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EvaluationoftheUnitedKingdomForesightProgramme

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Evaluation of the United Kingdom Foresight

Programme

Final Report

PREST, Manchester Business School, University of Manchester

March 2006

Evaluation of the UK Foresight Programme

Table of Contents

Summary ............................................................................................................................. 3 1. Introduction..................................................................................................................... 6 2. Methodology of the Evaluation .................................................................................... 10 3. Rationale and Objectives .............................................................................................. 11 4. Positioning .................................................................................................................... 14 5. Issues concerning project selection and scope.............................................................. 16 6. Impacts and Effects of the Projects............................................................................... 17 7. International Comparison.............................................................................................. 21 8. Management and Value for Money .............................................................................. 24 9. Additionality ................................................................................................................. 25 10. Conclusions................................................................................................................. 27 A1 Cognitive Systems....................................................................................................... 34 A2 Flood and Coastal Defence ........................................................................................ 40 A3 Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention ............................................................................ 47 A4 Exploiting the Electromagnetic Spectrum ................................................................. 53 A5 Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs........................................................................... 59 A6 Ongoing Projects......................................................................................................... 65 A7 List of Interviewees..................................................................................................... 77 A8 National Comparative Analysis .................................................................................. 79 Evaluation Team Hugh Cameron Luke Georghiou Michael Keenan Ian Miles Ozcan Saritas

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Summary This report presents the findings of an independent evaluation by PREST, University of Manchester of the current round of the United Kingdom Foresight Programme, launched in 2002. It addresses the impact of the Programme and its constituent projects, its cost-effectiveness and its management. The overall conclusion is that the Programme has achieved its objectives of identifying ways in which future science and technology could address future challenges for society and identifying potential opportunities. It has succeeded in being regarded as a neutral interdisciplinary space in which forward thinking on science-based issues can take place. All projects have been successful in mobilising diverse groups of high-calibre specialists to work in a multidisciplinary framework and have demonstrated the scope for collaboration across disciplinary boundaries. It is doubtful whether such mobilisation could have been achieved by conventional ministerial or Research Council programmes. Key stakeholders have been unanimously positive about its success and the necessity for the Programme. Evidence has been taken from 28 stakeholders, the Foresight team, from documentary analysis of outputs and external references, and through an international comparison. Impact of the Programme and its Projects Foresight has directly informed national policies and programmes. All projects have succeeded in mobilising diverse groups of high calibre specialists to work in a multidisciplinary framework. The Programme has engaged senior policymakers with science and scientists, sometimes for the first time. Persistence of the effects through active networks has been variable. While maintaining activity of this kind is principally the responsibility of the Project sponsors, an explicit (but modest) foresight resource should be devoted to “aftercare”, to enable lead participants to present and represent the findings for some time after the launch and to extend the term of at least one project manager part-time to support the transfer. Many further impacts will take time to be manifested where Foresight has anticipated issues which have yet to come to the fore. This “reservoir” of knowledge will enable rapid policy responses when they do arise in the future. Cost effectiveness The overall process has been justified by its track record of delivering high quality outputs. The approach adopted is fit-for-purpose and offers good value for money and adds to this by leveraging resources.

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Additionality exists in that no foresight had, or would have, taken place on the project themes on this timescale. Much of the additionality lies in the new configurations of knowledge brought to bear. Behavioural additionality is evident in that several sponsors and participants were integrating foresight approaches into their future activities. Management There is an imbalance between the supply of projects and the demand. This is probably good for maintaining quality but means that the potential of Foresight is under-exploited. A modest expansion is recommended, with one more project undertaken each year, with a commensurate expansion of management and executive resources. Projects are moderately under-resourced – it is not only coincidence that the most expensive, Flood and Coastal Defence, also had the greatest impact. The Programme is entering a risky phase with impending turnover of its senior management. The quality and commitment of the team at all levels has been a key success factor. Strong efforts should be made to maintain the ethos and the knowledge base. Key Issues In terms of positioning, Foresight relates principally to the transdepartmental mission of OST and has as its prime focus the use of science in public policy. Unlike its predecessors, it does not have a central focus on wealth creation or prioritisation across research areas. This focus on public policy, though a successful strategy, involves responding to two important challenges:

• When conclusions raise challenging issues for public policy the Programme has come under some pressure. This should not deter Foresight from engaging with controversy. Well-founded views and analysis can only help form good policy.

• It is important to avoid, even inadvertently, giving the message that the fact of selection of an area implicitly prioritises it for future research funding. Foresight may inform such prioritisation and help to prioritise within an area but is not designed or intended to do more in this respect.

Business participation and engagement is project specific. It has been adequate in the relevant projects, notably EEMS, but there is scope for greater engagement with the wealth creation agenda. One way forward with this would be to run a project addressing the problems of the UK’s innovation system, analogous to the French Futuris exercise. Public engagement has been seen as an “end-of-pipeline” activity targeted at communicating findings through press and other coverage. This has been successful. However, most projects would benefit from an element of public

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participation before they are completed, drawing upon the methods of technology assessment. There is insufficient accumulated experience at present to judge whether the relative success of a public policy orientation is inherent to this approach to foresight or whether the science –driven approach should be extended to industrial or scientific objectives. A final judgement should be made after further efforts in the latter areas. This should be borne in mind during the construction of a new portfolio from the next project generation and selection rounds.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Terms of reference This report presents the findings of an evaluation of the United Kingdom Foresight Programme carried out by a PREST team in the period July-November 2005. The evaluation addresses the current round of Foresight which was launched in April 2002. The previous rounds beginning in 1994 and 1999 are not covered, though some persistent effects are noted where they have a bearing on the present activity. The objectives of this evaluation study are:

• To provide answers to the questions on: o The impact of the programme and the projects; o The cost effectiveness of the programme; and o The way in which foresight is run; and

• To deliver a report with findings and recommendations on the above which

provides a sound basis for the programme management and/or senior stakeholders to understand the costs and benefits of the programme and to identify any relevant lessons or improvements.

This report first describes the Programme, and then summarises the methodology of this evaluation. It then considers Programme level issues: rationale, positioning and project selection, before summarising key findings on project impacts. An international comparison is followed by considerations of Programme management and additionality before conclusions are drawn. A series of Annexes evaluate each project in terms of similar issues: aims and objectives, outputs, immediate impacts, longer-term impacts, appropriateness and positioning, additionality, value for money and an overall comment.

1.2 The Foresight Programme

1.2.1 Review The current round of Foresight had its origins in a review of the previous rounds announced by Lord Sainsbury in 2000 and carried out in 2001. The key findings of the review were that the programme needed to refocus on science and technology; be more flexible to take account of emerging developments; and to focus resources more clearly on where they would best add value. In practice this meant a move away from a structure based on sectoral panels1 representing a wide base of economic activity and towards a focus on a fluid rolling programme of pre-selected projects.

1 The second round also included three thematic panels which had some resemblance to the present projects in terms of their scope, though they were far more wide ranging in scope and were implemented using a quite different approach.

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1.2.2 Selecting the projects The first projects (described at the time as pilot projects) were launched in April 2002. They covered Flood and Coastal Defence (FCD) and Cognitive Systems (CS). In the absence of a formal selection process at that time it may be noted that they were topics reflecting the interests of their respective directors, Sir David King and Dr John Taylor (Director-General of Research Councils at that time). This meant that the projects had high level interest and backing from the start. Further topics were developed through a more systematic process. Initially an intensive workshop (“Hothouse”) was held in which a group of senior scientists identified 12 potential project topics. These were put out to consultation in September 2002. The consultation paper invited comments and ideas for further topics (two suggested additional topics were subsequently added to the website). Six criteria for project selection were announced, with projects needing to tackle issues that:

• Require looking ahead at least 10 years, in areas where the outcomes are uncertain. This typically occurs where the future direction of change is rapid, current trends are uncertain or different trends may converge;

• Have science and technology as the main drivers of change or are capable of impacting substantially on future scenarios;

• Have outcomes that can be influenced, to an extent that is significant for one or more of the economy, society and the environment;

• Are not covered by work carried on elsewhere. However, they must build from areas of active research;

• Require an inter-disciplinary approach to the science, and bring together groups from academia, business and government. They must not be capable of resolution by a single group; and

• Command the support of the groups most likely to be able to influence the future and be owned by a lead government department.

These were subsequently captured in the keywords: Futures, S&T, Value added impact, Value added existing work, Networks, and Buy in. Over 100 responses were received and other contacts were made in relation to the proposed selection. One of the externally suggested projects (on Obesity) has recently been launched as a Foresight Project. The scope of some projects was also refined in part as a result of the consultation. The selection itself was made using a process of scoring against a conflated set of the above criteria and with structured ranking information. A key factor was the ability to obtain senior stakeholder commitment. The first projects to emerge from this process were Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention (CTCP) and Exploiting the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EEMS, but at that time called

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“Applications of New Wave Technology”). CTCP was led by Professor King and EEMS by David Hughes, Director General of the Innovation Group in DTI. The next three projects were all short-listed for the future at this stage – Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs (BSAD), Detection and Identification of Infectious Diseases (DIID), and Intelligent Infrastructure Systems (IIS). At present consideration is being given to a new process for topic generation involving input from the new Horizon Scanning activity. A shortlist of new topics is to be generated by mid-2006 with a brainstorming “Hothouse” on similar lines to the 2002 held in March 2006.

1.2.3 Project Format Project design is guided by the production of a Master Plan to a common format which embodies a test against the (implicit) rationale, and includes scoping, detailed stage planning, stakeholder mapping, identification of deliverables and expected outcomes, communications and a risk register. The plan is continually updated to capture learning, during and after the project. It also acts as a vehicle for internal and external communication. The central project structure is a sequential five-stage process. For example in the Intelligent Infrastructure Master Plan the stages are summarised in Table 1. Table 1 Master Plan Stages and Key Issues/Actions Scope Subjects

Stakeholders Consultation Relevance Value-added Planning

Review Review the State-of-the-Art of Science Roadmap technologies

Analysis and Synthesis Scenarios, trends and other futures Modelling Testing hypotheses

Engage Broadening networks Engaging the influential with findings Draft action plans Test strategies

Launch and Action Link actions to owners Launch Plan and supporting outputs Track

1.2.4 Resources The Programme is located within the Transdepartmental Science and Technology Group of the Office of Science and Technology in the Department of Trade and Industry. The Programme is overseen by the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser, who is also the head of the Office of Science and Technology. It is operated by a Directorate with a staff

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of 25 (2 senior managers, 5 middle managers and 13 in executive or organisational management. The Director was externally recruited while other staff are recruited from within the Civil Service. Each project has a team of 3.5 civil servants working full time, alongside contracted experts and facilitators. A typical project costs between £400,000 and £700,000. Total expenditure for 2005/6 was planned at around £1.9 million with a further £1,237,000 on administrative costs (though the latter are shared with the Horizon Scanning activity). To these outgoings may be added the opportunity cost of the voluntary inputs of those attending events or otherwise participating. In calculating these “costs”, it should be borne in mind that many participants of this kind are also the most likely beneficiaries, both from the direct experience and potentially from the outcomes of the Programme.

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2. Methodology of the Evaluation The first issue to be confronted in an evaluation of a foresight programme is that of its scope, in terms of Programme content and timing. The main focus is on projects which have been launched (the term used by the Programme when the results of a project are published) but some comment is also offered on ongoing activity. Also covered are the central activities of the Directorate needed to support the projects. As with most foresight activities, the start date is relatively clear, though some project managers reported that the formal start dates were not realistic as teams were not in place. However, there is no clear end to a Foresight project. The system adopted is for projects to experience a period of “aftercare” but to become primarily the responsibility of the stakeholders. Hence, a Foresight project merges into implementation measures and inevitably becomes a diminishing signal as other influences make themselves felt. The principal instrument of the evaluation has been interviews. The complex nature of Foresight means that a questionnaire survey approach is not appropriate. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 8 members of the Foresight team and 28 stakeholders (listed in Annex 7). Interview guides were developed for each class of interviewee. These derived from the logic chart (described in the next section) and the evaluation criteria. Key areas to be explored with stakeholders were:

• Role of interviewee – to establish role and responsibilities in relation to Foresight and their engagement with the agenda for the programme or project in their area;

• Pre-foresight conditions – to establish the baseline against which the project took place;

• Immediate impacts – Identifying perceptions of key outputs, effects on knowledge base and on communities/networking;

• Ultimate impacts – effects on policy/strategy, alternative sources of information, effect on use of scientific evidence and follow-ons; and

• Management and process effectiveness – including value-for-money. Additional evaluation activities undertaken included a Forum with most of the Foresight Directorate and invited experts in which emerging evaluation findings and hypotheses were explored in a structured environment. An international comparison was undertaken, though the value of this was limited by the distinctive nature of the UK programme, which meant that direct comparison with similar activities elsewhere is problematic. A web-based consultation organised by OST and intended to feed into the evaluation failed to provide a sufficient response.

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3. Rationale and Objectives To make the link between rationale, objectives and actions clearer we have constructed a logic chart for the Programme (Figure 1). This links higher and Programme objectives to the actions taken and the effects. Effects are spread over time, immediate being those manifested while the programme/project is under way, intermediate those which are evident at the end of the programme/project (sometimes called outputs) and ultimate those which are manifested some time after completion (sometimes called outcomes). Logic charts have three roles in evaluations:

1) to set out objectives, actions and impacts in a hierarchical structure as a guide to the effects that can reasonably be expected;

2) To check the logical consistency of a programme – that is to say whether the actions can in any circumstances achieve the desired effects; and

3) To form an agreed basis for evaluation between evaluators and those commissioning the evaluation or those being evaluated.

2The Foresight Programme does not have a formal ROAME statement but its rationale is

contained in its rolling Business Plan. It does not derive directly from DTI’s Public Service Agreement objective for science and innovation which is to:

“Improve the relative international performance of the UK's science and engineering base, the exploitation of the science base, and the overall innovation performance of the UK economy”

but rather DTI’s Business Plan Objective 1 which is to:

“Improve the relative performance of UK science and engineering and its use by government and society.”3

This forms the highest level of the logic chart. The difference between this and the PSA target is important because it stresses the trans-departmental role that Foresight has assumed. It does contribute to the wealth creation agenda of the PSA target but this is not the central focus. The use by government is a key aspect. Discussions with senior staff in the Programme indicate that the most important distinctive features are cross-departmentalism and the science quality mixture. When considering the rationale for an activity of this nature, a major question will be its additionality – would the activities covered by the Programme take place without this particular intervention? The strategy of the Programme has been to ensure that the answer to this question is no. This has been pursued by taking on issues that have no clear Departmental home, either through their content or their timescale. The other claimed distinctive competence lies in being evidence-based, and in particular the ability of OST to bring evidence to bear from the

2 Statement of Rationale, Objectives, Appraisal, Monitoring and Evaluation 3 DTI Business Plan 2005-2008, Our Route to Prosperity for All

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science base. The location in the Transdepartmental Science and Technology Group and the support from and to the Chief Scientific Adviser emphasise this positioning. Figure 1 Logic Chart for UK Foresight Programme

Programme objectives

Programme activities

Immediate effects

Intermediate effects

Ultimate effects

Improve the relative performance of UK science and engineering and its use by government and society

Identify potential opportunities from S&T

Consider how future S&T could address future challenges for society

Select projects

Analyse & forecast key S&T elements

Visions of future

Recommendations and options for action Action

networks

Research agendas in science base influenced

Research funders in industry base influenced

Government policy influenced

Application of foresight methods

Foresight culture – capability

Consultation & engagement with decision makers

Recognition/ profile for area

New combinations of experts brought together

New combinations of stakeholders brought together

Overall objectives

Applying this analysis to Foresight, several observations may be made:

1) The Programme objectives are consistent with the overall DTI objective;

2) Programme activities fall into three major groups – project selection, analysis and foresight, and consulting with stakeholders;

3) Project selection itself creates effects;

4) Key outputs are state of the art reviews, action networks, visions of the future, consequential actions, and innovation in forms of engagement;

5) Expected areas of influence are in the science base, business and government policy;

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6) Action networks could be expected to continue further project-related activities. The logic chart shown above is based upon the intended actions as far as they could be derived from documents. For Foresight, as for many programmes, the outcome shows additional degrees of richness. For example at the programme objectives level it could be argued that “providing challenging visions of the future to ensure effective strategies now” has ex post become an objective. Activities include the full range of what is needed to implement a project, from scoping, to appointing experts, commissioning studies, organising workshops, and communicating findings to stakeholders. Intermediate impacts ex post include stakeholder/sponsor ownership of action plans and ultimate impacts could include developing a knowledge base which can be drawn upon when future unanticipated needs arise (what we shall later term the “reservoir model”). The evaluation seeks evidence both for targeted and for unforeseen effects.

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4. Positioning In this section we discuss the Programme strategy and how it has positioned itself in relation to actual and potential stakeholders. Earlier generations of UK Foresight were principally targeted on the wealth creation agenda, with panels also reflecting the concerns of the sectors they addressed and the government departments within whose remits those sectors fell. In the present Programme, the same ingredients are present but the balance has changed. Instead of panels chaired by industry with a government department representative, we now have a model where the main stakeholder is in government at a political level, supported by very senior members of the civil service. This emphasises the point made in the logic model discussion – that the key constituency is Whitehall. From our interviews it can be concluded that the Programme has operated a niche strategy and has in general succeeded in being regarded as a neutral interdepartmental and interdisciplinary space in which forward thinking on science-based issues can take place. More generally this model can be described as a licence to think outside the box and as one interview put it, “to smuggle in scenarios”. However, this model does not work without some challenges. The licence has its boundaries and a discomfort zone emerges when a project’s conclusions are seen as cutting counter to current policy. This phenomenon was evident in some of the reactions to the project on Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs. This does not negate in any way the validity of the work done, and indeed can be seen as a positive feature. However, it emphasises that the “think tank” nature of Foresight needs to be emphasised when presenting results. One potential cause of difficulty comes with the inevitable turnover of senior stakeholders, particularly at the political level. The efforts made to build up an understanding of the agenda being addressed by a project can be set back by such a transition and the busy schedules of all concerned can inhibit a rapid re-engagement. Changing political circumstances can also have this effect. It is not clear that the image of Foresight as being neutral and disengaged is fully accepted by its closest institutional neighbours in DTI and the Research Councils. In the first case the issue is one of sometimes divergent objectives and in the second one of concern about unintended (or even intended) effects on priorities. Hence, for DTI the is the interface depends upon the extent to which Foresight engages with its principal concern, wealth creation by UK industry and commerce. Our interviewees in that area saw no systematic difficulty, seeing the issue rather as one of project selection. Where projects had addressed this agenda (as with EEMS) the input had been useful. However, they were also clear that Foresight was not a substitute for the Technology Strategy process but rather one useful input among others. More industrial pull-through was seen as a desirable attribute for at least some future projects.

