. (Suvar's "lcf$sts"

. . .

Yrrgoslauia: ,177~ Fearful Asymnrctry of \Vor 159

versus Mika Spiljakqs "haretoiscs"), but, being a compromised and thinning establishment, thcy simply had no wl~crewithal to mount the only successful strategy-a democratic altcrnativr. That rask would befall Slovenia.

i;Zt;{$$J+j.e@$$ave tended to constitute the blunt angle of the Yugoslav triangle. Least numcmus-but most industrially prospcr- oueamong the principal South Slavic nations, their lands were covctcd by ltalo-Gcrman imperialistic projects, which divided Slovc- nia bcnveen thcmsclvcs in wartilne. Their history, too, unlike that of Croatia, was not burdened by traditions of statcl~oodthat are rooted in thc gentry, which made them less disgruntled with Serbian primacy. For as long as lcome and Vienna (or Berlin) represented a threat, the Slovenes found fewer risks and greater advantages in the Yugoslav state than in any alternative. Moreover, since no issues of territory or minority status created problems in their relations with the serbs, the S~OVCI~CS saw no advantage in backing Croatia. During the interwar period, as well as rhe period under Tito, their leaders skirted the Serb-Croat battlefields, always to the advantage of Belgrade. As a rcsulr, tllcy rverc permined greater iceway in CxPrcss- ing doubts ahout centralism, as IJdvard Kardeli,.Tito's heir apparent, reguInrly did f ron~ 1957 onward. Kardelj's reformism was predicated on gradu3) dtccntmlization. As the chief architect of Tito's constitu- tion of 1974, Kardclj probably {lid not anticipate that his handiwork would prompt the storm of Scrbian resentment. H e was not fated to confront it. Kardclj died a year before his chief. Part of his illegitimate inheritance was a widely held Serb notion that a Croat and 3 Slovene had sealed Scrbian fate for four decades.

Slovcnian \cadcrship would have been troubled by such charges in more volatile timcs. In the 1980s, however, Slovenia was not threatened by Italy, Austria, and othcr Western countries, which were no longer ellenlies but models to be emulated. Instend, the only

to Slovenia's drcams of gradual Westernization was to be found in Yugoslavia. Repression against the Albanians of Kosovo, the growing involvement of the Yugoslav PCOP~C'S Army UNA) in the K~~~~~ cluagrnire, tl1c rctrograJe policies of Slobodan Miloicvic- t~lcsc t l lc source of worr?. in Slovenia. l l y Collt'"Qf' from the

of tllc 1 y ~ ~ s , the Parry lcadcrsllip in Ljubljana put confidence in what thCll c311cd Eurocommunis~n, a tcndcncy that clllmi- nntcd in tllc :idoption of t l i c slogan "Europe now!" in f Y 8 Y . Indeed,

thcrc wcrc few discernible differences between such tcchnoc?atic Italian Communists as Giorgio Napolitano and Milan Kubn;thc leadcr of the Slovcne Communists. T h e similarity was expressed'in a libcr:rl a t t i ~ d c toward the growing "altcrnativc movement"-the democratic opposition that increasingly combined Slovcne natiotlal demands with harsh criticism of the JNNScrbian policies in Kosovo.

' ~ ~ ~ S l ~ ~ e n . e ~ ~ r c v i v a 1 ~ ~ ' I A ? w h s ~ ~ ~ ~ e n t i a l I ~ : ~ t h c handihork of elite ~iitcllp,alg..athcred above all around the journal Nova revijcr (New &,yj%);~~n.dof vnr io~uckraker rand social rebels, who were best ~~p~~qn~~.~~~thc;i~no~tic:wcekly-~ladirn (Youth): Tllis pi- cnlly (.cntral European dissident milieu, unhampered and to some extent even encouraged by the liberal Slovcnian leadership, became the envy of the Croat opposition and the refuge of Croat, Bosnian Muslim, Albanian, and even Serbian dissidents. Slovene dissident journals published the first legal statements by the 1971 generation of silenced Croat intellec~uals. MIadina was the.first Yugoslav journal that went after the JNA to expose the corruption of leading gcncr$s, including that of Admiral Branko Mamula, the federal secretaryof defense rMamula go home!")>9 and arms trafficking with the repressive regimes likc that of Mengistu Hai l6 Mariam in Ethiopia. Slovene intellectuals likc Taras Kermauner wcrc the first to challeige the chauvinism not only of Serbian leadership, but of the broad consensus of intellectual opinion. In his "Letters to a Serbian friend,"

