execu uchuan

8/10/2019 EXECU UCHUAN

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MARISSA R. UNCHUAN, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO J.P. LOZADA, ANITA

LOZADA and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review are the Decision1 dated February 23, 2006 and Resolution2 dated April 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 73829. The appellatecourt had affirmed with modification the Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Cebu City, Branch 10 reinstating its Decision4 dated June 9, 1997.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were theregistered co-owners of Lot Nos. 898-A-3 and 898-A-4 covered by Transfer

Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 53258

5

and 53257

6

in Cebu City.

The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their nephew Antonio J.P. Lozada (Antonio) under a Deed of Sale7 dated March 11, 1994. Armed with a Special Power of Attorney8 from Anita, Peregrina went to the houseof their brother, Dr. Antonio Lozada (Dr. Lozada), located at 4356 Faculty

Avenue, Long Beach California.9 Dr. Lozada agreed to advance the purchaseprice of US$367,000 or P10,000,000 for Antonio, his nephew. The Deed of Salewas later notarized and authenticated at the Philippine Consul’s Office. Dr.Lozada then forwarded the deed, special power of attorney, and owners’ copiesof the titles to Antonio in the Philippines. Upon receipt of said documents, the

latter recorded the sale with the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Accordingly, TCTNos. 12832210 and 12832311 were issued in the name of Antonio Lozada.

Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa R. Unchuan caused theannotation of an adverse claim on the lots. Marissa claimed that Anita donatedan undivided share in the lots to her under an unregistered Deed of Donation 12 dated February 4, 1987.

Antonio and Anita brought a case against Marissa for quieting of title withapplication for preliminary injunction and restraining order. Marissa for her part,filed an action to declare the Deed of Sale void and to cancel TCT Nos. 128322

and 128323. On motion, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

At the trial, respondents presented a notarized and duly authenticated swornstatement, and a videotape where Anita denied having donated land in favor ofMarissa. Dr. Lozada testified that he agreed to advance payment for Antonio inpreparation for their plan to form a corporation. The lots are to be eventuallyinfused in the capitalization of Damasa Corporation, where he and Antonio are tohave 40% and 60% stake, respectively. Meanwhile, Lourdes G. Vicencio, a



witness for respondents confirmed that she had been renting the ground floor of Anita’s house since 1983, and tendering rentals to Antonio.

For her part, Marissa testified that she accompanied Anita to the office of Atty.Cresencio Tomakin for the signing of the Deed of Donation. She allegedly kept it

in a safety deposit box but continued to funnel monthly rentals to Peregrina’saccount.

A witness for petitioner, one Dr. Cecilia Fuentes, testified on Peregrina’s medicalrecords. According to her interpretation of said records, it was physicallyimpossible for Peregrina to have signed the Deed of Sale on March 11, 1994,when she was reported to be suffering from edema. Peregrina died on April 4,1994.

In a Decision dated June 9, 1997, RTC Judge Leonardo B. Cañares disposed ofthe consolidated cases as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. CEB-16145, towit:

1. Plaintiff Antonio J.P. Lozada is declared the absolute owner of the propertiesin question;

2. The Deed of Donation (Exh. "9") is declared null and void, and DefendantMarissa R. Unchuan is directed to surrender the original thereof to the Court forcancellation;

3. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to cancel the annotations of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim of defendant Marissa R. Unchuan on TCT Nos. 53257and 53258 and on such all other certificates of title issued in lieu of theaforementioned certificates of title;

4. Defendant Marissa R. Unchuan is ordered to pay Antonio J.P. Lozada and Anita Lozada Slaughter the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages; exemplarydamages of P50,000.00; P50,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorney’s feesof P50,000.00; and

5. The counterclaims of defendant Marissa R. Unchuan [are] DISMISSED.

In Civil Case No. CEB-16159, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

In both cases, Marissa R. Unchuan is ordered to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.13

On motion for reconsideration by petitioner, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 10,



with Hon. Jesus S. dela Peña as Acting Judge, issued an Order 14 dated April 5,1999. Said order declared the Deed of Sale void, ordered the cancellation of thenew TCTs in Antonio’s name, and directed Antonio to pay Marissa P200,000 asmoral damages, P100,000 as exemplary damages, P100,000 attorney’s fees andP50,000 for expenses of litigation. The trial court also declared the Deed of

Donation in favor of Marissa valid. The RTC gave credence to the medicalrecords of Peregrina.

Respondents moved for reconsideration. On July 6, 2000, now with Hon. SoliverC. Peras, as Presiding Judge, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 10, reinstated theDecision dated June 9, 1997, but with the modification that the award ofdamages, litigation expenses and attorney’s fees were disallowed.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 23, 2006 the appellatecourt affirmed with modification the July 6, 2000 Order of the RTC. It, however,restored the award of P50,000 attorney’s fees and P50,000 litigation expenses to

respondents.

Thus, the instant petition which raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND VIOLATEDPETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT FAILED TO RESOLVEPETITIONER’S THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR.

