People vs Carlos

Facts: On March 3, 1924, Dr. Pablo Sityar, of Mary Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon Carlos wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments. She was eventually released from the hospital, but was required to go several times to Dr. Sityars clinic to dress the wounds caused by the operation. During one of the visits, Carlos was sent by the doctor to buy some medicine, and while out on such errand, Dr. Sityar outraged his wife. Despite having been informed of the incident, Carlos went back to the clinic to consult with the doctor regarding some lung trouble. While confined at the hospital, a letter was sent to him, demanding immediate settlement of his wifes account for professional services rendered by Dr. Sityar.

Carlos was released from the hospital, but when, one day, he went back to the clinic, he, without any prior quarrel between him and Dr. Sityar, attacked the latter with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice, killing the doctor. On trial, Carlos claimed he killed the deceased, but invoked self-defense. Carlos was however convicted for murder, due to premeditation, upon evidence in the form of a letter allegedly written to Carlos by his wife two days before the commission of the crime, the letter revealing Carloss wifes fear that Carlos would resort to violence in dealing with the accused.

Issue: Can the letter be deemed a privileged communication, hence, not admissible as evidence?

Held: Yes. Where a privileged communication from one spouse to the other comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouse, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. If said documents of communications were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged for otherwise, the privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for written communications; but if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressees consent, the privilege should cease.

In this case, the letter should be excluded as such was written by Carloss wife. If she had testified at the trial, the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony. However, she was not put on the witness stand, hence, the letter was not offered for the purpose of impeaching such testimony. If Carlos, by virtue of an answer or by other means, had indicated his assent to the statements in the letter, such letter might also have been admissible. However, such is not the case here, there being no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but hearsay, and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of Carlos in the criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine.

Doctrine: Where the spouse did not testify in the witness stand and a communication between the spouses was not offered as a means of impeaching such testimony, and where the spouse against whom the communication is offered as evidence does not give his consent, such marital communication is deemed privileged. Hence, it is not admissible as evidence.

Uy Chico vs Union LifeFACTS: The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods destroyed by fire. It appears that the father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at which time he was conducting a business under his own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the business and continued it under the same name, "Uy Layco." Sometime before the date of the fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother's interest in the business and continued to carry on the business under the father's name. At the time of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate.The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to compromise settlement of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged.Counsel, on this appeal, base their argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege may be withdrawn at any time before acted upon

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the testimony is privileged?

HELD: NO.RATIO: It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication betweenthe client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.

It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of the plaintiff's attorney as to his authority to compromise was properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect that when the attorney delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood that there was a compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face value.

ANALYSIS:Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the ruling would have been the same. It should be noted that inthis case, the communication was intended to be given in favor of a third person and the lawyer merelybetween the lawyer and his client to speak of.

REGALA vs SandiganBayan

FACTS: The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the certain corporations.Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment coveringsaid shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in the complaint, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.PCGG moved to amend its complaint which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco as party- defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved. Petitioners ACCRA lawyers moved that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in the complaint, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. The ACCRA lawyers then filed this petition for certiorari invoking the attorney-client privilege.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the identity of the client is covered by the attorney-client privileged?

HELD: YES by Exception.

RATIO:premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privilegedinformation is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. party suing or sued is entitled to know against unknown forces. Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions. 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3) Where the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice shareholdings. Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.

ANALYSIS:Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the ruling would have been the same. Nowhere in the Proposed Rules made mention that the name of the client is by exception privileged in character when revealing such name would furnish the prosecution the only link to build its case. Such non-inclusion could mean that such doctrine remains as a jurisprudential exception to the general rule that the name of the client is not a privileged matter. Under the Current and Proposed Rules, the communications between the counsel and his client are privileged with a few exceptions. However, in the instant case, such information is generally not privileged unless it falls under certain exceptions.