Local Rule 591.3 Judgment Forms Counsel must prepare, serve, and present to the Court forms for all orders and judgments, which require the Court’s signature. If no objection is forthcoming within ten days, the order or judgment may be signed as presented. Complaints in intervention under the Labor Code do not require supporting documentation. (San Bernardino Local Rules)

CRC, Rule 2.400. Court records (a) Removal of records Only the clerk may remove and replace records in the court's files. Unless otherwise provided by these rules or ordered by the court, court records may only be inspected by the public in the office of the clerk and released to authorized court personnel or an attorney of record for use in a court facility. No original court records may be used in any location other than a court facility, unless so ordered by the presiding judge or his or her designee.

CRC, Rule 2.550. Sealed records (c) Court records presumed to be open Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open.

CRC, Rule 3.1109. Notice of determination of submitted matters (a) Notice by clerk When the court rules on a motion or makes an order or renders a judgment in a matter it has taken under submission, the clerk must immediately notify the parties of the ruling, order, or judgment. The notification, which must specifically identify the matter ruled on, may be given by mailing the parties a copy of the ruling, order, or judgment, and it constitutes service of notice only if the clerk is required to give notice under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5

CRC, Rule 3.1112. Motions and other pleadings (a) Motions required papers Unless otherwise provided by the rules in this division, the papers filed in support of a motion must consist of at least the following: (1) A notice of hearing on the motion; (2) The motion itself; and (3) A memorandum in support of the motion or demurrer

CRC, Rule 3.1113. Memorandum (a) Memorandum in support of motion A party filing a motion, except for a motion listed in rule 3.1114, must serve and file a supporting memorandum. The court may construe the absence of a memorandum as an admission that the motion or special demurrer is not meritorious and cause for its denial and, in the case of a demurrer, as a waiver of all grounds not supported

CRC, Rule 3.1312. Preparation and submission of proposed order (a) Prevailing party to prepare Unless the parties waive notice or the court orders otherwise, the party prevailing on any motion must, within five days of the ruling, serve by any means authorized by law and reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties no later than the close of the next business day a proposed order for approval as conforming to the court's order. Within five days after service, the other party or parties must notify the prevailing party as to whether or not the proposed order is so approved. The opposing party or parties must state any reasons for disapproval. Failure to notify the prevailing party within the time required shall be deemed an approval. The extensions of time based on a method of service provided under any statute or rule do not apply to this rule. (Subd (a) amended effective January 1, 2011; previously amended effective July 1, 2000, and January 1, 2007.) (b) Submission of proposed order to court The prevailing party must, upon expiration of the five-day period provided for approval, promptly transmit the proposed order to the court together with a summary of any responses of the other parties or a statement that no responses were received.(Subd (b) amended effective January 1, 2007; previously amended effective July 1, 2000.)

CRC, Rule 3.1347. Discovery motions in summary proceeding involving possession of real property (a) Notice In an unlawful detainer action or other action brought under chapter 4 of title 3 of part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (commencing with section 1159), notice of a discovery motion must be given in compliance with CCP §§1013 and 1170.8.

(b) Opposition and reply at hearing Any opposition to the motion and any reply to an opposition may be made orally at the time of hearing or in writing as set forth in (c). (c) Written opposition in advance of hearing. If a party seeks to have a written opposition considered in advance of the hearing, the written opposition must be served and filed on or before the court day before the hearing. Service must be by personal delivery, facsimile transmission, express mail, or other means consistent with Code of Civil Procedure sections 1010, 1011, 1012, and 1013, and reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties no later than the close of business on the court day before the hearing. The court, in its discretion, may consider written opposition filed later.

CCP §86. Specific cases and proceedings that are limited civil cases (a) The following civil cases and proceedings are limited civil cases: (1) A case at law in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less. This paragraph does not apply to a case that involves the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll, or municipal fine, except an action to enforce payment of delinquent unsecured personal property taxes if the legality of the tax is not contested by the defendant.

CCP §88. Unlimited civil case A civil action or proceeding other than a limited civil case may be referred to as an unlimited civil case.

CCP §664.5. Notice of entry of judgment (a) In any contested action or special proceeding other than a small claims action or an action or proceeding in which a prevailing party is not represented by counsel, the party submitting an order or judgment for entry shall prepare and mail a copy of the notice of entry of judgment to all parties who have appeared in the action or proceeding and shall file with the court the original notice of entry of judgment together with the proof of service by mail. This subdivision does not apply in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, or for legal separation. APPENDIX-1

CCP §663a. Notice of intention to move to set aside and vacate judgment; Filing and service; Contents; Time limits; Entry of order; Review (a) A party intending to make a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment, as described in Section 663, shall file with the clerk and serve upon the adverse party a notice of his or her intention, designating the grounds upon which the motion will be made, and specifying the particulars in which the legal basis for the decision is not consistent with or supported by the facts, or in which the judgment or decree is not consistent with the special verdict, either: (1) After the decision is rendered and before the entry of judgment. (2) Within 15 days of the date of mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5, or service upon him or her by any party of written notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days after the entry of judgment, whichever is earliest. (b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 12a, the power of the court to rule on a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment shall expire 60 days from the mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5, or 60 days after service upon the moving party by any party of written notice of entry of the judgment, whichever is earlier, or if that notice has not been given, then 60 days after filing of the first notice of intention to move to set aside and vacate the judgment. If that motion is not determined within the 60-day period, or within that period, as extended, the effect shall be a denial of the motion without further order of the court. A motion to set aside and vacate a judgment is not determined within the meaning of this section until an order ruling on the motion is (1) entered in the permanent minutes of the court, or (2) signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. The entry of an order to set aside and vacate the judgment in the permanent minutes of the court shall constitute a determination of the motion, even though that minute order, as entered, expressly directs that a written order be prepared, signed, and filed. The minute entry shall, in all cases, show the date on which the order actually is entered in the permanent minutes, but failure to comply with this direction shall not impair the validity or effectiveness of the order.

CCP §1005. Requirement of written notice for certain motions Time for serving and filing; Method of serving (a) Written notice shall be given, as prescribed in subdivisions (b) and (c), for the following motions:

(1) Notice of Application and Hearing for Writ of Attachment under Section 484.040. (2) Notice of Application and Hearing for Claim and Delivery under Section 512.030. (3) Notice of Hearing for Claim of Exemption under Section 706.105. (4) Motion to Quash Summons pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 418.10. (5) Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement pursuant to Section 877.6. (6) Hearing for Discovery of Peace Officer Personnel Records pursuant to Section 1043 of the Evidence Code. (7) Notice of Hearing of Third-Party Claim pursuant to Section 720.320. (8) Motion for an Order to Attend Deposition more than 150 miles from deponent's residence pursuant to Section 2025.260. (9) Notice of Hearing of Application for Relief pursuant to Section 946.6 of the Government Code. (10) Motion to Set Aside Default or Default Judgment and for Leave to Defend Actions pursuant to Section 473.5. (11) Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action pursuant to Section 405.30. (12) Motion to Set Aside Default and for Leave to Amend pursuant to Section 585.5. (13) Any other proceeding under this code in which notice is required and no other time or method is prescribed by law or by court or judge.

(b) Unless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing. The moving and supporting papers served shall be a copy of the papers filed or to be filed with the court. However, if the notice is served by mail, the required 16-day period of notice before the hearing shall be increased by five calendar days if the place of mailing and the place of address are within the State of California, 10 calendar days if either the place of mailing or the place of address is outside the State of California but within the United States, and 20 calendar days if either the place of mailing or the place of address is outside the United States, and if the notice is served by facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, the required 16-day period of notice before the hearing shall be increased by two calendar days. Section 1013, which extends the time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done, does not apply to a notice of motion, papers opposing a motion, or reply papers governed by this section. All papers opposing a motion so noticed shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court days, and all reply papers at least five court days before the hearing.

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, all papers opposing a motion and all reply papers shall be served by personal delivery, facsimile transmission, express mail, or other means consistent with Sections 1010, 1011, 1012, and 1013, and reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties not later than the close of the next business day after the time the opposing papers or reply papers, as applicable, are filed. This subdivision applies to the service of opposition and reply papers regarding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication, in addition to the motions listed in subdivision (a).

CCP §1170.5. Time for trial; Extension; Payment of damages pending termination of action (a) If the defendant appears pursuant to Section 1170, trial of the proceeding shall be held not later than the 20th day following the date that the request to set the time of the trial is made. Judgment shall be entered thereon and, if the plaintiff prevails, a writ of execution shall be issued immediately by the court upon the request of the plaintiff.

CCP §1170.7. Motion for summary judgment A motion for summary judgment may be made at any time after the answer is filed upon giving five days’ notice. Summary judgment shall be granted or denied on the same basis as a motion under Section 437c.

CCP §1170.8. Discovery motion In any action under this chapter, a discovery motion may be made at any time upon giving five days' notice. Section 1170.8 is new. The section provides for an expedited hearing on a discovery motion in a forcible entry or forcible or unlawful detainer case, consistent with the precedence for such cases expressed in Section 1179a. The section is modeled on Section 1170.7 (five days’ notice required for summary judgment motion in action under this chapter).

APPENDIX-2

CRC, Rule 10.603. Authority and duties of presiding judge (a) General responsibilities The presiding judge is responsible, with the assistance of the court executive officer, for leading the court, establishing policies, and allocating resources in a manner that promotes access to justice for all members of the public, provides a forum for the fair and expeditious resolution of disputes, maximizes the use of judicial and other resources, increases efficiency in court operations, and enhances service to the public. The presiding judge is responsible for: (1) Ensuring the effective management and administration of the court, consistent with any rules, policies, strategic plan, or budget adopted by the Judicial Council or the court; (2) Ensuring that the duties of all judges specified under rule 10.608 are timely and orderly performed; and (3) Ensuring that the court has adopted written policies and procedures allowing the presiding judge to perform efficiently the administrative duties of that office. (Subd (a) amended effective January 1, 2007.) (b) Authority (1) The presiding judge is authorized to: (A) Assign judges to departments and designate supervising judges for divisions, districts, or branch courts; (B) Apportion the business of the court, including assigning and reassigning cases to departments; (C) Call meetings of the judges; (D) Appoint standing and special committees of judges; (E) Act as the spokesperson for the court; (F) Authorize and direct expenditures from the court's Trial Court Operations Fund; and (G) Perform all acts necessary to accomplish the duties specified by the rules of court. (2) No local rule or policy may limit the authority of the presiding judge as granted in the rules of court.(Subd (b) amended effective January 1, 2007.) (c) Duties (1) Assignments The presiding judge has ultimate authority to make judicial assignments. The presiding judge must: (A) Designate a judge to preside in each department, including a master calendar judge when appropriate, and designate a presiding judge of the juvenile division and a supervising judge for each division, district, or branch court. In making judicial assignments, the presiding judge must take into account the following: (i) The needs of the public and the court, as they relate to the efficient and effective management of the court's calendar; (ii) The knowledge and abilities demanded by the assignment; (iii) The judge's judicial and nonjudicial experience, including specialized training or education; (iv) The judge's interests; (v) The need for continuity in the assignment; (vi) The desirability of exposing the judge to a particular type of assignment; and (vii) Other appropriate factors. Judicial assignments must not be based solely or primarily on seniority; (B) Assign to a master calendar judge any of the duties that may more appropriately be performed by that department; (C) Supervise the court's calendar, apportion the business of the court among the several departments of the court as equally as possible, and publish for general distribution copies of a current calendar specifying the judicial assignments of the judges and the times and places assigned for hearings; (D) Reassign cases between departments as convenience or necessity requires; and (E) Designate a judge to act if by law or the rules of court a matter is required to be presented to or heard by a particular judge and that judge is absent, deceased, or unable to act. APPENDIX - 3

(2) Judicial schedules (A) The presiding judge must adopt a process for scheduling judges' vacations and absences from court for attendance at schools, conferences, workshops, and community outreach activities, and must prepare a plan for these vacations and absences from court. (B) The plan should take into account the principles contained in standards 10.1110.13 (on judicial education) and standard 10.5 (on community activities) of the Standards of Judicial Administration. (C) The presiding judge must review requests from judges for time absent from court and may approve any request that is consistent with the plan and with the orderly operation of the court. (D) The presiding judge must allow each judge to take two days of personal leave per year. Personal leave may be taken at any time that is approved by the presiding judge. (E) The presiding judge must allow the following number of days of vacation for each judge annually: (i) 24 days for judges with less than 7 years of service as a California judge; (ii) 27 days for judges with at least 7 but less than 14 years of service as a California judge; and (iii) 30 days for judges with 14 or more years of service as a California judge. (F) The presiding judge may authorize a judge to take more time off than is specified in (c)(2)(E) as justified by extraordinary circumstances, if the circumstances are documented and the authorization is in writing. (G) The presiding judge, in his or her discretion, may allow a judge to take additional vacation days equal to the number of vacation days that the judge did not use in the previous year, up to a maximum of 30 such days. A court may, by local rule, establish a lower maximum number of such days. This paragraph applies only to vacation days accrued after January 1, 2001. It does not affect any unused vacation days that a judge may have accrued before January 1, 2001, which are governed by local court policy, nor does it create any right to compensation for unused vacation days. (H) The court must, by local rule, define a day of vacation. Absence from court to attend an authorized education program, conference, or workshop for judges, or to participate in Judicial Council or other authorized committees or community outreach activities, is not vacation time if attendance is in accordance with the plan and has the prior approval of the presiding judge. Absence from court due to illness is not vacation time. This rule does not limit the time a judge may be absent from court when unable to work because of illness. (I) To ensure compliance with the plan, the presiding judge must establish a system to monitor judges' absences from court and maintain records of those absences. (3) Submitted cases The presiding judge must supervise and monitor the number of causes under submission before the judges of the court and ensure that no cause under submission remains undecided and pending for longer than 90 days. As an aid in accomplishing this goal, the presiding judge must: (A) Require each judge to report to the presiding judge all causes under submission for more than 30 days and, with respect to each cause, designate whether it has been under submission for 30 through 60 days, 61 through 90 days, or over 90 days; (B) Compile a list of all causes under submission before judges of the court, designated as the submitted list, which must include the name of each judge, a list of causes under submission before that judge, and the length of time each cause has been under submission; (C) Circulate monthly a complete copy of the submitted list to each judge of the court; (D) Contact and alert each judge who has a cause under submission for over 30 days and discuss ways to ensure that the cause is timely decided;

APPENDIX - 4

(E) Consider providing assistance to a judge who has a cause under submission for over 60 days; and (F) Consider requesting the services of the Administrative Office of the Courts to review the court's calendar management procedures and make recommendations whenever either of the following conditions exists in the court for the most recent three months: (i) More than 90 civil active cases are pending for each judicial position; or (ii) More than 10 percent of the cases on the civil active list have been pending for one year or more. (4) Oversight of judicial officers The presiding judge must: (A) Judges Notify the Commission on Judicial Performance of: (i) A judge's substantial failure to perform judicial duties, including any habitual neglect of duty, persistent refusal to carry out assignments as assigned by the presiding judge, or persistent refusal to carry out the directives of the presiding judge as authorized by the rules of court; or (ii) Any absences caused by disability totaling more than 90 court days in a 12-month period, excluding absences authorized under (c)(2); (B) Notice Give the judge a copy of the notice to the commission under (A) if appropriate. If a copy is not given to the judge, the presiding judge must inform the commission of the reasons why so notifying the judge was deemed inappropriate; (C) Commissioners (i) Prepare and submit to the judges for consideration and adoption procedures for receiving, inquiring into, and resolving complaints lodged against court commissioners and referees, consistent with rule 10.703; and (ii) Notify the Commission on Judicial Performance if a commissioner or referee is disciplined or resigns, consistent with rule 10.703(k). (D) Temporary judges Be responsible for the recruitment, training, supervision, approval, and performance of temporary judges as provided in rules 2.8102.819 and rules 10.74010.746; and (E) Assigned judges For each assigned retired judge: (i) Complete a confidential evaluation form; (ii) Submit the form annually to the Administrative Director of the Courts; (iii) Direct complaints against the assigned judge to the Chief Justice, by forwarding them to the attention of the Administrative Director of the Courts, and provide requested information in writing to the Administrative Director of the Courts in a timely manner; and (iv) Assist the Administrative Director in the process of investigating, evaluating, and making recommendations to the Chief Justice regarding complaints against retired judges who serve on assignment. (5) Personnel (A) The presiding judge must provide general direction to and supervision of the court executive officer, or, if the court has no executive officer, perform the duties of the court executive regarding personnel as specified in rule 10.610(c)(1). (B) The presiding judge must approve, in writing, the total compensation package (salary and all benefits) offered to the court executive officer at the time of the executive officers appointment and any subsequent changes to the executive officers total compensation package. (6) Budget and fiscal management The presiding judge must: (A) Establish a process for consulting with the judges of the court on budget requests, expenditure plans, and other budget or fiscal matters that the presiding judge deems appropriate; (B) Establish responsible budget priorities and submit budget requests that will best enable the court to achieve its goals; APPENDIX - 5

(C) Establish a documented process for setting and approving any changes to the court executive officers total compensation package in a fiscally responsible manner consistent with the courts established budget; and (D) Approve procurements, contracts, expenditures, and the allocation of funds in a manner that promotes the implementation of state and local budget priorities and that ensures equal access to justice and the ability of the court to carry out its functions effectively. In a court with an executive officer, the presiding judge may delegate these duties to the court executive officer, but the presiding judge must ensure that the court executive officer performs such delegated duties consistent with the court's established budget. (7) Meetings and committees The presiding judge must establish a process for consulting with the judges of the court and may call meetings of the judges as needed. The presiding judge may appoint standing and special committees of judges as needed to assist in the proper performance of the duties and functions of the court. (8) Liaison The presiding judge must: (A) Provide for liaison between the court and the Judicial Council, the Administrative Office of the Courts, and other governmental and civic agencies; (B) Meet with or designate a judge or judges to meet with any committee of the bench, bar, news media, or community to review problems and to promote understanding of the administration of justice, when appropriate; and (C) Support and encourage the judges to actively engage in community outreach to increase public understanding of and involvement with the justice system and to obtain appropriate community input regarding the administration of justice, consistent with the California Code of Judicial Ethics and standard 10.5 of the Standards of Judicial Administration. (9) Planning The presiding judge must: (A) Prepare, with the assistance of appropriate court committees and appropriate input from the community, a long-range strategic plan that is consistent with the plan and policies of the Judicial Council, for adoption in accordance with procedures established by local rules or policies; and (B) Ensure that the court regularly and actively examines access issues, including any physical, language, or economic barriers that impede the fair administration of justice. (10) Appellate records The presiding judge is responsible for ensuring the timely preparation of records on appeal. (A) The presiding judge ordinarily should delegate the following duties to the executive officer: (i) Maintaining records of outstanding transcripts to be completed by each court reporter; (ii) Reassigning court reporters as necessary to facilitate prompt completion of transcripts; and (iii) Reviewing court reporters' requests for extensions of time to complete transcripts in appeals of criminal cases. (B) After reasonable notice and hearing, the presiding judge must declare any reporter of the court who is delinquent in completing a transcript on appeal not competent to act as a reporter in court, under Government Code section 69944. (11) Local rules The presiding judge must prepare, with the assistance of appropriate court committees, proposed local rules to expedite and facilitate court business in accordance with Government Code section 68071 and rules 2.100, 3.20, and 10.613.(Subd (c) amended effective July 1, 2010; previously amended effective January 1, 2001, January 1, 2002, January 1, 2006, July 1, 2006, and January 1, 2007.) (d) Delegation The presiding judge may delegate any of the specific duties listed in this rule to another judge. Except for the duties listed in (c)(5)(B) and (c)(6)(C), the presiding judge may delegate to the court executive officer any of the duties listed in this rule that do not require the exercise of judicial authority. The presiding judge remains responsible for all duties listed in this rule even if he or she has delegated particular tasks to someone else.

APPENDIX - 6

EXHIBIT 12

SEP 8 20i4

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE DIVISION

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, Plaintiff - Respondent VS.

BONNIE SHIPLEY, Defendant - Appellant

case NO. ACIAS 1400026 [Trial Court UDDS 1204 1301

Appeal from a Final Judgment in San Bernardino Superior Court

Entered on March 20,2014

Honorable Michael A. Sachs

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

Clerk's Transcript on Appeal and Reporter's Transcript filed 713 1/14

Nancy D McCarron, CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane

Santa Barbara, CAP 93 103 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 Attorney for AppellanVDefendant Below

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES ……………….…………………............... first

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………………. 0

ISSUE ON APPEAL ……………………………………………………………………… 1

APPEALABILITY ……………………….. ……………………………………………..... 1

DE NOVO STANDARD OF APPEAL ………………………………………….…….….. 1

INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………… 2

I. Pertinent Facts and Procedural History ………………………………………………... 5

A. Former Panel Held, “As the Sublessee of a Mobile Home Owner Petitioner Does Not Fall Within the Category of an Unlawful Occupant ………………….… 6

B. Former Panel Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant ………………….. 6

C. The Trial Court Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant …………….….. 7

II. Serial Violations of Codes, Rules & Ethics in a Star Chamber Court Exceeded Limits on Judicial Power Imposed by Article III, §3 and Article VI, §13 ………..……. 8

A. Judge Sachs was not Assigned by Presiding Judge per Local Rule 530 …………... 8

B. Judge Sachs Stepped Out of His Role as Independent Arbiter and Into a New Role of De Facto Advocate for Stubblefield …………………….... 15

C. Court Had No Power to Grant Declaratory Relief to a Loser in the Judgment …… 18

D. Chronological Summary of Judge Sachs’ Serial Violations ………………………… 19

CONCLUSION …………………………………………………........................................... 21

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ……………………………………………………………………. 21

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ……………………………………………………..... 21

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD ……………………………………………………… 22

CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL ………………………………………………………….. 24

PROOF OF SERVICE …………………………………………………………............…… 26

TO BE FILED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL APP-008

I

m~Pmw1m.. 805-450-0450 fMm.D*a: 805-965-3492 E-U*lL*DwESS@&ul: nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

hmRNEYFO~IHjmex Petitioner [Writ of Mandate. Prohibition and Review]

~\PPELJANT&ITI~NER: Bonnie Shipley

COURT OF APPEAL, SanBernardin APPELUTE DISTRICT, DMSIOH AppellateDiv

A ~ ~ O R N E V O R P*RNV~HOUTA~ORIIEV (NW, sra&aarnvn&, m-I: Nancy Duf@ M&at-rob 164780 - 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbaw dt 93 103

RESPONDENT^ EL L PARTY IN INTEREST: Michael Sachs, Stubblefield Properties

w n d ~ ~ N u m b . F .

Appellate Div ------- wBfuccanca~ ~ u r b s c L, fit ji=d

UDDS1204130 FOR COWtTUSEONLY

I CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS 1 1 (Check one): INITIAL CERTIFICATE 0 SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE

Notice: Please read rules 8.208 and 8.488 before completing thls form. You may use this form for the innla1 certificate in anappeal when you file your brlef or a prebriefing motion, application, or opposltlon to such a motion o r appliCation in the Court o f Appeal, and when you file a petitlon for an extraordinary writ. You may a k o use thlS fohn as a supplemental certificate when you learn of changed or addltional information that must be disclosed.

1. ThiSfDrm IS belng submitted on behalf otthe follwring party (name): Petitioner

2. a. 0 There ate no Wrested e m e s or pemns that must be ~~sted inth~s certificate under rule 8.208.

b. Interested entitles or persons required to be listed under rule 8 208 are as follows:

Nature of interest IEYDlaln):

Fqll name of Interested entity or person

- - -

(1) Sfubblefield Pmperties, Partners Business BankcorplCA; see more- SEC filing Attachment 2

(2) ~tubblefield Quail Point Company D. William Bader; Neal Baker; William Cozzo, Alan J Lane

(3) Eva Stubt)Lefield Hazard, partner John E. Duckworth; Joh~i Riddell; Robert L Nottjngham;

(4) Arnold HStubbletield, Gen Partner John L Ridell; James W Andrews; Ruth E Adell

(5) Thomas Panish, General Partner Neil Dcrry,SB Cty Suprrace; Bill Postmus;Dale Stubblefield

Conhnded on attachment 2

The underelgned certifies that the above-llsted persons or entltks (corponUona, partnershipa, finns, or any other easoclion, but not including government e d e s or thelr agencies) have either ( I ) an ownership interest c4 10 percent or mare In the oartv If it is an entlN: or (2) a financial a other hUre+( In the outsome of the proceeding that tho jusUcoe . . . - - . . . - . - -. should consldPr in detemr~nlngne&ther to disqualify ihemselvea, as defined in rule 8.208(€4(2).

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Com. for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 C.4th 32,42 ……. 1

CONSTITUTION and STATUTES Article III, Section 3.................................................................................... 1, 3, 9,16,18 Article III, §3 and Article VI, §13 .................................................................... 2, 3, 4, 9 Civil §798.12 ............................................................................................................... 15 Civil §798.55 ............................................................................................................... 20 Civil §798.56 ........................................................................................... 1, 6, 15, 16, 18 Civil §798.75[c] ....................................................................................... 5, 6, 10,11, 14 Civil §798.85 ............................................................................................................... 21 Civil §1717 .................................................................................................................. 21 CCP §86 ...................................................................................................................... 18 CCP §580 .................................................................................................................... 18 CCP §663a(b) ............................................................................................ 3, 7, 9, 18, 19 CCP §798.56 ............................................................................................................... 15 CCP §904.2(a) .............................................................................................................. 1 CCP §1005 ............................................................................................................. 9, 19

RULES OF COURT CRC 3.110 ................................................................................................................ 9,19 CRC 3.113 .................................................................................................................. 16, CRC 3.1103 ................................................................................................................. 19 CRC 3.1201 ................................................................................................................ 16 CRC 3.1300 ................................................................................................................... 9 CRC 3.1312 ......................................................................................................... 3, 9, 19 CRC 3.20 ....................................................................................................................... 9 CRC 8.104 ..................................................................................................................... 7 CRC 8.841 ................................................................................................................... 22 LOCAL RULE 530 ....................................................................................................... 8 LOCAL RULE 591.3 ...................................................................................... 16, 17, 20

OTHER AUTHORITIES Committee on Judicial Performance .......................................................................... 4 CJE Canons 2, 2A Comment,2B, 2C ......................................................................... 4 Judicial Ethics, Preamble……………………………………………………………… 2 Public Corruption-Maximizing Remedies by Michael Sachs, Esq. Chief Deputy County Counsel and Leonard Gumport, Esq ............................. 2 Star Chamber Court .............................................................................................. 1, 2, 8

1

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did the court exceed its power, constitutionally limited in Article III, Section 3,

by running a Star Chamber Court 1 to revise a statute by judicial proclamation,

transmuting prevailing party’s judgment into a victory for the non-prevailing party?

APPEALABILITY

Under CCP §904.2(a), appellant Bonnie Shipley appeals from a final judgment

[CT 223: 3/20/14], after a former Panel directed final judgment entered in her favor

[CT 57: 8/13/13] by way of a Notice of Appeal [CT 269: 4/14/14] and NDR [CT 275].

Shipley was forced to appeal because the court’s paraphrasing of former Panel’s

conclusions, coupled with revising a statute by judicial proclamation, effectively

authorized respondent Stubblefield to evict her directly, contravening former Panel’s

conclusion that Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly because there was no

privity of contract between them---a statutory prerequisite to a direct eviction.

DE NOVO STANDARD OF APPEAL 2

The court revised Civil §798.56[d] in a judgment prepared by Stubblefield,

despite Shipley’s objection to directing a non-prevailing party to write the judgment.

It was delivered to chambers ex parte on 3/20/14. Judge Sachs signed and entered

the judgment immediately, depriving Shipley of any opportunity to object to its form.

Because the judgment transmuted loser Stubblefield into a winner, by gratuitously

granting him the same relief requested in his sham complaint [judicial authorization

to evict Shipley directly without privity of contract between them] she was forced to

appeal her own judgment or face the eviction former Panel rescued her from last year.

1 Star Chamber Court [15th Century] was permitted to inflict any punishment except death, without being bound by normal court rules or procedures. “Modernly, it is

used metaphorically to describe a runaway court, where a judge disregards codes, civil procedures, rules of court, or attempts to revise statutes by proclamation.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Star_Chamber 2 Com. for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 C.4th 32,42 [do novo standard of appeal is applied where the Panel must interpret a statutory dispute]

2

INTRODUCTION

“Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair

and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us.

The role of the judiciary is central to American…justice and the rule of law.

Intrinsic…are…precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must

respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance

and maintain confidence in our legal system. Judicial Ethics, Preamble

“A public office is a public trust.” Public Corruption-Maximizing Remedies

by Michael A. Sachs, Esq., Chief Deputy County Counsel and Leonard Gumport 3

After 7 years as judge and 13 years as county counsel prosecuting public trust abuse,

Judge Sachs knew he could not run a Star Chamber Court, disregard codes & rules,

or revise a statute by judicial proclamation to transmute a loser into a winner.

Judge Sachs ran a Star Chamber Court by ordering non-prevailing party to

write prevailing party’s judgment [and deliver it ex parte to chambers] which revised

a statute to authorize Shipley’s direct eviction without privity of contract. This ruse

flouted former Panel’s conclusion that Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly

because he was not in privity of contract with her, as well as its conclusion that such

eviction attempts would be illegal. This gratuitous gift exceeded constitutional limits

on judicial power imposed by Article III,§3 and ArticleVI,§13.

Forcing a second appeal imposes an undue burden on the Appellate Division.

Once judgment for defendant is ordered by Writ of Mandate, and a plaintiff has

exhausted appeals up to the Supreme Court, the burden to defend should be over.

Paraphrasing former Panel’s conclusions, affirmed on appeal, to transmute a loser

into a winner---to advance a political agenda---should not be condoned by this court.

After prevailing last year by writ petition, Shipley is forced to prosecute a second

appeal to eschew a tainted judgment from ripening into an un-appealable judgment.

3 by Michael Sachs 9/14/05-Annual Meeting of County Counsels in Los Gatos

3

Presiding Panel is not the same panel who issued a writ of mandate last year.

Former Panel held Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly as no privity of

contract existed between them because she was co-resident of a homeowner on a lease.

[CT 177, 184]. Former Panel found Stubblefield’s remedy was to proceed directly

against the homeowner for an alleged rule violation by a co-resident or homeowner.

[CT 185] Privity of contract is a statutory prerequisite to any lawful eviction.

To comply with a 7/22/13 writ, Judge Alvarez granted her summary judgment,

[CT 124:10/21/13], but never entered final judgment on the merits, although Shipley

offered one with the summary judgment order. [CT 148] After voluntary recusal on

1/7/14 Judge Alvarez reassigned the case to Judge Sachs. [RT 17] On 2/19/14, rather

than enter any one of three final judgments Shipley had submitted [CT 161: 2/10/14] ,

Judge Sachs decided to vacate Judge Alvarez’s prior summary judgment order,

without any pending motion for such relief. [CT 163] In fact, jurisdiction to vacate

expired 60 days after Judge Alvarez entered the order on 10/21/13. CCP §663a(b).

Ignoring Shipley’s oral & written objections to bizarre Star Court process, Judge

Sachs ordered Stubblefield to compose a new summary judgment order, to replace the

one he vacated after jurisdiction expired, combined with final judgment [CT 163, 165].

This violated Rule 3.1312 calling for the prevailing party to submit a final judgment.

Seizing an opportunity to transmute his loss into a win Stubblefield paraphrased a trial

court finding and Panel conclusions to grant the relief requested in his sham complaint.

Judge Sachs inserted or resident into a statute to expand a homeowner eviction remedy

to all residents. This not only contravened former Panel’s conclusion that Stubblefield

could not evict Shipley directly, but also revised a statute by judicial proclamation,

exceeding constitutional limits on judicial power in Article III, Section 3. 4 [CT 245]

4 Article III, Section 3.“The powers of state government are legislative,

executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution”

4

Vacating a summary judgment on 3/20/14 – 5 months after its entry on 10/21/13

exceeded limits imposed by Article VI, §13 on jurisdiction to vacate a judgment. 5

Judge Sachs signed the hybrid judgment on 3/20/14--the same day it was

delivered to chambers ex parte—violating Rule 3.1312. Judge Sachs’ signing,

as soon as the judgment hit his desk, not only consecrated blatant violations of

Rule 3.1312 but also failed to comply with Local Rule 591.3 requiring judges to

withhold entry of judgment for 10 days to afford a party opportunity to object.

Judge Sachs ordered a deputy to reject objections Shipley tried to file on 3/21/14.

The deputy said they were late as “the order had been signed yesterday” [3/20/14]

S-33 is a runaway court in which Judge Sachs ignores Codes of Civil Procedure,

Rules of Court, Statutes of Limitation and constitutional limitations on his power.

Judge Sachs acted as Stubblefield’s de facto advocate. Shipley prayed for Presiding

Panel to hold him in contempt of former Panel’s writ of mandate and to refer profligate

violations to Committee on Judicial Performance.6 Shipley’s prayer for contempt was

rejected by Presiding Panel, 4th Dist. Court of Appeal, Division 2, and Supreme Court.

Shipley was forced to prosecute a second appeal or be summarily evicted through

express authorization of a judicial officer by an evictor without privity of contract.

5 Article VI,§13 No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 6 “Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline to be imposed requires a reasoned application of the text and consideration of such factors as seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper activity, and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial system.” CJE, p. 3, Impropriety includes conduct that violates the law, court rules, or provisions of this code, and conduct that undermines a judge’s

independence, integrity, or impartiality. Canons 2, 2A Comment,2B, 2C

5

I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On 8/1/12 Shipley moved into Space 333 as the homeowner’s co-resident

in Stubblefield’s park. On 8/2/12 the homeowner delivered the same co-resident

application she used for all former co-residents since 2005 to the park office.

After homeowner left the park manager confronted Shipley at Space 333,

and threatened to lock her out of the park if she did not move out the next day.

Manager told Shipley if she wanted to live in the park she would have to find a

“sugar daddy over 55” who lived in the park and move into his mobile home.

On 8/11/12 a process server nailed a 5-day Notice to Surrender Possession

onto the mobilehome citing Civil Code §798.75[c] as the basis of the demand.

The notice was invalid as subsection [c] applied only to a purchaser or transferee

who occupies a mobile home without a park lease. Shipley was neither one.

Despite warning of invalidity, Stubblefield served a sham eviction on 8/27/12.

[CT 3]. The court overruled Shipley’s demurrer ordering her to answer. [CT 5]

After enduring 6 months of scorched earth litigation, Shipley petitioned the

Appellate Division to reverse denial of summary judgment. On 5/6/13 a former

Panel granted relief [CT 189] Former Panel found Civil §798.75[c] did not apply

to Shipley because she was not a purchaser/transferee of a mobile home and as a

lawful co-resident she was not an unlawful occupant. Former Panel found the 5-

day notice Stubblefield served was invalid and direct eviction was unauthorized:

CT 185

6

A. Former Panel Held, “As the Sublessee of a Mobile Home Owner Petitioner Does Not Fall Within the Category of an Unlawful Occupant.” CT 183

Panel concluded Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly because there

was no privity of contract between them and Stubblefield did not own the home:

CT 184

Because Stubblefield argued there was no remedy to evict co-residents directly

former Panel opined his remedy was to proceed directly against the homeowner if

he wanted to evict a co-resident for any purported violation of a reasonable rule:

CT 185

Former Panel did not opine as to the reasonableness of Stubblefield’s park rules.

CT 185

B. Former Panel Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant

Former Panel expressly found Shipley did not fall within such definition.

CT 183

Former Panel recited the trial court’s 2/14/13 erroneous finding verbatim:

“Rather the court found that Section 798.75, subdivision [c] ‘is not limited in its application , only in the escrow, sale or transfer of a mobile home. It applies when an occupant of a mobile home has no right of tenancy and is not otherwise entitled to occupy the mobile home pursuant to this chapter.’ ” CT 181

7

C. The Trial Court Never Held Shipley Was An Unlawful Occupant.

On 2/14/13 the trial court denied Stubblefield’s summary judgment, based on

arguing Shipley was an unlawful occupant subject to summary eviction. If the trial

court had found Shipley was an unlawful occupant the court would have granted

Stubblefield’s summary judgment rendering him the prevailing party. Instead,

the court set a trial date to let a jury decide if Shipley was an unlawful occupant.

On 7/22/13 former Panel issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court

to vacate its denial of summary judgment, to grant summary judgment, and to enter

final judgment on the merits for Shipley, with costs. CT 189

Because Stubblefield appealed Panel’s order to the Court of Appeal [ CT 132]

and the Supreme Court [CT 143] the trial court was unable to comply with former

Panel’s mandate until 10/21/13 by entering summary judgment for Shipley. CT 124

Department S-32 clerk served the order on all parties by mail on 10/22/12. CT 125

The clerk’s service by mail triggered the clock on Stubblefield’s window to appeal

[60 days in CRC 8.104] or to move the court to vacate the order. Civil §663(a)(2)

[15 days from clerk’s mail service]. Stubblefield failed to appeal or move to vacate

the 10/21/13 order granting summary judgment to Shipley. CCP §663(b) recites,

“the power of the court to rule on a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment shall expire 60 days from the mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk.”

Two weeks after Dept. S-32 clerk mailed notice of a summary judgment order,

reciting, “DEFENDANT/MOVING PARTY to prepare JUDGMENT” Shipley offered

a proposed final judgment to Judge Alvarez on November 4, 2013---accompanied

by Stubblefield’s objections to it, and his alternate proposed judgment. CT 153

Judge Alvarez never signed the proposed final judgment Shipley offered or the

alternate final judgment Stubblefield submitted. The court never composed its

own final judgment. The court failed to comply with former Panel’s directive.

8

II. Serial Violations of Codes, Rules & Ethics in a Star Chamber Court Exceeded Constitutional Limits on Judicial Power Imposed by Art. III, §3 & Art. VI, §13

A. Judge Sachs was not Assigned by Presiding Judge per Local Rule 530

On 1/7/14 Shipley’s Fee Motion came on for hearing. McCarron asked Judge

Alvarez to recuse as bias is presumed after reversal. Shipley feared he would gut

fees, just as he had done in other pro bono cases, forcing each party to appeal.

After self-recusal Judge Alvarez reassigned the case to Judge Sachs. Judge Alvarez

continued the attorney fee motion to February 10, 2014. [CT 158] Local Rule 530

required the presiding judge to reassign cases. “Something was rotten in Denmark.”

Why would Judge Alvarez reassign a judicial brother in a department right next door?

Why didn’t Judge Alvarez transfer the case to the presiding judge for reassignment?

On 2/10/14 McCarron appeared in S-33 to present the same three judgments she

had submitted to Judge Alvarez on 11/4/13--except the words prevailing party were

deleted because Stubblefield had objected to the words in November. “Judge of San

Bernardino Superior Court” was substituted for “Donald Alvarez, Judge.” [CT 161]

Judge Sachs refused to sign any judgment McCarron presented. [RT 26, 29, 30, 36]

A minute order recited counsel for plaintiff to submit proposed judgment to the court.

Judge Sachs continued the 2/10/14 hearing to 2/19/14. Court Rule 3.1312 called for

prevailing party to submit the order. Judge Sachs ignored McCarron’s objection to

his failure to comply with 3.1312. Judge Sachs conducts Star Court proceedings.

On 2-19-14 McCarron objected to vacating summary judgment 5 months later.

[RT 40:16] McCarron objected to no jurisdiction to amend a summary judgment

order as the window to appeal or vacate expired three months earlier--on 12/23/13.

[RT 40:20] McCarron told Judge Sachs he could not paraphrase trial court or Panel

findings. [RT 46:22]. McCarron urged him to consider reciting former Panel’s two-

sentence directive while attaching a 10-pg decision for clarity [RT 41:21, 42:14, 47:1]

or enter the order Shipley offered containing genuine findings as shown at CT 209.

9

McCarron objected again to no jurisdiction to paraphrase findings not recited in the

official transcript or former Panel’s order. Judge Sachs responded “I don’t want to

reargue what we just did.” RT 47:10 Judge Sachs runs Star Court proceedings.

Judge Sachs exceeded jurisdiction in waiving CCP §663(a)(2)’s 60-day statute of

limitations to vacate the Alvarez order. Even if the statute of limitations had not

expired, no judge can vacate a prior judge’s order unless movant serves Notice of

Motion under CCP §1005 reciting statutory grounds for relief. CRC 3.110, 3.1300.

Under CRC 3.20 local rules cannot be used to preempt California Rules of Court.

This ultra vires act violated Article III, §3 and Article VI, §13 of the Constitution.

The 2/19/14 Minute Order recited, “counsel for plaintiff to prepare judgment

as proposed by court” by 3/5/14. Objections shall be due no later than 3/12/14.

Judge Sachs ordered Stubblefield’s counsel to compose a hybrid judgment, violating

Rule 3.1312, calling for prevailing party to prepare the judgment. Who ever heard

of a Judge ordering a loser to write an appellate winner’s final judgment? No un-

biased judge would make such order. Judge Sachs runs Star Court proceedings.

On 3/4/14 Stubblefield offered a judgment reciting both courts found Shipley was

an unlawful occupant. Neither court ever made any such finding. CT 173:24-25

On 3/4/14 Shipley filed objections highlighting the words “such as defendant” in

RED which were artfully inserted into a paraphrased version of a 2/14/13 transcript

of trial court’s findings. CT 165:20. A Court Reporter’s official transcript [2/14/13]

shows the words such as defendant never appeared therein as shown below:

2/14/13 RT, p.11 of 24

10

The actual finding recited, “It applies when an occupant of a mobile home has no

right of tenancy and is not entitled to occupy the mobile home pursuant to this chapter.”

In a paraphrased version of the official 2/14/13 transcript, Stubblefield artfully inserted

the words “such as defendant” in the middle of a sentence to create a pretext that the

court found Shipley was within a class of “unlawful occupants” defined in findings.

Below is the paraphrased version Judge Sachs adopted in a judgment entered 3/20/14.

CT 173

Above words such as defendant never appeared in the official 2/14/13 transcript.

Stubblefield’s paraphrased version also recited that former Panel found Shipley

was a “sublessee of the mobilehome” --an unauthorized sublessee of a mobilehome--

thus, an unlawful occupant.” Former Panel actually found exactly the opposite; i.e.

that Shipley was the sublessee of a mobilehome owner-----not a mobilehome!

CT 183 top, ln 2

Judge Sachs refused to consider entering Shipley’s proposed judgment reciting the

trial court and former Panel’s findings and conclusions verbatim as shown at CT 209.

On 3/17/14 McCarron appeared for a third round of Star Court. The transcript

shows bias against McCarron while deferring to Mr. Williamson. Judge Sachs

addressed him as Counsel while calling McCarron “ma’am” in a condescending,

loud and misogynist tone of voice. Bias shown: RT 51:17, 52:1, 52:21,54:2, 62:26

11

The following excerpt shows deference to Mr. Williamson, bias against McCarron.

RT 51:17, 52:1, 52:21,54:2, 62:26

Disparate treatment of female attorneys does not comport with Judicial Ethics.

12

The transcript also shows when McCarron objected to paraphrasing former Panel’s

findings Judge Sachs interrupted to thwart recording of oral objections. RT 54:1

RT 51:24; 52:1

Judge Sachs facilitated Williamson’s distortion of Panel findings on the record.

RT 52:18

Williamson’s statement “there was no particular finding on that” was knowingly false.

Williamson and Judge Sachs knew former Panel did make a particular finding on exactly

that issue; i.e. that Shipley was the sublessee of the homeowner and not the sublessee of

the mobile home. Williamson and Judge Sachs also knew former Panel concluded

Shipley was a subtenant of the homeowner—not the home.

13

Former Panel found evidence established Shipley was a subtenant of the homeowner.

CT 180-top

Judge Sachs knew former Panel found Shipley was not an unlawful occupant.

CT 183-top

Judge Sachs rebuffed McCarron’s request that findings be quoted in full sentences.

RT 53:15-26

Judge Sachs facilitated attorney Williamson’s total distortion of Judge Alvarez’s

finding on the record by refusing to cross out the words “such as defendant” from

Stubblefield’s paraphrased version of findings typed into the proposed judgment.

Judge Alvarez set a trial date for a jury to decide if she was an unlawful occupant.

14

Former Panel quoted the trial court’s finding verbatim on 2/14/13 as recited below:

Words such as defendant were not in Panel’s verbatim quote from a 2/14/13 transcript:

CT 181:5 top

When McCarron objected to Stubblefield’s distortion Judge Sachs insisted it is accurate.

RT 54:21 bottom

Judge Sachs consecrated Stubblefield’s distortion by approving his paraphrased

conclusions in the final judgment to create a pretext that both courts found Shipley was

an unlawful occupant not entitled to reside in Space 333 under park rules. Judge Sachs

wrote the words or resident onto his copy of the judgment Stubblefield had submitted,

authorizing Stubblefield to proceed directly against residents under Civil §798.56(d).

McCarron asked why she could not file the order to avoid his paraphrasing. RT 60:25

The court responded “ It is his motion, it is his work” and offered to give us his copy.

The S-33 deputy made copies of the judgment with the Judge’s notes on it. RT 61:1

RT 63:13

15

Stubblefield cited Civil §798.56(d) verbatim on the Judge’s working copy.

Judge Sachs took it one step further by interlineating the words “or resident”

into his cited text, effectively revising Civil §798.56(d) by judicial proclamation,

authorizing Stubblefield to evict residents directly, which contravened former

Panel’s conclusion on 5/6/13 that Stubblefield could not evict a resident directly

as he was not in privity of contract with the resident who was not a homeowner.

It subjected Shipley to the same type of eviction the Panel rescued her from last year.

B. JUDGE SACHS STEPPED OUT OF HIS ROLE AS INDEPENDENT ARBITER INTO A NEW ROLL OF DE FACTO ADVOCATE FOR STUBBLEFIELD

Judge Sachs expanded the summary eviction remedies in Civil §798.56[d] to be

invoked not only against homeowners but also against non-homeowner residents.

Only a homeowner’s tenancy may be terminated under §798.56(d) for a rule violation.

Civil Code §798.56. Reasons for termination of tenancy; written notice; cure of default

A tenancy shall be terminated by the management only for one or more of the following reasons:

… (d) Failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or regulation of the park that is part of

the rental agreement or any amendment thereto.

Shipley is a resident but not a homeowner; there is no privity with Stubblefield.

Mobile Home Residency Law defines “tenancy” as only applying to the homeowner.

Civil Code §798.12. Tenancy

Tenancy is the right of a homeowner to the use of a site within a mobilehome park on which to locate, maintain, and occupy a mobilehome, site improvements, and accessory structures for human habitation, including the usef the services and facilities of the park.

Civil §798.55 & §798.56 apply only to homeowners-not to non-owner residents.

Under §798.56[d] Stubblefield may not proceed directly against a resident who is not

a homeowner as there is no tenancy to terminate where there is no privity of contract.

16

Stubblefield cannot proceed directly against Shipley under Civil §798.56[d],

for the same reason former Panel held he could not proceed directly against Shipley

under any statute---because there is no privity between Stubblefield and Shipley.

CT 184 bottom

Judge Sachs’ ultra vires expansion of Civil §798.56[d] to be used against residents

violated not only his oath to be impartial, but also constitutional limits on his judicial

powers imposed by Article III, §3 and Article VI, §13 of California’s Constitution.

Judge Sachs had no power to transmute the loser into a winner by revising a statute for

his sole benefit. To guarantee entry of this gratuitous gift before Shipley could file

written objections Judge Sachs orchestrated the following Star Court Proceedings:

On 3/17/14-Judge Sachs made a bizarre journal entry: Files retained in department.

CT 71 top. By retaining all case files in his own department---rather than returning

them to the public records department [available for daily public filings and review]

Judge Sachs gained exclusive control over which pleadings were accepted for filing and

entered into the online case docket. Stubblefield hired First Legal Support to deliver

the debauched judgment to Judge Sachs’ chambers ex parte. CT 223 [see logo on top].

Williamson could shift the blame for violating Rules 3.113, 3.1201 & Local Rule 591.3

from his firm to First Legal Support, who delivered a proposed judgment to chambers

ex parte on 3/20/14. Judge Sachs signed the order the same day---on 3/20/14. CT 223

Attorney Williamson knew if he tried to file a proposed final judgment in the

records department a clerk may have rejected it for failure to comply with Rules

3.113, 3.120 and Local Rule 591.3. McCarron did not see a proposed final judgment

---delivered ex parte on 3/20/14---until the next morning---Friday 3/21/14. It was

already too late as Judge Sachs entered the judgment when it was delivered to him.

Shipley was deprived of any opportunity to object before entry of her final judgment.

17

McCarron wrote objections and emailed them to Shipley to print out in Highland

and deliver by hand to Dept. S-33 that same day–Friday 3/21/14. Shipley was unable

to file objections at the public filing window as Judge Sachs maintained the files in

Department S-33 on 3/17/14. Shipley took her objections upstairs to Dept. S-33.

The S-33 clerk told Shipley she had to wait outside the courtroom while she checked

with Judge Sachs. The S-32 clerk returned to say she could not accept the objections

because Judge Sachs already signed/entered the order the day before—on 3/20/14.

Shipley dropped her objections into the drop box in front of the Appellate Division

at 4:00 p.m. as the window closed at 3:00 p.m. Judge Sachs’ refusal to accept

objections only one day after a judgment arrived ex parte violated Rule 3.130(d).

Even if objections were late Judge Sachs was still required to accept them on 3/21/14.

(d) Filing of late papers No paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing. If the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate

Even if late, under LOCAL RULE 591.3 Judge Sachs was required to wait at least

ten (10) days before entering a judgment. Sachs runs Star Court proceedings.

On Friday 3/21/14 McCarron printed the online case docket. There was no

journal entry reciting that a final judgment had been entered on 3/20/14.

On Monday, 3/24/14 there was still no evidence a judgment was entered on 3/20/14.

McCarron called Marsha Lenihan, Legal Processing Supervisor, at 4:00 p.m. to ask

why there was no journal entry by 3/24/14 for a judgment purportedly entered 4 days

earlier on 3/20/14. On 3/25/14 Marsha Lenihan called McCarron to notify her that

a journal entry would be made showing the judgment had been entered on 3/20/14.

As of 4/2/14 no camera image icon appeared online to download the final judgment.

On 4/2/14 Shipley drove over to court to obtain a copy of the 3/20/14 judgment.

A records clerk said she could not provide a copy because Judge Sachs was maintaining

the case files in Dept. S-33. CT 71- top. Shipley walked up to Dept S-33 to get a copy.

The S-33 clerk told Shipley to return to the records department to get the judgment.

18

Shipley told the S-33 clerk the records department had directed her to go up to S-33.

The S-33 clerk told Shipley to return the next day. On 4/3/14 when Shipley returned a

second time the S-33 clerk directed her to download the judgment from court online.

Shipley told the S-33 clerk there was no camera image icon to enable downloading

the judgment, which is why she had driven over to the court to obtain a hard copy.

The S-33 clerk told her to return the next day. On 4/4/14 Shipley returned a third time.

The S-33 clerk said she still did not have the final judgment and did not know how to

obtain a copy of it. After three trips to S-33 Shipley was unable to obtain a copy of a

final judgment as prevailing party. On 4/1/14 Stubblefield served “Notice of Ruling”

by mail. McCarron finally received the “Notice of Ruling” by mail service on 4/4/14.

This was fourteen [14] days after Judge Sachs had entered final judgment. CT 242

C. Court Had No Power to Grant Declaratory Relief to Stubblefield in Final Judgment

Under CCP §580 a court may not grant declaratory relief in a limited jurisdiction case,

except as recited in CCP §86. When an appellate court directs judgment on the merits

for the defendant a court has no power to grant any relief to a losing plaintiff, especially

where plaintiff did not even request such relief in his complaint. Plaintiff never prayed

for the trial court or former Panel to interpret Civil §798.56[d] or grant declaratory relief.

Expanding a remedial statute by judicial proclamation, to be used against non-owner

residents, where express language circumscribes the remedy to homeowners only,

exceeded constitutional limits on judicial powers imposed by Article III, Section 3.

Revising statutes may only be done through legislation. Judge Sachs’ ultra vires act

was prohibited under CCP §580 as well as Article III, §3. This ultra vires act of vacating

a prior order after jurisdiction to vacate it had expired three months earlier, violated

CCP §663a(b) and Article VI,§13. There was no “miscarriage of justice” in entry of

summary judgment for Shipley on 10/21/13, after former Panel’s mandate to do so.

Shipley fought like a gladiator through 2 years of scorched earth litigation to thwart an

illegal eviction. Judge Sachs deprived her of victory by authorizing her direct eviction.

It was a miscarriage of justice to Shipley and 675,000 residents now subject to eviction.

19

D. Chronological Summary of Judge Sachs’ serial violations:

1. 2/10/14 Violation of CRC 3.1312 (prevailing party to prepare her judgment)

Judge Sachs refused to sign a judgment prevailing party submitted at the hearing.

Judge Sachs invited non-prevailing party’s attorney to prepare the final judgment.

2. 2/19/14 Violation of Civil §663(b) (power to vacate judgment expired in 60 days)

McCarron objected to revisiting a summary judgment order entered on 10/21/13.

McCarron told Judge Sachs jurisdiction to vacate the order expired months ago.