: Kcrmauncr recommended that his counterparts: abaridon [their] centralism, demands for a united rail system, for a comrnon educational program, for the Kosovirarion of Yug"slavia, for a unirary Yugoslav official language, for homogeneous society! For everything that rhc other nations reject! Should you travel wirh 11s to C~thcrn, which is to say Civil.Society, you willbe able to live as you I wish! Nobody will expect you to submit to other$, nor will ybu need to crack the whip over the unsuhmissive.~o As "the Slovcne syndrome" became the chief alternative r'o

Milojevif and theJNA, notably as a result of a military trial against Mladirra's writer Jancz Janja in June 1988 on the trumped-up charges of div~tlging military secrets, Slovcne criticistns hccanle evert more poitrtcd. 'nit Slovcnian Pany press irrcludcd den,;rnds or1 Srrhi;~ to:

give full autonomy to Vojvodinn and Kosovo and the proble~n of SR Scrhia will be rcmovcd. Or otherwise: reconcile yourselves for o~lce ,

-

with tllc fact lllc participation of Serbia in the creation of a second lcomnlullistl Yugoslavia was less essential than ill the creation of the first [irltcnvar] Yugoslavia! Give up, while there is st i l l tilnc, the myth that scr1,ia will play the main role ill the Balkans and lYu6oslavial."

Slovenia was taking a stand that traditionally bclongcd to Cr0atia.A~ a in the eyes of Milofvit's controllcd media, the Slovenes became political Croats.

In his "Eleventh Letter to a Serhian frierld," Kerniauner declared tliat, thoudl Catholic, he would rcrriain ;rri i~icorrigihle "Calvinist." and that ;In analysis of Slovcne Catholicism would show the infusion of Pro[csta~lt tllcrnes that diffcrc~ttiatcd Slovenes llot ollly from "Orthodox, Muslim, and Stalinist Yugoslavia, but also from the rest of C~thulic Y~gos\avia,"41 The disclaimer, though largely fallacious, was important. T ~ C communality of Slovcncs andCroats~was3~~uilp, .on their common Catholic tradition, the l ink~t l~a t 'wo~ldnot~be~~~s~!$ on the Serbian polemicists:W+t'i'tiii,ri~in~I~, 1987 ind19CwaS thd

of a ,.. . . , . .. campaign against thcCatholic 'Church, and :.jpccifisnlly . , . , , agaitlst the Vatican, which was hcing presented as histora'8. i,c=lly niotiv3tcd by a "blind hatred toward Slavdom and 0nho.r

was that the ail11 of the Vatican in the 1930s Was to "Catholicize the Serbs with the :aid of the Concbrdat," which failed to take over the obiections of the Serbian Orthodox Church; that having failed, the "Vatican lost intercst in good relations with Yugoslavia 2nd worked with al l powers at its disposal, that is, clericalist politics, indoctrinated priests, and the Ustajjs--the ' >34.l barter- ing-rarll of Croat cliauvinism-to destroy Yugoslavia

'r11c allti-catholic authors did riot overlook Slovene Catholicism. lndcCd, it was claimed that Slovcne Catholic prelates, like Bishop Anton Jegli? of Ljubljana, had taken the lead in loyalist Pro- Habsburg attacks on Serbia in 1914 and that the Slovene Catholic press had iflvcnted the slogan "Hang the Serbs from the willow trecs!"44 B U ~ it was tile Croat CathoIics who were cast in the lead role of tllc Vati~at1.s doriiestic accomplices. The third picture[- J, from Janu:lry 1990, shows at1 inquisitorial Catholic prelate with

an l l s r a i a IJ \lnder h i s cross. There is a dccorativc CYC on his c P s c l l . I,IJ&, hc is playing with a wreath of threaded Ilulilatl cycs. His sitlister smile watches over Serbian children that arc held captive hchinJ barbed wire, most of their CYcs plucked out.4s

I I Ytrgoslovin: T/I~ Fearfir1 Asytntrretry of War 16.3

prelate cotlld llavc hecn Archbishop Alojzijc Stcpinac ( 1 898- 1960). the m~tn11x1linll of Croatia, who rvns rllc favnrirc

of . . Serbian polctntc~sts ilcsllitc his frcqucnt protests ag,linst ustaja mi=lCc~ls.~~ 'Shc t:trgct, howcvcr, rr-1s not tIlar spccilic, hc sure

