eur pol & soc xx class 8 verdery

8/21/2019 Eur Pol & Soc Xx Class 8 Verdery

1/12

E D I T O ~ S

Sherry B 0l tne1;Nicholas B Dirks eofr

ley

7

RINCETON STUDIES

IN

CULTURElPOWERiHlSTORP

WHAT WAS SOCIALISM

A N D WHAT COMES NEXT?

atherine Verdely


2/12

WI-IAT WAS SOCIALISM AN D WHY DI D IT FALL?

T

1E STAR'I' I. ING DIS INT EG WrI ON of Corn mu~ ~is t;trty 1-nlr

l l

Eastern Europe in 1989 , and its somewhat lengthier unraveling

i l l

the Soviet UII~III Ietweell 1985 and 1991, rank among the cct~tu ry's

most lllotlrcntous occurrclrces. Especially because neither policv-m;tkers

nor area specialists predicted them, these events will yield much analysis

;~fte rhe fact, as scl~o lars evelop tlrc I~irtdsight ecessary for un derstaiiding

w l ~ a t hey railed to grasp betore. In this chapter, I aim to stimulate discus-

sion ab ot ~t hy Soviet-style socialism fell. Because I believe answ ers to t11v

q t ~ e s t i < n ~e q ~ ~ i r cittderstnnding L OW s < ~ c i a I i s ~ , ~'\vot-k ed,'' 11egi11 ,itlt ; I

;trlalysis of this and tlten suggest l~ o nt i ~ ~ t c r s r c t c di t e f~ ~ l l yit11 rcrta il~

features of i ts wo rld-systei~ ~ontext.

What

Was Soc ia l i sm?

T l ~ eocialist societies of Eastern E um pe and the Soviet Union diffcred f i .olll

one ano ther in significant i-cspccts-for instance. in tllc intctlsity,

S ~ R I I .

~ ~ d

elfectiveness of central control, in tlte extent of popular support or rcsis-

t;mce, and in tlre degrec and timing of (affi~rts t refonn. N otw itl~s t;ul( li~~ g

t l~cs e i f fe rc t~ccsw i t l ~ i t ~fot-tl~erly xisting socialistn,"' I fullon, theor ists

sttc l~ s Kor~ rai n op ting for a single at~alyticalmodel of it.' The family re-

semblances alllong socialist countries \\,ere nlore important than their vnri-

c ty , f r~r t l;dytic p t~ rp os ~~ s ,

I I I I C ~ B

s \\.c

C;III

I)est c01111)rcl1et1d il.rllcI1, Ji ~p it-

Tlris cltnpter

war originally

entitled

"\Vhat

\ \ g r Socialislr. and \ \%at

Comes

Next?

nncl

\ ,;a

delivered

as a

lectarc

bl-

ile

Center

fur Cotnparativc

Rcscarcl~n ilist


3/12

~

~

.~

.

~.

~

~

2

C ~ P T E R

N E

nese, West Gennan, and Worth American societ ies as variants of

a

single

&a pita l is ts ~st enr . "knowledging,-then, that m y descript ion npplics inore

fully to certain countries an d t ime pe riods than to others, I t reat t l~ cm l l

under one umbrella.

...

F or s ev er al d ec a de s, d ~ enalysis of socialism Ilas been an i n t e r ~ ~ a t i u t ~ a l

industry, employing both \Vestern poli tical scientists and Eil stc r~ ~issi-

dents. Sin& 1889 thisindust iy has received a massive infr~sion f new raw

mater ia l s, i s once-secret fi les are open ed and t~a nslat ioos ppear of research

b y Io ca l s c l ~ o l a r s ~ ( e s ~ e c i a l l ~olish and Hungarian) intu their own dec li t ri~lg

sbcia l i s t sys ten~s .~y taste ins uc h theori& is "iodigenist": 1 have found

most r~se ful he analyses of East E ul-opeans concerning the world in which

ihey l ived . T li e fo l lowing surn~na~ yw es ~ n u c l ~o that work,

and

it is subject

to refinement and revision as new rcsearch appears. ' C;ive~ ~emporal and

spatial c,instr;~ints . wil l compress el~e~ncntsf a longer discussion, cmplla-

sizing how p r ~ d ~ e t i o ~ ~as organized and the conser/ocllces of this ibr con-

sumption and for inarkets . ' I bel ieve these themes af i~ rd h e l ~ c s t ntry into

why Party r111& ruml~led I I > I ~ ~ Ifas ter than anyone v~pe cted .

Product ion

Fro111 t l r rarl iest days of th e "total itarian" ~no dcl ,Americ;~ns ' l t~agc f

" C ~ ~ ~ n n ~ u r ~ i s t ~ l "as of

an

autocratic, all-powerfid st:ltc incxo~-;tl)ly ~t~ pub ing

its l larsl~will

U I I

its subjects. Eve n afte r 1n0st ;ues sl)ccii~lisl\ c:krcd to ldsc

the tenn "totalitarian" in their-writing, the image of totalita~.i;ln ~ltocl-;cy

persisted with 110th the broader public and many politicians; indeed,

i t

un

der pinn cd Ronald Reagan's view of t he "evil enrpire" as 1;ltc 21s tl ~ c 980s.

Yct the image was By ; ~ n d31-gewrong. Connnur~ i s tWrty states were 11ut

all-powerful: the), were cornpar.atioely weak. Because so cialisnis leivlers

manag ed only partially itnd fitfully to \vin a positive and sr~p prn ting ttitude

froid their citizens-that is, to be seen as legitimate-the regimes wel-e con-

stantly unde rn~i ned y internal resistance and hidden forms of sabotage

at

all syst m leoels. This contributed much to their final collapse. I will de-

scribe briefly sonle of the elements of socialist nontotalitatianis~u nd signal

a few place s w her e resistan ce la):'

Socialism's fragility begins w ith th e system of "centralized planning,"

which the center nei ther adequately planned nor control led. Central plan-

ners would draw u p a plan with quanti t ies of everything they wanted to see

produced, known as targets . They would disaggregate the plan into pieces

appropriate for execution and est imate how m uch inves t~nent nd how many

raw materials were needed if managers of fi rms were to fi l l their targets .

