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Title: MitigationSub-title : Tricky targets! Mitigation negotiations under KP

Authors (and Affiliations): Gebru Jember Programme officer, Climate Change Forum-Ethiopia

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for sustained capacity building in support of international climate change negotiations

pour un renforcement durable des capacités en appui aux négociations internationales sur les changements climatiques

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Issues

1. Introduction

2. Scale of emission reductions needed

3. What is the situation at present?

4. unresolved political issues

5. Conclusion

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cbiI. Background

• In December 2007 at the COP-13 in Bali, more than 180 countries adopted the Bali Road Map, a two-year negotiating process for designing a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, the climate agreement set to expire in 2012.

• An important outcome was a shared recognition among countries that deep cuts in global emissions will be required to avoid dangerous climate change.

• The COP-14 in Poznań was the most important interim meeting before the negotiating process was expected to be concluded, at COP-15 in Copenhagen in November 2009.

• At COP15, the “Copenhagen Accord”

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4

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cbiMain issues

• Emission Reduction

• CDM Reform

• Adaptation

• Technology Transfer

• Finance

• Mitigation

• Capacity building

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Emission Reduction• To agree on emission targets of countries

CDM• To ease the access of developing countries for CDM funds

• To probably include some items such as REDD, nuclear and CCS under the CDM

REDD• Bali Action Plan 1(b)(iii): Policy approaches and positive incentives on

issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries

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Emission Reduction

Background• To agree on emission targets of countries• We need to cap the temperature increases at 2 degree celsius to

avoid catastrophe• The global temperature has already increased by 0.8• Developed countries that are signatories to the Kyoto Protocol

are already committed to reduce emissions by 2012: Emissions should have fallen to 1990 levels and 5% below the 1990’s by 2012

• The reality: emissions have increased by 14.5% just between 1990 and 2006 and it ‘s still on the rise

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•Originated from Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997, in force 16 February 2005.

•Quantifed emission reduction of GHG for developped countries (Annex I) 5.2 % reduction from 1990 level. Countries have between 2008 and 2012 to fulfil their comitments.

•Clean development Machanism (between developed and developing countries)

• Joint implementation (between Countries with economy in transition of Eastern Europe and developed countries)

• Emission Trading Scheme (between developed countries) Marrakech Agreements COP7 defined eligibility criteria to CDM

For carbon sequestration: Only Afforestation and Reforestation on non forested land since 31 December 1989 are eligible.

Carbon market

Three mandatory mechanisms

Voluntary Market

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Scale of emission reductions needed

Scale of emission reductions• 2020• What is situation at present?

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Scientific evidence suggests that a 450ppm CO2e pathway with over-shoot gives a 40–60% probability to limit global warming to 2 degrees

Peak at 550 ppm, long-term stabilization 550 ppm

Peak at 510 ppm, long-term stabilization 450 ppm

Peak at 480 ppm, long-term stabilization 400 ppm

550 ppm pathway

450 ppm pathway

400 ppm pathway

Expected temperature increase

3.0˚C

2.0˚C

1.8˚C

Global GHG emissions and pathways for GHG stability

GtCO2e per year

Probability of temperature increase under 2˚C

15–30

40–60

70–85

2005 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 2050

70

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

• 450ppm is not safe – it has a 40–60% pro-bability of warming exceeding 2oC

• Even 2oC will require signifi-cant investment in adaptation

* Climate impact estimates for current proposals calculated using C-ROADS model

Source: IPCC WG3 AR4,, den Elzen, van Vuuren; Meinshausen; Global GHG Abatement Cost Curve v2.0, Catalyst analysis

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Our common but differentiated future• All Annex I

emissions need to reduce, starting now

• Some developing countries need to start taking action

DCs

EU, US, Annex 1

20502000

Em

issi

ons Global

LDCs

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Implications for international agreements

The range of the difference between emissions in 1990 and emission allowances in 2020/2050 for various GHG concentration levels for the Annex I and non-Annex I countries as a group