. . .

the Catholic Church in Croatia was the institutional home of + unworthy and evcn criminal clerics and laymen in thc course of J Axis-dependent Ustaia dictatorship. But so was the Scrbian Ortho9 dox Church, whosc clergy produccd their share of Chcmik conl- r mandcrs:~Thc point, horvcvcr, was not whether eithcr ccclcsiastic~l organization failcd to hold the hand of political gangsters in thcir respectivc backyards. The Catholic Church was simply to bc secn ;IS an anti-Scrbian and anti-Yugoslav institution. In the words of Milorad EkmcSit, a lcading Scrb historian, in the ninetccnth and twentieth ccnturics, the "Yugoslavs were as unitcd as the Catholic Church succccdcd in tnaintaining Croat and Slovene scparatisnl." Therefore, the full inrcgration of the South Slavs always dcpcnded on the "downfall of religious sentiment," but mainly among the Cath- olics." The fear of Catholicism is often presented less clcgantly. Extremist Serbian painter Milit Starikovit (MiliC of MaCva), recently put it this way: "The papal penetration of the East i s relying on an artificially created Croat nation . . . and soon [will be rclying] on the Nazi-Croat state of extreme proselytistic intentions."'"

The various systcnls of collusion not only extcnd to covert t ies benvecn the Vatican and Moscow (in 1934, "at thc rccommcndatit~n of the Vatican, Josip Broz rrito] revived the broken channcl bctwccn the Comintcrtl and Ustaia terrorists in the ~migration"'~), but embrace other conspirators, including thc Masons and nlodcrnism (in the system of columnist Drag05 Kalajit and the Scrb Party of Saint

'Sava),J') Macedonians and Muslims. The fourth picture from the Serbian Grand Guignol (see Ft'ip~trc 4) i s titled "A House Built on Coopcration."J' I t sllows the cotlrention between a Catht~lic bisl~op and a Muslim i ~ n a n ~ over a Scrll child. "Catholicize!" shouts the rnitercd prelate. "Yok," the fczzcd Muslim with an unplensant razor shouts in Turkish negation, "Circumcise!" The dispute i s rcsolved in the lower frame. 'She bishop and the imam, in n virtual parahlc of how nationalist Serbs view the fate of Bosnia-Hercegovin:~, smilc at one another as the former plucks the child's eycs out and the latter holds t l~e child by thc foreskin. . .

T h e Croat rcnctions to thc nlanufacturc of Scrhian fears wcrc slow and typicnlly incrcilulous. In tlic absence of ally strong ccntral authtlrity, wit11 cotncrvativc Titoists still ntore or lcss in cllnrgc in the lntr IYXOs, rlic Croat politicnl scene ~lccdcd ncw strategies of sclf-dcfcnsc atld ncw forces to intplcrncnt thetll. MiloicviCs r u l i ~ ~ g

I K S * rcllanled tile socinlist h r t y ~,fScrl,ia ((lq in 1 y y t ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ d StrU"ure of 3 Leninist cdrc Imrty, hut su~~~iturll

idc(llob, of

Y~r~vslauin: The Fearfit1 Asynlntetry of War I65

Titoist communism with a hybrid of anti-Westernism, Serbian tta- tionalis~n, and bellicosity. Miloicvit's hold over the Serbian 1':lrty- state with all r ~ f i t s attendant instruments of persuasion and control Icgitim:ttcd artd popl~larized the Scrbian culmrc of fear. An equiva- lent dcvclopnic~it \rqas irrrpossiblc withirt the Croatian contmr~~iist organizatio~t. .flit Croat variant of Central European "rcfolution" (as T. Garton Ash put it) meant t l ie decriminalization of dissent, hut not a liccltsc for hoary suprcrnacist ambitions. By the spring of 1989 the lirsr Croat "a l tcr~ lat ive groups" got t l ~ c i r start, among thcnl the Cro:~r Sucinl-1.ibcr:iI Alliance (Iatcr Party, HSLS), the Association for Yugoslav Dcrnocratic l~iitiativc (UJDI), thc Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), and numerous othcrs. These groups, most of which were registcrcd as lcgal parties by the end of the year, reprcscntcd the wliolc political spectrum from post-Marxist Yugoslavism and social dcrriocracy to the Croat irltcgral right. With the cxception of the Scrb minority organizations, al l of tlient (including the rcvivcd Co~i i~ l lu- nists, newly renamcd the Parry of Democratic Change) were set on a dcfcnsc coursc agni~lst Milokvit's Serbia.