Man agersle arned early on, however, that not only did the targets increase

annual ly bu t the materi a ls requ i red o f t en d id not ar rive on t ime or in d ~ e

W I I A T

W A S S O C I A L S h l . ND W Y D I D I T P A L L ?

21

rigl~ t mounts. So they would respond by bargaining their plan: dem anding

lllorc investments and raw rnatcrials than the an~ouutsctually necessaly for

t l ~ e i ra r g e t s . E v c ~ ynanageg and cvely level of t l ~ e)ureauc~-acy , added

I,udgets and requests in hopes of having enough, in tile actnal mom ent of

pmduc tion. (A result of the bargaining process, of crlul-se, \\,as that c entra l

alwavs had f;~nlty nfunnation about \v l~at r.;,s really req uired for

production, and this impeded their ability to plan.) Then, if managers some-

how ende d up wit11 more of some n~ate rial han they needed they hoarded

it. Iloard ed material had two uscs: it could be kept for tl ~ c ext production

cycle, 111- i t could be exchanged with so n~ e ther firm h r so n~e thin g ne's

own firm lnckcd. These excl~anges r barters of i~ latrri :~l cre a crucial corn-

ponellt of bel~ aaior vitllin centra lized plann ing.

A result of all the paddir~g fbudgets and hoarding oi i~ lstc ria ls as wide-

spread shortages, fur wl~ic h eason socialist economies ;)I-e allcde cono mies '

of shortage.' Shortages were som etimes relcttive, ;IS \v11e11 r ~ni cie nt uan ti-