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Given the public policy focus of most of the projects, it was difficult for the evaluation to find industrial stakeholders who felt sufficiently engaged to give any detailed feedback on the process. We may note the involvement at stakeholder level, of the Association of British Insurers on FCD; Hewlett Packard and IBM on Cognitive Systems; Hewlett Packard on CTCP; and GSK and a large number of business participants in the business survey on BSAD. However in general, industry has been downstream of the projects and benefiting in ways described in the projects. It has not, however, been in any prominent role in respect of positioning. The Research Councils have engaged with the Programme and very positive feedback was expressed by the Chairman of RCUK. However, at an operational level there are some tensions evident. These arise from concerns about the potential role of foresight in priority setting. Research Councils would not like the simple fact of selection of an area as a project to be seen as implying that sooner or later significant resources would be diverted to that area, bypassing existing prioritisation and allocation procedures. Having said that, to date the evidence is that they have been willing to respond to opportunities emerging – they would argue on their intrinsic merits. The tensions arise from the relationship with earlier Foresight cycles where there was a strong pressure for almost all new initiatives to carry the “Foresight compatible” brand. This is clearly inappropriate for a project based activity and it is not a line that has been pursued. However, this message has not always got across to the academic communities addressed by projects. There is some need for management of expectations such that academic communities understand that having a foresight project in their domain is not in itself a guarantee of additional research funding – consequent actions might be in another sphere altogether. Making this clear will also lessen any latent lobbying pressure on foresight A final word on positioning concerns public engagement with Foresight. This is project specific but has largely been seen as an end of pipeline activity – with the aim to maximise public exposure to launched projects but without involving the public in the process of arriving at those results. Some topics could reasonably have been expected to benefit from some form of public consultation at an earlier stage but this would require additional resources and careful planning. It is an issue that could possibly be pursued in tandem with those responsible for science and society issues. Since most of the projects concern matters of high public interest or else involve technologies which potentially could be so, we believe that foresight could extend its range by including an element of “technology assessment” as a sub-activity as a matter of course.

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5. Issues concerning project selection and scope Project selection is one of the more sensitive issues, raising issues about the implications of selection and non-selection. For example, in the section on positioning above we discuss whether selection is seen to imply funding priority. Examination of candidate projects and views of interviewees suggested that demand for Foresight projects exceeds supply, though this would have to be tested in terms of real resource commitments. The project process is readily modularisable if resources were available though this should not be seen as an argument for franchising it to other organisations on a general basis as this would raise issues both of quality control and of opening up scope for lobbying (some evidence of this was present in the Second Cycle). Circumstances where passing on the approach to others would be favourable are, as far as we can see, confined to second generation activities hosted by Government departments who have had a close involvement with existing projects. The combination of tacit learning and legitimacy as a stakeholder would overcome the reservations expressed above. Within the Programme, two constraints are evident:

• The time of the two senior managers who handle all the necessary preliminary stages of gaining stakeholder commitment and who also manage broader relations with other parts of government; and

• Headcount restrictions on staff constrain extension more than cash resources in the first instance, though some projects have also reported being limited by the latter (se below).

The first of these points raises a broader issue of the risk to the Programme of reliance on the skills, networks and reputations of 2 senior managers. Behind them there is also the critically important aspect of the support of the Chief Scientific Adviser. The imminent transition for the first two individuals and the eventual transition of the latter present a challenge for DTI in preserving the activity without hiatus. One further issue emerging from some interviews concerned the scope of individual projects in relation to resources. Project managers in some cases felt that they had been given remits beyond the real level of resource in both Programme and administrative budgets available to them and despite huge personal efforts they felt that some important aspects were covered too thinly or not at all. We return to these issues after considering the projects in more detail.

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6. Impacts and Effects of the Projects In the following sections we present our assessment of the impacts and effects of each of the projects, based upon interviews with participants and stakeholders and on the reported outputs and effects. Before doing this, however, we present an overall assessment of the effects and impacts of the projects. First, it is worth highlighting the challenges associated with identifying and assessing impacts and effects associated with an activity such as Foresight. Whilst it is sometimes possible to directly attribute a given outcome to foresight, often the picture is more confused, with foresight contributing to an outcome but rarely constituting the sole influence. Moreover, focusing upon only the effects of concrete outputs, such as reports and recommendations, misses the process benefits associated with foresight. These include the development of self-sustaining networks and advocacy coalitions, changes in people’s perceptions and understanding of a given issue, knowledge-sharing between the actors involved, and so on. These soft impacts can, and often do, lead to policy effects, but tracing these back to foresight requires a certain amount of detective work as well as a considerable amount of time and effort. Despite these caveats, the evidence collected in this study clearly shows that Foresight has directly informed national policies and programmes. To date, this is most apparent in the FCD project, where Defra and Environment Agency (EA) strategies have been strongly influenced by Foresight. The EEMS project has also directly influenced the Technology Programme of the DTI. Significant and easily attributable policy impacts of the other three completed projects – CTCP, CS, and BSAD – are less evident at the moment, though this picture could change, particularly for BSAD, which is currently undergoing review by the sponsoring ministry. In fact, many interviewees suggested to the evaluation team that it was perhaps too early to assess the impacts of the projects. They argued that it was unrealistic to expect impacts to occur “instantaneously”. Rather, it would take time for the results to be “absorbed” and that, in any case, Foresight projects constituted a “reservoir” of knowledge resources that policy makers would be able to dip into over the coming years. Other foresight evaluation work, for example, in the UK and Hungary, bears this out – policy impacts often occur some time after foresight exercises are completed, although this may not conform to the “reservoir” model highlighted by interviewees. Instead, the negotiation and bargaining processes associated with policy formulation and implementation take their time, as does the development of a wide appreciation for action. An important focus of this evaluation has therefore been concerned with assessing the conditions for future policy impacts to occur. In the logic chart outlined earlier, three levels of effects are highlighted, the anticipation being that the immediate effects lead to the intermediate effects, which in turn lead to the ultimate effects. We say more on each of these levels in the following paragraphs.

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6.1 Immediate effects The anticipated immediate effects of Foresight include increased recognition / profile for the topic area, and new combinations of experts and stakeholders brought together. From the evidence gathered, both of these have clearly been achieved. All projects appear to be well-known in their communities, in part by virtue of the use of high-calibre experts to help steer them. In addition, the level of interest from the media is unprecedented for foresight reports, at least in the UK. Some projects, notably FCD and BSAD, have had their findings featured prominently in the national press, including television. As for the formation of new combinations of actors, all projects have been successful in mobilising diverse groups of high-calibre specialists to work in a multidisciplinary framework and have demonstrated the scope for collaboration across disciplinary boundaries. It is doubtful whether such mobilisation could have been achieved by conventional ministerial or Research Council programmes. Moreover, the Programme has been largely successful in integrating natural and social sciences, something that has been traditionally difficult to achieve.

6.2 Intermediate effects Foresight’s anticipated intermediate effects include the articulation of visions of the future, the formulation of recommendations and options for action, and the formation of action networks. The reports generated by the projects have clearly achieved the first two of these, with visions articulated and action agendas set out. Projects have also prepared and disseminated good quality reviews of the state of the art of relevant science, and in at least three projects, these have been or will be published as academic monographs. But it is the way in which projects have brought together the “whole picture” of the topic area within a sound logical framework which is seen to be the biggest benefit. The high degree of international interest shown in the projects – particularly in the FCD, BSAD and DIID projects – can be further taken as evidence of their quality and relevance. The third anticipated intermediate impact concerns the formation of action networks. Here, the evidence is less conclusive than with the other anticipated intermediate effects. There is evidence of groups continuing to meet after projects have been launched, though this relies heavily on the sponsor agency and hence results in variable levels of activity Also, the evaluation uncovered several examples of project participants getting together to put in research proposals related to project findings. However, the general feeling is that much more needs to be done to nurture and expand emerging action networks so that they become self-sustaining. In principle, this has been left to the sponsoring ministry to pick up, but this strategy has really only worked well in the FCD project. In the other projects, there is the serious risk of an implementation gap developing, which could undermine the good reputation of the Programme. The reasons for this gap are manifold, and some lie outside of the control of the OST. One type of example, which occurred in a few of the projects, came when there was a change of minister during the lifetime of the project. This tended to be disruptive. Some interviewees suggested that the Stakeholder Group would be better constituted if it was led by senior officials rather than ministers. However, we agree with the Directorate’s

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view that Ministerial involvement is a positive feature that provides a focus and a clear indication of priority and importance of the exercise. It was also suggested that Stakeholder Group meetings are too infrequent and sometimes stilted, the latter being due to the lack of exposure to the project by Group members. However, while the Stakeholder Groups are not significantly exposed to the project, this does happen with advisory Groups, the membership of which usually includes lower level representatives of the High Level Stakeholders’ organisations. Furthermore, whilst those intimately involved in the Foresight activity may have been convinced of the potential for cooperation, developed better understanding of how this could be forwarded, and established good working relationships with likely collaborators, for those not closely associated with the project, these have been difficult to realise. As a consequence, some of the interest shown in funding calls related to project outputs has been less than expected. For example, the response to a joint Wellcome Trust / Research Council call for research in the CS area is regarded as being disappointing. This was put down to the fact that the professionals in question lack the social capital needed to embark upon these research projects. We note that there is also a difference between identifying a need for research and the competence and capability being there – community building where none exists requires significant investment, and you cannot always rely on the people who just happen to be around at the time to have the right skills.) The response to parts of the EEMS-inspired DTI Technology Programmes is also considered to have been disappointing. The explanation given here is that some of the areas highlighted by Foresight are not yet ready for commercialisation, thus the lack of interest of firms – we will say more on this below when we discuss the relationship of the Programme to the private sector. The main message to emerge from interviews is that self-sustaining networks need to be built for Foresight messages to be further developed and implemented. Foresight is already successful in starting this process, but this needs to be active long enough for the networks to gel and for momentum to be built. Without sufficient aftercare, there is a danger that the networks established during the course of the project may dissipate due to the slow pace or absence of follow-up activity. Who should be responsible for this and how it might be carried out remains open to question, but building networks across disciplinary, professional and industrial boundaries is a long haul activity. We return to this issue in the conclusions.

6.3 Ultimate effects As for the ultimate impacts, these include influence on the research agendas of both public and private actors, influence on Government policy, and the development of a foresight culture. Influence on Government policy has already been discussed above. Influence on the research agendas of the Research Councils is evident, though no new research programmes have yet been initiated in response to project findings. Rather, the results stimulated new areas of work within existing programmes and fora. Specific details are given for each of the projects in the following sections.

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Turning to the influence on industry, first, it should be borne in mind that the private sector features a lot less prominently in the current round of Foresight than in earlier rounds. In today’s Programme, the emphasis is far more on influencing public policy. Some interviewees thought that this was the correct focus, and that expanding Foresight’s scope to serve several clients, including industry, would be diversionary. Moreover, the DTI’s Technology Programme is seen as largely serving this purpose. But private sector interests have been involved in all of the projects, both as suppliers of views and opinions, but also as consumers of emerging messages. There have also been deliberate attempts at disseminating project findings to industrialists and venture capitalists, though from what we can tell, these have had little impact, despite being perceived as successful and interesting events.

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7. International Comparison The first cycle of UK Foresight was internationally linked in two ways:

1. Key design elements were adopted from programmes in other countries. The preliminary study which preceded the announcement of the Programme in the Science, Engineering and Technology White Paper Realising Our Potential had examined in some detail the long-running sequence of Japanese and the more recent German Delphi exercises and members of the Steering Group visited Japan. Aspects of these activities were included in the UK design. While the UK Programme went well beyond Delphi, it did share the common element of being wide-ranging multi-sectoral/technological exercise. Presentations had also been sought from an innovation-oriented foresight activity going on in the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs which was project-based and focused on pre-selected areas but this had less influence at that time.

2. The UK Programme’s perceived success led it to be widely used as a model for

other countries. The particular mix of sectoral panel based activities using various scenario and consultation techniques became the dominant approach of the 1990s as a succession of countries experimented with this policy instrument. Elements of this interactive approach were even fed back into the design of the Japanese activity.

These common features made international comparison relatively easy. However, the present Programme is much more distinctive in its design (though imitation may yet follow as international interest is high). A further trend is that public sector foresight has become more distributed, with much activity taking place at the regional or organisational level and therefore not being directly comparable with national exercises. Today, the international benchmarking and comparison of foresight is more systematic and institutionalised. For example the UK Directorate takes part in the ERA-NET ForSociety in which managers from 15 countries compare experiences. One aim is to develop transnational joint foresight activity in areas of common interest. The Programme also keeps in touch with international developments through the European Commission’s European Foresight Managers Network which oversees initiatives such as the European Foresight Monitoring Platform and the FORLEARN project. In Annex 8 we present some key features of recent or ongoing foresight programmes or exercises in six countries: Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Spain and France. In all cases they share the basic feature of using futures methods of one kind or another and of being concerned with science and technology. They also share with the UK Programme the situation of not being the country’s first experience of foresight activities. However, in other respects they differ from the UK in that they are all principally oriented to the steering of their respective science and innovation systems, normally aiming to identify priority fields.

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Commenting on some individual features:

• The Swedish Technology Foresight 2004, described as a single technique panel-based exercise, moved from the more technical focus of the first round to a social focus while still trying to follow up the earlier exercise. A recent evaluation has concluded that this was too ambitious and that insufficient effort had been made to find customers for such outputs4. The lack of controversy was also seen as a factor in low influence. In both of these respects the UK Programme has followed a more productive course.

• The German Futur exercise bears some superficial resemblance to UK Foresight

in that it is project-based. Essentially the exercise has been an attempt to involve a wider constituency (notably social stakeholders) in the identification and articulation of new themes for the German research ministry’s R&D programmes. An elaborate process of project selection results in “leitvisionen” (lead visions) which are intended to reflect demand for research on interdisciplinary problems, with clear goals and a scenario indicating the visionary content. Two evaluations suggested that some simplification would be possible and noted that the final selection was not part of the process, rather being made by the ministry and its advisers. One lead vision, Understanding Thought Processes, addressed the same area as the UK Cognitive Systems project. However, this topic was not directly an output of Futur but was added late in the process by the Innovation Advisory Council. For UK foresight the main conclusion that can be drawn is a consensus that computational neuroscience is an important area that has been hitherto somewhat neglected.

• Foresight in Japan has evolved in recent years from the rather disconnected

publication of Delphi reports which were then left to find their own audience. In recent years, NISTEP, the organisation responsible for technology foresight, while remaining in the education and science ministry (MEXT) has also had an explicit connection to the Science and Technology Policy Council, the main advisory and agenda setting body for Japanese science policy. The Council is responsible for the 5 year Basic Plans which provide the overall priorities framework. Hence, we see, as in the UK, a much more explicit connection to the customer. However, the remit is somewhat more broad-ranging. A UK equivalent would be for foresight to be seen as a key input to the 10 Year Investment Framework for Science and Technology, something that the project orientation does not really permit it to do.

FutuRIS in France was essentially a foresight project in terms of having a clear timed remit and project management style implementation. It is also an example of complex stakeholder management arrangements. However, for the purposes of comparison perhaps the most interesting aspect that can be drawn out concerns its content – turning foresight as an instrument to look at the national innovation system. While the UK has 4 From Foresight to Consensus? An Evaluation of the Second Round of Swedish TechnologyForesight Teknisk Framsyn, 2002-2004 , Erik Arnold, Sven Faugert, Annelie Eriksson, Vicent Charlet, June 2005

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benefited from activities such as the Innovation Review, foresight has not been applied in this context. Given the concerns with addressing issues such as industrial innovation performance it provides an interesting suggestion for a future project theme, possibly covering issues such as the role of public procurement in driving innovation and public service innovation and drawing upon state-of-the art social science research in these areas as well as science and engineering opportunities perspectives.

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8. Management and Value for Money The overall process of the Foresight Programme has been justified by the track record of quality delivery described throughout this report. Overall the view from stakeholders was that the approach adopted, including foresight methods, was fit for purpose. The detailed planning and programming approach represents a step forward in international standards for foresight management. However, some issues have been raised several times and deserve some further discussion. Resources for projects (human and financial) have been a matter of some contention. Several project managers challenged the assumption that they had been given sufficient time and resource to match their remit. The project which has achieved the highest impacts, FCD, experienced substantial cost overruns and some time over-run. Without these additional resources it is unlikely that it would have achieved its aims. More generally costs have been driven up by “scope-drift” as projects uncover promising issues to explore. While a hard line could be taken on this, it might produce unnecessary constraints and lead to a loss of value. The timing issue is also related to complexity. This tends to increase over time and with the wide interdisciplinary range involved in most projects. There is also a learning curve effect, particularly in relation to networking. Projects take time to build up contact networks and productive working relationships with the sponsor ministries. This suggests that timescales should not be shortened. Learning between projects has been systematic and highly beneficial. Earlier concerns that a methodological straitjacket would constrain creativity have proved unfounded. We found a general feeling that there was sufficient space for experimentation. Methodological designs have been allowed to evolve to some extent to reflect the specificity of the issue and the community. Creativity and a productive element of chaos are essential elements of foresight which need to be balanced against the structured elements of planning. Overall we would say that the balance was about right. Translating these concerns to the question of efficiency, experimentation has sometimes led to some small-scale wastage, but generally speaking, the Programme does not waste money. It also typically leverages time and resources of people on the advisory group and the sponsoring ministry for each project and is always pushing contractors to do more and more. Foresight has had to pay the going rate for inputs, prompting one interviewee to complain that it had inflated academics expectations of what this type of consulting might pay. However, it is better that such transactions should be transparent and not invoke hidden subsidies. On the other hand it should be recognised that those preparing inputs derive benefit from participation and generally accept that this is the case. When asked directly, interviewees almost unanimously thought Value for Money to be high. Again we could point to success at leveraging support from others, especially the sponsoring ministries. Given the scale of many of the problems being addressed and the attendant large government budgets they attract, a few hundred thousand pounds for these foresight projects seems to be excellent VFM.

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9. Additionality The concept of additionality is important in evaluation as it focuses not upon the impacts achieved by a policy intervention but rather upon the specific contribution of government support to those effects. It can be summarised succinctly by the question “What difference did it make?” Traditional approaches to the issue concern themselves with inputs – was the additional resource spent – or outputs – which of these are attributable to the intervention. However, in recent years many OECD members have been extending their assessments to include considerations of behavioural additionality. A concept originally labelled by PREST,5 this turns the focus to impacts upon behaviour, organisational routines and in particular upon persistent changes achieved. This approach is inherently more suited to an instrument such as foresight. Hence, the questions posed here for each Foresight project are:

• Would the project have happened without the action of the Foresight Directorate? • If, so, would the nature of the work have been substantially different (slower,

reduced scope etc)? • Have the networks and actions induced by the Programme persisted after

handover to other bodies? • To what extent has participation in the Programme increased the propensity to use

science-based evidence in policymaking? • To what extent has the Programme resulted in Foresight tools and processes being

used elsewhere? A first answer is that in no case had there been a specific foresight activity in the past addressing the topic as defined. A substantial aspect of the additionality lay in the configuration of knowledge that Foresight assembled, sometimes in entirely new combinations across science and social science as noted by several interviewees. BSAD was singled out as being a particularly innovative approach. EEMS’ additionality lay partly in acceleration, bringing the area to the fore sooner than would otherwise have happened. In terms of network formation, FCD was acknowledged to have hugely improved networking and joined up strategic thinking in its area. Some doubts were expressed about the persistence of networks in CTCP and Cognitive Systems – some interviewees remarked that the networks would need a further impetus to keep the new linkages going. Research Councils also attributed lower additionality to Cognitive Systems in that their own processes would have eventually engaged with the area. Against this it should be remarked that past efforts had not succeeded – notably a Joint Council Initiative on Cognitive Science and Human Computer Interaction in the 1990s

5 Buisseret TJ, Cameron H and Georghiou L (1995) “What difference does it make? Additionality in the

public support of R&D in large firms”, International Journal of Technology Management, Vol.10, Nos 4/5/6 pp587-600

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where the evaluation noted a strong reluctance of the communities, particularly in cognitive science, to engage. Finally, in terms of policy approach two Chief Scientists and a Minister commented that the use of science evidence based approaches had been demonstrated and reinforced by the Foresight experience. Other interviewees were planning to use foresight techniques in their own institutions.

