evans-aristotle on relativism

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Scots Philosophical Association

University of St Andrews

Aristotle on RelativismAuthor(s): J. D. G. EvansSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 96 (Jul., 1974), pp. 193-203Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and theUniversity of St. Andrews

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2/12

THE

PHLOSOP

QU RTERL

VOL.

24

No. 96

JULY

1974

ARISTOTLE

ON

RELATIVISM

BY

J. D.

G.

EVANS

Let

me first state

dogmatically

the dialectical situation

which we shall

be

exploring

in detail as this

paper develops.

For

Aristotle,

Plato

was

a

realist,

Protagoras

a relativist. He

could

view each as

presenting

his

position

in conscious

reaction

to the other and in the belief that one or

other of

them

is correct.

Yet

Aristotle

regards

the theories of each

as

seriously

defective.

What

I

want to consider is

why

Aristotle finds them

inadequate,

and

what

possible

position

is left for him if he will

accept

neither of the

alternatives.

The

situation

in which he finds

himself

is characteristic. Time

and

again

he

prefaces

his

accounts

with a

statement of the

conflicting

answers

of his

predecessors,

in such a

way

that even

though

there is indeed

good

reason

for thinking them all wrong, there seems to be no scope for any further

answer.

It is most

important

for our

understanding

of Aristotle's

conception

of

philosophy

to see the

manner in

which he views

his

problem

and the method

by

which he resolves

it. The

following

passage

from the

Eudemian

Ethics

(H

2,

1235b

13-18)

tells

us much about this:

We

must

adopt

a

line of

argument

which will both

best

explain

to

us the views

held

about

these matters and will resolve the

difficulties

and

contradictions;

and we shall achieve this

if

we show

that the

conflicting

views

are held with

good

reason. For such an

argument

will most closely accord with the agreed facts; and it will allow the

conflicting

views

to

be retained if

analysis

can show

that

each

is

partly

true and

partly

false.

In other

words,

Aristotle

wants

to

preserve

the obvious truths

of common

sense,

and

at the

same

time

to do

full

justice

to those

aspects

of the

philo-

sophers'

paradoxes

which

incline us

to

see

something

in them.

He

will


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3/12

194 J. D.

G.

EVANS

disarm

the

paradox,

by

separating

the

true

insight

from

the

outrageous

conclusion which was built

upon

it. He will

also eliminate

from

the

com-

bination

of all

the views the

conflict which

presently

characterizes it:

dis-

agreement will be shown to be the consequence of the distortion of the

importance

of

some

single aspect

of

the case.

We

shall see

in detail

later

how this

method

operates.

The natural

place

to look

for Aristotle's

treatment of

relativism is

Meta-

physics

F. In fact

I

shall

be

concentrating

more

on certain

other

texts.

But

I

want

first to

say

something

about the

arguments

in

r

and

why

I

find them

not

so

interesting

as

certain other

discussions. He is

here

princip-

ally

concerned with

thinkers who

deny

the

law of

non-contradiction.

He

includes

under

this

heading

Protagoras,

on the

ground

that his

relativization

of truth enabled him

to allow that

p

and

not-p

could each

be

true for different

persons.

Now Aristotle

maintains

that this law is

the

most

fundamental

principle

in

reasoning;

and

he

argues

that it

follows

from it

that

it

is im-

possible

for

anyone

to

believe that

there

is

a

counter-instance

to it.

For

a

belief that

p

is

contrary

to

a

belief

that

not-p;

and so

someone

who,

for

any

substitution

for

p,

believed

both,

would

be

in

two

contrary

states. That this

is

impossible

is a

consequence

of the law

of

non-contradiction

(Met.

F

3).

This is

not,

of

course,

a

proof

of

the law.

What

it

does

establish is that

the law is fundamental; for it cannot be doubted by one who accepts it,

whatever he claims to

the

contrary.

If it

cannot

be

doubted,

it

cannot be

proved;

and

although

Christopher

Kirwan

says

that,

despite

saying

this,

Aristotle

goes

on to

try

to

prove

it in

Met.

1

4-6,1

he

misconstrues

Aristotle's

purpose.

Aristotle

divides those who

deny

the law

into

two

kinds,

those

who do

it for

the

contentious

reason

of

saying

something

paradoxical,

and

those

who

do

it out

of a

genuine

sense of

perplexity.

The

former

want

to

win

an

argument.