3. 2/19/14 Violation of CRC 3.1103; 3.112; 3.1113. CCP §1005 (no motion notice

with basis for relief or Points & Authorities was filed as required) CCP §1005

4. 2/19/14 Violation of CRC 3.1312 (prevailing party to prepare judgments)

Minute Order recited “Counsel for Plaintiff to Prepare Judgment”

5. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to apply the law-violation of due process

Judge Sachs thwarted McCarron from reciting objections on a transcript record,

depriving Shipley of an opportunity to be heard and an opportunity to object.

Disparate treatment-calling counsel “ma’am” instead of by her name or counsel.

6. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Apply the law- violation of due process

Judge Sachs actively advocated for Stubblefield by distorting prior findings of

two courts and allowing Stubblefield to paraphrase findings to alter its import.

7. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Apply the law- violation of due process

Judge Sachs advocated for Stubblefield by inserting the words “or resident” into

his judge notes, and then giving the notes to Stubblefield’s counsel for insertion

into the final judgment (a contrivance even Stubblefield didn’t think of doing).

This violated Shipley’s right to due process under federal and state constitutions.

The deck is stacked against a party where the Judge is the opponent’s advocate.

20

8. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Apply the law- violation of due process

Judge Sachs made a bizarre journal entry “files retained in department” which

enabled him to exercise exclusive control over which documents would be filed

or rejected. Judge Sachs then refused to accept the objections Shipley tried to file

on 3/21/14—only one day after Stubblefield submitted a debauched judgment

ex parte to chambers on 3/20/14. This deprived Shipley of opportunity to object.

9. 3/20/14 Violated Local Rule 591.3 (no entry of judgment for 10 days)

Rule 591.3 was amended on 1/1/13 to afford opposing parties a chance to object

Stubblefield hired Legal Support Services to hand deliver a paraphrased final

judgment directly to chambers ex parte on 3/20/14, without first serving the

proposed judgment to opposing counsel, who represented prevailing party.

Judge Sachs signed the judgment the same day it was delivered [on 3/20/14]

without waiting even one day to afford Shipley an opportunity to object to form.

10. 3/21/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Apply the law- violation of due process

Judge Sachs prevented Shipley from obtaining the judgment entered 3/20/14.

Shipley appeared 3 consecutive days to try to get it. [3/21/14, 3/24/14, 3/25/14]

because his clerk had not scanned it to the online docket. Each time she appeared

in Dept. S-33 for a copy of the judgment she was told to return the following day.

Shipley was never able to obtain a copy of the judgment despite three attempts.

This was not one isolated incident or a few inadvertent mistakes. The 10 incidents

above displays a serial pattern of intentional violations of Codes of Civil Procedure,

Rules of Court, Statutes of Limitations, Local Rules, and the Judicial Code of Ethics.

By inserting the words “or resident” Judge Sachs paved the way for park owners to

evict residents directly on 5 days’ notice, instead of proceeding against homeowners,

who can invoke statutory protections against arbitrary evictions under Civil §798.55.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Shipley prays for Presiding Panel to direct Judge Sachs

to vacate the final judgment entered on 3/20/14, reinstate a summary judgment order

Judge Alvarez entered on 10/21/13, and enter the final judgment on the merits for

defendant--which prevailing party Shipley submitted on 3/4/14 as shown at CT 209.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Appellant Shipley prays for the Presiding Panel to order the following:

1. Direct Judge Michael A. Sachs to vacate a final judgment entered on 3/20/14,

contravening the directives of former Panel's Writ of Mandate issued July 22,2013

and reinstate the summary judgment order Judge Alvarez entered on 1012 11 13.

2. Direct Judge Michael A. Sachs to enter Judgment on the merits as submitted by

Shipley, as the prevailing party, on 3/4/14 as shown at CT 209, with all costs and

attorney fees pursuant to Mobile Home Residency Law, Civil Codes $798.85; $1717.

3. Direct Judge Michael A. Sachs to award appellant attorney fees as costs, as the

prevailing party in all proceedings below, including all writ proceedings, in an

amount to be determined by separate motion, and as costs and fees on this appeal.

4. Direct Judge Michael A. Sachs to recuse himself and transfer the case files to

the Presiding Judge for re-assignment to a retired judge who is not afraid to rule

against Stubblefield for fear of political retribution in future judicial . campaigns.

5. Direct any additional relief the Appellate (30~1-t deems equitable and just.

./ CER~~FICATE OF WORD COUNT

This Opening Appellant Brief contains 6,015 words [excluding cover & tables]

and is size 13 roman typeface font. I relied on a word count generated by MS

Word 2010 as recited in the status bar.

September 8,2014

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE DIVISION

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,

Plaintiff – Respondent vs.

BONNIE SHIPLEY, Defendant – Appellant

Case No. ACIAS 1400026 [Trial Court UDDS1204130]

Appeal from a Final Judgment in San Bernardino Superior Court

Entered on March 20, 2014

Honorable Michael A. Sachs

MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal and Reporter’s Transcript filed 7/31/14

Nancy D McCarron, CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane

Santa Barbara, CA 93103 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 Attorney for Appellant/Defendant Below

22

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD [RULE 8.841]

Appellant Bonnie Shipley moves the Presiding Panel, under Appellate Rule 8.841,

to augment the record with two documents Judge Sachs prevented her from filing.

Exhibit 1 – Objections to Second [Proposed Order] Rewriting a Prior Judge’s Order

Without Jurisdiction and Rewriting an Appellate Order in Contempt of that Court’s

Order; Notice of Intent to Appeal Illegal Order and Hold Michael Sachs in Contempt of an Appellate Division’s Writ of Mandate; Objections to Sachs Acting as Advocate

for Plaintiff and Request for Recusal - Dept S-33 Clerk Refused to file it on 3/17/14.

As shown below in the official transcript of a hearing on the judgment on 3/17/14

McCarron asked Judge Sachs to file the proposed final judgment because she knew

Stubblefield would paraphrase holdings and corrupt the final judgment. [RT 60:25]:

25| Ms. McCARRON: Why Can’t I file it, you Honor? He 26| is going to paraphrase again. RT 60:25-26 1| THE COURT: It is his motion, it is his work I am 2| working off of and I am assuming counsel will do what I have 3| asked him to do. In fact, I am happy to give him my notes, 4| you can make a copy and both of you can share it. RT 61:1-4

11| THE BAILIFF: Your honor, did you want me to make 12| copies? 13| THE COURT: The record should reflect that I have 14| handed to Mari, my courtroom attendant, my worked up order 15| that she is going to make copies for everybody. RT 63:11-15 The bailiff gave both counsel a copy of the Judge’s worked up order on 3/17/14.

This is pages 11, 12, 13 of Exhibit 1 attached herein. McCarron was shocked to

discover Judge Sachs interlineated the words “or resident” into the proposed text:

Exh. 1, p. 12

Three days later, on 3/20/14 – rather than serve McCarron with the newly typed up

judgment, as required by Rule 3.1312, Stubblefield delivered it to chambers ex parte.

McCarron did not receive it until 3/21/14 at which time she wrote objections, emailed

them to Shipley to hand deliver. Dept. S-33 refused to accept them for filing as “late.”

23

Dept. S-33 clerk said objections were late because judgment had been entered.

Even if late, this nonetheless violated Rule 3.130(d) which required a clerk to accept

a late filing, mark it late, and recite in the Minute Order a remark about a late filing.

This was not done. The S-33 clerk refused to accept the objections for filing in court.

Shipley then dropped her objections [Exhibit 1] into the Appellate Division’s outside

box drop at 4:00 p.m. because the filing window at that court had closed at 3:00 p.m.

An Appellate Division clerk confirmed that she has the original objections in this case.

Shipley included the objections in her Designation of Record, but the clerk could not

locate a copy of the Objections to insert into the Clerk’s Transcript from the trial court.

Judge Sachs also violated Local Rule 591.3 by not waiting 10 days to enter judgment,

to afford Shipley an opportunity to object to the form of it. Instead, the court signed and

entered judgment as soon as it was delivered ex parte to his chambers before she saw it.

Judge Sachs deprived Shipley of opportunity to object and refused to accept objections.

To comport with equity under the circumstances the Panel should augment the record to

include these objections. Exhibit 1, p.12 shows Judge Sachs acted as an advocate for

Stubblefield by inserting new language into the judgment, which authorized him to evict

Shipley directly---the remedy sought when he first served a sham complaint on 8/27/14.

EXHIBIT 2 - May 9, 2014 Letter to RESIDENTS from Stubblefield’s Park Manager

Exhibit is a 5-page exhibit containing a Letter to RESIDENTS served on Shipley.

The park’s letter threatens to use Civil Code §798.56(d) to evict RESIDENTS directly.

McCarron wanted to let Judge Sachs know Stubblefield was already capitalizing on his

gratuitous gift---interlineating “or residents” to authorize evicting RESIDENT directly.

On June 23, 2014 at a hearing on a motion to expunge lis pendens McCarron tried to

offer the letter to the Bailiff to give Judge Sachs so he would understand the trouble he

caused by authorizing Stubblefield to use Civil §798.56(d) to evict residents directly.

Judge Sachs refused to look at the letter, stating that “the matter was not before him.”

In oral & written objections McCarron predicted the harm from a debauched judgment.

RT 46:22, 51:24, 53:22, 60:25. Judge Sachs knew it would be used to evict residents.

To comport with equity under these circumstances the Panel should augment the

record to include Exhibit 2 because it is a highly relevant document on this appeal.

It proves that McCarron was correct in predicting the potential damage that would flow

from Judge Sach's order allowing Stubblefield to compose a final judgment'on merits.

Exhibit 2 shows Stubblefield l l l y intended to capitalize on the unfair advantage Judge

Sachs donated in authorizing him to compose the final judgment instead of Shipley.

Judge Sachs' blatant violations of the Code of Judicial Ethics should not be condoned.

Judge Sachs intentionally gave Stubblefield a new tool to filch even more mobile homes

fiom elderly, sick, and disabled residents who will be rendered homeless after evictions.

Stubblefield will add several more free mobilehomes to his monthly rental portfolio, . .

expanding wealth exponentially on the backs of poor, elderly and disabled residents.

For the above reasons, Shipley respectfully asks the Panel to augment the appellate

record with Exhibits 1 and 2, which are numbered consecutively and attached herein.

September 8,2014

- - CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL UNDER OATH

I, Nancy Duffy McCarron, declare the factual statements made in the

Opening Brief and Motion to Aument the Record are true to the best of the

undersigned's knowledge. Counsel confmed with an appellate court clerk

that she Shipley's Objections to Judgment which theS-33derk would not

accept for filing on 3/2&14 [Exhibit A] L~he'undersi~ned declares that

Exhibit B was delivered to Space 333 which tlireatens to evict park residents 4 -

for purportea violations Gf road rules under Civil §798.56[d]--the same code

Judge Sachs gratuitously revised by proclamation in the judgment, proving

Stubblefield fully intended to capitalize on Judge Sachs' gratuitous gift.

This certification was executed in Santa Barbara on September 8,2014.

September 8,2014

EXHIBIT 1

I Nancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780 Law Office of Nancy Duffy McCarron 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

I I Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

TO SACHS ACTING AS ADVOCATE OR PLAINTIFF Sr REQUEST FOR RECUSAL

STLJBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California General Partnership, dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community

Plaintiff, I v.

BONNIE SHIPLEY,

I Defendant I action filed: 8-27-12

I I / Judge Michael Sachs Department S-33 i

Case No. UDDS1204130

OBJECTIONS TO SECOND ORDER REWRITING A PRIOR JUDGE'S ORDER WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND REWRITING AN APPELLATE ORDER IN CONTEMPT OF THAT COURT'S ORDER NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAL ILLEGAL ORDER AND HOLD MICHAEL SACHS IN CONTEMPT OF AN APPELLATE DIVISION'S WRIT OF MANDATE

cting as Advocate in Violation of Judicial Ethics

Defendant objects to this court's acting as an advocate for plaintiff and demands that Michael

Sachs voluntarily recuse himself for violations of Code of .ludicial Ethics as set forth below:

CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS PREAMBLE

Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair, and competent judiciary will

interpret and apply the laws that govern us. The rolc of the judiciary is central to American concepts of

justice and the mle of law. Intrinsic to this code are the precepts that judges, individually and collective1

must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confident

in our leeal system. The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of disputes and a highly

visible member of government under the rule of law.

A. Promoting Public Confidence

A judge shall respect and comply with the law* and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes

public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judicia~y.

- 1 - .........................................................................................

Objections to Second[Proposedl Order Vacating Denial of Sumnlary Judgment and Judgment for Defendant

The test for the appearance of impropriety is whether a person aware of the facts might reasonably

ntertain a doubt that the judge would be able to act with integrity, impartiality, and competence.

Canon 2. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's

ctivities. "Impropriety" includes conduct that violates the law. court rules. or provisions of this code,

nd conduct that undermines a judge's independence, inteaitv. or impartialitv.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY

Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges.

PECIFIC ACTS IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW, COURT RULES, AND IMPROPER CONDUCT:

.)On 5/6/13 the Appellate Division entered its order directing Judge Alvarez in S-32 to vacate his deni,

of defendant's summary judgment motion, and enter a new order granting it and enter a final judgme

on the merits for Shipley with costs. On 10121113 Judge Alvarez entered the order vacating his denia

of summary judgment and entered a new order granting it to Shipley, but never entered a judgment o

the merits for Shipley with costs as proposed by Shipley. Judge Alvarez wanted to enter the orders

separately but never entered the judgment although submitted to him. At-r

.)Shipley filed her motion for statutory attomey fees on 5129113 set for 7/2/13, which he continued to

712211 3, then to 10121113, then to 1/7/14, then to 211 0114; because the case was transferred to Michae

Sachs in S-33 after Judge Alvarez recused himself upon Shipley's request.

.)At the first hearing on 2110114 for defendant's motion for statutory attomey fees, counsel for Shipley

McCarron bought the judgment to be entered for Shipley exactly as written by the appellate division,

verbatim, the last two sentences of their order. McCarron asked Judge Sachs to enter the judgment or

the merits so her attorney fee motion could be concluded. Judge Sachs had both McCarron's order ar

Stubblefield's order which McCarron objected to because it paraphrased both the trial court and the

appellate court's findings and completely changed the import of the order to benefit Stubblefield. [%:

.) Judge Sachs then invited Stubbelfield's counsel to propose a new order. McCarron objected a:

the usual practice is for the prevailing party to compose the order---not the losing party---for exactly

reason she stated-the loser will rewrite the order to benefit himself.

.) Judge Sachs also announced sua sponte that he would re-write Judge Alvarez' 10-21-13 order

There was absolutely no jurisdiction to rewrite another court's order entered 4 months ago.

There was not even a motion to vacate that order pending or ever filed or served by plaintiff.

- 2 - ...--~-~.-----.~---~..--~...--~....~...~~...--~~---~-.--~~..----..~-~....~~~...~~~...~...

Objections to SecondIProposedl Order Vacating Denial of Summary Judgment and Judgment for Defendant

I.) McCarron objected to such unorthodox procedures; i.e. letting the loser make up an order re-writing

another Judge's prior order which changed the entire findings and import of the order, as well as

parphrasing the appellate court's order. See Objections attached here as Exhibit B.

'. Despite McCarron's objections Michael Sachs scheduled another hearing letting plaintiff propose ne

hybrid" order as he called it. See his minute orders attached as Exh. A3-A6 Michael Sachs then - ontinued it for another hearing on 3/17/13.

I. On 3/17/14 Judge Sachs authohzed all the paraphrasing to completely change the import of both the

rial court's order and the appellate divisions order. Judge Sachs then dismissed the hearing stating he

vould give counsel a copy of his notes for the "final order." 5 I. McCarron was shocked that he actually acted as an advocate for Stubblefield by interjecting the wori

or resident" after homeowner on page 2---basically authorizing Stubblefield to "proceed against the

m, Shipley under Civil Code section 798.56(d) which is an action which can only be taken agains

lomeowner---not a resident! This is not what the appellate division wrote in its order. l,? 0. This language was never discussed at the hearing or McCarron would have vehemently objected.

nstead it was gratuitously given as a gift by sneaking the words into his "notes" given to us.

If course, Stubblefield jumped right on it and inserted them into what will be the ORDER.

rhis gratuitous gift was beyond the pale. Judge Sachs has stepped into the role of advocate for

Stubblefield and must disqualify himself as his bias is clearly demonstrated.

tespecthlly submitted: 312 111 4

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY COUNSEL

Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed ORDER and defendant's alternate Proposed Order were served via

Tail to attorney Robert Williamson at: Hart King, 4 Hutton Center Dr., Suite 900, Santa Ana, CA 92705

declare the above to be true under penalty of perjury. Executed in Santa Barbara, CA on 3/21/14.

L courtesy copy will also be delivered to the appellate division.

Objections to Second[Proposedl Order Vacating Denial of Summary Judgment and Judgment for Defendant

EXHIBIT A

Pending Home ComplaintslParties Actions Minutes Hearings

case vpe: - . ,, . . . . . . . . . .- -; -

Case Number: ' ~~~ .~~~~ ~ ..... ~ :

Case UDDSI204130 - STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY

Case Images Report

HEARING RE: CASE MGMT CONFI OSC RE STATUS OF APPEAL 1012112013 -8:30 AM DEPT. 532

DONALD ALVAREZ. JUDGE

CLERK: STEPHANIE CHANDLER COURT ATENDANT ERIC ASHE NOT REPORTED

APPEARANCES AJTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAlNTlFFlPETITlONER ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT - PROCEEDINGS HEARING ON. CASE MGMT CONF 1 OSC RE STATUS OF APPEAL HELD

PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD BASED ON THE RULING ISSUED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION ON THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HAVING DENIED PLAINTIFFS PETITION FOR REVIEW AND APPLICATION

FOR STAY. THE COURT HEREBY RULES AS FOLLOWS

COURT FINDS: THE COURTS RULING ON DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARD ON FEBRUARY 14,2013 IS HEREBY REVERSED AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO ITS ENTIRETY. DEFENDANTIMOVING PARTY TO PREPARE JUDGMENT. - HEARINGS: HEARING DATE OF 01107114 CONFIRMED (RE DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ATK)RN~Y FEES)

NOTICE GWEN BY JUDICIAL ASSISTANT

CORRESPONDENCE COVERSHEET GENERATED TO MAIL MINUTE ORDER DATED 10121113 TO COUNSEL

5 A ,

OF RECORD. ACTION - COMPL E TE

=== MINUE O R ~ E R END === COMPIAIM DIS~OSITIONED BY JUDGMENT.

ACTION DISPO: JUDGMENT

Home Compleintsf~arties Actions Minutes Pending Hearings

Case Type:

Case Number: I

Case U D D S I ~ ~ ~ I ~ O - STUBBLEFIELD-VSHIPLEY Action:

Case Report Images

MOTION RE: ~VTORNEY FEES FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY 02/1012014 -8:aO AM DEPT. S33

MICHAEL A SACHS, JUDGE CLERK. WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPOR&R KATHY SELLERS 4420 COURT A ~ E N D A ~ T MARY KILGORE

APPEARANCES.

ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT.

PROCEEDINGS:

PREDISPOSITIONHEARING HELD MOTION I

ACTlON CAME ON FOR MOTION RE AlTORNEY FEES FILED BY BONNIE SHIPLEY. COURTHAS REVIEWED THE MOTION, OPPOSITION, REPLY, EXPERT DECLARATIONS, AND OTHER ADDITIONAL DECLARATIONS ~ H I C H HAVE BEEN FILED -

t COURT DOES N q GO FORWARD WITH MOTlON FOR ATIDRNEY FEES AND SETS MATIER FOR HEARING REGARDING JUD~MENT COURT HAS RECEIVED PROPOSED JUDGMENTS FROM ATTORNEY MCCARRON AND INSTRUCTS COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO SUBMITT PROPOSED JUDGMENT TO M E COURT HEARING REGARDING JUDGMENT WILL BE HELD ON 2/19/14 AND THEREAFTER A HEARING FOR THE MOTION FOR A ~ R N E Y FEES WILL ~ BE SET.

HEARINGS:

HEARING RE: PRPPOSED JUDGMENT SET FOR 02/19/14 AT 08 30 IN DEPARTMENT S33A. ACTION -COMPLETE

Pending Case Home Comp1,ainWParties Actions Minutes Hearings Reporl Images

I

Case U D D S I ~ O ~ I ~ O - STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY

HEARING RE:: PROPOSED JUDGMENT 02/19/2014 - 8130 AM DEPT. S33A

MICHAEL A S A C ~ S , JUDGE CLERK: WIMAIA BLANCHARD COURT R E P O R ~ ~ R JULIE QUINTANILL4 11309 COURT ATTEND~NT MARY KILGORE - I APPEARANCES:I ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAlNTIFFlPETITlONER. ATTORNEY NAN^ DUFFY PRESENTFOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT.

PROCEEDINGS PREDISPOSITIO Id HEARING HELD COURT HAS RE~IEWED THE PROPOSED JUDGMENTS SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL HYBRID PROPOSAL WORKED I

OUT BY THE COLRT. LANGUAGE IS STATED ON THE RECORD.

COUNSEL FOR +LAINTIFF TO PREPARE JUDGMENTAS PROPOSEDBY COURT. APPELLATE DOCS FROM DEFENSE I

MAY BE AnAcAED PROPOSED JuoGMENT DUE To DEFENSE COUNSEL N o LATER THAN 3/05/14, OBJECTION SH d L L BE DUE NO L A k R THAN 3/12/14. IF NO OBJECTION IS FILED COURT WILL ENTER

JUDGMENT. HEARING REGARDING MOTION FOR ATJORNEY FEES IS SET AS FOLLOWS:

HEARINGS: ~ LAW 8 MOTION RE: ArrORNEY FEES SETFOR 03/17/14 AT 08:30 IN DEPT. 533.

ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE O R ~ E R END ===

I I I i !

I

Home ~ o r n ~ l b i n ~ ~ a r t i e s Actions Minutes Pending

1 Hearings

case Report Images

.. ........................ , I

Case Number: i I

. .- .........

Case ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 2 b 4 1 3 0 -STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY

MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES 0311712014 - 8:90 AM DEPT. S33

MICHAEL A S A C ~ S , JUDGE L CLERK: ANCHAL E M PRICE

COURT R E P O R ~ R KATHY SELLERS 4420

COURT A ~ N D ~ N T MARY KILGORE

~ APPEARANCES.' ATTORNEY N A N ~ Y DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR PLAlNllFFlPEllTIONER. ATTORNEY R O B ~ R T WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT

MOTION POST-DISPOS~~N HEARING HELD

M E COURT IS Id RECEIPTOF DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS AND PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTIONS W E COURT HAS R E ~ S E D ME PROPOSED JUDGMENT AND A COPY OF ME PROPOSED JUDGMENTWW WE COURTS I

NOTES ARE PROVIDED TO COUNSEL

PLAIN~FFS COL~NSEC TO PREPARE JUDGMENT AS DISCUSSED ON THE RECORD !

bURSUANTT0 IIPULAllON OF COUNSEL:

BONNIE SHIPLE)('S MOllON RE:AlTORNEY FEES IS HEARD. THE COURT RE~ITES ITS TENTA~VE RULING ON ME REOCRD.

ARGUED BY CO~NSEL AND S U B M I ~ D . -

I

COURT FINDS: ~ BONNIE SHIPLE)"S MOllON RE:ATTORNEY FEES IS DENIED.

wrniolrr PREJ~IDICE THE COURT F I N ~ S M A T DEFENSE COUNSEL IS ENlllLED TO HER ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANTTO CCP

i

I

798. d HOWEVER DEF NSE COUNSEL WAS NOT SPECIFIC AS TO HER BILLlNG.DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY SUBMIT ANOTHER MOTION DETAIL1 I G HER FEES FOR THE COURTS REVIEW.

IE ACTION - COMPL TE === MINUTE O R ~ E R END ===

*st Legal Support (951)779-0100 00/00&

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO - C M L DIVISION

Plaintiff,

14 v .

10

l 1

I z

STUB~LEFIELD PROPERTIES, a ~ a l i f o k a general partnerslip dba MO~TAINSHADOWS M O B I ~ H O M E COMMUNITY,

I

Case No. UDDS 1204130

Assigned for all purposes to:

IS

Judge; Hon. Michael A. Sachs Dept.: S-33

B O d I E SHIPLEY; and DOES I through

(PROPOSED] ORDER VACATING DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AM, JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT

16 10, ina~usive, 1 i

'o( i On February 14.2013. the Cowt, after having considered the evidence and points and

17

I8

19

21 I+utbotitiea submitted by all parties, and oral argumeut of counsel deied Dekndaot Bonnie

Ship)/;yls motion for summary judgment on the grounds that California Civil Code section 23

798.i5, subdivision (c) is noi Lhnited h its application only in the escrow, sale, or transfer of

I

24 I 1 a rnobilcliome, but that it applied when an occupant ofa mobilehomc, such as Defendant, \>as

1 Defendants.

i I ~

25 )no dbht of tenancy under the Mobiiehame Residency Law (Civ. Code secfioo 798 e1 srg.)

26/and 1 not Memise enltled to oicupy the tn&ilehome under the Mobilehome Residency 2 7

Law.

I I On February 17, 2013, Defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate with the 1 Appellate Division of the San Bemardino Superior Court ("Appellate Division") requesting

an order that denial of her summaryjudgment motion be vacated and that sumrriary judgment

vil Code section 798.56, subdivision (d)

4'

5

6

7

r "failure to comply wit11 a reasonable rule or regulation of the park that is part of the rental

ent or any amendment the;eto." A copy of the Opinion filed May 6,2013is attached

narkced Exhibit "1" and incorporated herein by this reference.

On July 22, 2013, the Appellate Division issued a Writ of Mandate directing that the

urt vacate its February 14, 20 1 3 order -denying Defendant's summary judgment

and to enter a new order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and to . . .

judgment in 'favor 6f '~eiendant. A -copy .df the writ'of anda ate issued July 22,

attached hereto marlced Exhibit "2" and incorporated herein by this reference.

, ,-

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Court's order entered February 14, 2013, denying Defendant's motion for

be granted in her favor.

On May 6, 2013, the Appellate Division, having considered Defendant Bonnie

Shipley's Petition for Writ of Mandate, issued its unpublished Opinion granting tbe Writ

fmding that Civil Code section 798.75 applied only to a purchaser or transferee of a

25 11 summary judgment is vacated;

zsi 2. Summary judgment is grantcd in favor of Ddodant on the grounds Udf Civil

27 1 Code section 798.75 does not apply to Defendant because Defendant was not a

28 ]I purchaser of a mobilehome in Plaintiffs mobilehome park, rendering the 5-Day - L

fPROPOJED1 ORDER AND JUDGhITWT

e r s t Legal Support (951)779-0100 00100 m3

Notice to Surrender pursuant to subdivision (c) of 798.75 inapplicabie;

3. Sumnary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant.

4. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant B o d e Shipley and against Plaintiff

StubblefieId Properties, a California general partnership dba Mountain Shadows

Mobile Home Community. Piaintiff to takenothing by way of its complaint.

5. Defendant is awarded costs.

6. h y award of attorney's fees is to be determioed by way of separate motion.

91 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _I 7014 - Hon. Michael A. Sacbs, Judge, Superior Court

EXHIBIT B

Iq

SUPERfClR COIJRT O f 'WE STATE OF CALIFOwIA CO-?Y OF SAN REkVARfllNO

S'lXXlBtEFlUD PROPERTIM,a Gali%mia Ceaerat P~tnersbip, d h Motmain Slradornh.lobile Norno Community

Plaintifi: 1 V.

BONNIE3 SHIPLEY,

CascNo, UBDSll;bl.f30 DEFENDANT'S OBJECTXONS TO PLAIKT1I;P1S [PROPOSED] ORDER VACATlNG DENIAI,

OF SUMMARY JUDGMLbiT At-$$ J L ~ C E M E ~ T FORDBENDtbw

Wsno~ble Micl~eol Sacbs Dcpnrtrnont S-35 303 Ur. 3"? St, San Bcrnnrdino CRC 3,1312

I/ Refindtint objects top~uifltiflspraphrasf~rg of the uinI lrnd appellare coun's orders to create rrpstex

tbr mum made findings agninsLprevdingp;lrtyS interest whic!~ clcnrly w r o not rccitcd in either o&r

PIainriBhmded tu lcad the cow down a prinuosc pzk dcrror ~iniply to gain n stmtegicadvmr;lgc,

lf ptainli$canobtaincrry judicin! oEkerlr sigmuw on wry finditr~ against a mobile hmne resident su&

adec will he thro\\x in the hcc af any elderly resident who dart% lo challeng~ park o m r ' s aurhofily.

Exccrptu/bel~~v show how plaintiff tried to get this courf to munr$asrvre new findings against flhipley,

In tllc first paragraph or its proposed order shown bclbw plaintiff inserted "'such as d~*ncluni" in the

n~iddieatlhc coun's findings. The w r l s nrc not contained mywhere in tl~s cow's

order or transcript, Plaintiff tries m makc ir appwr J u d p Alvac~Jbunrl Shipley had no right of tenancy.

11 SO such k i n g was ma&. Judgc Alvarclzsct the case hr jury S z l indicating he would la a jury dacid,

ndge ~lvarhzaevos uttered the ~vordr" "in his Xi4113 ruling wanseriberf belo% I

1ic court must stpikc tho NO& "mir as dirhdmt" which clearly were mt contained in tbe order.

'he apflellilac division found tBe "unluwfl~IoccupatrP under 5798.751~1 did nor apply ta ShTpley.

Plaintifftrird rn xwenk the appellate divisi~ds findi~gs on Shiplcy's lease with McCmn, as follo~~rc

she aroupicd whiel~ i ~ o ~ ~ d by

er oitomcy k h c y DufTy M&mn andsihwrcd bnspacc 33 that McCarton tea& h m Plnintiff:

zm m y t;, 'rarx -h ~wam DIMW ~ s h h miw ikr* a d e Li~ley'r l'eilrdn for OrWdl5r~Mimhn. hwd 11s unplblirhCd OginTm @anllm 6* Wd1 Win;p rknt flvil Code y:dan 7@*7J mpTW only D a pnrdusu a mrmfat of i

mpb(!&mr unlt tha ~ m p i u *& W1 gwa rsilhour T i aoelrt;lop r M e n kPFe

$he aecqid whrh rr out~rd by hu ~uancy Msey Puffy McE- and

sbnfd on space 333 lh51 AlcCwcn lead ffm PlalnWY In PlrinllWa nnhilchomc prr4

md Um w d a the Matrilchrmc Rrsawy laws Pklndff may trin a .W11cmc by

&a &mly~lialrretbh. &-\you undm civil Cob mim ?98,46, mbtiWn 14) rw %YIP ~aromply ~~(Ltarwmbtcalsoy rcpUtrliondlthcpk dt% b piyl of llR rssd

hucrb m&ed iZ%hibihibitY"" and tncwpm4 hcrdn by Mihirrrhw. 4 Proposed Order, p2

'Inintiffs misleading pornphrasing did not rcmotcliy res~mble the appcllatc division finding be lo^

- 2 - ---"------------------------------..----"--------"*--"-------*-+-------*--------*-*-.---

%Xe&aaV*Y Sn:ecCfdD'~ totlr4P39C5I S~de: Bacarlr.9 24n;nl d Sua-rry >Jdpcn? sxd J s e p a t Ibf mioMan!

f + ~ ~ * 1 siOtiMl lor strmmmy judpcni a n l a w thBt MI JUY 27.

201z. CmEUtlcMer s W E M ~ ~ m o ra~h t ~ u m m m r Nzmq ~ u @

n &&dnaRa 'hWm9 t~ shrm McCem's m W e h a s at space ~d 333.4 E. Piedman1 D M H & I ? M . CA 82348. 10 sum d Ula mtion.

gnasan& iha d e U a r a of MSam. wha Oddam that an JaMlacy Sa

PUtchWd lhe rn&Wme * I- 333 b suao&&M tnUbHeMms 4 w , , Odcr 5/6/13

Ie4 the p a w tease. h4ccwm a m s V\at an Jaw 27, 2OlP.

P d r signed a srrm~ntk fezse to tham M hema as a ce-rwkhnt nflar k r

cantimd to i%c?pt mnWy mnl ficm her. St@ a h rhsl aU al Ural u r 1 6 h

pre in tpr name and Bhb p a p (Ol them ?ha. Pwitlaner's M8em &@bhkct

fharrha it )h Md, a sii%iawm of s u h a n t d McCemn end that W m m b

h onner of %a u r m e l W & sjmes 333 d Subb$CMs m b i m

park&uant b a Wsaagreemanl behrreen McCerran end 6iuIs@lr0ld. 4 iVd% Oder 516! I3

fhc appellate division nevcr found Shipicy u-as r publcssec of* ~nnbifehnn?*-b~ ~ U I W Found @a1

dsfendnfil Shipley a a v *

uF.dctq~rc$ tindim5 chat Shipby is ihe rublesee uf :L

caing a nrodflelrome without firk.8 eqresscd d t l c n approval

! Shipl~y is the co-mcidcnl, subbsn: of a mobilchomc mvncr.

fheappellotk Diviion Dund fhat as 'a ,nblcswe of a mobilchome o\w!cr. Petitioner dots not fall dvithin l e deff n3tion of an "t19~lo1~~1 occrpant;'

~lmnanq, 'Yhus, ihrs ' u n W ceapnl" p a , pvrrhaxw nmool 6 b#Sn

sgraa&l) ts an bodupwt tMt 'L no1 o!h&M e n l W b m y the

mdwm pwuant lo I% bsphnplCr' k n subeew DI o mcM#hwne oxmt.

P~&@mb am# nct1.a &thin bcledetmBbauf on %@uvlvl mamV lS11ipley is not unlawrul occupant

L;: I

39 Wrially, plaintiff miaeptcm~s ahm thcspp~?llntc division Lund on Stuhblcticld'ssdcquate remedy.

I

- 7 - * _ _ ~ * _ ~ l ? ~ * f - * - - i ~ _ _ ~ _ _ _ - _ ~ I l - _ ~ - - ~ - ~ ~ - - h - ~ - - - - - ~ - - _ I _ _ _ _ _ " _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ r - _ - - _ - -

& % i e d ? y " a :blar;rma %aL?rap?.rsal orasr .Ie=arz~q Dclr.:si cr s~rrszg 3 ~ s ~ o r . c *:,=I J M ~ a z t f G r i;eicc0err;

in t e follorving cxccrpt plaintiff crated a false paieorrhm the appellate division be16 piafntiffmay

evict 1 , hiplq" by ~virting the homeowner, McCarron..

~kinkff's geraghmsed words arc intcnriodly mislwdin~ and misstntcWhat the appelbtcdivision bun I

The ~Wotedivision did not say Stubblblcficld may svicr me. Ir merely noted thm Stubbrlefield had an Idqdate remedy by invoking civil Code 798.56.

&.%ding k n v n tbc lints, via gmtuirous' foomotc, it suggzsts t h t if Stubblefield 10 c\"ict rhc sub less& by evicting thc hamcowncr, they coulci dsfand the action by srguing Iherutes are unnlmnable.

For ihe &eve ra%ms 8ipicy objcc~to tho pmposed order, If thc court wants to mclude findings in ic

h.vhjidjudgmenl there is oalyjurisdiction to hcludc fmdkw aac~ually made. verbatim by the trio1 caun

and ,Ure appellate cotirt. There is no jurisdiction ro adopt newly manu~actured findings plnitttiff fabricate

utd(suwtcb in a propsea aidcr. This clcvct mnnmver is os transpareat as a piccc of clcm glsss,

Detkndant submirs hm alternote propod orderwt*ltic!i inctudea findings oc~ually made-not fabricated.

AFFlDAVlT OF E M L SERVICE RY COUNSEL

P1RjlltiEserved his proposal otder via mail only, Likovvisc dcfcndant mcs her order by cniail.

A copy ePObjec~ions to Plaintiffs Praposcd ORDER and defendant's alfemare Praposcd Order wcrc

d ~ d via cglail to: ~jllimsoa@iltlkingl~~~.c~m: an314/14 8:00 am.

I ddarci rhcaixrve to be true undcr penally nfprjury. Executed in Flighlmd CA on 31Jll4.

June 9,2014

INSTRUCTIONS

We are enclosing in this mailing two (2) letters, one from Park Management and one from your HOA Board's new Traffic Safety Committee with an Acknowledgement page and this instruction sheet.

Please retain both letters for your records, sign and return the Acknowledgment page t o the Park Office. BE CERTAIN THAT EVERYONE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO ISON THE LEASE HAS SIGNED THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

In order to achieve the goals of your Traffic Safety Committee it is necessary to read, understand, agree and return your signed copy of the enclosed Acknodledgment page of the Traffic Safety Committee letter dated June 9, 2014 to the Park Office by: June 13,2014.

Remember, with your complete and total cooperation, your Traffic Safety Committee, your resident's Homeowners Association and Park Management will be able to move forward!

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

May 9,2014 1 !

Dear Resident:

We may now be in a position to better focus on the issues of speedinnand coming to a full stop at stop s i~ns within our commbnitv.

A potential progrem may be within our grasp and if so it is entirely due to the efforts of your HOA Board of Directors and an hnselfish group of 9 community minded residents. This group has come together under the name of the "TRAFFICSAFETY COMMITTEE". In order to implement the program it will require the cooperation of every resident within the community as well as a commitment from your Park Management.

I

We, the Park Mahagement, are committed to the following:

1. ~ o d i f y tde speed bumps where needed. 2. Agree t o Pestripe all streets and walkways not less than every two years and not more than three

years. 3. Continue to enforce all traffic rules within our community equally and fairly, BUT MORE

VIGOROUSLY. 4. tontinud t o treat all offenders impartially, promptly and equally.

Management has committed to the above provided the residents are willing to accept their responsibility for good safe drlving habits within the community. That consists of the resident and guest commitment to the following:

1. Not t o ekceed the 15 MPH maximum speed limit 2. Full andcomplete stop at all stop signs and intersections whether marked or not. 3. ~ o t to pass the vehicle in front of you unless it comes to a full stop. 4. To diligently comply with a l l aspects of the traffic guidelines within our community.

In order t o accdmplish this goal it will be necessarv t o have 100% cooperation from each resident and, the attached ~ckndwledgement p ~ O R n e d c e by June 13,2014.

If we can al l wqrk together on this program we commit to you to modify the speed bumps where needed, and continue to enforce the traffic rules within our community, which we have all previously agreed to in writing.

This will go a ldng way in heipingto continue maintaining a very happy and safe community with an extra eye out for our more senior residents that enjoy walking and bike riding.

~ l i of the above is very achievable, and will require an effort on the part of gacJ resident to read. understand, sign and return the Acknowledgement page.

YoursTruxJ,

Eva S. Hazard Community Manager

May 9,2014 I

Dear ~esident: I

We can d l agree that Mountain Shadows is a great place to live. Even when living in lovely places there can be initating issues. One of those issues that has challeng 1 d RESIDENTS and MAhTAGEMENT for a long time is the matter of enforcedent of our traffic regulations.

In an effort to solve the problem, additional speed bumps were installed in many places d t h i n the park. Unfortunately, most of us have found that this "solution" has not been as effective as we hoped, and may have caused dis~pt ion and even hardship to some of our residents. In response to our pleas for relief, management has asked the home owners to come up with a plan to address the problem, while still achieving the main goal, "Traffic Safety". Our committee has been meeting, and is r&ommending the following plan.

This letter is the first part of our plan. We know that the majority of our residents are anxious to make our park a very safe place to live, and this includes residents stopping at all stop signs and driving within the speed limit. We commend them for this cooperation. However, there is an entrenched minority that for whatever reasons, habitually ignore these safety requirements. There is also a small group of delivery people, sub-contractors, outside guests and even children of some of our residents. This letter is a special appeal to those people to live within the restrictions that make our park such a nice place to live. If this earnest appeal goes unheeyd, we must find other ways to reach the offenders with methods that will meet our goals.

In support of this objective, we would encourage all residents who witness obvious violatibns, to report them to the park office. Emphasis should be on license numb&, type and color of vehicle and the date, time and location the violation occun'ed.

We assume that some of the offenses are inadvertent and we may not be aware we are speeding. Our first action would be a documented verbal warning. The ncxt step would be to send the first written notice, then a second, followed by a final

notice. he final notice states that continuance of non-compliance may result in a review o 4 residency status in Mountain Shadows.

~alifomia Civil Code provides for this remedy. It states in Article 6, Section 798.56 ... 1'A tenancy shall be terminated by the management for one or more of the followink reasons ... (d)Failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable lule or regulation of the park that is part of the rental agreement or any amendmknt thereto." Further, the Memorandum of Understanding dated March 1, 2010, ~ektion 7(A) (1) describes the consequences of Non-compliance with commudity Guidelines.

Management has agreed to enforce Section 11B of the Community Guidelines dated Mhrch 1,2010. The Guidelines clearly state that residents and resident's guests must obey all posted traffic control signs. This includes coming to a full and complete stop at all stop signs. This is for the good of our community as a whole. Management has assured us that if we are successful in obtaining compliance with the traffic regulations they will adjust or lower the most offensive speed bumps. Please work with us to achieve this goal.

Your Ttaffic Safety Committee

Barbara Smith, Chairman

Committee Members:

Jim Chenoski John Robert

I Jim Cline Ray Regis

i Arlind Hackett Charles Romer

Diane Murphy Steve Sutherland

I

I

I Acknowledgment o f thd HOA Board's Traffic Safety CommitteelManagement letters dated

I

1 June 9,2014

In order \o move forward with this proposal, acknowledgement of receipt and willingn k ss to comply is required. ALL SIGNATORIES TO THE LEASE ARE ASKED TO PLEASE SIGN AND DATE BELOW.

D E ~ L I N E I TO RETURN TO THE PARK OFFICE IS: JUNE 13,2014

Space Number:

I

Name (Signature) Date Name (Signature) Date I

I

Name (Signature) Date Name (Signature) Date

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDWO

Stubblefield v. Shioley Court Case: UDDS 12041 30 APPEAL Case: ACIAS1400026

The undersigned is counsel for Bonnie Shipley, who is appellant in this appeal, (Appellate Division) and defendant in UDDS1204130 in limited jurisdiction below.

950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, California, 93 103 nancyduffvsb(iT),yahoo.com cell phone: 805-450-0450 fax and phone: 805-965-3492

On the date recited below the undersigned served the below document as indicated:

Appellant's Opening Brief, Certificate of Interested parties, Motion to Augment Record

[x] PERSONAL DELIVERY to the Justice Center on 9/8/14

Presiding Panel, Appellate Division San Bernardino Justice Center 247 West Third Street San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063 tel 909-521-3574 fax 909-521-3563

Hon. Michael A Sachs S-28 Robert Williamson, Esq. Atty for Real Party San Bematdino Justice Center HartKing 247 West Third Street 4 Hutton Drive, Suite 900 San Bemardino, CA 9241 5-0063 S & a Ana, CA92707 909-708-8699 fax 909-708-8586 te1714-432-8700 fax 714-546-7457

I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelopes in the mail at Santa Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after-deposit date on affidavit. Copies were sent by 2-day mail to track and ensure speedy delivery.

[ ] (By Electronic) to email addresses below; copy to nancydufljsb@yahoo.com Y , rwilliamson@hartkinglaw.com -

[x] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above statements are true. Executed in Santa Barbara CA on the date recited below.

September 8,2014 - P. G L Q ~ ~ I arron, Attorney for ~ ~ ~ e &

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNILF L E D COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDlNO SUPERIOR COUNTY OF COURT MN OF BERNARDINO CALIFORNIA

APPELLATE DIVISION SAN BERNARDINO DISTRICT

247 West Third Street, San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063 SEP 2 6 2014

CASE NO. ACIAS1400026 1 UDDSI 2041 30 (San Bernardino) DATE: September 26,2014

S-I-UBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

1 BONNIE SHPLEY, Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Appellant's Motion to Augment Record on Appeal - ----- --- - .- - - - - - - - .---

In a motion filed with this court on September 8, 2014, appellant seeks to augment the record on appeal with Wo documents.

California Rules of Court, rule 8.841 provides, in pertinent part: "[I] At any time, on motion of a party or its own motion, the appellate division may order the record augmented to include: [TI (A) Any document filed or lodged in the case in the trial court; . .."

The record may only be augmented by matters that were before the superior court. The augmentation procedure cannot be used to bring up matters outside the trial court record. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1 996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.)

The documents with which appellant seeks to augment the record were not before the trial court and are therefore matters outside the trial court record.

The motion is DENIED.

cc: San Bernardino Courthouse

I certify that copies of the above Order were mailed to counsel of record as indicated on SEP 2 6 2014

e- - Swbpnl;, V

Court Clerk

CAROLYN SQLBERG

MAILING LIST FOR ACIAS 1400026:

LAW OFFICE OF NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON 950 ROBLE LANE SAIVTA BARBARA, CA 93 103

HART KING -- --- ---4- s Y w E 9 0 -- - - -- -

SANTA ANA, CA 92707

SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER 247 WEST THIRD STREET SAN BERNARDINO, CA 924 15

F I L E D SUPERlOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO SAN BERNARMNO DlSlRlCT

DEC 2 % 2014

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

APPELLATE DlVlSlON

- v.

BONNIE SHIPLEY,

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, Plaintiff and Respondent, 1

P E R C U R I A M --- ------ O P I N I O N - - - - - - -

Case No: ACIAS 1400026 (Trial Court: UDDSI 2041 30)

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from summary judgment, San Bernardino superior Court, San Bernardino District, Michael A. Sachs, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Nancy D. McCarron for defendant and appellant.

Hart King, John H. Pentecost, Robert G. Williamson, Jr. and Rhonda H. Mehlman, for plaintiff and respondent.

'THE COURT:

On August I I, 2012, plaintiff - ' and respondent Stubblefield

' Properties, a California General Partnership, dba Mountain Shadows

Mobilehome Community (hereinafter "Stubblefield") sewed appellant

Bonnie Shipley with a 5-Day Notice to surrender Possession. The notice

1 The following facts are taken from the clerk's' Transcript, including the Opinion issued by the Appellate Division on May 6, 2013, granting appellant's petition for writ of mandate, which can be found at pages 177-187.

was based upon Civil Code section 798.75, subdivision (c), "for failure to

move into the mobilehome without being approved as a sublessee or any

other capacity." The notice also stated that "this is a violation of the Rules

and Regulations of the mobilehome park."

On August 27, 2012, Stubblefield filed a complaint for forcible

detainer (Code Civ. Proc., § 1160) naming appellant as the sole defendant.

The complaint alleges that Stubblefield is the owner of the premises

commonly known as 4040 E. Piedmont Drive, Space 333, ~ i g h l a n d , ' ~ ~

92346. The complaint also alleges that prior to service of the Notice to

Surrender, appellant had, without Stubblefield's consent or approval,

without signing a rental agreement, and without beconling the registered

owner of the mobilehome situated at the premises, entered into

possession of the premises. The complaint further alleges that appellant

has continued to hold and keep possession of the premises by force and in

violation of Civil Code sectian 798.75 by failing to surrender the premises

to Stubblefield. The complaint prays for possession of the premises, for

damages at $30.01 per day (reasonable rental value of space 3331, and for

, attorney's fees.

On January 23, 2013, appellant filed a motion for summary

judgment. On February 14, 2013, the trial c o ~ ~ r t denied appellant's motion

for summary judgment. The court also denied Stubblefield's motion for

summary judgment, which was heard on the same day.

On February 27, 2013, appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate

requesting that the Appellate Division issue an order directing the trial

court to set aside its order denying appellant's motion for summary

judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion.

On May 6, 2013, a former panel of this Appellate Division granted

appellant's petition and issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to

vacate its order denying appellant's motion for summary judgment, and to

enter a new and different order granting the summary judgment motion.

Subsequently, Stubblefield filed a petition for writ of mandate in the

Court of Appeal, District Four, Division Two. On July 19, 2013, the Court

of Appeal summarily denied the petition.'

On July 22, 201 3, appellant filed a document entitled, "Request for

Immediate Recusal of Judge Alvarez Before Ruling on any Pending

Motions in this case Due to Presumed Bias Upon Reversal of his Ruling

Denying Shipley's MSJ which was reversed on appeal."3

On or about August 5, 201 3, Stubblefield filed a Retition for review in

the California Supreme On August 14, 2013, the Supreme Court

summarily denied re vie^.^

- - ---

CT 88 3 CT 90-1. Appellant's request for immediate recusal is based upon Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (c), which states: "At the request of a party or on its own motion an appellate courf shall consider whether in the interests of justice it should direct that further proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose judgment or order was reviewed by the appellate court." (Italics provided ) Thus, appellant's request for recusal appears to have been based upon an inapplicable statute, as it was presented directly to the trial court. 4~~ 91

On October 21, 2013, the trial court vacated its prior order denying

appellant's motion for summary judgment, and entered a new and different

order granting the summary judgment motion of appellant. The court also

ordered appellant to prepare and submit a proposed order and judgment.

The court set a hearing date of January 7, 2014, to hear appellant's motion

for attorney's fees, and requested that appellant submit the proposed order

and judgment by that date.6 I

On January 7, 2014, upod learning appellant had filed a peremptory I I

challenge on July 22, 201 3, t h e ( ~ o n . Donald Alvarez recused himself and

the case was reassigned to DPpartment 33, the Hon. Michael A. Sachs

presiding.' i

At a hearing on February10, 2014, the court noted that both plaintiff

and defense counsel had subm~tted proposed judgments. The court set a i hearing on February 19, 2014, tb rule on the proposed judgments.'

On February 19, 2014, tHe court and counsel discussed revisions to I

the proposed judgment. Thd court ordered Stubblqfield's counsel to

prepare a new proposed judghent I incorpqrating the changes suggested

, by the court and to attach a copy af the Appellate Division's opinion as an I

exhibit. The court set a further hearing for the proposed judgment on

March 17,2014.'

On March 17, 2014, the court and counsel discussed the proposed

language to be incorporated in the final judgment. The court noted it

reviewed the objections submitted by appellant.1° The court reviewed the

changes to the language in the proposed judgment based upon the court's

notes. The court ordered Stubblefield to prepare the proposed final

judgment and provided counsel with copies of the court's notes."

On March 20, 2014, Stubblefield filed a "[Proposed] Final Order

Vacating Denial of Summery Judgment and Judgment in Favor of

Defendant." The judgment was signed by the court on the'same date it

was filed.I2 On April 2, 2014, Stubblefield filed a notice of entry of the

j~dgment. '~ This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, we note appellant's brief contains several references to

facts and documents that do not appear in the record on appeal in this

forcible detainer matter. We therefore must disregard them in evaluating

this appeal. (Kohler v. Interstate Btands Corp. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th

1096, 1102.)'~

This appeal concerns the final judgment and the trial court

proceedings leading up to the preparation, signing, filing and entry of the

judgment, after the issuance of a writ of mandate by a former panel of this

Appellate Division.

Appellate Division's May 6,2013 Writ of Mandate Opinion

In its May 6, 2013 opinion, a former panel of this Appellate Division

determined that Stubblefield's attempt to evict appellant, who is a

subtenant of the owner of the mobilehome in question, was not authorized

by Civil Code section 798.75.15 The Appellate Division found that "As a

l4 Included in appel!anils opening brief is a motion to augment the record. We previously denied appellant's motion to augment the record on the ground the documents sought to be included were not filed with the court and/or are not part of the trial court's file. l5 Civil Code section 798.75, entitled "Sale or Transfer of Mobilehome Located in Park--Rental Agreement, Purchaser's Rights of Tenancy; Unlawful Occupant," states:

(a) An escrow, sale, or transfer agreement involving a mobilehome located in a park at the time of the sale, where the mobilehome is to remain in the park, shall contam a copy of either a fully executed rental agreement or a statement signed by the park's management and the prospective homeowner that the parties have agreed to the terms and conditions of a rental agreement.

(b) In the event the purchaser fails lo execute the rental agreement, the purchaser shall not have any rights of tenancy.

' (c) In the event that an occupant of a mobilehome has'no rights of tenancy and is not othenvise entitled to occupy the mobibhorne pursuant to this chapter, the occupant is considered an unlawful occupant if, after a demand is made for the surrender of fhe mobilehome park site, for a period of five days, the occupant refuses to surrender the site to the mobilehome park management. In the event the unlawful occupant fails to comply with the demand, the unlawful occupant shall be subject to the proceedings set forth in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 11 59) of Title 3 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(d) The occupant of the mobilehome shall not be considered an unlawful occupant and shall not be subject to the provisrons of subdivision (c) if ail of the following conditions are present:

(1) The occupant is the registered owner of the mobile home.

sublessee of a mobilehome owner, (appellant] does not fall within. the definition of

an 'unlawful occupant."' The court further found that "Although Civil Code section

798.75 does not authorize Stubblefield to evict Petitioner, Stubblefield is not

without a remedy under the Mobilehome Residency Law," and that Stubblef~ld's

remedy under the Mobilehome Residency Law is to proceed against the

homeowner in accordance with Civil Code section 798.56, subdivision (d) for

'failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or

regulation of ihe park that is part of the re~ ta l agreement or any amendment

thereto.'" The Appellate Division concluded,that "The trial court misinterpreted

Civil Code section 798.75. This statute applies only to a purchaser or transferee

of a mobilehome unit that occupies the park's space without first executing a

written lease agreement with the park. Petitioner is not a purchaser or transferee

of the subject mobilehome. Therefore, the 5-Day Notice to Surrender is invalid

because it is based upon an inapplicable statute. As such, the eviction of

Petitioner by Stubblefield under Civil Code section 798.75 is not authorized."16

The Appellate Division granted appellant's petition and issued a writ of mandate

directing the trial court to vacate its order denying appellanfs motion for

summary judgment and to enter a new order granting appellant's motion for

summary judgment." I

(2) The management has determined that the occupant has the financial ability to pay the rent and charges of the park; wilt comply with the rules and regulations of the park, based on the occupant's prior tenancies; and will comply with this article.