tirs of ~n;~terials~ l d;111or ijr

a

given l cvu l o fou tpu t ;~ct~~al lyaistoc l. 11ut

riot

~~~~~~t xr~ d rl lcn

t l q

were i~e ed ed . ometilnes s11ort;igcs a8cl-e il,soI~ ~te.

3ince relative sllartage often resu lted in lowel-ecl prod uctio n, o~--a, i n Ilo-

n~ania-s ince i t en~s equ ired fi1r production or co ns t~ n~ pt io ~~cre he in^ ex

ported. The causes (~l 's l~ortageere primarily that pe ople 1on:er clown i n t h r

p l a n n i ~ ~ grocess \ \ere usking for more inaterials t l~ nl ~he retluil-t.d iu ~d

tl ier~ oarding whatever they got . Underlying their h el~a vior\ .as w l~a t cotl-

o ~ ~ ~ i s t sa ll s o ft 1111 (lge l ~ ~ ~ ~ s t r . ~ i ~ ~ t s - t l ~ a ts, if :I firm ~ V ~ L S< ~ s i ~ gI I C I I K ? t l ~ .

center woold hail it out. I n o ~ l r

I \VI I

economy, with certain exceptions (SLICII

21sClnysler and the savings and loan industry) , l~ ud ge t unstrnints a re 11;tr~I:

if yuu cannot make ends meet,

you

go 11ndel:But in socialist ecun on~ ics, t

did not matter if fir~ns~skecl ill- eat r i a inves t~~~cntr l~o:tl-cle(l

lw

n,;itcri;~ls;

they paid no penalty fol- t.

A fictitious cxan~ple ill 11clp o illostrate-say,

a

shoc f i~ctoryhat makes

women's shoes and boots. Central planners set the fistory's targets for tlw

year at one 11undrcd tllousarrrl pairs of slloes and twenty thousand pail-s of

oots, for which they think management will need ten tons of leather, a half I

ton of nails, and one thousand pounds of glue. The m anager calcu1;ttes what

Ile would need under ideal conditions, if his workers worked consistently

during three eight-hou r shifts. He adds some for \vastage, knowing the

workers are lazy and the machines cut badly; some for theft, since workers

are always stealing nails and glue; some to trad e \\ it11 ot11e1- irms in case he

:

comes up short on a crucial material at a crucial mom ent; and some m ore for

the fact that the tannery always delivers less than requested. The manager

t l ~ u sefuses the plan assigned him, saying Ire cannot produc e that n u~ nb er

of shoes and boots unless he gets thirteen rather than ten tons of leather, a

ton rather than a half-tun of nails, and two thousand rather than one tllou-


4/12

C H P T E R

O N E

Ii r

sand pounds of glue. Moreover, he says he needs two new power stitchers

from Germany, without wl~iclrhe can produce nothing. In short, Ire has

bargained his plan. Th en w hen he gets some part of these goods, Ire stock-

I

p iles t l ~ e ~ nr trades excess glue to the ~ nanager

of;^

coat facto~yn rx c l ~ a l g c

for som e extra pigskin. If leath er supp lies still prove ins uffici ent, Ire will

make fewer bouts an d mor e shoes, or more footwear ofsmall size, so as to l~ sc

k ss leather; never m ind if women's feet get cold in winter, or W I I I ~ ~ I Iit11

big feet can find no thing to weal:

With all t l~is adding and hoarding, it is clear why sl~ortag e as er~ det~ lic

to socialist systems, and why tlre main problem for fimls was not u~hetl~er

I

they could meet (or genrrate) demand but whether they could procure ade-

qua te supplies. So whel-eas the chief problem of ecorro~nic ctors in \\'cstern

;

econonries is to get profits by selling things, the chief pro ble ~u or soc ia l i s~~is

econo~nic stars was to p rocure things. Capitalist firnls compete wit11 ra cl ~

?

o t l ~ e ror markets i r ~ l~iclr hey will make a profit ; socialist firms co ~~ ~p t. tc d

to ~naxi~nizeheir bargaining power with suppliers higher up. In our societ ;

the p rob le~ n s other sellers, and to outcompete them you have to befriend

the buyel: TIILIS ur clercs a nd sh op owners smile and give the customer

F

fr iendly se~ vice recause they want business; customers can be groucl~ : but

I

it will only m ake th e clerk try lrarder, In socialism, the locus of co~n petitiun

.

was els ew l~e rc: oltr compe titor was other buyel-s, other procurers ; and to

outcompete tllem you needed to befriend those higher up who supplied

you. Thos in socialism

it

was not the clerk-the pnn ide l; or "sellel-"-\vho

was fi-iendly (they were ~ ~s ua ll yrouchy) but tlre procurers, the custonlcrs,

who sougl~to ingratiate t l , r~n selveswith snriles, bribes, or favors. Thc

\\.ark

o f p ro cu r in g ge n era te d who le n ct wo rk s o f c oz p r el at io ns am ~ rn g a ~ r ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ i c

3

?

~nanage:-s nd t l~c ir urcnoo-ats, clerks and their custon~ers.Ve wo r~l d ;ill

this c or n~ pt io n, ut that is bccau sc gettin g supp lies is not a pn111lt:111 11r

c;~pitalists:he prohlcln is getting s;lles. 1x1 a word,

bl

capitalists salrs~~r;ltl-

ship is at a prcmium; for socialist managers, the premium was on istl~~isi-

i

t

t ionsmanship, or p rocurement.

\

So far

I

have been describing the clientelism and bargaining that UII-

j

derc ut the Party center's eflkctive control. similar weakness in vertical

power relations emerges from the way socialist production and shortage

1 bred workers ' opposit io~ral o~~sciousnessnd resistance. Among the m any

things in short supply in socialist systenls was labor. Managers hoarded

labor, just like any o ther raw m aterial, because they never k new 11ow many

workers

they w ould n eed. Fifty workers working three eight-h our shifts six

1

days week might he enoug h to meet a firm's tar ge ts if all the ~rlaterials

wer e on hand all month long. But this never happened. Many of those work-

ers would stand idle for par t of the month, and in the last ten days when most

t

of the materials we re finally on hand the firm would need

75

workers work-

ing overtime to com plete the plan. T he manager therefore kept

75

workers

I

on the books, even t l~ough

I I I J S ~

f the tim e 11e needed fewer; and since all

otller lrrauagers were doing th e same, labor was scarce. This provided a con-

venient i f ~~nplanned~ ~ p p o l - lor the regimes' gua ~an tee d mployment.

AII irnpwlant result IS l ;~ l rsi l~leijr t l irir p;~ cl~eck. acll-es olien fou ~ld o way ~ ~ I . I I L N I ~his