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10. Conclusions Overall, the third cycle of the UK Foresight Programme is a process that is widely admired and valued. It has restored the reputation of foresight activity more generally in the UK from a position in 2001 where many had become sceptical, and has done this from a position of far less obvious prominence than its predecessor programmes which had much wider remits. It has created a process for original thinking in government and in particular for the application of science based evidence and foresight techniques to policy issues. At the end of this section we discuss some key issues. Before this, we present our detailed conclusions as responses to the questions originally posed to the evaluation:

10.1 The impact of the Programme and its projects Would the foresight activity have happened without the OST programme? Was the foresight activity done differently or better because of the OST programme? As discussed in the section on additionality, in no case had there been a foresight activity in the past addressing the same topic area. Foresight provided a new configuration of knowledge on each topic and a distinctive approach. Uniqueness is harder to assess and lies more in the approach than in the territory addressed. Foresight provides a ‘safe environment’ for thinking the unthinkable. It provides a space for structured uncertainty to be investigated. It enjoys freedoms that other government departments would have difficulty in securing. Foresight can codify the things others want to say but are not allowed to say in public – exemplified by BSAD. What have been the Programme’s key impacts? Foresight has directly informed national policies and programmes. This is most evident for the FCD project where Defra and EA strategies have been strongly influenced. The EEMS project has also directly influenced the Technology Programme of DTI. For the other projects the influence at present is probably most evident in the climate of thought in relevant policy making bodies and in the emergent networks, though some initiatives have also been stimulated in funding bodies. A general effect has been to bring together key players and hence to allow a more “joined-up” approach. The same could be said of the disciplinary combinations, which in some cases have changed the ways of understanding an issue or demonstrated its significance. More broadly speaking there is evidence that the Programme has engaged senior policymakers with science and scientists, often for the first time. What are the anonymous confidential views of key stakeholders on the value of the programme? The message has been universally positive. Two interviewees were willing to be quoted and summarise general sentiment:

“Foresight is a successful exercise…and has led to key policies in the Department set out in the Making Space for Water document – which sets out a new

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government strategy for flood and coastal erosion management…” Elliot Morley, Minister of State, Defra “If it didn’t exist, it should be invented” Ian Diamond, Chief Executive, ESRC and RCUK

Are the resulting actions better because of foresight? Some care needs to be taken with this question because of the long term nature of some likely consequences of Foresight. This is discussed at the end of the conclusions. However, some comments may be made on how foresight is used. Even in the area of highest impact Defra does not consider Foresight to have provided “the answers” for it to use. Rather, it has provided a “route map” as the end point. This emphasises that Foresight does not make policy – it informs it. This is appropriate and is a role that needs to be maintained. It is hard to argue that in any circumstances policy would not be improved through better information and a more joined up and strategic approach. Bringing individuals from currently opposed positions together to explore future uncertainties could also be seen as providing some positive feedback to the present situation. Many further impacts will take time to be manifested where Foresight has anticipated issues which have yet to come to the fore. This “reservoir” of knowledge will enable rapid policy responses when they do arise in the future.

10.2 Cost effectiveness of the Programme The overall process has been justified by its track record of delivering high quality outputs. The approach adopted is fit-for-purpose and offers good value for money and adds to this by leveraging resources. Bringing the whole picture together within a sound logical framework has been a major benefit, allowing resource concentration, task specialisation, modularity and scale economy. Additionality exists in that no foresight had, or would have, taken place on the project themes on this timescale. Much of the additionality lies in the new configurations of knowledge brought to bear. Behavioural additionality is evident in that several sponsors and participants were integrating foresight approaches into their future activities.

10.3 The way foresight is run There is an imbalance between the supply of projects and the demand. This is probably good for maintaining quality but means that the potential of Foresight is under-exploited. A modest expansion is recommended, with one more project undertaken each year, with a commensurate expansion of management and executive resources. Projects are moderately under-resourced – it is not only coincidence that the most expensive, Flood and Coastal Defence, also had the greatest impact. Of course, other factors associated with the sponsoring ministry, Defra, and the topic issue itself may

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account for some, or maybe all, of this, but the suspicion is nevertheless there that the greater resources accorded to this project have led to its success. The Programme is entering a risky phase with impending turnover of its senior management. The quality and commitment of the team at all levels has been a key success factor. Strong efforts should be made to maintain the ethos and the knowledge base.

10.4 Key issues Timescale for impacts Despite the need to demonstrate evidence of Foresight’s effectiveness, the simple fact is that its full impacts are likely to take some time to be evident. A clear understanding of the implementation environment and Foresight’s relation to other sources of policy advice will also be required. A foresight report is rarely if ever the only evidence on the table and it is important to understand how it will interact with the likely additional sources and interest groups. Evidence from foreign programmes and to some extent from earlier rounds in the UK is that a high quality report may act as a reservoir of knowledge that is drawn down when a policy issue “goes live”. In this case fast action will be possible. The conclusion is that at least some foresight activity should be in this anticipatory mode and the expectation should be that initial impact may be muted. Aftercare and Implementation Environment Now that several projects have been completed, Foresight will begin to be judged on how successful it has been in informing policy, in shaping research priorities, and so on. Our judgement is that the present handover is not exploiting sufficiently the momentum generated by projects. Stakeholders have sometimes been slow in driving things forward. Self-sustaining networks need to be built for Foresight messages to be further developed and implemented. Foresight is already successful in starting the process, but needs to be active long enough for the networks to gel and for momentum to be built The current practice of handing over responsibility for implementation to the sponsor therefore needs to be reviewed. In principle, continuing this practice would seem to be the right thing to do, but OST will need to assess what extra support it should provide in order to maintain momentum and to plug any gaps that might become apparent. We recommend a modest increase in resource to be devoted to this activity to enable lead participants to present and represent the findings for some time after the launch and to extend the term of at least one project manager part-time to support the transfer. Sustainability The churn in personnel at Foresight Directorate is an issue that will need to be carefully managed. Earlier rounds of UK Foresight suffered when key personnel left the Programme, and it is quite possible that the same thing could happen again, particularly as several experienced people are due to leave at around the same time in the near future.

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It is a problem of knowledge management, but also one of preserving the ethos of the Programme. Timescale and scope of projects – matching supply and demand Given its general success, the question arises as to whether the Programme should be expanded. Each project requires a considerable amount of effort to get started – not least in identifying and convincing an appropriate sponsor to become involved. A lot of effort is also required to manage the projects. In other words, OST would need to either increase the human resources devoted to the Programme or to conduct shorter projects in order to cover more areas more quickly. There is, however, a minimum period required for conducting these projects, and the evaluation suggests that the EEMS project came close to this limit. Public engagement has been seen as an “end-of-pipeline” activity targeted at communicating findings through press and other coverage. This has been successful. However, most projects would benefit from an element of public participation before they are completed, drawing upon the methods of technology assessment. Engagement with the wealth creation agenda As already noted the focus has been mostly on government policy, with the business community and innovation lower on the Programme’s agenda. This does not mean that there has been no contact or communication – briefings have been provided to venture capital companies, the insurance sector was heavily involved in FCD and the interest of the pharmaceutical sector in BSAD is a certainty. However, even in the most business oriented project (EEMS) there was some sense of a mismatch in timescales – foresight is beyond the planning horizon at least of UK firms. The problem may lie an excessively short-term outlook in parts of industry. It is certainly true that earlier rounds of foresight which had an explicitly wealth creating agenda tended to trim back from their foresight role and focus their recommendations on the present environment. The other barrier to work in this area may come from the setting of the Programme itself. We had some sense that project managers are stepping back from engagement with business so as not to stray into the territory of the DTI Innovation Group. This interface was well-managed in EEMS, despite the mismatch in timescales mentioned above, but may have been a problem elsewhere. A closer link would be mutually beneficial. An overtly innovation-oriented topic for a project would be a good way to proceed. Perhaps even an action on the lines of the French FutuRIS, as suggested earlier, would be helpful – foresight on the future nature of R&D and innovation – covering changes mode of knowledge creation, the service sector etc. This could draw upon cutting edge social science research as well as upon reviews of opportunities in key areas of science and technology. The long-term performance of the UK’s innovation system is a critical challenge for the UK and one not really covered in more immediate policy reviews of recent years. There is insufficient accumulated experience at present to judge whether the relative success of a public policy orientation is inherent to this approach to foresight or whether

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the science–driven approach should be extended to industrial or scientific objectives. A final judgement should be made after further efforts in the latter areas. This should be borne in mind during the construction of a new portfolio from the next project generation and selection rounds.

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Annexes In this section, detailed accounts of each of the Foresight projects ongoing or completed at the time of the evaluation are provided. These are mostly based upon documentary evidence and a programme of interviews carried out with those directly involved in the projects. The projects covered are as follows:

• Cognitive Systems (CS) • Flood and Coastal Defences (FCD) • Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention (CTCP) • Exploiting the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EEMS) • Brain Science, Addiction, and Drugs (BSAD) • Detection and Identification of Infectious Diseases (DIID) • Intelligent Infrastructure Systems (IIS)

Each project is described in terms of its aims and objectives, the process used, the resulting outputs, the immediate and longer-term impacts, the appropriateness and positioning of the project, and its value for money. Completed projects – CS, FCD, CTCP, EEMS, and BSAD – strictly follow this format. By contrast, ongoing projects have much more devoted to process and immediate outputs (reflecting the concerns of interviewees and current documentation), with little focus on impacts (for obvious reasons). This has had the advantage of the evaluation closely examining projects at different points in their life-cycles. Moreover, whilst the evaluation has attempted to gather the same sorts of information across all projects, this has sometimes been impossible to achieve. For this reason, some project accounts are stronger than others on some of the aspects covered, e.g. accounts of media coverage of projects and their results is variable and reflects the information that was available to the evaluation. Lessons from the projects, which essentially constitute the Programme, have already been taken into account in the main parts of this report. But it is nevertheless interesting to reflect upon the balance of project types across the Programme portfolio. From conversations with Programme managers, OST consider there to be three types of project focus:

1. Policy orientation: FCD, CTCP, BSAD, DIID, and IIS 2. Research orientation: CS 3. Innovation orientation: EEMS

An interesting, though overly simplistic, question to ask is whether one type of project achieves better results (in terms of impacts) than others. On first impressions, FCD seems to have had the most impact to date, which might suggest that policy-oriented projects are better for impact. But there are two problems with this hypothesis:

• First, the following detailed accounts will show that the other major policy-oriented project that finished more than a year ago, i.e. CTCP, has had nothing like the same degree of impact as FCD as yet. So this would appear to disprove the hypothesis. On the other hand, it might be that greater impact can be expected when dealing with an established agenda (FCD) and less if trying to set the agenda (CTCP). Or it might be that the latter, by its nature, is a longer-term

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endeavour and that an early-stage evaluation like this one comes too soon to capture the impacts that will follow later.

• Second, each of the other orientations has a sample of just one project, which is woefully insufficient if trying to draw conclusions on the best project types for impacts. But even assuming that these types of projects are going to have less immediate policy impact, the impacts they might have on research and innovation agendas and actors might be even more important ultimately, but might take longer to become apparent.

There is therefore a variety of types of impacts to acknowledge, with different times of realisation. This makes comparing the different types of projects difficult at this relatively early stage. What is clear is that the variety of project type has offered the Foresight Team the possibility of learning from different sorts of experiences. For example, CS taught Programme managers a lot about running cross-disciplinary debates; FCD about tackling a mainstream policy agenda; EEMS about wealth creation projects; and CTCP about science-driven issues where there is no single policy lead. All of these have generated lessons that could be successfully transferred to other projects in the portfolio, no doubt strengthening them and the Programme as a whole. In the longer term, which projects are the better use of public funds is likely to continue to be a matter of judgement, and there is probably room for Foresight to continue to do a variety of projects in the future.

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A1 Cognitive Systems A1.1 Aim and Objectives The stated aim of the Foresight project on cognitive systems (CS) was “To produce a vision for the future development of cognitive systems through an exploration of recent advances in neuroscience, computer science and related fields, and their potential for future interaction.” The project started in April 2002 and launched its findings in November 2003. It was sponsored by the Director General of the Research Councils, and cost around £355K. The stated objectives were:

• to examine recent progress in two major areas of research – artificial and living cognitive systems - and their related disciplines (including computer science, neuroscience, cognitive science, artificial intelligence) - to understand whether progress in understanding cognition in living systems has new insights to offer those researching the construction of artificial cognitive systems;

• to scope the likely developments in these fields over the next decade, and in particular to scope the likely rate of progress in our capability to build artificial cognitive systems; and

• to articulate significant conclusions from this, if any, which are worthy of communication to a wider audience.”

As one of the new projects in the third cycle of Foresight, and the first to have its results launched, this project was, first, very much a learning experience. There was no standard model as to the process to be adopted for the new projects. Each project had to be designed so as to deliver its own objectives. But, second, it would inevitably be taken to be a demonstrator of the viability of the new model of Foresight. It was considerably more focused on developments in science than was the other project launched at the same time (FCD), and (largely because of this) it put little emphasis on scenario analysis. Equally, it tended to involve academic researchers, with what industrial participation there was coming mainly on the computer science side. While such researchers tend to take a long-term view, the exercise pressed them to go further forward than they normally would.6

A major underpinning of the project was the aim of bringing together widely separated (and themselves internally heterogeneous) cognitive and computer science communities – also referred to in the CS context as “life” and “physical” sciences. Though there were some links between the two communities, these were limited; earlier efforts to build bridges (e.g. through Research Council programmes) were not regarded as having been very successful. There was seen to be scope for mutual learning, and gaps to be bridged productively, across the boundaries of these broad areas. Thus, it was important to explore the possibilities and modalities for cooperation and knowledge exchange. There

6 The very rapid pace of change in these areas of work made some participants reluctant to take a perspective of more than a decade or so.

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was much modification of the initial ideas of what the project might look like, as it was scoped and implemented.

A1.2 Process There was little use of formal Foresight tools such as scenario analysis or Delphi. Generation and discussion of expert views was a main method. The eventual organization of the project took the form illustrated below. It is apparent that there are streams of activity engaging each of the two main scientific communities, together with more integrative activities. The project process began with three brainstorming sessions (one to design the overall project process, one for each of the two streams), selection of key areas to focus “mini-summaries” on, separate in-depth workshops for the life and physical sciences, more substantial summaries of the key areas, and then a series of three interaction workshops and an Interaction Conference (IAC) bridging the communities. The IAC was intended to test the findings from the workshops with a wider scientific audience (two days of more scientific discussion), as well as introducing these findings to non-academic audiences (one day more oriented to dissemination). This was intended to build interest in the outcomes of the project, preparing the ground for wider communication. Finally, the “Manifestos”, early versions of which were discussed in the IAC, were to be specifications for new areas of collaborative and interdisciplinary research, intended to help funding agencies better understand the research communities and opportunities for joint work. The figure indicates that interaction with the stakeholders (including industrial representatives) was embedded throughout the process.

Launch of Manifestos

4 mini summaries

Identify key areas for work

Intelligible summary Intelligible summary

Joint life & physical workshop

Full overview

Full overview

Interaction/review

l workshop

7 mini summaries

InterAction Conference (IAC)

Life workshop PhysicaLIFE SYNTHESIS PHYSICALSTREAM STREAM

SSttaakkeehhoollddeerr iinntteerraaccttiioonnss

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The key areas chosen for the “Life” Stream were: (1) Learning and Memory; (2) Language and Speech; (3) Social Cognition; (4) Self-Organising Systems; (5) Actions and Habits; (6) Representation; and (7) Advanced Neuroscience Technologies. The key areas chosen for the “Physical” Stream were: (1) Memory/Reasoning/Learning; (2) Sensory Processes and Perception; (3) Large Scale/Small Scale Systems; and (4) Interaction/Planning/Motivations. These areas emerged from the brainstorming activities. An additional state of science report was also prepared on robotics, though this area was not covered by the main project – this is indicative of the enthusiasm generated by the project. The “manifestos” discussed at the IAC were: (1) “The role of rhythmic activity in the brain”; (2) “Neurocomputational approaches to Language & Speech”; (3) “3D localisation in animals and artificial systems”; and (4) “Memories for Life”. The project website mentions several other areas where similar manifestos might need to be developed.

A1.3 Outputs According to the Foresight website, the project is widely perceived as having been successful in:

• Helping to define an emerging field of new science - cognitive systems - to which life and physical scientists are contributing.

• Identifying relevant groups of UK-based scientists and engineers, based in industry and academia, and bringing them together for interactive workshops at which common ground was established.

• Identifying exemplar ‘grand challenges’ that constitute fertile ground for further research.

• Creating an accessible summary of the work done during the year, with the assistance of a consultant science writer … and distributing this to a wide range of relevant groups (CUGPOP, members of Research Councils and their Research Boards, selected scientists in other countries working on similar topics). A book has also been prepared.

• Establishing ‘Foster Parents’ (professional societies) to carry work forward in the years ahead, a framework of ‘Foresight Fellowships’ (to be funded by EPSRC and MRC) for small cross-disciplinary pilot projects, and an ‘Action Plan’ to ensure self-sustaining research networks.”

In addition, the project was an important learning experience, providing many lessons on how to apply foresight to cross-disciplinary science. Innovations such as the science reviews and the use of science writers were pioneered in the CS project and adopted in subsequent projects.

A1.4 Immediate Impacts The evaluation study concludes that the CS project was extremely successful in terms of preparing and disseminating good quality reviews of the state of the art of science, and

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future prospects for the individual areas of work and the overall field of CS. While we have not undertaken a scientific refereeing process, the quantity and quality of this work is evident, and its reception seems generally very positive. The project is reported to have been featured in a major article in a national paper, together with coverage in three specialist papers. It is featured in numerous web links, which is some indication that the work is found to be useful; though there is little or no substantive commentary on its results in those we have examined. We also conclude that the project demonstrated the future economic significance of the field, and the likelihood that needs for collaboration will grow. This is not to say that the two sciences will merge, but to underline the point that there are many ways in which they can support each other in methodology, conceptual development, and practical applications. The project demonstrated the scope for collaboration across disciplinary boundaries, despite some initial reluctance from some quarters (more in life sciences than physical sciences, apparently – this may be paralleled in the extent of involvement of industries from the two bodies of work).7 Whether the aim of kick-starting longer-term and large-scale collaboration in the field was achieved, or is on the way to being achieved, is less clear. The difficulty of establishing and maintaining momentum in bridging the scientific communities may have been underestimated. Those intimately involved in the Foresight activity may have been convinced of the potential for cooperation, developed better understanding of how this could be forwarded, and established good working relationships with likely collaborators. But the bulk of the research communities remain in their “silos”. Four Research Councils, following an offer of matching funds for research from the Wellcome Trust, called for cross-disciplinary proposals building on the CS project. The response to this call for research in the area is generally regarded as being disappointing so far (whilst the level of expressions of interest was considered to be okay, none have yet translated into actual bids). This probably indicates not that there is a lack of scope for working across the boundaries, but that the professionals in question lack the social capital needed to embark upon this. The project did develop a list of (some 60) potential Research Council referees, who, having been involved in the project, were knowledgeable of and sympathetic to multidisciplinary work in CS. This was a useful contribution, but the wider communities still need to recognise the opportunities for collaboration and develop links with suitable partners. Though the CS technical coordinators are committed to continuing to support the initiative, it looks like a more proactive role will need to be undertaken in order to achieve continuing progress. The CS project was not intended to directly inform policy (other than research policy) as such. (A one-day workshop to brief EC officials was organised.) However, it may be that by providing a model for interdisciplinary working and bridge-building it makes for a positive demonstrator. While this is argued in some quarters, a more general perception

7 Whether and how these points are related is an interesting point, but one that would require more analysis.

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seems to be that the good work undertaken in the project has yet to result in a really substantial impact in terms of how the communities work together. In terms of steps toward achieving industrial impact, representatives of 25 investor companies attended an initial event, leading on to three dinner briefings (each attended by 6 to 8 investors) focusing on the areas of greatest interest. Interviews suggest that some of the major players in the computer industry were drawn into the project. Life science industries (e.g. medical imaging, psycho-pharmacology) were largely absent however. It is unclear how far this is down to short-term vision in the latter industries, and how far it reflects the social networks readily available to the project team.