(3) The management failed or refused to offer the occupant a rental agreement.

Issues on Appeal

In her opening brief, appellant lists numerous procedural

irregularities and claimed errors in the case under review, making it difficult

to ascertain the precise issues she is raising in her appeal. We discern

three issues from our review of appellant's opening brief. First, appellant

contends the trial court erred by allowing Stubblefield, the non-prevailing

party, to prepare the proposed judgment. Second, appellant contends the

trial court erred by signing the proposed judgment prepared by Stubblefield

without affording appellant the opportunity to file objections to the

judgment. Third, appellant contends the trial court erred by permitting the

words "or resident" to be inserted into its final judgment, effectively revising

a statute "by judicial proclamation" and "transmuting prevailing party's

judgment into a victory for the non-prevailing party."'8

Preparation of Proposed Judgment by Respondent

Appellant asserts the trial court violated rule 3.131 2 of the California

Rules of Court by permitting Stubblefield, the non-prevailing party, to

prepare the judgment.

I California' Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 provides, in pertinent part:

"Unless the parties waive notice or the court orders otherwise, the party

prevailing on any motion must, within five days of the ruling, serve by any

means authorized by law and reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to

the other party or parties no later than the close of the next business day a

proposed order for approval as conforming to the court's order. Within five

days after service, the other party or parties must notify the prevailing party

as to whether or not the proposed order is so approved. The opposing

party or parties must state any reason for disapproval. Failure to notify the

preva'iling party within the time required shall be deemed an approval. ...

[m The prevailing party must, upon expiration of the five-day period

provided for approval, promptly transmit the proposed order to the court

together with a summary of any responses of the other parties or a

statement that no responses were received." (Cal. Rules of Court, rille

3.1312(a), (b).)

We agree with appellant that Rule 3.1312 provides for the

preparation and submission of the proposed judgment by the prevailing

party, and that the court should have permitted appellant to prepare and

submit the proposed judgment. Nevertheless, we find any error was

harmless, did not result in prejudice, and of no effect on the judgment.

Local Rule 591.3 and Insertion of "or resident" in Judgment

Appellant asserts the trial court erred by failing to wait 10 days prior

to signing the proposed judgment submitted by Stubblefield.

San Bernardino Superior Court Local Rule 591.3 states: "Counsel

must prepare, serve, and present to the Court forms for all orders and

judgments, which require the Court's signature. If no objection is

forthcoming within ten days, the order or judgment may be signed as

presented. . . . "

At the hearing on March 17,2014, the court reviewed the changes to

the proposed judgment from the court's notes. Specifically, the court

stated, "So again, the court's requesting that Defendant was not a

purchaser or transferee of the subject mobile home period, and then we

are going to line out lines 10, 11, and midway through line 12. And so the

next sentence starts, and this is where the next change is, is Plaintiff may

proceed directly against the homeowner or resident under Civil Code

Section798.56." Defense counsel responded: "Okay. What about the first

three sentences where they paraphrased it and they added the word such

as ~efendant?" '~

On appeal, appellant contends the court improperly included the

phrase "or resident" at page 2, line 10 of the judgment. Appellant argues

that "By inserting the words 'or resident' Judge Sachs paved the way for

park owners to evict residents directly on 5 days' notice, instead of

proceeding against homeowners, who can invoke statutory protections I

against arbitrary evictions under Civil ~ 7 9 8 . 5 5 . " ~ ~

We agree with appellant that the inclusion of the words "or resident"

is a misstatement of Civil Code section 798.56 and changes the meaning

and effect of the statute. Section 798.56 provides the permissible reasons

for the terrr~ination of a "tenancy" at a mobilehome park, including "failure

of a homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or regulation

of the park that is part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto."

(Civ. Code, § 798.56, subd. (d).) Section 798.56 does not state that a park

owner may evict a resident directly. Rather, it provides that a

homeowner's tenancy2' may be terminated if the homeowner or resident

fails to comply with park rules.

Here, the trial court signed the proposed final judgment on March

20, 2014, the very same day the judgment was submitted by Stubblefield.

Appellant was not afforded the opportunity to submit any objections to the

proposed judgment. We find the court erred by failing to wait the requisite

10 days, to permit appellant to file any objections, before signing the

proposed judgment. Nevertheless, we find the error to be harmless.

Because the insertion of the words "or resident" in the final judgment

was erroneous, we will modify the judgment to delete those words from the

final judgment.

, Respondent's Request for Dismissal

Stubblefield urges this reviewing court to dismiss the appeal for

appellant's failure to comply with appellate rules-namely, appellant's

*' Civil Code section 798.12 provides: "Tenancy" is the right of a homeowner to the use of a site within a mobilehome park on which to locate, maintain, and occupy a mobilehome, site improvements, and accessory structures for human habitation, including the use of the services and facilities of the park.

failure to cite matters in the appellate record to support her arguments,

appellant's repeated and unwarranted personal attacks on the court,

Stubblefield and its counsel, and failure to comply with formatting rr-~les set

forth in the California Rules of Court.

We will disregard any noncompliance and decline to dismiss the

appeal. However, we admonish appellant and appellant's counsel to

refrain from making personal attacks on the trial court. "Disparaging the

trial judge is a tactic that is not taken lightly by a reviewing court. Counsel

better make sure he or she has the facts right before venturing into such

dangerous territory because it is contemptuous for an attorney to make 'the

unsupported assertion that the judge was 'act[ing] out of bias toward a

party."' (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 422; citing in re White

(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1478.)

The case is remanded to the trial court with directions to modify the

judgment by deleting the words "or resident" from page 2, linelo, o f the

judgment. In in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The parties to

bear their own costs on appeal.

DAVID COHN, wesiding Judge of the Appellate Division

~ ~ I C H A E L A. KNISH Judge of the Appellate Division

n n

7

El-IA V. PlROZZl Judge of the Appellate Division

guyertor Court State of California Countp ot B a n j'Bernarbino

Appellate Division DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1 1 vs. Case # AClAS 1400026

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ) Trial Court# UDDS1204130

The undersigned hereby declares: I am a citizen of the United States of America, over the age of eighteen years, a resident of the above-named State, and not a party to nor interested in the proceedings named in the title of the annexed document. I am a Deputy Appellate Clerk of said County. I am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing-with the United States Postal Service. Correspo~dence would be - - -

deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. On the date of mailing shown below, 1 placed for collection and mailing following ordinary business practices, at the request and under the direction of the Superior Court in and for the State of California and County above-named, whose office is at the Courthouse, San Bernardino, California, a sealed envelope which contained a true copy of each annexed document, and which envelope was addressed to the addressee, as follows:

LAW OFFICE OF HART KING NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON 4 HUITON CENTER DR., SUITE 900 950 ROBLE LANE SANTA ANA, CA 92707 SANTA BARBARA, CA 931 03

cc: Honorable Judge MICHAEL A. SACHS, San Bernardino Justice Center Courthouse

Trial Court: San Bernardino Justice Center Courthouse

Date and Place of Mailing: December 22, 2014, San Bernardino, California.

Document Mailed: PER CURIAM OPINION <. .

I declare under penalty of perjury that the fo?egoin$is, M e and correct.

Executed on December 22, 2014, at San Bemardino, California.

Clerk

DEC 2 2 2014

[d-rnq R V t ' && of vie superi~ Cou~t of Ihe %ts of

I h s Calitomia. in and lbr ehe CarPlyof

EXHIBIT 1.3

CLAIM AQAINST THE CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO (For damages to persons or personal property)

(Complete Both Pages)

9 ciaim aaainst the Ciw of San Bernardino must be filed with the Ciw Clerk within 8 months after the incident or event occun~d. &sum WUr claim Is . ---. -. .~ . . ., - ~ ~

against the City of Sen Bwnsrdmo and not anomer publ~c entity Completed claims mum be mailed or del~vered to: Cily Clerk. C(g of Sen Bernsrdino, 300 Nonh D Strent. Ssn Bernardino. Cslif0m.a 92418. If add tional space is needed to answer one of tho questions. please a w h en additional shest.

Warnlng: AI It b a Crlmlnel Offense t o Fils a Falm Claim1 (Penal Code Sec. 72; insurance Code See. 556.11

61 It 11 a Crimlnsl Offanr t a FBe . h l a e Clalm egslnat a PWCe OfflCerl (Penal Code 148.61

Dele Stamp

Claimant Information

- Address to whlch cla~mant deslras notmsto 8~ sent

Name --

Address

*- Dre r ' s L~canse NO / "PS-~~;~RYL

I I

Date of claim incident

'on: Whirr Caoav& Rot - C O ~ ; Ooldenrod. clsimam DICIA R,- . ,I

Damages Claimed - Less Than B'IAQWI

Propem Dsmagm Bodily Injury

Amount claimed as of thls date.

Ertimatsd amount of future costs.

Subtotal

Total Costs of Claim

Damages Claimed - More Than $10.000

You must indkate court jurisdiction: ~ u n i c i p l ~uper ior % Claim Investigation

&&do, names of any employee(s)who have bean involved. 5 0 6 /71, y-0 wd(

Wes this incident reported toe law enforcement agenw? ~ e s B NO If yes, which agency?

Who reported it? .- When wes it reported?

List the following:

Hospitels or Doctors:

I*"" ..em.

h"" - Ynr ..em.

Indicate eddiiional information whlch you believe might be helpful in considering this claim.

-

Warning: A) It 11. a Crlminal M f a n u to File a Faloo CIaBml (Penel Code Sec. 72: Insurancecode Sec. 556.1)

B) It i m a Crlrnlnal Offenan to File a Fa1.s Claim ag0in.t a Peac. Onlcerl IPenel Code 148.6)

I have read the matters and statements made in the ebove cleim and I know the same to be true of m y own knowledge, except as to those meners stated upon information or belief and as to such matters I believs the same to be true. I certify under penalty ofperjury that the foregoing is 7RUE and CORREC7:

4%. . - 23 dayof Hm Signed this

RM-15 M b u r i o n : White. Canan&Pink- City; Goldenrod. Claimant

C W M AGAINST COUN (CLAIM FORM MUST BE FILLED OUT PROPERL Y OR CLAIM M'T;tL BE RETURNED WITHOUT

Claim is hereby made against the treasury of the County of San Bernardino, State of California, as follows:

Less than $10,000 - State the total amount claimed $ More than $1 0,000 - Check one of the boxes:

Municipal Court Jurisdiction ($1 0,000 - $25,000) X Superior Cc:urt Jurisdiction ($25,001 and up)

Claimant makes the following statements in support of the claim:

1. Name of Claimant: Nancy Duffy R?.;Carron 805-965-3492 Fist Middk Last (Area Code and Phone No.)

2. Address of Claimant: 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara CA 93103 Zip Code

3. Notices concerning claim should be sent to:

Address Zip Code (Area Code and Phone No.)

4. Circumstances giving rise to claim are as follows: attached Notice of Racketeerinn Action

I

6. Public property and/or public officers or employees causing injury, damage or loss: Kyle Brodie (will add other cons~irins racketeers on discoverv of sup~ortina evidence)

7. NN

8. Basis of computation of claimed amount is as follows:

Medical expenses to date Loss wages ------ Estimated future medical expenses Genercl damages Other expenses PropeCy damage $80,000 value mobile home Other damages: Judge Brodie is enabling abusive, harassing, ',legal litigation tactics by refusing to

,apply the law, Codes of Procedure, C~sort Rules; refusing to rezlassify case to higher jurisdiction to enable cross claims for elder abuse ar:d intentional infliction of emotional distress, Judge Brodie is a participant in a racketeering enterprise in which he refuses to rul: against Stubblefield, has granted an order to authorizing Stubblefield's gocn squad to invade our hcme to "videotape, photograph & test" ?he inside of our private home; "tests & ssmples" on exterior (bye believe agents intend to plant drugs) and he intends to sign an order compe!ling my husband to tesli:;/ at a deposition, breaking his spousal

Office: (909) 386-8631 Fax: (909) 382-321 2 ,,

C W M AGAINST COLIN (CLAIM FORM MUST BE FIL LED OUT PROPERL Y OR CLAIM WILL BE RETURNED WITHOUT

Claim is hereby made against the treasury of the County of San Bernardino, State of California, as follows:

Less than $10,000 - State the total amount claimed $ More than $10,000 -Check one of the boxes: Municipal Court Jurisdiction ($10,000 - $25,000)

Claimant makes the following statements in support of the claim:

1. Name of Claimant: Bonnie Shi:;ley call McCarron 805-965-3492 P /.r.st p

2. Address of Claimant:4040 E. Piedmont Drive, Highland, CA 92346 .s%et w

3. Notices concerning claim should be sent to: Nancy McCarron, 950 Roble Ln. Santa Barbara CA

Name Address Zip Code (Area Code and Phone No.)

5. Date, Time and Place (city, street, cross-street) damage occurred and nature thereof: see attached See d t q

6. Public property andlor public officers or employees causing injury, damage or loss: FireIArson investigators Steve Tracey, Brian M. Carvalho, Battalion Chief Brian Crowell, and Judge Kyle Brodie

7. N c c h e d

8. Basis of computation of claimed amount is as follows:

Medical expenses to date Loss wages - Estimated Mure medical expenses General damages, Other expenses Property damage Fire Damage to Space 333 Other damages: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, kist wages-not able to work due to having to print, deliver and file pleadings to defend 2 sham unlawful evictions, which Kyle Brodie should have dismissed or classified in unlimited jurisdiction so that I would be able to file cross-claims for damages; destroying my credit rating, physical and mental anguish from harassment and violations of my privacy, falsifying arson investigation reports to imply that I caused a fire at space #333 in Stubblefield's mobile

RETURN COMPLETED FORM TO: Office: (909) 386-8631 Fax: (909) 382-3212

San Bernardino. CA 92415-0016

Claim is hereby made against the treasury of the County of San Bernardino, State of California, as follows:

Less than $10,000 -State the total amount claimed $ More than $10,000 -Check one of the boxes:

U Municipal Court Jurisdiction ($10.000 - $25,000) X Supelior Court Jurisdiction ($25,001 and up) ~.

Claimant makes the following statements in support of the claim: ,

1. Name of Claimant: Stephen C. Allen 805-965-3492 (attorney) Fist Middle Last (Area Code and Phone No.)

2. Address of Claimant: PO Box Highland, CA

3. Notices concerning claim should be sent to:Nancy McCarron, 950 Roble Ln, Santa Barbara, CA

Address Zip Code (Area Code and Phone No.)

6. Public property and/or public officers or employees causing injury, damage or loss: Steve Tracey, M. Cawalho, Brian Crowell (knowingly falsified fire reports t o imply I caused fire damage t o #333) i n conspiracy with Arnold Stubblefield, Tom Parrish, and Robert Williamson; participants in racketeering enterprise by accepting bribes or political favors for falsifying arson & fire reports

7. Name, address and telephone number of witnesses: see attached

8. Basis of computation of claimed amount is as follows:

Medical expenses to date Loss wages Estimated future medical expenses General damages Other expenses Propert.) damage Other damages: to my reputation, slander, loss of wages, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of my privacy; trying to get judge to compel videotaping my face--violating my native American religious beliefs (violation-Is. Amendment (US Const) and inali ights under CA Const. Artl.$l

)31 C I (jXirnanilWRepresentatrve (S~gnature)

RETURN COMPLETED FORM TO: Risk Management Division - County of San Bernardino, State of California . . Office: (909) 386-8631 222 W. Hospitality Lane. 3d Floor * Fax: (909) 382-3212 San Bemardino. CA 92415-0016 k b -

Cih 04- L l 3 P x - 07.8387-286

n d m , GJ-~ u , ~ L N NO. o 9Zf/8

1

TO: Clerk, City of San Bernardino (fax 909-384-5158) and County of San Bernardino (fax 909-382-3212)

NOTICE: Intent to Name Steve Tracy, M. Carvalho, Brian Crowell, Judge Kyle Brodie in Racketeering Action, together with Arnold Stubblefield and participants in his racketeering enterprise to defraud mobilehome owners.

TRUE Narrative/exhibits prove Steve Tracy, M. Carvalho, Brian Crowell falsified evidence in arson reports:

The truth about what happened by Wendy Durr, the only witness who saw where the fire started, and put it out:

8/28/14 -10:30 am Thursday--2 days before 8/30/14 Saturday fire-Wendy experienced large surge & loud boom; Saturday (8/30/14-12 noon) she had similar surge, but no bang; her air conditioning unit popped off, then on. 20 minutes later she exited home to go out to patio and heard a crackling noise, looked out window and saw fire at McCarron/Shipley’s home, in the electrical pedestal and plastic fence, and vegetation in front of the pedestal. Durr called 911 to report fire at 1:14 pm. Durr took her fire extinguisher over to the fire area and joined Jerome Poland who had run across the street when he saw fire. Durr gave Poland the hose; she extinguished the fire at the electric pedestal with fire extinguisher. Poland extinguished the fire at base of palm trees with a water hose. Durr said it took 22 minutes for a fire engine to arrive (from less than 1 mile away); fire was already out by then Durr said the fire department staff interviewed her about what happened. Durr said So. Cal Edison rep returned to the fire site the next day to examine the pedestal and restore her electric service. SoCal rep said he saw damage a bus-bar within the electric pedestal and he had documented same in his report. Durr said he also found a ball of metal down in the hole, underneath the pedestal, where the electrical wires come up from the ground. After the fire department departed Wendy Durr called Nancy McCarron to notify her of the fire & above events. IT WAS INDISPUTABLE EVIDENCE THE FIRE STARTED ON INSIDE OF ELECTRIC PEDESTAL. Pages 1-5 8/30/14 NFIRS-Basic Internal Fire Report on space #333 at 4040 E. Piedmont Dr. Highland, CA shows 911 call: 1314 (1:14 pm); page 2 shows Brian Crowell left section K1, K2 blank (witnesses) [in a later 10/7/14 report (pg. 35) Brian Crowell admits there were 2 witnesses at scene when he arrived] Crowell whitewashed: “resident not home” “called in by next door neighbor” “extinguished by bystander”

“possibly damaged inside wiring..unknown cause of fire..possibly electrical in nature..electrical box taped off” Crowell taped off the box with hundreds of feet of electrical tape wrapped around several times so that no one could look inside the box which revealed exactly how the fire started. Crowell did not know Wendy had taken a picture of the inside of the box before he arrived---evidence of the real origin of the fire (see pic @ page 20) Crowell intentionally failed to document 2 witnesses (Wendy Durr & Jerome Poland) to suppress real evidence.

9/02/14 – McCarron called Steve Tracy to ask for investigation. Because she had already heard Stubblefield “owned” local fire department bosses and bribes them to alter reports and bury complaints about fire hazards, and because she did not trust Steve Tracy, she asked him to tape record her report so he could not lie about her. Tracy said to call back on an alternate number so her interview would be tape-recorded. City now refuses to give McCarron a copy of her recorded report. During their recorded interview she told Tracy everything Wendy had told her on 8/30/14. Tracy knew on 9/2/14 the fire started in the pedestal and spread to the palm trees after starting in pedestal. McCarron told Tracy pedestals were 50 years old and that she suspected sabotage by Stubblefield as the park controls pedestals and resident/tenants have no access to the pedestals which are locked. McCarron told Tracy that Stubblefield tried to evict her co-resident in a vitriolic litigation lasting for two years, and because he had lost the 2-year battle he had a motive to “burn her out of the park” after losing his appeal. Secondly, maintenance staff told McCarron manager Tom Parrish ordered them not to replace a pedestal at 333. Parrish told staff to “stay out of it” and “let McCarron replace the pedestal and gas meter” to restore her utilities. McCarron called Hanna Noreiga (assistant park manager) on 9/2/14 to request immediate restoration of utilities. Noreiga told McCarron it was “not the park’s job to replace the pedestal and gas meter” and told McCarron she had to “contact her homeowners’ insurance carrier to get them to replace utilities.” Clearly Stubblefield and his racketeers intended to drive Shipley and McCarron out of the park as it was impossible to live without utilities. Despite knowing the origin of the fire, and history of vitriolic 2-year litigation relayed during a taped interview which Tracy promised to keep confidential, Tracy betrayed a victim by meeting with Stubblefield’s manager,

Tom Parrish & his lawyer to conspire how they would falsify reports to create a pretext Shipley caused the fire. The evidence below shows exactly how these corrupt fire investigators participated in a racketeering enterprise.

2

Pages 6-10 9/2/14 After McCarron’s recorded interview with Steve Tracy, in which she told him all of the details

Wendy Durr had told her on 8/30/14 (the day of the fire), including the origin of the fire in the pedestal, and in which she gave Tracy Wendy Durr’s space no. 332 & cell phone no. 909-347-1940 (which she always answers) and Jerome Poland’s space no. 316 & cell no. 909-362-9988 corrupt investigator M. Carvalo falsified a report: M. Carvalo never contacted two witnesses with personal knowledge of the origin of the fire (Durr and Poland). Carvalo utters a BOLDFACED LIE reciting, “Investigator Tracy (l684) and I (l688) took photographs and interviewed witnesses. The general area of origin was determined to be the planter on the southeast (left side) of the structure. The cause of fire was found to be undetermined.” HE NEVER INTERVIEWED WITNESSES. WE BELIEVE THAT EITHER HE OR TRACY PLANTED CIGARETTE BUTTS NEAR THE PALM TREES. Carvalo then recites “We began an investigation into the cause and origin..” On 9/2/14 they already knew the

cause and origin of the fire because Wendy Durr identified the cause and origin to McCarron on 8/30/14 which McCarron repeated to Steve Tracey IN A RECORDED STATEMENT ON 9/2/14 exactly what Wendy told her. After planting cigarette butts by the palm trees Carvalo then recites, “Evidence of smoking materials was found all along the planter surrounding the structure.” Witness statements from Durr & Poland are conspicuous by

their absence, as well as any statements by the victim, Nancy McCarron. Only what could work to Stubblefield’s

advantage was written in the report; i.e. inferences that “smoking” by the residents was the cause of the fire! In No. 7 of his report (page 8) M. Carvalo lists the property value at $100,000. This supports evidence that Judge Kyle Brodie is part of Stubblefield’s racketeering enterprise as he refuses to classify UDFS1406978 to unlimited jurisdiction despite McCarron providing evidence the damages Stubblefield seeks (over $25,000 in back rent) and the property he seeks to seize both exceed Judge Brodie’s jurisdiction (limited to $25,000 or less). [see the attached Writ Petition to Appellate Division after Judge Brodie denied reclassification to unlimited jurisdiction) In No. 10 M. Carvalo recites, “Evidence of smoking materials was found near the general area of origin. Therefore smoking can NOT be ruled out.” M. Carvalo knew his statements were false when made because he had my recorded interview telling Tracy that Wendy Durr saw the fire started in the electric pedestal, and had taken a picture of the burned out lug hole which was the origin of the fire by an arching event. M. Carvalo’s final conclusion (No. 12 – pg. 9) conveniently recites “the cause of this fire was undetermined.” Carvalo prints out “Investigation Report Detail” which includes the following fraudulent “evidence.” Evidence Item Number Type Class Disposition 1 Photographs Fire Cause Determination Description: Stored in SIB-Scene Photos We believe Tracy and/or Carvalo planted cigarette butts in the palm trees to imply that Shipley started the fire. * Steve Tracy & M. Carvalho intentionally did not interview Durr or Poland so they could falsify the 9/2/14 report for Stubblefield’s immediate benefit as will be shown by the remainder of chronological evidence below! pp 11-12 9/4/14 Housing & Community Development (HCD) Investigator Bryan Winn (760-702-1436) arrives after McCarron’s 9/3/14 complaint-park refused to replace electric pedestal & gas meter to restore utilities to 333 Page 12 top shows second round of evidence proving a conspiracy with fire department to falsify arson reports. Manager Hanna Noreiga stated “the fire investigator had completed the investigation and was able to determine a starting location of the fire which was by some palm trees by the street in the area close to the lot utilities, not from the electric pedestal, but was unable to determine the cause of the fire.” This was a BOLDFACED LIE!

Wendy Durr stopped by the office to report the fire and told Noreiga and Tom Parrish it started in the pedestal. This also demonstrates the conspiracy between Tracy, Carvalho, Tom Parrish and Noreiga to falsify evidence. After my initial call to Tracy on 9/2/14 he avoided me like the plague for two days (9/2/14 and 9/3/14). He would not take my calls; rather he left his phone on voicemail continuously and refused to return my calls. I even called other fire department clerical staff, who answered the main line to contact him to call, as I had new information. Tracy finally took a call from me at the end of the work day on 9/4/14 which was our last conversation.

3

Tracy told me he was “finished with his investigation” and that he would tell me the same thing he had just told Tom Parrish and his lawyer at a meeting they just finished; i.e. that the cause and origin of the fire was “undetermined” but that he could not rule out (and believed) the fire was started by “smoldering cigarette butts in the palm trees.” I asked if he had interviewed the only 2 witnesses with personal knowledge (Durr & Poland). He said “no.” It was “not necessary” to interview them because HE had already determined the cause and origin of the fire and had taken pictures of “the cigarette butts all along the planter areas.” Shipley never smoked in that remote area. Shipley smokes only in her garage and places her butts into closed containers in the garage. We knew then that Tracy and/or Carvahlo had planted cigarette butts in palm tree area near the fire to imply that Shipley had caused the fire, and to protect Stubblefield from any liability for gross negligence or intentional acts of arson to drive us out. This also explains why both Carvalho and Stacy intentionally failed to even acknowledge the existence of witnesses Durr & Poland in any of their reports---let alone interview them before “arriving” at their fraudulent “conclusions” about the “origin and cause” of the fire at 333. This also explains why Battalion Chief Brian Crowell intentionally left the witness blocks blank in his initial 8/30/14 report at the time of the fire, and why Crowell intentionally delayed arrival for 22 minutes when his fire engine was less than a mile away. Crowell had arranged with Tom Parrish to delay arrival---hoping my house would be burned down by then. THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED IN THE COLONIES CORRUPTION CASE WHEN THE WITNESS AGAINST THE CONSPIRATORS’ HOUSE MYSTERIOUSLY BURNED DOWN- THE SAN BERNARDINO FIRE DEPARTMENT TOOK 45 MINUTES TO ARRIVE AT THE SCENE TO FIND ONLY RUBBLE LEFT! ATTORNEY GENERAL MUST INVESTIGATE THIS SEWER OF CORRUPTION IN SAN BERNARDINO! Pg. 13 9/5/14 Stubblefield’s corrupt lawyer (Robert Williamson) sent a letter to McCarron with boldfaced lies:

“According to the Fire Department Battalion Chief and the arson investigator, with whom I have already spoken with, it is very clear the origin of the fire occurred at the base of two palm trees at the Southeast corner of Space 333, moved toward the electric pedestal, destroying the pedestal, and then continued toward and damaged the gas meter and line which for obvious safety reasons was shut off. In fact, based on my discussions with the arson investigator, the fire was accelerated and burned intensely as a result of two conditions on Space 333:(i) overgrown shrubbery containing some type of oil-based liquid; and (ii) the palm trees on the Space.”

The Fire Department’s initial report indicates and confirms the location of

the fire’s origin, a copy of which will be forwarded to you upon receipt.

I am informed the arson investigator’s report, which will confirm the same

information, will not be available for another 10-15 days, at which time a copy will be provided to you. Whether to request initiation of a criminal investigation is under consideration pending issuance of the arson investigator’s report.

While the cause of the fire is still under investigation, the Fire Batallion Chief and arson investigator both conclude that the cause of the fire was in no way related to nor triggered by the electric pedestal.

Amazingly, neither Tracy nor Carvalho, nor Chief Brian Crowell talked to Wendy Durr or Jerome Poland. Instead, the only persons they wanted to meet with and talk to were Stubblefield, Parrish and their lawyer! How dare they be so dishonest and unethical. They all should be fired forthwith for blatant corruption! Pg 15-27 9/8/14 Irate after receiving AttorneyWilliamson’s email, McCarron faxed City Clerk at 4:00 a.m. Outlining the details of the fire, and the blatant in-your-face corruption of Steve Tracy and Battalion Chief. I also filled out a government claim asking for an investigation of this corruption in the fire department, and asked the City Clerk, Ms. Hanna to investigate corruption. Ms. Hanna said she would forward my fax and my claim to the City Attorney’s office for review and action. The City later denied the claim on October 22, 2014.

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Pg 28-29 9/8/14 Stubblefield’s Attorney Robert Williamson filed a declaration under oath, in Judge Sach’s

court testifying to Judge Sachs that (in No. 4) “On Thursday, September 4, 2014 I spoke with the arson investor regarding origin of the fire at Space 333. The arson investigator confirmed that the fire originated at the base of the palm trees on Space 333.” Pg 30 9/8/14 Because of the fax transmitted at 4:00 a.m. which Ms. Hanna read upon her arrival at 8:00 am., and which she immediately forwarded to the City Attorney, we believe the City Attorney immediately called the Fire Department to find out what had happened and how the investigators could complete their report on 9/4/14 and “conclude” the fire started in the palm trees, without ever having interviewed either of the two witnesses

who had personal knowledge of where the fire started. (Wendy Durr and Jerome Poland). In a kneejerk reaction to that contact by the City Attorney Steve Tracy FINALLY decided it would be prudent to FINALLY INTERVIEW WENDY DURR AND JEROME POLAND which he did THAT DAY! Page 30 is Tracy’s summary of his 9/8/14 interview of Wendy Durr---10 days after the fire and 4 days after he met with perpetrators Stubblefield, Tom Parrish, and their corrupt attorney Mr.Williamson on speaker phone. Continuing blatant corruption, Tracy tried to trick Wendy Durr by starting the recorded interview by stating their interview was being taped on September 2, 2014 --- Wendy had to correct the record by saying, “ NO, TODAY IS SEPTEMBER 8, 2014!” Tracy tried to falsify again by creating a pretext that he interviewed her on 9/2/14. In this interview Wendy Durr recited the identical history of events she had told me on 8/30/14 after the fire. DURR SAW THE FIRE START IN THE PEDESTAL AND THEN MOVE OVER TO PALM TREES. Durr also explained how the Edison employee saw the damage to one of the bus-bars (lug nuts-live wires) within the electrical pedestal. She also stated he found a ball of metal down in the hole underneath the pedestal where the electrical wires come up FROM THE GROUND. Edison employee excavated the dirt for hours digging very deeply to see if the fire originated in the main line. He explained to Wendy Durr that he believed an arching event occurred inside the pedestal causing the fire. Tracy conveniently left this part of her testimony out of his “summary of interview.” How convenient? Pg 31- 9/8/14 Tracy’s interview with Jerome Poland. Jerome told McCarron that Tracy tried to “trip him up.” Tracy kept repeatedly asking Poland, “Are you sure the fire didn’t start in the palm trees” at least three times. POLAND stated, “I felt like the fire had moved from the area in front of the pedestal towards the palm trees and then continued to start the trees; those trees would have been a bigger blaze if it was the other way around.” THIS IS NOT WHAT TRACY WANTED TO HEAR BECAUSE IT DID NOT MATCH HIS CONTRIVED CONCLUSION; HE WAS SO EAGER TO GIVE STUBBLEFIELD ON 9/4/14 TO USE IN COURT 9/8/14. PG 32 - 9/9/14 Ex Parte Hearing on Shipley’s Application for Order to Repair or Replace Electric Pedestal Judge Sachs denied Bonnie Shipley’s righteous application for an Order to Compel Repair or Replacement of the Electric Pedestal and Gas Meter so that utilities could be restored. We were without electric power, gas, telephone and DSL and had been for nearly 2 weeks by then, in the middle of a heat wave over 105 degrees. I wrote a letter and called Mr. Williamson to ask if Bonnie Shipley could relieve herself from the extreme heat by going into the air conditioned clubhouse and swimming pool. He said, “no, she is an “unapproved resident.” This was despite the stress she was under, as the sole caregiver for a brother dying of Stage 4 cancer (she takes him to chemo, radiation, and proton therapy nearly every day, and has to hand-feed him 3 meals per day, as well as the stress for caring for her 80-year old mother with congestive heart failure. These people are pure evil! Judge Sachs had no sympathy whatsoever for Bonnie Shipley’s plight – denying her order to restore utilities. Williamson smirked at me as he walked out, knowing he defeated us with corrupt reports by bribed fire officials. Because Judge Sachs refused to compel utilities restoration, I had to spend over $3,000 to restore utilities myself.

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Pg 35 -10/7/14 Tracy’s belated interview with Battalion Chief Brian Crowell, in an attempt to whitewash fraud! Amazingly, Crowell back peddles and ADMITS “there were two neighbors at the location when they arrived on scene that had extinguished the body of the fire with garden hose prior to his arrival. Crowell stated one of these neighbors was the RP who had called 911 to report the fire.” It is also amazing that Crowell never

included summaries of his interviews with these two percipient witnesses who extinguished the fire. NOTE that on Brian Crowell’s initial report entered 8/30/14 (pages 1-5 above) he never listed these 2 witnesses on his report or a summary of his interview with both of them immediately upon his arrival at the fire scene. Even in this belated report Crowell still does not identify Wendy Durr & Jerome Poland as witnesses therein. Tracy then narrates, “Crowell did state the cause of the fire may have been possibly electrical in nature but was not able to make this determination based on his training and experience.” How convenient? Crowell did not need to make a determination based on his training and experience. He had a live witness on the scene who TOLD HIM what caused the fire – it started inside the electric pedestal shown by Ms. Durr’s picture.

(see picture - page 20). But that is not the “evidence” Stubblefield wanted included on the corrupt reports! Accordingly, Crowell filled out his initial report as if there were no witnesses, reciting he “could not determine

the cause” Crowell conspired to send corrupt racketeers (Tracy and Carvalho) to plant evidence Stubblefield

wanted to “appear” in the pictures at the scene; i.e. cigarette butts in the palm trees. How convenient? These corrupt participants in Stubblefield’s racketeering enterprise executed the plan to falsify reports. Pg 33–10/13/14 Belated Final “Narrative” Issued by Steve Tracy (5 weeks after the fire-on city attorney advice) Tracy’s narrative is replete with BOLDFACED LIES in a belated attempt to whitewash prior corrupt reports. First LIE: “Offensive fire attack was initiated and the fire was extinguished.” Brian Crowell intentionally delayed arriving with the fire truck for 22 minutes despite the fact the station was less than a mile away. Wendy Durr marked the time she called (1:14 pm) and said the fire truck did not arrive until 1:36 p.m. Wendy Durr & Jerome Poland had already extinguished the fire. Brian Crowell delayed arrival as requested by racketeer Stubblefield --- in hopes my entire home would be burned down before the fire truck arrived. What they did not count on is that two courageous neighbors would extinguish the fire with their bare hands! CONCLUSION: CORRUPT FIRE INVESTIGATORS AND CHIEF FALSIFIED ARSON REPORTS PLEASE BE ADVISED WE INTEND TO FILE A RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE CASE IN FEDERAL COURT IN EARLY APRIL 2015. The time of discovery of this blatant fraud by falsifying fire investigation reports was 10/28/14 ---- the day Nancy McCarron picked up Fire Department Final Narrative Report. This claim is timely as it is filed within 6 months from discovery of this blatant fraud (falsified reports). The racketeering case will be filed in federal court after waiting 30 days from denial of the claims. We intend to name Steve Tracy, M. Carvalho, Brian Crowell and Judge Kyle Brodie as racketeer participants. The following pages outline how Judge Kyle Brodie continues to enable Stubblefield to prosecute his SECOND SHAM eviction complaint against McCarron and Shipley in the WRONG JURISDICTION.

WE DEMAND THAT STEVE TRACY, M. CARVAHLO, AND BRIAN CROWELL BE FIRED FOR BLATANT CORRUPTION AND FALSIFYING FIRE ARSON REPORTS FOR PERSONAL GAIN (EITHER MONEY BRIBES BY STUBBLEFIELD OR PROMISED FUTURE POLITICAL FAVORS) WE EXPECT A WRITTEN RESPONSE, NOT JUST DENYING OUR CLAIMS, BUT EXPLAINING WHY.

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CLAIM AGAINST KYLE BRODIE WHO HAS GONE OVER THE LINE IN APPEASING STUBBLEFIELD Summary of Why Judge Kyle Brodie will be named as a participant in Stubblefield’s Racketeering Enterprise Stubblefield’s Racketeering Enterprise is designed and operates to filch mobile homes from their legal owners to add to Stubblefield’s portfolio of rental units inside his “Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community.” Stubblefield prosecuted a SHAM eviction proceeding against my co-resident Bonnie Shipley. Stubblefield and his attorney, Robert Williamson, knew it was a sham complaint before filing and serving it upon Shipley. The “Notice to Vacate” Stubblefield served on Shipley was unlawful because the statute authorized eviction of “purchasers and transferees” who move in to a mobile home without a new park lease [Civil Code §798.75(c)]. This statute did not apply to Shipley because she is not a purchaser or transferee of McCarron’s mobile home. Shipley was/is a lawful co-resident sharing the home with McCarron. It was also a sham because there is no privity of contract between Stubblefield and Shipley -- a prerequisite to eviction proceedings. McCarron is Stubblefeld’s contract tenant---not Shipley who is McCarron’s co-resident sharing her mobile home. McCarron recited these arguments in a demurrer which Judge Wilfred Schneider should have granted 9/28/12. Instead, he disregarded Stare Decisis, Codes of Procedure, Rules of Court and common sense as a UD Judge. This was because Judge Schneider either feared billionaire Stubblefield would run a candidate against him during his next 6-year reelection, or he wanted to curry favor with Stubblefield for campaign contributions. Stubblefield engaged in scorched earth litigation tactics---fighting us as if ten million dollars were at stake. We had 53 court hearings, with over 400 items on the docket, 15 volume case file wheeled around on a cart, and a case summary sheet which is 43 pages long. It is one of the most complex UD cases ever litigated. Schneider would not rule against Stubblefield no matter how obnoxious his motions were to harass Shipley. However, Judge Schneider knew where to draw the line and did not cross over it. He denied Stubblefield’s vile motion to converge upon our home with a goon squad to “videotape, photograph, test and take samples.” After awarding unwarranted and illegal sanctions against us for $9,000 – upon which we complained to the Presiding Judge Marcia Slough, Judge Schneider voluntarily revoked his sanctions order and recused himself. The case was then assigned to Judge Donald Alvarez, who was also afraid to rule against Stubblefield and failed to apply the law to the facts on most of the motions. Judge Alvarez also knew where to draw the line and denied Stubblefield’s renewed obnoxious motion for an order authorizing a goon squad of videographers, testers, photographers, and unidentified “agents” to converge upon our home for “testing and extracting.”

Judge Alvarez denied Stubblefield’s motion to restrain myself and my husband from talking to any witness. Judge Alvarez denied Shipley’s summary judgment motion and set the case for trial. Shipley filed a timely Writ petition in the Appellate Division. Judges Ochoa and Briscoe, who were the first judges we encountered who were not afraid to rule against billionaire Stubblefield, and who actually applied the law to undisputed facts. The Panel granted the petition reciting the same arguments I presented on demurrer and in a pre-litigation letter. The Panel held the Notice to Vacate was invalid as it did not apply to Shipley because she was not a purchaser or transferee, and Stubblefield could not evict her directly because he was not in privity of contract with Shipley. The Panel ordered Judge Alvarez to enter summary judgment for Shipley and final judgment on the merits. Judges Ochoa & Briscoe were removed from the Appellate Division Panel after issuing the Writ of Mandate. Although Judge Alvarez entered summary judgment he never entered final judgment on the merits for Shipley, despite that I had presented 3 alternate proposed final judgments for his signature in court. Judge Alvarez recused himself. The case was reassigned to Judge Michael Sachs who was afraid to rule against Stubblefield. In fact, despite my vehement objections he allowed Stubblefield’s attorney to compose Shipley’s final judgment.

This violated CRC 3.1312 which calls for the prevailing party to compose final judgment. As one would expect, Stubblefield paraphrased the Panel’s holdings, which recited that Stubblefield’s remedy was to proceed against

the homeowner under Civil Code §798.56(d) if he believed any resident had violated any reasonable park rule. However, Stubblefield composed the text in final judgment to recite Stubblefield could proceed directly against the homeowner ---or resident---under Civil Code §798.56(d) -- thus authorizing him to evict Shipley directly.

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This directly conflicted with the Writ of Mandate issued by the Appellate Division Panel which expressly recited that Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly because he was not in privity of contract with her. In violation of CRC 3.1312 requiring Stubblefield to serve Shipley with the proposed judgment and wait five days for objections, and Local Rule 591.3 requiring a Judge to hold a final judgment 10 days for objections, Stubblefield delivered the judgment to Sachs’ chambers and he signed it on the spot entering it that same day. Shipley’s attorney was forced to spend hundreds of hours prosecuting an appeal of her own victory to protect

Shipley from yet another unlawful eviction based on a statute which did not apply to her; i.e. Civil §798.56(d). Shipley prevailed as a new Appellate Panel ordered Judge Sachs to strike “or resident” from the judgment.

Although Shipley cited Judge Sachs’ nine serial violations of statutes, court rules, codes of procedure, and his judicial oath, the Panel labeled them as “harmless errors” and denied Shipley her costs for daring to allege bias, and even chastised her for “alleging judicial bias” and recited a veiled threat that it bordered on “contempt.” It was hardly “harmless” when it caused McCarron to have to labor hundreds of hours on research, writing appellate briefs, paying $173 for transcripts, and hundreds of dollars on copy costs for filing brief and reply. After Stubblefield lost all three appeals, and McCarron filed a motion for significant attorney fees for 2400 hours of labor over 3 years defending scorched earth litigation tactics (53 hearings, over 400 docket entries, 43-page case history, 15 volumes of case files -- wheeled around on a cart) it remains to be seen what Judge Sachs will do with this motion. Will he award McCarron appropriate attorney fees? Will he have the courage to actually apply THE LAW (attorney fees are mandatory to prevailing parties on MRL cases) or will he be so afraid to rule against Stubblefield he will find a way to significantly slash fees or stall the award indefinitely. Furious that he lost 3 appeals Stubblefield resorted to trying to “burn us out” of our home by sabotaging the

electric pedestal to start a fire (there has been no other reported fire in a park pedestal in over 50 years) and arranging for conspiring racketeer Brian Crowell to delay arrival at 333 for 22 minutes hoping our home would burn before they arrived. The station is less than a mile from the park. What could take a fire truck 22 minutes to go one mile? The racketeers did not count on heroic neighbors saving McCarron’s home! When this evil failed to drive McCarron out Tom Parrish became even more determined to evict McCarrron and Shipley. Stubblefield summoned his pit bull lawyer Williamson to prosecute a new SHAM eviction against both of us. Judge Brodie was assigned to the case. While all the other Judges ignored the law and ruled for Stubblefield on most motions, they were astute enough to know where to draw the line; they denied the most repugnant of motions; such as, unjustified restraining orders on free speech against my husband and I, and denied orders to authorize goon squads to invade our home to “videotape, photograph, extract samples, and perform “tests.”

This violation of our privacy, with no compelling need, was denied by every Judge before cavalier Judge Brodie. Judge Brodie does not know where to draw the line. He has taken “under submission” a motion to compel

my husband to appear for deposition to testify against his own spouse—researching the law himself for weeks to try to locate a case which could support denying my husband’s privilege not to testify against his spouse, conveyed by statutory privileges under Evidence Code §970 and §971. We cited the Duggan case which is exactly on point, holding an adversary cannot compel a spouse to testify against the other spouse. Judge Brodie should have sustained our demurrer as there is no legal basis to evict McCarron or Shipley under stare decisis. (see Summary of Merits). Judge Brodie clearly erred by refusing to transfer this case to unlimited jurisdiction. See attached Writ Petition in Appellate Division (attached in email version of this “Notice of Intent to Name.”) McCarron provided admissible, authenticated evidence that Stubblefield prayed for open-ended damages already exceeding $25,000 [McCarron’s Monthly “Resident Account Statement” reciting over $25,000 Rent Due 1/1/15] and County Tax Assessor records showing the home is valued at $27,800 for tax purposes. Incredibly, despite this undisputed evidence, Brodie DENIED our motion to transfer and insists on keeping it in his court which is a limited jurisdiction UD court where past due rent damages do not exceed $25,000. UD court imposes undue burdens on McCarron as motions and depositions are set on only 5-days’ notice. Because McCarron has to drive over from Santa Barbara these short deadlines impose exhausting hardships. Trial is set on only 21-days’ notice depriving McCarron of adequate time for discovery and trial preparation.

UD court has no provisions for telephonic appearances forcing McCarron to drive over for every hearing.

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There are no court reporters. The record is audio-taped. McCarron must pay to have verified each time. Transcribers discovered mysterious clicks on the tape in the middle of McCarron’s sentences. There are no clicks in the middle of Williamson or Judge Brodie’s sentences unless he interrupts. Parts of McCarron’s

objections were deleted from the audio, as she remembers making specific points, and has written notes on them. When McCarron listens to audio recordings she does not hear words she remembers uttering during the hearing. Instead there is a click in the middle of her sentence---then Williamson or Judge Brodie is heard talking.

Besides these mysterious deletions Judge Brodie is so anxious to please Stubblefield that he consistently interrupts McCarron during hearings to prevent her from recording important arguments on the tape for appeal; yet Judge Brodie never interrupts Mr. Williamson. Most of the transcript is a colloquy between Judge Brodie and Williamson---like two lawyers trying to figure out how they can tweak the law to support Stubblefield’s

request for relief. If McCarron dares to try to get a word in edgewise Judge Brodie chastises her---threatening to eject her from the courtroom. Yet Williamson is allowed to interrupt McCarron and Judge Brodie at his whim and Judge Brodie never chastises Mr. Williamson for interrupting. There is a double standard at all times.

We have been arguing before every judge at nearly every hearing for 3 years now that Stubblefield is prosecuting sham evictions, and there is no legal basis to evict Shipley or McCarron as shown below. Williamson argues there is a triable issue for a jury to decide if McCarron regularly occupies the mobile home; if not then Stubblefield can evict her for “violating a 2010 park rule requiring every owner to occupy the mobile home at all times in order to have a co-resident in the second bedroom.” Williamson’s argument is illogical. If a defendant is ticketed for exceeding 65 miles per hour he cannot invoke a jury to decide if 65 is a reasonable maximum speed limit. A jury cannot overrule a legislative enactment which sets 65 as a maximum speed limit. The same logic applies here. Stubblefield cannot invoke a jury to decide if his rule prohibiting subleasing is a reasonable new rule. The appellate court in Rancho Santa Paula Homes v Evans already decided this issue, holding a new rule prohibiting subleases, as applied to an existing tenant is unreasonable as a matter of law. Stare Decisis must be applied to the undisputed facts. A jury is not authorized to overrule an appellate court! Both sham complaints should have been dismissed with prejudice at the first demurrer hearing based on:

Otanez v. Blue Skies Mobile Home Park (1991) 1 CA 4th.1521 (first sentence) holding: We hold that the tenant need not live in the premises full-time in order to be a resident

City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, holding the following: “people have an inalienable right to life...liberty … happiness…privacy.”

Rancho Santa Paula Mobile Homes v. Evans (1994) 26 CA4th.1129, 1147-1148 holding:

Because of the high cost of moving mobile homes, they are anything but mobile..However, as explained above, a rule prohibiting subleasing affects the very nature of the holding and may well cause the eviction of both the tenant and the mobile home owner. We hold that such a rule, when applied retroactively--that is, against a homeowner whose lease contains no such restriction and who has not agreed to the restriction--is contrary to the stated purpose of the MRL and is therefore unreasonable.

II Respondent claims that the regulation he seeks to enforce does not prohibit subleasing, but only requires the owner to be one of the residents of the mobilehome. However, the restriction would permit subleasing only if the home remained unoccupied or if the homeowner were one of the occupants. The restriction is broader than a no-sublease clause in that it also prohibits a noncommercial arrangement in which persons other than the homeowner are the sole occupants of the home. Nevertheless, it is essentially a prohibition of subleasing.

III Respondent contends that the restriction did not operate retroactively because it was incorporated by law into the original lease. He argues that, since Civil Code, section 798.25 permits the making of new rules without the homeowner's consent, the homeowner in commencing the tenancy agrees to subsequently enacted rules. However, the argument begs the question. To be valid and enforceable, the rule must be reasonable. A homeowner could not be expected to foresee a rule change effecting such a radical change in such an important condition of his tenancy. Insofar as it attempts to operate retroactively, such a rule is not reasonable.

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Attorney General Opinion No. 11-703 (July 23, 2013) on sublease prohibition concluding:

“…with the possible exception of rentals to park employees under appropriate circumstances that satisfy the

requirements of Civil Code section 798.23(b), if the management of a mobile home park has enacted rules and regulations generally prohibiting mobile home owners from renting their mobile homes, then park management is also bound by these same rules and regulations.” Civil Code §798.23(a) HUD WEBSITE: HOPA.95 pdf page 10

Questions and Answers

Concerning the Final Rule Implementing the Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995 (HOPA)

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Federal Fair Housing Act), as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (the Fair Housing Act), prohibits discrimination in housing and real estate-related transactions based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap and familial status (in general, the presence of children under the age of 18 in the household). The prohibition against discrimination based on familial status became effective March 12, 1989. The Act contained a provision exempting "senior" housing from the prohibition against familial status discrimination. The Housing for Older Persons Act (HOPA), signed into law by President Clinton on December 28, 1995, amended the housing for older persons exemption against familial status discrimination. The HOPA modified the statutory definition of housing for older persons as housing intended and operated for occupancy by at least one person 55 years of age or older per unit. It eliminated the requirement that housing for older persons have significant services and facilities specifically designed for its elderly residents. It required that facilities or communities claiming the exemption establish age verification procedures. It established a good faith reliance defense or exemption against monetary damages for persons who illegally act in good faith to exclude children based on a legitimate belief that the housing facility or community was entitled to the exemption

“Question 22 Are there circumstances under which a 55 or older owner/tenant might be temporarily absent from a dwelling without affecting the exemption status of the community/dwelling?

Answer

Yes. For example, the 55 or older occupant may be on vacation, hospitalized, or absent for a season without affecting the exempt status of the community. The resident may, if he/she wishes, allow a younger relative or a house sitter under 55 years of age to live in the unit during this absence. In either event, the unit would be included in the calculation of the 80 percent occupancy requirement as long as the dwelling is not rented out, the owner/tenant returns on a periodic basis, and maintains legal and financial responsibility for the upkeep of the dwelling.” Civil Code §798.19. Waiver of homeowner rights void (Mobile Home Residency Law) No rental agreement for a mobile home shall contain a provision by which the homeowner waives his or her rights under the provisions of Articles 1 to 8, inclusive, of this chapter. Any such waiver shall be deemed contrary to public policy and void. Civil Code §798.34 (b) (Mobile Home Residency Law) A homeowner who is living alone and who wishes to share his or her mobilehome with one person may do so, and a fee shall not be imposed by management for that person. Clause 10 in 1-05-2005 Duffy lease which plaintiff admits was never modified. [Exh. B, No persons other than those listed on the signature page of this Lease, and one guest (where resident would otherwise be living alone) may reside at the Space without Park’s prior written consent.

Stubblefield wants Brodie to maintain UDFS1406978 in limitedjurisdiction court for the following reasons:

1 .) Stubblefield knows Judge Brodie will disregard stare decisis and rule in his favor on every motion.

2.) Stubblefield knows Judge Brodie will interrupt McCmon when she tries to get a key point on record.

3.) Stubblefield knows Judge Brodie will deny Tim McCmon his privilege under Evid. Code $970 & $971 and compel him to testify against his own wife in violation of the law just to vex and harass McCmon. No unbiased judge would ever make such an oppressive and unfair order.

4.) Stubblefield knows Brodie will order a goon squad to invade the inside of Shipley/McCmon's home to violate their right to privacy in their residence without any compelling state need. Judge Brodie adopts the invalid argument that Stubblefield needs to videotape the inside of the home to "show it to the jury" to argue the "firniture layout" somehow proves McCmon does not "regularly occupy" the mobile home. Stubblefield does not need to videotape the inside of McCmon's home. All he has to do is present the guard shack logs to the jury, as each guard is required to write down every time McCanon enters or exits. That is a reasonable alternative to ordering the invasion of a person's private home by a goon squad. No unbiased judge would ever violate the sanctity of a person's home as violating the 4th Amendment. Criminal defendants are afforded more rights than McCmon and Shipley who have done nothing wrong. This is the most outrageous miscarriage of justice. It shocks the conscience of a civilized society. Brodie crossed the line in ordering videota~e/~hototzra~~~~e of the inside of McCarron & Shiplev's home.

5.) Stubblefield knows Judge Brodie will alter the record by deleting words from the audio tape if necessary. G-

6.) Stubblefield knows Judge Brodie will do whateverfie needs to do to ensure5tubblefield prevails, even if he has to grant a motion notwithstanding the verdict if McCmon prevails at a jury trial.

h 7.) Transcripts and rulings in this case clearly show Judge Brodie rules against the law on every issue.

Judge Brodie has never ruled for McCmon or Shipley even though Stare Decisis required him to do so. Judge Brodie rules against Stare Decisis to rule in favor of Stubblefield-to guarantee his financial and political support for the remainder of his tenure on the bench.

8.) Judge Brodie continues to violate the law by not filing Form 700 since the 2012 year, disclosing his assets and investments. We believe it is because he does not want to disclose significant monetary contributions by Stubblefield or straw entitles Stubblefield uses to launder money to political allies.