i11ter11;11; ~ l x ~ t ; ~ p c ,.llic11by r~:clr~cingrod uc ti vi ty d e e p en e d t h e p ~ - u l ~ l r r ~ ~ sf

soci:iIist < ~ I I I ~ I I B ~ < , S(I the 11


5/12

In each countn,. some eauivale~rt f the KGB was i t~str u~n entaln main-

taining surveillance, with varying degrees of intensity and success. Partic-

ularly effective were the Secret Police in the Soviet U I I ~ ~ I I .ast Germany,

a i d Romania, but networks of informers and collnli~)r;~torsp e n ~ t e d 11some

extent in all. 'I'hese formed a i~ig l~l y~ elab ora tep r r ~ d t ~ c t i r r ~ ~ "y s t c ~ ~ ~:~r;illcl

I

:)

,

i : to the system for prod ucing goods-a system producin g paper, whiclr con-

.,

.

.

tained real and falsified histories of theCpeople ver wlro n~ he Party ruled.

i

i

i18

Let us call the im med iate PI-oduct "dossiers," or "files," tllougl, tllc ultimate

;I

,

pro duct was political'sul~jects nd subject dispositions useF111 o the I-egime.

;

-

This parallel production system wa sat least as impol-tant as the system for

: , .

I

producing goods, for producers of files were inuch better paid tlra~~rr~doc-

ers of goods; hl image of this parallel production system comes friirn th


6/12

6

C I I A P T E R

O N E

selves further productive. Socialist regimes wanted not just eggs but the

goose that lays them. Thus if capitalism's inner logic rests on accumulat-

' ing surplus value, the inner logic of social ism was to ac c u ~ r ~ ~ ~ la teneans of

production.1'

The emphasis 11 k ee pi ng r e so ur ce s a t t h e c en t er f i x r e d i s t r i l ~ ~ ~ t i o ~ ~s

one reason why items produced in socialist countl-ies so often proved UII-

competitive on the world market. Basically, most of these goods were not

being m ade to be sold competit ively: they were being ei ther central ly ac-

cumulated or redistributed at low prices--effectively given away. Thu s

whether a dress was pret ty and well made or ugly and ~nissewt~ils irrel-

evant, since profit was not at issue: the dress would be "given amla);" at

a

subsidized price, not sold. In fact, the wlrole point was wt to sell things: the

center wanted to keep as much as possible under its control, because Illat

was how i t had redistributive power; a d t wanted to give away the rest ,

because that was how it confirllled its legitimacy with the Selling

things competitively was therefore beside the point. So too were ideas of

"efficient" production, which for a capitalist \vould enhance profits 11y wast-

ing less material or reducing wages. But whatever goes into calculating a

profit--costs of material or labor inputs, or sales of goods-was uo im po rt a~ ~t

in socialism until very latc in the game. Instead, "e ffic ie~~ cy"as understood

to mean "the full use of existing resources," "the n~aximizatinn

f

Sivcn

cn-

pacities" rather than of results, all so as to redirect re source s to a goal greater

th an s atisGing th e pop"lation's needs.'" 111 oth er word s, what was r:ttionaI ill

socialism differed from capitalist rationality Both are stu pid in the ir own

way, but differently so.

Socialis~n's redistri l~utive n ~pll asisead s to on e of the gl-c:at pal-i ~dox rs f

a

paternalist regime claiming to satisfy needs. Having constantly h anlass

means of production so as to enlrance redistributive power caused Party

leaders to prefer hea\y industry (steel mills, machine construction) at the

expense of consunier industry (processed foods, or shoes). After all, once a

consumer got hold of something, the center no longer co ntr ~~ lle dt; central

power was less served by giving things away than by PI-oducing things it

could continue to control. The central fund derived more from set t ing u p a

factory to make construction equipment than from

a

shoe factory or a choco-

late works. In short, these systems had a basic tension between what was

necessary to legitimate them-redistributing things to the masses-and

what

w s

necessary to their power-accumulating things at the center. Th e

tension was mitigated where people took pride in their economy's develop-

ment (that is, building heavy industry might also bring legitimacy), but my

experience is that the legitimating effects of redistribution were more im-

portant by far.

W H A T

WA S

S O C I A L 1 S M . A N D

W l l Y D I D

I T

P A L L 7

27

Each country addl-essed this tension in its own way. For example, Hull-

gary after 1968and Poland in the 197 sgave things away more, while R o~ l~ a-

nia and Czechoslovakia accumulated things more; but the basic tension ex-

isted everywhere. The socialist social contract guaranteed people food and

clothing but did 110tpromise (as capitalist systems do) qu;tlity, ready avail-

ability, and choice. Thus the systemn's mode of operation tended to sacrifice

in favor of production an d controlling the produc ts. This para-

doxical neglect of consump tion contributed to the long lines about which we

l le ar d so ~ n u c l ~and we heard ahuui i iem, of course, because we live in a

?ctr~no wl~icl luns11nlpti1111s cn~cia l ) .

In emphasizing this ~~eglectf cunsnmption as against building rlp the

central resource base. I have so far been speaking of theforr~lnllyorgan-

ized ecolinm y of socialism-some call it the "first" or "utlicial" economy. But

tllis is 110t the wllole stor Si ~l ce he center would not supply what people

neccled, they strugglcrl to

l

so t h e ~ ~ ~ s e l v c s ,eveloping in the process a

llllgc rcpcrtoiru of stn~tegich

I

r ~ ~ t a i i ~ ga ~ ~ s u ~ n r roods and

services. These strategies, cal led the " s e c o ~ ~ Cr "informal" economy,

spanlled a wide range from t l ~c uasi-legal to the definitely illegal.'" In most

socialist coun trics it was not illegul to mr~onl ight or eutt.;, pay-by doing

carpen try, say-11ut pcop le doing so often stole nraterials or illegally ~l sc d

tools from their \\rorkplace; or they might manipulate state goods to sell

on tlre side. Clcrks i t ) storcs ~uight arn favors or

r w t t : ~

1;:onr): for P X ~ I I B -

ple,

by

saving scarce goods to sell to special crlsh)mers, wlro tipped ~ ~

or did some inpo l-tant favor in return Also part of the second economy was