Source: IPCC, AR4, den Elzen and Hoehne, 2008

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For a 450ppm pathway, and based on equity considerations, developed countries should take on stringent emission caps

and provide support

Caps

Support on mitigation/ adaptation

Leadership on technology

• Take on collective caps which are consistent with a 450 ppm pathway

– 80-95% below 1990 by 2050– 25-40% below 1990 by 2020

• Develop/ demonstrate emerging low C technologies• Facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound technologies,

know-how, practices and processes to developing countries

• Provide financial support to developing countries on adaptation and mitigation

Resulting responsibilities for developed countries

450 ppm pathway as global goal and following equity considerations

Source:IPCC AR4 Box 13.7

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cbiMitigation

• Offset mechanisms must be secondary to domestic efforts. A need to define how and how much.

• Decision to reduce should not be guided by political consideration but scientific reality and vulnerability evidence.

• A need to ensure that mitigation commitment are guided by adaptation implications of delayed or weak commitments on mitigation actions

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NAMAs• Developed countries should declare their commitments and then

developing countries will have confidence to act.

• MRVed Means of implementation first then MRVed NAMAs

• Under NAMAs three types of actions are envisaged:– Unilateral – Supported with international funding under the UNFCCC– Trade, linked into actions (tradable and linked to carbon markets)

• Institutional arrangement for NAMAs will be important. Three possible approaches. – registry approach;– Low carbon development plans;– Schedule approach

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What is situation at present?

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cbi Other issues including:

The flexibility mechanisms and Land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF); and

•The AWG-KP focus was on:

Legal issues on ways to avoid the gap between the implementation of the first and second commitment periods ; and

Potential consequences of response measures

Annex I emission reductions;

• The Bonn II and III Climate Change Talks were held from 31 May to 11 June and 2-6 August 2010, respectively in Bonn, Germany and the last one before Cancun in Tianjin, China from 4-9 October 2010. The AWG-KP focus was on:

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AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON FURTHER COMMITMENTS BY ANNEX I PARTIES UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

the need to make progress on technical issues in order to guarantee the environmental integrity of the outcome in Cancun and as it is a common concern, there is a need to have synergies between the two AWGs improve understanding and increase the transparency of all mitigation commitments in the Copenhagen Accord and urged working in line with the AWG-LCA consider carryover of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) a fair and effective international framework in which all major emitters participate

Among the concerns expressed by developing and least developed parties include:

slow progress and urged Annex I parties to raise the level of ambition in their current mitigation pledgessome parties’ lack of commitment to the Kyoto Protocol’s future and urged agreement on a second commitment period as soon as possible to avoid critical increases in global temperatures

The reactions from most of the Annex I countries include:

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• to raise the level of ambition of Annex I pledges;

• to translate pledges into quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs); and

• the relationship between Annex I commitments and:

surplus AAUs; LULUCF; and The flexibility mechanisms

Discussions focused on how:

Annex I Emission Reductions:

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Annex I Emission Reductions:

two five yearOne five year and One eight year

using a single legally-binding base year with multiple reference years.

using a table with base years as defined by individual countries in their pledges, as well as columns comparing 1990 and other common base years.

Several developed and developing countries called for retaining 1990 as the base year for the sake of simplicity, comparability and transparency.

• On comparability:

• On the length and number of future commitment periods:

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A paper presented by Bolivia below highlights:

•Even if the aggregate emission trend is decreasing compared to the base year, there are parties which still have increasing trend •Some parties, however, stressed that the use of LULUCF and the flexibility mechanisms should aim to increase the level of ambition of the current pledges and not just to achieve the current pledges.

•Annex I Parties will only take the high end of their targets if they get the surplus AAUs and LULUCF emissions loopholes that they want

• A paper presented by AOSIS also shows the 17-25% pledged by Annex I parties would result in effective emission reductions of only 1-7% when all the technical rules are considered

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On impact of technical rules on aggregate ambition:

The primary topics of discussions include the implications of these ranges and options on aggregate emission reductions, and on how to deal with them.