Since

their

demand for

a

proof

of the law

cannot be

met,

their denial of it

cannot be

refuted.2

Even

the

peritropic argument,3

which

is one of the

strongest

weapons

in the arsenal of the

opponent

of

relativism,

is not

conclusive.

This

argument

claims

that

the

statement

all

truth

is

relative to

the

individual who

believes

it

must be

itself

an

absolute

truth

-that

is,

true

for

everyone;

and

so if

some

person

denies

it,

it

must

be

false

for him. It

is,

then,

both true and

false for

him;

and

since

the

relativist

thesis states that no

one ever

has a

mistaken

belief,

the

dissenter's

denial

of

this

thesis

constitutes a

counter-instance to

it.

The

thesis

cannot

co-exist

with someone

who

denies it. But

the

extreme

relativist

can

break this

argument by denying that his thesis is 'an absolute truth. He can claim

that this

thesis is true

only

for

him;

and

that

this

is

not in

the

least

affected

by

the fact

that it is

false for

someone

else.

In

taking

this

stance the

relativist

assumes the

life of a

plant,

as

Aristotle

says (1008b 10-12).

His

position

1Aristotle's

Metaphysics

r, A,

E

(Oxford,

1971),

p.

113.

sSee

Met.

1009a

16-23,

1011a

8-25,

1012a

17-21.

3Met.

1008a

28-34,

1012b

13-18.




4/12

ARISTOTLE

ON

RELATIVISM

195

rules out

the

possibility

of rational discussion

and thus

is

trivialized.

But

the

position

is

open

to

him if

he wants

it.

So

Aristotle is

not

concerned

with an

opponent

of this

type.

His

interest

lies rather with the victim of honest perplexity who thinks he can see some-

thing

in the reasons for

the relativist's

position

and thus is

unable to

sleep

safely

with the view of

the committed realist.

This man needs a

therapeutic

type

of

dialectic,

which

will enable him to see both the nature of the con-

siderations

which

incline him to relativism and

how

those considerations

do

not in fact

promote

the conclusion

which he

is

inclined

to

draw from them.

The

majority

of the

numerous

arguments

in

Met.

F

4-6 are of a Platonic

character and

in

many

cases were first

suggested

by

Plato's Theaetetus.

In

some

ways they

seem

to

go

too far in the

Platonic

direction. Thus the victim

of

perplexity

needs to be reminded that some

things

are

intelligible

and

eternal: he

has concentrated too

much

on

perceptible changing

things.

Now

this is redolent

of

Plato,

with

its

suggestion

that the nature of

reality

is to

be

discovered

by attending

to

the

eternal and that the world

of flux

can

be

dismissed

as not

relevant to the

enquiry.

Yet

Aristotle's

point

cannot be

quite

this,

since

he asserts that

the law of non-contradiction brooks no

exceptions,

not even

among

perceptible, changing things.

His

point

must

rather

be

to

remind

the victim

of

perplexity

of

something

which

he

knows

well, but has temporarily forgotten, in order to make him question whether

the law

of non-contradiction can be

broken

anywhere.

Relativism,

if it

is

pushed,

tends to

be

supported

by

reasons of

very

general

scope.

So

if a

dent can

be made

in the

position

in

one

place,

this

will

lessen

its

appeal

in

other

areas

also.

Aristotle's

major

argument

in these

chapters

is

based

on an

appeal

to

the

notion of essence

(r4,

1006a

28-7b

18).

The burden of this

difficult

argument

is that

whatever

may

be the

case with other

modes

in

which

subjects

can be

characterized,

at the

very

least

it cannot be

the case that

the

definition,

which

gives

the

subject's

essence,

both is and is not true of it.

I do not

propose

to

go

into this

argument.

I

mention

it now

because

it

raises an idea which

will

recur

in the

following

analysis.

There

is

one set of

remarks in

F

5 which are

suggestive

of

a

point

which

we

will

find

developed

in the

passages

to which

I

am

going

to

turn next.

Aristotle

jokingly

suggests

that

Homer must have been

a

relativist because

he describes

an

unconscious Hector

as

lying

with his mind

on other

things

(this

is an

acceptable

description

of unconsciousness

in

Greek):

Aristotle

says

as if those who are mindless have their minds on things, only on different

things

(1009b

28-31).

The

point

of

this

remark

is

that relativists do not

admit that

people

make mistakes

or

misuse

their faculties. For them what

is,

on the

realist

view,

the difference

between the

good

and the bad

use

of

the faculties

is

just

that-a

matter of difference without

any

such

accom-

panying

values as the

realist

imports.