the so-called "private plot" of collective farm peasants, who

held it legally

an11 in theory co ~ ~ l do wha t they \\,anted with it-grow food for the ir own

t;~l)le r to srl l in the ~ nark et t s tate-control led prices. But al t l~ o~ ~g hlle plot

itself w s l eg a l, p ~ o p l e btained higll or~t pu ts rom it not just by virtue of

hard work 1n1t elso

~

t c a l i ~ ~ f

I I I I I

l ~ cr~llectivc arm: krt ilizc r and Ilerbi-

cides, foddcr for their pigs or cr~ws ,work time for their o\vn weeding or

han ~es ting, ractor time and file1 for plo\ving their plot, and so on. The scc-

ond economy, then, which provisioned a large part of consumer needs, was

parasi t ic upon the state ea ~n om y nd inseparable fro n~ t. It developed pre-

cisely because the state economy tended to ignore consumption. To grasp

the interc onnection of th e two economies is crucial, lest one think that sirn-

ply dismantl ing the state sector will automatical ly enable en t ~ ~ p r e -

neu rsl~ ip-a lrea dy presen t in embry-to flourish. On the contrary: parts of

the second economy will wither and die if deprived of the support of the

official, state economy.

It is clear from what I have said that whereas consumption in our own

society is considered primarily a socioeconomic question, the relative ne-

glect of consumer interests in socialism made consu mption d eeply political.

In Rom ania in the 1980s (an extreme case), to kill and ea t your own calfwas

a political act, because the government prohibited killing calves: you were


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r'

8

C H A P T E R

O r

.suppoied to sel l them cheap

to

the state farm, for export . Ro~n anian i l lagers

.

w l r o f c d ~ n c v e a lhaving assu red them selves of my complicity) did so wit11

special satisfaction. It was also illegal for urbanites to go and buy forty kilo-

g r ams o f p o ta to e s d ir e ct iy f r o m d ~ eillaiers wh o grew potatoes on their

private plot , because the autl io~it ies-suspectedhat villagers would c11a1-ge

more than the state-set pl ' ice, thus enriching then~s elves. o Ro~nanian u-

l icemen routinely stopped cars riding low on the chassis and coofisci~te~l

p n ~ d u c ehey found inside.

Consumption became politicized in yet another way: the vely definition

of "needs" became a matter for resistance and dispute. "Neerls," as we

should know from o ur own expe rience, are nut given: they are cre;~ted. e-

veloped, expanded-the work especially of the adve rtisir~g ~r~ sine ss.

t

is

advert is il~g's ob to convince us that we need t l liugs we didl i t k n~lwwe

rwedcd,, or t llat if we feel unhappy, it 's l~ec aus c e need s ol ne tl ~i ~~ g;I slll.illli,

or a leer, or a Marlborn, or a man). Our need requires only I nalllu, a ~ lt

car1 he satisfied with a pl-oduct or service. Nan~ingl-o1111led st ;~t l:s , ; ~ l ~ e li ~ ~ g

them as need s, and finding co n~m odit ies o fill them is at the 11r;ll t f our

ecollotny Socialism, by contrast, whicll reste d not

11

d c v i s i ~ ~ gnlinite kirlds

of things to sell pcople but on claiming to satisfy people's b sic o e c d , l la d

a v c ~ y n a d or n e d d e f i ~ ~ i t i o nf them-in keeping with socialist egalitnria~l-

ism. Indeed, som e Iiungarian dissidents wm te ofsocial isnis relationship to

need s as a "dictatorship."" As long as the food olfered was edible or the

clothes availa1,le covered you and kept you warm. that should be sulKcie~~t.

If you had trouble finding even these, that just meant you were not l(x~king

b a r d e n o l ~ g l ~ .o p1a1111cr resun ~cd o i~~v est ig i i te\ ha t k i ~ ~ d s~ f g o o < l sro-

ple wanted, or worked to name new needs for ne\vly created products and

newly developed markets.

At the sam e t in ~e . ~owevel; eginre policies paradoxically ~ na de rrllsnmp-

tiun a pro11lel11.E v e n as t l ~ e egimes prevented people from consu~ ning y

not making goods available, they insisted that under socialism, the standard

of liviug would constantly improve. This stimulated consumer upl~ctites,

perhaps wit11 an eye to fostering increased ellort and tying people illto the

system. Moreover, socialist ideology presen ted consu mptio ~l s a "right."

The system's organizat ion exacerbated co nsumer desire further by fiustrat-

ing it and thereby making i t t he focus of ef fo rt , res is t ance , and d i sc o~ ~t e~ ~t .

Anthropologist John Borneman sees in the relat ion between desire and

goods a major contrast be twee n capitalism an d socialism. Capitalisn ~, 1r

says, repeatedly rend ers des ire conc rete a nd specific, and offers specific--if

ever-changing-goods to satisfy it. Socialism, in contrast, aroused desire

w i t k t focal iz ing i t , and kep t i t a l ive by depr ivat ion ."

s people b ecam e increasingly al ienated from social ism a nd cri t ical of i ts

acl~ievemen ts, hen, the poli t icization of consumption also mad e them chal-

lenge official definitions of their nee ds. Th ey did so not just by creating a

W I I A T W S S O C I A L 1 S M ,

A N D

W H Y D I D T F A L L ?

29

second economy to grow food or make clo t l~e s r work after hours but also,

sometimes, by public protest. Poland's C om ~nu nist eaders fell to such pro-

test at least twice, in 1970 and in 1980, when Polish workers insisted on

having nrore food t l~z ~novernnlent price increases \vol~ld ermit them . Less

immediately

disrupti \ .e were forms of protest in which people used con-

sumption styles to forge resistant social identities. The black markets in

Western goods that sprang u p everyw here enall led al ienated consumers to

express tl~ oi r ontenrpt for t l~ ci r overnniellts tlil-ough tlle kinds of things

they chose to I~uy.

O

could spend an entir e rl~onth's al a~ y n a pair of blue

jeans, for instance, but it was worth it: wearing them signified that you could

ge t s o ~ n c t l ~ i ~ ~ ghe system s; id you (l idi t rived and shouldn't have. Tllus

c o ~ ~ s r ~ r n p t i o noods and objects conferred a11 identity that set you off fro111