We demand the elected officials who govern the City of San Bernardino and the County of San Bemardino investigate this Big Developer corruption permeating the Fire Department and the courts. We ask presiding County Officials to order the Presiding Judge of San Bemardino Superior court to transfer our case to unlimited jurisdiction where it must be litigated under mandatory classifications set forth in CCP $85, 86 and 88 as recited in CCP $32, and appoint a Judge who is not afraid to rule against Stubblefield when Stare Decisis requires him or her to do so. We await a response at your earliest convenience. We will not submit to Judge Brodie's illegal jurisdiction any longer because every unjust order he enters is void ab initio because it exceeds his jurisdiction.

and as ~ t t o m e ~ for ~ o k e Shiiley and Steve Allen

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Page 5 of 5

onth Day Year Hou

1 REPORTTYPE

FIRE DEPARTMENT CA0365300 S A N BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

SBFD# 14-21471 SBPD# N/A ADDRESS: 4040 PIEDMONT DR. # 333 SAN BERNARDINO, CA 92346 DATE: 09/02/2014 TIME: 1510 CAUSE: UNDETERMINED

1. SYNOPSIS

On 08/30/14, at 1314 hours, the San Bernardino City Fire Department responded to 4040 Piedmont Dr. in the City of San Bernardino for a report of a planter on fire. Medic Engine 228 (ME228) was the first to arrive and the officer in charge, Captain Brian Crowell found a planter, along with vegetation and other debris smoldering. On primary and secondary survey no occupants were found inside or outside of the structure. Offensive fire attack was initiated and the fire was extinguished. According to Captain Brian Crowell, 91 1 operators were called by a next door neighbor, Investigators were requested to the Location via a request by the home owner. On 09/02/2014 at 1510 hours the request was approved by Battalion Chief G. Hubbell. lnvestigator Tracy (1684) and 1 (1688) took photographs and interviewed witnesses. The general area of origin was determined to be the planter on the southeast (left side) of the structure. The cause of fire was found to be undetermined. No injuries to firefighters or civilians were reported.

2. ARRIVAL B ASSIGNMENT

On 09/02/2014 1 was assigned as the Firefighterlparamedic and Fire lnvestigator along with Investigator Tracy (1684) at Fire Station 232. At 1510, Fire investigators were dispatched to the above address, at the request of the home owner and approved by the on duty Battalion Chief. There was no resident's home at the time to make contact with. We began an investigation into the cause and origin, even though the scenes integrity had been disrupted and compromised pilor to our arrival.

CR2

PAGE 1

3. SUSPECT I WITNESS INFORMATION

See lnvestigator Tracy's report.

REPORTING INVESTIGATOR (S) CARVALHO, M.

RPPVTFWED BY:

/

TDENTlFICI\TTON NUMBER (SJ 12470

ll.\'l'l+;:

09/02/2014 RECORDS BNICODlNG ONLY

Dr\lE FURTHER ACTION: KIiCOKDS PROCESSING BY

4. UTILITY SERVICES

Electrical

Southern California Edison provides electrical service to the property. The electrical pedestal is owned by the mobile home park. The pedestal was found on the south (left) facing exterior wall of the structure and damage by the fire.

CASE NUMBER FIRE DEPARTMENT CA0365300

Natural Gas

CRZ

The natural gas service is provided by Southern California Gas and the meter was found on the south (left) facing exterior wall of the structure and damage by the fire.

SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

5. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

The involved property is located in the northeast area of San Bernardino City at 4040 Piedmont Dr. # 333. The single family manufactured residence was built in 1984 and is approximate 1,300 sq. ft. The property contains two bedrooms, two baths, a kitchen, a living room, a dining area and detached garage. The exterior walls are wooden construction with wood panels. The roof is pitch construction with composition shingles.

1 PAGE 2

6. EXTENT OF DAMAGE

14-21471

A search of the surrounding area and a perimeter search were conducted. No ignitable liquid containers or open flame devices were found. Evidence of smoking materials was found all along the planter surrounding the structure. There was also notable destruction of fire patterns and burn indicators to the area due to the removal of burnt vegetation with in the general area of origin prior to the arrival of investigators. Exterior examination of building was initiated from least damage to most damage in a counter clockwise rotation.

Exterior examination revealed minor to moderate melting and charring damage to the garden hose reel on the southeast corner of the driveway. The palm tree standing left of the garden hose reel also received minor to moderate charring damage, more towards the planter involved with fire. There was a second palm tree standing towards the east (front) of the planter involved, which received moderated to severe charring damage. The west (back) of the palm tree sustained the most damage, along with the brush surrounding the area of the tree. This area appeared to be mostly consumed and damage by the fire. There also appeared to be a fence in this area, which was removed prior to our arrival. Continuing towards the west (back) of the planter, the gas meter and electrical panel sustained minor to moderate oxidation and melting to the exterior. The electrical panel also received moderate melting to its underground components. The building and roof appeared to be structurally intact, with no burned through areas.

( REPORTING INVESIIGATOR (Sj IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (Sj l>,VYl!,;

CARVALHO, M. 1 REVIEWED BY I DATE: 1 FUK'lHbR ACTION. 1 RECORDS PROCESSI'VG BY.

12470 I 09/02/2014 RECOWS BARCODING ONLY

7. VALUE OF BUILDING 8 CONTENTS

Property Value $1 00,000 Loss TBD Content Value $10,000 Loss $0

CASE NUMBER FIRE DEPARTMENT CA0365300

8. FIRE ORIGIN AND CAUSE

CR2

The determination of the origin of the fire involved the coordination of the data derived from the following sources: 1) The physical marks (fire patterns) lefl by the fire. 2) Statements of first arriving firefighters. 3) Interview of witnesses.

SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

There were significant fire and burn patterns on the southeast (left) planter of the structure, indicating where the fire would have originated. Due to the absence of other supportive evidence, the scene being disrupted prior to our investigation and the fact other causes cannot be eliminated, the cause of this fire has been found to be undetermined.

9. WEATHER

I PAGE 3

Time (PDT) Temp. Dew Point Humidity Pressure Visibility Wind Dir Windspeed Gust Speed Precip Events Conditions 11:48 AM 89.6"F 41.0 "F 18% 29.84 in 10.0 mi West 4.6 mph - NIA Clear 1232 PM 95.0 "F 33.8 "F 12% 29.92 in 10.0 mi NW 4.6 mph - NIA Clear 1:48 PM 98.6 ' F 37.4 ' F 12% 29.80 in 10.0mi NW 9.2 mph - NIA Clear 251 PM 98.6'F 35.6 "F 11% 29.78 in 10.0 mi WSW 9.2 mph - NIA Clear

14-21471

10. ELIMINATION OF OTHER CAUSES

SMOKING Evidence of smoking materials was found near the general area of origin. Therefore smoking can NOT be ruled out.

INCENDIARY An incendiary fire is a fire that has been deliberately ignited under circumstances in which the person knows the fire should not be ignited. The existence of a single indicator or combination of indicators is not conclusive proof that a fire is of incendiary cause. Therefore incendiary can NOT be ruled out.

ELECTRICAL The electrical panel was found damaged externally and internally and is within the general area of origin. Therefore electrical can NOT be ruled out.

REPORTING INVESTIGATOR (9 CARVALHO, M.

REVEWED BY

Q

IDENTIPILAI'ION NUMBER (S)

12470

-- D .\77':

09/02/2014 RECORDS BARCODING ONLY

DA1E: FURTMER ACTION: wCORDS PROCESSING BY:

OTHER No evidence of items capable of self-heating, spontaneous ignition or combustion was found in the area. Therefore these elements capable of ignition CAN be ruled out as the source of this fire.

11. EVIDENCE

CASE NUMBER FIRE DEPARTMENT CA0365300

Evidence collected consisted of digital still images taken by Investigator Carvalho.

CR2

12. OPINION AND CONCLUSION

SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

Through the facts obtained in the course of this investigation, it is my opinion that the cause of this fire was found to be undetermined and therefore is consistent with the first arriving Company Officers conclusion noted in his fire report.

13. ATTACHMENTS Witnesses Interview SBFD Captain Brian Crowell Interview SBFD Dispatch Log SBPD Incident Log Photographic Log (digital)

PAGE 4 14-21471

lnvestigation Report Detail

Print DatelTime: 09/02/2014 16:49 From Date:

Login ID: 11241 To Date: Investigation Number: 2014-00021471 Incident Number: All

Investigation Status: All Entry Method: All

IgnitionlDelay Device: All Fuel: All

San Bernardino Fire Dept FDlD Number: 36195

Container: All AssignedTo Officer: All

Investigation Started Investigation Number lnvestlgation Type Location lncident Number Investigation for FDlO

9/2/2014 2014-00021471 Residential 4040 E PIEDMONT DR 332 SAN EERNARDINO. CA 2014-00021471 92346

Alarm Datemime: 0813012014 13.14 Disposition: Undetermined Field Diagrams: NO Photographs: FD-Yes

lnvestigation Start Date: 9/2/2014 ActuallAttempted: , Actual Disposition Date: 9/2/2014 Exterior Type: Other Scene Altered: Undetermined Scene Examined By: 12470 - Calvaiho Exam Conditions: Not Limited Structure Occupied: inhabited - Occupied

Method of Entry: Unknown Availability of Material First Ignited: Available at scene

~ x t e n t of Fire Involvement: Smoke Only shm.ng Property Ownership: Private

Container: No container IgnitiodDelay Device: No device Fuel: No device

&&rs Motivation Factors Apparent Group Involvement

Unknown Unknown

Subjects

Evidence

Item Number Type Class 1 Photographs Fire Cause Determination

Description: Stored in SiBScene Photos

Other Investigative Info

Disposition

Asslanments

Assigned Personnel Assignment DateRime Role Assigned By 11241-Tracy 09/02/2014 1510 Arson investigator 10589-Hubbell 12470-Cawalho 0910212014 15:lO Origin and Cause Investigator 10589-Hubbell

Initial Observations

Total Number of investiiatlons: 1

,w.n,, 6, ,"".r-#.. T &sIgmnanlff. MP'14.0988 C. ID t 38:WD.MP

Date: September 4, 2014

Date: ~ September 4, 2014 Repolthy: Blyall WinW!?E_-

. . .AREA OFFICES:

Address: LUop ledmon l D r P 3 3 3 ~ l M d . ~ ~ 9 2 3 4 6 . . '

- ' @ SouthernAres HOMEILINIT:' . . # FLDORS: 1731 ~ e i n s i r a e ~ Sull~ I00 RlnmlEc, CA91501

E I M P 1 G I 0 ,., Ni Address: -

PURPOSE OF REPORT (Checked ;Was aporapriale) n INSPECTION RECORD ONLY -, -.

INFORMATION ONLY NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND REUTED INFORMATlONl

Tnlr rooort pr~vbe. narlse of vlolatlor$ 01 inlormatlon relalea.lo !ha Catllornie Health end Sakty code orvrrron 13 or me Cadlomia Code of Rsgulallonr, Title 25, Dlvlslnn 1. Chapla~Z. Senlons IndlcYed, Copies d the i ~ w s an0 fe~ulalane rnny be oblaned from Barciays b w PubliBnerL. P.O. Box 3066. Sovlh San Francisco, CA 94083.3066, or onrme a1 -, ar almost Ilbrarles.

1 MH ALTERATION mP4: ,, .,- ., ., 1 U A c ACC OROOF U F P I? 0

THIRD-PARTY MONITORING:

VidaBmS indlatej shall ha conedea and a writlsn request for fudher hspedon ftkd with the Area MP INSPECTION DATA: OR& indicted adave &hi" 7 days oras ~tberwlse noled. The request lor lnlpectlon shall Be accompanisd by a rnlnlmum fee of $ M H L O ~ x R V L O ~ 115.

A permi! shall be oblained rrom !he Area Office i i lenli lel above for work l o colr0Cl l lms(s i U I 1 En INSPECTION DATA:

&erev~i le: R r oec~r Type of Unit: SoxSlze:

Manufacturer: -- rear:

HUD LebelorHCD Insign$ ND: . . .

Serial No. or V.1 N.:

R ~ ~ F O R M A T ~ O W : r t n investigation was conducted at the above listed m o b i l e h o m e park in response to a complaint receivedby t h e

' D e p a r t ~ ~ i c r t r - 'Illis ii~:pci;tioi~ .was c o n d t r c t c d u n d e r :lie a l t t l i o r i t y af-Hcnlth asd -Sa fe ty -&dc (1-ISC), Secrjpn-l-$dO[L T i t l e 25, California Code c f Rcgulaticns (T25CCR), Chapter 2, Section 1004.5.

Complaic~ant alleges: An electrifal pedcstal caught on fire at space #333 on Saturday 8/30/14. Res idents at dlis location are w i t h o u t e l e c t r i c i t y and gas since the fire. Park m a n a g e m e n t refuses to make repairs.

Tlte park m a n a z c m e n t and park owner Tom Parfish were cont~eted on September 4,2014 with regards to the c o m p l a i n t filed on Se~~lcrnbcr 3, 2014. T o m P a r r i s h srotad that the damaged eleatrical pedes ta l 11od not bmn rcpIac. due to an ongoing investigation by The City o f Sen B e m a r d i n 0 Fire D e p a r t m e n t fire investigator, to d e t e r m i n e the cause oft l te fire. He also statcd tI1z.t On= t ~ e l e c t r i c a ~

Recnlved By: - __ Title:

OEP~TMEHT USE ONLY: a Close Flle o Rel?sPecIlan R & U I ~ ~ o Progress lnspeclnn ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a Enforcement Actlon N e w : 0 FCO D NO1 0. Other.

COPIES SENTTO D AppUcanl U MHlRV Omer O Pan Opcratar/Owner SA4 0 ~d D Other

REVIEWED BY. DATE COPIES SENT BI' ,DATE:-

HCO 61 (.70v.8110) Paoe 1

Iryou believe this reporl has been issued in error oris legally drfenus~iy incorrecl, you have a (0 i n informal review andlor hearing. P leas conlnn the Area 3upewisar at !he Area Wee indicsled abavs. - -

INSPECTION UNIT INDEN~IFICAT~DN:

. , . 0 Inactive

MAX CAP: p a p i ; occ: _ SFO: DORM MflI3V: 0:

Momaln Shadaw MH

HmnaNoriega the assistant manager was interviewed late afternoon nt the Mountain 'shadows MH Community oEce on September 4,2014. She stated the fire investigator had completed the inves!igation a d was able to determine astartin= location of the fire which was by some palm trees by rhe sweet id thc area close to the lot utilitieq not from the electri<d pedestal, but was unable to determine the cause of the fite. investiggtor hnd cleared the park to with repairs. Also during the investigation the fire investigator notic& a gas leak at the gas meter adjncent the fire damaged electrical pedestal md called the locnl gas utility company kor gas disconnection.

1. Inspection revealed a fire damage electrical pedestal including electric wires, (and a fire damaged gas meter at Lor #333. The park shall replace the electrical pedestal and gas meter as needed. The power supply wires &om the mabilehome to the lot electrical pedestal w e n damaged and shall be repldced by thehome owner at lot #333. California Code of Regulations. Title25, Chapter 2, Section I l~a(a)(bj

The pa& shall obtain building permits from the Department for the pedestd replncchent. . -. . . , - . -. . -.- . - -. . ! - --. ----__

The park shall correct the violations ASAP and no later than September 1 1,2014 p&uant I+Iealth ond Safety Code, Section 18402 and Title 25, California Code ofRegulations, Chapter 2, Section 1 1 d and 1610.

Failure to comply with this order will be considered willful violation of the ~ o b i l e h b k e Pmks Act, hywi(lfi,l violation is a misdemeanor under Health nnd Safbty Code, Section 18700.

HCD 63 (Rev. 8114)

~>PF;;"'!w

H A R T ! K I N G A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W Robd G. Willlamson, Jr.

~llfllamson@harlklnglau~uNn

September 5, 2014 OUI me Numher: 3 ~ 6 8 . ~ ~ 1 4 a m - ~ 4 2 - D 9 9 0 v . l

VIA E-MAIL 8 OVERNIGHT MAIL Nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

Nancy Duffy McCarron. Esq. Law Offices Of Nancy Duffy McCarron 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, California 93103

Re: Stubblefield Properties v. Bonnie Shi~lev. Case No. U!3D$1204130--Ex Parte Ao~lication re: Space 333

Dear Ms. McCarron:

Please be advised that my client Stubblefield Properties dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community is in receipt of your written correspondence dated September 3, 2014 regarding a fire that took place on Space 333 on or about August 30. 2014. Your unfounded accusations of my client attempting to "burn you out" are despicable, false and malicious, how dare you.

First and foremost, your correspondence is replete with false, conclusory and defamatory statements punctuated with wild speculation entirely untethered to any factual basis. Your claims that a "corroded pedestal . . . blew out," and that "[tlhe fire spread from the pedestal to the white fence, burned a palm tree, and the left outside wall facing the street behind the palm tree" are utterly reckless, irresponsible and fiat wrong.

According to the Fire Department Battalion Chief and the arson investigator, with whom 1 have already spoken with, it is very clear the origin of the fire occurred at the base of two palm trees at the Southeast corner of S~ace 333, moved towards and up the electric pedestal, destroying the pedestal, and then continued toward and damaged the gas meter and line which for obvious safety reasons was shut off. In fact, based on my d~scussions with the arson investigator, the fire was accelerated and burned intensely as a result of two conditions on Space 333: (i) overgrown shrubbery containing some type of oil-based liquid; and (ii) the palm trees on the Space.

X The Fire Department's initial report indicates and conflrms the W i n of the fire's origin, a copy of which will be fotwarded to you upon receipt. I am informed the arson investigator's report, which wili confirm the same information, wili not be available fcr another 10-15 days, at which time a copy will be provided to you. Whethei to request initiation of a criminal investigation is under consideration pending issuance of the arson investigator's report.

While the cause of the fire is still under investigation, the Fire Batallion Chief and arson investigator both conclude that the cause of the fire was in no way related to nor triggered by the electrlc pedestal. Notwithstanding that you and Ms. Shipiey, your illegal subtenant, failed to call the fire investigator for two davs after the fire, neither the Fire Department nor the anon investigator found any evidence within the pedestal that it in any way caused the fire. Again, your claims about the origin of the fire are baseless and flat wrong.

A Professional Corporation 4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900, Santa Ana, Call!arnia 92707 Ph 714.432.8700 ( www.hartklnglaw.com ( Fx 714.566.7457

~~ . . " . H A R T 1 K I N G

.I... " . . l l . , . l

Nancy McCarron, Law Offices Of Nancy Duffy McCarron September 5, 2014 Page 2

Upon learning of the incident at Space 333, and in accordance with standard procedure, my client immediately shut off the electricity and gas lines on the Space to prevent any further damage or safety threat to persons or property.

The remaining claims in your correspondence of intentional, willful, and/or malicious acts on behalf of my client in response to the fire are frivolous, reprehensible and based on nothing more than your venomous ill will toward Park Management and Mr. Parrish in particular. How dare you utter these deliberately abusive accusations knowing they were false when you made them.

For obvious safety reasons, my client is also unable to comply with your unreasonable demands that the electric pedestal be replaced immediately, but please be advised that the Park will be replacing the pedestal as soon as practicable. As you know, the Park is required to obtain a permit for replacement and have the new pedestal inspected and approved. Moreover, the gas meter and raiser must be inspected and approved by the gas company before sewice is restored. My client is taking immediate steps to do so, though I anticipate it may take at least 10-15 days.

My ciiem is also in receipt of your notice of intent to move for ex parte relief before the Honorable Michael Sachs on Monday, September 8. 2014 and the related ex parte application. Simply put, you are wrong on the facts and wrong on the law. As you well know, the current matter Is pending on appeal. Your 'request" regarding the electric pedestal is entirely unrelated to Me prior matter which, but for the pending appeal, is concluded. Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain your frivolous request. Your reliance on Civil Code 5 789.3 is also entirely rnlspiaced and inapplicable. Furthermore, your application, that neither includes the requlred declaration nor makes the required factual showing. violates California Rules of Court 3.1201 and 3.7202. I am confidentthat your attempt to sidestep the Civil Code and 'bootstrap" improper requests under the guise of a prior matter will be readily apparent to the Court.

i have confirmed with the court clerk for Deparfment S-28 that no ex parte is on calendar for Monday. September 8, 2014. Should you attempt to notice an ex parte hearing, we intend to appear and oppose your improper request and seek sanctions for the appearance since the Court lacks jurisdiction and your claims are frivolous.

Very t ~ l y yours,

HART KING

Enclosures

NANCY D M W ~ MCCARRON 950 Roble Lane

Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 nancvduffvsbiiT).vahoo.co~n

landfax 805-965-3492 cell 805-450-0450

by fax to: 909-384-5158 ~e~ternber 8,2014

Georgeann Hanna, City Clerk 300 NO. "D" st, znd floor San Bernardino, CA 924 18

RE: Fire in an Electric Pedestal at 4040 E. Piedmont Drive, Space #333 Highland, CA, 92346 Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Park - owned by Developer Arnold Stubblefield

COMPLAINT-Request to Investigate Cormution at S t a t i o m ( Steve Tracey, Investigator)

Dear Ms. Hanna:

I sent this fax to you because you claim to be assio ion ate about open and ethical government." There is corruption at Station 222 involving arsonlinvestigator engineer Steve Tracy, a Battalion Chief and developer Arnold Stubblefield, who has been bribing city officials for over 40 years. Exhibit A As you know, Stubblefield laundered a $5,000 bribe to Neil Derry through Tax Assessor Bill Postmus. The DA prosecuted felony counts against Neil Derry and Bill Postmus but never indicted Stubblefield.

I have owned a mobilehome at space #333 in Stubblefield's p ~ r k since 2005. Because I commute often between Santa Barbara and San Bernardino I have always had a co-resident who shared the home to keep up the gardening and maintain the property while 1 am away. On 8/1/12 Bonnie Shipley moved in as co-resident. I dropped off her application for residency at the park office the next day on 8/2/12. After I departed the park manager drove up to #333 and tried to intimidate Shipley into moving out. The manager said the owner was "no longer going to allow co-residents to move into #333." He said if Shipley wanted to remain in the park she had to "find a sugar-daddy over 55 and move in with him."

When Shipley did not move out Stubblefield sent a process server to nail a "5-day Notice to Surrender Premises." On day 6 Stubblefield served her with a shall: complaint for "forcible detainer." This was while simultaneously collecting the full monthly rent $1,053 from me, Stubblefield's tenant. Because I am an attomey and real estatc broker I defended Shipley h m a sham, unlawful eviction. Stubblefield has engaged in scorched earth litigation tactics for two years. We prevailed, despite 2 years of acrimonious litigation. Stubblefield appealed all the way to the California Supreme Court, with no avail, and will now have to pay my attorney fees because Shipiey is tke prevailing party. The appellate court found Stubblefield could not evict Shipley as he was not in privity of contract with her and that his attempt to evict her directly was unlawful. A motioll for statutory attorney fees is pending and Stubblefield has done everything he can to make life nliserable for Bonnie Shipley. Shipley is not welcome at the clubhouse and is banned from using the swimming pool or facilities.

On Saturday, August 30,2014 while Bonnie Shipley was awz:? for the day, a fire erupted at the electric pedestal which supplies electric to the home at space #333. Wendy Durr, who lives next door, and the neighbor across the street ran over to put out the fire which had spread to a palm tree next to it, and also burned the gas meter adjacent to the electric pedestal. Bonnie has been without gas and electric since Saturday. The park manager, Tom Panish, told both maintenance men (Jim & Rick) to "stay out of it" and not repair or replace the electric or gas meter.

15''

1 suspected sabotage as I have never heard of anyone's electric pedestal catching fire at the park before in ten years that I have owned a home there. I thought that because they have not been able to evict Shipley, despite two years of acrimonious litigation that Toni Parrish resorted to sabotage. I called Steve Tracey and asked him to investlgate as to what caused the fire in the pedestal. For the entire 10 years 1 have owned the home residents have talked about how Tom Parrish and Stubblefield have bribed city officials to "look the other way" when residents complain about fue hazards or other unsafe conditions in the park. I asked Mr. Tracey to record my telephone request. You can listen to our recorded telephone conversations. Mr. Tracey took the report and said he would call me back. I told him he needed to interview Wendy Durr and Jerome Poland, the 2 neighbors who saw the fire and put it out as they were the only witnesses. I gave him both of their phone numbers. Mr. Tracey never interviewed either witness. A short time later 11e called to tell me that he visited the site and took pictures. He never looked in the pedestal because it had been "taped up." He said he saw cigarette butts in the garden area so he "could not rule out" a cigarette butt causing the fire. I told him that was ridiculous because Bonnie and her friend Steve had left in the morning and were gone all day.

The following is what happened. On Friday Wendy Durr (ncxt door) hear a loud "pop" and lost electric, which then went back on. Wendy thought it was a power surge due to air conditionhg use. On Saturday morning, while in the back yard her air conditioner compressor popped on and then off. She went inside and returned outside shortly thereafter. While at the unit, she heard a third louder "op" and a crackling sound from her front yard. She walked up znd discovered my pedestal was burning. Jerome ran across to help when he saw the fire. Wendy went inside to fetch a fire extinguisher in her kitchen as water pressure is very low in the park. When she returned the fire had spread from the box to the palm tree. Jerome sprayed the tree whi!e Wendy sprayed the pedestal. They put the fire out. The next day a man from Southern California Edison arrived to investigate. He was excavating the area. Wendy asked him what caused the fire. He pointed to a "hole" on the left side where a double lug used to be. (see Exhibit B). He said :here was arching on that line, and when that happened it got "hotter than the sun" and melted the double lug into a molten ball which he found at the bottom of the pedestal when he opened it. He threw the molten ball into the dirt. Wendy took the pieture at Exhibit B. Exhibit C is a replacement pedestal. You can see three double lugs, and also replacement of three lugs. Wendy said the fire started in the pedestal and moved toward the tree as that was the way the wind was blowing that day. Yet, Mr. Tracey never called Wendy. I explained all this to Mr. Tracey but he still never called Wendy or Jerome---the witnesses to the fire. He also never called the manufacturer or an electrician. Mr. Tracey told me he "did not know anything about electric as he was not an electrieian." He said he "talked t~ someone" from the electn'c company who denied liability because they are afraid of being held liable for damages.

I wrote a letter to the park's attorney. Exhibit D. I was shocked to at his response. Exhibit E. Apparently, Mr. Tracey and the "battalion chief' met with Tom Pai~ish and talked to the park's attorney during that meeting. I was not notified about & ~ s "meeting" and was not invited to attend. 1 cannot believe the "battalion ehief' and Mr. Tracey would violate the confidence of my report, while your website assures residents that reports are .'confidential." Why did they talk to the ark's lawver?

I ask for a full investigation. How could the "battalion chief' and Tracey come to a "conclusion" the electric pedestal was not the cause of the fire and we are now blamed for it? This conflicts with all of the evidence; i.e. what the witnesses saw and the man from the electric company told Wendy the next day. He said the archine in the box caused the fire. He showed Wendy the melted ball thrown in the dirt, which has now "disappeared." See attached "arching" explanations from Wikipedia. Exhibit F

Why would your so-called investigator, Steve Tracey, tell me he "knows nothing about electricity." If not, then he should not have been hued into the position of a r ~ o ~ ~ v e s t i g a t o r ! Secondly, why would he not interview the ONLY WITNESSES who had personal knowledge of what happened (Wendy and Jerome)? Why would he not contact the manufacturer to ask? Why would he not contact an independent electrician? Instexd the only people he interviewed were Tom Parrish and his attorney. This is outrageous and reeks of corruption. "Something in rotten in Denmark."

Bonnie Shipley's 80-year old mother has congestive heart failure; prognosis is not good and her bother (who lives with her mother) is dying of Stage 4 cancer. Bonnie is going through the most challenging time in her life and has no energy to fight this evil. She has been without electric and gas for 8 days no@ Please call me to discuss this matter in more detail. I demand a full investigation of this apparent corruption. I await your response.

-. .. ..L,.,.-umu GUUNW Judge denies Derry probation changes I Breaking News I PE.com - Press ...

THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE

S A N BERNARDINO COUNTY: Judge denies Derry probation changes

BY lMRAN GHORI

STAFF WRITER

Published: 13August 2012 06:22

PM

San Bemardino A ,,,, g~ County SupeFJisor ... . . ... . . Neil Deny sought to modify his probation conditions from his guilty plea last year in a campaign finance violation case, but a judge rejected the request, according to court records.

Attorney Rajan Maline appeared on behalf of Deny before Superior Court Judge Richard Peel to seekthe changes on Aug. 3.

Court records state Maline and Stephanie Chow, a state deputy attorney general, conferred with the judge off a e record. When they went back on the record, Peel ruled that Denywould continue probation on the same terms and conditions.

Derty, when reached by phone Monday, Aug. 13, declined to comment on his request except to say itwas 'personal."

A spokesperson for the attorney general's office said they were looking into the case but did not have details as of Monday evening.

State prosecutors accused Deny of attempting to launder a campaign contribution

3. mdocal-news1 ... R 0 1 2 0 8 1 3 - s a n - b e m a r t l i n o - c o u n t y - j u d g e - d e n i v . e c e

- *AN B!=RNARDINO COUNW. Judge denla Derry probation changes ( Breaking News 1 PE.com - Press ...

and charged him with two felonies and a

misdemeanor in April 201 1.

Deny agreed to a plea deal in July 201 1, where he admitted to a single misdemeanor charge of failing to report a campaign contribution.

He was sentenced to three years probation, under which he is required to obey all laws or face a 30-day jail sentence that was suspended.

Derry also was fined about $10,000.

The charges stemmed from a $5,000 campaign contribution in May 2007 from San Bernardino developer Arnold Stubblefield. Prosecutors say Stubblefield approached

' Derry about contributing to his campaign but

him to a political action committee that then made a contribution to Derry, according to

the indictment.

The conviction has become an issue in Derry's re-election campaign. In campaign mailers, challenger James Ramos, former chairman of h e San Manuel tribe, has accused_-Derry of being part of a culture of 8 corruption at the county. I

Deny has sald the charges against hlm were polltically motivated and said he tookthe plea deal to avoid a drawn-out trial.

In June. Ramos took47 percent and Deny got 33 percent of the vote. A third candidate won 20 percent. A majority is required to win, prompting the need for the November runoff election.

Comments P E . m Is now uslng Facebwk Cmrnents. Comments are suqecl lo F a c e b m k b ~ a n d ~ o f S e w i y @n data USL If you don? want your comment to appar on Facebook, uncheck the Past to Facebook'box. To find out more, rrsat5e Em.

NANCY DMffY MCCARRON 950 Roble Lane

Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 nancvduffvsb~yahoo.com -

landlfax 805-965-3492 cell 805-450-0450

VIA EMAIL to: rwilliarnson@,hartkin~law.com - and FAX to: 714-546-7457

w b e r t c(. W i l l i a w o v ~ September 3,2014 Ha.rtJKing 4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900 Santa h a , California 92707 re: Stubblefield v. Shipley UDDS1204130

VIOLATION OF CIVIL CODE s789 .S Shut off of Gas & Electric to #333 -Notice of Ex Parte Monday

Dear Mr. Williamson:

Electricity is supplied by an underground line to Space #332 (Wendy Dm), #333(McCarron/Shipley), #334(Lelane) and #335 (?). Each of the 4 spaces has what So. Cal. Edison refers to as a "pedestal" which is the main supply of electricity to the entire lot. This is separate and distinct from each panellbreaker box which is mounted on the side of each home. On #333 it is on the right side iiear the back end of the mobilehome. There is a main gas supply line also located directly next to the main electrical supply (the "pedestal").

On Thursday [8/28/14] Wendy D m heard a loud "pop" and there was a strong surge of electric in her home. On Saturday 8/30/14, after she arose and had breakfast, Bonnie Shipley went out to do errands and shopping. Shipley did not retun home until the late afternoon. According to Wendy, about 1: 13 p.m. she saw a fire at the "pedestal" on space #333 which faces her front porch. I believe she was outside when it happened. Jerome Poland (who lives across the street from #333) also saw this fire. Wendy aimed the water from her hose at it. When Jerome ran across he took the water hose so Wendy could run inside to get her fire extinguisher. Wendy returned and helped put out the fire with it and my garden hose, while Jerome continued with her hose. They called the fire department. The fire spread from the pedestal to the white fence, burned a palm tree and the left outside wall facing the street behind the palm tree. The fire was out when the firemen arrived at #333. Jim (regular park maintenance man) was off for the weekend. Rick (back up maintenance) was summoned. The electric pedestal was completely burned out. (see attached picture) Both electric & gas .#ere shut off. Shipley returned home late that afternoon. She called me about dinner time tc report the fire and events.

So. Cal. Edison staff at 1-800-655-4555 [Edgar 3257, Supervisor Yolanda 1514, Eddie, and Supervisor Maxime 33221 told me they only supply electric to the pedestal, the pedestal is the park's equipment, and is always maintained by the park. The pedestal was installed probably 40-50 years ago [original installation]. As shown from the picture it is totally corroded and should have been replaced years ago. It is burned and unusable. So. Cal. Edison will not reinstall service until the pedestal is replaced and a City Inspector has verified that the pedestal and installation complies with Mobile Home Park and electrical code requirements.

Page 2 9/3/2014 9:30 a.m.

The gas meter was also turned off and has bum damage on the top front. Both utilities remain off. Accordingly, Bonnie Shipley has had no gas or electric in the mobilehome since Saturday, August 30,2014. I talked to Rick [909-936-6791] who said he could not repair or replace the unit as he was sick with a cold and had already reported events to Hanna in the office. I called the office at 6 pm Saturday but no one answered. I called Rick (the park's back-up maintenance man) and asked him to contact Hanna to ask her to call me. I never heard from Hanna. We waited patiently through Sunday, Monday (labor day holiday) with no gas or electric to the home. Shipley slept elsewhere on Saturday night as it was about 105 degrees that day so it was impossible to sleep without air conditioning or a fan. The home also smelled of smoke as windows were open.

We fully expected on Tuesday that Jim or Rick (or both) would replace the pedestal and call the city inspector to check it for reinstallation of electric service. No park staff showed up to replace the pedestal. About 4:30 p.m. I called the office to inquire. Hanna answered. I asked Hanna why no staff had arrived to deal with this emergency. She replied, "have vou notified vour fire insurance carrier to am for the ~edestal and repairs?" I responded, "I do not own the pedestal; it is not my responsibility, nor did we cause the damage. As you know, under Health & Safety Codes & MRL, the park must supply gas, water & electric to each home. The park has always maintained the electric pedestals and gas meters, and has always replaced them as needed. THEY ARE NOT MY PROPERTY AND ARE NOT MY RESPONSIBILITY. I called Rick back last night. Rick said Tom Parrish told him and Jim to "stav out of i f ' and "do not replace or reaair the pedestal at #333."

We believe Tom Parrish is intentionally withholding electric and gas service to #333 to evict Shipley. These willful acts violate Civil Code 5789.3. Failure to maintain services is a nuisance under Civil s798.87. We cannot live without utilities and it is a health and safety hazard. The penalties for violations under Civil Code 5789.3 are $100/day and were found constitutional. see Kinney v. Vaccari (1980) 27 C3d 348,351-353. see also Otanez v. Blue Skies Mobile Home Park (1991) 1 CA.4th 1521 and Spinks v. Equity Residential BriarwoodApartments (2009)171 CA.4th 1004; Kinney v. Vaccari ( 1 980) 27 Cal.3d 348. You must realize that Tom Parrish, who is in his So's, shows signs of dementia and lacks the cerebral capacity to act rationally. His conduct is not only inhumane, but illegal and malicious, warranting punitive damages. Although we may have our differences in representing our mutual clients, I do not believe this is conduct that you would approve. I trust vou will advise your clients to immediately replace the pedestal and call the inspector to approve it todav so electric and gas can be reinstated. Shipley has been without gas and electric for 5 days now since Saturday.

Please be advised that if I do not receive notice fmm your office or the park staff that the pedestal has been replaced by 5 pm tomorrow (Thursday) and the city inspector called to approve it on Fridey, an ex parte hearing will be held in S-28 on Monday, for an emergency order to direct the owner to replace the pedestal and to assess penalties of $100 for every day Bonnie Shipley has no utilities resulting from Tom Pamsh's malicious conduct, and a loss in services caused bv his failure to replace a 40-50 vear old pedestal destroved bv corrosion. I await your immediate response to this basic human rights violation.

H A R T 1 K I N G A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W

Roberl G. Wlllamsnn. Jr. nuiliiamson@hadkinglawawC[lm

September 5. 2014 Our Flle Numbsr: 36568.053148464842-499Ov.l

VIA E-MAIL & OVERNIGHT MAIL Nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

Nancy Duffy McCarron, Esq. Law Offices Of Nancy Duffy McCarron 950 Robie Lane Santa Barbara, California 93103

Re: Stubblefield Properties v. Bonnie Shiplev, Case No. UDDS1204130-Ex Parie Application re: Space 333

Dear Ms. McCarron:

Please be advised that my client Stubblefield Properties dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community is in receipt of your written correspondence dated September 3, 2014 regarding a fire that took place on Space 333 on or about Ausust 30. 2014. Your unfounded accusations of my client attempting to "burn you out" are despicable, false and malicious, how dare you.

First and foremost, your correspondence is replete with false, conclusory and defamatory statements punctuated with wild speculation entirely untethered to any factual basis. Your claims that a "corroded pedestal . . . blew out," and that "[tlhe fire spread from the pedestai to the white fence, burned a paim tree, and the left outside wail facing the street behind the palm tree" are utterly reckless, irresponsible and flat wrong.

&cording to the Fire Department Battalion Chief and the arson investigator, with whom I have already spoken with, it is very clear the origin of the fire occurred at the base of two paim trees at the Southeast corner of Space 333, moved towards and up the electric pedestal, destroying the pedestal, and then continued toward and damaged the gas meter and line which for obvious safety reasons was shut off. In fact, based on my discussions with the arson investigator, the fire was accelerated and burned intensely as a result of two conditions on Space 333: (i) overgrown shrubbery containing some type of oil-based liquid; and (ii) the palm trees on the Space.

The Fire Department's initial report indicates and confirms the location of the fire's origin, a copy of which will be forwarded to you upon receipt. I am informed the arson investigator's report, which will confirm the same information, will not be available for another 10-15 days, at which time a copy will be provided to you. Whether to request initiation of a criminal investigation is under consideration pending issuance of the arson investigator's report.

While the cause of the fire is still under investigation, the Fire Batallion Chief and arson investigator both conclude that the cause of the fire was in no way related to nor triggered by the electric pedestal. Notwithstanding that you and Ms. Shipiey, your illegal subtenant, failed to call the fire investigator for two davs after the fire, neither the Fire Department ncr the arson investigator found any evidence within the pedestal that it in any way caused the fire. Again, your claims about the origin of the fire are baseless and fiat wrong.

A Professional Corporation 4 Hutton Centre Drive. Suite 000, Santa Ana. California 92707 Ph 714.432.8700 ( w~.hartkinglaw.com I Fx 714.546.7457

Nancy McCarron, Law Offices Of Nancy Duffy McCarron September 5.2014 Page 2

Upon learning of the incident at Space 333, and in accordance with standard procedure, my client immediately shut off the electricity and gas lines on the Space to prevent any further damage or safety threat to persons or property.

The remaining claims in your correspondence of intentional, willful, andlor malicious acts on behalf of my client in response to the fire are frivolous, reprehensible and based on nothing more than your venomous ill will toward Park Management and Mr. Parrish in particular. How dare you utter these deliberately abusive accusations knowing they were false when you made them.

For obvlous safety reasons, my client is also unable to comply with your unreasonable demands that the electric pedestal be replaced immediately, but please be advised that the Park will be replacing the pedestal as soon as practicable. As you know, the Park is required to obtain a permit for replacement and have the new pedestal inspected and approved. Moreover, the gas meter and raiser must be inspected and approved by the gas company before service is restored. My client is taking immediate steps to do so, though I anticipate it may take at least 10-15 days.

My client is also in receipt of your notice of intent to move for ex parte relief before the Honorable Michael Sachs on Monday, September 8, 2014 and the related ex parte application. Simply put, you are wrong on the facts and wrong on the law. As you well know, the current matter is pending on appeal. Your "request" regarding the electiic pedestal is entirely unrelated to the prior matter which, but for the pending appeal, is concluded. Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain your frivolous request. Your reliance on Civil Code 9 789.3 is also entirely misplaced and inapplicable. Furthermore, your application, that neither includes the required declaration nor makes the required factual showing, violates California Rules of Court 3.1201 and 3.1202. 1 am confident that your attempt to sidestep the Civil Code and "bootstrap" improper requests under the guise of a prior matterwill be readily apparent to the Court.

I have confirmed with the court clerk for Department S-28 that no ex parte is on calendar for Monday, September 8, 2014. Should you a t tem~t to notice an ex anrte hearinn WP in+-nrl tn

~ ~ ~ . . r-,.- ........=, ....-.. - .- appear and oppose your improper request and s'eek sanctions for the appearance since the Court lacks jurisdiction and your claims are frivolous.

Very truly yours,

HART KING

/" ---, ._

RGWlrje

Enclosures

Definition --.

A controlled arc-flash, produced in a flashtube. Even though the energy level used is fairly low (85 joules), the low-impedance, low-inductance circuit produces a flash of 24,000,000 watts. With an arc temperature of 17,000 K (30,100 OF), the radiation output is centered at 170 nanometers, in the far UV. The intense burst of radiation easily penetrates the shade #10 welding filter which shields the camera.

An arc flash is the light and heat produced from an electric arc supplied with suscient electrical energy to cause substantial damage, harm, fire, or injury. Electrical arcs experience negative resistance, which causes the electrical resistance to decrease as the arc temperature increases. Therefore, as the arc develops and gets hotter the resistance drops, drawing more and more current (runaway) until some part of the system melts, trips, or evaporates, providing enough distance to break the circuit and extinguish the arc.['] Electrical arcs, when well controlled and fed by limited energy, produce very bright light, and are used in arc lamps (enclosed, or with open electrodes), for welding, plasma cutting. and other industrial applications. Welding arcs can easily turn steel into a liquid with an average of only 24 DC volts. When an uncontrolled arc forms at high voltages, arc flashes can produce deafening noises, supersonic concussive- forces, super-heated shrapnel, tem~eratures far ~reater than the Sun's surface, and intense. high-energy radiation capable of vaporizing nearby materials.

Arc flash temperatures can reach or exceed 35.000 O F (1 9.400 "C) at the arc termina~s.'~'

The massive energy released in the fault rapidly vaporizes the metal conductors involved, blasting molten metal and expanding alasma outward with extraordinarv force.[21

A typical arc flash incident can be inconsequential but could conceivably easily produce a more severe explosion (see calculation below). The result of the violent event can cause destruction of e c l u i p i n v o l v e d . L y to an electrical worker but also to bystanders. During the arc flash, electrical energy vaporizes the metal, which changes from solid state to gas vapor, expanding it with explosive force. For example, when copper vaporizes it suddenly expands by a factor of 67,000 times in volume.P1

In addition to the explosive blast, called the arc blast of such a fault, destruction also arises fiom the intense radiant heat produced by the arc. The metal plasma arc prodyces tremendous amounts of light energy from far infrared to ultraviolet. Surfaces of nearby objects, including people, absorb this energy and are instantly heated to vaporizing temperatures. The effects of this can be seen on adjacent walls and equipment - they are often ablated and eroded from the radiant effects.

Arcing, sometimes called an arc flash, occur,^ when electricity flows o r discharges along an unintended path. Electricity jumps during anarc to a nearby grounded object. Arc faults, caused by low, erratic elcctrical flows, commonlv occur due to fraved or exoosed wires. They can occur anywhere in a building. \Vhilc half of arc flashes occur in appliances, computers and other ~telns that run via clcctricity, 36 percent of arcs occur in electrical panels.

Overload o Arcing in an electrical panel occurs when circuits that make up the panel become overloaded.

Overheating can occur where a circuit breaker connects to an electrical panel bus. It can damage the bus as well as the connection, making equipment unreliable and prone to hilure. Damaged circuit breakers may not perform properly when excessive currents occur. Instead of t~ipping whcii excessive or dangcrous current occ~us, damaged circuits may continue to let electricity flow, leading to overheating and possible arcing. Contributing Conditions

o Conditions in or around an elcctrical panel can contribute to possible arcing as well as to the arcing's severity, should it occur. Electrical panel wiring should never be exposed outside the box. Combustible materials, including gasoline, paint thinner and similar liquids, should be kept away from the vicinity of the electricity panel. Over-fusing, or using too many fuses inside an electrical box, can cause too much electricity to flow through the circuitry, leading to overheating and arcing. Fuses that blow, or circuits that trip frequently, can indicate a possiblc arcing hazard. Other indicators of potential arcing include bum marks or a burning slnell near the panel, as well as buzzing or cracking sounds.

Read more :

http:l/electricd.about.com/od~electri~alsafety/darcfaultsafety.h~ What is an Arc-fault? An arc-fault occurs when loose or corroded connections make intermittent contact and causes svarkinv or arcing between the connections. This translates into heat. which will break down the insulation of the wire and can be the trigger for an electrical fire. Unlike a short circuit, that is a hot wire coming into contact with a ground or neutral wire, arcing may not trip the circuit brcakcr. If vou've ever heard a switch buzzing. hissing. or povving, you'll know what I'm talking about.

In order to protect your home, an arc-fault circuit interrupter can be used to detect just such a problem. Read more: http://electrical.about.com/od/elec~cdsafety/darcfdu1tsafety.htm

I 1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law before all courts of the State of

California, and am a partner with the law f m of Hart ( King, attorney of record for Plaintiff

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a general ~artnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS

MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY ("Plaintiff?. The fz.,fs set forth herein are true of my own

personal knowledge, except those facts stated on inf~rmation and believe and as to those

facts I believe them to be true, and if called as a witless, I could and would competently

testify thereto.

I

2

2. This declaration is made in support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant

Bonnie Shipley's Ex Parte Application for Order to Repair or Replace Electric Pedestal at

Space 333, and to Reinstate Electric & Gas Service.

3. On Wednesday, September 3, 2014, I reliewed the letter correspondence from

Defendant's counsel, Ms. McCarron attached as Exhibit A to Defendant's Ex Parte

Application.

I 4. On Thursday, September 4, 2014, I spoke with the arson investor regarding the

origin of the fire at Space 333. The arson investigator confirmed that the fire originated at

DECLARATION OF ROBERT G. WILLIAMSON. JR.

I, ROBERT G. WILLIAMSON, declare:

/the base of the palm trees on Space 333. On Septe~claer 5, 2014, I drafted and sent Ms.

19 1 ~ c ~ a r r o n a response letter outlining these facts and demanded that Ms. McCvmn take the

20 ex parte off calendar. A true and correct copy of said correspondence is attached hereto as r 2 1 Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof by this reference. r 22 1 5. I am informed that on Thursday, Septembcr 4, the arson investigator informed

23 the Park that the Park could proceed with installing a new electric pedestal and new gas I

27 1 7. However, power from the serving utilities cannot be restored until an inspector

24

25

26

28 11 from California's Department of Housing and Community Development ("HCD") inspects

meter on Space 333.

6 . 1 am informed that a new electrica! pedestal and a new gas meter were installed

on Space 333 on Friday, September 5,2014.

1 36568.05314844-1046-5054v.1

D E C L A R A T I O N O F R O B E R T G. W I L L l A M S O N . J R . 2%

1 and authorizes restoration of the power. I 2 11 8. As of the date of this declaration, I am informed and believe that my client has

3 been in contact with HCD to have inspectors inspect the installations and authorize power to A 4 be restored. R 5 11 9. However, my client received conflicting information from HCD as to which

6

7

8

9

10

L 36568.053/4844-1046-5054~. 1

DECLARATION O F ROBERT G . W I L L I A M S O N , J R .

inspector for the HCD district in which the Park is located will actually conduct the

inspection. I am informed that HCD has apparently resolved the conflict and will proceed

with the inspection.

10. As of today, as noted above, a new electric pedestal and gas meter have already

been installed. My client is currently awaiting an inspection from HCD inspectors to

1 1

12

13

14

authorize that service may be restored.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the

foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 8th day of September, 2014, at Santa Ana, California.

On 09/08/2014, at approximately 13:45 hours, I conducted a phone interview with WENDY DURR a witness to a fire that occurred on August 301h, 2014 at Mt. Shadows Mobile Home Park located at 4040 Piedmont space 333 in the City of San Bernardino. The following is a summary of DURR'S statement:

FIRE DEPARTMENT CA0365300 SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

DURR stated two days prior to the fire her home experienced a large serge accompanied by a loud boom, she stated this occurred at approximately 1030 in the morning. DURR said her lights flickered a little bit but did not go off completely. DURR stated she did look outside but did not see anything. DURR stated on Saturday August 30, at approximately 12 noon she had a similar serge, but stated there was no bang associated with this serge. DURR did state that her air conditioning system did shut down during this second serge. Approximately 20 minutes later DURR went outside to see if the breaker had gone off on her air conditioner. DURR stated she check the breaker later after the fire occurred and the breaker did not trip. DURR stated as she was exiting her home out to her patio she could hear crackling. DURR said she wasn't sure what the crackling was or where it was coming from. DURR stated she looked out the window towards her driveway and saw fire on the side of her neighbor's house next to the electrical pedestal and plastic fence. DURR stated the vegetation in front of the electrical pedestal as well as the white fence was on fire and moving towards the two palm trees.

DURR stated she went outside to grab her fire extinguisher and met her neighbor from across the street who also noticed the fire. DURR stated she gave her neighbor the hose and she and he attempted to extinguish the fire with a hose and fire extinguisher. DURR stated the first thing she saw on fire was the plastic fence on the south side of her neighbor's house in the planter area and in front of the electrical pedestal. DURR said the fire was traveling towards the palm trees in an easterly direction. DURR stated she used her extinguisher on the plastic fence towards the electrical pedestal and that was able to knock most of the fire down in that area. DURR said her neighbor put the fire out around the base of the palm trees with the water hose.

CRZ

PAGE 1

DURR stated that Southern California Edison came to repair the electrical pedestal and wiring on Sunday the 31st. DURR said the Edison employee had stated he saw some damage to one of the bus-bars within the electrical pedestal. DURR indicated in her statement that the Edison employee stated he would document his findings in his report. DURR also stated the Edison employees found a ball of metal down in the hole underneath the pedestal were the electrical wires come up from the ground.

CASE NUMBER 14-21471

WIlNESS

DURR had nothing more to add to this interview. I concluded this interview at 13:59 hours.

WENDY DURR REPORT TYPE

STATEMENT VICTIhl'S NAhE/FII(IMS NAME (LAST, ARSI; MIUDm] RESIDENTIIU ADDRESS CITY ST,4TF TELEPIlONE NUMBER DUFFY, NANCY MC CARRON 4040 PIEDMONT SPACE 333 SB, C A 805-450-0450

R E C O R ~ S BARCOUING ONLY REPORTING INVESnGATOR [Sj S. TRACY

REVIE\VEDOY.

7.0 2'

IDEUTIFICr~TlON VUMBER [S) 1-684

l>,'O'lJ.: 1011312014

RECORDS PROCESSING BY: D A ~ : F U R ~ I E R A C ~ O N :

NO

FIRE DEPARTMENT CA0365300 CRZ

SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA PAGE 1 11 -5386 WITNESS I RPPORTTYPF . . . . . , . . . . - . . -

RESlDENnlL ADDRESS 4040 PIEDMONT SPACE 333 --- SB, CA --- 805450-0450

On 09/08/2014, at approximately 1054 hours, I conducted a phone interview with JEROME POLAND a witness to a fire that occurred on August 3oth, 2014 at Mt. Shadows Mobile Home Park located at 4040 Piedmont space 333 in the City of San Bernardino. The following is a summary of Mr. POLAND'S statement:

POLAND stated he was walking out to his car located in his driveway when he noticed two palm trees on fire on the side of his neighbor's house. POLAND said he went to his neighbor's house and knocked on the door to see if they were home, but stated they were not at home. POLAND then stated he went to his neighbor's to the north and knocked on his door to alert him that there was a fire. POLAND then ran down the street to his other neighbor's to the south of the house that was burning, but stated she was already outside and was moving towards him. POLAND stated she handed him the water hose and he started to put the fire out on the plastic fence and around the palm trees. POLAND stated it was very hot that day and he did not have enough water pressure in the water hose to reach the fire fully so he had to stand back 3 to 5 feet. POLAND stated his neighbor helped him with a fire extinguisher to extinguish the fire as well. POLAND stated they were able to extinguish the fire and his neighbor called 91 1 to have the fire department respond.

POLAND said the first thing he saw on fire was the palm trees. However, POLAND went on to state he did see the electrical around the pedestal was melted. POLAND stated he's pretty sure it was some kind of electrical fire but he stated he did not see anything in front of the Pedestal burning. POLAND stated the plants in front of the pedestal had already burnt up. POLAND stated "I felt like the fire ad moved from the area in front of the pedestal towards the palm trees and then continued to

d! start th trees; those trees would have been a bigger blaze if it was the other way around." I

POLA D stated when the fire department arrived the blaze was already put out. POLAND stated the fire de artment continued to water down the area that was burning and then checked the roof and the surrou ding area around the mobile home for any hotspots. i POLA(D had nothing further to add to this interview, I ended the interview at 11:10 hours.