A1.5 Longer Term Impacts It is too early to be definitive as to longer-term impacts, but the clear signals are that investment in, and strategy for, aftercare is required if this project is to achieve a sustained impact. Building networks across disciplinary, professional and industrial boundaries is a long haul undertaking. New communications technology may make collaboration easier than in the past, but social capital is required for this to be really effective.

A1.6 Appropriateness / Positioning “Cognition” is emerging as a focus area in a number of Foresight programmes, with UK Foresight having played a pioneering role here (and the CS project attracting attention from research and policy communities elsewhere). The compelling arguments for the social and economic significance of the topic area certainly warrant such a focus. Likewise, there will be a need to develop public discussion of the area before we stumble into significant social and ethical minefields, and a start on this was made with joint work with the British Association. The grand challenge that remains is to effectively embed collaboration, to establish and promote interdisciplinary work in the area. In many ways this project is just a first step in this process. The Research Councils responded to challenges identified by CS Foresight, but building momentum in the research communities looks like being a long-term process in its own right. Initiatives such as building a pool of referees who can deal with proposals are necessary, but the research communities themselves will need to be reoriented.

A1.7 Value for money? Begun with a budget of £250,000 and an 18 month timetable, the project had cost some £355,000k when it presented results after 20 months. (Funds had to be raised for the IAC in particular.) This puts it among the cheaper Foresight projects. CS Foresight is seen as having mobilized diverse groups of high-calibre specialists to work in a multidisciplinary framework that would have been unlikely to emerge from conventional Research Council strategic analysis. This was made possible by the involvement of respected experts in

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such roles as project leader, academic experts, and members of the Steering Group; this meant that people gave their time freely, so that the project leveraged resources well above its financing (including these key individuals putting in more effort than they were strictly contracted to.) A private initiative to acquire similar state of the art and forward-looking reports, let alone the commissioning of consultancies to supply such information, would almost certainly have cost a great deal more – and been unlikely to supply such quality material. The outstanding issue is moving from recognition of the significance of this area to nurturing substantial applications-oriented R&D in the area. This will be vital to acquiring the full value from the project.

A1.8 Overall Comments This project was a pioneer of the current round of Foresight, and helped establish the way in which the new projects can operate. It is widely seen as accomplishing a great deal in raising the profile of the field and demonstrating the scope for work across boundaries. It was more successful in engaging scientific as opposed to industry interest, however. Moreover, building on its achievements requires a proactive strategy.

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A2 Flood and Coastal Defence A2.1 Aims and Objectives The Flood and Coastal Defence (FCD) project was initiated because of growing awareness that flooding poses an increasing threat to the economic and social activity of the UK. Currently, flooding and flood management cost the UK around £2.2 billion each year, with around £800 million per annum spent on flood and coastal defences, and a further £1400 million spent on fixing the damage caused by flooding. The rising values of buildings and their contents mean that even the prevailing intensity of flooding could impose greater economic and financial burdens in the future. Climate change will exacerbate the risk still further. The project, which was sponsored by Defra, set out to provide a firm and rigorously researched basis for consideration of the responses that the UK should use in managing those increasing risks. A lot of work had already been carried out on flooding by the likes of Defra and the Environment Agency (EA). What distinguished the FCD project was its integrated analysis of drivers and impacts of flood risk in the UK over a time-scale of 30 to 100 years. The uncertainties in such an analysis are considerable but need to be embraced if policies are to be developed that are flexible and adaptable to an evolving future. With this in mind, the project aimed to produce a long-term vision for the future of flood and coastal defence in the UK, by answering two questions:

• How might the risk of flooding and coastal erosion change in the UK over the next 100 years?

• What are the best options for government and the private sector for responding to the future challenges?

Accordingly, the objectives of the project were to:

• identify and assess the relative importance of drivers which will affect future flood risk;

• construct a set of risk-based scenarios 30 to 100 years out; • provide an overview of responses and when best to use those responses; • inform policy and its delivery; • consider implications for the future skills base; • identify possibilities for knowledge transfer from other areas of science and

technology; • inform public understanding; and • promote effective and enduring dialogue between the science base and

stakeholders. Along with the Cognitive Systems project, FCD was the first project in the newly launched Foresight Programme. Nobody knew how to carry out these new projects at the start and a lot of learning was required. Eventually, the project was extended to two year’s duration, officially starting in April 2002 (though in reality starting in June 2002) and launching in April 2004. Moreover, the project budget was also substantially

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increased from initial estimates, with the project costing approximately £1m, by far the most expensive project to date.

A2.2 Process It would be fair to say that OST underestimated the scale of the FCD issue at the beginning – so costs spiralled. There was a lack of knowledge of FCD, which was due to an understandable unfamiliarity with what was an already well-established area. This lead to some initial problems with the project sponsor, Defra, which was sceptical as to OST’s ability to successfully conduct the project and to add value. These problems were quickly resolved, however, as OST quickly found its feet and Defra began to appreciate the benefits the project could bring. The methodology was worked out as the project proceeded. No one knew how to do it. Whilst the project team needed to do lots of plans, they also had to be careful not to stifle creativity – an element of “chaos” was therefore essential to the project. Moreover, the three phase project structure (evolution of the logical framework, impacts, and responses – see below), allowed the project to maintain flexibility and adapt to changes in priorities.

Pressures

Flooding system

System state Impacts

Economic drivers

Technological drivers

Social drivers

Future flood management responses modify state of system and hence flood risk

Climate change drivers

Flood risks:

Economic

Social

Environ-mental

Responses

Physical drivers

To createAct upon To which we can develop

The project proceeded in the following three phases:

• Phase 1 – scoped the problems of flooding and coastal erosion and developed a methodology for the analysis in subsequent phases.

• Phase 2 – analysed drivers and potential impacts of future flood risk under a simple baseline assumption that existing flood management policies continue unchanged. This assumption enables existing policies to be assessed against future risks, and identification of useful changes.

• Phase 3 – analysed potential changes to flood management and related policies that would improve the management of future flood risk.

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Several different methods were used, some expert-driven, others more views-based. From the outset, a leading professor cleared his teaching diary for one year and devoted himself to the project as a lead expert. This is considered to be one of the crucial success factors for the project. There were also significant human resources devoted from Defra – about half a person per year in total, spread among 6-7 persons. This had the added benefit of inculcating ownership of the project’s process and results.

A2.3 Outputs According to the project introduction set out by Sir David King, the project “constitutes the most wide-ranging analysis of the problem of increasing flood risk that has ever been made in the UK and possibly internationally.” All of those interviewed for this evaluation study broadly agreed with this assessment. Two key messages emerged from the project. Firstly, if the UK continues with existing policies, in virtually every scenario considered, the risks grow very substantially. Secondly, the risks need to be tackled across a broad front. Reductions in global emissions would reduce the risks greatly. However, this is unlikely to be sufficient. Hard choices need to be taken – the UK must either invest more in sustainable approaches to flood and coastal management or learn to live with increased flooding. Accordingly, the project’s reports have been targeted at policy-makers in central and regional Government and the private sector. In addition, it was believed that the project’s outputs could also be of interest to a wide range of professionals, whose work is affected by flooding and coastal erosion, including planners, environmentalists, those in business, social scientists, researchers and flood managers. The following project reports and documents were produced as outputs of the project:

1. Executive Summary 2. Key messages for stakeholders: this is a series of information sheets for

researchers, skills providers, local and regional government, and the insurance and financial services.

3. An overview of the science used may be found in: a. Scientific Summary: Volume I – Future risks and their drivers b. Scientific Summary: Volume II – Managing future risks

4. Scotland. This is a detailed technical report analysing the extent and nature of future risks specifically for Scotland.

5. A series of technical papers detailing the underlying work of the project. 6. FloodRanger flooding simulator: this computer based educative tool enables the

operator to explore the interaction of many issues relating to future flood defence for an imaginary part of the UK – including climate change, planning, infrastructure provision and flood defences. It is of potential interest to educators and professionals interested in flooding and its interaction with society, the environment and the economy.

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A lot of effort was made to make the reports visually attractive and accessible. The use of maps showing the impacts of flooding in different scenarios certainly paid off, with several reproduced in the national press. Nevertheless, according to one interviewee, reading some of the reports is “like wading through treacle” at times, but that is said to “go with the territory”. The reports contain a lot of data and it was such a big project, covering everything from hydro dynamics to social sciences, that this was perhaps inevitable. As with other Foresight projects, the baton was passed to the sponsoring ministry, i.e. Defra, to take responsibility for follow-up action. An Action Plan was assembled by OST, in consultation with Defra and a wider community of stakeholders. It covered the following categories: (a) implications for policy; (b) applying and deepening the work in specific parts of the country; (c) informing research priorities; and (d) informing the climate change agenda.

A2.4 Immediate Impacts With a project of this scale, a number of impacts are already apparent. Only a few will be reported upon here. Impacts are most obvious in the sponsoring ministry, Defra, where FCD was used heavily to inform Defra’s long-term strategy on flooding, “Making Space for Water”. For instance, in the Autumn 2004 public consultation document of the same name, Foresight is referred to an incredible 58 times. Despite this, Defra does not consider Foresight to have provided “the answers” to UK flooding policy challenges – something that is hardly surprising. Rather, it has provided a “route map” as the end point, a map for Defra to use in policy development and decision making. In interviews with Defra, the main success for the project was said to be its bringing together of the key players in industry, government, the insurance sector, and so on. Through this dialogue, a shared understanding of the issues has been achieved. Indeed, feedback from the one-year FCD project review suggests that FCD has encouraged a more joined-up and strategic approach to the problems involved in tackling flood risk, something that is essential where so many stakeholders must work together. Related to this point, the project is also credited with increasing public and industry exposure to the changing risks associated with flooding in the future. One Defra interviewee described FCD as a “wake-up call” for Defra as well – this is reflected in the extensive use being made of the results in Defra’s strategy development. Whilst the project is considered to have improved knowledge in a few areas, bringing the whole picture together within a sound logical framework is said to have been the biggest benefit. But the project has also given a wider group of stakeholders a better understanding of the potential scale of future flood risks and has helped to inform strategic planning and investment in managing them. For example, the Environment Agency (EA) has used the work to inform its Science Strategy and the work of the joint Defra/EA Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management R&D Programme. The EA also reports that the Flood Ranger simulator has become a respected and valuable part of its Flood Risk Management

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toolbox. The Agency has found it particularly useful in communicating key messages on the political impacts of climate change to stakeholders. The Devolved Administrations have also been active in following-up on FCD, with Defra organising regular meetings framed by the findings of the project. For example, the Scottish Executive has started putting in place a comprehensive asset register of river and coastal defences in Scotland after FCD highlighted the need for one for the RASP (Risk Assessment of Flood and Coastal Defence for Strategic Planning) flood-risk assessment tool. Meanwhile, it is reported that FCD was important in informing the Welsh Assembly Government’s current changes to flood defence management, its technical advice note on development and flood risk and its Environment Strategy. Other impacts that have been highlighted in the one-year project review of FCD include the following:

• HM Treasury reports that it found the project a valuable contribution to preparations for SR 2004, which ensured the continuation in the high level of funding for flood management allocated in SR 2002. This was originally intended as a short-term increase following flooding in 2000. Defra has also enhanced the FCD methodology to use more recent data sets to improve accuracy and resolution. The results of this will provide a basis for the 2006 Spending Review.

• The Association of British Insurers (ABI) used the scenarios developed by the project to develop projections of flood risk in the 2080s for their report Making Communities Sustainable. The ABI has also formalised its cooperation with Defra as a result of the project.

• A Foresight FCD project team and the science experts organised a trip to China at the request of the Chinese, who are very interested in developing a similar project for their own use. Further trips to Russia and India are planned.

• A commercial science publisher is working towards the publication of updated versions of the project’s analysis as a book, which should provide a valuable resource and reference for further research.

The project generated considerable interest in the media, with 21 articles in the national press referring to the report in the period from April to July 2004. There were 37 articles in regional and local newspapers and 20 articles in journals or on websites. The project featured as headline number three on the national TV news of the day. This extensive press coverage has been useful for disseminating the projects central findings to the public. The final reports included maps demonstrating possible changes in flood risk according to various metrics by area of the country (England and Wales). These proved to be an excellent way of communicating the key messages from the project.

A2.5 Longer-term impacts Action is still moving forward, and Defra anticipates that Foresight will continue to feed into its review of policy for some years to come. It was emphasised by one interviewee in Defra that Foresight’s policy impacts would not be instantaneous and that anyone who

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thinks this is being unrealistic. Moreover, FCD is a very big target area and there are a lot of unknowns associated with the topic. Instead, the impact of Foresight will be continuous as policy makers return to the route map set out in the reports. In this way, Foresight provides a sort of reservoir that decision makers can keep going back to. It is not considered to provide the detail, however, but is more visionary. Defra and other users will therefore need to develop the knowledge base further before they can incorporate FCD’s messages into policy and strategy.

A2.6 Appropriateness / Positioning The FCD project was first proposed by Sir David King at a meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Science Policy in December 2001. Several interviewees suggested that the choice of project reflects the CSA’s interest in climate change. Defra agreed to formally sponsor the project, particularly as it was a significant programme and not piecemeal as it could have been if Defra has done it alone. Despite the initial link with climate change, it soon became apparent that FCD is concerned with a much wider agenda encompassing things like economic development, expectations of the population, environmental governance, and so on. People perhaps did not see this at first, but Foresight quickly showed that FCD is a bigger issue than just climate change, and much more complex than people had perceived. According to one interviewee in Defra, this is one of the main reasons why Foresight will continue to be a useful resource for a long time to come. One interviewee questioned the appropriateness of the Action Plan. Whilst accepting the argument for an Action Plan that binds people to the project, it was suggested that perhaps too many actors had been included. Here, reference was made to Foresight’s role in informing Government policy. According to this interviewee, the inclusion of private sector actors in the Action Plan was potentially diversionary. Clearly, FCD was not starting from square one – it was an area with a strong existing knowledge base and an understanding of the main drivers. But there were questions that needed to be answered. Also, there was already a strong connected community around the topic, but Foresight is considered to have contributed to strengthening it. The main benefit, however, is that the project has brought everything together in one place and given it a focus. This is unique and has led to interest in other countries such as the Netherlands, China, Japan, the US and India. This focus has proved useful to specialists and stakeholders in the area, but also to non-specialists who now have a greater awareness of the changing risks associated with flooding. As for value added specifically for Defra, its long-term strategy on flooding would have happened anyway, but Foresight provided a useful reservoir and a long-term strategic framework that additional work could operate in and be complementary to. Also Foresight has made a formal engagement with consultation more than the other research programmes in Defra, drawing information from a wider range of academics and picking up an overall range of views. The results of FCD demonstrated to Defra that there is more to think about than they previously thought. Foresight was making connections not

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really thought about previously, providing an holistic view to sets of issues that were previously treated separately.

A2.7 Value for money? There was wide agreement that the project, though costly when compared to other Foresight projects, had provided excellent value for money. As already highlighted, the UK spends hundreds of millions of pounds every year on flood and coastal defence. As a result of FCD, Government agencies and other stakeholders concerned with the issue have started to think differently about flood defence, and have a better understanding of the problem. With this achievement, the price tag of £1m represents very good value. From a programme perspective, OST got substantive amounts of work for free – the project manager estimated a figure of £2 million of research for £1 million spent. Substantial amounts of help were offered by Defra and the Environment Agency, something OST did not have to pay for. Also, Flood Ranger cost just £20K to develop, described as “an absolute bargain” given its extensive subsequent use.

A2.8 Overall comments This was one of the first of the new style projects to be organised by Foresight, and mistakes were inevitable. It seems that the OST under-estimated the scale of the task they had set themselves at the start, at least partly on account of unfamiliarity with the topic area. Some interviewees suggested that Defra could have been more effectively engaged in the beginning to avoid some of the false-starts experienced. Things got easier for OST once the project team was fully in place and the experts were engaged in Phase 1 of the project. However, the project continued to spiral in costs and the amount of time needed for completion. Some interviewees have suggested that this experience has led OST to be more careful in keeping in check the pressures for project scope to expand as projects unfold. It has also been suggested that subsequent Foresight projects have been more strictly bounded in their costs and duration and have not attempted to undertake such an ambitious analysis. Despite these problems, the project can only be considered a success. It has been widely praised for its approach and has already had significant impacts on Government policy. Moreover, it laid the foundation for similar cross-departmental cooperation on Foresight’s current projects. The strong support from the lead minister was very important, whilst close working links with Defra meant that the Foresight team could rely on their commitment to the project. Much of the success of the project also relied upon the dedication of the project team and high-class science experts, who put in a lot of extra time to bring it to launch.

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A3 Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention A3.1 Aim and Objectives The stated aim of the Foresight project on Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention (CTCP) was to explore the application and implications of next generation information technologies in areas such as identity and authenticity, surveillance, system robustness, security and information assurance and the basis for effective interaction and trust between people and machines. The project started in March 2003 and launched its findings in June 2004. Its objectives were fivefold; to:

• Produce state-of-the-art reviews of relevant areas of science; • Set out visions of the future that define a range of possible outcomes; • Identify possible drivers, opportunities, threats, barriers to progress and models

for decision-making; • Create networks of scientists, business people and policy makers that can act on

the findings to influence the future; and • Set out some specific key challenges and engage all those that can take

them forward. The Home Office was the lead department for the project, which cost £486K.

A3.2 Process The overall project process is outlined in the diagram below. Two lead experts (a social scientist and an information systems expert) were appointed, and played a key role in project design and development. A consultation exercise and deskwork first identified a large number of subjects relevant to the project. In an initial workshop in May 2003, participants from research, industry and government departments examined these and suggested priorities for work that were used to scope CTCP. Other workshops then discussed topics further, and RAND Europe reviewed other Foresight studies bearing on the domain. The Advisory Group also made proposals. In consequence, ten themes were selected for Science Reviews. These included not only Information Systems work, but ranged also across disciplines bearing on crime and trust such as philosophy, economics and psychology. The review papers were subjected to peer review, and the two key experts prepared an extensive Synthesis Paper drawing on these reviews. According to the project report, over 45 scientists, and 260 experts overall, were involved during the project; modes of involvement ranged from reviewing papers through to writing them, and participating in workshops.

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CTCP Project Process

A3.3 Outputs According to the Foresight website, the main outputs were:

• A detailed science evidence base for assessment of future opportunities and risks; • A broad community with a shared understanding of what the future risks might be

and key steps we should take now to reduce those risks and maximise the benefits we gain from these advances; and

• A set of three scenarios which allow those with policy responsibility to check their strategies for robustness against possible future cyber crime risks.