Options highlighted by Parties to address the impact of the carryover of surplus AAUs include:

In the 14th session, a table of options on carryover of surplus AAUs was presented by the secretariat and parties give their reflections. The Russian Federation has been highlighting that any proposal to eliminate or limit carryover is inconsistent with the Kyoto Protocol.

not allowing carryover; capping carryover; restricting carryover use(allowing carryover of x% of AAUs); adopting stricter emission reduction targets to absorb the surplus; Putting AAUs in a strategic reserve. taxing transfer or acquisition of carryover AAUs; agreeing not to purchase surplus AAUs; andRestricting use of acquired AAUs.

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On translating pledges into QELROs, The Secretariat presented:

•A paper compiling pledges, related assumptions and associated emission reductions (FCCC/KP/ AWG/2010/INF.1); and•A technical paper on translating pledges into QELROs (FCCC/TP/2010/2).

Among issues raised by parties include:• pledges should not simply be translated into QELROs, it needs to be negotiated at the political level;

• how the methodologies outlined in the technical paper would apply to actual pledges on the table;

• call for a joint discussion of emission reductions by all Annex I countries; and• A call for broader discussion of the commitments of all countries.

The Secretariat then prepared and presented two tables (for a commitment period of eight and five years, respectively) translating current pledges into QELROs

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Other Issues: LULUCF: The key issues discussed included construction and transparency of reference levels and interannual variability. Among issues raised by parties include:

• broadening the scope of eligible LULUCF activities under the CDM• conclusions should focus on improving the Protocol’s environmental integrity and not creating more loopholes• The need for transparency in accounting and consideration of potential linkages between LULUCF rules and REDD+.

•Parties would inscribe their reference levels in an annex and would then be required to submit a description of the elements used in their construction, followed by a period for revision. •Proposed a review of reference levels starting in 2012 and of annual inventories, highlighting the need to ensure that accounting occurs with the same elements used in establishing reference levels. •Called on parties to begin discussing elements of potential review guidelines. •Noting problems of accurate, transparent and verifiable accounting of forest management activities. However, Tuvalu underscored that there are other accounting options.

Brazil, for the G-77/China, outlined the G-77/China’s proposal on constructing reference levels:

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The G-77/China also proposed a cap on forest management that is fixed for all parties, noting lack of agreement on a specific percentage. Parties then have raised issues like:

• Whether caps are necessary, given the transparent accounting in the G-77/China’s proposal. • Caps should only apply to forward-projection baselines.• Historical averages should be used as baselines.

During Bonn III session, discussions were based on a Chair’s note (FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/6/Add.2).

Delegates exchanged views and presented four proposals from parties on:

•accounting for forest management; •force majeure ; •use of harvested wood products; and•Including and reviewing the reference levels for accounting of emissions and removals from forest management.

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The contact group held a joint session with the LULUCF spin-off group, to consider the overlap between LULUCF and the numbers. Issues considered by parties include:

how LULUCF can help fill the gap between Annex I parties’ level of ambition and the IPCC ranges;

the possible contribution of LULUCF to meeting parties’ QELROs, and whether such contribution should be open-ended, capped or vary according to parties’ judgment; and What additional information is required regarding the role of LULUCF to enable agreement on Annex I targets.

• Then parties suggested exploring the consequences of the various options regarding base year, LULUCF scenarios and treatment of surplus AAUs, together with their impacts on the desired environmental outcome.

