evidence first 3 cases assigned kjt

8/11/2019 Evidence First 3 Cases Assigned KJT

1/5

CASE No. 2

ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 127240; March 27, 2000

Nature of the Case:Petition for Review of CAs decision

(CA reversed RTCs [Branch 24 Koronadala S. Cotabato] decision admitting Ong ChiatoPhilippine Citizenship)

FACTS [1989] Petitioner, at the age of 66, filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen

under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to

corroborate his testimony.

Petitioner, born on January 1923 in Amoy, China

In 1932 (9y/o), petitioner arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel Angking and stayed inthe Phils. since then

He got employed/eventually started his own business and married a Filipina with whom he had4children

Administrative was first sought in filing a petition for naturalization with the Special Committee onNaturalization (Office of the SolGen) but the same was not acted upon as it was not reconstitutedafter Feb 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions by Administrative process wassuspended.

Hence, the consequence of seeking judicial intervention.

With such testimony, the Prosecutor got impressed asking the trial court to admit petitioner toPhilippine citizenship and wished not to present any evidence to counteract/refute the testimonyfor the petitionerwhich the trial court did (in 1999).

The State, however, through the Office of the SolGen, appealed for:

failure to his other name in 1989 petitiono a copy of the 1977 petition filed with the Committee was annexed to the States appellant

brief, in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewisebeen known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong

failure to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7

o

as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, petitioner resided at "J.M.Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition

failure to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in thePhilippines, in violation of 2

o petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until theywere married in 1977

o petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any

having no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient ormisdeclared, also in contravention of 2

o income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his netincome could hardly support himself and his family

failure to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contention: The appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merelybeen annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of thetrial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they aremere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," so it was argued, because underRule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence whichhas not been formally offered.


2/5

ISSUE: Whether petitioners contention is tenable.

HELD: NO. The SC found the contention to have no merit.

(1) Naturalization; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Formal Offer of Evidence. The rule on

formal offer of evidence is clearly not applicable to a petition for naturalization; Decisions innaturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicataPetitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that the rules shall notapply toland registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalizationand insolvency proceedings, and other casesnot herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable andconvenient.

The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to thepresent case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied byanalogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient."That is not the case here,since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears tobe the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalizationproceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment doesnot preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis ofthe same documents.

(2) Same; Same.The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has notbeen formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to theiradmissibility.Petitioner cannot claim that, as a result of the States failure to present and formally offer itsdocumentary evidence, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, thus, depriving him ofhis fundamental right to procedural due process. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting theadmission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance toobject to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to theauthenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.

(3) Same; Same; Public Documents. Where a party fails to make a satisfactory showing ofany flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of documents which havebeen executed under oath, the court may rely on them.The Court notes that the documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner'smarriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Sincepetitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on theauthenticity of these documents, it is in the conclusion of the SC that the appellate court did not err inrelying upon them.

Disposition:Decision of the CA AFFIRMED; instant petition DENIED.

CASE No. 4CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTING.R. No. 107383; February 20, 1996


3/5

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC ofManila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from privaterespondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

FACTS Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin.

On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in thepresence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawersand cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondencebetween Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.Martin's passport, and photographs.

The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and fordisqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damagesagainst petitioner.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of theproperties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in theMotion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalfto a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him certain amount including

nominal and moral damages. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and

her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting asevidence" the documents and papers in question.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:Whether the documents and papers, so forcibly/illegally taken or seized by the wife from andwithout the consent of her husband as the capital owner of the same, are admissible in evidence in acase of legal separation to which they are parties.

HELD:NO.

(1) Illegally obtained evidence; Constitutional Law; Privacy of communication andCorrespondence; Privacy of Communication and Correspondence is inviolable. The onlyexception in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safetyor order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.Indeed thedocuments and papers in questionare inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication andcorrespondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herselfaggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to beenforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a]court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of thisprovision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

(2)The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawersand cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity, as in theinstant case.A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right toprivacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

(3) The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making itprivileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of theaffected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the otheras to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/feb1996/gr_107383_1996.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/feb1996/gr_107383_1996.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/feb1996/gr_107383_1996.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/feb1996/gr_107383_1996.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/feb1996/gr_107383_1996.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/feb1996/gr_107383_1996.html#fnt2


4/5

specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for eachone to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity thateach owes to the other.

Disposition:Petition for review DENIED for lack of merit.

CASE No. 6PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (plaintiff-appellee) vs. JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMYBASCUA y LAZARTE, VICENTE STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.G.R. No. 97525; April 7, 1993

FACTS All the three accused-appellants were convicted by the Trial Court as the latter found all guilty

beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of Robbery with Rape, and eachsentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith the accessories provided for by thelaw.

On appeal: The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoring the fingerprint examination report

submitted by the Crime Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none ofthe specimen latent fingerprints were found to be positive.

o It is their contention that since their fingerprints were not found in the objectsfound in the scene of the crime they cannot be held guilty of the crime chargedbeyond reasonable doubt.

They claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee, evenwhen they had all the opportunities to do so, prove their innocence.

When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them during the firstconfrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until they wereagain required to appear at the police station for the second time. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decisionnot to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.

ISSUE (1): Whether the absence of fingerprints as accused-appellants posited, eliminatespossibility that accused could have been at the crime scene.

HELD: NO. The SC agrees that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance,however, it cannot sustain their (accused-appellants) theory that from the negative findings in thefingerprint examination conducted in the course of the investigation in the instant case, it must beconcluded that they could not have been at the scene of the crime.

Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for there may be logicalexplanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not being presentat the scene of the crime.Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of

comparison in a crime laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or brokenlines instead of complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in afingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily substance adhering to the surfaces ofobjects that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread suchthat when the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, onlysmudges instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to beguided accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting theinterplay of many circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of proper latentfingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility


5/5

that the accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they hadnot left any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints areinvolved. The findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not sufficient to case even just areasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.

ISSUE (2): Whether police line-up is required by law for proper identification of the accused.

HELD: NO. Face and body movement of assailant create lasting impression on victim. Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified at thetrial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. The complainant'srecognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be doubted for she had during the carnalacts ample opportunity to see the faces of the men who ravaged her. It is the most natural reactionfor victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants andobserve the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant andbody movement thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from their memory.

ISSUE (3) Rule 128, subsequent circumstance: Whether non-flight can be considered aproof of innonce.

HELD:NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. They claim that the fact thatVicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee, even when they had all the opportunities to do so,prove their innocence. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence. The SC does notagree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does not necessarilyfollow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so when there is overwhelmingevidence to establish their guilt.

Disposition:Appealed decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants are heldjointly and severally liable to indemnify Vilma de Belen for multiple rape and that none of the accused isrequired to recognize the offspring