II.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY AND SHOULDREVIEW THE CONFLICTING FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLEREGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN ITS OWN DECISION AND RESOLUTIONS ONTHE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION, AND THAT OF THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS.

III.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDINGTHAT PETITIONER’S CASE IS BARRED BY LACHES.

IV.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDINGTHAT THE DEED OF DONATION EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER ISVOID.

V.



WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOTHOLDING THAT ANITA LOZADA’S VIDEOTAPED STATEMENT ISHEARSAY.15

Simply stated, the issues in this appeal are: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals

erred in upholding the Decision of the RTC which declared Antonio J.P. Lozadathe absolute owner of the questioned properties; (2) Whether the Court of Appeals violated petitioner’s right to due process; and (3) Whether petitioner’scase is barred by laches.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court violated her right to due processwhen it did not rule on the validity of the sale between the sisters Lozada andtheir nephew, Antonio. Marissa finds it anomalous that Dr. Lozada, an Americancitizen, had paid the lots for Antonio. Thus, she accuses the latter of being amere dummy of the former. Petitioner begs the Court to review the conflictingfactual findings of the trial and appellate courts on Peregrina’s medical condition

on March 11, 1994 and Dr. Lozada’s financial capacity to advance payment for Antonio. Likewise, petitioner assails the ruling of the Court of Appeals whichnullified the donation in her favor and declared her case barred by laches.Petitioner finally challenges the admissibility of the videotaped statement of Anitawho was not presented as a witness.

On their part, respondents pray for the dismissal of the petition for petitioner’sfailure to furnish the Register of Deeds of Cebu City with a copy thereof inviolation of Sections 316 and 4,17 Rule 45 of the Rules. In addition, they aver thatPeregrina’s unauthenticated medical records were merely falsified to make itappear that she was confined in the hospital on the day of the sale. Further,

respondents question the credibility of Dr. Fuentes who was neither presented incourt as an expert witness18 nor professionally involved in Peregrina’s medicalcare.

Further, respondents impugn the validity of the Deed of Donation in favor ofMarissa. They assert that the Court of Appeals did not violate petitioner’s right todue process inasmuch as it resolved collectively all the factual and legal issueson the validity of the sale.

Faithful adherence to Section 14,19 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution isindisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. The parties toa litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of thefactual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.20

In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterates the rule that a notarizedand authenticated deed of sale enjoys the presumption of regularity, and isadmissible without further proof of due execution. On the basis thereof, itdeclared Antonio a buyer in good faith and for value, despite petitioner’scontention that the sale violates public policy. While it is a part of the right of



appellant to urge that the decision should directly meet the issues presented forresolution,21 mere failure by the appellate court to specify in its decision allcontentious issues raised by the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believeappellant’s contentions is not sufficient to hold the appellate court’s decisioncontrary to the requirements of the law22 and the Constitution.23 So long as the

decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary findings of facts towarrant its conclusions, we cannot declare said court in error if it withheld "anyspecific findings of fact with respect to the evidence for the defense."24 We willabide by the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed,25 and all matters within an issue in a case were laid down before the court andwere passed upon by it.26

In this case, we find nothing to show that the sale between the sisters Lozadaand their nephew Antonio violated the public policy prohibiting aliens from owninglands in the Philippines. Even as Dr. Lozada advanced the money for thepayment of Antonio’s share, at no point were the lots registered in Dr. Lozada’s

name. Nor was it contemplated that the lots be under his control for they areactually to be included as capital of Damasa Corporation. According to theiragreement, Antonio and Dr. Lozada are to hold 60% and 40% of the shares insaid corporation, respectively. Under Republic Act No. 7042,27 particularlySection 3,28 a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which atleast 60% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and heldby citizens of the Philippines, is considered a Philippine National. As such, thecorporation may acquire disposable lands in the Philippines. Neither didpetitioner present proof to belie Antonio’s capacity to pay for the lots subjects ofthis case.

Petitioner, likewise, calls on the Court to ascertain Peregrina’s physical ability toexecute the Deed of Sale on March 11, 1994. This essentially necessitates acalibration of facts, which is not the function of this Court.29 Nevertheless, wehave sifted through the Decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals but foundno reason to overturn their factual findings. Both the trial court and appellatecourt noted the lack of substantial evidence to establish total impossibility forPeregrina to execute the Deed of Sale.

In support of its contentions, petitioner submits a copy of Peregrina’s medicalrecords to show that she was confined at the Martin Luther Hospital fromFebruary 27, 1994 until she died on April 4, 1994. However, a Certification30 fromRandy E. Rice, Manager for the Health Information Management of the hospitalundermines the authenticity of said medical records. In the certification, Ricedenied having certified or having mailed copies of Peregrina’s medical records tothe Philippines. As a rule, a document to be admissible in evidence, should bepreviously authenticated, that is, its due execution or genuineness should be firstshown.31 Accordingly, the unauthenticated medical records were excluded fromthe evidence. Even assuming that Peregrina was confined in the cited hospital,the Deed of Sale was executed on March 11, 1994, a month before Peregrina



reportedly succumbed to Hepato Renal Failure caused by Septicemia due toMyflodysplastic Syndrome.32 Nothing in the records appears to show thatPeregrina was so incapacitated as to prevent her from executing the Deed ofSale. Quite the contrary, the records reveal that close to the date of the sale,specifically on March 9, 1994, Peregrina was even able to issue checks33 to pay

for her attorney’s professional fees and her own hospital bills. At no point in thecourse of the trial did petitioner dispute this revelation.