Aristotle's

use

of

the

word

'

mindless

'

is

suggestive

because while this

word is used

by

the

realist to describe

some-




5/12

196

J. D.

G. EVANS

one whose mind is

functioning

poorly,

the

relativist

is

able to

appeal

to

its

other-totally privative-sense

to

argue

that

the

realist's

use is

self-contra-

dictory:

if the

activity

of mind is

not

present

in

just

as

satisfactory

a

form

as it is in all other cases, then it is totally lacking.

There

is

no

question

that Aristotle

is

a

realist. He

says

it

might

seem

that

knowledge

is a measure and

the

object

of

knowledge

is measured . .

.

(but)

in a

way

it is

knowledge

that is

measured

by

the

object

of

knowledge

(Met.

I

6,

1057a

9-12).

But he

recognizes

that

realism can

go

to extremes

which make

it as

unacceptable

as

relativism;

and it

is

under this

heading

that the criticism

of Plato comes.

Where

Plato

goes wrong

is

well

brought

out

by

a

passage

in the

Topics

(Z

8,

146b 36-7a

11),

which is

a

development

of

a

difficulty

which

Plato himself indicated in the Parmenides

(133b-4e).

In that

work Plato

presented

an

argument

that

if

only

objects

of the same

type

are

correlative with each

other,

and if Forms and

perceptible particulars

are indeed

objects

of different

types,

then the

Forms,

as

objects

of

knowledge,

must be

objects

of the Form

Knowledge

rather than of the instances

of

human

knowledge

which

participate

in

that Form: those instances

of know-

ledge

must

be related

to

objects

of the same

type

as themselves-that

is,

to

the world

of

perceptible

instances.

I could

argue

that this

lamentable conclusion

does

represent

a

serious

difficulty for Plato, but not here.4 Aristotle's argument in the Topics runs

as follows.

Most

of

us

would think

inadequate

a definition of

desire as

'

appetite

for the

pleasant

';

for it

ignores

the

intentionality

of

desire,

the

fact

that

people

may

make a

mistake

and

desire

what

appears

to

them

pleasant

when it

is

not

really

so. Therefore

we must amend the definition

to include

a

reference

to

appearances.

But

it is

not

open

to the Platonist

to make this

common-sense

move. For

his definitions

are

considered to

be

definitions

of

Forms;

and

it is an

axiom

of

his

metaphysics

that the cate-

gories

of

the

real and

the

apparent

exclude

each other. As

a

Form

the

object

of desire must be

real;

and so to avoid what is for him the contradiction of

admitting

that there

exists the real

apparent

good,

he has to

deny

the

name

of

'

desire

' to what

does not have the

really

pleasant

as its

object.

If

we

strip

this

metaphysics

of its

ontological superstructure

of

Forms,

we have

an account

which makes it

a condition

of

being

an

exercise of a

faculty

that

it does not

err

in

its

object.

This

consequence

has

the curious

effect

of

assimilating

Platonic realism

to

the relativism

which it

is

designed

to combat.

This,

with

other

aspects

of the

case,

is

well

brought

out

in the

discussion

of

the object of wish in E.N. F 4, to which I,now turn.

A

few

preliminary

remarks are

needed.

Aristotle

regards

wish

(Bo6X7a7q)

as

the

faculty

which is

concerned

with

the

ultimate

grounds

for action.

This makes

it

the

more

natural that the notion of

good,

the

fundamental

value

notion,

should

figure

centrally

in his discussion.

Secondly,

Aristotle's

4For

this,

see

my

Aristotle's

Concept

of

Dialectic

(forthcoming

from

Cambridge

University

Press).




6/12

ARISTOTLE

ON

RELATIVISM

197

ethics

is

eudaimonistic;

and he

would see no

sense

in

the

suggestion

that a

person

could

consciously

and

consistently

fail

to

act in accordance

with

what he conceives

to be

the

good

life.5

The account starts by recognizing two answers to the question what

is

the

object

of

wish ? . Both answers

seem to

promote

fatal

objections;

and

yet

between them

they

seem

to

represent

all

the

possibilities.

We

are

in

a

typical

Aristotelian

position.

The first answer is

that it is

the

good.