The ten Science Reviews were well-received, and are seen as having influenced the way in which subsequent projects have gone about their work. The consultants prepared a high-quality and substantial (over 100 pages) – but readable – synthesis of these Reviews, which forms the core of a book that has now been published. An extensive Technology Forward Look was also prepared, along with a detailed Scenario Report (Gaining Insight from Three Different Futures). Other material is also available on the project website, and is remarkable for the breadth of issues considered in lucid and informative fashion. As befits Foresight, this is not in the main new research, but an articulation of the state of the art in a series of fields that bear heavily on each other, but that have been poorly integrated in the past. A major conclusion of the project was that there are no purely technological solutions. With increasingly complex and interdependent technological and social systems: “it becomes even harder to predict how systems might fail, or what the consequences of failure might be.” Establishing trustworthy systems will require new forms of

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governance, initiatives in terms of monitoring and responding to crime and new criminal opportunities, and in terms of training, and using social research on risk and social learning. Given these conclusions, a clear implication of the project is that issues of CTCP require

A3.4 Immediate Impacts al generated in the scientific reviews is impressive, and

another immediate output of the study, the Executive Summary of the Project Results,

“I have found the role of chair of the stakeholder group a fascinating and

A3.5 Longer Term Impacts project will only be verifiable after the passage of

closer integration of social sciences and engineering. This in turn suggests that the success of the project in the long-term will be largely a matter of the extent to which the building of “a community with a shared understanding” has been achieved.

The quality and quantity of materithe further dissemination of the work through a commercial publication is welcome. However, there is some feeling that the OST was rather too keen to hand determination of follow-up activity over to stakeholders at this point. Inthere is a clear indication of the engagement of senior policymakers in the CTCP process and of intentions to use its results. In the Preface to this report, Hazel Blears (Home Office Minister for Crime Reduction, Policing, Community Safety and Counter-Terrorism) wrote:

illuminating experience. … The investigations spanned the technical and social issues related to the use of networked systems and were informed by leading experts in the fields under consideration. The analysis of the issues was well informed and often thought-provoking. … As a non-scientist I have never before had the opportunity to work with such an eminent group of scientists to discuss these issues. It has added to my capability as a Minister by giving me direct insight into how science needs to be central to strategic policy matters. …. The issues raised by the project are both challenging and of great importance to our society. … The report sets our a number of challenges for the future and I am particularly interested in how we can all work together to ensure the UK obtains the maximum benefit from this new technology whilst minimising its misuse.” (Project Executive Summary, p4)

While the long-term impacts of thetime, a number of activities noted in the one-year review as having followed the launch of the CTCP reports point to efforts to affect such impacts, and in some cases suggest the creation of ongoing momentum. However, while not discounting the likelihood of real impacts from CTCP, our interviews suggest that there has been some “re-branding” of ongoing initiatives under the CTCP banner. Similarly, some of the impacts that are cited appear to be more in the nature of ambitions than achievements. Some of the impacts

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cited in the one-year report have been excluded from the discussion below on these grounds. In terms of informing government policy in general, mention is made of workshops

ther impacts cited in the one-year report include an Industrial Research Forum held by a

urther activities through the Research Councils, which have agreed to fund a network

here are many indications of progress in terms of shifting policy assumptions away

ome informants suggested that the policy impacts of the project may have been limited

using the project scenarios in the areas of road user charging, data protection, civil contingencies and offender tracking, led by four different departments. Specific mention is also made of CTCP being helpful to Home Office work on the definition of fraud, the Council for Science and Technology work on better use of personal datasets across government, and the Cabinet Office’s development of a Strategy for Information Assurance. The DTI Innovation Group is reported to have made cybersecurity a priority proposal for one of its two first new Knowledge Transfer Networks, presumably in large part due to CTCP. This would be a contribution to establishing cross-sectoral networks; other activities with such an orientation include CTCP involvement with events of the Information Assurance Advisory Council, the British Computer Society, and the Institution of Electrical Engineers. Onumber of leading IT companies, leading to recommendations for cross-disciplinary research and development of appropriate professional skills, and efforts at public engagement involving in one case two firms, and in the other the Royal Society (which organised “a public dialogue on cyber trust and information security”). Fbridging the social science and engineering communities, have developed more slowly than expected. This seems to have been largely due to illness and other commitments on the part of the key consultants, and action here remains on the cards. There is a danger that the networks established during the course of the project may have dissipated due to the slow pace of follow-up activity. Whether awareness has been effectively spread among much wider communities than those involved directly in these networks is also unclear; there are suggestions that (despite the existence of networks among computer scientists and engineers interested in such issues) there is still much work to do to make CTCP an integral part of the considerations that enter the design of new technologies and organisational innovations. Tfrom a “technology fix” approach and toward a more sophisticated recognition of the interplay of social and technological issues. It is also claimed that the project raised the profile of the issue among senior decision-makers in the corporate sector. Within Whitehall, after some delay, the Home Office is now using CTCP outputs in the formulation of Identity Card policy. The Department for Transport is also reported as having been sufficiently impressed by its involvement with CTCP that it was willing to sponsor the subsequent Intelligent Infrastructure Systems project. Sor delayed by factors beyond the control of CTCP itself. For example, the turn-over of Home Office ministers had made implementation and follow-up of results and

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conclusions more difficult than anticipated. Doubt was expressed as to whether, for instance, messages about the need for public engagement had been adequately taken on board. Some stakeholders had expressed concerns about this during the preparation of the one-year review, and reported that efforts to address these problems were subsequently put in place.

A3.6 Appropriateness / Positioning r countries that we (and the CTCP team)

“Cyber Trust is an important issue identified in broad domains such as ICT

ture dependability, protection,

ion to scope is the need to integrate

Prevention was not often explicitly mentioned in the studies

scope is the need to integrate work on

he main contribution to the field, however, is the UK’s own Foresight Crime Prevention

There has been little systematic work in othehave been able to locate. The topic of security has been the subject of some “futures” studies since 9/11. RAND Europe (2003) prepared a report early on in the course of the CTCP project, entitled Cyber Trust & Crime Prevention: Foresight Overview, which did identify seventeen relevant earlier futures studies and draw lessons from these. None of these studies explicitly characterised the domain in the same way as did CTCP, and that the issues addressed by this project cut across those taken up in both narrower and broader studies. RAND Europe concluded that:

futures and national risk assessments. There is a commonly expressed concern both that failures in or malicious attacks on cyber-dependent infrastructures will threaten public safety and well being and that vulnerabilities in the wider information infrastructures will undermine trust and confidence in the Information Society.

The detailed futures work on infrastrucassurance and security provides a fairly comprehensive account of technological and application trends, drivers, risks and socio-technical requirements. In some cases, it has mapped these requirements to gaps in particular communities (e.g. UK, US or European research bases) and produced prioritised R&D plans.

The main gap evident in relattechnological R&D planning with wider policy, societal and legal needs and R&D.

Crime examined. Instead, work in the area of cyber trust did address “designing in security / assurance / dependability” and attack prevention. Meanwhile, work in the area of crime fighting or counter-terrorism addressed prevention as one of several application areas.

The main gap evident in relation tocrime prevention with work on designing in dependability / assurance / security.” (pp 16-17)

TPanel that ran between 1999 and 2002. This Panel produced a set of scenarios and a wide-ranging review and set of recommendations – taking a broader look at crime than

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the current “cyber” focus. The EPSRC’s programme on Crime Prevention and Detection Technologies was in part inspired by this Foresight work. This in turn influenced EPSRC recommendations to Foresight concerning what projects should be undertaken in the round that led to CTCP. The earlier project also recommended that the Home Office (lead department for CTCP) should develop a strategy for e-crime. It is evident that substantial new challenges are emerging in consequence to social and technological development, and there is thus a need for Foresight as well as other types of work in this field. This makes the lack of focused attention in other countries’ programmes rather surprising.

A3.7 Value for money? atenation of eminent social sciences and information

A3.8 Overall Comments articipants as well-organised and achieving valuable

ontinuing effort will be required to ensure that the lessons of CTCP are embedded to

CTCP achieved a unique concsystem researchers, bringing their knowledge to bear on an important domain. The outputs provided striking evidence about the value of this approach in demonstrating the social and economic importance of the topic, and the needs for further research to anticipate and mitigate emergent problems. This would not have been possible without the recruitment of respected and well-networked experts, who were able to draw upon personal contacts in mobilising contributors and participants in CTCP. (One reservation about this is that the selection of participants may have been unconsciously limited by these networks. There are also suggestions that the Foresight team may have discouraged involvement of certain more radical orientations to questions of cybersecurity.) The project was able to draw on social capital to enhance its financial resources. Assessing overall value for money is complicated by the wide range of stakeholders associated with the CTCP issues, but the project appears to have made contributions that are highly relevant across this range. The scenario work was seen as providing a useful framework for highlighting and capturing the intertwining of social and technological issues.

This project was regarded by presults. State of the art science reviews and useful integrative frameworks were produced, and a large number of experts brought into greater understanding of issues and approaches that need to be articulated if we are to successfully confront critical challenges of the Information Society. Cwider, and more lasting, policy effect. Similarly, continuing effort will be required to achieve long-lasting and broader impacts on the research community. These impacts may have been limited to date by contingencies that would be hard to plan for, but it is not too late to build further on the substantial work that has already been done.

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A4 Exploiting the Electromagnetic Spectrum A4.1 Aims and Objectives The electromagnetic spectrum encompasses much scientific research and is the basis for a wide range of vitally important technologies that have applications in areas as diverse as communications, health and security. Whilst the UK has a long history of world-leading research across the electromagnetic spectrum, it has not always moved from invention to innovation to reap the commercial rewards from its discoveries. Therefore taking an innovation focus, the aims of the Exploiting the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EEMS) Foresight project were to:

• identify key areas of long-term commercial opportunity across the electromagnetic spectrum;

• assess these against UK capabilities; and • agree a plan of action to help the UK exploit these areas.

With its innovation remit, the project was sponsored by the DTI’s Innovation Group. It started in March 2003 and its findings and action plan were launched in April 2004. The project cost was £380K.

A4.2 Process The project process is outlined in the diagram below. In common with other Foresight projects, the EEMS project started with a scoping phase, which was based around two workshops. The first workshop brought together a small group of scientists from business and academia, and focused upon “science push” issues. It identified around 20 areas of research with application potential. The second workshop brought together a much larger group of business and user representatives and focused on “market pull” issues for the technologies identified by the first workshop. This resulted in a shortlist of nine topics where there was felt to be both a clear market demand, and hence exploitation opportunity, and a strong UK research base from which to start. A further ‘sifting’ of this shortlist of nine projects was carried out according to (a) future economic prospects and innovation potential; (b) the UK’s ability to exploit the area; and (c) a balanced portfolio that covered the full range of the electromagnetic spectrum. Four areas were subsequently identified:

• All-optical data handling • Photonics at the molecular level • Electromagnetics in the near field • Non-intrusive imaging

Action groups for each of these topic areas were convened to identify the technical challenges and business opportunities, and to develop plans for action. Members were

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drawn from business, academia, user communities, government and other agencies, and numbered more that 60 across the four topic areas.

The first action group meetings focused upon potential applications and their underpinning technologies. Drawing upon state of the science reviews for each topic area, the action groups developed detailed “technology timelines”, mapping out the intermediate steps needed to deliver a few exemplar applications. A second set of action group workshops focused on selecting the most promising markets and applications for the UK to exploit, and identifying actions to help the UK realise these opportunities. These drew upon an assessment of the potential market size for the applications identified as offering the greatest potential. The groups also considered competition both from other countries and other technologies in meeting the demand, and the investment costs needed to get to market. They were assisted in their selections by an easy-to-use real options tool that allows a broad comparison of potential returns from investment in different areas of research. This was developed by researchers at Manchester Business School specifically for use in the project. Reflecting on the process, a number of problems have been highlighted. To begin with, the workshops in the scoping phase did not use professional facilitators, which made life very hard for the OST project team, as they had to facilitate themselves. Also, the project team was appointed to the project after the process had started, making it hard for them to get to grips with what was an ongoing project. In fact, most problems reported with the project are related to the tight time schedule (13 months). For instance, there was insufficient time to sequence activities as the project team would have liked, which was frustrating. One example of this was the ‘late’ arrival of the real options model, which was needed earlier in the process. There was also insufficient opportunity for the four action groups to come together to discuss overlapping areas.

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A4.3 Outputs The project produced a review of the current state of science for each of the four primary topic areas chosen. Alongside the science, the groups created a number of one-page ‘roadmaps’ for key areas within each topic (with the assistance of road-mapping experts at the University of Cambridge), which illustrated the steps that would need to be taken over the next 15 years to develop the technology for the identified applications. The science reviews were condensed into overviews and published with the project findings, analysis and an executive summary. The project was unique in setting out tables that indicate the initial investment costs and a best guess of the UK market share of five of the EEMS subject areas. The project concluded that significant amounts would need to be spent in these science areas in order to benefit from the potential returns from related technologies. Moreover, the time scale for this development was seen as short in some cases, for example, six years for low cost security imaging. Such monetary assessments were meant to be provocative, highlighting the scale of future opportunities and the levels of investment required in the near-future. One interviewee described them as “defendable numbers” to convince the DTI of the area’s importance, whilst another considered them unwelcome and dismissed them as “pet-subject positioning”. The OST also commissioned two science writers to write Tales from the Future, a set of science-fiction stories taking the project topics as their inspiration. Whilst this was a novel way of communicating the future visions from the project to non-experts in a more easily-accessible way, the stories do not really focus on the specific applications coming out of the project. According to one interviewee, the science writers should have been brought to the workshops to talk more with the scientists. This did not happen due to timing problems. Finally, an Action Plan was published calling upon several actors to take specific steps to follow-up on the project. Amongst those expected to act were the DTI’s Innovation Group, the MoD, the Research Councils, NPL, and Foresight. Actions were mostly short-term and measurable, and in the one-year review of EEMS published in mid-2005, many of the actions had already been completed.

A4.4 Immediate Impacts After its launch in April 2004, Foresight passed responsibility for the project to DTI Innovation Group. Foresight continued to provide support on completing Action Plan commitments, mostly through the organisation and funding of events. Around one-tenth of the project budget was spent in this after-case phase by the OST (£36k from a total budget of £346k). As the sponsor of the project, the DTI was expected to use its results. In the April 2004 competition of the DTI Technology Programme for collaborative R&D, two projects

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were funded directly relevant to the EEMS project, with a combined value of £1.6m. They both proposed to develop terahertz (THz) sensor imaging technology to detect concealed plastic explosives, firearms, drugs and other objects. The project’s findings also influenced the choice of bids submitted to the Technology Strategy Board, with the November 2004 competition of the Technology Programme supporting, among other areas, (a) opto-electronics and disruptive electronics and (b) imaging technologies. The support available to each area was worth approximately £7m. The April 2005 competition of the DTI Technology Programme has supported a further EEMS relevant topic, covering next generation lasers in manufacturing, healthcare and security with £5m available to support successful proposals. Finally, a Knowledge Transfer Network has also been set up around the area of photonics and is expected to continue to feed in ideas for projects to the Technology Programme. Despite this success, some qualification is required. Terahertz was the main area picked up from EEMS by the Technology Programme, and whilst others were already promoting and supporting the area, it was Foresight that gave it the push for DTI to include it. Yet, the response from the community to the calls was below DTI’s expectations, suggesting that it is an area still someway off readiness for commercialisation. As for the other areas highlighted by EEMS, many of these were noted but were not taken up as explicitly as the terahertz work. Indeed, for most of this work, even if Foresight is mentioned as having been instrumental, the Technology Programme would have probably included the area anyway. More generally, the DTI’s Technology Programme uses Foresight reports for ideas, but many of these are considered “way-out” in terms of their commercialisation horizon and are therefore of limited interest. So, DTI keeps abreast of Foresight, but it is just one of many inputs they use to identify new areas to support. In the near future, it is likely that new calls will be announced that will have drawn inspiration from the BSAD and possibly IIS projects. As for the Research Councils, the EPSRC already funds significant amounts of work in the area. Photonics is especially well represented, and it is reported that EEMS has informed the EPSRC ‘Electrophotonics’ £6M programme though to what extent is unclear. Another organisation named in the Action Plan is the MoD, which is reported to be still engaged with EEMS but which has yet to make progress in meeting its target. Finally, Library House was employed by Foresight to help take the EEMS project findings to the venture capital community. Findings were presented to 17 venture capitalists and 15 industry representatives. The feedback received from those who attended was very positive and the events provided an excellent forum for discussion. However, the general feeling was that it was too early for the venture capital community to show much interest in the area, given that much of the science remains unproven, and the technologies have still to be developed. This view is broadly in line with the point made by the DTI Technology Programme highlighted above.

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A4.5 Longer-term impacts Whilst it is too early to look for longer-term impacts, a striking feature of the Action Plan for EEMS is the largely short-term nature of the actions being suggested. This no doubt reflects the limited after-care that has been offered by OST in support of dissemination and implementation activities following the completion of projects. Most of the actions suggested are therefore quite specific and are expected to be achieved in a relatively short time, usually less than one year. The emphasis is upon others to take things forward. The DTI has done this to some extent, although many opportunities are believed to remain unexploited due to DTI budget cuts. It is widely appreciated that self-sustaining networks need to be built for Foresight messages to be further developed and implemented. Despite the project receiving strong support from all those involved, the one-year project review concludes that the short duration of the project (13 months instead of the usual 18) did not allow sufficient time to generate self-sustaining networks. This view was also shared by some of our interviewees, who recommended that self-sustaining network-building should be an explicit aim of all Foresight projects. It was acknowledged that Foresight is already successful in starting the process, but needs to be active long enough for the networks to gel and for momentum to be built. There has been some small scale investment in the creation of networks, for example, in photonics, although this area was already relatively well-networked beforehand. Nevertheless, it is hoped that such networks could create a community that would seek to capture a share of some of the market opportunities identified. However, at this stage, there are no plans of action or significant investments in any of the areas identified. Related to this last point, the one-year review of EEMS complains that “There do not appear to be any Government mechanisms which could be approached and quickly mobilised to make significant investment in long-term speculative science and technology-driven market opportunities. The investment community in the UK does not appear to be geared up to take advantage of these opportunities.” Finally, the real options tool developed for the project has sparked considerable interest, with the Council for Science and Technology (CST) conducting a review of its possible wider use to R&D decision making in the public sector.

A4.6 Appropriateness / Positioning Whilst the UK has a strong science base in this area, the project was funded on the premise that more needs to be done to convert this strength into new markets and commercial opportunities. The project was partially successful in highlighting the need for investments today, but with significant uncertainly (on science, technology, and markets) still surrounding the opportunities that might be available in the future, the private sector showed less interest than was hoped for in supporting follow-up activities today.

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As for influencing government policy – which is the main rationale for the other Foresight projects – the project had limited impact, as was anticipated. The DTI has used the results in its Technology Programme, but if given the choice, might have chosen other areas to carry out a foresight analysis on. OFCOM has also taken up the results and its Spectrum Advisory Board is looking at future regulatory implications of some of the anticipated developments over the coming 10-20 years.

A4.7 Value for money? The project budget was around £350k excluding departmental salaries. This is relatively cheap compared to the other projects, but does reflect the shorter timescale. Interviewees considered the project to be good value, citing the voluntary participation of high-calibre individuals, the enthusiasm and commitment of those involved, and the high scientific quality of the state of the science reviews. However, there must be a question mark over whether a little more time and money could have led to more follow-on activities and ultimately to more significant impacts.

A4.8 Overall comments Although it was possible to deliver the project to the shorter timetable of 13 months, rather than the usual 18, this did not allow sufficient time to generate self-sustaining networks. The shorter timescale also put considerable pressure on the team and the project process. As with the other Foresight projects, there is unanimity that more attention needs to be paid to the ‘aftercare’ of projects.

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A5 Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs A5.1 Aims and Objectives After some discussions, the project’s main question was defined as follows: “How can we manage the use of psychoactive substances in the future to the best advantage for the individual, the community and society?” Three sub-questions underpinned the subsequent work:

What will be the psychoactive substances of the future? (and: What motivates people to use them; Why some people are resistant/vulnerable to addiction, effectiveness of treatment, resilience to relapse?)