Now, as to the validity of the donation, the provision of Article 749 of the CivilCode is in point:

art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must bemade in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and thevalue of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate

public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime ofthe donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notifiedthereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

When the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may bevalid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, thatrequirement is absolute and indispensable.34 Here, the Deed of Donation doesnot appear to be duly notarized. In page three of the deed, the stamped name ofCresencio Tomakin appears above the words Notary Public until December 31,

1983 but below it were the typewritten words Notary Public until December 31,1987. A closer examination of the document further reveals that the number 7 in1987 and Series of 1987 were merely superimposed.35 This was confirmed bypetitioner’s nephew Richard Unchuan who testified that he saw petitioner’shusband write 7 over 1983 to make it appear that the deed was notarized in1987. Moreover, a Certification36 from Clerk of Court Jeoffrey S. Joaquino of theNotarial Records Division disclosed that the Deed of Donation purportedlyidentified in Book No. 4, Document No. 48, and Page No. 35 Series of 1987 wasnot reported and filed with said office. Pertinent to this, the Rules require a partyproducing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to havebeen altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, toaccount for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another,without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected byit, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did notchange the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, thedocument shall, as in this case, not be admissible in evidence.371avvphi1

Remarkably, the lands described in the Deed of Donation are covered by TCTNos. 7364538 and 73646,39 both of which had been previously cancelled by an



Order 40 dated April 8, 1981 in LRC Record No. 5988. We find it equally puzzlingthat on August 10, 1987, or six months after Anita supposedly donated herundivided share in the lots to petitioner, the Unchuan Development Corporation,which was represented by petitioner’s husband, filed suit to compel the Lozadasisters to surrender their titles by virtue of a sale. The sum of all the

circumstances in this case calls for no other conclusion than that the Deed ofDonation allegedly in favor of petitioner is void. Having said that, we deem itunnecessary to rule on the issue of laches as the execution of the deed createdno right from which to reckon delay in making any claim of rights under theinstrument.

Finally, we note that petitioner faults the appellate court for not excluding thevideotaped statement of Anita as hearsay evidence. Evidence is hearsay whenits probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibilityof some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced.There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-

examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath.

41

It isa hornbook doctrine that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its makerdid not take the witness stand.42 Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of thiskind because she did not appear in court to affirm her averments therein. Yet, amore circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do notcover admissions of a party;43 the videotaped statement of Anita appears tobelong to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration oromission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Ithas long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they arehearsay.44 Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interestand declaration against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by

a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest withsuch party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as awitness. Declaration against interest are those made by a person who is neithera party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence andconstitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the

declarant is unavailable as a witness.45 Thus, a mans acts, conduct, and

declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for thereason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is hisfault if they do not.46 However, as a further qualification, object evidence, such asthe videotape in this case, must be authenticated by a special testimony showingthat it was a faithful reproduction.47 Lacking this, we are constrained to exclude

as evidence the videotaped statement of Anita. Even so, this does not detractfrom our conclusion concerning petitioner’s failure to prove, by preponderantevidence, any right to the lands subject of this case.

Anent the award of moral damages in favor of respondents, we find no factualand legal basis therefor. Moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of awrongful act or omission or fraud or bad faith. When the action is filed in goodfaith there should be no penalty on the right to litigate. One may have erred, but



error alone is not a ground for moral damages.48 The award of moral damagesmust be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondents actuallyexperienced emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice;they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof.49 As exemplarydamages can be awarded only after the claimant has shown entitlement to moral

damages,

50

neither can it be granted in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 23,2006, and Resolution dated April 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV. No. 73829 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The awards of moraldamages and exemplary damages in favor of respondents are deleted. Nopronouncement as to costs.

EXECUTIVE SEC VS CAThe Antecedents

Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers andOverseas Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on July 15, 1995. TheOmnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workersand Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in theApril 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before thelaw took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc.(ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory reliefunder Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court ofQuezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g),Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a)and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuanceof a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunctionenjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailedprovisions of the law.