soci;ilisrr~, nnl~ ling ou to dilrerentiate yo r~rse lf s an individual in the Llce

( I I c l e ~ ~ t l r s sressure s to 11ornoge:enizc c\ .er yo ~ie 's almc ities and tastes into

; ( I (

~~rld i lTere~~t ia t edo l l ec t iv i ty Acqui r i~~g1,jects became a way ofconsti-

t ~ t i l l l : y11 r sel lhood against a deeply nnpopolar regime.

U ~ r r e a ~ r c r u l i cact ioaolis~~znd Markets

Belore t~irningo why these systems fell, 1 wish to address one more issue:

puliticking in tl ~ e iirty bureallcracy. Although this took different and sp e-

cific fbrn~ sn the d if reren t coo ~~t r i es ,t is important to mention tlle issue, for

s


8/12

3 C H P T E R O N E

means of production upon which both bureaucracy and center rel ied. If '

productive activity were so stifled by "overadministration" that nothing got

produced, this would jeopardize the redistributive bureaucracy's power and

prestige.

,.;Thus when central accumulation of means of production began to

threaten the capacity of lower-level units to produce; when persistent im-

balances betw een inve stment in heavy industry and in light ind ust ~y , e-

tween allocations for investment and for consumption, and so on, dimin-

ished the stock of distributable goods; and when the center's attempts to

keep enterprises fr 111neddling with sulplus appropriation obstructed the

proces s of prod uctio n itself-this is wh en pressnl-e :arose for a sl~ ili f C.III-

['hasis. Th e pres sure w as partly from those in the wider socicty to ,vhorn not

eno ugl ~ as being al located and part ly from bureaucrats t l~etnselvcswhose

prest ige a d , ncreasingly, prospects of retaining power depended on baving

more goods to allocate. One tl~en eard of decentralization, of

tile

rate of

grow th, of productivity-in a wurd, of matters of outp ut, rath er thillr the

inputs that lay at tbe core of bureaucrat ic pe rfo rn ~a nc ~.his is pen o d elI I ; I \ ~given

al~uv e nd placing i t in i ts international context . This i~iclndes sking l~o\\ ,

sorial ism's encounter with a changing world capita1is~n roduced i ~ rggra-

vated

factional divisions within Communist Parties.

M y d i s c u s s i o ~ ~f

socialism

indicated sever;~l oints nf tel~sionn its \vr~rkingr

t l~ at ffected the syste~n'scapacity for extended repn~duction.Thruughi~ut

t l leir existence, these regi n~cs ou gl~t o nlanage s ncl ~ ensi i~ns n different

ways, ranging from Hungary's major market reforms in the 1960s to Rollla-

nia's rejectio n of reform an d its heigh tene d coe l-cive eatl-action . 111all case*.

~ n a n a g i ~ ~ ghese tensions involved decisiotrs that to a greater ur 1csst .r de x~ ec

upelled si~cial ist ol i tical economics to Western capital . Thc i n~pe tus i~rhis

openin g--critical to socialisnis demisc--came ch iel l\ fronr \vithin, as Party

leaders attempted to solve their structural problems without m;tjor htl-111-

tnral reform. Their at t i tude in doing so was reminiscent of a "plu~ lder l rn-

tu li tyn that sees the ex ternal e~ lv i r o r~ n~ en ts a source of boo(? to I J ~sed ias

needed in maintaining oi~e's wn systetn, without tllought fur tlrc cost. This

attitude was v isible in the tendenc y of socialist goverlllnents to treat foreign

trade as a residual sector, used to supplement budgets without being made

an integral part of

then^.^

Because of how this opportunistic recourse to the

external environment brought socialism into tighter relationsl~ipwit11 capi -

talism, it had fateful consequences.

Th e cri t ical intersect ion occurred not in 1989 or 1987 l ~ u tn the late lSGOs

and early 1970s, when global capitalism entered the cyclical crisis fru~n

which i t is still struggling to extricate itself. Amo ng capitalists' possible re-

sponses to the crisis (devaluation, structural reorganization, etc.), an early

one was to le nd abr oad; facilitating this option were the massive quantities

of petrodollars that were invested in Western banks, following changes in

OP EC policy in 1973. By lending, Western countries enabled the recipients

to purchase capital equipment or to build long-term infrastructure, thereby

expanding the overseas markets for Wester11 prodncts."


9/12

32 c l ln p ' r E n o w e

Th e loans became available just at th e n~ om ent r,hen all across the so-

cialistb loc, the first significant round of structl~rnl eforms had b een pn)-

posed, halfheartedly implemented, and, hecanse profitability and market

critC ia fit so poorly with the rationale of socialism, largely abandon ed. Re-

luctance to proceed with reforms o w 4 much, as well, to Czecl~oslovakia's

Prague Spring, from which the Party apparatus all :la-oss the region had

been able to see the dangers that reform posed for its n~onopoly n power.

Instead of reforming the system from within, then, most Party leaderships

opted to meet their problems by a greater avticolation with the snrro undin g

economy: importing \Vestern capital a~r d sing it to buy adw nc cd tecllnul-

ogy (or, as in Poland, to subsidize consr ~mp tion),n hopes of improving eco-

nomic perrormance. Bot.1-owing h usb ecatn ~e substitute for extensive inter-

nal changes that would have jeopardized the Party's monopoly over society

and sul)verted the inner n~c.cl~ar~isn~sf social is^^^ In this way, the internal

cycles of tw o contrasting systenls sod denly meslled.

T l ~ entent, as wit11 all tl ie in le r~ ~i ~t io i~ i~ l~ o r r o ~ i n gf t l ~ e eriod, was to

pay off he loans 11y exporting r~ri~nofa cturedoods into the world nmrket. By

the mid-1970s it was clear, howevel; that the world market could not absorb

sufficient amounts of socialisnis products to enable repayment, and ;it the

same time, rising interest rates added staggeringly to the de bt s en,ice. Wit11

the 1979-80 decision of the \Vestern banking establishm ent not to lend

more money to socialist countries, the latter were t l~rown nto r:o~ ~lp lete

disarray I have allready mentioned several features that mad e sorialist econ-

omies inapt co~npetito rsll the international export market. The "plunde?

stance toward external economies, the system's fundamental 01-ganizIt.on