REVIEWED

=I[ l>.VI'l? RECORDS BARCODING ONLY S. TRACY BS

3 I

1-684 1011312014 DATE: I F U Z ~ I I ACTION:

YES RECORDS PROCESSING BY: -

10/18R014 UDDS1204130 Minute Orders 1 San Bernardina Main

Home ComplaintslParties Actions Minutes Pending Case Hearings Report Images

Case Type: I__- A Case Number:

Case UDDS1204130 - STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY --- Action: wse) 7

EX-PARTE MOTION RE: DEF EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER TO REPAIR OR REPLA~E ELE 09/09/2014 - 9:30 AM DEPT. S28X 1 MICHAEL A SACHS, JUDGE CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPORTER LINDA BALDWIN 12453 COURT ATTENDANT MARY KILGORE - APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR BONNIE SHIPLEY. - PROCEEDINGS: NO FILE. PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD EX-PARTE HEARING IS HELD. EX PARTE APPLICATION ARGUED. COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THE MOVING PAPERS AND OPPOSITION FILED 9/8/14

COURT FINDS: EX PARTE ORDERS DENIED. FINDINGS ARE STATED ON THE RECORD. ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

On 08/30/14, at 1314 hours, the San Bernardino City Fire Department responded to 4040 Piedmont Dr. in the City of San Bernardino for a report of a planter on fire. Medic Engine 228 (ME228) was the first to arrive and the officer in charge, Captain Brian Crowell found a planter, along with vegetation and other debris smoldering. On primary and secondary survey no occupants were found inside or outside of the structure. Offensive fire attack was initiated and the fire was extinguished. According to Captain Brian Crowell, 91 1 operators were called by a next door neighbor.

The fire itself was small approximately 10 by 10 on the south side of a mobile home at space 333. As indicated in the fire report the fire was put out by locals prior to ME228's arrival. Refer to the attached fire report for further. On September 1, 2014 1 received a call from the owner of the mobile home (Nancy McCarron) involved in this fire requesting an origin and cause report. l informed Ms. McCarron who to contact to request the information she was seeking. As I was attempting to explain the process to Ms. McCarron she frequently would interrupt me by informing me of her long civil litigation issues with the mobile home park. Ms. McCarron went on to state she felt this fire was intentionally started as retaliation to her winning her court case against the mobile home park. I informed Ms. McCarron I would look up who the investigator was who was called out to the fire and attempt to put her in touch with the investigator for additional follow-up.

CASE NUMBER 14-21 471

FIRE DEPARTMENT CA0365300 SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

As I looked into this incident further I revealed an investigator was never requested to the fire scene. In fact, when I read the fire report the Captain noted in his narrative the cause of the fire was undetermined. I informed the home owner there was no investigator requested due to the fact the Company Officer conducted a preliminary origin and cause and based on his training and experience he listed the cause of the fire as undetermined. This explanation to the home owner was not acceptable has she persisted this fire was intentionally set or at least that's what she suspected.

CR2

PAGE 1

On September 1, 2014 1 contacted Chief Hubbell and informed him of the circumstances surrounding this incident. Both Chief Hubbell and I agreed it would be in the departments best interest to start a formal investigation due to the fact this home owner is an attorney and with her current litigation with the park we needed to absolutely rule out any foul play. I informed the home owner the fire department would look into the cause of the fire further. However, I did explain to the home owner the scene had been released the day of the fire and the fire scene and any possible evidence may have been spoiled and or tampered with. With this in mind, I further explained we would do are best in coming to a reasonable hypothesis as to the cause. The home owner seemed to be satisfied with our decision but questioned my explanation of possible scene tampering.

- -

In the days following our examination Ms. McCarron became more belligerent as to our methods and limitations of the investigation. I did call her back and explain to her the scene had been compromised by Edison and or park maintenance people. The general area of origin had been dug up and remarkably disturbed. I explained to Ms. McCarron we had no choice but to concur with the

Form of mvesagahon ORIGIN AND CAUSE

REPORT TYPE NARATIVE

VICTIM'SNAME/FIRMS NAME M S T , FIRST, MIDD1.E) RESIDENT1 AL ADDRESS Cl lY STATE TBLZPHONE NUMBER

DUFFY, NANCY MC CARRON 4040 PIEDMONT SPACE 333 SB, CA 805-450-0450 --

RECORDS BARCODING ONLY (S) IDENTIFICK~ION NUMBER (5) S. TRACY 1-684

l>;\'l'I<,

10/13/2014 I DATE: I NK~-IF.R ACTTON. 1 RECOlmS PROCESSING BY:

original cause listed in the fire report as Undetermined. She was not happy to say the least and went on to explain it was the parks responsibility to ensure her renters~electricity and gas be repaired so they could return to the home. I explained to her this problem was a civil matter between her and the park and the fire department had no jurisdiction regarding those matters.

On September 4th, I went back out to the scene and conducted a very thorough examination of the electrical pedestal. In addition to my examination I also requested Edison and the Gas Company back out to the scene to ensure the pedestal and the gas meter were safe. I did discover a small gas leak from the meter and had the Gas Company render it safe. The Pedestal was cleared by Edison as being DE energized and safe to work around. I conferred with the linemen from Edison on some Hypothesis related to the Pedestal and the cause of the fire and then released him. The Gas Company remained on scene to document their actions and post a safety report for the home owner.

14-21471 NUMBER7 FIRE DEPARTMENT CA0365300 SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

In the late afternoon on September 4th, I received another phone call from Ms. McCarron on the SIB line. I did inform Ms. McCarron I conducted the examination of the pedestal as she requested and informed her, the determination of the cause was going to remain Undetermined at this time. I explained I did still need to do some follow-up with some witnesses. I informed Ms. McCarron she may request a copy of the entire detailed report and it should be ready for her in four to six weeks. She was still not pleased with this additional work on this investigation. In Fact, she and her husband started to cross examine me over the phone on the methods of our investigation. It was at this time I informed Ms. McCarron if she had any further questions or complaints she could contact Captain Lentine or Chief Harker.

CRZ

PAGE 2

End of Narrative

i - A - - - I YES 1 . -

RBCORDS BARCODING ONLY I > i l l C REPORTING INVESTIGATOR (Sj IDENTIPIC.2TION NUhIBEll (S)

S. TRACY 1-684 101~/2014 REVIEWED BY: I-- ) DATE: I FURTIIER ACTION. I RECORDS PROCESSING BY

On 1010712014, at approximately 11:30 hours, I conducted an interview with CAPTAIN BRIAN CROWELL the Company Officer in charge of ME 228 who was dispatched to a fire that occurred on August 3oth, 2014 at Mt. Shadows Mobile Home Park located at 4040 Piedmont space 333 in the City of San Bernardino. The following is a summary of CAPTAIN CROWELL'S statement:

CROWELL stated ME228 arrived at the top of the mobile home park and found burnt and smoldering palm trees to the front of the mobile home space number 333. CROWELL said members of his crew checked the residents to see if the residents were home. CROWELL said his crew reported no one was home. CROWELL stated there were two neighbors at the location when they arrived on scene that had extinguished the body of the fire with garden hose prior to his arrival. CROWELL stated one of these neighbors was the RP who had called 911 to report the fire. CROWELL stated the fire burned a small portion of plastic fence, some light vegetation and melted the electric meter and possibly damaged the inside wiring. CROWELL said the gas meter was also damaged. CROWELL said the fire burned an area approximately a 10sqlft section of the planter on the South side of the home.

CASE NUMBER 14-21471 -

FIRE DEPARTMENT CA0365300 SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

CROWELL stated after he and his crew conducted additional cooling measures on the affected area and determined the fire was completely suppressed he conducted a preliminary origin and cause investigation. CROWELL stated based on his training and experience he did not observe anything that would indicate a crime had occurred. CROWELL stated he listed the fire as "unknown" as to the cause of fire. CROWELL did state the cause of the fire may have been possibly electrical in nature but was not able to make this determination based on his training and experience. CROWELL said he took additional protective measures to make the structure and environment safe by shutting off the gas, taping off the area around the electrical box and checking the area for embers and smoldering debris. CROWELL stated the onsite property management arrived and he informed them of what occurred on scene. CROWELL requested Edison to secure the power and render it safe. CROWELL stated after he and his crew were satisfied the property was safe and secure he turned the scene over to property management.

CRZ

PAGE I

I concluded this interview at approximately 11 :40 hours. See Captain Crowell's fire report for further.

WINEBS CAPTAIN B. CROWELL

REPORT TYPE STATEMENT

V I C T I ~ S ~ NW/FIRMS NAME (~As'I: PIRST, MIDDLE) RESIDENTIAL 4DDRESS I STATE TELEPHONE NUMBER _ DUFFY, NANCY MC CARRON -- 4040 PIEDMONT SPACE 333 SB, C A 805-450-0450

RCPORTING INVESTIGATOR (S) S. TRACY

KEVIEWD BY. 1 DATE 1 FURTHER ACTION: 1 RECORDS PROCESSING BY:

IUENTIPIC~\I'ION NUMRER 1-684

l ) . V ~ ' l < BARCODING ONI>Y 1011312014

John H. Pentecost, Esq., Bar No. 99527 Robert G. Williamson, Jr., Es ., Bar No.

HART #INc 9 Ryan J. E an, Esq., Bar No. 2 1836

A PRO A ESSIONAL CORPORATION 4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suitc 900 Santa Ana, California 92707 Telepbone: (714) 432-8700 Facs~mile: (714) 546-7457

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, FONTANA DISTRICT

6

7

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a Case No. UDFS 1406978 California general partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS Assigned for all purposes to:

Judge: Hon. Kyle S. Brodie MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY,

Plaintiff PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO FIRST SET OF FORM INTERROGATORIES

v. PROPOUNDED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY

NANCY B. DUFFY aka NANCY DUFFY aka NANCY MCCARRON aka NANCY DLW-MCCARKON aka NANCY B. DUFFY MCCARRON; BONNIE SHIPLEY; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.

1 1 1

Attorrteys for Plaintiff STUBBLEFIE1.D PROPERTIES, a California eneral 5 partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMU ITY

21 Defendants.

22 - - I 24 PROPOUNDING PARTY: I Defendant B O W SHLPLEY

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff STUBBLEFIP*D PROPERTIES, a California

26 I general pmtncrship dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS

MOBILEHOME COMMLNITY

One

3h5h8.02214819-20934080~.1 1

RESPONSES TO FIRST S E T OF FORM ~ N T E R R O O A T O R ~ E S

to the Sixty (60) Day Notice to Terminate Possession served on Defendant McCarron,

Responding Party responds as follows:

Responding Party owns Mountain Shadows Mobilehome Community (hereinafter

"Park"), a mobilehome park located at 4040 E. Piedmont in Highland, California 92346.

Responding Party does not own the mobilehome unit situated upon space 333. The

mobilehome unit is currently situated on Plaintiffs property, at space 333 inside the Park.

?a such, Responding Party does not maintain the rnobilehome unit, but does maintain the

areas of the Park. Responding Party is aware of inspections by representatives of

Fire Department and California Department of Housing and Community

ordered the Edison Company and Southern California Gas Company to

t:rminate services to spacc 333 due to a fire that destroyed the utility pedestal at space 333

cn or about August 28, 2014 as Responding Party understands those terns to mean,

rzgarding the common areas of the Park.

.E'-5 .,. . . .... ,.. . . . . .

- During the period beginning 36 months before the NOTICE TO QUIT was served to

I I tie present, did PLAINTIFF or LANDLORD receive a notice or other communication

r:garding the condition of the RENTAL UNIT or PROPERTY (including other rents

units) from a governmental agency? If so, for each notice or communication state:

(a) the date received;

I (b) the identity of all parties;

I (c) the substance of the notice or communication;

I (d) the identity of each DOCUMENT evidencing the notice or communication

a d the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of each PERSON who has it, b

I Objection: This interrogatory seeks information that is irrelevant to Ulis action and the

i terrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 1 p i s interrogatory is oppressive and burdensome because i t is vague, ambiguous, and

ulintelligible so as to make a response impossible without speculation as to the meaning of

1293093-008Ov.l 30

RESPONSES TO FIRST SET OF FORM INTERROGATORIES 3?

lthe question and the term "condition." This interrogatory is oppressive and burdenrome

5 land containing a mobilehome park are "pads" or space;; opposed to mobilehomes situated I I

6 on the "pads" or spaces." See Yee v. City of 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1 92) [A I P

2

3

4

7 mobilehome owner typically rents a plot of land, cs!led a "pad," from h e

g mobilehome park.] This interrogatory seeks informati05 that is irrelevant to I I

because it is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible so as to make a response impossible

without speculation as to the meaning of the question and the term "RENTAL UNIT." "[TJhe premises PLAINTIFF seeks to recover" in the c ntext of divided ownership of the P

9 1 the interrogatory is not reasonably calculated to lead to r discovery of admissible e idence. t This interrogatory is oppressive and burdensome

overbroad. This interrogatory is propounded with

burden Responding Party.

Without waiving any objections,

. ..., Responding Party owns ...

"Park"), a mobilehome park

Responding. Party does not

mobilehome unit is currently

l g AS such. Responding Party does not maintain h e mobdchome unit, but does mai tain h e I 4

19((common areas of the Park. Responding Party rece$ed an Activity Report 4om the

23 (1 regarding the condition of the common areas of the ~ask.1 I

20

21

22

Responding Party reserves the right to add this -response . . information obtained during discovery as well as om

California Department of Housing and C

2014 and a written and verbal fire repo - ___1_1__1

Bemardino ~ & e Department as Respo

I ' 26 1 FORM INTERROGATORY NO. 75.6 I ,I I 27 1 was there any corrective action t d e n in rcsp&selllto h e inspection or dice or d 28 1 communication identified in sections 75.4 and 75.51 i f rd , f+ dch :

, ,, , 3 1

365611.02'1J4S29-2093O0800 1 RESPONSES TO FIRST SET OF FORM 1::

VERIFICATION

2

3

4

I have read the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO FRST SET OF FORM

INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLBY and h o w

its contents.

5

6

7

I am informed and believe and on that ground allege that the matters stated in the

foregoing document are true.

I am the party to this action. The m a w stated in the foregoing document are hue to

my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated on information and

belief, and to those matters I believe them to be true.

9

10

The matters stated in the foregoing document are hue of my own howledge, except

as to those matters which.are stated on information and belief, and as to those mafters,

I believe them to be hue.

IX/ I am an officer a partner a Managing Agent of Stubblefield Properties, a

party to this action, and am authorized to make this verification for and on its behalf,

and I make this verification for that reason.

I am one of the attorneys for . a pariy to this action. Such party is absent from the

county of aforesaid where such attorney have their offices, and I mdx this

verification for and on behalf of that p a q for that reason. ]-am informed and believe

and on that ground d e g e that the matters stated in the foregoing document are true.

Executed on November 2014. 1 declare u=der penalty of perjuj. pursuant to the

laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct 23

24

25

26

p Stubblefield Properties

I I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party 4 to the within action. My business address is 4 Hutton Centre, Suite 900, Santa Ana, California 92707-0507.

f

1

2

3

I On November 26,2014.1 caused the foregorng document(s) described as PLAPITIFF'S RESPONSES TO 5 FIRST SET OF FORM INTERROGATORTES PROPOUNDED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE

PROOF OF SERVICE Srubblefreld hoperties v. DUB, et al.

Court C u e No. UDFS1406978

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

I1SHIPLEY be served on the interested parlies in this action as follows:

[XJ BY MAIL: 1 am kadi ly familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Seryice on that same day with postage thereon l l l y prepaid Santa Ana. California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or pastage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in the affidavit.

BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: 1 enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an overnight delivcry carrier and addressed to the persons identified herein. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery

BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE. B a r d m a murt ordm-or an agreement of thd pvlies to r r e p l mission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic

[time]. I did not receive, within a reasonable isted herein on this date at -- the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.

Y FACSIMILE: Based an an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I documents from a fax machine, at Santa Ana, California, with the telephone number. (714) 246-

parties andlor attorney for the parties at the facsimile transmission number(s) shown herein. The smission was reported as complete without error by a transmission report, issued by the

facsimile transmission machine upon which the transmission was madc. a copy of which is attached hereto.

SSENGER SERVICE: 1 sewed the documents by placing them in an envelope or package ons at the addresses listed herein and providing them to r professional messenger service

ion by the messenger will be filed separately.

eclare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the Stab of Califomiathat the foregoing

6

7

8

placlng the original a hue copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated below n $ b sDnding a copy as stated and a d d w e d below:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

i

PROOF OF SERVICE

22

23

24

Executed on November 26,2014, at Santa Ana, California

I

CARL \%IhRREN iFc COMPz4NY Claims Management and Solutions

October 22,2014

C E R T m D MAILIRETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED REGULAR U.S. MAIL

Nancy Duffy McCarron 950 Roble Ln Santa Barbara, CA 93 103

- - Our Principal: City of San Bernardino Claimant: Nancy Duffy McCarron Date of Loss: August 30,2014 to present File No.: 1893390-JM

NOTICE OF REJECTION

Dear Ms. McCarron:

The Claim that you presented to the City of San Bernardino, on or about September 8, 2014 was rejected on October 22,2014, by Carl Warren & Company, on behalf of the City of San Bernardino.

WARNING

Subject to certain exceptions, you havcgnly six (6) months from the dag of tfii_s_no&ce - *.., 7

W@i%%%afly delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court actidiin a superior court of the State of California on this claim. See Government Code section 945.6.

This time limitation applies only to causes of action arising under California law for ' which a claim is mandated by the California Government Tort Claims Act, Government Code sections 900 et seq. Other causes of action, including those arising under federal law, may have a shorter time limitation for filing.

You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice in connection with this matter. If you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so immediately.

AN EMPLOYEE-OWNED COMPANY

P. 0 Box 1820 I San Bernardino. CA 92402

www.carhvarren.com I Tel: 909-884-8669 I 800-762-3216 I Fax: 866-204-9268

CA License No. 2607296

%

Very Truly Yours,

' John McCormack Carl Warren & Company jmccormack@c~lwarren.com

6 "

cc: City of San Bernardino

2 Carl Warren & Co.

Y

222 W. Hospitality Lane, 3rd Floor, San Bernardino, CA 92415 1 Phone: 909.386.8655 Fax: 909.382.3212

- --------- NARDINO

UNTY - - - *- - --

Department of Risk Management

Kenneth L. Hernandez Director

March 23,201 5

Nancy McCarron 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103

-- = - RE: - ClaimarL .-. , .- Nancy_Mr;Ca r r o ~ o n n a - - - - _ _ Date of Loss.. .......... October 28, 201 4 Amount of Claim.. .... Undetermined Our File.. ............... . I 1 9658

Notice is hereby given that the claim which you presented to the County of San Bernardino on February 23, 201 5 was rejected on March 23,2015.

WARNING

Subject to certain exceptions, you have only six (6) months from the date this notice was personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court action on this claim. See Government Code Section 945.6.

You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice in connection with this matter. If you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so immediately.

Liability Claims Rep II DEPARTMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT (9b9)386-8637

BSWARa

STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) )

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO )

I, the undersigned, declare:

I am employed in the County of San Bernardino, State of California; I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action; my business address is 222 West

--- ~ t ~ ~ E I s s c ~ 5-LifsMia, 9BH-MlQIU--m---- -

with this office's practice for collection and processing of documents for mailing with the United States Postal Service. The documents are deposited with the United States Postal Service on the same day in the ordinary course of business. On the date written below, I served the document named below on the parties indicated by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing from 222 West Hospitality Lane, Third Floor, San Bernardino, Ca. following ordinary business practice, addressed as follows, and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration is executed on March 23, 201 5 at San Bemardino, California.

DOCUMENT: BSWARa

PARTIES SERVED:

Law Office of Nancy DufFy 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA. 93103 -- - -

I

proofsvc

- -- 222 W. Hospitality Lane, 3rd Floor, San Bernardino, CA 92415 1 Phone: 909.386.8655 Fax: 909.382.3214

Department of Risk Management

Kenneth L. Hernandez Director

Law Office of Nancy McCarron 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA. 931 03

RE: Claimants: Nancy McCarron, Bonr~ie J. Shipley & Stephen Allen Date of Loss: October 28,201 4 Our Claim #: 1 19658

Dear Nancy McCarron

Please be advised that we have completed our inquiry in response to the claim against the County that you filed.

At this time, we are denying liability for the following reason: The alleged employee are not employeed with the County of San Bernardino. It appears your claim may be against the City of San Bernardino, where the County has no jurisdiction. Also the County of San Bernardino Courts and its employees, including judges are under the jurisd-iciton of the State of California and not the County of San Bernardino.

The purpose of this letter is to advise your office of ol.lr findings and is not intended to - -- -

waive or eictend the statutory perioy-as cfe3riedmTh-e rejection notice d'afed March 23, 201 5.

Sincerely,

Richard Castanon Liability Claims Rep II DEPARTMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT

EXHI BIT

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.B~ecu.e;d '& tB$ &'jqic* nam&3 dl&trLct an j f~ G3)1 .2 : -. : yczqra,' VEGA

/ ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name and Address)

1 Nancy Duffy McCarron. 164780 ' 950 Roble Lane 1 Santa Barbara. CA 93103 I

Telephone Number

805-450-0450

I ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Bonnie Shipley -& -

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF S,4N B32RNPLRD1BJO 1 - - _ _ - - -- -- SBSC? Fontana District

I 17780 Arrow Blvd Fontana, CA 92335

1 PLAlNTlFFlPETlTlONER Stubblefied Properties, et al

DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT Nancy B. Duffy, et a1

FOR COURT USE ONLY

CERTIFICATE RE: DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE

(CCP 170.6)

I am the attorney for the Bonnie shipley

in the within action.

W~lfred Schneider , the Judge before whom the trial of said

action is pending is prejudiced against the interest of the Bonnie Shipley I

so that I believe a fair and impartial trial of said action cannot be had before said Judge

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on 10-1 0-1 4 at Fontana , California

Optional Form .";?I 5 (Rev. 07/03)

CERTIFICATE RE: DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE

fCCP 170.6)

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I

Case Type: v I i - d."". . -- . -... -- - ... - .-- .I 7---

Case Number: 8ear~h I L . - A d

Case UDFS1406978 - STUBBLEFIELD -VS- DUFFY Action: I (Choose) v

HEARING RE: 170.6 10/14/2014 - 4:00 PM DEPT. F2

KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL - APPEARANCES: PARTIES NOT PRESENT: STLIBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CAI-IFORNIA, NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY - PROCEEDIIVGS: CCP170.6 FILED AS TO JUDGE WILFRED J SCHNEIDER JR., CASE REASSIGNED TO JUDGE KYLE S BRODIE FOR ALL PURPOSES.

HEARINGS: LAW & MOTION RE: DEMURRERIMOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINTIQUASH SUMMONS SET FOR 11110114 AT 08:00 IN DEPT. F2. CASE ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO DEPARTMENT F2 - CLERK'S OFFICE TO NOTIFY ALL PARTIES ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

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Case UDFS1406978 ­ STUBBLEFIELD ­VS­ DUFFY Action: (Choose)

MOTION RE: DEMURRER/MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT/QUASH SUMMONS 11/10/2014 ­ 8:00 AM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL ­ APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER. DEFENDANT NANCY B DUFFY PRESENT ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT. ­ PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 09:09 NANCY B DUFFY'S MOTION DEMURRER/MOTION TO STRIKE IS HEARD. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT . ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . MATTER PUT ON 2ND CALL FOR COURT TO REVIEW DEFENDANTS JUDICIAL NOTICE REQUEST. 09:11 ­ 10:54 ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT . ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . AFTER TESTIMONY AND DUE CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT : DEMURRER IS OVERRULED AS TO NANCY B DUFFY NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT/QUASH SUMMONS IS DENIED. 5 DAYS TO ANSWER. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE. 11:28 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. ACTION ­ COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END === === MINUTE ORDER END ===

Case No.___________________

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

APPELLATE DIVISION

BONNIE SHIPLEY, Petitioner,

v. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

Respondent; __________________________________________________

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a CA General Partnership,

dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community Real Party in Interest.

WRIT PETITION - STAY REQUESTED [abatement required: other action pending(ACIAS140026)-same issue, same parties]

see CCP §597 see Browne v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 593, 597

Following Hearing: DEMURRER OVERRULED Case No. UDFS1406978 [limited jurisdiction] Hon. Kyle Brodie, Judge [F-2] (909) 320-5134

PETITION FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDATE AND PROHIBITION IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, OR ALTERNATIVE WRIT, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES; EXHIBITS [SEPARATE COVER]

TRANSCRIPT WILL FOLLOW ASAP _________________________________

Nancy D McCarron, CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane

Santa Barbara, CA 93103 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 Attorney for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities ..................................................................................................... 1, 2

Certificate of Interested Parties (on file)

Writ Issues Presented (4) ................................................................................................. 3

Statewide Urgency ........................................................................................................... 4

Petition, Authenticity of Exhibits, Beneficial Interest, Capacities, Urgency ................. 5

IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED ............................................................................ 5

Chronology of Pertinent Events ....................................................................................... 6

No Adequate Remedy at Law, Prayer for Relief ............................................................. 7

Memorandum of Points & Authorities, Standard of Review ........................................... 8

ARGUMENTS ................................................................................................................. 8

1. Court May Not Deprive Defendant of Oral Arguments at Demurrer Hearing ......... 8

2. Pendency of Prior Action Abates Second Action Against the Same Party ............. 9

3. Court Erred by Compelling Party to Litigate Complex Issues in UD Court ......... 11

4. Procedural & Substantive Defects Are Fatal to the Complaint ............................. 14

a. invalid notice and/or invalid service of notice (defective proof of service)

b. a general partnership complaint not verified by a general partner

c. breach of covenant despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of breach

d. sublease breach despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of subtenant

e. delay for over a year in suing for unpaid rent or uncured covenant breach

f: retaliatory eviction barred by Civil §1942.5 proven by RJN + exhibits

Admissions in P’s Opposition to Demurrer Negate Ability to State Claim ............. 18

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 19

Judge Brodie Should Not Sit As Judge in Violation of Gov’t Code §87203 ................ 20

Certificate of Word Count, Verification of Counsel & Petitioner ................................. 21

Request for Judicial Notice of Monthly Statement $23,538.09 rent due

Proof of Service ............................................................................................................. 22

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases

Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 CA.3d 141 .......................................................... 11

Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 ................................................. 9

Bedford Investment Co. v. Folb (1947) 79 CA.2d 363, 366 .............................................. 17

Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999) 69 CA.4th 354 ........................................................ 11

Browne v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 593, 597 ........................................................ 9

Cal-American Income Property Fund IV v. Ho (1984) 161 CA3d 583, 585............... 14, 17

Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 C.A.4th 177,182 .................................................. 7

Chong Pong v. Harris (1918) 38 CA 214, 217 .................................................................. 15

Deal v. Municipal Court 157 CA.3d 996........................................................... 11

EDC Associates, Ltd. v. Gutierrez (1984) 153 CA.3d 167 ................................................ 16

Halvorsen v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (1998) 65 CA.4th 1383, 1391 ............ 17, 19

Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155 ......... 8

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Riverside (1999) 73 C.A.4th 679, 685 ............. 7

Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co., 214 Cal.435, 440 ....................................... 17

Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co. (1931) 214 Cal.435, 440 ............................. 16

Kresteller v. Superior Court (1967) 248 C.A. 2d 545, 549 .............................................. 9

Lee v. Bank of America (1990) 218 C.A. 3d 914, 919 ......................................................... 7

Lindsey v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 ............................................................... 11

Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin (2000) 82 C.A.4th 592, 602-603 .............................. 7

Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper, supra, 218 CA.3d at p. 609 ................................................ 12

Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 CA.4th 367 .............................................................. 11

Mayflower Ins. v. Pelligrino (1989) 212 CA. 3d 1326, 1332 .............................................. 7

McCutchen v. City of Montclair (1999) 73 CA.4th 1138 .................................................... 7

Medix Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 C.A 4th 109, 112 ........... 8, 19

Mehr v. Superior Court, supra, 139 C.A.3d 1044 ............................................................. 11

Miller v. Reidy, 85 CA.757, 762 ............................................................................. 17

Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385 .................................................................. 11, 19

2

Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CA.3d @ 20 .................................................................................. 7

Requa v. Regents of University of Cal. (2012) 213 CA. 4th 213, 223 ............................... 18

Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803 ........................................................................ 11, 19

Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 C.A. 4th 513, 517 ..................................................................... 7

San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436 ............. 8

Simmons v. Superior Court (1950) 96 C.A. 2d 119, 122-123 ............................................. 8

Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146 .................................................................... 7

STATUTES

CCP §904.1 .......................................................................................................................... 6

CCP §1102-1105 .................................................................................................................. 9

CCP §430.10 .............................................................................................................. 2, 6, 19

CCP §597 ............................................................................................................................. 8

Civil §1942.5 ............................................................................................................ 3, 17, 19

Civil §798.56[d] ............................................................................................. 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10

Civil §798.88 ........................................................................................................................ 4

Civil Code §1717 ................................................................................................................. 7

RULES OF COURT

CRC 3.1312 ...................................................................................................................... 2, 6

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Legislative intent Civil Code §798.88 injunctive relief instead of eviction ....................... 4

3

(4) WRIT ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Can a judge deprive a defendant of due process by: 1) failing to read a demurrer,

[calling a 15-minute break for a cursory review]; 2) resume the hearing by vigorously

cross-examining defense counsel [effectively advocating for plaintiff] and abruptly

walking off the bench after counsel asked for an opportunity to argue the issues?

Did the court err by denying oral argument at a crucial demurrer hearing?

2. On May 6, 2013 a former appellate panel found Stubblefield could not evict

Shipley directly as he had no privity and directed final judgment in her favor.

Violating CRC 3.1312 the court ordered Stubblefield to write the final judgment

authorizing him to evict Shipley directly. Stubblefield delivered it to chambers ex

parte without a proof of service. Judge Sachs entered it. Shipley was forced to appeal

her own final judgment to reverse the debauchery. Despite a pending appeal on the

issue of whether Stubblefield could evict Shipley directly under Civil §798.56(d)

[as recited in the final judgment] he filed to evict Shipley under Civil §798.56(d).

Shipley demurred under CCP §430.10 [c] to abate the second action while the first

action [1204130] is pending between the same parties & appeal issue [ASIAS140026].

Did the court err in not abating the second action between the same parties?

3. Did the court err by compelling defendants to litigate complex issues in a UD court?

4. Can a court compel an answer to a complaint with fatal procedural & substantive defects?

a. invalid notice and/or invalid service of notice (defective proof of service)

b. a general partnership complaint not verified by a general partner

c. breach of covenant despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of breach

d. sublease breach despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of subtenant

e. delay for over a year in suing for unpaid rent or uncured covenant breach

f: retaliatory eviction barred by Civil §1942.5 proven by RJN + complaint exhibits

Admissions in Plaintiff’s Opposition to Demurrer Negate its ability to State a Claim

4

STATEWIDE URGENCY

“Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair

and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us.

The role of the judiciary is central to American…justice and the rule of law.

Intrinsic…are…precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must

respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance

and maintain confidence in our legal system. Judicial Ethics, Preamble

This petition addresses prevailing defendants having to defend a new case filed in

a different court while the first case is pending on appeal. It also addresses defendants

having to litigate complex real property issues in UD summary proceedings designed for

simple tenant issues. Answers must be filed in 5 days, cross claims are barred, pre-trial

motions and depositions are set on 5-day notice and trial is set on only a 21-day notice.

This deprives defendants of adequate discovery and truncates trial preparation time.

Granting the petition would enable the Appellate Panel to curtail judicial abuse by

reversing structural errors depriving litigants of due process rights to a fair hearing.

Overruling Shipley’s demurrer to a new UD complaint authorized Stubblefield to evict

her directly under Civil §798.56[d]. Whether he can evict her directly under that code is

the issue on appeal in ASIAS 140026. Oral arguments are set for December 2014.

Legislators expressed their stated goal of encouraging park owners to seek injunctions

under Civil §798.88 rather than evicting residents by Civil §798.56[c] for violations. 1

Notwithstanding the court’s clear error in denying Shipley oral argument on demurrer,

she must defend a complaint replete with fatal procedural and substantive deficiencies.

1 “Legislative intent: This three-year sunset will arguably provide the Legislature with the opportunity to re-evaluate this bill to ensure that the stated goal of encouraging a park owner to pursue a lesser remedy against a resident of a mobilehome park instead of eviction is actually reached without negative unintended consequences.) (Amended by Stats. 2012, Chap. 99 (AB 2272, Wagner), eff. 1/1/2013)

5

PETITION

AUTHENTICITY OF EXHIBITS

1. All exhibits accompanying this petition are true and correct copies of original

documents on file with the respondent court. There was no court reporter on duty

during defendants demurrer hearing on November 10, 2014. Counsel will submit an

electronic CD of proceedings when it is produced after her request at Fontana court.

BENEFICIAL INTEREST OF PETITIONER; CAPACITIES OF PARTIES

2. Petitioner is defendant in an action pending in the Respondent Court entitled,

Stubblefield Properties, a California General Partnership v. Nancy Duffy, et al

UDFS1406978, a summary eviction proceeding. Plaintiff is Real Party in Interest.

URGENCY TO PETITIONER

3. Absent intervention by this panel petitioner will be compelled to defend

summary eviction proceedings Stubblefield is currently prosecuting directly

against her, which were expressly prohibited by a Writ of Mandate issued by

this court on May 6, 2013. Stubblefield cited Civil §798.56[d] as the basis

for prosecuting the new case, while the exact issue of whether he can evict her

directly under §798.56[d] is on appeal. Briefing is complete. Oral arguments

are to be set on the December calendar.

IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED

Shipley asks this court to issue an IMMEDIATE STAY of all proceedings below

until this petition is resolved, or at the very least, until this court issues a decision in

the pending appeal between the same parties on the same issue, ACIAS 1400026.

Absent a stay Shipley will endure yet another unlawful eviction based on a statute

which does not apply [Civil §798.56[d] because Shipley is not a homeowner.

6

CHRONOLOGY OF PERTINENT EVENTS

4. On 8/1/12 Shipley moved in as co-resident of a mobile home owner at Space 333

in real party’s park. The owner had a series of co-residents sharing the home since

she bought it on 1/05/05. The owner registered Shipley as resident at the park office.

The manager drove up to 333 on 8/2/12 and tried to orally evict Shipley by stating if

she wanted to live there she had to move in with a sugar daddy over 55 in the park.

The manager confiscated a parking sticker the owner had attached to Shipley’s car.

The manager told Shipley the owner had “gotten away with having co-residents in the

past but would no longer get away with it under the 2010 park rules now in effect.”

5. On August 11, 2012 plaintiff nailed a “5-day Notice to Surrender Possession.”

Shipley was unable to surrender as she did not own it. On August 27, 2012 Shipley

was served with a UD summons and Forcible Detainer complaint. The trial court’s

denial of Shipley’s motion for summary judgment was reversed by an appellate

panel, who found Stubblefield could not evict Shipley directly because there

was no privity of contract. The Panel ordered judgment for Shipley on merits.

Violating CRC 3.1312 the court ordered Stubblefield to write a final judgment.

6. Stubblefield wrote a judgment authorizing direct eviction and delivered it to

chambers ex parte without proof of service. Judge Sachs entered it. Shipley was

forced to appeal her final judgment to reverse the debauched judgment. Despite

a pending appeal on whether Stubblefield could evict Shipley directly under Civil

§798.56(d) [as recited in the final judgment] he moved to evict Shipley under Civil

§798.56(d). She demurred under CCP §430.10 [c] barring the filing of a new action

while another action is pending between the same parties on the same legal issues.

On November 10, 2014 Judge Kyle Brodie overruled Shipley’s demurrer, Motion to

Quash Service, Motion to Strike, and Motion to Transfer case to higher jurisdiction.

Judge Brodie ordered defendants to answer Stubblefield’s UD complaint in 5 days.

7

NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

7. Respondent Court's denial of Shipley’s demurrer is not appealable. CCP § 904.1.

Appeal after final judgment is inadequate as Shipley will have to defend eviction

under §798.56[d] while the issue of whether Stubblefield can evict under that code

is the subject of a pending appeal [ACIAS 140026]. Writ relief is essential to avoid

wasting significant party resources and court staff labor. California courts will have

to conduct jury trials in unmeritorious actions. Petitioner faces summary eviction.

If relief is not granted owner will lose her mobile home without due process of law

and petitioner will be deprived of shelter in the home she has occupied for 2.5 years.

Petitioner has no other adequate remedy at law for the relief sought in this petition.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays the Appellate Panel:

1. Issue an immediate STAY of proceedings pending outcome of this writ proceeding.

2. Either (a) issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing Respondent Court to set

aside and vacate its November 10, 2014 order overruling Shipley’s demurrer, motions

to strike, quash service and transfer the case to a higher jurisdiction, and directing

respondent court to enter an order sustaining her demurrer and issuing a 180 day bar

on filing a complaint, or sustain demurrer without leave to amend due to plaintiff’s

waiver of alleged covenant breaches, and alleged sublease; (b) issue an alternative

writ directing Respondent Court to show cause why it should not so be directed, and

upon return to the alternative writ, issue the peremptory writ set forth in subparagraph

(a) next above; or (c) to direct any other appropriate relief.

3. Award Shipley costs incurred in this proceeding and attorney fees under MRL,

Civil Code §1717, and any other basis in law for which she is entitled to attorney fees.

Respectfully submitted, _______________________________________ Nancy D McCarron, Attorney for Petitioner

8

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STANDARD OF REVIEW [DE NOVO]

An appellate panel independently reviews an order overruling a demurrer de novo. 2

There is no transcript in UD courts. Counsel will order a CD of the recorded hearing.

A transcript is not necessary as the panel does not review the validity of a trial court's

reasoning but only propriety of the ruling itself. 3 Panel is not bound by a trial court's

construction of a complaint, but makes its own independent complaint interpretation 4

A minute order recites motions denied; defendants must answer in 5 days. [Exh. K]

1.) Court May Not Deprive Defendants of a Right to Oral Argument on Demurrer?

The court may not deprive defendants of oral argument at a demurrer hearing. Medix 5

We publish our opinion primarily in an attempt to delineate circumstances which require the court to hear oral argument. Medix @112

We doubt we have to persuade either the court or the litigants herein of the critical nature of the demurrer stage of the proceeding. If, as we will conclude in our discussion below, the demurrer should have been sustained, its being overruled results in defendants having to engage and participate in discovery and the expense of an eventual motion for summary judgment…

Clearly a ruling on a demurrer involves a "critical pretrial matter," and the dispute between the parties on the issues raised are undoubtedly "real and genuine…we conclude that the court erred in denying the parties an opportunity to argue the matter in open court. Medix @115

2 Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146; McCutchen v. City of Montclair (1999) 73 CA.4th 1138, 1144; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Riverside (1999) 73 C.A.4th 679, 685; Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin (2000) 82 C.A.4th 592, 602-603 Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 C.A.4th 177,182 3 Lee v. Bank of America (1990) 218 C.A. 3d 914, 919; Mayflower Ins. v. Pelligrino (1989) 212 CA. 3d 1326, 1332 4 Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CA.3d @ 20; Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 C.A. 4th 513, 517 5 Medix Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 C.A 4th 109, 112

9

Medix found that CRC 324 governing demurrers supported its legal conclusion.

Review of the recording will show Judge Brodie thwarted counsel’s efforts to argue,

including walking away. Every litigant has a duty to submit to the court’s rulings.

After a litigant has done so, he or she may demonstrate the legal errors on appeal. 6

Notwithstanding multiple errors, stare decisis mandates reversal on this error alone. 7

2. Pendency of Prior Action On Same Claim & Parties Abates the Second Action

Pendency of a prior action predicated on the same claim between the same parties

abates the second action. CCP §597 8 If the court in a second action overrules demurrer

its proceedings in the second action may be restrained by prohibition. CCP §1102-1105. 9

The court clearly erred in overruling demurrer in order to proceed with the second action

while the first action on same issue is pending in Appellate Division. ACIAS 1400026.

The pending issue on appeal is whether Stubblefield can evict Shipley directly under

Civil §798.56[d]. A process server served Shipley by personal delivery Oct 6, 2014 with

two sets of papers. He told Shipley 1 set was for her (after she identified herself at door)

and the other set was for Nancy Duffy. Exh A2 “as occupant” and Exh.A4 “as defendant”:

Exh A2 Exh.A4

The Duffy packet had a folded envelope on the bottom showing $2.24 postage. Exh. A6

Hart|King firm scanned the envelope via its postal meter (no post office cancellation).

It recited Duffy’s Santa Barbara address but was given to Shipley on 10/6/14 at #333.

First Legal mailed a third one, addressed to Duffy at Space #333 arriving 2 days later.

6 San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436 Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155 7 Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, [must apply stare decisis] 8 Simmons v. Superior Court (1950) 96 C.A. 2d 119, 122-123 9 Browne v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal. 2d 593, 597; Kresteller v. Superior Court (1967) 248 C.A. 2d 545, 549

10

Exh A7 Exh A9

No package was ever served or mailed to Duffy’s Santa Barbara address, despite that

defendants had to answer in 5 days (with an intervening 3-day Columbus day weekend).

Shipley’s packet had an empty “Prejudgment Claim of Right to Possession” JC form,

notifying Shipley in BOLD of her impending eviction if she did not answer. Exh. A10 .

Allegations show Shipley & Duffy’s sham evictions are based on Civil Code §798.56[d].

B14

B15

B15

B15

B15

The 8/10/12 7-Day Notice cited §798.56[d] ; correction was to remove Shipley.

B-93 B103

11

The 12/21/12 60-day Notice to Terminate Possession cited §798.56[d] to evict. B119

Complaint exhibits show Civil §798.56[d] as the purported basis for eviction. Judge

Brodie must be prohibited from proceeding with second action until appeal is complete.

3. The court erred by compelling defendant to litigate complex issues in UD court?

Palmer 10 court held mobile home tenancies cannot be terminated in summary proceedings:

...The summary proceedings for obtaining possession of real property outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable for termination of mobile home tenancies. Palmer 385

Palmer’s prohibition on summary eviction was later affirmed in Rich v. Schwab 11:

Our conclusion is also consistent with the holding in … (Palmer). In Palmer the court held the eviction requirements set forth in the MRL control over the less stringent requirements of the unlawful detainer law. (87 CA.3d at pp. 383-384.) Schwab @ 803

Although a court has discretion to preserve the benefits of summary proceedings,

it may not disregard a legitimate need for, and a right to, time to prepare and obtain

reasonable discovery in advance of a trial of complex issues on conflicting claims,

or require them to be tried within summary procedures designed for simple UD claims. 12

10 Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385

11 Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803

12 Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 CA.4th 367, 389; Deal v. Municipal Court 157 CA.3d 996; see Lindsey v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 [summary UD procedures are constitutionally acceptable only in straightforward issues of possession and incidental damages.] Id Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 CA.3d 141, Mehr v. Superior Court, supra, 139 C.A.3d 1044; Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999) 69 CA.4th 354; "the summary remedy of an unlawful detainer action was not the proper vehicle to litigate the complex issues of title in that matter. (Id, 364.)”

12

“…when complex issues of title are involved, the parties' constitutional rights to due process in the litigation of those issues cannot be subordinated to the summary procedures of unlawful detainer. … proceeding to try the complex issue of the parties' rights to title of the property. within the confines of the summary procedures that apply only to straightforward determination rights to possession, the court abused its discretion.”… Moore @ 391-392

“The cases cited above are consistent in holding that adjudication of complex issues of title to property should not be forced to adhere to the strictures that apply to summary proceedings for unlawful detainer. 13

Error in trial proceedings is prejudicial when there is a "reasonable probability" that the error affected the outcome of the trial cites… Under the applicable test, the error was prejudicial. Moore @ 395

Faced with these circumstances, the trial court's trial and implicit determination of the ownership issue within the summary unlawful detainer proceeding, and refusal to permit trial of the issue of title outside of those summary procedures, was an abuse of discretion requiring the judgment's reversal… Moore @396

Under stare decisis the court clearly erred when it refused to transfer the case

to a higher jurisdiction upon indisputable evidence the home is assessed at a

value exceeding $25,000. [Exh.C-174]. Duffy’s home is not a “mobile” home.

Homes manufactured after 1976 are manufactured homes---not mobile homes.

Health and Safety Code §18007. Manufactured home (a) Manufactured home, for the purposes of this part, means a structure that was constructed on or after June 15, 1976… is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a single-family dwelling. [see also HUD Code ] 14

Duffy’s home was built and installed after 1974 [in 1984] as shown below

13 Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper, supra, 218 CA.3d at p. 609 Moore @ 393 14 http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/ramh/mhs/faq

13

Plaintiff’s complaint admits Duffy’s manufactured home was installed on a

permanent foundation under HUD code (not moveable) with HUD decals in1984:

Exh. B-12

P admits [Opp.-Dem.Exh.G-186, ln 24 & complaint ¶37] filing in wrong jurisdiction:

Exh.G-186

Exh B-16

Damages: $31.75/day from 1/1/13 to 1/31/14 (365+31=396 days x $31.75= $12,593

$32.90/day from 2/1/14 to 2/1/14 (365 days) x $32.80=$12,008.50 which is for

rent only damages are $24,601.50---not included accrued monthly “guard fees”

which appear on monthly statements mailed since plaintiff refused to take rent 1/1/13.

[see Request for Judicial Notice of real party’s monthly statement mailed to Duffy,

attached to this writ petition and incorporated by reference:

14

The December 1, 2014 monthly statement will add $1,012 in rent damages.

The January 1, 2015 monthly statement will add $1,012 in rent damages. Thus,

within 6 weeks damages will exceed $25,000, before the Appellate Division even

writes a decision on the pending appeal ACIAS 140026 between the same parties.

Secondly, plaintiff’s Civil Case Cover Sheet [Exh. A-1] shows plaintiff prays for

monetary damages by checking that box on its Civil Cover Sheet filed on 10/3/14.

A-1

Third, plaintiff prays for attorney fees [Compl, ¶38 + prayer – Exh. B-16, B-17]

causing monetary damages to exceed $25,000. Finally, because plaintiff waited

more than a year to sue for unpaid rent, plaintiff is limited to collecting rent in regular

civil action, without restitution of premises.15

4. Procedural and Substantive Defects Are Fatal to the Complaint?

A defendant should not be compelled to answer a complaint with fatal procedural and

substantive defects appearing in the complaint, exhibits or in documents judicially noticed.

a. invalid notice and/or invalid service of notice (defective proof of service)

Eviction is based on a 12/26/14 “60-day Notice to Terminate Possession” B-152

B-152

The notice at B-152 is fatally defective, failing to list name, address and phone number.

15 Cal-American Income Property Fund IV v. Ho (1984) 161 CA3d 583, 585

15

The Proof of Service has a robo-signed stamped “signature” pasted on the document.

The form was generated at Hart|King. The unidentified process server is not registered

pursuant to B&P §22355 as the form does not list a license number. An eviction cannot

be based on such flimsy evidence of personal service, where validity cannot be verified.

b. a general partnership complaint not verified by a general partner

Where plaintiff is a general partnership only a general partner can verify a complaint.16

The affidavit is signed: "Fook Hing Lung Co. by Gee Chong Pong, Member & Clerk of said Co." A test of the sufficiency of an affidavit is whether it is so clear and certain that an indictment for perjury may be sustained on it if false. (2 C. J. 348.) It has been held that an affidavit cannot be made by a partnership firm in the firm name, since it would be impossible to convict the individual partners of perjury upon the evidence of such affidavit. (2 C. J. 325.) "An affidavit on behalf of a partnership, therefore, should be sworn to by one of the partners,.. The affidavit states that the partnership was sworn, and it nowhere appears that the affidavit was sworn to by one of the partners. Id

Plaintiff Stubblefield Properties is a general partnership. Thus, only a general

partner could verify the complaint. The verification at the end of the complaint

[B-153] is signed by Katherine Faulise, an account clerk in Stubblefield’s office.

B-153

16 Chong Pong v. Harris (1918) 38 CA 214, 217

16

A plaintiff must verify a UD complaint to ensure the allegations are truthful.

Where the plaintiff is a partnership, a general partner must verify the complaint.

There can be no negative consequences if a mere agent of the partnership verifies.

A general partner cannot be prosecuted for perjury committed by a straw man.

There is no incentive for a partner to refrain from making false allegations where

there can be no negative consequences for such misdeeds. The agent’s verification

is worthless fodder. Katherine Faulise testified “the matters stated in the foregoing

document are true of my own knowledge.” For example, ¶17 [Exh. B-13] recites,

“Defendant McCarron neither intended to, nor did she regularly occupy the

mobilehome.” Katherine Faulise could have no personal knowledge of Defendant

McCarron’s intent nor could she have any personal knowledge of whether McCarron

regularly occupies the mobilehome. Ms. Faulise does not live or work in the park.

Faulise works at Stubblefield’s office located several blocks away from the park.

Faulise rarely even visits the park so she could not possibly have any personal

knowledge of who regularly occupies his or her mobile home in the park at any time.

Plaintiff’s complaint is replete with innuendo, speculation, conclusions and lies.

The demurrer must be sustained because the straw verification is fatally defective.

c. breach of a covenant despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of breach

Under CCP §1161.5 a landlord’s declaration of forfeiture for breach of a covenant

“shall be nullified” if the landlord waives the breach by accepting rent from the tenant. 17

“…the acceptance by a landlord of the rents, with full knowledge of a breach in the

conditions of the lease, and of all of the circumstances, is an affirmation by him that the

contract of lease is still in force, and he is thereby estopped from setting up a breach in

any of the conditions of the lease, and demanding a forfeiture thereof." Kern @ 441

Exh.B of Shipley’RJN shows plaintiff waived alleged breach by taking rent. Exh. F-171

17 Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co. (1931) 214 Cal.435, 440;

EDC Associates, Ltd. v. Gutierrez (1984) 153 CA.3d 167

17

d. sublease breach despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of subtenant

The right of lessor to declare lease forfeiture by the making of a sublease without

the lessor's consent in violation of the lease is waived when the lessor, after

knowledge of the sublease, accepts the rents specified in the lease. 18

e. delay in suing for unpaid rent or uncured covenant breach for more than a year

CCP §1161[2] limits damages for rent to actions served "within one year after the

rent became due." If a landlord waits over one year to sue for unpaid rent he is relegated

to an ordinary breach of contract action, which results only in a money judgment without

restitution of the demised property. 19 The compliant shows on its face that plaintiff is

attempting to collect damages for “rent” as far back as January 1, 2013. [Exh. B-16, ¶37]

f: retaliatory eviction barred by Civil §1942.5 proven by RJN + complaint exhibits

A complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action if it shows on

its face or it appears from judicially noticed matter the action is barred by an affirmative

defense. 20 Shipley’s Request for Judicial Notice [Exh. F 168] shows defendants made a

complaint to HCD to compel Stubblefield to replace a burned out electric pedestal and

gas meter supplying utilities to Space 333. Defendants were deprived of gas, electric,

DSL or telephone for several weeks after a mysterious fire erupted in the electric pedestal

in front of defendants’ mobile home, which was under the exclusive control of the park.

An inspector issued a safety violation to the park manager, and ordered the manager to

replace the gas and electric meters to restore utilities to the home. He moved to evict.

Civil Code §1942.5 bars eviction for 6 months after a complaint it validated by HCD. 18 Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co., 214 Cal.435, 440; Miller v. Reidy, 85 CA.757, 762; Bedford Investment Co. v. Folb (1947) 79 CA.2d 363, 366 19 Cal-American Income Property Fund IV v. Ho (1984) 161 CA3d 583, 585 20 Halvorsen v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (1998) 65 CA.4th 1383, 1391

18

Request for Judicial Notice [Exh. F 168] shows the complaint was validated.

Thus, the park was required to wait 180 days before prosecuting an eviction case.

The affirmative defense appears on the face of the complaint coupled with Exh. F-168.

While the court’s focus is on the pleadings, relevant matters that are properly the

subject of judicial notice may be treated as having been pled.21 The demurrer should

be sustained because plaintiff was required to wait 180 days before moving for eviction.

Admissions in Plaintiff’s Opposition to Demurrer Negate ability to State a Claim

Admissions contained in plaintiff’s opposition to a demurrer can be used to negate

plaintiff’s ability to state a cause of action. Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 CA.

4th 177, 181 (face of the complaint showed the claim was barred by a statutory

affirmative defense); Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 CA.4th 513, 517 (taking judicial notice

of admissions in plaintiff’s opposition to demurrer); Setliff v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours

& Co. (1995) 32 CA.4th 1525, 1534. Plaintiff made various admissions in its opposition.

The most glaring admission appears at page 6 [Exh. G-186].reciting a UD action is

a limited civil case only when the amount of rent and damages claims is $25,000 or less.

G-186

Since the mobile home is not “moveable” as it was installed into a permanent foundation

and enclosed rock walls it is impossible to “relocate” it. Secondly, the park does not

allow any homes to be moved in the park. Third, all surrounding cities and counties have

ordinances precluding installation of any mobilehomes more than 15 years old onto lots.

These ordinances are to prevent “blight” of very old homes moved into neighborhoods.

If Stubblefield acquires “possession” Duffy will lose $80,000 invested in the home.

Even a tax assessor assigned a value of $27,800 exceeding $25,000 limited jurisdiction.