In a supplement to its petition, the ARCO-Phil. alleged that Rep. ActNo. 8042 was self-executory and that no implementing rules wereneeded. It prayed that the court issue a temporary restraining order toenjoin the enforcement of Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (m) on illegalrecruitment, Section 7 on penalties for illegal recruitment, and Section

9 on venue of criminal actions for illegal recruitments,viz :!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

Viewed in the light of the foregoing discussions, there appears to beurgent an imperative need for this Honorable Court to maintain thestatus quo by enjoining the implementation or effectivity of thequestioned provisions of RA 8042, by way of a restraining order



otherwise, the member recruitment agencies of the petitioner willsuffer grave or irreparable damage or injury. With the effectivity of RA8042, a great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies havestopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecutedunder the provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional. This

Honorable Court may take judicial notice of the fact that processing ofdeployment papers of overseas workers for the past weeks have cometo a standstill at the POEA and this has affected thousands of workerseveryday just because of the enactment of RA 8042.Indeed, this hasfar reaching effects not only to survival of the overseas manpowersupply industry and the active participating recruitment agencies, thecountrys economy which has survived mainly due to the dollarremittances of the overseas workers but more importantly, to the poorand the needy who are in dire need of income-generating jobs whichcan only be obtained from abroad. The loss or injury that therecruitment agencies will suffer will then be immeasurable andirreparable. As of now, even foreign employers have already reducedtheir manpower requirements from the Philippines due to theirknowledge that RA 8042 prejudiced and adversely affected the localrecruitment agencies.3 !r'll

On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining ordereffective for a period of only twenty (20) days therefrom.

After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the

inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which italleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and aplea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents fromenforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) andparagraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.

The respondent ARCO-Phil. assailed Section 2(g) and (i), Section 6subsection (a) to (m), Section 7(a) to (b), and Section 10 paragraphs(1) and (2), quoted as follows:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

(g) THE STATE RECOGNIZES THAT THE ULTIMATE PROTECTION TOALL MIGRANT WORKERS IS THE POSSESSION OF SKILLS. PURSUANTTO THIS AND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, THE GOVERNMENT SHALLDEPLOY AND/OR ALLOW THE DEPLOYMENT ONLY OF SKILLEDFILIPINO WORKERS.4



Sec. 2 subsection (i, 2nd par.)

Nonetheless, the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whetherland-based or sea-based, by local service contractors and manningagents employing them shall be encourages (sic ). Appropriate

incentives may be extended to them.

II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shallmean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contractservices, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether forprofit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder ofauthority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.

442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of thePhilippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who,in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to twoor more persons shall be deemed so engaged.It shall, likewise, includethe following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder ofauthority:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater thanthat specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by theSecretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay anyamount greater than that actually received by him as a loan oradvance;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document inrelation to recruitment or employment;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document orcommit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing alicense or authority under the Labor Code;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quithis employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer isdesigned to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions ofemployment;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not toemploy any worker who has not applied for employment through his



agency;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobsharmful to public health or morality or to the dignity of the Republic ofthe Philippines;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary ofLabor and Employment or by his duly authorizedrepresentative;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placementvacancies, remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may berequired by the Secretary of Labor andEmployment;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employmentcontracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor andEmployment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties upto and including the period of the expiration of the same without theapproval of the Department of Labor andEmployment;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency tobecome an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged

in travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in themanagement of a travel agency;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workersbefore departure for monetary or financial considerations other thanthose authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules andregulations;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by theDepartment of Labor and Employment; andcralawlibrary

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker inconnection with his documentation and processing for purposes ofdeployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually takeplace without the workers fault.Illegal recruitment when committed bya syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involvingeconomic sabotage.



Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried outby a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederatingwith one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committedagainst three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officershaving control, management or direction of their business shall beliable.

SEC. 7. Penalties.

(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer thepenalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) daybut not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than two

hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five hundredthousand pesos (P500,000.00).

(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than fivehundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one millionpesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitmentconstitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.

Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if theperson illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or

committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.

Sec. 8.

Prohibition on Officials and Employees. It shall be unlawful for anyofficial or employee of the Department of Labor and Employment, thePhilippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), or theOverseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), or the Departmentof Foreign Affairs, or other government agencies involved in theimplementation of this Act, or their relatives within the fourth civildegree of consanguinity or affinity, to engage, directly or indirectly, in

the business of recruiting migrant workers as defined in this Act. Thepenalties provided in the immediate preceding paragraph shall beimposed upon them.(underscoring supplied )!r#l#*l(br#rÿ

Sec. 10, pars. 1 & 2.

Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary,



the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, theclaims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue ofany law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment

including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms ofdamages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placementagency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint andseveral. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract foroverseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for itsapproval. The performance bond to be filed by therecruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall beanswerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to

the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being,the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be,shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation orpartnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.

SEC. 11. Mandatory Periods for Resolution of Illegal RecruitmentCases. The preliminary investigations of cases under this Act shall beterminated within a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the dateof their filing. Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by aprosecution officer and a prima facie case is established, thecorresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four

(24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminaryinvestigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is foundto exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the properprosecution officer within forty-eight (48) hours from the date ofreceipt of the records of the case.

The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. ActNo. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.5 According tothe respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilledworkers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection

clause, as well as Article II, Section 126

and Article XV, Sections 17

and3(3) of the Constitution.8 As the law encouraged the deployment ofskilled Filipino workers, only overseas skilled workers are grantedrights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have theright to seek employment abroad. According to the respondent, theright of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they areprevented from finding employment and earning a living abroad. Itcannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by



employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses.It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers aresubjected to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, theprohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would onlyencourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.