against notions of salability of its products, the shortage ec o n o ~ n ~ 'sre-

I ~ ~ I I I I In ac (pis i tionsn~i~nshipather than on salesmanship, the neglect of

c o n s u m p t i o ~ ~nd of producing to satisfy consumer needs with diverse 11igl1-

quality products-all this meant that an adequate response to the hard-

currency crisis nrould haj'e catastrophic effects on socialism's inne r m echa-

nisms. To this was added the fact that socialist economies were "outdated:

as Jowitt put it, "ATter 7 years of niurderous effort, the Soviet Union had

created a German indnstvy of the 1880s in the 1980s."'"

In these circumstances, the balance of power tilted toward the faction

within the Communist Par& of the Soviet Union that had long argued for

structural reforms, the introduction of market mechanisn~s, nd profit in-

centives, even at th e cost of the Party's "leading role." Th e choice, as Gor-

bachev and his faction saw it, was to try to preserve either the So viet Unio r~

and its empire (by reforms that would increase i ts economic pe do ma nc e

and political legitimacy) or collective property a nd the Party monopoly.

Car-

bachev was ready to sacrifice the latter to save the former but ended by

losing 110th.

Wbile Western attention was riveted on the speeches ofpolicy-makers in

W l l A ' l

W A S S O C I A L 1

S h l . A N D

W I l Y

D I D

I T P A L L ? 33

the Kremlin, the Inore 5ignificant aspects of reform, I~oweve~; ere in the

often-unauthorized i>eha\,iorof bureaucrats who were busily creating new

pruperty forms ~ I I I heir ouVn tanisrkis describes the growth of what she

calls "political capitalism," as bureaocrats spontaneously created their ow11

l)rofit-based cu~ npa nies ro111 within tlie state eco nomic bu reaucr;s y Sig-

nificantly fur 111). a r g r l ~ ~ ~ e n that socialisnis articulatioo with world capitnlism

\\.as crucial to its fall, the elam ples s he singles out to il lust~ ate hese trend s

arc all at the interface of socic~list co ~~ om iesith th r o111side worlrl-in

p;~rticolal; new c(~ ~np anie sediating the export tradv and state procure-

r ~ t e ~ ~ tf \~L CS ~C. I I I co11~~111trrs."~fact, she sees as ct.itiral tl ~ eactionill split

I, rt \reen the grorlps w l ~ r ~nar~agcd ocialism's interface wit11 the outside

\r,~,rld such as tl~ ose n li)rcign polic): a)unter i~rteIlig ence,and foreign

t~-:tde) nd those \r l~ n lanaged it internally (soc l~ s tlre Party's n~ iddle-le vel

c x ~ c ~ ~ t i v eppwiitlls ; ,IICI the

KCH)."

Fclrn~s privatiration alread y taking

place as edrlv as 1987

in

P0li111d ;lnd si ~n ila r rocesses as early as 1984

i l l

l l u ng a ~ y '* h o w t l ~ c ~ ~ i c r g i n go1~t0u1. s1. wlli~t tilniszkis sees BS tile re-

fol-~nists' oal:

a

clr~al cr,llorn)i On e p;~l-t1 this ecunollly was to he centl-;~lly

itd~ninistered, s before, and the r ~ther art w ls to he reformed through mar-

ketlprofit inecl~anisn~snd selccti \.c privatization ol'state property. T he t\rao

were tto coexist s .ml~ioticnlIy,~

Tl~ ese orn~ s f"11olit ic;i l c ; ~~~ italisn i"~roscn part I,? econ olnic nlan;qer s'

exploiting the shortages endem ic to socialism-sliortages now agrd vat ed to

crisis pr~~portions.n the new I ~o pe f inlaking a prufit, "political capitalists"

( I c al l t h e ~ ~ re~~tl-epratcl~iks")crc n-illing to put into circulation I-cscn,es

known only to t l~e~n-which they \+~ould t l~ e~ wi se~a \ ;eroarded-thus alle-

viating sl~or tages, o tliei~. w11 p;lin. As a result, even antirefomlist Soviet

i ~ l ~ dolis11 ) I I I . ~ . L I I C ~ I I ~ \i ~ , ~ r ~ ( ll w ~ ~ ~ s r l \ . e scqnicscing i n cntrcpr;~tchiks' ~c -

tivitics, \rillwut \\-liicl~,

l l

Sti~niszkis'swords, "the oNicial structure of thc

e c o n o m i c a d ~ n i ~ ~ i s t r ; l t i o ~ ~as al)solutely unstceral~le."'" Contributi~~go

heir tolerance was I-ampa111i~rc*aucr;~ticnarcl~ :

a

loss of control by thosc

higlier up , rur~tecl n tlle "innl~ility l'supcriors to supply their sub ordinates

(managers of 10\\.er level) wit11 the nleans to construct a strategy of sor-

v i ~ a l . " ~ 'ecaose s~~pe rior so ul d n o l u ~ ~ g e ruarantee deliveries and invest-

ments, they were fol.ced to accept \vhatever solutions enterprising subo~di-

nates could devise-- rven at the cost of illicit profits from state reserves.

En tr ep rat ch ik s son 11 b e g i ~ ~ ~o regard the state's acculnulatiuns niu cl~ s

Preobra zhensky had on ce 111-ged Soviet leaders to regar d agric ultur e: ;IS a

source of primitive accumulation. They came to find increasingly attractive

the idea of further "p~ivatiwtion," o in~p ortant o Western lenders.

It is possible (though unlikely) that socialist regimes would not have col-

lapsed if their hard-currency crisis and the consequent intersection with

capitalism had occurred at a different point in capitalism's cyclicity. T11e

specifics of capitalism's on.n crisis man agement, howevel; prov ed unman-


10/12

? 4

C H A P T E R

O N E

ageable for socialist systems. Without wanting to present recent capital-

ism's "llexible specialization" as either unitary or fully dominant (its furn~s

d . f f e rfrom place to place, and it coexists with other socioecononric furn~s),

I find in the l i terature about i t a numbe r of characterist ics even more in in~i-

cal to socialism than was the earlier "Fordist" variant, which Soviet prodl~c-

t ion part ly imitated. These characterist ics include: small-batch i ,r~~ductio~~;

just-in-time inventory; an accelerated pace of innovation; tremendous re-

ductions in the tulnover time of capital via automation and electronics; a

biuch-increased tulnover time in consumption, as well, with a conconritarrt

rise in techniques of need-creation and an incl-eased emphasis on the pro-

duction of events rather tha n goods; coordination of the economy by finance

capital; instantaneous access to accurate information and arralysis; and an

overall decentralization that increase s managerial cuntrul (at the expense of

I~iglrer-levelbodies) over labor.3z

How is socialism to me sh with this?-socialism with its emp hasis on