•

What are the effects of using psychoactive substances? • What mechanisms do we have to manage the use of psychoactive substances? •

The project considered the social and economic futures in which use of psychoactive substances might be set, including visions of changes in activities available to the individual, community and society for leisure, cognition enhancement and mental health. In order to examine these, it was intended to investigate what substances would be available in future, why would people use them, and their effects on the individual, including beneficial and harmful effects of use, addiction, treatment, and relapse. What mechanisms may be available to manage their use, ethical and economic questions, as well as perspectives from individual, community and social perspectives were also to be analysed. The project got underway proper in March 2004, with the first of two scoping workshops. Its findings were launched more than a year later in July 2005. The project’s lead department was the Department of Health, and it cost around £450K to deliver.

A5.2 Process The Henley Centre was commissioned in September 2003 to undertake a 3-month study of the ‘Brain Science and Drugs’ area, which identified research topics and named experts who could be approached to assist the proposed study. Several were invited to join the project as scientific experts. Meetings of these experts resulted in the addition of ‘Addiction’ to the major theme of the project. Three expert scientific advisors were employed, coming from different disciplines: psychopharmacology, experimental psychology, and health sociology. Each stakeholder was individually briefed about Foresight in meetings with Foresight team members, and the results of discussions reported back at the first Stakeholder Group meeting in May 2004. This, together with the Henley results, were presented at two Workshops held in March and April 2004 and involved more than 40 scientists from a wide range of disciplinary backgrounds. The purpose was to discuss the appropriate scope of the project, science and technology drivers, and which key areas would require reviews. The resulting material was organised using an ‘Issue Tree’ that identified the structure for eight brief state of science reviews. After further discussions this was

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increased to fifteen. These reviews ranged from medical sciences to the social sciences and humanities. The science experts subsequently carried out horizon scanning, which was integrated by the science writer retained by the Foresight office. This also resulted in the production of a matrix of four alternative scenarios of possible futures based on two axes: Life enhancement / Life preservation and Evidence-based regulation / View-based regulation. A further report was commissioned which gathered the views of the pharmaceuticals industry regarding the field.

The process was generally praised. The involvement of experts and other stakeholders such as the pharmaceuticals companies worked well. However some criticisms were made. For example, some elements of the plan were carried out in parallel (workshops and scenarios), and this led to a lack of integration between parts. The main timing problem was due to the late delivery of the state-of-science reports from academic experts. The launch was also six months late, mainly due to this. The planned contingency margin was entirely used up for this reason.

A5.3 Outputs The first substantial outputs from the project were the state of science reports, which can be used as reference works for each of the fields covered. The other major identified outputs were the project overview reports, the horizon scanning reports, the scenarios work, etc. The outputs are considered to have been well written, and are presented in easily digestible form for stakeholders.

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Following completion of the project, the Action Plan was not published and the reports were referred by the sponsoring ministry to the Academy of Medical Sciences for review. Opinions on the reason for this varied: the ‘official’ reason is that the Academy is going to examine implications of the project for future health policy. This is to be welcomed if it leads to policy relevant advice being given based upon evidence. However, the fact that the Health Minister did not attend the project’s launch event was interpreted by some interviewees as unease in the Department of Health as to the project’s controversial subject matter. The referral to the Academy also raised the suspicion that the project was being “kicked into the long grass”, particularly as the review timetable is scheduled for one year. The evaluation was unable to assess the validity of these suspicions. However, it was clear from interviews that stakeholders are unlikely to allow the messages in the BSAD reports to fade away, even if it is the case that the project’s evidence may be difficult for Ministers, or their civil servants, to fully endorse at the present time.

A5.4 Immediate Impacts Several interviewees considered that the MRC was likely to initiate some activity in the area, partly due to the project. The MRC was seen to be very supportive of the work, with the MRC CEO being a member of the Steering Group, and also being represented on the Advisory Group. The Home Office also supported the work with high-level representation, and showed a desire to further the science underlying future policy decisions, despite being in the difficult position of responsibility for policing drug legislation. The work identified possible contradictions in current policy, with current and possible future developments in the field, which could create difficult situations for policy makers here. The Home Office advisory council on misuse of drugs has already used the outputs. The methods of Foresight may well be appropriate for other work in the medical area, such as anti-social behaviour, within the Home Office. One reason given was that focusing on future uncertainties avoided the tendency for individuals to defend entrenched positions on past and current issues, so the methods were worth exploiting as a general policy making tool. Newspaper and media coverage was considered to be a particularly successful aspect of the project, with stories featured in several leading national newspapers. Many presentations of the project have been made in the UK and elsewhere, for example a public event at the Royal Institution, and a presentation to the NIH in the USA.

A5.5 Longer-term Impacts Given that the project was launched only in July 2005, the view of those interviewed was that it is too early to speculate on longer-term impacts.

A5.6 Appropriateness / Positioning The topic area addressed by the BSAD project is notable for several reasons. In particular it is a sensitive area for the public and for politicians. In addition, there is a

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broad range of sub-topics that are strongly connected, yet with no general agreement as to inclusion. Potential stakeholders give different interpretations to the word ‘drug’. For example, the scoping meetings and early discussions felt that present legal drugs (alcohol and tobacco) should be included in the study. These were left out, either to narrow the focus of the work, or to avoid sensitivities. It is important to outline the nature of the community that addresses the issues identified by the project. Interviewees described the field as fragmented. The size of the addiction research community in the UK is remarkably small considering the importance of the issue, though in some areas it is at the leading edge of research, and this seems also to be the case for other areas, including the ethics of drug use, and neurosciences. All of these are dwarfed by the effort in the USA. The specialised US agency in the field, the NIDA, has a similar budget to the UK MRC’s total budget. In addition, there seemed to be little regular contact between the different disciplines concerned. Concerning the field in general, there was universal agreement that the issues addressed were particularly appropriate for a Foresight project. There is an expectation that we will see a surge in the production of psychoactive drugs in the next few years that will create dilemmas for policy makers. These will have different characteristics to presently known substances, with the possibility of few harmful side effects, yet with far reaching social and economic impacts. In an already sensitive political sphere, it will be necessary to make decisions regarding these substances and also existing legal substances, which may be difficult, but are unavoidable. The evidence that will be essential in making policy comes from a broad range of sources: medical and psychiatric, economic and social, as well as ethical and moral. In this interdisciplinary domain, a Foresight project is well suited to contribute valuable contributions. The advances identified by the project, in brain science and in development (or non-development8) of drugs, and resulting changes in social and political attitudes, will inevitably lead to a reassessment of legal and regulatory frameworks to control use and minimise harms. Interviewees concurred that these considerations made BSAD an ideal subject for Foresight activity. There has been no previous work for at least 10 years, either in the UK or the rest of the world, with the coverage of the area. This Foresight project has been described as world leading, evidenced by the invitations to present results in other parts of the EU and in the USA. Moreover, a leading US commentator, Peter Reuter (University of Maryland), was asked by OST to review the work, and considered it a superb piece of work, which could not have been carried out in the US, and which would have an impact in the US. He already used it as source material. He also suggested areas he would have liked the project to look further at – the flows of trade in illicit drugs and the economic drivers of its production and sale and how these might change.

8 For example the non-development of less harmful alternatives to alcohol, which is apparently now feasible.

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A5.7 Value for Money The OST gave an approximate figure of about £450K for the project, not including OST costs. For this, they considered, they got the best people, produced high quality science, and produced the results in a short (18 month) space of time, receiving very good media coverage as well. Thus it was good value for money. Outside the OST, those interviewed generally declined to assess value due to difficulties of quantification and comparison, and because more time must elapse before assessing impacts. However, everyone interviewed considered that the high quality of the work presented sufficient justification for the project costs. The management of the project was universally praised in the highest terms. In particular, the personal commitment, enthusiasm, professionalism and hard work of the Foresight staff were singled out. Almost all the interviewees also mentioned the work of the external experts and other participants. This factor was identified on so many occasions (for this and the other projects examined) that it must be considered an important feature in the success of the project. The project gained from the experience of previous third round projects. In addition, the external contributors to the project often mentioned how much they enjoyed the experience of working with other experts, the Foresight team, and the use of the Foresight method. Several mentioned that they are involved in further Foresight work, or would like to use the methods again. Previous rounds of Foresight have produced some unconvinced observers, but this round seems to have converted many within the public service and outside it, of the value of such work. Press comment has been positive and has disseminated information about the project, and also has been in keeping with the purpose of the project, which is remarkable considering the possible perspectives in the field. The presence of a dedicated journalist attached to the project seems to have greatly assisted in this.

A5.8 Overall Comments There is little doubt that the BSAD project was well chosen. It addressed a fast changing and fragmented area of technological advance in which policy and regulatory choices will have to be made in the near future, with considerable impacts on society and the economy. Therefore the aim of providing evidence for policy makers was clearly appropriate. The activities of the project were well managed by the Foresight team, the experts fulfilled their roles, and the documentation produced seems to be of high quality and presented in a way that disseminates its outcomes in a readable way to non-specialists. The quality of documentation and availability through the Foresight website has been first class. The ‘Big Question’ for the project and for Foresight in general will be how far its outputs will influence policy makers in the near future, and it is too early to assess this. Clearly this project was well chosen, managed and produced high quality outputs. Though it is stressed that Foresight work is not intended to recommend policies, it is intended to provide an evidence base upon which policy may be designed. However excellent its process and outputs, these will not have been exploited to the full if sensitivity about the field of addiction prevents appropriate policy responses. If that were to happen it could

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raise doubts over the utility of a ‘Foresight’ type of evidence gathering in anything other than non-controversial areas. Therefore the outcomes of this project could be considered to be crucial in determining the nature of future Foresight work, particularly with regards to the selection of topics and planned impact routes.

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A6 Ongoing Projects A6.1 Detection and Identification of Infectious Diseases

A6.1.1 Aim and Objectives The aim of the Detection and Identification of Infectious Diseases (DIID) project is to produce a challenging long-term vision of the detection and identification of infectious diseases in plants, animals and humans. This vision should take account of (i) the evolving risk of diseases, (ii) the changing user contexts and requirements for detection, identification and monitoring (DI&M), and (iii) cutting-edge science. The project aims to inform policy at national and international level. Infectious Diseases includes parasites and their vectors and fungal infections. It also includes both natural and man-made infection, diseases that cross species boundaries, and diseases that are presently benign, but that may have the potential to become more virulent in the future, e.g. through drug resistance. More specifically, the project aims to address the question “How can we use science and technology to improve our capability to detect, identify and monitor infectious diseases in order to better manage the risk from them?” In doing so, the project has attempted to:

• Take a broad look across plants, animals and humans, so as to stimulate cross-fertilisation between different fields of science;

• Consider international as well as national issues, with a focus on Africa and China;

• Look 10-75 years into the future depending on the particular aspect of the work, although from what we understand, the time horizon has mostly been in the 10-25 year range; and

• Build upon the best work by others in this area. The project got underway in September 2004 and is due to launch its findings in April 2006. It is being sponsored by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).

A6.1.2 Process The overall project process is summarised in the scheme below. The project began with the organisation of two scoping workshops in autumn 2004, bringing together around 100 leading academics and practitioners to explore the cross-fertilisation of ideas from diverse areas of science and technology, and to identify the key issues and questions that the project should address. The workshops sought to look 10-25 years into the future and to encourage expansive and radical thinking. Specifically, participants were asked to consider:

• the future risks for infectious diseases • the scientific, technological and societal drivers of future risk

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• future requirements of future users of detection and identification techniques • specific recommendations on the questions and issues the project should address • specific recommendations on the state of science reviews

At the outset, the project was split into two streams of work, one focusing upon scientific issues (with four expert coordinators drawn from medical, veterinary and plant sciences) and another on risk issues (led by a single expert coordinator). Between them, the two streams have commissioned a number of specialist reviews, which have been used in selecting future DI&M systems for further analysis, and to inform that work. These include reviews of the state of the science, reviews that set out a vision of future control of infectious diseases in plants, animals and humans, reviews that consider how issues of culture and governance affect the approach to DI&M (with a focus on case studies in the UK and Africa), and a review that draws out the principles and lessons from history that could inform future approaches to DI&M. In addition, the risk stream of the project has employed a Delphi survey involving experts from the UK and sub-Saharan Africa. This has been used to provide expert views on the size and nature of future risks, and the drivers of change in risk levels. The survey covered diseases in plants, animals and humans. This was followed up by a series of expert reviews on important issues identified from the Delphi – 15 of these have been done in all, looking at how socio-economic factors relate both to disease source and to

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one another. Finally, a series of influence diagrams that show how different drivers affect one another have been produced. The project may be able to use these to integrate all of the results emerging from the various activities that are still going on. Whilst some of this work was completed early on in the project, some of it continued into the summer 2005. Nevertheless, in April 2005, a workshop was held to identify which DI&M “User Challenges” offer the most benefit, and where the DIID project can add most value. It also sought to identify barriers to implementation (technical, social, cultural, institutional and any others), future solutions, and threats and opportunities for the selected User Challenges. The workshop was also an opportunity to identify key experts and organisations who should be involved in the development of more detailed ‘road maps’ to implementation in the latter half of the project. 50-60 leading experts drawn from Government, business, academic and professional bodies and stakeholders attended the workshop. As a result of the workshop, the following User Challenges were identified:

1. Novel information technology for the capture, analysis and modelling of data for the early detection of infectious disease events.

2. Early detection and characterisation of new or newly resistant/virulent pathogens using genomics and post genomics. This would require centralised facilities (i.e. in contrast to 3 below).

3. Taking technology for identification and characterisation of infectious diseases to individuals by designing smart swabs or hand-held devices that analyze fluids.

4. High throughput screening for infectious diseases of people, animals and plants using surrogate, non-invasive markers (e.g. electromagnetic radiation, volatiles), for example in airports, containers and livestock markets.

A similar workshop with similar aims was held again in August 2005 in Uganda. This was led by Africans and dealt with issues that are important for Africa. The sponsoring minister from Defra attended the workshop, along with 40-50 experts from across Africa and beyond. In the meantime, for each of the User Challenges identified in the UK workshop, focus groups have been established to further explore the issues. Each is led by one of the scientific expert coordinators, with a “champion” for each group drawn typically from the project’s Stakeholder Group (for example, the Chief Medical Officer, Liam Donaldson, champions the focus group on handheld devices). Getting such people to play this role is considered important for follow-up actions. The scientific experts are continuing to work together to ensure that a cross-view from the centre is taken into account by each of the focus groups. They are also endeavouring to include the risk and ethical work that has been produced by the other stream of the project. At the time of writing (late 2005), much of this work is still ongoing. There are other strands of work planned or ongoing as well, and these include the economic costing of disease outbreaks and pandemics (and by extension, the economic benefits of taking

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preventative action through early detection and identification), and the development of scenarios. In contrast to some other Foresight projects, scenarios are not at the forefront of the process being used in the DIID project. Rather, they are to be used mostly as presentational devices. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that they will serve an important function in helping to:

• demonstrate the uncertainty and variability in future risks which policy makers will need to address;

• paint vibrant pictures of what risks and drivers are most important in each of the cases - allowing comparisons to be made and key issues to be drawn out (including how the risks might be different in 2015 and 2030)

• allow the robustness of future DI&M systems to be tested against different futures.

As the project is still very much ongoing, many comments from interviewees tended to focus upon the process. For example, several interviewees highlighted the fact that the detailed approach being followed emerged through the process itself. In the words of one interviewee, “It was a fog in the beginning and many things have been done on the hoof.” But this was rarely viewed negatively. The scope and nature of the project demands such an evolutionary and emergent approach. Only in one case did an interviewee express concern that the Foresight team seemed to lack an overall feel or coherence of where the project was going, though even this comment was tempered by an acknowledgement of the challenge set by the breadth of the project. At some points, it is clear that the scope set at the start has been too broad to handle. For example, the focus on China has gradually slipped off the project’s agenda, on account of the time and effort needed to collect the necessary data. Africa has remained as a focus due to a number of factors, including the UK’s historical links to the continent, the Prime Minister’s Commission for Africa study, and the UK’s strong scientific standing in tropical medicine. This naturally leads to a discussion of resources available for the project. The Foresight team responsible for DIID had previously worked on the FCD project, where more time and money were available. This allowed them, for example, to spend more money on expert coordinators than they are able to do in the DIID project. According to the project leader, fewer resources on the DIID project has meant that his team in OST has had to do “much more of the running”, since the expert coordinators do not have the time bought out to be as active as they could be. This is not to say that the expert coordinators have not been very active. On the contrary, they appear to be putting in more hours than they are being paid for, leading one interviewee to comment that “OST don’t fully understand the extent of work needed to deliver what they’re asking for”. Moreover, they are all acknowledged leaders in their fields and are very well networked. Foresight has managed to successfully leverage their knowledge and their contacts, leading one interviewee to remark that “Foresight is hugely subsidised by the science community”. More than one interviewee mentioned Full Economic Costing (FEC) in the universities and thought that Foresight needed to take

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greater account of this when deciding how much to pay people for their time. On the other hand and as already highlighted, other interviewees thought that Foresight already paid “the going rate”. The evaluation has been unable to account for this difference of view, though it is apparent that the lead experts employed by the Programme typically provide more time and effort to their respective projects than they are paid for. Also, the issue of OST’s working style was highlighted by more than one interviewee, especially the short notice given for things to be done. This relates to the point above on the emergent style of the process. It means that the expert coordinators find themselves working in reactive mode more than they would like, and they also face practical challenges in getting senior people to attend meetings at short notice. But on balance, this style of working is considered to be acceptable – even if it does need some getting used to – and even inevitable with something like Foresight. As one interviewee put it, “It’s the nature of the beast – you have to be flexible.” And the Foresight team was universally praised for the amount and quality of support it provides. The Foresight team was also praised by interviewees for achieving a good coverage of stakeholders involved in the project. This demonstrated to them that a lot of homework had been done, along with a lot of thinking on the continuity of activities after the project’s launch, i.e. in ensuring follow-up. Given the international nature of the project, efforts have also been made to involve the likes of the Gates Foundation, FAO, WHO, etc., all of which have shown lots of interest. Keeping such organisations on board is considered to be critical given the international nature of many of the issues being explored in the project. Closer to home, the project also seems to have been successful in attracting the interest of key people in Government and the Research Councils. This is in part due to the standing of the expert coordinators, each having their own circle of contacts to draw upon. As one interviewee put it, “You need to be in the loop [i.e. well-networked] and always thinking ahead on ways you might exploit those connections as best you can.” But this success can also be put down to OST’s networking skills. As one interviewee put it, “The responses to requests for help have been amazing. These are often from the best people, so they must think it’s important. It’s clearly a reflection of Foresight’s standing.” More than one interviewee commented on the “unprecedented” enthusiasm shown by project participants and the resulting challenge of “keeping things on track”. In this regard, the Advisory Group appears to have been very supportive in providing feedback and thereby helping to focus the project. But the key thing has been the ability to identify “the best experts who can think outside the box”. Finally, all interviewees highlighted the challenge of combining the risk stream of work with the scientific stream. One problem seems to have been the sequencing of activities in the limited time available, with the risk work ideally needing to be completed earlier in the process. In that way, it could have been better embedded into the latter stages of the project. As things stand, it seems likely that the risk work will be under-utilised across the project.