21 Requa v. Regents of University of Cal. (2012) 213 CA. 4th 213, 223

19

CONCLUSION

Depriving defendants of oral arguments at a demurrer hearing was reversible error.22

The court clearly erred in not abating the second action while the first action between

the same parties on the same issue [whether Stubblefield can evict Shipley directly

under Civil Code §798.56(d)] is pending on appeal in ACIAS 140026 to be set for oral

argument in December 2014, pursuant to CCP §430.10(c) [demurrer, Exh. E-160 ln12]

The court erred in compelling defendants to litigate complex real estate issues of title and

right to possession, and application of complex MRL statutes in a truncated UD court.23

The court erred in overruling demurrer where affirmative defense [retaliatory eviction]

appeared on in judicially noticeable documents under Evidence Code §453. 24 Exh.F-168

The court erred in compelling defendants to answer in 5 days a complaint which is

replete with fatal procedural and substantive defects, most of which cannot be cured.

a. invalid notice and/or invalid service of notice (defective proof of service)

b. a general partnership complaint not verified by a general partner

c. breach of covenant despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of breach

d. sublease breach despite waiver by accepting rent after notice of subtenant

e. delay for over a year in suing for unpaid rent or uncured covenant breach

f: retaliatory eviction barred by Civil §1942.5 proven by RJN + complaint exhibits

Admissions in Plaintiff’s Opposition to Demurrer Negate its ability to State a Claim.

Plaintiff admits that under CCP §85(a) and 86(a)(4) that where amount in controversy

exceeds $25,000 the case must be filed in a higher jurisdiction. RJN proved home is

assessed at $27,800 [Exh. F-174] and complaint ¶ 37 [Exh. B-16] shows rent damages

from January 1, 2013 at $32 day is over $25,000 by Jan 1, 2015. No jurisdiction in UD.

The Panel must reverse the clearly erroneous overruling of demurrer and sustain it.

22 Medix Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 C.A 4th 109, 112 23 Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385; Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803 24 Halvorsen v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (1998) 65 CA.4th 1383, 1391

20

JUDGE BRODIE SHOULD NOT SIT AS JUDGE UNTIL HE COMPLIES WITH LAW

As a final note, the Panel must find that Judge Brodie lacked any jurisdiction to rule on

this case, or any case, until he complies with judicial mandates of Gov’t Code §87203

Every person who holds an office specified in Section 87200 shall, each year at a time specified by commission regulations, file a statement disclosing his investments, his interests in real property and his income during the period since the previous statement filed under this section or Section 87202. The statement shall include any investments and interest in real property held at any time during the period covered by the statement, whether or not they are still held at the time of filing.

Gov’ Code §87200 expressly enumerates judges as subject to the mandatory reporting.

Complying with mandatory judicial duties is a condition of holding a judicial position.

Judge Bodie is not excused from complying with the law. Defendants object to his sitting

on a judicial bench despite his intentionally, inexcusable failure to comply with the law.

Judge Brodie failed to file a Form 700 with the FPPC in March of 2014 to report his

financial assets (for conflict analysis) for the prior year 2013. The last form he filed was

March 2013 for the prior 2012 year, and that form woefully failed to comply with duty.

Judges are subject to discipline by the Commission on Judicial Performance for failure

to comply with Gov’t Code §87200 to protect the PEOPLE of CA who pay their salaries.

Code of Civil Procedure §340, there’s a one-year statute of limitation — he can be subjected to discipline by the Commission on Judicial Performance. Art. VI, §18(d)(2) makes a judge fair game for scrutiny of conduct occurring during the six-year period prior to the commence of his or her current term. Yaffe’s current

term commenced in January. Yaffe’s failure to abide by his statutory oblgation

to report gifts and debt forgiveness, without more, would be disciplinable. Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Ethics provides: “A judge shall respect and comply

with the law.” The law — in particular, Government Code §87203 — requires that financial disclosures be made in the annual statement of economic interests. It says: “Every person who holds an office specified in Section 87200 [which includes “judges”] shall, each year at a time specified by commission

regulations, file a statement disclosing his investments, his interests in real property and his income during the period since the previous statement filed under this section or Section 87202.” California Judicial Commission v. Jaffe

21

CERTIFICATE OF WORDCOUNT

The petition contains 5,789 words (excluding tables) in roman typeface 14 font.

I relied on a word count generated by MS Word 2010 showing in the status bar.

11/14/14

VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER’s ATTORNEY

I, NANCY D MCCARRON, declare:

I am the Petitioner’s attorney in this proceeding. I have read the foregoing Petition

for Writ of Mandate, and know the contents; the same is true of my own personal

knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated upon my information or belief,

and as to those matters I believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury,

under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and this

Verification was executed on November 14, 2014 at Highland, California.

_______________________________________________

NANCY D MCCARRON, Attorney for Petitioner

VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER

I, BONNIE SHIPLEY, declare:

I am the Petitioner in this writ proceeding. I have read the foregoing Petition for

Writ of Mandate, and know the contents thereof; the same is true of my own personal

knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated upon my information or belief,

and as to those matters I believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury,

under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and this

Verification was executed on November 14, 2014 at Highland, California.

_____________________________________________

BONNIE J. SHIPLEY, Petitioner

22

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

Stubblefield Properties v. Nancy Duffy, et al UDFS1406978 ____________________________

The undersigned is counsel for petitioner/defendant at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

On the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:

WRIT PETITION+EXHIBITS re: Overruled Demurrer & Motions in F-9 on Nov 10, 2014

[x] (By Personal Delivery) on 11/14/14 to the parties below as follows:

APPELLATE DIVISION:: Original+4 copies + Exhibits (Volume 1 of 1) 220 pages 247 W. Third St., San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063 RESPONDENT COURT: Hon. Kyle Brodie in Fontana Division [F2 or F9] 17780 Arrow Blvd, Fontana, CA 92335 (brief only) [ ] (By Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4). I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.

[x] (By Electronic) email address below (by agreement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

to: rwilliamson@hartkinglaw.com and regan@hartkinglaw.com

[x] (By Mail) §1013a, §2015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:

Robert Williamson, Hart|King 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900

Santa Ana, CA 92707 714-432-8700 fax 714-546-7457

I am familiar with mail collection in San Bernardino. I deposited the envelope in the mail at San Bernardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

[x] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true.

Executed in San Bernardino CA on November 14, 2014

- %.

F I L E D SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIF COURT OF CALlFORNlA

OF SAN BERNARDINO

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO BAN BERNAROINO DISTRICT

APPELLATE DIVISION DEC 1 0 21114 247 W. Third St., San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063

(909) 521-3574 ~ y & ~ ~ CAROLYN OLBERG.

CASE NO. ClVDS 1417078 1 UDFS 1406978 (Fontana) DATE: December 10,2014

BONNIE SHIPLEY, Petitioner,

I I ORDER I SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO,

Defendant and Appellant. -- - - - - - i - -- --- -- -- - - - - - -

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

The petition for a writ of mandate and for a stay of the action is denied.

The Hon. Michael A. Knish and the Hon. Elia V. Pirozzi concur.

I certify that copies of the above Order were mailed to counsel of record as indicated on

Court Clerk

Superior Court State of California Countp of B a n Bernarbino

Appellate Division DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1 1 Writ # CIVDS1417078

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ) Trial Court# UDFS1406978

The undersigned hereby declares: I am a citizen of the United States of America, over the age of eighteen years, a resident of the above-named State, and not a party to nor interested in the proceedings named in the title of the annexed document. I am a Deputy Appellate C l e I k ~ u n & l a m t e a ~ r ~ l r t b g B b l s K 1 E ? s s g - & f o r & W & - processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. Correspondence would be deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. On the date of mailing shown below, I placed'for collection and mailing following ordinary business practices, at the request and under the direction of the Superior Court in and for the State of California and County above-named, whose office is at the Courthouse, San Bernardino, California, a sealed envelope which contained a true copy of each annexed document, and which envelope was addressed to the addressee, as follows:

NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON 950 ROBLE LANE SANTA BARBARA, CA 93103

HART KING & COLDREN 4 HUTTON CENTRE DRIVE, STE 900 SANTA ANA, CA 92707

FONTANA COURTHOUSE

Date and Place of Mailing: December 11, 2014: San Bernardino, California.

Document_Mailed: ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE -

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 11, 2014, at San Bernardino, California:

,> c- SM%, Deputy Clerk

CAROLYN SOLEERG I

COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH DISTRICT

DIVISION'TWO

ORDER

E062546 BONNIE SHIPLEY, Petitioner.

(Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1417078)

The County of San Bernardino THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY,

Respondeht;

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, Real Party in Interest.

THE COURT

The petition for writ of mandate and request for immediate stay are DENIED.

- HBLENHORSB Acting P. J.

cc: See attached list

COPY

- - ~ ~ ~ S ~ i i . - C 7 i S ~ O 6 2 5 4 0 ' -

Bonnie Shipley v. The Superior Court; Stubblefield Properties

Superior Court Clerk San Bemardino County 247 West Third Street San Bernardino, CA 92415

J Nancy Duffy McCarron Law Office of Nancy Duffy McCarron 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara. CA 93 103

- - Robert G. Williamson HartKing 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, CA 92707

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two - No. E062546

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

En Banc FILED

JAN 2 8 2015 BONNIE SHIPLEY, Petitioner,

' r a n k A. McOi~ire Clerk - . - v. - -

SUPERIOR COURT OF S AN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent;

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, Real Party in Interest.

The petition for review and application for stay are denied.

Chief Justice

EXHIBIT 15

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MOTION RE: FOR AN ORDER TO COMPEL NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON AND BONNIESHIPLEY TO APPEAR, TESTIFY FILED BY PLAINTIFF STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, ACALIFORNIA 12/19/2014 ­ 8:00 AM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL ­ APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY SHIPLEY PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT. ­ PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 10:36 THE COURT HAS REVIEWED THE MOTION TO COMPEL AND OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . PLAINTIFF REQUESTING AN ORDER FOR DEFENDANTS TO APPEAR FOR A DEPOSITION. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT . STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA'S MOTION TO COMPEL IS GRANTED. AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS. THIS COURT WILL NOT GRANT ANY SANCTIONS. ­ DEPOSITION DATES ARE AS FOLLOWS: BONNIE SHIPLEY SET FOR 01/05/15 AT 9:30AM IN ORANGE COUNTY. NANCY DUFFY SET FOR 01/06/15 AT 9:30AM IN SANTA BARBARA COUNTY. 11:15 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. ACTION ­ COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

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MOTION RE: SET ASIDE DEFAULT IMPROPERLY TAKEN BY WITHOUT COMPLYINGFILED BY DEFENDANT NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY 12/31/2014 ­ 8:00 AM DEPT. F7A

VICTOR ROY STULL, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL ­ APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT. ­ PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 09:07 THE COURT HAS READ THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SETASIDE DEFAULT. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT . ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT IS DENIED. 09:29 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. ACTION ­ COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

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MOTION RE: TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION FILED BY DEFENDANT NANCY B DUFFY,BONNIE SHIPLEY 12/31/2014 ­ 8:00 AM DEPT. F7A

MATTER HEARD AND RECORDED IN DEPT F3 ­ VICTOR ROY STULL, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL ­ APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT. ­ PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 09:07 THIS COURT HAS READ MOTIONS TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION AND OPPOSITION TO MOTION. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT . NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION IS DENIED. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE. 09:29 ­ 09:34 COURT RECALLS MATTER TO INQUIRY ABOUT MOTION TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION. ­ THE COURT STATES FOR THE RECORD THAT THIS MOTION HAS ALREADY BEEN HEARD, RULEDUPON AND DENIED. THAT IS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR TODAYS RULING BY THE COURT. 09:38 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. ACTION ­ COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

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MOTION RE: TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE WITH SEPARATE STATEMENT FILEDBY DEFENDANT NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY 12/31/2014 ­ 8:30 AM DEPT. F7A

VICTOR ROY STULL, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL ­ APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT. ­ PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 09:07 ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT . THE COURT HAS READ THE MOTION TO COMPEL AND OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL. ­ COURT TENTATIVE IS TO GRANT 70.12 ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT . NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION TO COMPEL AS TO 70.12 IS GRANTED. PLAINTIFF TO RESPOND WITHIN 5 DAYS ­ NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION TO COMPEL AS TO 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.6 IS DENIED. ­ ARGUMENT AS TO 71.5 & 71.5: ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT . ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION TO COMPEL AS TO 71.4 & 71.5 IS DENIED. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE. 09:29 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. ACTION ­ COMPLETE

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MOTION RE: FOR AN ORDER TO COMPEL INSPECTION; REQUEST FOR MONETARYSANCTIONS FILED BY PLAINTIFF STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA 01/29/2015 ­ 8:00 AM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL BAILIFF: A. VELA ­ APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT. ­ PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 10:37 THE COURT HAS READ THE NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO COMPELINSPECTION AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT . STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA'S MOTION FOR INSPECTIONS IS GRANTED. THIS COURT WILL ALLOW INSPECTION OF INSIDE OF MOBILE HOME. THE COURT WILL NOT ALLOWANY OPENING OF ANY CLOSED CONTAINERS (DOORS, CABINETS, DRAWERS, ETC..) INSPECTION LIMITEDTO FURNISHINGS AND LAYOUT, INSPECTION IS LIMITED TO NO MORE THAN 15 MINUTES. ­ BALANCE OF REQUEST IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ­ STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS IS DENIED. ­ PARTIES TO PREPARE ORDER AND SUBMIT TO COURT FOR SIGNATURE. ­ NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION FOR STAY TO FILE WRIT IS DENIED.

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Case UDFS1406978 ­ STUBBLEFIELD ­VS­ DUFFY Action: (Choose)

MOTION RE: TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FILED BYDEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY 01/29/2015 ­ 8:00 AM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL BAILIFF: A. VELA ­ APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT. ­ PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 10:21 THE COURT HAS READ THE REPLY MOTION TO DISMISS ACTION FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION ORTRANSFER. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT . ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION TO TRANSFER IS DENIED. 10:37 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. ACTION ­ COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END === === MINUTE ORDER END === === MINUTE ORDER END ===

3/15/2015 UDFS1406978 Minute Orders ­ San Bernardino Main

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Case UDFS1406978 ­ STUBBLEFIELD ­VS­ DUFFY Action: (Choose)

MOTION RE: FOR AN ORDER TO COMPEL TIMOTHY MCCARRON TO APPEAR, TESTIFYAT DEPO FILED BY PLAINTIFF STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA 01/29/2015 ­ 8:00 AM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL BAILIFF: A. VELA ­ APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT. ­ PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 11:16 THE COURT HAS READ THE NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO COMPEL TIMOTHYMCCARRON TO APPEAR, TESTIFY AT DEPOSITION AND OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT . ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . MATTER TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION. ­ COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT INFORMS COURT THAT THERE ARE 3 MOTIONS SET FOR 02/03/15.COURT INFORMS PARTIES THAT HE WILL REVIEW THE MOTIONS ASAP. THE COURT MAY NEED TO RESCHEDULE THEMOTIONS TO ANOTHER DAY. ­ PARTIES WILL BE INFORMED IF THE DATE FOR THE MOTION WILL BE RESCHEDULED. ­ COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT REQUESTING TELEPHONIC APPEARANCE. ­ DISCUSSION HELD ON THE RECORD REGARDING TELEPHONIC APPEARANCE. ­

3/15/2015 UDFS1406978 Minute Orders ­ San Bernardino Main

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NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION FOR TELEPHONIC APPEARANCE IS DENIED. DENIAL BASED ON THIS COURTROOM NOT BEING PROPERLY SET UP FOR TELEPHONICAPPEARANCES AND ABILITY TO

HAVE A GOOD RECORD. 11:43 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. ACTION ­ COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END === === MINUTE ORDER END ===

1 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

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Nancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley and Defendant Nancy McCarron, In Pro Per and for Non-Party Timothy McCarron (special appearance only)

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California general partnership, dba Mountain Shadows Mobilehome Community Plaintiff, v. Nancy B. Duffy, aka Nancy McCarron aka Nancy Duffy-McCarron, aka Nancy B. Duffy McCarron, Bonnie Shipley, and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants action filed:10-3-14; UDDS1204130 filed 8/2/12 appeals ACIAS1200111(2012) & 140026 (2014) CIVDS 1208367, 1210511, 1302013, 1403933 (related cases)

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Case No. UDFS1406978

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

COMPEL TIM MCCARRON TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY AND FOR $3,150 IN SANCTIONS

with Supporting Declarations of Nancy McCarron, Sharon McDaniel (owner, McDaniel Court Reporting) & Dianna Peirson, Manager, Office Suites Building at 206 E. Victoria St, Santa Barbara (where depo was set)

DATE: January 29, 2015 (Limited Civil Case) TIME: 8:00 a.m. DEPT: F7 Judge Kyle Brodie PLACE: 17780 Arrow Blvd, Fontana CA 92335

I. DEPOSITION NOTICES SERVED ON MCCARRONS WERE FRAUDULENT

Defendants object to unethical fraud on the court, fraud on the court reporter, fraud on the building

manager at 206 E. Victoria Ave., Santa Barbara, fraud on a process server, and fraud on McCarrons.

The court must sanction Ryan Egan, Robert Williamson, and John Pentecost [the HART/KING firm]

for the most blatant abuse of process this attorney has ever encountered in 20 years of practicing law.

The firm never called McDaniel Court Reporters to schedule two McCarron depos for 12/11/14.

[Exh 1-McDaniel declaration, 1:26]. Two Notices ordered McCarrons to appear at 206 E. Victoria Ave.,

Santa Barbara on 12/11/14 (Nancy-9:30 am) and (Tim-1:30 pm) despite the fact that McDaniel Court

Reporters have not occupied space since October. [Exh 1-McDaniel decl, 2:1]+[Exh. 2- Dianna Peirson

decl., 1:26]. The depo notices were a total fraud. They were served by hand to harass McCarrons at

their home and only to generate this motion for sanctions to harass. [Exh.3-Nancy McCarron Decl.,A,B]

2 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

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Suspecting fraud from the onset, Nancy McCarron called Sharon McDaniel on December 10, 2014 to

inquire about the scheduling. McDaniel told McCarron they had not occupied their office space at 206

E. Victoria since October and had relocated to 21 E. Carrillo St. downtown. McDaniel told McCarron

that no one from the HART|KING firm called to schedule any depositions. [Exh. 1, McDaniel decl.1:26]

McCarrons appeared for the depositions on 12/11/14. No attorney from HART|KING was present & no

attorney from HART\KING notified McCarrons depositions were never actually scheduled. This was

because the attorneys knew they had never actually scheduled any depositions. The building manager

directed McCarrons to drive over to 21 E. Carrillo St. downtown, and verified appearance by signing the

top of a copy of the front page of Nancy McCarron’s deposition notice. [Exh. 2 -PEIRSON decl., 2:1]

Evidence proves malicious intent to harass & abuse McCarrons by serving two fraudulent depo notices.

The court has a duty to report this unethical conduct to the California State Bar. McCarron has

complained to the court on several occasions about this firm’s continued violation of CCP §128.7(a)

by using a cut and pasted “signature block” on the bottom of every pleading with three attorney names

[Williamson, Egan, and Pentecost] and then having someone insert squirrely circles on a signature line,

rendering it impossible to discern which attorney is liable for signing if the pleading is held to be fraud.

The following appeared on the last page of the fraudulent deposition notices served on the McCarrons.

who is liable for intentional fraud?

When McCarron appears she must petition the court to ask Mr. Williamson who signed the pleading.

These three attorneys conspire to insulate the firm from sanctions for fraudulent and frivolous pleadings.

The three attorneys violate CCP §128.7 which requires the composing attorney to sign his name only.

To discourage continued violations the court must sanction all attorneys who appear on the notice.

Sanctioning all three attorneys for these blatant and continuous violations of CCP §128.7 by using the

deceptive signature box may result in discontinuance of at least this facet of blatant deceptive conduct.

A deposition is a proceeding commanded under the power of a court. Attorneys are officers of the court.

Lay persons are not authorized to issue subpoenas to preclude abuse the court expects from lay persons.

Judicial Council assumes attorneys will not abuse powers delegated to issue subpoenas & depo notices.

These continued violations are an unethical breach of the powers delegated to them by Judicial Council.

3 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

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Secondly, the firm continues to violate CRC, Rule 1.21 by failing to provide a signed Proof of Service.

The following excerpt demonstrates a violation. Anyone can cut & paste a stamp which fails to comply.

violation 1.21[c]

Proof of service of notice must be made by affidavit. Harris v Minnesota Invest. Co. (1928) 89 CA 396

Court must deny relief until plaintiff complies with same Rules enforced vigorously against defendants!

EQUITY DEMANDS SAME RULES MUST BE EQUALLY ENFORCED TO BOTH PARTIES.

On 12/31/14 Judge Victor Stull adopted plaintiff’s argument that plaintiff was not required to file a

substantive opposition to Shipley’s motion finding “insufficient time was given” Under CRC 3.1300.

12/31/14 transc. P.10

Judge Stull denied relief to defendants instructing them to re-file their motion complying with Rules.

COURT MUST NOW ENFORCE THE SAME RULES OF COURT AGAINST PLAINTIFF!

It is patently unfair, inequitable, and shows clear bias if a court vigorously enforces Rules of court

against one party while “looking the other way” and continuing to excuse the favored party’s violations.

THIS IS A COURT OF LAW AND EQUITY. RULES MUST BE APPLIED EQUALLY TO ALL.

P&A below provides indisputable evidence of fraud on the court, fatal procedural deficiencies,

violations of Rule of Court & Codes of Procedure. Motion clearly misled the court on spousal privilege.

Stare Decisis requires denial, notwithstanding fatal procedural deficiencies and court rule violations.

Auto Equity v. Superior Court (1963) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455-456. (court must apply Stare Decisis)

4 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

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II. The Motion Is Invalid as It Failed to State Statutory Grounds In the Notice of Motion

Notwithstanding all the substantive deficiencies the court must deny plaintiff’s motion for failure

to comply with CCP §1010 governing Notices of Motion, which “must state when, and the grounds

upon which it will be made, and the papers, if any, upon which it is to be based. It is not optional;

it uses the word must---not may. Plaintiff was required to state the statutory basis for relief—not jargon.

This court lacks jurisdiction to grant a motion not filed in conformity with mandatory statutes, especially

where sanctions are sought. This violates minimum due process which must be afforded all litigants.

HART|KING advertises representing clients for 30 years, and is fully aware of CCP §1010 mandates.

The purpose of CCP §1010 is to enable party served with notice to prepare defense to proposed motion.

Alvak Enterprises v Phillips (1959) 167 CA2d 69. Court may consider only grounds stated in the notice

Hernandez v National Dairy Products (1954) 126 CA2d 490. A notice of motion which fails to state the

grounds thereof is defective. Keown v Trudo (1925) 71 CA 155; Bonfield v Bonfield (1925) 71 CA 705;

Hecq v Conner (1928) 203 C 504. No statute is cited in the Notice which authorizes this court to

compel Tim McCarron’s appearance and testimony, or to award sanctions against him and his attorney.

This is because there is no statutory basis for the court to grant such relief in the body of the motion.

III. Plaintiff Failed To Cite Statutory Authority to Bring the Motion against a Non-Party

As argued above plaintiff failed to recite any statute authorizing the relief sought in his CAPTION,

violating CCP §1010 (must recite authorizing code in caption & notice). Plaintiff failed to cure the fatal

deficiency by even citing a statute inside the body of the motion authorizing sanctions against non-party.

Page 3 of motion (top) is the only reference to any statute applying to a non-party reciting as follows:

“If a non-party disobeys a deposition subpoena, the subpoenaing party may seek a court order compelling the nonparty to comply with the subpoena. (Code of Civ. Proc.§1987.1.”

CCP §1987.1 authorizes a party, witness, consumer or employee to move for a protective order, reciting:

CCP §1987.1 Order to quash, modify or limit subpoena

(a) If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

5 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

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Where a non-party does not appear for deposition after subpoena under CCP §1987, the remedy

immediately follows the statute authorizing the non-party subpoena; i.e. CCP §1991 reciting:

CCP §1991. Punishment of disobedient witness for contempt

Disobedience to a subpoena, or a refusal to be sworn, or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when required, may be punished as a contempt by the court issuing the subpoena. When the subpoena, in any such case, requires the attendance of the witness before an officer or commissioner out of court, it is the duty of the officer or commissioner to report any disobedience or refusal to be sworn or to answer a question or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when required, to the court issuing the subpoena. The witness shall not be punished for any refusal to be sworn or to answer a question or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition, unless, after a hearing upon notice, the court orders the witness to be sworn, or to so answer or subscribe and then only for disobedience to the order.

As shown by the attached declarations of Sharon McDaniel, Dianna Peirson, and Nancy McCarron

Tim McCarron appeared at the time and place recited on the subpoena and depo notice served on him;

no attorney or agent of plaintiff appeared at the scheduled time and place; no one ever notified the

McCarrons that plaintiff never actually scheduled any deposition at the recited time and place to appear.

This fraud proves the purported setting of a deposition was a pretext; plaintiff never intended to appear.

It was served only to harass, vex and annoy the McCarrons and to cause them hardship and annoyance.

Plaintiff must be sanctioned for his fraud on the court, court reporter, process server and the McCarrons.

Under CCP §2025.430 the court must sanction plaintiff for failure to appear at the noticed deposition:

If the party giving notice of a deposition fails to attend or proceed with it, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against that party, or the attorney for that party, or both, and in favor of any party attending in person or by attorney, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

Tactics violate CCP §2023.010 (a)-(c) and are a discovery abuse warranting sanctions. CCP §2023.030.

This firm has engaged in abusive, scorched-earth litigation tactics against the McCarrons since 2010.

At some point, this court must finally “get it” and realize “plantation owner” Stubblefield uses the courts

as a whip against any serf residing on the Mountain Shadows plantation who challenges his authority.

Once a serf challenges the dictator he proceeds to filch his/her mobilehome & personal property through

sham evictions in UD court. Once filched the home is added to Stubblefield’s portfolio of rental units

advertised on billboards strategically placed right outside of the Mountain Shadows serfdom, advertising

homes at $845/month--a tenant bargain---and a windfall to Stubblefield who acquired the unit for free.

6 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

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IV. Failure to Comply with CRC 3.1346 (service-non-party deponent) is Fatal to Motion

Plaintiff was required to serve Motion to Compel & Sanctions on a non-party by personal delivery.

The Proof of Service on this motion recites it was served by overnight delivery on attorney McCarron

who represents defendant Shipley and herself in pro per. The papers were not delivered by personal

delivery to Tim McCarron as required by CRC 3.1346. This failure is fatal to plaintiff’s motion.

V. Objections to the Deposition Were Warranted Under Stare Decisis and Statutes

Plaintiff’s argument objections were without merit is a blatant misrepresentation of the facts and law.

First, although plaintiff notes a proof of service indicates Tim McCarron was personally served 12/6/14,

that event occurred only after plaintiff tried to first serve notice by overnight mail, dumping it into the

same envelope used to serve Notice of Deposition of Nancy McCarron on Thursday, December 3, 2014.

below is excerpt from Exh. 4, p. 1 of this motion.

served subpoena by mail

McCarron served objections to plaintiff’s failure to personally serve Tim McCarron. In a knee-jerk

reaction, plaintiff sent a process server up to our home to deliver the subpoena by hand to Mr. McCarron

This proves plaintiff knew the service by mail to a non-party failed to comply with CCP §1987 service.

Accordingly, McCarron’s objection was appropriate and warranted as the service was clearly defective.

Although this deficiency was cured by the personal delivery on 12/6/14, plaintiff failed to cure its

defective service of this Motion for Sanctions under CRC 3.1346. This court is without jurisdiction here.

7 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

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VI. Evidence Code §970 Precludes Compelling Tim McCarron to Testify Against Party Spouse

Plaintiff has engaged in a history of misrepresenting the law and facts to 4 judges in this court.

Wilfred Schneider, Donald Alvarez, Michael Sachs, Appellate Judges, and now this court in Dept. 7.

These misrepresentations of fact and law resulted in their rulings being reversed on appeals or writs.

McCarron cautions this court not to be led down the same primrose path of reversible error by trickery.

Plaintiff misrepresented the law on the spousal privilege not to testify as a witness against a spouse.

EC §970 bars testimony against a spouse and EC §971 bars calling as a witness against a spouse/party.

Evidence Code §970. Privilege not to testify against spouse Except as otherwise provided by statute, a married person has a privilege not to testify against his spouse in any proceeding.

Evidence Code §971. Privilege not to be called as a witness against spouse Except as otherwise provided by statute, a married person whose spouse is a party to a proceeding has a privilege not to be called as a witness by an adverse party to that proceeding without the prior express consent of the spouse having the privilege under this section unless the party calling the spouse does so in good faith without knowledge of the marital relationship.

There are a few statutory exceptions enumerated at EC §972 – none of which apply in this proceeding.

There are only 2 instances where the privilege can be waived, expressly enumerated at EC §973:

Evidence Code §973. Waiver of privilege (a) Unless erroneously compelled to do so, a married person who testifies in a proceeding to which his spouse is a party, or who testifies against his spouse in any proceeding, does not have a privilege under this article in the proceeding in which such testimony is given. (b) There is no privilege under this article in a civil proceeding brought or defended by a married person for the immediate benefit of his spouse or of himself and his spouse.

Plaintiff knows that waiver does not apply on these facts as explained in cases annotated in EC§973.

Plaintiff misrepresents the facts and knows waiver cases hold exactly the opposite of its arguments.

Let’s get the facts straight. The mobilehome is separate property as acquired 1/5/05---6.5 years before

marriage on 9/28/11. (McCarron will bring her marriage certificate for in camera review to prove this)

Family Code §770. Separate property of married person (a) Separate property of a married person includes all of the following: (1) All property owned by the person before marriage. (2) All property acquired by the person after marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. (3) The rents, issues, and profits of the property described in this section. (b) A married person may, without the consent of the person's spouse, convey the person's separate property.

8 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

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As part of Stubblefield’s racketeering enterprise, to facilitate filching mobile homes from elderly and

disabled owners, who cannot afford a lawyer to save their home, racketeer Robert Williamson created a

52-page set of onerous, park-busting “Community Rules” to impose upon the unsuspecting victims to

facilitate filching their homes via sham evictions for purported “rule violations. “ This caused market

values of mobile homes in the Mountain Shadows plantation serfdom to drop from $100,000 to ZERO.

Any rent formerly collected from Bonnie Shipley for her shared use of the mobile home went

directly to Stubblefield by way of Nancy McCarron’s monthly rent paid to Stubblefield each month.

Shipley’s portion of rent did not even come close to creating a positive cash flow on the property.

McCarron would have to collect $80,000 in rent from Shipley, and pay nothing to Stubblefield to even

recover her initial $80,000 investment. Either counsel Egan, Williamson or Pentecost (whichever

fraudster composed this bogus motion), blatantly defrauded this court by reciting “Duffy-McCarron also

alleges to share the mobile home with her husband Timothy.” Any cites to where McCarron alleges

this are conspicuous by their absence! All 3 HART/KING racketeers continue to defraud this court by

peppering their arguments with purported “facts” which are always boldfaced lies by the attorneys.

[BAJI 1.02 Statements of Counsel are not Evidence] Plaintiff argues that Diepenbrock v. Brown (2012) 208 CA. 4th 743 recites there are “opposing views”

on whether waiver is triggered. Not true. Diepenbrock affirmed the trial court’s application of privilege.

The only issued appealed was sanctions awarded against deposing party’s counsel, which were reversed.

Plaintiff artfully omitted Duggan v. Supr Court (1981) 127 CA3d. 267 which McCarron cited in M&C.

Duggan is on all fours with this case. Duggan prosecuted an action to dissolve a partnership and force

accounting of partnership assets. Defendant partners noticed Duggan’s wife’s deposition. A trial court

ordered her to testify, finding a community property interest in any recovery her husband might obtain.

Duggan filed a Writ Petition. The court reversed the trial court’s order compelling her deposition:

“The question presented is whether the action … is prosecuted for the "immediate benefit" of petitioner's spouse… In granting the motion, respondent court accepted the argument of real parties that the exception contained in section 973, subdivision (b), applied…"There is no privilege under this article in a civil proceeding brought or defended by a married person for the immediate benefit of his spouse or of himself and his spouse." In light of the foregoing, we respond to the question whether a spouse who is not named as a party to the action, nor as a signatory to the partnership agreement at issue, nor as record holder of any of the real property at issue, is a person for whose immediate benefit the action was brought, solely by virtue of a potential community property interest in any recovery which petitioner might obtain. Duggan @ 269-270

9 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

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Duggan cited several cases, including two from the Supreme Court, defining “immediate benefit”: These cases appear to limit the application of "immediate benefit" to persons who are represented by a nominal plaintiff or defendant (as where a corporation serves as the alter ego of its sole shareholder) or who themselves have the right to act or defend against the adverse party on the issues involved. Otherwise, the right to a portion of the recovery is not immediate and direct

(3) The Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of existing judicial decisions construing words in analogous statutes and to have enacted a new statute in light thereof. …cites… In this case, petitioner was a partner in a real estate venture. We conclude that, under the authority heretofore set forth, petitioner's spouse has no present, immediate, or direct interest in the property constituting the partnership assets. Any claim to a community property interest in the partnership would be against petitioner rather than real parties, and under the showing made here, the action is not being prosecuted for the immediate benefit of the person whose deposition is sought.

Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue to prevent respondent superior court from enforcing its order compelling the deposition of petitioner's spouse. Duggan @ 272

Plaintiff omitted Duggan because the court must apply Duggan under Stare Decisis. Auto Equity Sales,

supra @455. Diepenbrock affirmed marital privilege. Legislative comments to EC §970 explain why:

“The rationale of the privilege provided by Section 970 not to testify against one's spouse is that such testimony would seriously disturb or disrupt the marital relationship. Society stands to lose more from such disruption than it stands to gain from the testimony which would be available if the privilege did not exist. The privilege is based in part on a previous recommendation and study of the California Law Revision Commission. See 1 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Rep., Rec. & Studies, Recommendation and Study Relating to the Marital "For and Against" Testimonial Privilege at F-1 (1957).”

Plaintiff argued Diepenbrock noted conflicting authorities as to “immediate benefit”citing only half of

a sentence from the Rutter Guide while artfully omitting the other half. Diepenbrock noted conflicts in

“immediate benefit” but only where community property is at stake, such as in a personal injury action.

“Personal injury damages recoveries are generally community property if the cause of action arose during marriage (Fam.C. 780); thus, in a married person's suit to recover damages for personal injuries sustained during marriage, the noninjured spouse has a direct interest in the outcome and the privilege is waived.'' (Guide, 8:2344, p. 8E-109)

There is only a conflict where a potential community property interest in a monetary award is at stake.

Here, there is no community property interest. Plaintiff admits the home is a separate property asset.

Any rent Shipley pays is her prorated portion of rent owed to Stubblefield to rent the space at #333.

10 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

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Even if Shipley’s rent were income it is separate property. FC §770 (a). Plaintiff’s argument Duffy

commingles funds deposited to her separate bank account is preposterous. Plaintiff knows Duffy

testified that she does not commingle funds with her husband.

rough draft of Duffy deposition 1-6-15

Asserting Duffy defends eviction for Tim McCarron’s immediate benefit to use a pool is preposterous.

Tim McCarron went in the pool once in 2012 (3 years ago) while Duffy was napping. Stubblefield’s

agent harassed him there so he never returned. There is no immediate benefit to being harassed.

VIII. Sanctions Against McCarrons are Unwarranted/Unuthorized; Court Must Sanction Plaintiff

As explained above, under CRC 3.145 plaintiff was required to serve any motion to sanction Tim

McCarron, or compel his appearance at a deposition, by personal service. Mailing a copy to Shipley’s

attorney fails to comply with CRC 3.145. An attorney and client may not be sanctioned for invoking a

statutory privilege. In Doe v. U.S. Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 CA.4th 1424, 1434 the court held that

“substantial justification” means a justification “well grounded in both law and fact.” (See Union Mut.

Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 1, 15. A party seeking discovery sanctions “must

demonstrate that the opposing party's objections were insubstantial, were interposed for purposes of

delay or harassment, or were otherwise unreasonable.” Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Proc.

Before Trial, supra, 8:846, p. 8E-152 (rev. #1, 2012). McCarrons were substantially justified to object

to a deposition prohibited by Evid. Code §970 & §971, and where waiver under §973(b) does not apply

as there is no community property interest in defending a sham eviction on a separate property asset.

CONCLUSION

The court should sanction plaintiffs attorney for serving a fraudulent "Notice of Deposition" set at

a non-existent location---where the attorney never scheduled depositions with the court reporter, and fo

filing a sham motion. This is clearly an abuse of discovery under CCP 52023.030. Secondly, plaintiff

failed to comply with CRC 3.145 and failed to file a motion under the proper Code of Civil Procedure.

(see declarations of Court Reporter Sharon McDaniel, Owner Dianna Peirson, and Nancy McCarron.)

The court should not tolerate this kind of unethical lawyer conduct, regardless of the merits involved.

Attorney McCarron spent 10 hours researching, obtaining witness declarations in defense of the

sham sanction motion, composing opposition & anticipates another 10 hours traveling to San Bernardir

(round trip) to appear at a hearing on this sham motion. McCarron's rate is $350/hour---the same rate

HARTKING charges Stubblefield for Mr. Williamson's attorney hours. Total sanction request is for

$7,000.00 to defend this fiivolous motion brought without substantial justification.

The court should sanction the firm for using a fraudulent signature stamv with swirled circles to

avoid complying with CCP 5128.7, and for serving a fraudulent Subpoena and Notice of Deposition,

under the authority of court, and for misrepresenting the true facts in presenting this motion to the coun

DECLARATION OF NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON

I, NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON declare:

1. I am attorney for Bonnie Shipley, Nancy McCarron, in pro per, specially appearing for Tim McCarrc

2. I make these statements based on personal knowledge and will testify to them if called as a witness.

3. All of factual statements made in above arguments' are based on my personal knowledge and are trut

4. I spent I0 hours researching, obtaining witness declarations in defense of the sham sanction motion,

composing opposition & anticipates another 10 hours traveling to San Bemardino (round trip) to app

at a hearing on this sham motion. McCarron's rate is $350/hour---the same rate HARnKING charg

Stubblefield for Mr. Williamson's attorney hours. Total sanction request is for $7,000.00 to defend

this fiivolous motion brought without substantial justification only to harass, vex & annoy McCarro~

5. The above excerpt from my deposition taken on 1/6/15 represents my testimony recited on that day.

I declare statements are true under penalty of perjury & California law. Executed in Santa Barbara, CA

DATED: 1/28/201 5

and as Attorney for Tim McCarron (special appearance

I I Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

EXHIBIT LIST

Declaration of Sharon McDaniel 12/15/14 + Exh A [Notice of McCarron Deposition - page 11

Declaration of Dianna Peirson 12/15/14 + Exh. A [Notes on P.l of McCarron deposition Notice]

Declaration of Nancy McCarron 12/16/14

Exh. A [Nancy McCarron depo notice] Exh. B [ T i McCarron subpoena and depo notice)

Exh. C [US Postal Confirmation of Personal Deliver of Objections on 12/8/14 at 8:3 1 pm]

Exh. D [fax confirmation showing objections were FAXED to 714-546-7457 on 12/5/14

Nancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley and Defendant Nancy McCarron, In Pro Per and for Non-Party Timothy McCarron (special appearance only)

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a 1 case NO. UDFS1406978 California general partnership, dba Mountain ) Shadows Mobilehome Communitv ! DECLARATION OF SHARON MCDANIEL

I I plaidtiff, J

V ) CO-OWNER-MCDANIEL COURT REPORTING

. . N~~~ B. ~ ~ f f y , aka N~~~ M ~ c ~ ~ ~ aka j Filed with Opposition to Motion for Order To Compel Nancy Duffy-McCmon, aka Nancy B. Duffy ) Nancy Duffy McCarron to appear for Deposition and McCmn. Bonnie Shivlev. and Does 1 1 Monetary Sanctions for $1,960.00 I I through 10, inclusive, '

Defendants 5 ) DATE: December 19,2014 (Limited Civil Case) - - - -. . .-

action likd:lO-3-11; UDDSl204130 filed 8/2/12 1 TIME: 8:00 a.m. DEPT: r 7 Judge Kyle Bmdie appeals ACIAS120011 l(2012) & 140026 (2014) ) CIVDS 1208367,1210511,1302013,1403933 , PLACE: 17780 Arrow Blvd, Fontana CA 92335

I, SHARON MCDANIEL, declare the following:

1. I am over 18, not a party, do not know any party, and base my statements on personal knowledge.

2. I am co-owner of McDaniel Court Reporting, together with my husband Kenneth McDaniel.

3. I have never scheduled a deposition, or been involyed in one, with Nancy or Timothy McCarron.

4. On December 10; 2014 I received a call from Nancy Duffy McCarron asking if we had scheduled a

court reporter to appear at 206 E. Victoria Avenue, in Santa Barbara on December 1 l,20 14 for the

noticed deposition of Nancy McCarron at 9:30 am and then Timothy McCarron at 1:30 pm that day

I told her we hadn't received any job request from the HARTKING Firm for December 11,2014.

I told Mrs. McCarron the last request we received with that name was from "Hart, King, Coldren"

and it was a long time ago. Mrs. McCarron said the firm split up last year and the name on her

Deposition Notice was "HARTKING," as shown on Notice of Deposition attached as Exhibit A.

5. Nancy Warron told me thoir notices included the 206 E. Victoria Street, Santa Barbara address

which we have not occupied since October. I told her w e moved our Santa B a r h a satellite office

to 21 W. Camllo St., but no reporter was scheduledto appear at either address December 11,2014.

I declare the above staternedts to bc true under penalty ofperjlrry and the laws of California

Executed in San Luis Obispo, Californiaon the date entered below to thc icfi of my signature.

Y ,*TED: 12 -IS-/+ --

CO-OWNER OF M C D m COURT REPOR'IWG

1

DECLARATION OF SHARON MCDANIEL, CO-OWNER OF MCDANl@L COtlRTREPORTTNG

I SUPERIOR COURT OF TIIE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

couNn OF SAN BERNARDINO, FONTANA DISTRIC~

6

7

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California eneral atnaship dba MOUNT& SH&OWS MOBILEKOME COMMUNITY, I

Attorneys for Pldotiff STUBBLEFZELD PROPERTIES, a California eneral partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILa,HOME cOMM&ITY

1 -

Plaintiff I vs

ANCY 8. DUFFY akaNANCY DUFFY NANCY MCCARRON ~ k a NANCY

DUFPY-MCCARRON &I NANCY: B. DWFY MCCARRON, BONNIE SHIPLEY, and DOES I thrwgb 10, inclusive,

Case No. UDFS 1406978

Assigned far all purposes to: Judge: Hon. Kyle S. Brodie

DATE: December 11.201 4 TUIE: 9:30 a.m.

Defendants.

. --

2 1 TO ALL PARTIES AND TEEIR ATTORNEY S OF W O R D :

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Code af Civil Procedure 85 2020.010, et.

23 seq., 2025.010, et seq., Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California

24 partnership dba MOUNTAM SHADOWS MOBUEHOLME COMML'MTY, will take the

25 deposition upon oral examination of Defendant NANCY DUFQY MCCARRON aka

26 ANCY B. DUFFl aka NANCY DUFFY aka NANCY MCCARRON aka NANCY . . . 27 WFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B. DUFFY MCCARRON, on December 11, 20l4, at

28 9:30 am, at 1McDanieI Court Reporters, 206 E. Victoria Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101

.

,

1 1&61.O;W~-18074816~.l NOTICE OF DEPOSITf3N

Nancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley and Defendant Nancy McCarron, In Pro Per and for Non-Party Timothy McCarron (special appearance only)

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

STLJBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a ), case NO. UDFS1406978 California general partnership, dba Mountain ) Shadows Mobilehome Community ) DECLARATION OF DIANNA PEIRSON

Plaintiff, ) ) Building Manager for 206 E. Victoria St, Santa Barbarz v. j

N~~~ B. ~ ~ f f y , aka N~~~ M ~ c ~ ~ ~ aka ) Filed with Opposition to Motion for Order To Compel N~~~ ~ ~ f f y - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , aka N~~~ B. ~ ~ f f y ) Nancy Duffy McCarron to appear for Deposition and McCarron, Bonnie Shipley, and Does 1 ) > Monetary Sanctions for $1,960.00 through 10, inclusive, j

~ ~ f ~ ~ d ~ t ~ ) DATE: December 19,2014 (Limited Civil Case)

action fded:10-3-14; UDDS1204130 filed 8/2/12 ) TIME: 8:00 a.m. DEPT: F7 Judge Kyle Brodie ) appeals ACIAS120011 l(2012) & 140026 (2014) )

CNDS 1208367,121051 1,1302013, 1403933 , PLACE: 17780 Arrow Blvd, Fontana CA 92335

I I I, DIANNA PEIRSON, declare the following:

1. I am over 18, not a party, do not know any party, and base my statements on personal knowledge.

2. I am building manager at 206 E. Victoria, Santa Barbara, Califo-mia where I work regularly.

3. I have never known or been involved with either Nancy Duffy McCarron or Timothy McCarron.

4. On December 11; 2014 at 9:20 a.m. a person walked in the front door. I went to greet her there.

She identified herself as Nancy Duffy McCarron and the man with her as her husband, Timothy.

She showed me a deposition notice commanding herappearance at "McDaniel Court Reporters,

206 E. Victoria St. Santa Barbara" on December 11,2014 at 9:30 a.m. I explained that a deposition

could not have been scheduled as McDaniel Court Reporting had moved their offices last October.

I showed her the room McDaniel Court Reporters had used for depositions, which is now empty.

I told her their office had relocated to 21 E. Carrillo St, located a few blocks away down the street.

II 1 DECLARATION OF DIANNA PEIRSON, BUILDING MANAGER FOR 206 E. Victoria St., Santa Barbara, CA

5. I wrote and signed the notations appearing on the top of Mrs. McCarron's deposition notice, whicl

is attached as Exhibit A. I gave Mrs. McCanon my business card with contact information on it.

6. Mrs. McCarron emailed a copy of the notes I had written nn the top of her notice (Exhibit A) with

a declaration for me to sign and return m her concerning what happened on 1211 1/14 at 9:20 am.

I declare the above statements to be true under penalty of pe jury and the laws of California

Executed in Santa Barbara, California on the date entered below to the left of my signahlre.

L

DATED: ,cL@+-a I?& DIANNA PEIRSON, Office Manager 206 E. Victoria Street, Santa ~arb&a, CA

2 DECLARATION OF DJANNA PEIRSON, BUlLDING MANAGER FOR 206 E. Victoria St.. Sanla Barbara CA

- 6 Attorneys for PlAihtiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California genera

- ilprtnership dba MOUNTAIK SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA A@-"

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, FONTANA DISTRICT

STUBRLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a ) Case No. UDFS1406978 California eneral partnership dba MOUNT.& SHADOW'S Assigned for all purposes to: M O B I L E H O ~ , COMMUNTY: Judge: Hon. Kyle S. Brodie

Plaintiff

I

NANCY B. DIJFFY aka NANCY DLWFY aka NANCY MCCARRON aka NANCY DUFFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B. DUFFY MCCARRON, BONNIE SHIPLEY, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

NOTICE OF TAKING OF DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON AND FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AT DEPOSITION

DATE: December I I , 2014 TIME: 9:30 a.m.

21 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: / I 22 (1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure $ 5 2020.010, e~

25 ]/deposition upon oral examination of Defendant NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON aka

23

24

26 NANCY B. DUFFY aka NANCY DUFFY aka N W C Y MCCARRON aka NANCY I( 27 1DljFFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B. D m F Y MCCAIIRON, on December 11,2014, at

seq., 2025.010, et seq., Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California general

parmership dba MOUNTAlN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY, will take the

28 I 9:30-a.m. at McDaniel Court Reporters, 206 E. Victoria Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101

rrt,n aq*.rc-< ?on? .no?c.. I 1 rl i r J

iancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780 50 Roble Lane lanta Barbara, CA 93 103 05-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 ancyduffysb@yahoo.com

~ttorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley nd Defendant Nancy McCarron, In Pro Per nd for Non-Party Timothy McCarron (special appearance only)

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

TUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a ) case NO. UDFS1406978 :alifornia general partnership, dba Mountain ) hadows Mobilehome Community ) DECLARATION OF NANCY MCCARRON

Plaintiff, 1 )

v. 1 rmcy B. ~ ~ f f ~ , aka N~~~ M ~ c ~ ~ ~ aka ) Filed with Opposition to Motion for Order To Compel rmcy D ~ ~ ~ - M ~ c ~ ~ ~ , aka N~~~ B, ~ ~ f i ) Nancy Duffy McCarron to appear for Deposition and IcCarron, Bonnie Shipley, and Does 1 ) Monetary Sanctions for $1,960.00

- - uough 10, inclusive, i

~ ~ f ~ ~ d ~ ~ t ~ ) DATE: December 19,2014 (Limited Civil Case)

C ~ ~ O D fikded:lO-3-14; UDDS1204130 filed 8Ril2 TIME: 8:OO a.m. DEPT: F7 Judge Kyle Brodie ppeals ACIAS120011 l(2012) & 140026 (2014) ) !WDS 1208367, 1210511, 1302013,1403933 PLACE: 17780 Arrow Blvd, Fontana CA 92335

I, NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON, declare the following:

I. I am a defendant and attorney for co-defendant Bonnie Shipley, and for non-party Tim McCarron;

I base the following statements on personal knowledge.

. On December 11, 2014 at 9:20 a.m. I waked into a building at 206 E. Victoria Street in Santa

Barbara with my husband, Tim McCarron because I had received a deposition notice command'ing

me to appear at "McDaniel Court Reporters, 206 E. Victoria St. Santa Barbara" Decl 1,2014-9:30.

A woman who identified herself as Dianna Peirson greeted me upon my arrival at the front desk.

I asked for McDaniel Court Reporters. Mrs. Peirson told me McDaniel Court Reporters had not

occupied office space there since October and had relocated to 21 E. Carrillo Street---downtown.

Before we left she made notations on the first page on my Notice to confum I had timely appeared.

Ms. Peirson later signed a declaration supporting opposition to this motion to confum these facts.

1 DECLARATION OF NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON

3. I also called Sharon McDaniel, co-owner of McDaniel Court Reporters to verify their relocation.

Mrs. McDaniel told me during a telecom that no one fiom HARTIKING law firm had called to engage

a court reporter to appear for any deposition at any time on December 11,2014. She told me the only

similar law firm she had in their attorneyflaw firm database was Hart, King, Coldren in Orange County

I told her the old firm broke up last year and Mr. Coldren is not affiliated with the firm on my notice;

i.e. "HARTIIUNG." Mrs. McDaniel also signed a declaration in support of our opposition to this motic

4. My husband's deposition was also scheduled the same day. (December 1 I , 2014 at 1:30 p.m.)

My husband told me he drove over to 21 E. Carrillo (the new location for McDaniel Court Reporters) a

the time listed in a Subpoena for Deposition he received fiom a process server last week at our home.

My husband told me he left a post-it note on the door at 21 E. Camllo Street to let the staff know that h

had showed up at 1:30 pm (as commanded in his deposition) and found no one inside the locked office.

The front door and office were all glass. If aperson were inside they could be seen through the glass.

5. My deposition notice was not served personally. The notice was delivered by a Fed Ex employee

who regularly leaves packages at my front door on Thursday, Dec 4,2014. I did not see it until eveninl

The fm scheduled it to amve Thursday, to thwart my ability to research complex issues for three

deponents, including a non-party deponent (my husband). Since the depos were only 5 days later, and

the code requires objections to be served 3 "business days" before the appearance objections would ha\

to be served Friday (by personal delivery to the firm) when I did not even see them until Thursday nigh

6. It was nearly physically impossible to research legal issues and prepare objections for 3 deponents.

I was forced to do the best I could and FAXED them to the law office on Friday, Dec 5,2014 and also

delivered them to the post office at 6 p.m. in 2-day mail, which was to deliver them by hand Monday,

December 8,2014 which was 3 business days before the depositions, in addition to being faxed 12/5/12

Attached herein to my declaration is my confirmation that objections were faxed on 12/5/14 and that

hard copies of deposition objections were hand delivered to HartlKing on Monday, 12/8/14 at 8:31 am,

which was 3 davs before commencement of depos. Deliverv bv mail carrier counts as oersonal service

USC v. Weiss (1962) 208 CA2d. 759,769. see also Colyear v. Tobriner (1936) 7 Cal.2d. 735.

[McCarron decl.Exh. C-UPS confirmation shows objections were delivered by camer 12/5/12 8:31 am

see also Exhibit D herein-a fax confmation showing objections were faxed to the firm on 1215114--

I notified Mr. Egan a mammography was scheduled for me in Santa Barbara on 12/10/14 - making it

impossible for me to attend Shipley's deposition even if it were authorized under discovery statutes.

Evidence shows the deposition notices were used as a fraudulent tool to seek monetary sanctions.

2 DECLARATION OF NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON

. F i y , the depositions of Shipley and McCanon include notice to bring certain documents as well

he list of documents is the SAME documents plaintiff demanded at previous depos already delivered.

'he fact that the new requests were nearly identical to the first request for documents in 2012 shows

here are no additional issues not addressed in the fust round of extended depositions in 2012.

. I spent 16 hours working on opposition to this motion. Eight hours were used to benefit myself.

Cight hours were used to benefit my client Bonnie Shipley. My rate is $350 per hour --- the same rate

h. Williamson bills Stubbefield for work on the same case against the identical parties. The total bili

or hours to benefit Shipley is $2,800 (8 hours) which I ask the court to award as sanctions for discover

buse as set forth in Points & Authorities in the opposition to this motion.