large-scale heroic production of means ofproduction, its resources frozen

Ily

11oa1-ding-no just-in-tim e herel-its lack of a sy ste ~n ic mpe tus tou,ard ill-

novation, the irrelevanck to it of notions like "turnove r time." its neglect of

consumption and its flat-footed definition of "needs," its constipated and

secretive llows of illformation (except for rumors ) in which the cen ter could

have no confidence, and the perpetual s truggle to retain central control over

all phases of the production proc ess? Thus, submit, it is not simply social-

ism's embrace with capitalism that brought about its fall but the fact that it

happe ned to embrac e acapital ism of a newly "flexible" sort . David Han ey's

schem atic comparison of "Fordist modernity" with "Hexible post-modeniitf'

clarifies things further: social is t systems have much more in con~rn,~r~it11

his "Fordist" column than with his "flexible" one."

Let me add one more tllought linking the era of flexible specialization

with socialisnis collapse. Il~creasir~gumbers o f'sc l~ol ars ote tllat acconl-

panying the change in capitalism is a change in the nature of state power:

specifically, a number of the state's functions are being undermined." The

international weapons trade has m ade a n~ock ery f the state's monopoly on

the means of violence. The extraordinary n~obility f capital means that as it

moves from are as of higher to areas of lower taxation, many states lose some

of their revenue a nd industrial base, an d this constrains their ability to at-

tract capital or shape its flows. Capital Bight can now discipline all r . on-

state government^ ^^ Th e coordination of global capitalism by finance capital

places a premium on capital mobility, to which rigid state boundaries are

an

obstacle. nd the new computerized possibi l i t ies for speculat ive t~ading

have generated strong pressures to release the capital immobilized in state

structures and institutions by diminishing their extent.%

This has two consequences for the collapse of socialism. First, groups

W I I A T

W A S S O C I A L 1 S M .

A N D \ l r l l Y D I D I T

F A L L 7

35

inside socialist countries who se stru cti~ ral ituation facilitated the ir fuller

p~rrticipation n the global econolny now l~i al easons to expand their state's

receptivity to capital-that is, to promo te reform. Seco nd, the control that

socialist states exerted over capital Bows into their cou ntries m ay have n ~ a de

t h e ~ r ~pecial targets for international financial intere sts, eag er to increase

their opportunit ies by u ndermining social ist s tates. Thes e internal and inter-

lrational groups each found their chance in the interest of the other. It is in

any case clear from the politics of international lending agencies that they

aim to redocc the power of socialist states, for they insist upon privatizatio~i

of state prvperty-the basis of these states' pow er and reve nue . Privatizalion

is pusherl

?\ en

i l l th e face of s o u r ~ ~ c o ~ ~ o ~ ~ i i s t s 'b j ect ions that " too n~r ~c l i

effort is bring irrvestrd in privatiz;rtion, and too little in crea ting an d foste~ ;

i l lg the de\ : r lop~~~cntf new private 1irms"-wllose clllry privatization may

; ~c t ua ll y ~ ~ ~ ~ ,e t l u . : "

No Tia ieJor So ci n l i s~ ~

Ratt iel- t llan explore further how Hexil~le pecial izutiu~l o~ ~ ~ l ~ c l l c d111~11ges

in suri;~lis~r,,wisl l to surnniarize rriy argulne~~t1 ~iltking i t 111 ~ ~ o t i ~ ~ r ~ sf

t i n ~ e . i ~ n e , s antl i ropulogists have sbown, is a fi~nd;rn~e~rtali n ~ t n s i o ~ ~f

1111111a11:~fF:rirs, akin g d iff er en t to nn s in dif fe ren t k ind s of societ y. 'C l~e \'est-

e rn n o t i o ~ ~f a lir~ear,rreversible t ime consisting of eyoivalent and d ivisi l~le

on it s, for i~ l s t a ~~ ce ,s bu t one poss ib le way ofco ncep tual i z i~ ~gi ~ r ~ rnd li\*illg

it

p i\ rncultnral construct ion of t ime ramifies t l~ ru ~ ~g hl ~r l tts social nrd e~ :

it ; r; t l r~~


11/12

Like the reorganization of capital is^^^ at the end of the ninctc.rnt11 ccnt~~ty,

the present reorganizatibn entails a lime-space conlpressiun, which we ;dl

feel as a nrammoth speedup. Yet the socialism n;itl~w l ~ i c l ~t intersected had

no such t ime-compressing

dynamic.

Iri

this light, the significance of Gor lx-

cl~ ev 's erestroika was its rea,gn ition that socialism's tc~n pora litywas I I I I -

sustainab le in a ca pitalist \vorl d. Pel-estruik;~ eversed Sovict ide:~s as to

whose t ime-defini t ion and rhythms were dominant and \ \ ,her


12/12

38

C H A P T E R O N

Its "extinction" radically revises the framework within whicll the West, the

United States itself, the Third World, and the countries of Eastern Europe.

tile

fonner Russian Empire. and many nations in Asia have bounded

and

defined

themselves.

Tlre Leninist Extinctiun will

force

the United States [not to inention

811

those

others] to reexamine the ntraning of its national identit "

Wlrat the Leninist Extinction cunfi-unts us with, the n, is

a

conccptttal vac-

uum. Jowitt concludes by invoking the biblical story of Genesis

("tire

world

was witltout fornt, and void"), whose theme is boundi ng and nn~ tting ir\rr

entities, as the "narrative" nmst appl-upriate to t l ~ en ~ m e d ie

I'

ttttre.

In my view, not only is Juu.itt absolutely right 11ut one ct~ttldgo even

h~rt l~er .t is not just new political identities, including our ow n, that we will

have the task

of

l~ounding t~d a~t~ing-a task which, if the ex;ttnple of

Bosnia is any indication, is ofa\ ves on~ e nag t~itu dc. t is also tlte ent ire

toll

ceptual arsenal through wltich Western institutions and social science disci-

plines lrave been defined in this century As one reads scholarsl~ip n the

postst~cialist rocesses of "privatiration," the creation of "propert), rights,"

the dev elo p~n ent f "democracy" r~ r civil society" or "consti1utions"-ill

short, the proposed l~ui ldin g fti "liberal stat

eur pol & soc xx class 8 verdery

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