This

is the Platonic

answer;

and

we have seen that

it

gives

rise

to

the

diffi-

culty

that someone

who wishes

something

which is in fact other

than the

good,

must

be

claimed not to

be

wishing

at all. For his

alleged

wish

is for

something

other than that for which

all

wishes,

by

definition,

are.

The

second answer is

that the

object

of wish is what

appears

to

each

person

to

be

good.

This answer has the

consequence

that it is

impossible

to

distinguish

different

wishes in order of

merit,

since there is no common

standard

by

which to measure

them. On

this view

the

object

of

wish has no definite

nature,

since

anything

might appear

good

to

some individual. Now the

man

who has

espoused

relativism welcomes

this

consequence;

for indeed

it

is

just

what

he

wants to assert.

But

Aristotle,

in

pointing

it

out,

is

concerned

not with

him but

with the

person

who

sees the

difficulty

in the

Platonic

account

and

thus

has

good

reason

to

identify

the

object

of wish with

the

apparent good.

The basic

inadequacy

of both

accounts

is

that

they

force

us

to obliterate

a distinction

which is

recognized

by

common

sense

and,

Aristotle

believes,

must

be

preserved

in

the

true

account of

the

matter.

This is

the

distinction

between the successful

and the unsuccessful uses

of the

faculty

of

wishing.

We

must allow

a use

to

such sentences

as

'

he

wishes,

but his wish is

wrong

'.

But

this cannot

be allowed on either of

the

contending

accounts.

For the

realist such wishes

are not wishes

at

all,

since

they

are

unrelated

to

the

object

of wish.

Similarly

the

relativist,

by making

every

act of

wishing

equally

related to its

object,

makes all wishes

equally

good.

In this

way

the

two

answers,

which

looked

initially

so

very

much

opposed,

end

up

in

agree-

ment on

the

cardinal matter

of

whether there is the

possibility

of

distinguish-

ing

between wishes in

respect

of their success. This is ironic because the

realist and

the relativist believe themselves to

be

in

conflict on this

very

point.

By

dialectically

assimilating

them,

Aristotle shows not

only

that

they

are

wrong

as

judged by

the

standards

of common

sense,

but also that

they

fail in their intention.

Clearly what is wrong is that due recognition is not being made of both

the

intensional

and the extensional

aspects

of

wishing

and

its

objects.

Granted

that

nobody

would

deny,

if

asked what

he

wishes,

that

he

wishes

the

good,

then

this

shows

that

intensionally

there is

just

one

object

of

wish

5A

third

caveat

is

perhaps

needed. None of

the

talk about 'the

good'

in what fol-

lows

conflicts with Aristotle's thesis in E.N.

A

6. The

good may

be

enormously

com-

plex,

and

yet

still

have

an

utterly

definite

nature.




7/12

198

J. D.

G.

EVANS

-the

good.

But when we

attend to the

ways

in

which

this

opaque descrip-

tion

has to be filled

in

for

varying

individuals-that

is,

when

we note

the

extensional

aspect

of the

object

of wish-we find

diversity

of nature in

the object from individual to individual. Although Aristotle's account is

not couched

in

this

modern

jargon,

it does

incorporate

this

insight.

But

to

draw this

analytic

distinction

is not

to

say

which

party-realists

or

relativists

-are

right.6

Aristotle's

analysis

attempts

to

adjudicate

on this

issue.

Before

moving

on to

the substance of

this

analysis,

let

me

emphasize

once

again

what is

and

what

is

not to be

expected

from

it.

I

have

already

drawn

attention to Aristotle's

remarks

in

Metaphysics

F

on

the limits to

provability

in

this

area,

and

urged

that

his

arguments

in

that work should

be

read

in

conjunction

with

those restrictions. This

must also be

borne

in

mind

in connection

with what follows.

Those who are

prepared

to

accept

the

unacceptable

will not be moved

by

what Aristotle

says;

but it

will,

I

maintain,

be of interest to those

who,

recognizing

the

unacceptability

of the

alternative

accounts,

are disturbed

by

their

inability

to find

anything

more

satisfying.

Aristotle's

own account

of

the

nature of the

object

of wish

consists

in

showing

that

the

two

opposing

positions

are

not as

incompatible

as

they

at

first

seem. In order to do this he introduces a

logical

distinction,

the

usefulness of which in the present context had gone quite unappreciated by

the

proponents

of

the

paradoxical

views:

this

is the

distinction between

the

qualified

and the

unqualified

forms of a

concept.