According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to servicecontractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensedand authorized recruiters is an invalid classification.Licensed andauthorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property anddue process and to the equality of the person. It is understandable forthe law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate againstlicensed and registered recruiters is unconstitutional.

The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to

(m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitmentagencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters.Itcontended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiterswho are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the impositionof penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. Thepenalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalidclassification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause,besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section19(1), Article III of the Constitution.9 It was also pointed out that thepenalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies whoare found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment

under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment. Since recruitmentagencies usually operate with a manpower of more than threepersons, such agencies are forced to shut down, lest their officersand/or employees be charged with large scale illegal recruitment oreconomic sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment. Thus, thepenalty imposed by law, being disproportionate to the prohibited acts,discourages the business of licensed and registered recruitmentagencies.

The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15)

and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section22, Article III of the Constitution10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws andbills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume that alicensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegalrecruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that itcommitted any of the prohibited acts under the law.Furthermore,officials, employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegalrecruitment involving economic sabotage upon such finding that they



committed any of the said prohibited acts.

The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10,paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter should decide a moneyclaim is relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered

recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which thesummons and the complaint would be served on foreign employeesand, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would takemore than 90 days. This would thereby shift on local licensed andauthorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreignemployers. Furthermore, the respondent asserted, Section 10,paragraph 2 of the law, which provides for the joint and severalliability of the officers and employees, is a bill of attainder and aviolation of the right of the said corporate officers and employees todue process. Considering that such corporate officers and employees

act with prior approval of the board of directors of such corporation,they should not be liable, jointly and severally, for such corporate acts.

The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law areunconstitutional:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment asdefined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of theprovince or city where the offense was committed or where theoffended party actually resides at the time of the commission of theoffense: Provided , That the court where the criminal action is first filedshall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided,however , That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to thosecriminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of theeffectivity of this Act.

SEC. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to thecontrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction tohear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of thecomplaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship

or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers foroverseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary andother forms of damages.

Sec. 40.

The departments and agencies charged with carrying out the



provisions of this Act shall, within ninety (90) days after the effectiviyof this Act, formulate the necessary rules and regulations for itseffective implementation.

According to the respondent, the said provisions violate Section 5(5),

Article VIII of the Constitution11 because they impair the power of theSupreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.

In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that(a) the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b)the petition was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No.8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions donot violate any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law wasapproved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State.In opposition to the respondents plea for injunctive relief, the

petitioners averred that:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

As earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoidof merit for failure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that theassailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect and improprietyof the petition. One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionalitymust prove its invalidity beyond reasonable doubt (Caleon v. AgusDevelopment Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All reasonable doubtsshould be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (Peoplev. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption of constitutionality is based onthe doctrine of separation of powers which enjoin upon eachdepartment a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments(Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]). Necessarily,the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ ofpreliminary injunction prayed for must fall. Besides, an act oflegislature approved by the executive is presumed to be withinconstitutional bounds (National Press Club v. Commission on Elections,207 SCRA 1). 12 !r'll

After the respective counsels of the parties were heard on oralarguments, the trial court issued on August 21, 1995, an order

granting the petitioners plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon abond of P50,000. The petitioner posted the requisite bond and onAugust 24, 1995, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunctionenjoining the enforcement of the following provisions of Rep. Act No.8042 pending the termination of theproceedings:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ



Section 2, subsections (g) and (i, 2nd par.); Section 6, subsections (a)to (m), and pars. 15 & 16; Section 7, subsections (a) & (b); Section 8;Section 9; Section 10; pars. 1 & 2; Section 11; and Section 40 ofRepublic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers andOverseas Filipinos Act of 1995.13 !r'll

The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appealsassailing the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by thetrial court on the following grounds:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

1.Respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s orthat of its member-agencies to be protected by the injunctive reliefand/or violation of said rights by the enforcement of the assailedsections of R.A. 8042;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2.Respondent Judge fixed a P50,000 injunction bond which is grosslyinadequate to answer for the damage which petitioner-officials maysustain, should respondent ARCO-PHIL. be finally adjudged as notbeing entitled thereto.14 !r'll

The petitioners asserted that the respondent is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the trial court.It is inconceivable how therespondent, a non-stock and non-profit corporation, could sustaindirect injury as a result of the enforcement of the law. They arguedthat if, at all, any damage would result in the implementation of thelaw, it is the licensed and registered recruitment agencies and/or theunskilled Filipino migrant workers discriminated against who wouldsustain the said injury or damage, not the respondent. Therespondent, as petitioner in the trial court, was burdened to adducepreponderant evidence of such irreparable injury, but failed to do so.The petitioners further insisted that the petition a quo was prematuresince the rules and regulations implementing the law had yet to bepromulgated when such petition was filed. Finally, the petitionersaverred that the respondent failed to establish the requisites for theissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement ofthe law and the rules and regulations issued implementing the same.