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Flexibility Mechanisms:

Methodological Issues: Discussions on this issue (FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/6/Add.4) were focused on:

•inclusion of new GHGs; •common metrics to calculate CO2 equivalence of greenhouse gases and application of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines; and•The list of sectors and categories in Protocol Annex A

Discussions focused on the Chair’s note on the flexibility mechanisms (FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/6/Add.3). The proposals covered a range of topics, including:

•CCS and nuclear under the CDM;•standardized baselines;•CERs; •discount factors; •joint implementation (JI) and co-benefits of CDM and JI;•carryover of AAUs; •share of proceeds for CERs issuance; •emissions trading; •new market mechanisms; •Wording of proposal on quantitative limit on supplementarity; and•Increased use of CERs from certain host countries with less than a certain amount of CDM projects.

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Legal Issues:

Discussions focused on

• Options to address a possible gap between commitment periods, its implications on Protocol institutions, a proposed paper and defining the gap.

The Secretariat explained that avoiding a gap requires that three-quarters of Protocol parties deposit their ratification instruments by 3 October 2012

On options, On legal options for addressing the gap between commitment periods, the Secretariat’s paper addressed:

changing the amendment procedures to allow for expedited entry into force; provisional application of amendments as provided for in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; andPossible extension of the first commitment period.

On the implications of a possible gap, the Secretariat noted that if mechanisms or institutions are characterized as assisting parties in meeting their obligations under Article 3.1, then it is “doubtful” they would continue to exist without a second commitment period.

•Australia said a gap would not prevent the continuation of key elements of the Protocol, such as the CDM and JI. •The EU agreed that it is up to parties to decide and that he believes the CDM will continue. And emphasized that 80% of global emissions trading is based on the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme, which will continue operating regardless of a gap in commitment periods.

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•This issue relates to the consideration of information on potential environmental, economic and social consequences, including spillover effects, of tools, policies, measures and methodologies available to Annex I parties,

•Discussions in the contact group centered on methods for deepening understanding and a possible system to respond to negative consequences.

Potential consequences of response measures:

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Potential consequences of response measures:

The focus was on the question of establishing a permanent forum or using existing channels, including national communications.

•Brazil said a permanent forum is necessary to report, evaluate and address the specific needs and concerns of non-Annex I countries.

•New Zealand and the EU said this might duplicate the work of the SBI in reviewing national communications and might contravene on parties’ sovereign rights.

•The EU noted that information needs to come from both developing and developed countries, and said the issue should be addressed under SBI and SBSTA.

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cbiunresolved political issues

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cbiIntroduction

• First commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol: 2008-2012

• New commitments required for the period beyond 2012

• AWG-KP established in December 2005 to agree on such commitments through an amendment to the Protocol

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Broad areas of divergence

• Scope of the mandate– Restricted to new legally binding commitments; or– Include also adjustments to the rules and the Protocol’s architecture

• Arriving at the quantification of commitments– Top down vs. bottom up approaches– Global reductions vs. only Annex I– Pledges: insufficient (currently 17-25% below 1990 by 2020) and

not transparent

• Other: limited coverage of the Protocol, historical responsibility and linkages to the AWG-LCA

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Issues to be solved in Cancun &/or beyond

• Most remains to be solved• Main political issues:

– New quantified commitments: aggregate and individual reductions

– Rules for the use of sinks

• Specific/technical issues: – Length of the commitment period, how to express commitments– Improvements to the mechanisms– Methodological aspects including new gases, reporting

guidelines and others

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Conclusion• Global average temperature rise must be kept as far below 2C as possible, compared

to pre-industrial levels. This requires global emission to peak well before 2020 (between now and 2015) and to decline rapidly to far below 50% of 1990 levels by 2050. This is a survival and equity issue for African and LDC Countries

• The pledges for the second commitment period from Annex I Parties reach 17-25% from 1990 levels by 2020. Besides, these pledges are also accompanied by loopholes.

• Developed countries must demonstrate credible leadership. Aggregate reductions by developed countries must be consistent with Science

• The right to develop is key. Differentiation should be in accordance with capability and emission contribution

• In order to deliver what the atmosphere is requesting and ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of Annex I Parties emission reduction, their pledges must raise using top down approach, and the loopholes must be closed

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cbi THANK YOU