He

says

that

the true

and

unqualified

object

of

wish is the

good,

but the

object

of each

man's wish is

what

appears

good

to

him.

In

the

case of the

good

man

appearance

and

reality

coincide,

so

that

what

appears

good

to him

really

is

so,

whereas in

the case of

those other

than

the

good

man

there

is

a distinction

between

what

appears good

to

them

and

what

is

good.

There

are two

components

in

this

analysis.

Firstly,

there

is the

formal

distinction

between the

object

of

wish

in

a

general

and

unspecified

form and the

various

objects

which

come into view

when we consider the actual

exercises

of

the

faculty by

individual

persons,

the

objects

of each

man's

wish.

The two are

not un-

related.

For the

object

of some individual's wish is

the

object

of

wish in a

qualified

form. It

is what

appears good

to

him;

and

the reason and

justifica-

tion

for

calling

this-whatever

it

happens

to

be-the

object

of his

wish,

is

precisely

that the

object

of wish is

the

good.

But

while the two

are

not

unrelated,

neither

are

they

identical.

So

Aristotle's first

criticism of the

contending parties is that by insisting that the object of wish is either the

good

or

the

apparent good,

they

oversimplify

and

reach

a situation of

false

conflict.

Both

answers,

hedged

with the

appropriate explanations,

must

find their

place

in

the

full and sober account

of the matter.

Secondly,

6G.

E. L.

Owen,

in Aristotle on

Dialectic

(Oxford, 1968),

p.

119,

relies

overmuch,

I

think,

on the

power

of the

intension/extension

distinction to

resolve

the

issue,

and seems

to be led

by

this

over-reliance

to

the

substantively

wrong

conclusion

that Aristotle

regards

the

apparent

good

as

the

object

of

wish.




8/12

ARISTOTLE

ON

RELATIVISM

199

Aristotle

makes

his

pronouncement

on

the substantive issue when he

says

that

the

good

is the true

object

of wish

and

the

object

of

the

good

man's

wish.

With

this

further

component

of the

analysis

he

firmly

nails his

colours

to the realist mast; and he also shows that the object of wish is not to be

understood

simply

as a

general concept,

to

be

specified

only

when we attend

to

details

of

individuals' wishes and determine the

object

of each man's

wish,

but

rather

as

itself

something

utterly

specific-the

good.

Indeed,

in

this

area

the

vague

and

general

concept

is rather that of

being

the

object

of someone's

wish,

since

there

is

no control over the

diversity

of

objects

which

can

satisfy

this

description.

A

parallel

case

will

illustrate both

the

nature

and the

scope

of Aristotle's

reply

to

the

extreme and

paradoxical

accounts

of

the

relation between the

faculty

of

wish

and its

object.

In

gunnery

we have a connection

of

persons

and

objects

by

means of the

faculty

of

shooting.

In

order

for the

letting

off

of

guns

to

qualify

as an exercise of

shooting,

there has to

be a

special

object

-the

target-to

which

the

guns

are

essentially

related.

So

here we have two

elements-shooting

and a

target-which

are related

to

each other

in

the

same

way

as are

wishing

and its

object.

Now realism and common sense

tell us

that

there is

scope

for

distinguishing

between

good

and bad

shooting,

for

allowing

that

while

some shots

may

hit the

target,

others

may

miss

it.

But on the basis of certain aspects of the account of the relation between

shooting

and

targets given

above,

it

is not difficult to

construct a thesis

which

disallows this

possibility.

On

the

one

hand,

the

extreme realist main-

tains that the

object

of

every

shot

is

the

target.

But it

seems clear that the

gun

of the

person

who

makes a

poor

shot is

not

in

fact

directed at

the

target,

whatever

he thinks

or

intends

to the

contrary;

and

so we

have to

say

that

whatever he thinks or

intends,

such a

person

is

not

in

fact

shooting.

On the

other

hand,

the extreme relativist maintains that the

object

of each

shot,

whatever

it is

directed

at,

is

its

own

target.

This

thesis

preserves

the cor-

relation of shots and

targets,

which had also been

respected

by

the

extreme

realist,

and

preserves

the

claim that the

poor

shots are

really

shots,

which

the extreme realist had been

forced

to

deny.

But,

of

course,

on

this

account

every

shot

will hit its

target;

and

so the

scope

for

characterizing

any

shot

as

poor

is removed.