On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-pagedecision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order andwrit of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellatecourt, likewise, denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of thesaid decision.



The petitioners now come to this Court in a Petition for Review onCertiorari on the following grounds:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

1.Private respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clearright/s or that of its member-agencies to be protected by the

injunctive relief and/or violation of said rights by the enforcement ofthe assailed sections of R.A. 8042;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2.The P50,000 injunction bond fixed by the court a quo and sustainedby the Court of Appeals is grossly inadequate to answer for thedamage which petitioners-officials may sustain, should privaterespondent ARCO-PHIL. be finally adjudged as not being entitledthereto.15 !r'll

On February 16, 1998, this Court issued a temporary restraining order

enjoining the respondents from enforcing the assailed order and writ ofpreliminary injunction.

The Issues

The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committedgrave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdictionin issuing the assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on abond of only P50,000 and whether or not the appellate court erred inaffirming the trial courts order and the writ of preliminary injunction

issued by it.

The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus standi .It is anon-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. Although the respondent filed thepetition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed and registeredrecruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy ofits Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said membersauthorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings.Neither is the suit of the respondent a class suit so as to vest in it apersonality to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is service-

oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent areprofit-oriented. The petitioners assert that the law is presumedconstitutional and, as such, the respondent was burdened to make acase strong enough to overcome such presumption and establish aclear right to injunctive relief.

The petitioners bewail the P50,000 bond fixed by the trial court for the



issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and affirmed by theappellate court. They assert that the amount is grossly inadequate toanswer for any damages that the general public may suffer by reasonof the non-enforcement of the assailed provisions of the law. The trialcourt committed a grave abuse of its discretion in granting the

respondents plea for injunctive relief, and the appellate court erred inaffirming the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by thetrial court.

The respondent, for its part, asserts that it has duly established itslocus standi and its right to injunctive relief as gleaned from itspleadings and the appendages thereto. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of theRules of Court, it was incumbent on the Petitioners, as respondents inthe RTC, to show cause why no injunction should issue.It avers thatthe injunction bond posted by the respondent was more than adequate

to answer for any injury or damage the petitioners may suffer, if any,by reason of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC. Inany event, the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 exposed itsmembers to the immediate and irreparable damage of being deprivedof their right to a livelihood without due process, a property rightprotected under the Constitution.

The respondent contends that the commendable purpose of the law toeradicate illegal recruiters should not be done at the expense and tothe prejudice of licensed and authorized recruitment agencies. The writof preliminary injunction was necessitated by the great number of duly

licensed recruitment agencies that had stopped or suspended theirbusiness operations for fear that their officers and employees would beindicted and prosecuted under the assailed oppressive penal provisionsof the law, and meted excessive penalties.The respondent, likewise,urges that the Court should take judicial notice that the processing ofdeployment papers of overseas workers have come to a virtualstandstill at the POEA.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The Respondent Has Locus Standi

To File the Petition in the RTC in

Representation of the Eleven



Licensed and Registered

Recruitment Agencies Impleaded

in the Amended Petition

The modern view is that an association has standing to complain ofinjuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of anassociation with that of its members.16 An association has standing tofile suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its membersare affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert theconcerns of its constituents.17 !r'll

In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v.Commission on Elections ,18 we held that standing jus tertii would be

recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has somesubstantial relation to the third party, or that the right of the thirdparty would be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espousethe third partys constitutional claims.

In this case, the respondent filed the petition for declaratory reliefunder Rule 64 of the Rules of Court for and in behalf of its eleven (11)licensed and registered recruitment agencies which are its members,and which approved separate resolutions expressly authorizing therespondent to file the said suit for and in their behalf. We note that,

under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized forthe purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth anddevelopment of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the localand international levels; providing, creating and exploring employmentopportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general membership;enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipinoworkers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company,

entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment

industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to

accomplish the purposes embodied therein. The respondent is, thus,the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it

and its members are in every practical sense identical. The respondentasserts that the assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights ofits members and the officers and employees thereof. The respondentis but the medium through which its individual members seek to makemore effective the expression of their voices and the redress of theirgrievances.19 !r'll



However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for andin behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to impleadany unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead,as parties-Petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered recruitmentagencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with

Section 2 of Rule 6320 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since theeleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which therespondent filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, theamended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.21 !r'll

The Assailed Order and Writ of

Preliminary Injunction Is Mooted

By Case Law

The respondent justified its plea for injunctive relief on the allegationin its amended petition that its members are exposed to theimmediate and irreparable danger of being deprived of their right to alivelihood and other constitutional rights without due process, on itsclaim that a great number of duly licensed recruitment agencies havestopped or suspended their operations for fear that (a) their officersand employees would be prosecuted under the unjust andunconstitutional penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 and metedequally unjust and excessive penalties, including life imprisonment, forillegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment without regard towhether the recruitment agencies involved are licensed and/orauthorized; and, (b) if the members of the respondent, which arelicensed and authorized, decide to continue with their businesses, theyface the stigma and the curse of being labeled illegal recruiters.Ingranting the respondents plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, thetrial court held, without stating the factual and legal basis therefor,that the enforcement of Rep. Act No. 8042, pendente lite, would causegrave and irreparable injury to the respondent until the case is decidedon its merits.