. I declare the above statements are true under penally of ptrjury. Exccuted in Santa Barbara on

Iecember 16,201 4.

3 DECLARATION OF NANCY DUFFY NICCARRON

1

2

3

4

5

I1 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA I

John H. Pentecost, Esq., Bar No. 99527 Robert G. Williamson, Jr., Esq., Bar No. 73176 Ryan J. Egan, Esq., Bar No. 281836 HART KING A PRO ti ESSIONAL CORPORATION 4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, California 92707 Telephone: (714) 432-8700 Facsimile: (714) 546-7457

6

7

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California general partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY,

I 1 \

Attorneys fur Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California eneral R partnership dba MOUNTAIN SKADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMU ITY

/I Plaintiff

NANCY B. DUFFY aka NANCY DLTFFY j aka NANCY MCCARRON aka NANCY ) DUFFY-MCCAKKON aka NANCY B. DUFFY MCCARRON; BONNIE SHIPLEY, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.

I )

19 1 1 Defendants, i

Case No. UDFS1406978

Assigned for all purposes to: Judge: Hon. Kyle S. Brodie

NOTTCF, OF TAKTNG OF . . - -~ - - -. - - -. . - - - DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON AND FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AT DEPOSITION

DATE: December 11,2014 TIME: 9:30 a.m.

2 I / )TO I L L PARTIES AND THEIR ATTOKYEYS OF RECORD: I 22 1 1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure $ 8 2020.010, et I

! I - " -- ' req.: 2025.010; et seq., Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California general I 1- ;armership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY, will take the - - - eposition upon oral examination of Defendant NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON aka

I: >.IXCY R. DUFFY aka NANCY DUFFY aka NANCY MCCARRON aka NANCY ( - - I - DLTFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B. DUFFY MCCARRON, on December 11, 2014, at - - - - . -. 1.:: 2 2.m. at McDaniel Court Reporters, 206 E. Victoria Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101

. ~ ~ . . .-- ..--~ .. . . i826--SCii -C816v 1 1 NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

2 1 1 The deposition will be taken before a deposition officer who is authorized to / 1

3 administer an oath. If for any reason the taking of such deposition is not completed on the i l

I i

/and will continue from day to d b . excluding weekends and holidays until completed.

4 date set out above, the taking of the deposition will be continued froin day-to-day I I 5

G

17 Dated December 3; 20 14 I I

thereafter, Sundays and holidays excepted, at the same place until completed, or will be

continued to such other dates and times as otherwise agreed by counsel. In addition to

7 1

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

HART I KING

recording the deposition tesrimony by the stenographic method, the deposition will be

recorded by audio and!or videotape in conformity with Code of Civil Procedure 5

2025220(a)(5). Plaintiff also reserves the right to record the deposition by way of instant

visual display of the testimony pursuant to California Code of Civil Proccdure 5 2025.220(a)(5) along with stenographic recording. This deposition shall be taken under the

provisions of Code of Civil Proccdure 4 2020.010: et scq. and 2025.010, et seq.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER KOTICE that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure

section 2020.510 and 2025.220(a)(3), the deponent is required to produce for inspection

and copying at the rime of deposition the items set forth in Attachment "A" hereto.

'" Robert G. Williamson, Jr. /' Ryan J. Enan ~itorneys-for Plaintiff STLBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California general

artnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS LOBILEHOME COM~IUNITY

I MNLING AWRESS

CIIYAN~ZIP coos: Fontanl, CA 92335

4~ .- SUBP-015

~RANCHNALIE Fontana District

PLAINTIFF! PETITIONER: STUBBLEFIELD ~arlnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBlLENOME COMMUNiM

r R ~ D R N E Y OR PARTI W~~IMITATVJRNEY (mm. S I ~ I ~ Barnunbw. andaddm*sJ: john H. Pentecost, Esq., Bar No. 99527, Robed G. Wllllemson, Jr.. Esq., Bar No. 73178 an J. Egan. Esq., Bar No. 281836 HART KING 4 Hdtton Centre Drive, Suite 900, Santa Ana, CA 92707

TELEPHONENO.: 714.432.8700 ~ax~o.(~llmslr.714.~46.7457 E-~ILAODRESS io#~~uo: twllllamson@haflkinglaw.cam

AnonrrEr rm warn*: plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO STREETPOORESS: 17780 Arrow Blvd.

FOR cDWTUSEDNLY

I 1 I

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, TO (name, address, and telephone number of deponent Hknowl: TIMOTHY MCCARRON

DEFENDANVRESPONDENT: NANCY 8. DUFN, et al.

DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE

1. YOU ARE ORDERED TO APPEAR IN PERSON TO TESTIFY AS A WITNESS In thls action at the fOlbllOWItlg date, the, andptace: Date: Time: Address: 1211 1114 130 P.M. 206 E. Vlctorla Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101

a. As a deponent who Is not a natural person, you are ordered lo designate one or more peraons to teslify on your behalf as lo the matters described in item 2. (Code Civ. Proc., 5 2025.230.)

b. @ This depositlon will be recorded slenographicaliy through the instant visual display of testimony and by audiolave (XI videotape.

c. This vldealape depositlon Is intended for possible use al trlel under Code of Clvli Procedure sectlon 2025.620(d).

CABE NUMBEW UDFSl406978

2. i f the wltness is a representalive of e buslness or other entity, the matters upon whlch the witness Is tc be examined are as bllows:

3. At the deposition, you wlll be a s k e d queslions under oath. Questions and answers are recorded atenogmphbally at the deposlth; larar they a m transcribed forposslbte use el 1M. You may read the wn'lten record and change sny tnconect answers before you sign the deposition, You am entitled in receive witness fees and rnilaape actually traveled both ways. The money must he paid, at tha oplion of the paIfygiving nolice oflhe deposllion, eitherwith s d c e ofthis subpoena or at tho the of the deposltion. Unless the court orders or you m e otheiwlso, ifyou are behg deposed as an individual, the deposition rnusl take place withln 75 miles of your residence or within 150 miles 0f)'OUr~sidence dthe depositmn wlll be teken within the county dthe couri where fhe action is pendlng. 7he iooalion of tha de~O8liioR for all deponents 1s mvemad by Code of CIvil Procedure seotion 2025,Z50,

DISOBEDIENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA MAY BE PUNISHED AS CONTEMPT BY THIS COURT. YOU WILL ALSO BE LIABLE FOR THE SUM OF 8 0 0 AND ALL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM YOUR FAILURE TO OBEY.

Date issued: 1213114

Robert G. W~lliarnsan. Jr., Esq. ITYPEOR PRlM NAME)

Attorney for Plaintiff TITLE)

emor of ssrvlee an ;euers%) P a g o l d 1 Fwm*dwCd br Mmdalow Usl

ludijat CaunJI d cetianrta DEPQSlTlON SUBPOENA Code OfCivllProcrWI~ 85 ZWo.3ro. SUBPUt5 ( R w . J a n w l .10ODJ

2m5.220.2025,2P, 2025s2W, M25620 FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE 5cwarnnaM cad% gBW7.l

mn".rn*.LkOW

PROOF OF SERVICE OF DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE

* .., SUBP-015

1. I sewed thls DeposlHon Subpoena for Personal Appeamnce by personally delivering a Copy lo ihe parson sewed as follow^: a. Person s e ~ s d (name):

I

PLAI~FFIPETITIONER: sTUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a Californjs general - partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY

b. Address where sewed:

CASE NUMBW: UOFS140697B

c. Date of delhrery:

DEFENDAW~ESPONDENT: NANCY 0. DUFFY, st al. - -

d. Time of delivery:

e. Witness fees and mlleage boih ways (check onel: (I) wers pald. Amount: ............... .. .... $ (2) were not pald. (3) were tendered to the witness's

publlc entity employer as required by Government Code secUon 68097.2. The amount tendared was (speclfyl: ......... .. ...... $ L

f. Fee for service: ................... .. ................... S

2. i recelved this subpoena for servlce on (dale):

3, Person serving: a. a Not a reglstered Callfornia process server . b. Callfornia shedfor marshal c. Registered CalBrnla process server d. Employee or Independent contractor of a reglstered Callfomla process server e. Exempt from reolstratlon under Business and Pmfessions Code sectlon 22350(b) f. Registered professional photocopier g. Exempt from reglatratlon under Business and Professions Code sectlon 22451 h. Name, address, telephone number, and, if applicable, oounly of reglstralton and number!

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of (For Callfomja sheriff or marshal use only) Callfmla lhet the foregoing Is true and correct. I certlfy thatthe foregoing Is true and correct.

Date: Date:

SUSPUiS IRN January 1.2008] PROOF OF SERVICE OF ~ a w l d i DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE

w F 0 f r " ~ CDm

John H. Pentecost, Esq., Bar No. 99527 Robert G. Williamson, Jr., Es .,Bar NO.

H A ~ T I & G % Ryan J. E an,Esq., Bar No, 2 1836

A PROFESSIONAL C O R P O R A ~ O N 4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, California 92707

714) 432-8700 714) 546-7457

1 SUPERIOR COURT OF TKE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

I COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, FONTANA DISTRICT

6 I 7 I

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California eneral artnership dba MOUNTA~N S&OWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY,

Plaintiff I

v.

Attorneys for Plaintift'STUBBLEFlELD PROPERTES, a California general partnership dbn MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBLLEHOME COMMUNITY

Case No. UDFS1406978

NOTICE OF TAKING OF DEPOSITION OF TIMOTHY MCCARRON

DATE: December 11,2014 TIME: 1:30 p.m.

Defendants. i 20 IITO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

21 I / PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure $ 4 22 112020.010, et seq., 2025.010, et seq., Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California

23 general partnership dba MOUNTAM SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY, will I I 24 take the deposition upon oral examination of TIMOTHY MCCARRON, on December 11, I I 25 112014, at 1:30 a.m. at McDaniel Court Reporters, 206 E. Victoria Street, Santa Barbara, CA

28 / I The deposition will be taken before a deposition officer who is authorized to

26

27

1136568.022148~-43014784~~1 1 NOTTCE OF DEPOSITION -0

93101, and will continue from day to day, excluding weekends- and holidays until

completed.

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5

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administer an oath. If for any reason the taking of such deposition is not completed on the

date set out above, the taking of the deposition will be continued from day-to-day

thereafter, Sundays and holidays excepted, at the same place until completed, or will be

continued to such other dates and times as otherwise agreed by counsel. In addition to

recording the deposition testimony by the stenographic method, the deposition will be

recorded by audio and/or videotape in conformity with Code of Civil Procedure 4 7

8

9

HART I KING

2025.220(a)(S). Plaintiff also reserves the right to record the deposition by way of instant

visual display of the testimony pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 5 2025,22O(a)(S) along with stenographic recording. This deposition shall be taken under the

10

11

provisions of Code of Civil Procedure 2020.010, et seq. and 2025.010, et seq.

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, JOUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

Stubblefield v. Nancy B. Duffy, et al UDFS 1406978

am counsel for defendant Shipley: My address is 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103. 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

In the date recited below I served plaintiff with the following documents:

IPPOSITION to MOTION TO COMPEL TIM MCCARRON TO APPEAR AND FOR SANCTIONS

: ] (By Personal Delivery) as follows: Mail Carrier to personally deliver in 2 days (by 12/18/14)

: ] (By Fax) The fax machine I used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by nachine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4) I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.

x] (By Email) to email address below @v ameement) with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

rwilliamson@hartkinalaw.com reaan@,hartkinalaw.com

] (By Mail) §1013a, $2015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:

Robert G. Williamson, Attorney for Plaintiff HARTIKING 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, CA 92707

I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelope in a US mailbox ocated in Santa Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed nvalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

XI (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that d e above is true. Executed in Santa Barbara, CA on the date indicated below.

~ a h c ~ DU@ McCarron, in Pro Per and as Attorney for Tim McCarron 1/28/15

13 Opposition to Motion to Compel Tim McCarron to Appear and Testify at Deposition and for Sanctions

Claim is hereby made against the treasury of the County of San Bernardino, State of California, as follows:

Less than $10,000 - State the total amount claimed $ More than $10,000 - Check one of the boxes:

Municipal Court Jurisdiction ($10,000 - $25,000) X Superior C~: i i~ t Jurisdiction ($25,001 and up)

Claimant makes the following statements in support of the claim:

1. Name of Claimant: Nancy h?zCarron 805-965-3492 (Area Code and Phone No.)

2. Address of Claimant: 950 Roble Lane

3. Notices concerning claim should be sent to:

Address Z p Code (Area Code and Phone No.)

4. Circumstances giving rise to claim are as follows: attached Notice of Racketeerins Action

I

5. Date, Time and 1 c (city, street, cro s-street damage o curred a d nature thereof: see attached S C ~ [B/3.&zQ, d ~ 4 ~ 1 2 - %

6. Public property and/or public officers or employees causing injury, damage or loss: Kyle Brodie (will add other cons~ir inq racketeers on discovery of s u ~ ~ o r t i n q evidence)

8. Basis of computation of claimed amount is as follows:

Medical expenses to date Loss wages ----- Estimated future medical expenses Gener2.l damages Other expenses Propetty damage $80,000 value mobile home Other damages: Judge Brodie is enabling abusive, harassing, illegal litigation tactics by refusing to a ~ p l y the law, Codes of Procedure, Cocrt Rules; refusing to re:lassify case to higher jurisdiction to enable cross claims for elder abuse ai?d intentional infliction of emotional distress, Judge Brodie is a participant in a racketeering enterprise in which he refuses to rulr against Stubblefield, has granted an order to authorizing Stubblefield's gocn squad to invade our hcrne lo "videotape, photograph & test" the inside of our private home; "tests & samples" on exterior (we believe agents intend to plant drugs) and he intends to sign an order compe!ling my husband to testi;;/ at a deposition, breaking his spousal

Office: (909) 386-8631

I

3/15/2015 UDFS1406978 Minute Orders ­ San Bernardino Main

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Case UDFS1406978 ­ STUBBLEFIELD ­VS­ DUFFY Action: (Choose)

RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER 03/02/2015 ­ 4:00 PM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL ­ COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS ON SUBMITTED MATTER: STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO COMPEL TIMOTHYMCCARRON TO APPEAR IS DENIED. ­ STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA'S MOTION FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IS DENIED. NOTICE GIVEN BY JUDICIAL ASSISTANT CORRESPONDENCE COVERSHEET GENERATED TO MAIL RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER TOCOUNSEL OF RECORD. ACTION ­ COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

EXHIBIT 16

3/15/2015 UDFS1406978 Minute Orders ­ San Bernardino Main

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EX PARTE RE: ORDER TO ENJOIN AND RESTRAIN DEF NANCY DUFFY MCCAR FILEDBY STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA 02/18/2015 ­ 1:14 PM

Receipt: 150218­2081 $60.00150218­2081­MC Reference Number 27­0163313708

Code Text Operator*FEE 150218­2081­MC MMF/ 60.00 Paymt JECAS

*REFNM 150218­2081­MC Reference Number 27­0163313708 JECAS

SuPERloR L'ubT5FDCAuFoRNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNAROINO

FONTANA OIS?RICT

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FEB 18 2015 John H. Pentecost, Esq., Bar No. 99527 Robert G. Williamson, Jr,, Es .,Bar No. 73176 Ryan J. E an, Esq., Bar No. 2 1836 d HART 1 NG

3 4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, California 92707 Telephone: (714 432-8700 F a s m i e : (7141 546-7457

5 Attorneys for Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California eneral 1 partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME C O M M ~ T Y 6

7 I SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO-FONTANA DISTRICT

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a ) Case No. UDFS 1406978 California general partnership dba ) MOUNTAIN SHADOWS

) Assigned for all purposes, Judge: Hon. Kyle S. Brodie

MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY, PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE

Plaintiff APPLICATION FOR ORDER T O ENJOIN AND RESTRAIN

V. DEFENDANT NANCY DUFFY- ) MCCARRON AND HER EMPLOYEES

AND AGENTS FROM NANCY B. DUFFY aka NANCY DUFFY COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY oR aka NANCY MCCARRON aka NANCY IM)IRECTLY TO PLAINTIFF,S DUFFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B. DUFFY MCCARRON, BONNIE EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS; SHIPLEY, and DOES 1 through 10, DECLARATIONS O F ELISAVETA inclusive, POGODAEVA ; RYAN J. EGAN IN

SUPPORT THEREOF Defendants. Date: February 19,2015

Time: 8:00 a.m. Dept: FT$

e

Nancy D m McCarron, CBN 164780 Law Office of Nancy D u f ~

950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103

March 3, 2015

Honorable Marsha G. Slough sent via fax to: 909-708-8769 Presiding Judge sent via email to: msloug;h@sb-court.org San Bernardino Superior Court re: DEMAND TO ENFORCE 303 W. Third Street, Fourth Floor COURT RULES & CODES San Bernardino, CA 92415-0302 CONFIDENTIAL - PART 1

Dear Ms. Slough:

I realize you just returned today after a leave or vacation since February 23, 2015. Unfortunatelv. vou must act immediatelv to address the abuses occurring in vour courts. I am sure that you have already reviewed the complaint I submitted to the county and city about Stubblefield's continued corruption & intimidation of public officials, including bribing arson investigators and battalion chiefs to falsify arson reports to cover up criminal conduct. Stubblefield advertises his love of money by wearing it in pictures posted on facebook. (Exh. A). Apparently, Stubblefield's intimidation of judicial officers continues to infect your courts.

WE DEMAND AN ANSWER IN WRITING TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION?

DOES MONEY MAN STUBBLFIELD CONTROL ALL OF YOUR COURTS & STAFF?

It certainly appears so. &? Every time we file a pleading in Fontana F7 the clerks review our proof of service ~i&o~rously. They even require my husband to sign the bottom of my proofs of service telliiizme-they have to require a "third party" to sign it because I am a "party defendant" even though the motions and oppositions are filed for Bonnie Shipley, and I am her attorney of record. On the other hand, these same clerks are now accepting pleadings from HART I KING law firm without any proof of service at all, and setting his motions on 24 hour notice where there is no emergency! A bogus so-called "emergency" exparte motion was filed in F7 for a "restraining order" against me on 2/18/15 without anv roof of service or notice t o m . I did not even discover there was a hearing until after the hearing already occurred. Judge Lily Sinfield had enough sense to see through this fraud on the court and must have realize no bar member would fail to appear or oppose a motion for a permanent restraining order against her free speech. She DENIED it. Even after the frivolous motion was denied the firm still re f~~sed to serve me with the papers.

-

I had to send a runner to seek out Supervisor Amanda Tam~eron to get a copy of the papers, which the firm never served to date. WE DEMAND THAT YOU STOP THIS ABUSE NOW!

Less than a week later, HART I KING filed yet another frivolous so-called "emergenc_V1' exparte motion in Judge Sachs' court (S-28) on 24-hour notice setting it for 8:30 tomorrow, without anv proof of service. The firm ignored my 2 emailo dsmanding papers to be served. They are being trained, like Pavlov's dogs, to continue this abuse because your staff rewards them by continuing to accept these ex parte motions where there is no "emergency" and with NO PROOF OF SERVICE. Even if it were an emergency there is no excuse for not serving! CRC 2.117 requires all papers filed in court to be served on all parties to the action. (Exh. B)

*

Please consider this a demand that you carry out your duties as presiding judge. I t is YOUR RESPONSIBILITY to control San Bernardino Judges and court staff.

YOU MUST STOP THIS ABUSE NOW!

We demand that you circulate notices to all judges and court staff that they cannot accept motion papers under anv circumstances without executed proofs of service attached thereon. (except in cases of domestic violence where it would be too dangerous to give notice).

WE DElMAND TO KNOW WHY YOUR CLERKS AND JUDGES ARE ALLOWING STUBBLEFIELD'S LAWYERS TO FILE EX PARTE MOTIONS WHERE THERE IS NO EMERGENCY AND WITHOUT ANY PROOFS OF SERVICE ATTACHED TO THEM?

You know this is a blatant violation of due process. Yet, your staff is training these lawyers like Pavlov's dogs, that they will continue to reward their illegal and unethical conduct by continuing to set ex parte motions where no emergency exists and without serving me at all!

Secondly, we demand an answer as to why you continue to allow Judge Brodie to prosecute this action against me where there is NO JURISDICTION and why you're Appellate Division Judges are sitting on a writ I filed on February 17, 2015 where no opposition was ever filed. Has Stubblefield been told that he need not oppose writs as all of them will be denied for him, regardless of the law? WE DEMAND THEY APPLY THE LAW AND TRANSFER THIS CASE. I already emailed you about my righteous writ petition which your judges are sitting on! Why? Why can't they just apply the law even if it means ruling against the almighty billionaire!

The unethical HART I KING firm continues to vex and harass us, enabled by your staff. I set a renewed motion for attorney fees in Judge Sachs' department on 3/18/15 at 8:30 a.m. Yesterday this unethical firm intentionally, and with malice, scheduled two bogus motions to compel with sanctions on the SAME DAY in Judge Brodie's court in Fontana 3/18/15 at 8:00. I cannot be in 2 physical locations a t the same time although they can with 2 different lawyers! These are two frivolous motions (filed for no other reason than to harass us) against innocent third parties who have nothing to do with whether Bonnie Shipley can be my co-resident. (my handyman Steve Allen and his ex-wife). They have nothing to do with this. See Exh. C This is vet another reason whv vou cannot allow this case to be prosecuted in Fontana. There is no jurisdiction in Fontana as damages sought exceed $25,000. You must transfer it!

We expect a response in writing as to what you intend to do to carry out your duties. If you do nothing, we will file a new complaint with Kamala Harris and ask her office to investigate yet another massive corruption in San Bernardino now infecting the courts!

cc: Supervisors, County, City

URGENT - MUST IMMEDIATELY STOP FRAUD I S-28 8:25 AM

Nancy D u e McCarron, CBN 164780 Law Office of Nancy Duffy

950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103

March 4, 2015 8:25 (before Dept. S-28 starts calendar at 8:25 a.m.

I Honorable Marsha G. Slough sent via fax to: 909-708-8782 909-708-8586 I

Presiding Judge sent via email to: msloueh@sb-c0urt.G. San Bernardino Superior Court re: DEMAND TO ENFORCE 303 W. Third Street, Fourth Floor CRC 1.21, 2.117, 3.1203, 2.117 San Bernardino, CA 92415-0302 Local Rule 73 1.1 Confidential-Part 2

I Dear Ms. Slough:

WE DEMAND YOU IMMEDIATELY GO DOWN TO 5-28 AND STOP THIS FRAUD

Attached are Exhibits A-D proving the hearing a t 8:30 in S-28 is a complete fraud! I t violates CA Rules of Court, and Local Rule 731.1 (as cited above and shown in Exh. D)

A- Shows right before noon (1136 am) I emailed Hart\King demanding a copy of the papers they filed in your court (cover page shown a t Exh. B) Exh. A also shows despite notice at noon they intentionally withheld emailing me The 52-page motion until 3:00 p.m (after court closed to preclude filing opposition)

B- Shows YOUR CLERK accepted a 52-page motion WITHOUT a PROOF of SERVICE violating CRC 1.21, 2.117 Local Rule 731.1 proves she accepted it before NOON WITHOUT ANY PROOF OF SERVICE ATTACHED SHOWING SERVICE ON ME

C- This is the LAST page of the 52 page motion showing NO PROOF OF SERVICE Although it complied with CRC 3.1203 (notice by 10 am) it FAILED TO COMPLY With CRC 1.21 and 2.117 and combined with Local Rule 731.1

D- Shows all rules of court and local rule VIOLATED

If you do not go down to S-28 and STOP THIS FRAUD ON THE COURT I WILL HOLD YOU RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOWING THIS BLATANT FRAUD ON THE COURT

I WILL FILE A COMPLAINT WITH THE GOVERNOR AND W I L L A HARRIS TO OPEN A NEW INVESTIGATION FOR A SEWER OF CORRUPTION IN COURTS

cc: Supervisors, County, City

March 2 20 15 11 52 am

We have not raeivecl any papers served by fed ex or atherher . it isnearty noon.

We demand that you IUMEDlATELY SENDALLPAFERS &our mothnand dl attachments) b1Unz1th by ematl

This dnes not q a l i 8s an "merge~y'umlecex pertewles You confinned that you knew about *fee d o n an Feb. 1%!

You nlen6an;llty waitfa unhltha dav before lrour opposlrion vras due to intentionally -&o:age me VI~UI 24 hour notlce

You are the most ufimwl anarneF I have encoumered in 20 yem %u ha..% M, marats no ethfcs. no dimly YGU are scoundrels and will pay !he pnee

That is a promisst

We +ill take all legal adlon (c assore your blatantviolatlm at mrt rules are no! STOPPED by ma murt

Nancy Duffy McCat-ron, CRN 164780

( Rale 731.1 Civil cx arrte apltlira(Mor Afl ex. pde applications must be Bled with ihe Caure no later tk

wuri day prwding the: day of the scheduled hearing on &e ex parte appiic an ex prte order must notify aEI W e s nu later than 10:M A.M. oa the etzaut day before the ex

appearance ss provided by the mi%mia Rules of C o a rule 3.1203. (EfX July E,2tlt 1.)

I.:< CGten a '.V4ilran?m 3.. Rgsn 2. Elan

Ms, PAcCaren,

Attached @east find P i ~ i n t i R ~ Ex Paito Ap~licatat!cn ic:i3r~e:Contmuin; t h ~ Hoai rq an Uef~dart's ilrnei-we M2t8sn LrxMtcmcy Fesfa Peml: s!ai%tj'! ;.o mpxi Erpa? Cedaration c?:bi:&G. Vdiibarnrm. ;r; C~8ardBm of R?zr J. Fgi:: m Soppo:t?ile!eof rttk :?narc to :hf &?houe-re%reared matter

Sandy Moore I Legal Aaistant

Td. i14-432-6703 x357 1 Fax. ?14-540-I457 5!%3ure@h>ttk%?>claw,~ 1 v<v:w bacsi<nt7~2!!.%of:l

1 7 . . < ;t..v;:,. a 'Q? ' 3s :&ear+:- mt br St+mqr a d 4.- piovir% i r i x%nh

gyc?

John H. ~entecost, Esq., Bar Robert G. 'Williamson, Jr., Ryan J. E an, Esq., Bar No. 2 1 3 HART I ~ N G 4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900- Sanfa Ana. Cal

* lifornia 92707

Tele hone; (714) 432-8700 .Fats i' mile: (714) 546-7457

F I L E D suPER@R COURT OF c,q.Ip~np,;~ COuWr OF SAN B E R & I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ERNARDINO n f s ~ ~ l c ~

Attorneys for Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California General Partnershi dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILE HOME COMMUNIT!

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF S A N BERNAIM0 10

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a ) Case No.: UDDS 1204130 California Genera1 Partnership, dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home I Assigned for all urposes to:

Judge: Hon. ichael A. Sachs Dept: 328

Id'

l 4 I Plaintiff,

BONNIE SHIPLEY,

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER CONTINUING THE HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO DEPOSE DEFENDANT'S EXPERT; DECLARATION OF ROBERT G. WILLIAMSON, JR,; DECLARATION OF RYAN J. EGAN I N SUPPORT

) THEREOF 1

DATE: March 4,2015 TIME: 8:30rm DEPT: S28

j Complaint Filed: August 27,2012

36568,0531485 1-2088-681 8v.l PLAlNTlFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER

From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Ryan J. Egan Tuesday, March 03,2015 9:07 AM nancyduffysb@yahoo.com Robert G. Williamson Jr. 36568.053/Mountain Shadows v. Shipley - Ex Parte Notice - Case No.: LlDDS 1204130

Ms. McCarron,

Be advised that tomorrow. March 4,2015 at 8:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter in Department S28 before Judge Michael A. Sachs, Plaintiff will move ex parte in Case No. UDDS 1204130 for an order continuing the March 18, 2015 hearing date on Defendant's "renewed motion for attorney fees to permit Plaintiff to depose Defendant's expert Joel Mark. Please advise if you intend to oppose.

Ryan J. Egan I Associate Hart ( King 4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900 ( Santa Ana, CA 92707 Tel. 71 4-432-8700 1 Fax. 7 14-546-7457 Direct No. 657-622-4703 reaan~hartkinulaw.com 1 www.hartkinalaw.com

CA Rules of Court , Rule 1.2 1. Service Ll' (a) Service on a party or attorney Whenever a document is required to be served on a party, the service must be made on the party's attorney if the

party is represented.(Subd (a) amended effective January 1,2007.) (b) "Serve and file" As used in these rules, unless a statute or rule provides for a different method for filing or service, a requirement to "serve and file" a document means that a copy of the document must be served on the attorney for each party separately represented, on each self-represented party, and on any other person or entity when required by statute, rule, or court order, and that the document and a proof of service of the document must be filed with the court.(Subd (b) amended effective January 1,2007.) (c) "Proof of service" As used in these rules, "proof of service" means a declaration stating that service has been made as provided in (a) and (b). If the proof of service names attorneys for separately represented parties, it must also state which party or parties each of the attorneys served is representing.(Subd (c) adopted effective January 1,2007.)

CA Rules of Court , Rule 2.1 17. Conformed copies of papers All copies of papers served must conform to the original papers filed, including the numbering of lines, pagination, additions, deletions, and interlineations except that, with the agreement of the other party, a party may serve that other party with papers printed on both sides of the

I page. !

I CA Rules of Court, Rule 3.1203. Time of notice to other parties 1 (a) Time of notice A party seeking an ex parte order must notify all parties no later than 10:OO a.m. the court day before the ex parte

appearance, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances that justify a shorter time for notice.(Subd (a) amended effective January 1, 2008.)

LOCAL RULE 731.1

Rde 73 f .I Civil en ~ar te aptrlica4ions All ex pfie appfications must he fded \vith the Cow no later tkm f2:W P.M. on the

court day preceding the day of the scheduled hearins on $he ex pparte applieatiun. A pwy seeking an ex p t e order must noti9 all pir-ties t10 lager W n 10:W A.M. cnr the caw day before Ihc ex

apparance as pruviderl by ehe @i%mia Rules of Courl., ruIe 3.1203. (Eff Jdy f ,261 1.)

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . ,. 1'11~1~ : 03/r34/2015. 0 ~ : 32 : ~ . . ' NAME : N & N I ~ ~ - M C C ~ R F ? ~ ~ ~ ] '

FAX : 8059653492 TEL : 805965:3492 SEE. # : 00065,J::;2:3985

E;CIS,.~.' : E;I-IS': /P.II:I ~EI~FOI..ISE b,.IC; : POCIA LINE CONDITIOb4 :

1::'4 : CrJ'#,,,IEeF'AGE . ;

PC: : F',,;: -F '.:.:' H, ..

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Case Type: v i

Case Number:

Case UDFS1406978 - STUBBLEFIELD -VS- DUFFY Action: 1 (Choose) v

Case Report

Images

EX-PARTE MOTION RE; ORDER TO ENJOIN AND RESTRAIN DEF NANCY DUFFY- MCCAR 0211912015 - 8:00 AM DEPT. F8A

MATrER ELEC.TRONICALLY RECORDED 08: 57 - LILY L SINFIELD, JUDGE CLERK: SUSAN KING BAILIFF: ALFRED BENNElT - APPEARANCES: AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR. PRESENT FOR PLAlNTlFFlPETlTlONER. PARTIES NOT PRESENT: NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY - PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD - MOTION STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA'S MOTION ORDER TO ENJOIN AND RESTRAIN IS HEARD.

ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF. STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA'S MO1-ION ORDER TO EN JOIN AND RESTRAIN IS DENIED. DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE ACTION - COMPLETE - 09:Ol CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. === MINUTE ORDER END ===

EXHIBIT 17

Nancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780 Law Office of Nancy Duffy McCarron 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancyduffy sb@yahoo.com

111 Case No. UDDS 12041 30 filed: 8-27-12

I 5

6

7

Att~riley +'or D e f e i ~ d ~ : Boilr~ie Shipley

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, California General Partnership,

Mountain Shadows Mobile ome Community

Plaintiff,

II' 1 Dept. S-28 (Justice Center)

NOTICE OF RENEWED MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES UNDER M,RL [CIVIL $798.851 [CCP 5 102 1.51 and Request for Court to delete (cross out) the words "or resident" from the final iudmnent entered on 3120114

C v. ONNIE SHIPLEY,

~ ~ f ~ ~ d ~ ~ ~

-11- - TO: THE COURT AND ATTORNEYS OF filECSm . -- I - I

Date: March lS, 2015 CRC 8.891 & 3.1702(a)

Time: 8:30 a.m.

I I PLEASE NOTE at above time & place, Bonnie Shipley RENEWS a MOTION for ATTORNEY FEES, ( I I formerly set, but put on hold, due to a pending appeal in ACIAS 1400026. The appellate panel entered

I I a remittitur 21311 5 to return jurisdiction to the trial court after an opinion entered on 12/22/14: I DISPOSITION

"The case is remanded to the trial court with directions to r~zodifi the judgment by deleting the words "or resident "$-om page 2, line 10, of the judgment. " In all other respects the judgment is a@rnzedY

Defendant asks the court to cross out the words "or resident" in the final judgment entered on 3120114.

SUMMARY OF AMOUNT OF AWARD REQUESTED (see motion + exhibits)

Former Motion for Attorney Fees (before 2nd appeal-"or resident" stricken) $ 840,000 2400 hr x $350

Amount of Attorney Fees with a 1.5 multiplier added 1,260,000 (x 1.5 multiplier) "i I I I Amount of Attorney Fees with a 2 multiplier added 1,680,000 x (2 multiplier) I

MINIMAL 'TOTAL AMCUNT OF FEES REQUESTED . . . .. !E 840,000 actual labor hrs

Shipley asks for a 2 multiplier for crucial benefit she secured for $G75,000 mobile home residents facing

I I arbitrary eviction by getting a decision reversed which would have enabled park owners to evict resident 4 I I via summary proceedings without just cause on 2 inapplicable statutes. (CCP §§798.75[c) & §798.56(d). I - 1 -

Notice of RENEWED MOTION for Attntncy Fees Under MRL 5798.85 as Prevailing Party

homes through arbitrary summary eviction, in which most residents cannot afford to hire an attorney to

litigate to save their homes from being filched through arbitmr~~ sunzmary evictions on 5-days' nctice.

Please see Points & Authorities included in the FORMER motion for attorney fees which is being

RENEWED. Counsel called calendar department to schedule RENEWED Motion for Attorney Fees.

Clerk checked with Department S-28 for permission to RENEW the voluminous motion with exhibit tal

and color-coded for ease of review---as opposed to having to COPY it all and file an entirely new set.

The court authorized counsel to RENEW the motion by simply giving NOTICE of RENEWED Motion.

without having to RECOPY the package already submitted which was put on hold pending appeal in

ACIAS 1400026. The Appellate Division issued a remittitur on 2/3/15 and returned jurisdiction to the

trial court after entering an order on 12/22/14 which neither party appealed during the 30 day window.

see Declaration of Nancy Duffy McCarron supporting this RENEWED attorney fee motion.

1 Shipley litigated this case to ensure that residents were afforded the protections legislators conveyed

I

DECLARATION OF NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON

2

3

I am attorney for defendant and make these statements in support of Motion for Attorney Fees.

1. I make these statements based on personal knowledge and can testify to them if called to do so.

2. I downloaded the official court docket in this case, cut and pasted it into an excel spreadsheet,

which I added a few columns on the sides to enter number of hours worked on various tasks in the

case as shown on docket and tasks. It shows prep time (research & writing motions, oppositions,

or replies, or preparing evidence to attach) travel and hearing time, which was usually 4 hours for

each hearing, including traveling ?4 hour each way in the morning from Highland, and waiting 2-3

hours in court for the case to be called up, and filing papers, etc.

3. I programmed formulae into certain cells to compute sub-totals, totals, averages, etc.

4. Actually, I spent more time on this cas9 than reflected i:~. the filed spreadsheet on related issues,

and various investigations. I had to decline accepting any other cases to properly litigate this case.

5. The exhibits attached to this motion are true and correct copies which have not been altered,

authenticated by counsel. $350 hour is my regular hourly billing rate, with 20 years of experience.

in Civil Code $798.55; i.e. protection from eviction without just cause, and only for 7 specijed reasons.

This important reversal protects 675,000 residents in mobile home parks from the loss of their mobile

- 2 - Notice of RENEWED MOTION for Attorney Fees Under MRL 5798.85 as Prevailing Party

6. This is the most litigious and acrimonious lawsuit I have ever been involved with in 20 years

as an attorney, and was more labor intensive than any case I have ever worked on in 20 years.

7. I sent a letter to plaintiffs counsel as soon as he served Shipley with a 5-day Notice to Vacate,

explaining that he could not evict her on a forcible detainer case because Stubblefield was not in

privity of contract with Shipley and he was not a purchaser under Civil Code 5798.75

I spent 80 more hours (60 research-20 writing) on opposing the Writ Petition to the 4th. Circuit

Court of Appeals. Division 2. which was denied on 711 91 13.

I spent another 90 hours (65 research-25 writinn, printing. collating & binding 20 copies)

opposing the Writ of Review to the Supreme Court. Court Rules required submission of original + 13 copies, and service on all 3 lower courts and parties. The Writ of Review was denied 8/14/13.

8. Counsel & plaintiff were fully aware of potential for significant attorney fees on continued appeal.

9. Because plaintiff defrauded the court, defendant, and her counsel by inserting the words "or

resident" into the final judgment which the court allowed plaintiff to submit (over defendant's

vehement objections) defendant was forced to prosecute yet another appeal to get those words

stricken from the final judgment entered by the court.

10. I received notice of order entered12/22/14 in ACIAS 1400026, and a remittitur issued 2/3/15,

noting the decision is final and returning jurisdiction to the trial court.

11. I called the court calendar department to schedule a RENEWED MOTION for attorney fees.

I talked to court clerk Sulma. She set the motion for March 18,2015 at 8:30 a.m. in S-28.

She said 311 811 5 was the first date Judge Sachs had an opening to schedule a motion to be heard.

I explained that I had already filed a very lengthy, detailed motion (color-coded for easy review)

with multiple tabs, etc. and requested permission to use the motion already filed as the operating

motion for the March 18,201 5 hearing. She checked with the court who approved the request.

Accordingly, the court will review the detailed motion already on file. Opposition will be due per

code. Reply will be due per code. The court will hear the motion on March 18,201 5.

12. I declare under penalty of perjury the above statements, and those made in the motion, are true.

Executed in Santa Barbara, CA on the date below. I

February 17,20 15 ";ri,w&r/7c L w Nancy D MCC&~, Attorney for Bonnie Shipley

- 3 - Notice of RENEWED MOTION for Attorney Fees Under MRL $798.85 as Prevailing Party

-7

PROOF OF SERVICE 1

2

3 COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO I I STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Properties v. Bonnie Shipley UDDS1204130 -

I1 On the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:

6

7

1 1 RENEWED MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AS PREVALING PARTY

The undersigned is counsel for defendant at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

lo 11 [ ] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows:

11 [ ] (By Electronic) to address below (by agreement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

11

12

l4 I1 to: rwilliamson@hkclaw.com

[ ] (By Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.

Robert Williamson, Esq. Hart, King & Coldren 4 Hutton Centre Drive, Ste. 900 Santa Ana, CA 92707

15

6 [XI (By Mail) 9 1 0 13 a, 920 1 5.5 CCP. I deposited documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:

February

20

22

23

Notice of RENEWED MOTION for Attorney Fees Under MRL $798.85 as Prevailing Party

1 am familiar with mail collection in San Bernardino. I deposited the envelope in the mail at Santa Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

[ ] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true. Executed in San Bernardino CA on

LJRGENT - MUST IMMEDIATELY STOP FRAUD I S-28 8:25 AM

Nancy D u e McCmron, CBN 164780 Law Office of Nancy D u e

950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103

March 4,2015 8:25 (before Dept. S-28 starts calendar at 8:25 a.m.

Honorable Marsha G. Slough sent via fax to: 909-708-8782 909-708-8586 Presiding Judge sent via email to: msloueh@sb-court.=- San Bernardino Superior Court re: DEMAND TO ENFORCE 303 W. Third Street, Fourth Floor CRC 1.21, 2.117, 3.1203, 2.117 San Bernardino, CA 92415-0302 Local Rule 73 1.1 Cofidential-Part 2

Dear Ms. Slough:

WE DEMAND YOU IMMEDIATELY GO DOWN TO S-28 AND STOP THIS FRAUD

Attached are Exhibits A-D proving the hearing at 8:30 in S-28 is a complete fraud! I t violates CA Rules of Court, and Local Rule 731.1 (as cited above and shown in Exh. D)

A- Shows right before noon (11:56 am) I emailed Hart\King demanding a copy of the papers they filed in your court (cover page shown at Exh. B) Exh. A also shows despite notice at noon they intentionally withheld emailing me The 52-page motion until 3:00 p.m (after court closed to preclude filing opposition)

B- Shows YOUR CLERK accepted a 52-page motion WITHOUT a PROOF of SERVICE violating CRC 1.21, 2.117 Local Rule 73 1.1 proves she accepted it before NOON WITHOUT ANY PROOF O F SERVICE ATTACHED SHOWING SERVICE ON ME

C- This is the LAST page of the 52 page motion showing NO PROOF OF SERVICE Although it complied with CRC 3.1203 (notice by 10 am) it FAILED TO COMPLY With CRC 1.21 and 2.1 17 and combined with Local Bule 731.1

D- Shows all rules of court and local rule VIOLATED

If you do not go down to S-28 and STOP THIS FRAUD ON THE COURT I WILL HOLD YOU RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOWING THIS BLATANT F W D ON THE COURT

I

I WILL FILE A COMPLAINT WITH THE GOVERNOR AND KALVILLA HARRIS TO OPEN A NEW INVESTIGATION FOR A SEWER OF CORRUPTION IN COURTS

cc: Supervisors, County, City

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Case UDDS1204130 ­ STUBBLEFIELD­V­SHIPLEY Action: (Choose)

EX­PARTE MOTION RE: PLA EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER CONT THE HEARING ON DEF 03/04/2015 ­ 8:31 AM DEPT. S28X

MICHAEL A SACHS, JUDGE CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPORTER REGINA VEGA 12612 COURT ATTENDANT MARY KILGORE ­ APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER. ­ PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD NO FILE. ACTION CAME ON FOR PLA EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER TO CONT DEFT HEARING. ­ COURT ADVISES COUNSEL OF ORDER PREVIOUSLY SIGNED ON 2/27/15 REQUIRING NEW MOTIONWITH NEW SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS TO BE FILED. EXPARTE APPLICATION DENIED AS MOOT. ­ COURT VACATES HEARING CURRENTLY SET 3/18/15. MOVING PARTY TO CONTACT CLERKS OFFICEAND OBTAIN FIRST AVAILABLE DATE FOR HEARING. ­ COURT ORDERS CSR REGINA VEGA TO PREPARE A TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS DATED03/04/15. ­ HEARINGS: VACATE HRG HEARING SCHEDULED FOR 03/18/15 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28. ACTION ­ COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

County of San Bernardino

REQUEST FOR FURTHER ACTION Y

Judge SACHS Date

Name STUBBLEFIELD VS SHIPLEY Case No. UD DS 1204130 %

-- 2Y' /,2Q,e. * r L J PlaintifflDefendant Requests: )&v =,I'

REQUESTING CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER THIS MOTION NEEDS TO BE FILED " IN

THE PREVIOUSLY FILED MOTION AS ITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS?

- -A- -- . --_. - - - -- - -- ---- - -- - - -

u ANITA JOHNSON. LPA II

COURT ORDER

Granted

Denied

- - -- --

Remarks

7

1 / i

9 k.: -

Date

16-1 091 5-349 REV. 5/89 (ALL)

Superior Court of California Zounty of San Bemardino

\I 3an Bernardino District-Civil Division

%I7 West Third Street ~

Sari Bernardino, CA 9241 5-021 0

Mad er F1",5r-CL&SS

$2 RETURN 2 5 Q3)3 J)2Q15

SE!?'d!E Q * $00.2

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Case UDDSI r----.-----,... 2041 30 - STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY - -.--.-,------ - Action: ! (Choose)

1 .-.--.-- ,*-.-".*.--"-. .... -- 3

EX-PARTE MOTION RE: FOR ORDER CONTINUING HEARING 09/17/2014 - 8:31 AM DEPT. S28X

MICHAEL A SACHS, JUDGE CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPORTER CRAIG ANDERSON 11800 COURT AlTENDANT ROBERT KRETZMEIER

APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFlPETIl~lONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFT-BONNIE SHIPLEY.

PROCEEDINGS: NO FILE. PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD EX-PARTE HEARING IS HELD. COURT ADVISES ATTORNEY MCCARRON THAT SHE MAY APPEAR BY COURTCALL ON FUTURE EXPARTE HEARINGS.

COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO MOVE FORWARD WITH TODAYS HEARING. CASE REMAINS STAYED PENDING APPELLATE RULING. COURT VACATES THE MOTION REGARDING ATORNEY FEES CURRENTLY SET 10/02/14.

HEARINGS: VACATE L&M HEARING SCHEDULED FOR 10/02/14 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28. NOTICE TO BE GIVEN BY ATTORNEY WILLIAMSON. ACTION - COMPLETE --- --- MINUTE ORDER END ===

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Case Number:

Case UDDSI 2041 30 - STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY

Images

Action: ease) r i - - -.-----. -- ~-",----a

MOTION RE: EXPUNGE LIS PENDENSIAWARD A T N FEES * FILED BY PLAINTIFF STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES A CA GENERAL PARTNER 06/23/2014 - 8:30 AM DEPT. S28A

MICHAEL A SACHS, JUDGE CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPORTER REGINA VEGA 12612 COURT ATrENDANT MARY KILGORE

APPEARANCES: AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER. AlTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT.

PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD AlTORNEY MCCARRON STATES APPEAL IS ONGOING. MOTION STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES A CA GENERAL PARTNER'S MOTION RE: EXPUNGE LIS PENDENSIAWARD ATTY FEES IS HEARD. COURT GIVES TENTATIVE RULING. ARGUED BY COUNSEL AND SUBMITTED.

COURT FINDS: COURT HAS REVIEWED AUTHORITIES STATED BY EACH PARTY AS IT RELATES TO LIS PENDENS. MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS IS GRANTED. . MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS UNTIMELY, COURTS FINDINGS ARE STATED ON THE RECORD.

OTHER ORDERS: MOTION REQUESTING ATTORNEY FEES ARE DENIED. ORDER SIGNED THIS DATE. ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

MS. DUFFY MC CARRON: A l l r i g h t . So t % a t l s a dead

i s s u e .

THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . So we a r e h e r e today on a

Motion t o Expunge t h e l i s pendens t h a t was f i l e d on t h i s c a s e .

My t e n t a t i v e w i l l be t o g r a n t t h e motion, expunging t h e

l i s pendens.

Couple of p o i n t s r a i s e d by t h e o p p o s i t i o n I wanted t o

a d d r e s s . One of t h o s e p o i n t s was t h a t t h e Motion t o Expunge

was un t ime ly . CCP S e c t i o n 405.30 b a s i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e

.Motion t o Expunge may be made a t any t ime a f t e r t h e n o t i c e of

pendency h a s been r eco rded . So t h i s w i l l be t i m e l y .

Hold on one second.

Okay. Secondly, I d o n ' t b e l i e v e i t was a p p r o p r i a t e

f o r t h e l i s pendens t o be f i l e d i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e .

According t o some a u t h o r i t y a c t u a l l y c i t e d by t h e Defendant i n

t h i s c a s e , t h e l i s pendens i s a p p r o p r i a t e l y f i l e d by t h e

P l a i n t i f f o r Defendant t h a t s e e k s a f f i r m a t i v e r e l i e f . There

wasn ' t any a f f i r m a t i v e r e l i e f sought by M s . S h i p l e y . And t h a t

c a s e , by t h e way, i s Welton v. Cook. I t ' s an ex t remely o l d

c a s e , 1 8 6 2 , 6 1 Ca1.981. But t h e law is s t i l l good.

. Some o t h e r concerns I had was t h a t t h e l i s pendens i n

t h i s m a t t e r appea r s t o have been f i l e d r e a l l y f o r t h e one

purpose o n l y t h a t was c i t e d by t h e Defendant i n h e r b r i e f . And

I ' l l j u s t quote , "There i s no s e p a r a t e p a r c e l t o r e c o r d a g a i n s t

on each l o t . A s e x p l a i n e d above, S h i p l e y was l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d

t o r e c o r d t h e l i s pendens and r e t a i n i t , r e s e r v e h e r r i g h t t o

by trying to go around what the law says. And unlawful

detainer is very clear that a defendant is not allowed to file

any cross-complaint or anything. They're not allowed, which is

one of the reasons why I made a motion to transfer to a higher

jurisdiction. Because possession was involved.

You have to look at what's the typical case, your

Honor. Typically, when it's an unlawful detainer it's because

I own the property, that tenant is renting from me, and that

tenant is not paying the rent, and I'm losing money every day

because I have to pay the mortgage and blah, blah, blah, and

they're living there free.

So the court provides what they call a summary

proceeding where I can get them out in 30 days. I set a

hearing --

THE COURT: Let me interrupt, please.

MS. DUFFY MC CARRON: But it's not the same --

THE COURT: Let me interrupt, please.

MS. DUFFY MC CARRON: Sure. Sure.

THE COURT: We've gone down this road.-

MS. DUFFY MC CARRON: Okay.

THE COURT: In this circumstance, I understand

there's no cross-complaint. But the answer that you filed is

not a property claim as contemplated by 405.31. I'm granting

the motion expunging the lis pendens.

I'm going to ask the moving party to prepare an

order. And I'm denying the motion for attorneys' fees at this

Lr,

pending.

And under Peery v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.3d 837,

1981, it says that when there is a lis pendens filed on a case,

if there is an appeal that lis pendens must remain on the

property through all levels of the appeal.

And I bring that up only because it wasn't in my

brief the first time because the first time we hadn't filed an

appeal on the final judgment, which we have. So now, Peery

becomes relevant because of this appeal that was filed last

month.

Also, there's several Supreme Court cases that I

cited. They're also old. Just as you said, they're old

Supreme Court cases, but they clearly have validity. And the

one I'm going to quote from is from 1890, like your case, very

old but has not been overruled, and that's Drinkhouse v. Spring

Valley Water Works. And it says that "any leasehold is an

estate in land and to hold that a leasehold does not affect the

right to possession is unreasonable as a matter of law."

That case was also cited in an appellate case in 1970

entitled Parker v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.3d 397. And

again, citing that old case, Parker said that the -- the same

thing, that any leasehold is an estate in land, and it's

appropriate. It doesn't matter whether the plaintiff or the

defendant filed the action.

If there is any dispute as to a leasehold or the

right to possess land, that the lis pendens is appropriate only

CCP 9405.31. Underlvin~ action not containing real property claim In proceedings under this chapter, the court shall order the notice expunged if the court finds that the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim. The court shall not order an undertaking to be given as a condition of expunging the notice where the court finds the pleading does not contain a real property claim.

CCP 9405.4. Real propertv claim Real property claim means the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if meritorious, affect (a) title to. or the right to possession of. specific real property or (b) the use of an easement identified in the plea$ing, other than an easement obtained pursuant to statute by any regulated public utility.

CCP 9405.1. Claimant Claimant means a ~artv to an action who asserts a real property claim and records a notice of the pendency of the action.

Civil 947. Privileged publication or broadcast A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:

(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty. (b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law,

or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows:

(4) A recorded lis pendens is not a privileged publication unless it identifies an action ~reviouslv filed with a court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or r i ~ h t of possession of real property, as authorized or required bv law. Lis pendens recorded as to leasehold for years on real property is proper. Parker v. Supr Court (1970) 9 CA. 36 397,400

Lis Pendens is . absolutely . privileged, constitutes no basis for slander of title. Woodcourt, 11 Limited v. McDonald Co. (198 1) 119 Cal. App. 3d 245,250;. Effect of a lis pendens is anyone acquiring interest in property after the action was filed is bound by a judgment. Palmer v. Zaklama (2003) 109 CA4th 1367,1375; BGJAssoc. v. Supr Ct (1999) 75 CA4th 952,966

Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 C.4th 642,647

'A lis pendens is a recorded document giving constructive notice that an action has been filed affecting title or right to possession of the real property described in the notice.' [Citation.] A lis pendens may be filed by any party in an action who asserts a 'real property claim.' (Code Civ. Proc.. 405.20.) Section 405.4 defines a ' "Real property claim" ' as 'the cause or causes of action in a pleading which would, if meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property . ..' "Kirkeby v. Supr Court (2004) 33 C.4th 642,647

"We reject Alpha's interpretation of subdivision (b)(4) of Civil Code section 47. In discerning the Legislature's intent, we look to the words of the statute, 'assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute's plain meaning governs.' [Citations.] [I The language of subdivision (b)(4) of Civil Code, section 47 is not ambiguous and in any event is not reasonably susceptible to a construction that would create an additional exception to the absolute litigation privilege based on the lack of 'evidentiary merit' of a claimant's real property claim in connection withea recorded lis pendens." (Alpha & Omega, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pu. 666667.)