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A6.1.3 Outputs and Impacts Publicly available project outputs are few in number at the time of writing (late 2005), and are confined to brief workshop reports and a couple of publications on the role of science in eradicating disease in Africa (in support of the Commission for Africa). The majority of outputs will be published on the project’s launch in April 2006. As for impacts, the project is unique in its scope, covering plants, animals and humans – communities that normally have little interaction with one another. The process so far is reported to have already changed people’s perceptions as different sorts of knowledge are brought together and people are encouraged to think “outside of the box”. So the interactions of all the various participants / components of the project are seen as being the biggest benefit to date. Indeed, in the words of one interviewee, “The project isn’t designed to come up with lots of solutions but rather to change ways of understanding – and by extension, to raise lots of issues that require further work.” A number of concrete impacts have already been highlighted by interviewees:

• Scientists have seen how their work could be applied as a consequence of the project

• Inter-departmental discussion on a wide-ranging agenda concerning disease risks. Whilst DoH and Defra are natural bedfellows on things like bird flu, other disease areas have seen little interaction. For example, Defra have a big stake in bovine TB – but the research investment in this will be dwarfed by investment in human TB by DoH and MRC and others. Foresight has highlighted that the two communities should be able to learn from one another, although this requires deep level cooperation, involving funders, ministries, and scientists. Breakthroughs could work in both directions. Researchers are good at talking to one another on this, but Government ministries have so far been relatively poor.

• A number of generic and flexible technologies now emerging have been highlighted that are of direct relevance to the human and animal health agencies. One example is the use of web crawlers to detect media reports on emerging diseases around the world. Another is the lab-on-a-chip technology that will allow for rapid throughput of samples. The main benefit from the DIID project is not so much in identifying these individual technologies, but more in emphasising the need for technologies that are both generic and flexible in the DI&M of infectious diseases.

• The Nuffield Council for Bioethics has included two speculative projects in their next five year funding proposal that have been inspired by the DIID project. These are concerned with ethical issues surrounding the move towards the individual in disease management and the consequences for human rights in the light of new technologies. The lead expert coordinator for the DIID project was responsible for these areas being picked up as she sits on board of the Nuffield Council.

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Looking out to longer-term impacts, one thing to point out is that the backdrop against which the final report will be issued is changing rather fast with the threat of a bird flu pandemic. The likely impact of the project will therefore be very context-dependent. An Action Plan will be published, however, and this will identify numerous actions to be taken by a wide range of actors. In the meantime, the Foresight team has been pushing hard for the project to come up with some figures that cost the impacts of infectious diseases, and, by extension, the savings to be had from their early detection and identification. Recalling the wide attention paid to the startling figures presented in the FCD project final report, the Foresight team is hopeful of a similar impact with figures around the costs associated with infectious diseases. Finally, there are concerns around the sustenance of networks being built by the project. As one interviewee put it, “If funding stops at the end, it’s going to be difficult to take things forward. But we haven’t really discussed this as we’ve been busy trying to meet deadlines.” As for building scientific communities, it is acknowledged that scientists will follow the funding. However, the organisational lines of the Research Councils mean that human, animal, and plant work are divided. Ways will have to found to bridge these divides if interdisciplinary work is going to flourish at the interfaces.

A6.1.4 Appropriateness / Positioning Whilst the combination of humans, animals and plants is rather unique within a single project, not to mention the focus on three continents, work at these interfaces is not unknown. For example, areas such as ecology regularly look across the human, animal and plant worlds. Some of the veterinary schools in the UK have also been active in veterinary public health, though there is less evidence of medical schools showing much appreciation of the importance of animal health for human health. This division is far less apparent in the US, where the “one medicine” concept is popular. Work on emerging infectious diseases and the one medicine concept have now come together there, and there are regular scientific meetings in the area. This has not been the case in the UK up until now, so the DIID project is in virgin territory. Moreover, there has been a recent shift in the emerging diseases context, a shift in importance to early detection. As one interviewee put it, “In the time of my 25 year career, I can’t think of a better time than now for the DIID project.” The project has also been timely in fitting with the focus on Africa, and especially the work of the Prime Minister’s Commission for Africa.

A6.1.5 Overall Comments With six months still to run on the project, it is difficult to draw any overall conclusions. From the interviews, the project seems to be working very well – even if things do have to be done more quickly and with shorter notice than people would like. There are already discernible impacts – for example, the Nuffield proposals – and with so many other “irons in the fire”, i.e. a wide group of stakeholders engaged, a range of impacts

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might be expected to follow after the project’s launch. However, and in common with other Foresight projects, there are already some concerns being expressed about aftercare, related specifically to funding opportunities and to the realisation of self-sustaining networks.

A6.2 Intelligent Infrastructure Systems

6.2.1 Aim and Objectives The aim of the Intelligent Infrastructure Systems (IIS) project is to explore how S&T may be applied over the next 50 years to the design and implementation of intelligent infrastructure systems that are robust, sustainable and safe. It was decided early on that the project needed to focus further, with the topic of transportation of goods and people and the alternatives to mass movement emerging. Coupled to this, the project also looks at the future of transportations systems and the application of information technologies and infrastructure. Accordingly, the project has the following objectives:

• Consider how demand will vary, based on changes in location and development of alternatives to travel;

• Consider how development in science and technology could change the way transportation is managed and delivered;

• Compare the sustainability, safety and robustness of different options. The project was initiated in late 2004 with its findings due to be launched in early 2006. The Department for Transport (DfT) is the sponsor, after having been impressed with the earlier CTCP work carried out by Foresight.

A6.2.2 Process As with all Foresight projects, the process began with scoping workshops, held in September 2004. Around 100 leading academics and subject experts participated, from diverse disciplines such as artificial intelligence, complexity, energy, logistics, transport studies, engineering, social science and economics. The aim was to identify:

• current and future developments in science, technology and society which will affect the way things are moved around

• how intelligent infrastructure might evolve in twenty to fifty years time • the questions that the project should focus on • recommendations for state of science reviews

The process being followed is shown in the figure below. It has been strongly informed by the experiences of the CTCP project, since the same team in Foresight is responsible for both projects. One example of this inter-project learning concerns a more active use of the project’s Advisory Group to help deal with the increasing complexity as the project

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has evolved. This was also done in the CTCP project, but more by default than by design. By contrast, this has been a deliberate strategy in the IIS project.

Outputs

The process involves five main areas of work, as follows:

1. Reviews: a review of futures work was first undertaken to inform the project scope. This review identified the key drivers and trends in relevant current reports and highlighted areas where Foresight could add the greatest value. It was followed by the commissioning of 15 or so science reviews on a wide range of topic areas, including, for example, materials science, the psychology of travel, and the potential for Artificial Intelligence in transport. At the same time, two further reviews were commissioned, one on the public perceptions of risk, and another on complexity and emergent behaviour. The distinguishing feature of these last two reviews is their relevance to several Foresight projects. Because of this, these reviews are being used across the Foresight Programme.

2. Soft Systems Mapping: using a variety of techniques with different groups in different settings, the relationships between the various drivers were explored and visualised.

3. Scenarios: the work on the scenarios has been mostly in the hands of Henley Centre, Decision Integrity and Waverley Consulting, with input from the IIS Advisory Group, and from workshops and trial runs to test that the scenarios are robust and include the key issues. The process is shown in the figure below.

Science Reviews

Futures Review

Specific Reviews

Reviews

Review Material

Local

Regional

Retail

Case Studies

Traveller/Container

Application of External Models

Case Studies

Scenarios

Rich Pictures/ Systems Mapping

Rural

Urban

Inter-Urban

Scenarios

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Testing the

implications

Approx 45

driversident-ified

Axes

Scenariosdeveloped

and tested

An iterative process

Systems mapping

16-18drivers

prioritisedand

tested

Workshop WorkshopsWorkshops

Case studies

Working session

4. Application of External Models: this involves several strands of work, including collaboration with DfT on running the IIS scenarios against its National Transport Model. The outputs from this are to be used to engage with the DfT’s Board. In addition, Foresight is jointly funding with DfT work that explores the concept of a Smart-Market in Journey Slots. This uses a combination of spatial transport modelling, complex adaptive system modelling of the urban environment and agent based modelling of the smart-market.

5. Case Studies: these are being conducted at different levels: regional, with the support of Advantage West Midlands; local authority, with the support of the Borough of Telford and Wrekin; and with the retail sector.

The Foresight Team have also been busy with engaging with a broader set of national and international actors. For example, bilateral meetings have been arranged with key directors and immediate teams in the Treasury, Cabinet Office, DTI, ODPM, HO & Defra. A workshop of senior civil servants was scheduled for autumn 2005, to be led by Sir David King and Robert Devereux (permanent secretary in DfT) to discuss the emerging findings. Meetings with relevant teams in the EC are also reported to have been arranged. In addition, Foresight is represented on the OECD’s Futures project on Global Infrastructures. This is in recognition of the fact that the UK cannot act alone in addressing many of the factors and issues of concern to IIS. The project has received extensive support from the sponsor ministry, DfT. For example, Foresight was able to make beneficial use of a DfT Fast-Streamer to research and write the review of futures work relevant to IIS (3 months approx). DfT also agreed to share the cost (50% of £55,000) of the seat on the steering group of the OECD Futures project on Global Infrastructure. In addition, DfT agreed to share the cost (50% of £45,000) for

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Smart Market modelling work. DfT personnel are also active contributors to meeting and workshops. On top of this, several DfT executive agencies are involved – particularly the Highways Agency.

A6.2.3 Outputs and Impacts The project is not due to launch until early 2006, with many outputs due to be published at this time. At the time of writing (late 2005), only a small number of outputs are publicly available, including a review of existing futures work in the IIS area, a review of public perceptions of risk, and a review of complexity and emergent behaviour. The 15 or so science reviews, the scenarios, the models, the case studies, etc. will be published once the project is launched in 2006. As the project has yet to be completed, it is too early to establish its immediate impacts, let alone any longer-term impacts. However, several impacts are anticipated by OST, including:

• Clear understanding of potential future infrastructure capability • Highlighted critical choice and decision points and options • Enhanced evidence base for policy owners to draw upon • Research challenges relevant to intelligent infrastructure identified • Feed across: Government reviews: Eddington, Stern and Energy; OECD Global

Infrastructure project • Broader range of modelling tools explored to support decisions

It is hoped that these, collectively, will lead to:

• Clear vision of future options for broader discussion • Proposed strategy that will face up to key challenges • Courageous decisions being taken

More specifically, it is hoped that

• the vision set out will be accepted by key stakeholders • a self-sustaining interdisciplinary network will flourish • an increase in funded research proposals in relevant areas will come about • a relevant Technology Strategy call will be issued • the regional and local authority case studies will inspire others to conduct similar

studies • the project’s findings will influence the international agenda through the EC and

OECD • the science reviews will be published together as a book

Some impacts are already discernible. For example, the DfT has recently started its own horizon scanning work, partly prompted by the positive experience of the Foresight Programme. The early scenarios in the IIS project, which are focused mostly upon S&T, stimulated DfT to widen their scope a little more. For example, they wanted to extend the Foresight perspective to include things like the commercial structure of transport (bus

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deregulation, and so on) – not an obvious focus for the OST. Henley Centre have been helping them with scenarios on what the transport world might look like in 2050. It has also been reported in interviews of SG members that SG meetings have been useful for an exchange of ideas among members, often on matters outside the immediate concern of IIS. In that sense, IIS has been a catalyst for valuable conversations between SG members.

A6.2.4 Appropriateness / Positioning Despite much work in many sectors (especially transport, environment) covering this topic, relatively little of it attempts to bring things together to explore the combined implications. Also, several areas of potentially disruptive science and technology need exploring further (e.g. large datasets, small sensors, pervasive computing, transport and energy technologies, etc.). Along with the long-term implications of decision-making on infrastructure, these factors make IIS a suitable subject for a Foresight project. Initially the project’s scope was too wide. Infrastructure had a broad meaning, including consideration of the built environment, transport, information systems, sewage systems, and so on. But to consider all of this would take too much time – the project’s duration is only 15 months. So a focus had to be chosen and this was transport. At the same time, all of the above systems are related to transport. For example, the design of cities largely determines the need for travel. ODPM, who are responsible for the built environment, are therefore involved in the project, as are other ministries with a stake. The Research Councils, and to a lesser extent, business, are also involved in the project. However, these have tended to be secondary targets when compared to public policy actors. The extensive involvement of the DfT begs the question as to why they could not do such an exercise themselves without the need to ‘outsource’ it to the OST. Besides the cross-departmental perspective that OST can more readily achieve, other reasons were highlighted by one DfT interviewee. To paraphrase, “I would be careful about having departments like mine run something like Foresight – the OST have an arms-length view that is outside of the political immediacy. You do want it to be an external led thing. Some of the issues are highly politically charged, so getting OST to look at these, with its S&T brief, is safe for us. They are better positioned to ask the difficult questions that are often taboo for departments like mine to publicly discuss”.

A6.2.5 Overall Comments As the project is still ongoing, it is difficult to draw many evaluative conclusions. However, it is reported that people are talking about the project in transport circles. The project also overlaps with several other hot areas like telematics. There is a curiosity as to what will emerge. The active involvement of the sponsoring ministry, DfT, also suggests that extensive follow-up actions can be anticipated.

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A7 List of Interviewees Office of Science and Technology Prue Backway Jeremy Clayton Claire Craig Derek Flynn Fiona Harrison Andrew Jackson Gary Kass Jo Marsden Miles Yarrington Flood and Coastal Defences Elliot Morley, Defra Reg Purnell, Defra Cognitive Systems Richard Morris, University of Edinburgh Sohaila Rastan, Wellcome Trust Bill Sharpe, Future Applications Ltd Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention Darren Bhattachariya, Royal Society Ian Diamond, ESRC James Kahan, RAND Europe Robin Mansell, London School of Economics Alasdair Rose, EPSRC Paul Wiles, Home Office Exploiting the Electromagnetic Spectrum David Hughes, Innovation Group, DTI Pat McDonald, Innovation Group, DTI Will Stewart, Innos Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs Crispin Acton, Department of Health Declan Mulkeen, MRC David Nutt, University of Bristol Gerry Stimson, University College London Sandy Thomas, Nuffield Council for Bioethics Detection and Identification of Infectious Diseases Joyce Tait, University of Edinburgh Catherine Peckham, Institute of Child Health Mark Woolhouse, University of Edinburgh

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Intelligent Infrastructure Systems Brian Collins, University of Cranfield Frank Kelly, Department for Transport Alf Roberts, Institution of Electrical Engineers

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A8 National Comparative Analysis

Swedish Technology Foresight 2004 Identification of the areas to be covered – Positioning – Objectives Swedish Technology Foresight (Teknisk Framsyn) is a project aimed at identifying Sweden’s preconditions for technological and economic growth in a 10-20 year perspective. Teknisk Framsyn’s second round Foresight exercise was launched as part of a national effort for Choosing Strategies for Sweden. This initiative arose from the concern that not all organizations in Sweden possessed the capability or the capacity to engage in future-guided activities. The study followed a first round foresight exercise (completed in 2000), which resulted in a report called The Foresighted Society. The second round supplemented and built on the analyses made in the first round. Thus the Foresight project was officially described as an ‘update’ of the previous Technology Foresight Programme. In addition, it took a considerably broader, more societal oriented approach. The objectives of the project included to:

1. Strengthen future-oriented and guided activities within organizations in both private and non-private sectors

2. Identify competence areas with strong growth and innovation potential for Sweden economically, socially and ecologically

3. Engender a basis and create processes for priority-setting for Sweden to further develop knowledge and competence areas in the national innovation system.

Resources (time, money) The second round of the Swedish Foresight project (2004) was implemented and carried out during 2003–2004. The financial sponsors of the project were the Swedish Industrial Development Fund, the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA), the Knowledge Foundation, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), the Swedish Business Development Agency (NUTEK), the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, the Swedish Research Council and the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA), in close collaboration with the Swedish Government, companies, public agencies and other interested parties. Processes (methods, degree of participation) The project was conducted through a combination of panel discussions, interviews and hearings and open forums. A number of panels were set up around the following themes: - Other National Foresight Programmes, - Inspiration for Innovation, - Upgrading (Swedish) Foresight.

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The latter consisted of seven focused projects and panels dealing with Technological Environments, tasked with updating the findings from the first foresight study. These were:

- Information Technology, - Production Systems, - Materials, - Infrastructure for a Borderless Europe, - Biological Sciences, - Health, and Education

In forming these panels, there was an emphasis on ensuring a diversity of backgrounds. In addition to these panels, a final Synthesis Panel, which comprised 12 experts of varied backgrounds, brought together all the project’s findings into a synthesis report: Choosing Strategies for Sweden. In addition, the Synthesis Panel broadened the perspective of the discussion to include economic and social preconditions – such as the innovation climate, tax system, institutions and regulations. Products As said earlier, the project updated the panel reports that were published during the previous round. It performed this task primarily by means of interviews and hearings. The updated reports included:

- New, Better and More Secure – IT in the Service of Future Society - The Production System – Engine of Swedish Prosperity - Materials and Material Flows – Challenges and Opportunities - Infrastructure for a Borderless Europe - Biological Natural Resources – A Swedish Strength for the Future - The Health Care of the Future – Advances and Challenges - Education and Learning

In addition to updating the previous reports, Swedish Technology Foresight published the following new reports in various subprojects:

- Inspiration for Innovation – Knowledge and Technology Looking Toward 2020 - Other National Foresights - The Context of Technology

A Synthesis Report was also produced based on documentation from a project entitled Energy Foresight – Sweden in Europe. Impacts The Swedish Technology Foresight is a project in which some of the country’s foremost experts participated in order to identify important technologies for the future. The major impacts of the project are expected to be on companies and organizations to strengthen their futures-oriented work and on the promotion of sustainable growth and renewal in Sweden. The project compiled information and design processes for identifying high-priority areas in which Sweden should build expertise.