We note, however, that since Rep. Act No. 8042 took effect on July 15,1995, the Court had, in a catena of cases, applied the penal provisionsin Section 6, including paragraph (m) thereof, and the last twoparagraphs therein defining large scale illegal recruitment committedby officers and/or employees of recruitment agencies by themselvesand in connivance with private individuals, and imposed the penalties



provided in Section 7 thereof, including the penalty of lifeimprisonment.22 The Informations therein were filed after preliminaryinvestigations as provided for in Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 8042 andin venues as provided for in Section 9 of the said act. In People v.Chowdury ,23 we held that illegal recruitment is a crime of economic

sabotage and must be enforced.

In People v. Diaz ,24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but anamendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post

facto law because it is not applied retroactively. In JMM Promotion and

Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals ,25 the issue of the extent of thepolice power of the State to regulate a business, profession or callingvis--vis the equal protection clause and the non-impairment clause ofthe Constitution were raised and we held,thus:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning ofour constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right towork and the right to make a living because these rights are propertyrights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normallyconstitutes an actionable wrong.

Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of aprofession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as alegitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the stateparticularly when their conduct affects either the execution oflegitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, thepublic health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim,sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within thelegitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner inwhich every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injuryto himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights ofproperty, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainlymuch wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements

violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, underthe mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice ofvarious trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad arerequired to pass rigid written and practical exams before they aredeemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take testsdetermining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional RegulationCommission has begun to require previously licensed doctors andother professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either



re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses as arequirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that theserequirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property rightunder the due process clause. So long as professionals and otherworkers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation

exists.

Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke thenon-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argumentthat the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measuresbecause they abridge the freedom to contract. In Philippine Associationof Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, we held that [t]he non-impairmentclause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targetedby the government. Equally important, into every contract is readprovisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police

power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressedwith the public welfare.

A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainersand performing artists under the assailed department ordersconstitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clauseof the Constitution. We do not agree.

The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favorand individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibitlegislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or bythe territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absoluteequality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under likeconditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Wehave held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of theConstitution does not forbid classification for so long as suchclassification is based on real and substantial differences having areasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. Ifclassification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns allmembers of the class, and applies equally to present and futureconditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection

guarantee.26

!r'll

The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides thatemployees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegalrecruitment has been upheld in People v. Chowdury :27 !r'll

As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons



who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals,accomplices and accessories. An employee of a company orcorporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable asprincipal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively andconsciously participated in illegal recruitment. It has been held that

the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecutionthe corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes thecorporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, andcan act, only by and through its human agents, and it is their conductwhich the law must deter. The employee or agent of a corporationengaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carryingon of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if, withknowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciouslycontributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight hiscontribution may be.28 !r'll

By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailedpenal and procedural provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042, including theimposable penalties therefor. Until the Court, by final judgment,declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcementof the said provisions cannot be enjoined.

The RTC Committed Grave Abuse

of Its Discretion Amounting to

Excess or Lack of Jurisdiction in

Issuing the Assailed Order and the

Writ of Preliminary Injunction

The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not isaddressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if thecourt commits grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the said writamounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified

via a writ of certiorari and prohibition.

In Social Security Commission v. Judge Bayona,29 we ruled that a lawis presumed constitutional until otherwise declared by judicialinterpretation. The suspension of the operation of the law is a matterof extreme delicacy because it is an interference with the official actsnot only of the duly elected representatives of the people but also of



the highest magistrate of the land.

In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,30 the Supreme Court of the United Statesemphasized, thus:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in theirentirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, arenot to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes areunconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immunefrom prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. Theimminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to beunauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief inequity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to preventirreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. 752 Beal v.Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 49, 61 S.Ct. 418, 420, 85

L.Ed. 577.

And similarly, in Douglas, supra, we made clear, after reaffirming thisrule, that:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

It does not appear from the record that petitioners have beenthreatened with any injury other than that incidental to every criminalproceeding brought lawfully and in good faith 319 U.S., at 164, 63S.Ct., at 881.31 !r'll

The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not ofitself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it,unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any otherunusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.32 The on itsface invalidation of statutes has been described as manifestly strongmedicine, to be employed sparingly and only as a last resort, and isgenerally disfavored.33 !r'll

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement ofa law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that itwill suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must

demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there aresufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of

hardships tips decidedly in its favor .34 The higher standard reflects judicial deference toward legislation or regulations developed throughpresumptively reasoned democratic processes. Moreover, an injunctionwill alter, rather than maintain, the status quo, or will provide themovant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be



undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.35 Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief andauthority, in assessing whether to issue a preliminary injunction, thecourts must sensitively assess all the equities of the situation,including the public interest .36 In litigations between governmental and

private parties, courts go much further both to give and withhold reliefin furtherance of public interest than they are accustomed to go whenonly private interests are involved.37 Before the plaintiff may beentitled to injunction against future enforcement, he is burdened toshow some substantial hardship.38 !r'll