111 January IYYO, t h e League of Communists of Yugoslavia hcld i t s forrrtecntl, (:id last) corlgrcss and proceeded to fall apart in the struggle l~ctwccn M~loicvii- and his opponents, notably the dclcga- tio~is of Slovcninn nnd Cro~tialt Com~nunists. With the collapse of the Titoist parry thc wholc Yugoslav project, which was held and mnintni~lcd by communist methods of governance since the war, itsclf ground to a halt. As a result, the dcrnocraticoption could not be a s[;ttcwidc solutio~~. Multipnrty politics and the absence of coercion and idcologic~il control succccdcd in a pieccrncal fashion in those republics where tltc Comrlil~nists became agreeable to changes, first in Slove~iia, illen Croatia, and finally in Macedonia and Bosnia- Hercegovina. I t could not succeed in the nonexisting center, whose only viable pxrt w:~s the terrified and disoriented JNA, the Party- army without the I'arty and increasingly without a country. Nor could i t succccd irt Scrhia and Montcncgro, where tlie renationalized 1'3rn-state r c~~~ t i s t i ~ r~ ted itsel f under a ncw label, but with far harsher conscquenccs for tltc minorities, notably Albanians. The anxictics of tile Scrbia~i-hloutc~legri~i axis and tltc JNA wcrc fuclcd h!, the systc~~iic changcs ill rhc "nortliwcst."

TI1c first frrc nlirl ~tiultip;irty clectiorls in posnvnr Yup)slnvia wcrc hcld ill Slovctiin a~ id Croatia in April and May 1990. Serbian puhlic

! 166 Ivo Uanac opinion grectcd them with fear. Thc caricarurc, of the croarian ~I~c t ions fi urC 5 S ~ O W S four Urtdar in black unifclrms riding their h u m d 6 u r d c n in an aquatic racc that is chccrcd by

Y~~S(JS/,~UI~I: T l ~ c Fcarh l Asynrttterry of W'rr 167 knifc-wiclding Ustaias on both sidcs of the pond." :It is ralllyl remarkable to what cxrcnt the last ties of trust bctwecn thcScrbs b11$,,

- Croats.,&eliedb,y 1990'P~~ir'jtid':'' .:.?-. . . . . . . . ,. . ,. . . a rriontli' ticfoie the massacre , , ..., :>- .:! .. , . . .-, ...,....,.. ..*. ........ ~.

o f i abienCroanan polrcernen hy the Scrbian rrrcgulars in Borovo$ _ . _ . A' . . . . ". .... , . -, .. " . . . . $elo, eastern Slnvonia, which is gcr,crally regarded i s the bcginriing of$ .< , the Croatian war.::lt should bc remembered, howevcr, that the Scrbian nationalist c;lmp did not regard the victory of thc nationalist pnrtics in Slovenia (DEMOS) and Croatia (HDZ) as a clualitativcly new develop~ncnt. 'They viewed the Croat Communists as ollly somewhat lcss "Ustnioid" than I'ranjo Tudjrnan, whosc predictable historicism was cxl~cndcd in a scrics of futile ncgoti;~tions with Milo3evi6, whose i~ctwork in thc JNA and the Scrb co~~lmunitics in Croatia and Uusnia-Hcrccgovir~a had already laid the for war.

In January 1991, the JNA tried to prcvcnt the sclf-arming of Croatia and tlrcrcby provokcd a state crisis. The consequences wcrc mcagcr for Croati~, but in the process the JNA emancipated itself frorn any fcdcral control. Thc disappearing govcrnmcnt of prime minister Antc Markovii- should be mentioned in this context alone. .I~licrc followcd more futilc negotiations among the ic:~dcrs of the republics (nut al l of whotn wcrc cqu:lI in powcr, even in relative tcrnls) and hopclcss internationally sponsored atrernl)ts at jump starring the vchiclc of the wrecked fcdcral presidency, whosc four Serbian-Montcncgrin mcmbcrs blockcd the four reprcscntativcs of the othcr republics in rnaintainil~g the system of rotating chairman- ship and evcry othcr aspcct of rcgular proccdurc. In J~ltle Slovenia and Croatia proclai~ncd thuir inilcpcndcncc and incurrcd further JNA intervention that WIIS ~pot~sorcil and finnnccd by Scrbi:l.:By Septcrn3 ber Slovenia's indcpcndcncc was no longer in doubt; the ,conflict$ having turned into a bloody war of conquest ("lil>cration," 'in# Belgrade parlancc) of all Cro;ltian nrcas with- a significant'Scrb$ presence.