As with the

conflicting

accounts of

the

nature of the

object

of

wish,

both

these

accounts of the

object

of

shooting

obliterate the

distinction

between

the successful

and the unsuccessful

performances

of the

exercise. Here

also

there are extremists who will not be disturbed to see shooting as an all-or-

nothing

matter and

not,

as most

of

us

suppose,

an exercise

which is

subject

to variation in

degree.

But

it

is,

I

hope,

less controversial

than

in

the

case

of the

object

of wish that

something

has

gone

wrong

here. Once

again,

to

say

that

both accounts founder because

they

ignore

the

element

of intention

(the

aim)

in

shooting

is

true

but less

than

adequate.

It

is,

in

fact,

only

in

areas where intention

operates

that

paradoxes

of

this

type

can

arise.

Con-




9/12

200

J.

D.

G.

EVANS

sider the

following

very

different

type

of case.

When

a number of rivers

flow

from the heartland

of a

continent,

some

converge

to enter

the

sea from

the same

mouth,

but others make

their

way

to the

sea

independently.

Here

we may speak of the rivers' object of seafall ; but there is no inclination

here

to

produce paradoxical

accounts

of the

nature

of this or

of these

objects,

or

indeed

to

see

any problem

in this

area.

So

we

recognize

that what

gives

rise to the

problem

in

the

problem

cases

with

which we are

concerned

is

the

occurrence

within

them of aims and intentions.

But even

when we

allow

this,

we still

have

a

real

problem

in

providing

an

analysis

which

will

not

disqualify

the

unsuccessful exercises

of the faculties from

being

exercises of

that

faculty

at

all,

irrespective

of

what is claimed for them

by

their

per-

petrators

or

by

other observers.

Aristotle's account

suggests

a

way

to do

this.

In

the case of

each of

the

poor

shots

we must

say

that it is related

not

to

the

target

but

to its

target.

Thus

its

object

is not

simply

and

without

qualification

the

object

of

shooting;

but neither is

it

something

which is not

in

any

way

a

target.

Moreover,

the relation between

a

qualified target

of

this

sort and the

target

is

a matter

which is

open

to

objective

investigation.

We can determine

why

some

shots have

gone

wrong

;7

and we

can also

rule

that

certain

gun-firings

are related

to

objects

themselves so

unconnected

with the

target

that

these are not shots

at all. That

is,

we

have

the

scope

for distinguishing the problem cases-the poor shots-from, on the one

hand,

the

good

shots

and,

on the

other,

the non-shots.

The

account

preserves

the

notion,

so

essential to

a realist

view,

of the

target,

and thus

preserves

the

distinction between

good

shooting,

which hits the

target,

and

bad

shooting,

which does

not. It does not

infringe

the

requirement

that there

must be an essential

relation

between

a shot

and

a

target.

An

oversimple

interpretation

of

this

requirement

led the

proponents

of the extreme

positions

to

their distorted

views

of the matter. But the distinction between

the

unqualified

and the

qualified

forms

of

being

a

target

enables

us,

following

the

indications

provided

by

Aristotle's

analysis

of

the

object

of

wish,

to take

a

more

complex

view of

the

relation

between shots

and

targets.

Now

it is

no

longer

essential

that there should

be a

relation

between

every

shot and

the

(unqualified)

target,

at

least

not

the

same relation

as

exists between

the

good

shot

and

the

target.

My purpose

in

developing

this

account of

shooting

as a

parallel

to

Aris-

totle's

account of

wishing

has been

to show how

moves similar to those made

by

the

contending

parties

in

the

latter debate lead

to

positions

which

will

immediately strike the victim of honest perplexity as unacceptable. How-

ever,

the effect of

the

comparison

can be

two-edged;

and

this

promotes

a

consequence

which is both unfortunate

and

interesting.

The

metaphysics

of

gunnery

is,

in

a

way,

an area too

little infested

by

controversy

for

the

com-

parison

to be

fully

useful.

The notion of

the

target-as

the

object

which

is

7Aristotle

suggests

this idea

in

a

very

brief

and

general

way

at E.N. 1113a

33-5;

cf.

also 1147b 6-9.




10/12

ARISTOTLE

ON

RELATVSM 201

hit

by

some but

not

necessarily

by

all shots-is

so

well entrenched

in our

discourse that there is

an

implausibility

both

in the

development

of the

paradoxical

positions

which

make all

shooting

successful and in the

presenta-

tion of the notion of the qualified target, which is designed to disarm these

implausible paradoxes.