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Danish Technology Foresight 2015 Identification of the areas to be covered – Positioning – Objectives The purpose of the Danish Foresight exercise was to gain insights into, and prepare for, future technological developments, and market and social needs. The exercise was meant to assist government ministries and agencies to formulate and develop a framework for new research programmes. It was intended to align the Danish national innovation system with important future technology and the competencies needs, and in particular with those of the business sector. In this context the specific objectives of the exercise included:

• To develop insight into and prepare the system for technological and social requirements for the next 10 years

• To create future-oriented scenarios as a basis for prioritisation in research, product and process development, and market development

• To assist in public priority-setting in the area of research, technology and competence development

• To develop and consider methods and concepts for conducting technology foresight which could be later used by private and public sector organisations in any future oriented strategy activity

• To create networks and stimulate dialogue on future challenges and opportunities between industry, innovation system organisations, and interest groups

• To support broad societal debate on possible, desirable technological developments

Resources (time, money) In 2000, the Danish government earmarked 24 million DKR to the national Technology Foresight project for the period 2001-2004. The initiative was initially dealt with by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, but with the new government in November 2001, it was moved to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation. Processes (methods, degree of participation) Developing well-grounded advanced scenarios on future technological and societal developments was the key element of the methodology designed. The scenarios engendered a social debate and dialogue around the future and would help policymakers in setting policy priorities. Products The Foresight project focused on seven themes including Environment, Biological and Health Sciences, ICT, Hygiene, Nanotechnologies, Aging and Robotics. Under each of these themes, the areas of application for Denmark and the technologies needed were identified. Impacts The general message that came out from the completed exercises is that Denmark will need to focus on sectors and areas in which it has a comparative advantage and where it can make a difference. Accordingly panellists emphasized the importance of

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interdisciplinary research as a tool that would help make new and emerging technologies more relevant to Danish needs. The real challenge for the future will be the ability to fuse different bodies of knowledge together and work across multidisciplinary teams. The latter will have to be consolidated in the form of institutions. Thus, new multidisciplinary institutions will have to be built to reflect the future. The proposal for a nanotechnology centre for cancer research is a case in point. The main recommendations made to the policymakers in academia, government and in industry focused on the following:

• Integrating technologies, products and services by cooperating across various fields of applications

• Interdisciplinary training and education at schools and universities • Multidisciplinary research teams and institutes

German FUTUR Identification of the areas to be covered – Positioning – Objectives The ongoing German ‘Futur’ exercise was launched in 2001, with the first phase completed in 2003. Futur, the German Research Dialogue, involves a process of comprehensive and non-sector specific Foresight activity. It aims at introducing fresh ideas into the existing research funding priorities of BMBF (the Federal Ministry of Education and Research), by adding to the traditional mechanisms for agenda setting and prioritisation. Taking into account the weaknesses of conventional decision-making processes around S&T, which are characterised by a close and rather opaque interaction between research institutions, industry and government, Futur was oriented towards the identification and inclusion of societal needs in future research agendas and served as a means of ‘priority setting for future innovation-oriented research policies and a foresight process of the involvement of the broader stakeholder groups’. At first, Futur identified thousands of topics relevant to the demands from society. Then, topics were filtered. Research, Technology and Education remained as the main focus areas with the decision of BMBF. Resources (time, money) Futur was planned as a continuing, rolling activity. The first phase of Futur started in Spring 2001 and ran until the beginning of 2003. It was evaluated by an international expert group in autumn and winter 2002. Following the evaluation the programme was prolonged for the next two years. The second phase of Futur ran until March 2005. Meanwhile in 2004 there was another evaluation of the project. The third cycle of Futur began in winter 2005 and will be finished at the end of 2005. The future of Futur remains unclear at the time of writing. The BMBF financed the activity. In terms of the running costs of the programme, the internet pages, conferences and workshops were the main cost items. In addition, additional costs arose regarding the facilitation of the activities and production of protocols. Although the participants were not paid and in most cases they met their own

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travel expenses, the total cost of Futur rose to 3 million Euros per annum. Compared to Delphi’98, which cost about 800,000 Euros over its whole lifetime (from 1997 to 2000), the cost of Futur was a considerable increase in resource commitment. Processes (methods, degree of participation) A wide variety of methods and instruments were used during the Foresight activities. It was decided that face-to-face meetings of working groups should be at the centre of the discussions, and the Internet should be used for information, and for supporting the transparency and communication of the whole process. The internet also aimed to provide the involvement of more and a greater variety of participants. The exercise covered wider social themes and involved social stakeholders. Widespread participation was provided with the inclusion of the ‘interested public’, which represented a specialised and knowledgeable part of the public. This group could follow the proceedings and introduce their own ideas. The participants were populated around ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ circles. A two-step co-nomination process was applied in order to select the participants. The members of the inner circle were the target group to participate in the face-to-face activities. The members of the inner circle then nominated the members of the outer circle. In order to achieve the aims of Futur, different methods were integrated. A sequence of workshops, conferences and focus groups were organised to work from a broad analysis of future trends for 2020 through an initial selection of 12 focus themes. In turn, the five most advanced and promising focus themes were selected from these and further articulated in focus groups prior to a final selection using multiple approaches, including:

• On-line voting • Ranking against the relevance of research, societal demand, the status of maturity

of the themes and the possibility of political usability • Discussion on the innovativeness and quality of the focus themes

Following further development and discussions, scenarios and lead visions were produced. Interdisciplinary and problem oriented ‘lead visions’ were intended to be the major outcomes of the process. The lead visions were considered to reflect the demand for research and can be translated into publicly funded research programmes or projects. As defined by BMBF list the characteristics of lead visions are as follows:

1. Include precise objectives 2. Include a new quality of problem solving (by a mix of methods and participants) 3. Be interdisciplinary and include the perspectives of heterogeneous stakeholders 4. Start from a societal need and build up the necessary steps in research to meet

these needs 5. Be communicated to the public 6. Have a high economic relevance

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Products The tangible outputs were the Lead Vision papers, which contained:

- Goal and vision - Description of the topic - Description of the relevance for industry and civil society - Future research topics - The current state of the research as well as existing programmes - A scenario which illustrates the visionary content of the Lead Vision and makes

the potential future developments tangible and conceivable Other outputs included discussion papers, and other materials came out during the programme, which were all available on the internet. Networking and interdisciplinarity were considered as to be the main intangible output. Impacts Using lead visions, BMBF intends to bundle research sponsorship into strategically important areas of activity. Lead visions are a new element in the ministry’s research policy and complement research support across borders to establish individual support programmes. Above all, they help non-experts to compare the future images with their own ideas and desires and, thereby, support the discussion through concrete action and design alternatives.

Japanese Foresight (8th cycle) Identification of the areas to be covered – Positioning – Objectives The eighth Japanese Foresight exercise was designed to provide a base for discussing the next “Science and Technology Basic Plan”. The drivers of the exercise include:

1. The importance of prioritisation of areas for S&T policy 2. The necessity for a comprehensive view of S&T for effective investment 3. The necessity for Foresight that can directly contribute to the discussion of S&T

policies Processes (methods, degree of participation) In order to get a comprehensive view of future S&T, the design of the exercise has undergone major changes from previous incarnations. A multi-method approach has been introduced. In addition to the customary Delphi method, the following changes have been adopted:

1. Socio-economic needs analysis: Broader understanding of social and economic needs has been obtained through participatory processes. The goals of future science and technology have been examined by making adjustments regarding social and economic needs. The research took European methods of foresight

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research into account by seeking the opinions of many other people in addition to science and technology experts. Participation: by non-experts on S&T Time horizon: Present to medium term (2015)

2. Study on rapidly developing research areas: Study on rapidly developing research areas. Rapidly developing areas were explored through analysis of scientific publication databases. Areas in which the number of papers published has increased rapidly over the past few years were discerned by utilizing international scientific publication databases. The possibility that such fields will become important science and technology areas in the future was examined. Data: Utilisation of scientific publication databases Time horizon: Present

3. Scenario analysis: Scenario analysis of major areas was carried out based on the opinions of outstanding experts. The next ten years are foreseen to discern areas likely to make major social or economic contributions or to generate innovative knowledge over the next ten years. Experts with outstanding views in the areas were selected to create scenarios for their development. This research clarified the direction of development in noteworthy areas from normative perspectives. Participation: Opinions of outstanding individuals obtained Time horizon: Present to medium term (2015)

4. Delphi survey: The Delphi aimed to forecast the development of 13 fields such as

electronics and life science, including 130 areas and 858 topics. 3,000 - 4,000 respondents evaluated the topics against the criteria including the time of realisation, importance, effects, Japan’s technological level, measures that the government should adopt. Participation: Experts Time horizon: long term (2030)

13 fields in the Delphi survey included:

- Information and communications - Electronics - Life sciences - Health, medical care and welfare - Agriculture, forestry, fisheries and food - Space, marine and earth sciences - Energy and resources - Environment - Nanotechnology and materials - Manufacturing - Industrial infrastructure - Social infrastructure - Science and technology for society

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Products Expected outcomes:

1. Foresighted understanding of S&T over the next 30 years, taking 2015 as a middle point

2. Suggestion of S&T fields and areas that should be emphasised 3. Suggestion of direction of development for each field and identifying obstacles

for their development NISTEP has compiled a report entitled “The 8th Science and Technology Foresight Survey – Future Science and Technology in Japan”. The report is now available in Japanese and English. The report aims to provide fundamental data to be utilised in establishing the future master plan of S&T. The report covers fields from basic natural science, medical science, technology, social science to economy. Impacts 51 research fields and 130 areas have been identified as the most rapidly developing ones. These are being analysed with the purpose of identifying spending priorities.

Spanish Foresight – OPTI Identification of the areas to be covered – Positioning – Objectives Spain is said to suffer from the “European Paradox”, implying a reasonably acceptable level of basic research but a lack of industrial capacity for assimilating technologies and improving competitiveness. This has been accentuated by the industrial restructuring that occurred during the 1980s, during which industries demonstrated little interest towards technology and innovation. Therefore, the promotion of scientific development and innovation during this time was one of the main policy objectives to modernise the science and technology system. To achieve these targets it was necessary to count on information on the evolution of technology and the impact that it has on industrial development; and to some extent as well, in Technology Foresight. Given this background, the Spanish Foresight exercise was directed primarily to the needs of industry. A secondary target was that part of the public administration that makes the decisions on which technologies should be adopted and who tracks the evolution of technologies within the industry. The context in which these technologies were placed was defined by socio-economic aspects, which are the main drivers of the evolution of technology. OPTI as a central body assessed the coverage of the exercise attending at some socio-economic criteria affecting technology:

- The contribution of technology to GDP. - The rate of employment linked to technology, considering not only the current

employment rate but also forecasts. - The impact of technology on society. - The influence of technology on other sectors.

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The measurement of these variables led to the emergence of eight sectors that set the baseline for OPTI’s foresight activities: agro-food, energy, environment, chemistry (4 sub-sectors), information and communication technologies, transport (air, rail, ship and car), basic and transforming manufacturers and traditional industries (footwear, textile, toys, wood and furniture, glass and ceramic and jewellery). Resources (time, money) As a first approach to a fully-fledged exercise in Spain, the First Foresight Program was designed to run during a three-year period, although each year, a certain number of annual assets needed to be covered. Since 2001, the fully-fledged approach was replaced by a series of sectoral exercises, each of which has an average duration between no more than 9 to 11 months. Each of the sectoral exercises that OPTI promotes has an average cost of 60.000 Euros. Processes (methods, degree of participation) The methodology used in the First Spanish Foresight Program was based on expert panels, brainstorming sessions, Delphi surveys, key technologies and deskwork. The methodological approach for each sector had the following steps:

1. A Literature Review was carried out by the working group on the exercise. During this process, similar international reports were analysed. The purpose was to enumerate a list of key events and/or technologies relevant to a certain area, and to define a socio-economic background in which these technologies were embedded. The outcome of this process was a working document that is available for the experts previous to the first meeting session.

2. An Expert Panel meeting was held. During the meeting, the socio-economic background was discussed and the experts assessed and prioritised the events or technologies that had been considered in the first approach. The experts also assessed the existing technologies and discarded the less relevant ones. This meeting was crucial for the rest of the process, as the focus of the study relied on the expert opinions. During this session, the Delphi questionnaire was also presented for getting feedback and comments.

3. After the first Expert Panel meeting, the initial working document was enriched with some of the visions from the experts. This draft was sent with the Delphi questionnaire to the rest of the experts involved in the consultation process.

4. The analysis of the questionnaire gave the first conclusions.

5. In the Second Expert Panel Meeting, the Steering Committee presented the results of the questionnaires. This led to a further discussion among the experts and the steering committee. The conclusions and the first recommendations were drafted in this meeting.

6. As a result of the second panel meeting, the working group and the steering committee produced a final document. This document was circulated to all the experts.

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Products The outputs from the first Spanish Foresight Programme included 3 reports covering 26 Foresight exercises in 8 different sectors. In addition, a series of technology trends was extracted. This led to 5 new reports of technology trends in:

- Agro-Food - Chemistry - Energy - Environment - Information and Communication Technologies - Transport

Impacts The exercise had impact on the following programmes, initiatives and actors:

- PROFIT (Program for the promotion of Technical Research), carried out by the Ministry of Industry.

- PN I+D (National Plan for R&D), carried out for the Ministry of Science and Education.

- Regional governments (Madrid, Navarra and Murcia) to define strategic areas in R&D.

- Industrial associations and enterprises

French Key Technologies 2010 Identification of the areas to be covered – Positioning – Objectives Following the two previous exercises "Key technologies 2000" and "Key technologies 2005", the new Direction Générale des Entreprises (DGE) of the Ministry of Industry launched a third exercise, entitled “Key Technologies 2010”, in November 2004. It was planned to run to September 2005. The geographical perimeter of the study had 3 levels, where the key technologies were identified:

• An international and European level: Candidate technologies for collaboration with another country were identified;

• The national level: This was the level where the decisions were implemented. The main actors for proposed actions included the French State and the actors of local economic development;

• Regional level: Regions were also integrated into the analysis, as actors of economic development, and future users of the instruments developed by the study.

Resources (time, money) The four phases of the project were carried out over 10 months.

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Processes (methods, degree of participation) and Products The key points of the methodology were:

• Collection and analysis of economic, strategic and technological information; • Interviews with stakeholders of ministries and research organisations; • Organisation of working groups; • Strong correlation with the regional actors; • Use of the Internet to communicate about the study.

Phase 1 (3 months) - Preparation of main orientations: The main objective of this first stage was to delimit the framework of study, to conceive and develop the instruments which will support the methodology and to establish "good practices". A multicriteria analysis was prepared according to two perspectives including and technological. Main challenges for the 10 coming years were identified for the main application areas: energy, environment, housing, daily needs, mobility, materials, chemicals, production equipments, support functions. This work was carried out by an expert group, entitled “methodological working group”. From a segmentation of technological activities (ICT, biotech, materials, etc.) emerging technologies were identified. This work was done via a survey towards basic and applied research organisations. In parallel, a benchmarking exercise was launched. It aimed at identifying similar "key technologies" practices in industrial countries in order to avoid a "mono-cultural " vision. At the end of this stage a first appraisal on the future of technologies, which were identified as being “key”, was formulated. Phase 2 (2.5 month) - Technical and economic diagnostic: From the results of this initial stage, the work included the identification of the positioning of France and its regions in the economic and technological panorama by considering "2010". Many discussions took place with the users including the discussions on the actors of local development and innovation in regions (RDT, Chambers of commerce, Regional councils, DATAR, ANVAR, etc). In parallel, 8 working groups representing the application sectors met twice in order to identify the position of France by considering their economic role, technology requirements, France’s strengths and weaknesses, and factors of competitiveness and attractiveness. They were also planned to focus on the worldwide panorama of issues in 2010. In addition, an Internet electronic forum was created to encourage further participation to discussions. Phase 3 (2.5 months) - Characterisation of key technologies: This phase aimed to build a prospective vision towards 2010. Each technology was characterised in comparison with its impact. A set of criteria were drawn up in the form of a multicriteria analysis, where each technology was evaluated according to these criteria. Furthermore, key technologies were prioritised according to the long-term appreciation of their impact on the development of activities identified as structuring for France. Then, several scenarios were proposed. Phase 4 (2 months) - Restitution and final deliverable: The database of information gathered during the exercise was reorganised so that it could be exploitable and could

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stay for further improvement. Recommendations aiming at perpetuating the networks were formulated. Impacts Key technologies were identified aiming to make policy recommendations by considering the strengths and weaknesses of the country. It is too early to make any assessment of the use of the results by the Ministry or others.

FutuRIS – Foresight on the French Innovation System Identification of the areas to be covered – Positioning – Objectives The Lisbon objectives and its associated Open Method of Coordination (OMC) benchmarking exercises provided an intellectual and a political context for raising the question of the unsatisfactory performance of the French National Innovation System (NIS). Concerns were raised on the overall efficiency and on the relevance of the architecture and governance of the NIS, leading to increasing doubts concerning the ability of the French research and innovation system to meet the needs of French society in the future. An aspect of that “archaism” of the NIS is that it is very fragmented, with a lack of interactions between its different parts. Reforming the NIS requires an in-depth review and a long-term perspective, drawn together by the various stakeholders; that is what FutuRIS aimed to provide. FutuRIS therefore aimed at correcting systemic failure in order to strengthen the NIS. It considered the NIS as a whole, with a systemic approach, addressing issues related to its governance and organization, the interactions between players from research, academia, business and society. The general objectives of FutuRIS are “to bring together leading players of the public and private sectors with the aim of laying the foundations for the future of the NIS”; “to review and then launch the debate on the challenges the NIS is likely to face in the future”; and “to build a shared vision of the future of the NIS between research, academia, business and society”. These general objectives have been translated into the following operational objectives:

• To explore alternative states of the NIS at a time horizon of 2020 to be described in terms of financial flows, the human resources situation and governance structure, all in the international, European, and socio-political context

• To assess the contribution of the alternative future states to national objectives (industrial innovation, contribution to public goods & public policies, defence, security….)

• To outline the policies needed to bring them about (institutional reforms, financing flows, education….)

• To identify the key issues to be addressed and discussed for reforming the NIS in view of the Lisbon objectives

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Resources (time, money) The FutuRIS exercise ran from February 2003 to June 2005 under the auspices of the Association Nationale de la Recherche Technique (ANRT), being jointly financed by the ministries of research and of industry, firms and ANRT itself. Processes (methods, degree of participation) and Products A one-year feasibility study was conducted by ANRT in 2002, which led to a formal launch of phase I in February 2003, followed by phase II (May – December 2004) and phase III (January – June 2005). Throughout the phases, a Steering Committee of about 25 top-level personalities coming from research, business, government and society met every 4 months and a Strategy Committee of six persons met every month. The project team, under a project director, involved about 10 persons, most of them part-time, leading to an average of about 5-7 persons as full-time equivalents. Phase I: the objectives were to build scenarios in order to raise and document the key questions to be faced by the NIS in the coming 15 years. Four working groups were set up after a process of participant identification through the co-nomination method. Participants were selected according to criteria of balance between categories such as experts / stakeholders, research and higher education / business / government / society, gender, age, sector, professional profile and position, geographical area of origin, and so on. Beyond the four working groups, circles of external (‘second circle’) participants were set up, and interaction using collaborative virtual tools was organized (to react to papers, to complete questionnaires, etc.). The four groups met 8-10 times (once a month on average) to identify key factors, to document them, and to define hypotheses about the possible evolutions. The hypotheses were then combined to build the scenarios concerning their field (research excellence, competitiveness through innovation, science and society relationships, trends in the international, European and national contexts). The project team then built global scenarios across all the fields. Phases II took place at the time of the researchers’ protest and proposals movement and consisted in disseminating the results of phase I and in preparing recommendations for the government bill on research and innovation. The dissemination strategy was concerned with including FutuRIS in events and debates prepared by other institutions. In addition, ad-hoc working groups focussed on points for which additional understanding was needed, for example, on the strategic governance of the NIS, the synergies between higher education, research and innovation, the attractiveness of France and its regions for research and innovation activities, and so on. Phase III was a follow up for disseminating the recommendations as well as working further on issues such as employment and careers for PhD graduates, the development of innovative firms, and ways for dealing with the inter-sectoral competition for allocation of resources. Phase III was also used for preparing and launching the programme’s

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evaluation, as well as preparing for the follow up of FutuRIS on a smaller scale on a regular basis. Products FutuRIS produced nothing on research themes, on substantive priorities identification, nor on sectoral analysis, but instead identified “systemic” issues concerned with the structure and functioning of the French NIS. Impacts At the end of phase I of the operation, under pressure from the researcher community, the Government began to prepare an important bill on research and innovation policy and asked FutuRIS, among others, to contribute to the process. Even though one cannot ‘prove’ impacts, it can be said FutuRIS was influential in the process. Furthermore, its internet site is highly regarded has been widely used as an independent source of documentation and analytical references. In a more general sense, FutuRIS revealed the strong, but often latent need for social actors to address and discuss uncertainties concerning the dynamics and change of the innovation system. It highlighted the lack of ‘spaces’ to do so, that is, the need of an instrument of dialogue for the coordination of anticipations, the joint production of visions, and the integration of partial analysis, all of which take their meaning from a broader context. FutuRIS proved to be an instrument capable of handling the diversity of perception of issues and the uncertainty of a number of trends, through hypotheses / scenarios / questionnaires. It was also able to deal with controversial issues through the work on hypotheses and by focusing upon longer term horizons. It systemic perspective also allowed it to address issues of coherence (how can things fit together?). It has proven to be a workable and acceptable platform for informed debate, analytical work, and exploration of hypotheses, to accompany structural change processes.

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