The sloppy and hrutish rnanncr of the JNA should be notcd.Tito's army was purgcd of or dcscrted hy most of its non-Serb sontmandcrs ill Jtlnc 199 1. In thc war that followcil, thc JNA was dc-Tiroizcd :lnd dc-Croatia~~izccl. ' Ih is quict proccss was rcally a v n t revolution. cspccially i f the role of 1':trtis;tri Croati;~ is kcpt in mi id in the cnrly llistory thc JNA. 'lllc ;irlrly's ideological nttrihutcs 1111 longer hcing clear, i t cntcrcd itrro co~~scns~~al rcl;ltions with various irrcgttlar

Serbian units that were connected with the MiloieviC-sponsored Serb "autonomous regions" of Croatia and ~osnia-~crce~ovin

ahcr Macedollin bccnlnc a part of its tcr~,tory, the pcasafits fult tllc l imits of Serbia. Likewise, when tlie Panisiris retrcarcd frolrl scrl,ia in 1941 across the Uvac river [ into thc Sandiacj, these ,inter~lnriol,alist fighters ohen took a lump o f Serbian soil and pu t i t in,thcir kcrc~,iCfs. People feel very deeply what is thcirs and what is rlot tlicirs.'~*

Thercforc, heal ing hcnvcen Serbia and h c r neighbors, ahovc all, w i l l mcan the ncccprnncc of Scrbia's real borders. And the fcar o f rcn l crocodiles, n o t of thc w i t ch doctor 's mask of fcar.

ENDNOTES

'Roben D. Kaplnn. "Croarianism." T1,r Nrw Rc(,rrblic (2s ~~~~~~b~~ 1 9 ~ 1 ) : 18. J"Russia and Ccrm.rny," London Times. 23 Dccembrr 1991. 'Frrrcro. 44. 'On the hism~y o f South Slavic rclarions. with spccinl rcfcrrncc to narional

idcolrlcicss scc l v n Banac. T l~e Narional Qacrriott Lr Ytrgoslovia: o,,gi,,, I i jsruv, Politics IIlhaca. N.Y.: Comcll Univcrsiw Prerr. IY841.

'Fcrrcro. 42.

. . . -,.--.

lhc 1980s bfckground to the currcnr South Slavic conflicts, scc /vo nanac, : 'P?st-(hmunlsm as Post-Yugoslavistn: T ~ C ~ugoslav Non.Revuli~ti~,rlr

. 1989-IYY0." in lvo Banac. cd., 6 s u n r Europe i r i Rc~*oh,ri~,t (Irh;ica, N.Y.:

Cotticll Univcrsiry Press. 1992),168-87. "R~riiirwrc rroabrc ( l t c l p ~ l ~ ] ~ I May 1989. 2.

1 I)adaba h;ls hcrn ~~~isucccssful in its c h n s to illcare ihc ri,,hrr llc,l,~cr ,,[ ,he - matcri;llin Fifiurrs 1-5 hrftlre thr drtc of pr~hlicarinn. I'crsnris harirlp il~klrlll.l~i,lll pcnain in~ lo thr\r rights arc rcqucstcd to contact tlie l>Lmd,rbrs rclitl lrirl ,,f,i((.

101" a kcy w3rtil~lc rhcorrrical Jocumcnr, Tiro drrcribcd prcwar Yugo

172 luo ilaitac yl15'O~loui~: 711~ Fror/itl Asytn~nctr )~ of W ~ l r 173 "lhid.. 37.

n,,r,,cric311y scrhs: "This fcar, which had a defcnsivc ch3r.lcter. 62C rise lJAzcm vllali. an Albanian and thc hcad of the KOSOVO partr co,,,minre, rrspondcd to awrPsion lrd to gen',cidc apninst the Scrbs in Croatia." IlliJ., 4.

with a counlcwhnrgc that Scrbs whrr cmigrarc frnnr Kosovo, c~pccia~ly inlcllcc ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i r ' . ~ Work jr rcplc~c with methodoh~~icr l errors, nn~tably 111 the arc3 o f Nals and norablcs, arc cowards. "Tko r u kukavicc; D~,,,,S (hgrcb), (4 analow, ~f rl,r crontS ..Rm,,cida~ i