The fear or chilling effect of the assailed penal provisions of the law onthe members of the respondent does not by itself justify prohibitingthe State from enforcing them against those whom the State believesin good faith to be punishable under the

laws:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

Just as the incidental chilling effect of such statutes does notautomatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect thatadmittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on thestatute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State fromcarrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing these lawsagainst socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faithto be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.39 !r'll

It must be borne in mind that subject to constitutional limitations,Congress is empowered to define what acts or omissions shallconstitute a crime and to prescribe punishments therefor.40 The poweris inherent in Congress and is part of the sovereign power of the Stateto maintain peace and order. Whatever views may be entertainedregarding the severity of punishment, whether one believes in itsefficiency or its futility, these are peculiarly questions of legislativepolicy.41 The comparative gravity of crimes and whether theirconsequences are more or less injurious are matters for the State andCongress itself to determine.42 Specification of penalties involvesquestions of legislative policy.43 !r'll

Due process prohibits criminal stability from shifting the burden ofproof to the accused, punishing wholly passive conduct, definingcrimes in vague or overbroad language and failing to grant fairwarning of illegal conduct.44 Class legislation is such legislation whichdenies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon oneindividual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in likecase offending.45 Bills of attainder are legislative acts which inflict



punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certainindividuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment,penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.46 !r'll

Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and theirofficers and employees and their relatives employed in governmentagencies charged with the enforcement of the law for illegalrecruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who commitlarge scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. Theaccused may be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegalrecruitment only if, after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all theelements of the crime charged.47 !r'll

The possibility that the officers and employees of the recruitment

agencies, which are members of the respondent, and their relativeswho are employed in the government agencies charged in theenforcement of the law, would be indicted for illegal recruitment and, ifconvicted sentenced to life imprisonment for large scale illegalrecruitment, absent proof of irreparable injury, is not sufficient onwhich to base the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction tosuspend the enforcement of the penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042and avert any indictments under the law.48 The normal course ofcriminal prosecutions cannot be blocked on the basis of allegationswhich amount to speculations about the future.49 !r'll

There is no allegation in the amended petition or evidence adduced bythe respondent that the officers and/or employees of its members hadbeen threatened with any indictments for violations of the penalprovisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. Neither is there any allegation thereinthat any of its members and/or their officers and employeescommitted any of the acts enumerated in Section 6(a) to (m) of thelaw for which they could be indicted. Neither did the respondentadduce any evidence in the RTC that any or all of its members or agreat number of other duly licensed and registered recruitmentagencies had to stop their business operations because of fear of

indictments under Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8042. Therespondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed andregistered recruitment agencies would close shop and stop businessoperations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law.A writ ofpreliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannotbe based on such conjectures or speculations. The Court cannot take judicial notice that the processing of deployment papers of overseasworkers have come to a virtual standstill at the POEA because of the



assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. The respondent must adduceevidence to prove its allegation, and the petitioners accorded a chanceto adduce controverting evidence.

The respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove

irreparable injury because of the enforcement of Section 10(1) (2) ofRep. Act No. 8042. Its fear or apprehension that, because of timeconstraints, its members would have to defend foreign employees incases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true,such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.

The trial court even ignored the public interest involved in suspendingthe enforcement of Rep. Act No. 8042 vis--vis the eleven licensed andregistered recruitment agencies represented by the respondent. InPeople v. Gamboa,50 we emphasized the primary aim of Rep. Act No.

8042:!"#ñr$bl%& '(r†)#l l#* l(br#rÿ

Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicatespreying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad isone of the primary considerations that led to the enactment of TheMigrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 . Aimed ataffording greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is asignificant improvement on existing laws in the recruitment andplacement of workers for overseas employment. Otherwise known asthe Magna Carta of OFWs, it broadened the concept of illegalrecruitment under the Labor Code and provided stiffer penaltiesthereto, especially those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e.,Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed

by a Syndicate.51 !r'll

By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitionerssans any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, theprosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continuevictimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employmentabroad as overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of thesalutary policies52 embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042. It bears stressing

that overseas workers, land-based and sea-based, had been remittingto the Philippines billions of dollars which over the years had proppedthe economy.

In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court consideredparamount the interests of the eleven licensed and registeredrecruitment agencies represented by the respondent, and capriciously



overturned the presumption of the constitutionality of the assailedprovisions on the barefaced claim of the respondent that the assailedprovisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 are unconstitutional. The trial courtcommitted a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lackof jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary

injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a temporaryrestraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminaryinjunction issued by the trial court.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. Theassailed decision of the appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated August 21, 1995 in CivilCase No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued byit in the said case on August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and TINGA, JJ., concur.

Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.

execu uchuan

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