This

is

unfortunate insofar as it

reduces the

power

of

the

comparison

to

illuminate the

apparently

more

problematic

area of

wishing.

But it

is

also

interesting,

in

that it throws further

light

on a meta-

philosophical

issue which has

been of central

importance

in

this

paper.

Aristotle

would,

I

am

sure,

regard

the facts in the area

of

wishing

as essen-

tially

no more

problematic

than

they

are with

shooting.

He

would

say

that

we are

very

well

able to

distinguish good

from bad

wishing,

as

we are

good

from bad

shooting,

even

though

in

the case of

wishing

the

target

is

not

established

by

decree. But

ordinary

discourse does not

supply

an

expression,

analogous

to

'the

target',

to indicate

the

special

and definite

character of

the

object

of

wish;

and

this both

opens

the

way

for

the contentious relativist

to

maintain

that

it has

no

definite

character,

and lulls the

unwary

into

thinking

that what

he

says may

be

right.

The situation

under

analysis

is one

in

which the

roles

of

faculty

and its

object

both

need

to

be

kept

in

proper

perspective.

The

contending

parties

go wrong

by

overemphasizing

one element

of the relation at

the

expense

of

the other. The extreme realist is right to insist on the independence of the

object

of

the

faculty

from

any

particular

exercise

of it.

But

this

position

can lead to one

which divorces

the

object

from all

exercises

of the

faculty,

as we have seen

in

connection with the

difficulties in the Parmenides

and

the

Topics.

The extreme relativist

overcorrects this

defect

by

making

the

exercise of the

faculty

a

defining

criterion of its

object.

How

much,

and

how

little,

Aristotle

is

prepared

to

concede to this

position

is indicated

by

his

assertion

that where

the

objects

of human

faculties are

concerned,

the

good

man is

marked

by

his

ability

to see

the truth and

is

like

a standard and

measure.8 The

Protagorean

echo here cannot be

unintended;

but Aristotle

tempers

the

relativist

position

by

speaking

of the truth and the

good

man.

The latter

is, moreover,

only

like

a

standard measure.

Now

if Aristotle were

defining

the

object

of wish

by

reference

to the

good

man,

his

account would

be

viciously

circular,

since we have no

way

of

determining

the

identity

of

the latter

except

by

reference to the

former.

Rather,

he must be

asserting

that it

is a

necessary

characteristic of the

object

of wish that

it be the

object

of the

good

man's wish. To

see the

point

of

this,

we have

to remember the

consequences of the extreme realist's ignoring this fact and of the extreme

relativist's over-reaction

to his

opponent's position.

It

is an

inevitable

con-

sequence

of the

type

of

therapeutic

dialectic which Aristotle is

practising

in

the

present

analysis

that

any

of

his

remarks,

when taken

by

itself and

not

thought through

in

terms

of

its

part

in

the whole

account,

should seem

to

provide support

for

the

position

of either of the

contending

parties.

8E.N.

1113a 31-2.




11/12

202

J.

D.

G. EVANS

I

noted

earlier that the

major

argument against

relativism

in

Metaphysics

T

is based on

the notions

of definition and

essence.

These

notions

have

continued to be anathema to

committed relativists and a

stumbling-block

to those whose commitment to realism is unsure. But they lie at the basis

of the

ontological expression

which

Aristotle

gives

to his

realism;

and

I

want to conclude

by briefly

considering

a discussion

in

which Aristotle

resolves a

problem

about

definition

in

a

manner

similar to that

in

which

he

tackles

the

difficulties

about

wishing.

The

passage

is from

the

Topics

(Z

4,

141a 26-2a

16);

and as we

would

expect,

given

the

character of the

work,

the

dialectical

aspect

of the

analysis

is

even more

apparent

than

in

the

Ethics. Aristotle's advice

at the end

of

the discussion to make

precise

each

of

such distinctions and use

them to

advantage

in

one's dialectic

is

not

an

invitation to the

contentious to

be

self-serving

but a

reminder

that

one

needs

to be sensitive

to the context of the

dispute

when one treats

issues of

this

type.9

The discussion takes its

start from

two

basic theses about

definition.

The

purpose

of definition is to

instruct us as to the nature

of

the

thing

under

consideration,

and

definition must

give

an

account of that

thing's

essence.

An

immediate

consequence

of

this

second

requirement

is that

as each

thing

has a

single

essence,

so it has

only

one definition.

Thus insistence

on

the

realism implicit in the essentialist thesis rules out the possibility that defin-

itions of the same

thing

should be

graded

as better or worse:

only

the

best

will do

at all.

It should

by

now

be clear that Aristotle

will

not

be content to leave the

matter

there,

with definition

viewed

simply

as an

all-or-nothing

matter.

For

attention to the other

requirement

for

definitions-that

they

be instructive

-reveals a

complexity

which

needs to be

reflected

in

the full account. It

is

part

of Aristotle's realism that he believes there

to be a

natural

order

in

which

certain

things

are more

intelligible

than

others,

and that the com-

ponents

of a

thing's

essence are

prior

in this natural order of

intelligibility

to the

thing

itself. The

former are without

qualification

more

intelligible

than

the

latter;

and

they

are

also,

as with the

(unqualified)

object

of

wish,

more

intelligible

to the man of sound

understanding.

So

far, then,

there is

no

problem

in

an

unadulterated realist

account,

since

the man of sound

understanding

is instructed

by

the definition which

presents

the essence

of

the

thing

concerned.

But

what is without

qualification

intelligible

may

not

be so to someone whose

understanding

is

not sound.

If

he

finds more in-

telligible an account which describes the thing in terms other than its

essential

components,

he

will

not be instructed-or will be less well instructed

than he

might

be-by

the

only

account to

which the

realist

will

allow the

title of the definition

.

Aristotle

will

not

relax

the

restriction on what

may

count

as

a definition.10 But

he does

recognize

that

such a

sub-definitory

9142a

12-13.

10142a 6-8.




12/12

ARISTOTLE ON RELATIVISM 203

account should be

provided

where the

audience

is

of

less

than

sound under-

standing,

and he

describes someone who does this as

defining

.11

Aristotle is

mainly

concerned

to

combat a relativist view

which,

exploit-

ing the fact that what is intelligible to one man may not be so to another,

would call

a

definition

any

account which

happened

to

instruct

some

individual,

irrespective

of

the

success

with which

it

portrayed

the nature of

the

thing

concerned. This view is fatal to essentialism and

unacceptable

to

the realist

if he

believes that

things

have definite natures which

can be

approached

by

a

process

of

rational

discovery,

however

haltingly

and

how-

ever much

provision

has

to be made

along

the

way

to

discovery

for accounts

which cannot

yet

be

regarded

as the

definition.

But

the realist who does

not

make this

provision

pays

the Platonic

price.

He makes success an all-or-

nothing

matter,

and has to

say

that the

person

who is not in

complete

contact with

reality

is

not

in

contact at all. Aristotle is less exclusive as to

which

performances

should be counted as

defining.

He

makes more

allow-

ance for

the

part

played

by

human faculties

in

the

relation between them

and

their

object

than

does

the

Platonist;

and in

doing

so

he

shows

the

victim of

honest

perplexity

that

an

unpalatable

relativism is not the

only

alternative

to an

only

slightly

less

unpalatable

realism.

I

maintain that

in

these two accounts

in

the Ethics

and the

Topics

we

have a good example of the way in which the realist can deal with the

relativist without himself

going

to

unacceptable

extremes. He cannot refute

him;

but he can

disarm

him. He can

show

the

person

who feels

moved

by

the

force

of

the

relativist's

argument

that

it

does

indeed force us

to

preserve

the role of the

cognitive

subject

when

we

discuss how

things

are,

but

that

this does not mean that these

subjects

determinehow

things

are.

The discussions

are

brief,

and this

disguises

their

importance.

Some

find

them

trivial,

some

find them false.

This

disagreement

in

itself shows

their

importance,

and

I

think that Aristotle would

reply

to those who

find

them

trivial that

they

have not

sufficiently

felt the lure of the extreme

accounts,

and to

those who

find them false that

they

have felt

that lure all too well.

My

thesis is that

they

make an

important

philosophical

contribution,

as

well as

telling

us much that

is

fundamental

in

Aristotle's

philosophy

and

metaphilosophy.12

Sidney

Sussex

College,

Cambridge

11141b 23.

12Versions of

this

paper

in its

latest

metamorphosis

were

given

in

1973

at the

Uni-

versity

of

Georgia,

Athens,

the

University

of

Oklahoma,

Norman,

and the

University

of

California,

Berkeley.

I

have

benefited from comments on all those

occasions.

evans-aristotle on relativism

Documents