(8) We believe this analysis of the privilege statute is correct. Civil Code, section 47(b)(4) does not contain a lack of" 'evidentiary merit' " exception to the litigation privilege, and it would be improper for us to insert what the Legislature has plainly omitted. (Alpha & Omega, supra, 200 Cal.A~p.4th at DV. 666; see 1858 [court's role is to declare terms of a statute, not to "insert what has been omitted"].) (9)" 'It is a prime rule of construction that the legislative intent underlying a statute must be ascertained from its language; if the language is clear, there can be no room for interpretation, and effect must be given to its plain meaning. "An intent that finds no expression in the words of the statute cannot be found to exist. The courts may not speculate that the legislature meant something other than what it said. Nor may they rewrite a statute to make it express an intention not expressed therein." ' [Citation.]" Moreover, we believe that if the Legislature had intended to erect an evidentiary hurdle or create an exception to the privilege based on lack of evidentiary merit, it would have said so. Since the Legislature did not do so, we are not at liberty to insert what has been omitted. For these reasons, we reject appellants' proposition that the availability of the litigation privilege to a recorded lis pendens depends upon whether the claimant is able to make a certain evidentiary showing of merit to support the real property claim. On this issue, the dicta in Palmer, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 1367, that is relied upon by appellants was in error Mutual Life Ins. Co v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402,412

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EX­PARTE MOTION RE: DEF EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER TO REPAIR OR REPLACE ELE 09/09/2014 ­ 9:30 AM DEPT. S28X

MICHAEL A SACHS, JUDGE CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPORTER LINDA BALDWIN 12453 COURT ATTENDANT MARY KILGORE ­ APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR BONNIE SHIPLEY. ­ PROCEEDINGS: NO FILE. PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD EX­PARTE HEARING IS HELD. EX PARTE APPLICATION ARGUED. COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THE MOVING PAPERS AND OPPOSITION FILED 9/8/14. ­ COURT FINDS: EX PARTE ORDERS DENIED. FINDINGS ARE STATED ON THE RECORD. ACTION ­ COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

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Case LID~SI 2041 30 - STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY --.-.-- ---*-.-.-.- -..------..-.....-.. .

Action: FChoosel 7

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MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY 07/02/2013 - 8:30 AM DEPT. S32

DONALD ALVAREZ, JUDGE CLERK: STEPHANIE CHANDLER COURT REPORTER FRANCES MACIAS 10918 COURT ATTENDANT ERIC ASHE

APPEARANCES: ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR APPEARS BY COURTCALL FOR STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES A CA GENERAL PARTNER. ATTORNEY NANCY D U F N MCCARRON (BY PHONE PRIOR TO CALENDAR) PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT. - MOTION BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS HEARD. MATTER ORDERED CONTINUED REASON: CASE STAYEDIAPPEAL PENDING - HEARINGS: CURRENT HEARING CONTINUED TO 07122113AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S32. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE. ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

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Case UDDSl204130 - STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY Action: I P2hoosel r 1

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MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY 07/22/2013 - 8:30 AM DEPT. S32

DONALD ALVAREZ, JUDGE CLERK: STEPHANIE CHANDLER COURT ATTENDANT ERIC ASHE NOT REPORTED

APPEARANCES: ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR APPEARS BY COURTCALL FOR STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES A CA GENERAL PARTNER. ATTORNEY NANCY DLIFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT. - M OTl ON BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS HEARD. MATTER ORDERED CONTINUED REASON: STILL AWAITING REMITTITUR MOTION ORDERED TO TRIAL OSC RE STATUS - HEARINGS: CURRENT HEARING CONTINUED TO 10/21/13AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S32. NOTICE WAIVED. ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

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MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY 1012112013 - 8:30 AM DEPT. S32

DONALD ALVAREZ, JUDGE CLERK: STEPHANIE CHANDLER COURT REPORTER JILL LANGLEY 7663 COURT ATTENDANT ERIC ASHE - APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT.

MOTION STUBBLEFIELDPROPERTIES A CA GENERAL PARTNER'S MOTION FOR AlTORNEY FEES IS HEARD. MAlTER ORDERED CONTINUED TO BE HEARD AFTER DEFENDANT HAS PREPARED AND SUBMllTED A PROPOSED JUDGMENT AND ORDER.

DEFENDANT TO LIST AlTORNEY FEES TO BE DETERMINED IN THE PROPOSED JUDGMENT. PURSUANT TO STIPULATION OF COUNSEL: DEFENDANT SHALL BE ALLOWED TO SERVE A COPY OF THE PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL VIAL EMAlL OR BY FAX.

HEARINGS: CURRENT HEARING CONTINUED TO 01107114 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S32. ACTION - COMPLETE --- --- MINUTE ORDER END ===

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MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY 0110712014 - 8:30 AM DEPT. S32

DONALD ALVAREZ, JUDGE CLERK: STEPHANIE CHANDLER COURT REPORTER REGINA VEGA 12612 COURT ATTENDANT ERIC ASHE - APPEARANCES: AlTORNEY ROBERT G WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF/PETlTIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT. - MOTION BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS HEARD. ARGUED BY COUNSEL AND SUBMITTED.

COURT FINDS: THE COURT IS INFORMED THAT THE DEFENDANT FILED A REQUEST FOR RECUSAL (170.6) ON 71221 1 3.

NOTE: THE COURT NOTES THAT THE 170.6 WAS PREMATURELY FILED BY DEFENDANT 0~7122113, AS THE COURT WAS STILL AWAITING THE REMITTITUR (THAT THE COURT HAD NOT YET RECEIVED) HOWEVER DEFENDANT HAVING MADE AN ORAL REQUEST FOR RECUSAL IN OPEN COCIRT, THE COURT RLILES AS FOLLOWS: JUDGE DONALD ALVAREZ RECUSES SELF FROM THE CASE. CASE ASSIGNED TO JUDGE MICHAEL A SACHS FOR ALL PURPOSES. CASE ASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT S33, BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE SACHS FOR ALL PURPOSES. - HEARINGS: CURRENT HEARING CONTINUED TO 02/10/14 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S33. NOTICE GIVEN BY JClDlClAL ASSISTANT CORRESPONDENCE COVERSHEET GENERATED TO MAIL MINUTE ORDER DATED 1/7/14 TO COUNSEL

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MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY 0211 012014 - 8:30 AM DEPT. S33

MICHAEL A SACHS, JUDGE CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPORTER KATHY SELLERS 4420 COURT ATTENDANT MARY KILGORE

APPEARANCES: AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAlNTlFFlPETlTlONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT. - PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSIl-ION HEARING HELD MOTION ACTION CAME ON FOR MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES FILED BY BONNIE SHIPLEY. COURT HAS REVIEWED THE MOTION, OPPOSl1-ION, REPLY, EXPERT DECLARATIONS, AND OTHER ADDITIONAL DECLARATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN FILED.

COURT DOES NOT GO FORWARD WITH MOTlON FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND SETS MATTER FOR HEARING REGARDING JUDGMENT. COURT HAS RECEIVED PROPOSED JUDGMENTS FROM ATTORNEY MCCARRON AND INSTRUCTS COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO SUBMITT PROPOSED JUDGMENT TO THE COURT. HEARING REGARDING JUDGMENT WlLL BE HELD ON 2/19/14 AND THEREAFTER A HEARING FOR THE MOTION FOR AlTORNEY FEES WlLL BE SET.

HEARINGS: HEARING RE: PROPOSED JUDGMENT SET FOR 02/19/14 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S33A. ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

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MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES 03/17/2014 - 8:30 AM DEPT. S33

MICHAEL A SACHS, JUDGE CLERK: ANCHALEE M PRICE COURT REPORTER KATHY SELLERS 4420 COURT ATTENDANT MARY KILGORE - APPEARANCES: AlTORNEY NANCY DLIFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER. AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPON DENT.

MOTION POST-DISPOSITION HEARING HELD THE COURT IS IN RECEIPT OF DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS AND PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTIONS. THE COURT HAS REVISED THE PROPOSED JUDGMENT AND A COPY OF THE PROPOSED JUDGMENT WITH THE COURTS NOTES ARE PROVIDED TO COUNSEL.

PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL TO PREPARE JUDGMENT AS DISCUSSED ON THE RECORD.

PURSUANT TO STIPULATION OF COUNSEL: BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION RE:ATTORNEY FEES IS HEARD. THE COURT RECITES ITS TENTATIVE RULING ON THE REOCRD. ARGUED BY COUNSEL AND SLIBMITTED. - COURT FINDS: BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION RE:AITORNEY FEES IS DENIED. WITHOUT PREJUDICE THE COURT FINDS THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL IS ENTITLED TO HER ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO CCP 798, HOWEVER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT SPECIFIC AS TO HER BILLING.DEFENSE COUNSEL MAY SUBMIT ANOTHER MOTION DETAILING HER FEES FOR THE COURTS REVIEW.

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EX-PARTE MOTION RE: FOR ORDER CONTINUING HEARING 0911712014 - 851 AM DEPT. S28X

MICHAEL A SACHS, JLIDGE CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPORTER CRAIG ANDERSON 11800 COURT ATTENDANT ROBERT KRETZMEIER - APPEARANCES: AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPE-IITIONER. A'ITORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFT-BONNIE SHIPLEY. - PROCEEDINGS: NO FILE. PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD EX-PARTE HEARING IS HELD. COURT ADVISES A'ITORNEY MCCARRON THAT SHE MAY APPEAR BY COURTCALL ON FUTURE EXPARTE HEARINGS. - COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO MOVE FORWARD WITH TODAYS HEARING. CASE REMAINS STAYED PENDING APPELLATE RULING. COURT VACATES THE MOTION REGARDING A7TORNEY FEES CURRENTLY SET

- HEARINGS: VACATE L&M HEARING SCHEDLILED FOR 10/02/14 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28. NOTICE TO BE GIVEN BY ATTORNEY WILLIAMSON. ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

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EX-PARTE MOTION RE: PLA EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER CONT THE HEARING ON DEF 03/04/2015 - 8:31 AM DEPT. S28X

MICHAEL A SACHS, JUDGE CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPORTER REGINA VEGA 12612 COURT ATTENDANT MARY KILGORE - APPEARANCES: AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER.

PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD NO FILE. ACTION CAME ON FOR PLA EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER TO CONT DEFT HEARING.

COURT ADVISES COLINSEL OF ORDER PREVIOUSLY SIGNED ON 2/27/15 REQUIRING NEW MOTION WITH NEW SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS TO BE FILED. EXPARTE APPLICATION DENIED AS MOOT.

COURT VACATES HEARING CURRENTLY SET 3/18/15. MOVING PARTY TO CONTACT CLERKS OFFICE AND OBTAIN FIRST AVAILABLE DATE FOR HEARING.

COURT ORDERS CSR REGINA VEGA TO PREPARE A TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS DATED 03/04/ 1 5. - HEARINGS: VACATE HRG HEARING SCHEDULED FOR 03/18/15 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28. ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

31512015 UDFSi406978 Minute Orders - San Bernardino Main

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HEARING RE: MOTIONS SET FOR 02103115 01/30/2015 - 9:30 AM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL

APPEARANCES: PARTIES NOT PRESENT: STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA, NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY

PROCEEDINGS: ON ITS OWN MOTION, THE HEARING ON DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND TO COMPEL RESPONSES ARE RESET FOR 02/10/15 AT 8:30AM IN DEPT. F7.

THE CLERK IS ORDERED TO NO1-IFY THE PARTIES BY TELEPHONE. NOTICE GIVEN BY JLlDlClAL ASSISTANT BY TELEPHONE & MAILING OF MINUTE ORDER CORRESPONDENCE COVERSHEET GENERATED TO MAIL MINUTE ORDER DATED 01/30/15 TO COUNSEL OF RECORD. ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

3/15/2015 UDFS1406978 Minute Orders - San Bernardino Main

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MOTION RE: TO COMPLE RESPONSES TO BONNIE SHIPLEYS DOCUMENTINSPECTION FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY 0211012015 - 8:30 AM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL BAILIFF: J RODRIGUES

APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT

PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 10:17 THE COURT HAS REVIEWED DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND COMPEL RESPONSES. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF . DOCUMENT(S) SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW. MATTER TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION. 11:08 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. ACTION - COMPLETE --- --- MINUTE ORDER END === --- --- MINUTE ORDER END === CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED

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HEARING RE: MOTIONS UNDER SLIBMISSION/NEXT HEARING DATE 03/06/2015 - 4:30 PM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE, JLIDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL

PROCEEDINGS: MOTIONS TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION ON 02/10/15 IS ORDERED VACATED. MOTIONS TO BE HEARD AT A DATE TO BE DETERMINED BY JUDGE SACHS (DEPT. S28).

COURT ORDERS THIS CASE TO SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER TO BE HEARD WITH UDDS1204130. - COURT ORDERS MOTIONS THAT ARE SET TO BE HEARD ON 03/18/15 IN DEPT. F7 TO BE RE- CALENDARED FOR 03/18/15 IN DEPT. S28 (SAN BERNARDINO) TO EITHER BE HEARD OR CONTINUED TO A DATE TO BE DETERMINED BY THAT DEPARTMENT. - THE COLIRT NOW ORDERS THIS CASE ASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT ( S28) FOR ALL PURPOSES. CLERK'S OFFICE TO NOTIFY PARTIES CLERK'S OFFICE TO SEND FILE TO SAN BERNARDINO FOR NEXT HEARING AC1-ION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

EXHIBIT 19

Nancy DL@ McCarron, CBN 164780 Law Office of Nancy Duffy

950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

Richard Castanon, [so9-3a6-86311 sent via fax to: 909-382-3212 Liability Claims Rep I1 sent via email to: msloug.h@sb-court.org Department of Risk Management San Bernardino County BOS (5 emails) 222 W. Hospitality Lane, 3rd. Floor Your File: 119658 (McCarron, Shipley & Allen) San Bernardino, CA 92415 Judge Michael A. Sachs (added to claim)

Claim is amended to over $25,000

Dear Mr. Castanon:

I received your March 16, 2015 letter. Please consider this a n amendment to claim 119658. We are adding Judge Michael A. Sachs to our claim. The judicial abuse and corruption we have cndured in his kangaroo court since Feb 10, 2012 caused me to seriously consider naming him with Brodie. Sachs is sneakier and more subtle in his corruption so I didn't name him. However, Sachs' callous acts this week exceeded the bounds of a civilized society, causing me to amend to name Sachs. If Sachs is not removed from our case by 3/26/15, and all of his void orders vacated, wo will seek punitive damages in our racketeering case to be filed this April. I believe a federal jury would be so outraged they might award millions against Judge Sachs.

On Friday 3/13/15 I called Kay Lewis residing judge Marsha Slough's assistant) and Judge Sachs' deputy Mary Kilgorc to notify them about the very tragic and untimely death of my younger brother, whose daughter and wife were murdered a few years ago by her ex-boyfriend. This was the thirdhorrifying tragedy in our immediate family which has been devastating. I also told them my diabetic daughter was rushed to the emergency room in a semi-coma state. With these two tragic events I needcd a few weeks to grieve the death of my brother and help my daughter's family in a time of crisis. I faxed a 2-page "Notice o f UnavailabiIity of Counsel' with a n incorporated Notice ofPreempto~y Challenge to Judge Sachs, under CCP 2170.6 (a)(2). (see Exhibit A - a t end see mail priority confirmation proving Sachs received papers 3/13/15.) Judge Alvarez postponed a 12/17/12 trial date to 1/10/13 when Tom Parish's stepson died. Our case was transferred from Judge Brodie's UD court in Fontana to S28 in the Justice Center last week to be consolidated with the first case which we won in 2013. The case is still pending because we had to appeal the judgment Sachs entered against our interest, and because Judge Sachs has done everything in his power to delay and thwart awarding mandatory attorney fees.

Stubblefield's lawyer (Williamson) had just pummeled me with 3 motions (on 5-days' notice). In UD court discovery motions are brought on 5 days' notice. CCP 21170.8. Opposing party may file written opposition a day before hearing or present opposition orally a t the hearing. see CRC 3.1347. The first motion was 52 pages; the second one 102 pages; the third 129 pages. With the unexpected death of my brother and my daughter's emergency hospitalization, it was humanly impossible to research the issues addressed in 183 pages of motions and arguments, and prepare written opposition. I was so overcome with grief and worry over my daughter, that I could barely function last week and was in no condition to try to perform the impossible. Exh. A shows Sachs received my Notice Monday, 3/13/15, I-Ie knew I could not He opposition the day before the 3/18/15 hearing. Any unbiased judge would have continued everything!

Any unbiased judge would refuse to hear oral argument from a malicious opposing party, showing up to take full advantage of counsel's physical and mental impairment in her time of severe grief over the death of her brother and worry over the near death of her daughter. Instead, evil Sachs showed his true colors. He is a hcartless monster without a conscience. Attached as Exhibit B is the rulings he made on 3/18/15 while I was not there to rebut the lies.

Here are excerpts from the callous Judge with the heart of a grcat white shark:

"Court addresses filng of a CCP 170.6 filed by defendant against Judge Sachs is DEMED." "Court treats Notice of Unavailability of Counsel submitted by attorney McCarmn as a request for antinuance. Matter is continued due to attorney McCarron's emergency situation. Court notes no opposition to motion filed. Cour-t h u e due dates for fine of ouvasition."

What kind of a callous monster would make such a ruling, where movant filed 183 pages of motion papers on 5 days' notice, when he knows she is physically, emotionally, and mentally unable to cope duc to two immediate family tragedies. Sachs has a malignant, evil heart. This is not the first time Judge Sachs has acted with a malignant heart and zero compassion.

On May 6, 2013 the AppelIatc Division granted Bonnie Shipley's writ petition and reversed the biased trial court's denial of summary judgment every judge knew was a sham complaint. For 2 years Judge Sachs (Stubblefield's chore boy) has thwarted my ability to collect attorney fees which are mandatory under Mobile Home Residcncy Law to every MRL prevailing party. First, after the writ of mandate arrived in the trial court Judge Alvarez recused himself a t my request because bias is presumed when a judge's decision is reversed. (see Exh. A; exh. A) The case was transferred to Sachs, who was a more vigorous. advocatc for Stubblefield then his own half-competent lawyers. Sachs proceeded to engage in g n e serial violations of statutes, scparation of powers, Rules of Court, Stare Decisis, and Codes of Procedures (see Exh. C) even going so far as to insert the words "or resident" into a statute Stubblefield quoted in the final judgment Sachs let the loser prepare, instead of prevailing party as required by CRC 3.1312.

We have encountered only 2 unbiased judges who actually applied the law; i.e. Judge Ochoa and Judge Brisco, who authored the Appellate Division's 10-page Decision and Writ of Mandate directing the trial court to cnter judgment in Bonnie Shipley's favor. The court immediately pulled them off the Appellate Panel, and replaced them with Judge Hosking, the Judge who "dissented in the ruling. With a chore-boy on t.he Appellate Panel Stubblefield is home free. They wiLl never assign either of the two honest judgcs to us. They will only assign judges who will rule against us no matter what the law, rules of court, or codes of procedure.

Sachs not only let the loser compose final judgment, but even went one step furthcr. Sachs inserted the words "or resident" into tho final judgment to provide a remedy for Stubblefield to evict Bonnie Shipley directly, contravening what Appellate Panel mandated. Stubblefield's lawyer then delivered the debaucbedjudgment directly to his chambers. Sachs entered the judgment before I had an opportunity to evcn sce it, let alone object to it. When Shipley tried to hand deliver objections the next day Judge Sachs refused to file them, stating objections were "late" as he had "signed the judgment already." This violated Local Rule 591.3 requiring all judges to hold a final judgment for 10 days to allow for objections. Shipley was forced to appeal her own victory to prevent abuse by using the debauched judgment to steal mobile homes from residents at Mountain Shadows Community.

2

Shipley dropped off her objections which Sachs refused to accept in his Kangaroo Court. The new Appellate Division Panel (Sachs' lunch buddies) DENIED Shipley's motion to augment the record with her objections, opening the door for Stubblefield to argue we waived objections. Sachs lunch buddies on the Appellate Panel had to order Sachs to strike the words "or resident." They found his nine serial violations to be "harmless" and chastised me for daring to argue bias---making a subtle threat that such arguments "bordered on contempt of court." Incredible! Sachs' nine serial violations were hardly "harmled' to us. We had to pay $175 for a transcript. Sachs was able to thwart my ability to receive any attorney fee award for another six months. I had to spend hundreds of hours researching issues, writing Opening and Reply briefs, and attending oral argument in San Bernardino, including travel costs. Sachs loves revenge. Perhaps a federal jury will have the last say on Sachs' campaign to punish and degrade me.

It would take hundreds of pages to show all of the blatant violations of judicial ethics, not to mention gender discrimination (calling me Ma'am while addressing Williamson as "counsel"). The final showing of a malignant heart is how Sachs treated Bonnie Shipley this past summer. Stubblefield exhausted all appeals as high as California Supreme Court, and lost them all. Once the concept of possibly having to pay my attorney fees for 3 years became a reality, Stubblefield tried to burn us out of the mobile home. The electrical pedestal and gas meter on the side of our home caught fire. The neighbor who saw the fire start up, and another who ran over to help save our home extinguished the fire with their bare hands, water and extinguisher. Both witnesses said i t started in the electric pedestal, which was under park manager's control. We had no gas, electric, telephone or DSL. The park manager refused to replace the meters. We filed an emergency ex parte hearing to ask Sachs to order utilities restored to the home. (see Exhibit D) D-1 is priorty mail confirmation Sachs received the papers on Friday 9/5/14. Yet, when we showed up Monday morning (918114) Judge Sachs played his cute little game of reciting they "neverrcceived thepapem." Attorney Williamson was not there. I am sure Sachs had his deputy call to telI him not to bother driving over as he would continue it to Tuesday. We had to stay overnight and return Tuesday, at Williamson's whim and total convenience. Sachs DENIED our motion (Exh. D 1) while temperatures exceeded 105 degrees. I had to pay $3,000 to restore utilities to our home. I asked if Bonnie could relievc herself from the extreme heat by sitting in the air-conditioned clubhouse and going in a swimming pool. THE ANSWER WAS "NO, SHE IS NOT AN APPROVED RESIDENT OF THE PARK SO SHE C N T GO. Judge Sachs was fully aware that Bonnie was caring for.her bother, who has stage 4 cancer, undergoing chemotherapy, radiation and proton therapy to try to save his life, and her mother who suffered congcstive heart failure and could not care for her son or drive him to therapy.

Both Sachs and Williamson arc malignant hearts who have zero compassion for anyone. Sachs may enjoy all the power he can hoard over us in his black robe and guard with a gun. Some day Sachs will have to face a higher force on judgmcnt day and try to justify his cruelty. I could write pages about all the unfair treatment and gender bias abuse from Judge Sachs. The transfer of the Duffy case to Judge Sachs for "consolidation" is so he can deny my fecs again, by claiming he needs to wait for the outcome of the "related case." I am not retarded! This scam is transparent. We wonder many thousands Stubblefield laundered into Sachs' "judicial campaign fund." We have no chance for an ounce of justice in his kangaroo court.

CC: Supervisors, County, Steve Graham

EXHIBIT A

Fa% $0 p- 4 b$ - ggp;L ,

(1<' w y ? ~ S - f Z S z .

1 Nancy Duffy McCarron, CRN 164780 950 Roble Lanc

2 Santa Barbara, CA 93103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

3 nancyduffysb dyahuo.com k Real Estate raker Lie. #00853086 4

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

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I1 I CONSOLIDATED CASES

Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shiplcy

Nancy Duffy McCarron, In Pro Per Special Appearance for Steve Allen and Christine Allen

URGENT!

7- Case No. UDPS1406978 filed 10/3/14 Case No. UDDS1204130 filed 8/13/12

PPREMPTORY CHALLENGE AGAINST JUDGE SACHS -2 CONSOLIDATED CASES CCP 5170.6 .

NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL TRAGIC DEATH OF

17 BROTHER AND HER DIABETIC DAUGHTER'S IN A SEMI-COMATOSE STATE

19 ba Mountain Shadows Mobile MTC non-parties Steve & Chistine Allen 5 MTC Bonnie Shipley, defendant

(Motions are Filed & Served by 2-day Mail 3-1-15) will be filed 1-day before rescheduled date

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TO: PRESIDING JUDGE MARSIU SLOUGH, .JUDGE SACHS AM) COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF

PLEASE TAKE NV'I'ICE that Nancy Duffy McCarron, as counsel for Bonnie Shipley, and herself in pro per, & specially appearing, without conceding./urisdiction, for Steve Allen and Christine Allen (non-parties harassed)

Counsel will be unavailable until after April 3,2015. 3 Hearings set for March 18 & 19 must be vacated.

Nancy Duffy McCarron's 55-yr old brother nnexpectedly died this week from complications of pneumonia and

mcst grieve the first death of a sibling. Secondly, his surviving daughter is devastated as she and her father just

buried her only sister & mother a few years ago who were murdered by an ex-boyfriend. The family i s devastate0

We need time to mounl this horrible third tragedy in this family. Secondly, counsel's daughter was rushcd to the

hospital in a diabctic coma, sunivetl hut is still hospitalized. Counsel needs to help her family in this recovery. ---- --- .-

- 0 - ~ T - L - - - c T T - -..- :i-h:i:k. -..-- -I..-&:I ..a- A I ? I I < ~ ~ x ~ ~ ~ : - - + - n : - - . . - i : r . . T.A--Q,,A.~ P P D s17n L

McCarron expects the same equal treatment from this court which was extended to Stubblefield when his

lawyer filed "Notice of Unavailability" due to two "compelling circumstances" (death in family & sickness also).

(See Exh. A). Judge Alvarez immediately continued all hearings for an entire month for "family emergencies."

Accordingly, the 2 hearings set for March 18 against Steve &Christine Allen, as well as the hearing set March 19

against Bonnie Shipley must be vacated and no other hearings be set until after April 3,2015 to afford McCarron

her time to grieve the tragically premature dcath of her younger brother & to deal with her daughter's emergency.

Rcmittitur was entered 21311 5 in UDDSl204 130. Transfer of UDDS 12041 30 was enteredlserved 3/9/15

1 Non-parties Steve & Christine Allen join in this Motion to Disqualify as to their imarouer motions.

I Presiding Judge is required to reassign both consolidated cases to a new judge who is not afraid to appl!

the law and rule against the almighty Stubblefield when mandated by Stare Decisis & who is not afraid

to enforce mv, Rules of Court, Civil Procedures fairly and equally to both parties in the litigation.

Judicial Estoppel [as amply explained in Jackotr v. v. County ofLos Angeles (1997) 60 CA.4th 1711

precludes Stubblefield from opposing disqualification because he already gained an advantage by havin

his denial of disqualification reversed on a writ by making the identical claim McCanon makes above.

see Stubblefield v. Superior Court of Sun Bernardino County (2000) 81 CA 4'h. 762 (Exhibit B)

Accordingly, wc request the presiding judge to immediately disqualify Judge Sachs, vacate all

motions which may be reset after April 3,2015 on 16 day notice in the court of a newly assigned judgc

Oppositions to 3 motions will be filed after the motions have been reset on Drover notice per CCP $100:

I declare the above to be true under penalty of perjury. Executed in Santa Barbara, CA on 3/13/15.

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and specially appearing for non-parties Steve and Christine Allen

MOTION BY AFFIDAVIT FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE SACHS ON BOTH CASES

NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

She is attorney for the named parties, and both non-parties to the within action (or special proceeding). That Judg

Sachs, who has been assigned to preside over both consolidated cases cited above now pending, is prejudiced

against the party (or his or her attorney) or the interest of the party (or his or her attorney) so that affiant cannot

or believes helshe cannot have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judge, under CCP 170.6 (a)(2)

"A motion under this paragraph may be made following reversal on appeal of a trial court's decision, or following reversal on appeal of a trial court's final judgment, if the trial judge in the prior proceeding is assigned to conduct a new trial on the matter. Notwithstanding paragraph (4), the party who filed thc appeal that resulted in the reversal of a final judgment of a trial court may make a motion under this section regardless of whether that party or side has previously done so. The motion shall be made within 60 days after the party or the party's attorney has been notified of the assignment.

- 1 - Notice of Unavailability of Counsel until after 4/3/15 & Motion to Disqualify Judge Sachs CCP 51 70.6 -

Robert S. Coldren, Esq., Bar No. 81710 Robert G. WOliamsan, Jr., Esq. Bar No. Justus J. Britt, Es ., Bar No. 269352 BART, r n ~ B ~OLDREN A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORAT 200 Sandpointe, Fourth Floor Santa Ana, California 92707

73176

'ION

California gneral partnership dba

13 HOME COMMUNTTY,

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14 I Plaintiff

Attorneys for Plaintiff Stubblefield Pro ertics, s Csk:i'ornia general partnership e dba Mountnin Shadows Mobile Home ommuniPf

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE )F CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERN.4RDM3 -CIVIL DNISTON

L STUBBI>EFI[ELD PROPERTIES, s ) Case<.r'o. UDDS1204X30

B O m SHIPLFY, and DOES 1 through 17 10, inclusive, I 18 1 Defendants.

Judge: Hcn. Donald R. Alvarez Dept.842

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22 TO &L PARTIES AND TO THEIR OF R E C O ~ :

23 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Properties dba Mountain , . s ,,

24 1 Shadows Mobile Home Community, wial witnesses set firth below are unavailable to attend

I 15 nnd testify at trial until after January 1.2013 due to :%garate compelling circumstances as

26 1 set forth in the declaration of Plaintiffs counsel. . I . Thomas Parrish, Senior Executiva Vice ~r.=iii;;;?t, ~tubblefield Properties.

28 -.

,'?'.',?, .

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2. Marvin Freeman, Manager, Mountain Shadows

m e reasons for each of these witnesses unavilability are Set

of Robert G. Williamson, Ir.

DECLARATION OF ROBERT G. WILLIAMS

I, ROBERT G. WILLIAMSON, JR., declare:

1. I attorney duly licensed to practice law before all cou

~alifomia, and am a partner with the law firm of Hart, King Coldren. att

for Plaintiff STUBBLEFIE3.D PROPERTIES, a partnership dba

SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY YPIaintiff 7. The facts set forth herei

of my own personat knowledge, except those facts stated

to those matters I believe them to be true and could and would completely testify thereto.

2. Mr. Thomas Parrish is Senior Executive Vice President of Plaintiff..:.

Stubbletield Properties. His duties, among others, include supervising management and . . . ..

,

operations of Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Corn~nunity. As Plaintiffs representative he

expected to attend trial every day.

3. Mr. Parrish is also a percipient witness and expected to testify at trial about

Defendant's presence in the community, the Community Guidelines and resideacy age

restriction and his communications with Defendant's munsel Nancy D u e McCarron,.

4. On December 10, 2012. the initial trial date, the C o w with counsel and

Defendant present in court reset the trial date for December 17, 2012 and Defendant

5. I learned that morning after leaving ourt that MI. Parrish's son's funeral will

n December 17,2012. It is my understanding that the passing of M ~ . pan-&$..- . .

call^ premature and naturally . . his family is dkeply grieving their loss. Under the stances I do not expect Mr. Parrish to be prepared to be in court for . ~ a l and to testify . r January 1,2013.

36568.053/4814-7826-5618~. 1 2

S m ~ m r n L D O)NSTRUCI'ION COO et .I., Petitloner+ v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO C O W , RrepondenQ c m OF SAN BERNARDMO et al., Real ParKw in Interest. COURTOF ~ppI3.L OF CALIFORNIA, FOUR733 APPELLATE DISTRICT, DlVlSlON TWO 81 cy ~ p p 4 6 76UI Cal. App. 4th 76% 97 C d Rptr I I2197 Cal RpU. U 121; 2 m O &I &PIP*IS 4 W D N Cd. App. m 1 S 412; 2N0 W 04 Op S& 49012000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4901; 2000 Daily JournnlDAR651 12080 Daily J O ~ D A R 651 I No. W26308 June L6,2000, Decided Editorial Information: Prior HisfDry Superior Cwrt of San Bmardino County. Super. Ct. No. SCV-232058. Martin A. Hildrnh ~udge. ' Retired judge of the former San Bemardino Municipal CouR W a t Valley Divison, @signed by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VL section 6 of the ~ a i k i a ~nsrilution. Disposition:

a peremptoy writ of mandate issue as prayed. Petitioners shall rewVCr their Costs. ~eadnntes CALIFORMA OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES: Clsssified to California Digest dOfficial Report3 (I \ rudees 6 14-Disqudifietdion-Groundr-Bias or Prejudiob-Party's PerempWry Chalknge--Timelinm-Applieabilify ofFILsr Track Rules-Following . - ,~~~- -~ ,. Reversal and ema and. --AAer rmaod in a civil action in which a mmmary judgment in favor of defendants had been reversed in pan and in whieh the eaCs was assigned to the same judge who had made the mmsry judgment mling, the Rial c o w emd in denying as untimely plaintiffi' per-tory challenge to the judge p u m to Code Civ. Pme., 5 170.6, subd. (2). First, given the policy reasons for the 1985 amendments to Code Civ. Proe., 5 170.6 rubd (2), i.e., the potcdial for biason the pert of the trial judge who had b m reversed, plainti@ had the right to disqualify the judge, even though they had previously mereired such a challenge. Althmgh m a rule a party is limited to a single peremploy challenge in a e m , the stafutc permis an a d d i t i d ehallenge following reversal of ajudgment if thc same judge is assiped to bear the case on remand. Second. plainti*' motion was timely. Although Gov. Code, $ 68616, subd(i) (fast uack rules), limits a parly's exerehe of a peremptory challenge to the I5 days following the first appearnee, this provirion only applies when the assignment of an dl-purpose or direct ealendar judge is mnde simultaneously with the aceepcance of the complaint for filink Thm, Gav. Codc S 68616 has no aodicntion when aiudment has been reversed on appeal and rebJmed tn the trial court for retrial. hscesd, the 60-day ~

provision d < ~ c d e ~ i v . me., y170.6, eontro~~cd. - [See 2 Witkin, Cal. Pmeedure (4th ed. 1996) C O W , 8 146 etscq.] Summary

ARsr remand in a civil action in which a summary judgment in favor of defendants had been rcwrscd in pa? the casc wasaesigncd to the umejudge ~ h o had m& the summary judgment d i n g . Plaintif% filed a peremptory challenge to the judgc pursuant to Codc Civ. Proe., 5 170.6, subd (2). and defendants obicctcd bawl on untimelincss. The trial iudnc msfaincd defendad obiection. (Sumior Court of Ssn Bmmdino Counw.No. SCV252058, - - . . ~ d n A Hiimh, Judge. *)

Retired judge of the former San Bemardino Municipal Court, West Valley Division, assigned by the C h i e f l ~ i c e p u m t to artiele VI, pertion 6 of the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal granted plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandate. The wurt held that, given the policy remns for the 1985 amendments to Code Civ. Pmc., 5 170.6, subd. (2). i.e.. the potential for biw an the part ofthe trial judge who had k e n reversed, plaint& had the I+& to disqualify the judge, even though they had previously exercised meh a challenge. Tke court also held that plaintiff? motion wss timely. Although Gov. Code, 8 68616, subd. (i) (fast Uack rules), limits a p W s exereire of a peremptoryehallenge to the 15 dar j following the first appearance. this pmvision only applies whm the rssignment of an all-plrrpose or direct calendarjudge is made simultaneously with the aeeepmee of the complaint for filing. Thus, Gov. Code. 9 68616, has no applicaion when a judgment has been reversed on appeal and refilmed to the vial eourt for reaid. Instead, the m d a y pmvision of Code Civ. Pmc., 5 170.6, contmlled. (Opinion by Gaut, Aeting P. I., with Riehli and Ward, JJ., eoneurring.) Counsel Hill, Pamr & Burrill and Dean 8. Dennis for Petitionem

No appearance for Respondent. Lmis, VAmato, Brisbois & B i s g e Christopher D. Lockwood; lamer F. Penman. City Ammey, and H q Empeno, Depofy City

Anmey, for Real Pm'es in Interest Judges: Opinion by G a a Aciing P. J., with Richli and Ward, JJ., wneurring

Opinion by: Gaut (81 Cd. App. 4th 7631 (97 Cal. Rptr. Zd 123) GAUT, Aeting P. 1. In thin muter we aq as happens far too ofleu, Eancd upon to reconcile and auempt to harmonize two stnrutes which strenuously resist any effort to make sen= of them. Of me two possible results argued by the panics, neither is either mmpelled or compelling. Nevertheless, in our 81 cal. ~ p p . 4th 764) view the eonelusion we reaeh wmpot'ts best with the intent of the Legislahue as we understand it and does the 1- violence to the English language. We find that petitioners' attempt to disqualify the trial judge wan t h e w and that the hial court erred in findhg otherwise. 'Ihe facts of the underlying case arc not signilimt Earlier proceedings resulted in a summary judgmmt in favor of real pmiw in infwest the Ciw of San ~ e d i n o d related dekndan4 (hereinafter City). However, on appeal by pefitioners SNbbletieM ConJtrueiion Co. a al. (hcminaffer Srubblefield), we reversed the summary judgment in pan and remanded for fuitha pmceedings. Our opinion was filed on June 29.1999, and theminihlr was rcccived by the trial wurt on August 3 1 of that year. On Sepiember 17. the clwk of the wurt notified the W i e s thnt the ease had been mimed to the Honomblc Christopher J. Wmer for all purposes. Judge Wmer had, in fact, made the ruling which led to the latest appeal and partial revernal. On October 29, Stubblefleld filed a pmmmory ehallenge to Judge Wamer pmuant to Code Of Civil Pmeedure, seetion 170.6, and the City filed an objection b a d on untimeliness The court susuained the C i y s objeciion and refused to disqualify iaelf This petition followed and we stayed funher p m d i w pending our resolution of the matter. DISCUSSION (1)(1) Stubblrtield relier upon Code Of CivilProeedurenection 170.6,subdivlsion (2). In pertinent part this statuk providm that " [a] motion

under this paragraph may be made fallowing rwersal on appeal o i a trial court's dslslon, o r iollowlng reversal au appeal of a trlal court's final judgmenb if the trial judge in the prior proceeding is aasigncd to eonducta new trial on the mam. Notwithstanding paragraph (3) of this secf io~ the party who fded the appeal that resulted in the reversal of a final judgment of a trial wurt m y make a motion under this s e c t h mgardless of whaher that p a w or side has previously done so. The motion shall be made within 60 days after the party or the p a w s attorney has been notlfied oithe assignment" ,/Of

, To this, the City raises two arguments: I) that Stubblefield, having previously filed a ehallcnge under Code ofcivil Proesdurc, section 170.6, is not entitled to file another, w d 2) that the case is governed by sepaate, and shorter, t h e limits established in the Govemmenl Code. We a d d m these w m ~ f s sop&y. - (81 Cal. App. 4th 765) A. First, the City argues that Stubbleiield may not exereise its right to cballcnge Judge Wamer bemuse it previwsly exercised sueh a challenge. I Although as a (97 CaI. Rpb: 2d 124) mle a party is limited to a single peremptory ehallenge in a gse, as sd forth above, the statute elearly permits an addillonel

following reversal of ajudgment if the same judge is nssigned to hear the cau; on remand. However, the City argues that because the proccdings were terminad by summary judgment, rather than by judgment & trial, the remand will not result in anew lrial but in a first Wial. Henez, the argument runs, the exeeptim to the "one ehallcnge" rule does not apply.

The contention is meritless. It is quite hue, as the City argues, that the exception does not spply to all pmeeedings after remand by the cant of~ppea l . In Stcgs Investment. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal. App. 3d 572.576 1284 Cal. Rpv. 4951 (hereinafter S t e p Investmmts), the wmt q w s d the view that the disqualieation right would not apply if the remand was for a "ministerial" purpose, such as calculating interest However, the cowl painted out hat the pup.% of the provision, enacted in 1985 at a time when it was common to reasign the trial judge to the remanded cn% was to address the "concern. . . that a judge who bed been mversed might prove to be biased agalnst the party who succurfully a p p l e d the judge', erroneous ruling a t the original trial." (Id. at pp. 575376.) Accordingly, as the wwr explained. a party may disqualify the former judge w s l g n e d to the case if the ease involves m actual re(rinl of one or more issues. Stegs Investments, supra. 233 Cal. App. 3d 572, was followed in Hendershot v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 860 124 CaL Rpk. 2d 6451, whieh, in defining "new trial," relied on the "very broad" application of the phrase in Code of Civil Pmedu* section 656. (See also Carney v. Simmonds (1957) 49 Cal. 2d84,90-91 13 13 P.2d 3051.) It k also weU reeognid Lhata molion for new trid may properly bcnddm~ed to a summary judgment rendered under Code of Civil Proeedure, section 437c. (Seoll v. Farm (1983) 139 Cal. App. 3d 462,467 [I88 CaL Rptr. 8231; see alsu Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1606 [275 Cal. RpW. 8871.) Thus, the proceedingr contemplated by our remand will be a new Uial within the meaning of Cade of Civil Proeedure seecion 170.6. mMivision (81 Cat. App. 4th 766) (2). Although there was no full of the matter in this case, a final judgment was entaed. Our parrial reversal requires that the case be reopened with an netual trial if neeesary; finthenno% our partial revenel refleeted our view that the vial judge cmd in a emeial deeision of law.

Artumiag. as the Legirlabre dld, thot s judge may reaet with n eerbin piqac to the negative treslment of hlr or her dcciaioos by an appellate rourl, thls situntlon is ohvlonsly one in whlch the potcmiel far bias cxists. 2 Glvcn the policy rentoas for the 1985 amendmeab to Code of Civil procedure, seetion 170.6. I t k thnt ~tubblefield had the right to disqnalify Judge Warner. We mrn now to the more difficult auestion-whether Stubblefield exercised that rieht in a timely f d i o n . B. Thi Ciry's responsc to ~mbbkficld's reliance on the time provisions of &&of ~yvil ~ r o c c d u k section 170.6 is to point to h ia l ly canvary provisions in Govcmmem Ccds secfion 68616, subdivision (i). That sIamtc is pan orthe Tria Court Delay Reduction A d and wplies to all ca% falling under that act (commonlv known as M track mas). as thisone docs. The l&eume on whieh the Citv relies orovides hat "~o&ithstandin~ Seelion 170.6 ofthe (97 '~al . ~pn..ld 125) Code of Civil dm in direct e a l e n d m ~ u ~ s . challengcs p u r s k t to tiat section shall be exercised shin I5 dayoofthe p a w s firs impearwee. M&-tercalcnd.w mrls shall be governed solely by Section 170.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure.' (Italics added.) This case - . . invilves a d<& eakndar assignment. The d d c effen of an unadorned reading of this provision is immediately apparent. If the direct calendar assignment is rnadc more Lan 15 days after a p a q s first Bppearaacc in the caw, that patty would ncva have the right to exercise e peremptory ehallenge. It would also n e d y mew that a peremptory challenge could ncver be exercised after an appeal md remand, because all parties would have long since made a tint appearance. Nevertheless, his was the conshuetion argued by the real party in interest in Fight for the Rams v. Superior Court (1 996) 41 Cal. App. 4th 953 148 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8511 @ereinafter Fight for the RsmS). In thzd care, the plaintiff filed suit (&us appearing) on February 15, but an all-purpare nssipment (or dircet calendar assignment) was not made until May 4. The plaintiff then filed a peremptory challenge on May 1 2 The vial wurt denied it as (81 Cal. App. 4th 767) untimely, and when the plaintiff sought review by extraordinary wit, the defendant argued that due to the timing neither side had MY right to aperemptory challenge.

The appellete wurt had no dacu l ty in rejecting this mntention in revming the trial m u t t instead, the wurt held that "Government Code seetion 6861 6. subdivision (I) unambiguously requires a pariy to uereisea p m m p m y ehdlenge 'within 15 days of the pert)rs first appearanee' in a dinet ealendnr mutt" (Fight for the Ratm, supra. 41 Cal. App. 4th al p. 958, italies added.) In the eourt's implicit view, n trid court does not b m m e a d i e calendar court until a direct eelendat assignment is made, and it is only at that time that a party makes its first appearance in that murt and the h e in which a peremptory challenge must be made begins to w. 3 A similar mult was reachcd in Cybermedi% suprn, 72 Cal. App. 4th 910, whieh bvohed a case in which the assigned all-pu~pmejudge was revlaeed by anotherjudge. Without referring to Fight for the Rams, suma, 41 Cal. App. 4th 953. and expressing the intent to "harmonize' Code of Civil Procedure, section 170.6 with Govmment Codc section 68616, suMivislon (i), the wurt k p l y stated that "whsre, as here, apmty has already appeared m the action, il must file its challmge within 15 days of receiving not ie of a change in the individual falexdar judge assigned to the case." 4 (Cybermedin, supra, 72 Cal. &D. 4th at o. 913.)

r ~-~~ The City here does not argue that Stubblefield had no rightto e x s s e aperemptbjchal~en~e foilowing the remand, but argues by w o g y h m Fight for the R a m supra, 4 1 Cal. App. 4th 953, that it had only 15 days from the date Judge W m e r was wigned the csse aftn rmmd. The City argues t h a x the East track rulcs are desigued to (97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126) limit delay, it is '"absurd" to sllppose that the rules would require a petty to make a peremptory ehallenge at the beginning of the ease within I5 day$ but allow four times as long in whieh to ehallmge ajudge reassigned to the case after remand This position h x substantial appeal. The problem is that, on its face, the Govcmmmt Code provision s e e m to apply to all possible situations, b w if (81 Cal. App. 4th 768) so, its use of the pnrty's first appearance as the trigger date is singularly poorly ehoseh Fight for h e Ram& supra, 41 CaL App. 41h 953, and w e m e d i a , supra, 72 Cal. App. 4th 910, rewguize this at kart implicitly. In both eases the eourt war compelled to intapret ~ b d i v i ~ i o n (i) of Govemment Code. section 63616 5 in order to avoid thepreesumably unintmded result that parties in b t t m k cares would frequently be deprivsd of any o p p m i t y to exenise a peremptory challenge 6 A fair reading of the fnsttrnek provision leads to the conclusion that it was draREd as if only one situation would eVK be presented: the immediate assignment ofan all-purpose judge at the time the original mmplaint is filul. Only in thatsituation will both sides invariably have I5 days in whieh lo ehallenge the svigned judge &er their respedive first appesranew. In d l 0 t h ~ srmation- latn- ansigned judge, a ehange in judges, or retrial after appeal--a literal reading of subdivision (i) would caneel the right 10 disqualify the judge b e e a m the challenge would necerserily eomc too late aRer the firs1 appearance. Thus, the appellate courts have went ia ly rewitten the samae to provide a fair opmmnity for B e parties to make a peremptory challenge.

.,,,e*ehoiEe LA us is lo join in the $0~. or wb&er to eonelude thntfirst appe-cc means fim appesranee. f i e term ",ppesranccn has a well+stablished p o Q d u ~ meaning. A plaintiffnppem in an action when the -hint is fled. (Lyons v- State of Califmia (Isa5)

67 Gal, 380! ,s4 [7 p. 7631.) on the ride, "[a) defendant appears in an action when ths defendant answers. demurs, files a notice Of motion to

mike, a notie ofmotion to transfer . . . moves for reeIassilication purmant to n Code of Civil Procodurn, S~ecfon 403.040, gives pbintiff tes do not "appear'

hn of a p p e m e , or when an aMmey givesnotiecof Bppemancc for Ule defendant." (Code Civ. Pme., 8 1014.) The F'

when an all-purpose judge is awigned or replaced; they are already there. We respect the Legislamre's use of the lerm'fira appwce : ' kbwever, this does no( -that Smbblefield's only opporiwity m exercise a peremptory ehallenge came when it filed its complaint beck in ihe mists of pdiEia1 time. 7 We ahofledge, as did the eo& in Fight for h e Rams, supra, 41 Cal. App. 4 L 953, and C~bermcdia, ~ p r q 72 ~ a l . App 4th (81 Cd. ' A ~ ~ . 4th 769) 910, that applying Ur statute to Ur siiualion before us would be illogieal and unfair. &uglr subdivihn (i) of O o v m I I ~ t Cod6

68616 dm limit a p w - s aereise of aperemplory ehallenge lo the I5 days following the fim appesranee, this only maka smsc if the Legislanrrc intended it to apply only when the assimment of an all-purpose or d i m eacendar judge is made simuttaneordy with ihe eeccptanee of the amplaint for filing. We are reluemt to uttribute an illogieal or uni%r inlent to the Legislamre; (97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127) instezd, we a s m e that it did intend to make sense. (See People v. Broussnrd (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 1067, 1072 [22 Cal. Rptr. 26278.8% P.2d I 1341, on avoidanee of absurd resulls.) Thus, Govmment Code seetion 68616, subdivision (i) has no application to the situation whieh arises after remand. Although it may he anomalous, as the City argnes, to allow 60 days tollowing the assignment ofthe same trial judge a&r reversal, our interpretaim doe8 not do unaeeeptable violenee to the fa% track whcme as a whole. In La Seigneuric U.S. Holdings, Ine. v. Superior Comt (1994) 29 Cal. App. 4th 1500 pS Cd. KpZ Zd 1751, the wurt found it "somewhal punling" thal the fksl t rek mles aaually allow ilve more days to exmire a peremptory ehallmge than does C d e of Civll Procedure, seetion 170.6. 8 It eoneluded that the Legislature might have believed that extra tim wes nnecensary because of the expedited nature ofthe proaam so thal a defendmf "brought inm an aetion wainst hi will; eould have .aWi oppormnity rn rdec t and coosida on the issue of R challmp~ to the assigned judge." (La Scigncuri, sup% rit p. 1504.) Assuming lhis to be the legislative intent then Itmiring the effed of the Government Code pmvision to the situation in which an all purpose judge is arrigned mtemporaneously with the filing of a mrnplaint makes sense. The extended pcriod for making a perempbrj ehallens is thus remickd to L e defendant faced with numaous deeisirms and ehoices at the very beginning ofli(igation, while in l e s prcrsvrcd situations thc shorter l0.day period of the Code of Civil Pmedurn wfinws mnmI. We therefore wnelndethnt Governmeut Code, section 68616 has nonpplication when a ludgmenr has bwn revcraed an sppsl md . h r n r d to the t h l wuri Tor rebial. The 60-day provlslon of Code of Civll Procedure, reelion 170.6 wntrolp and S t ~ b b l ~ f i e l d * ~ motion was timew. S l CAI. Am. 4th 770) DISPOSITION

Lets pernnptory writ of mandate bane as prayed. Petitioners shall recover their coats. Richlii I., and Ward, J., wnarrrsd. Fwblotes

Retircd judge ofthe former San Bernardino Municipal C o y West Valley Divison, wigned by the Chief Justice pursuam to &cle VI, scction 6 of the Califomin Canstitution.

Retired judgeof h e former SanBernaPJino Municipal Court, WestVdly Division, svigncd by the ChieiJuvtiee purnuanttomicleVI, seetion 60f the California Constitution. I The City did no1 raiw this issue below. However, as the issue is one of law and does not involve disputed facts, we may consider it even though the City neglaed to raise it belaw. Wale v. Morgan (1978)22 Cal. 3d 388.394 [149 Cal. Rptr. 375,584 P.Zd 5121; I n n Maniage ofPnm(1997) 52 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1490 [61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4931.) We do note that the City filed M abbreviatsd objection and did request have to prep= fullcr briefing if the m n felt it ncc- how-er, the eourt's d i n g in the City's favor mooted that request. 2 We do not. o fmrse , suggest that Judge Wmer has so reacted or vmuld so react. We merely accept the Legislature's opinion 41at such a reanion is possible, and very human. i The result reached by ~ i g h t for the Rams, supra, 41 Cal. APp. 4th 953, is cleaciy equitable and we agree with if bW it does involve m e rcanangemenl of the shltu10ry langnage. The murrs bland stanee that it is merely conshling %nbmbignous" lwguage might be called romcuhat d&genuous. In Cyb=di% Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Gal. App. 4th 9 10 [gZ Cd. RPV. Zd 1261 (heninafler Cybermedia), by contrast. thc c m did not rdy on any fiction that a WIfY did not wpp'ar in a dir& calendar murt until a direct o r l e n d ~ j u d ~ e was a s s i m d but simply mgnized that Govanmart Code section 68616, subdivision (i)could not be strictly applied= dr&d in all cirsumstanccs. 4

Presumably3 under Fight fortheRam% sup- 41 Cat. App. 4th 953, the peremptory ehallenge filed in Cybermedia, supra, 72 cal. ~ p p . 4th 910 have bem untimely, because the Cybenoedia trial coun became a direct calcndar c m whm the first all-purposehdp was &gned. 5 AS we have observed in Fight for the Rams, supra 41 Cal. App. 6ha1 page 9 1 , the coun desnibcdthe languw whiB we quoted abwe as "unambiguouslJ" bW then rwote "fust a p p m o e " to mean firat appearance orthe time of the assignment of an all-purpose judge, whichever is later 6 As we hwe naed above, a literal and drict rending of Govcmmt Codesection 68616, subdivisjor, (i) wmld ocgste k provision in CodcdCivil Proccdwe, section 170.6 that allows achallenge after appeal. 7

SeptemberZ9, 1989, to be precise. X Code of Civil i'mcaiurq secrion 170.6 providcs in p e t thaf "ifdirected to ike MU ofa muse tha hm bem asrignd to a judge B r all purpose% m e

molion shall be made . . .within 10 days afier notice of ihe all purpose assignmen$ or if the party has not yet appeared in the aetion, then witbin 10 days atter the appmrmce." 2 0 Cal. App. LEXlS 477::Metro. Water Dist. of S. State v. Imperial Irrigation Uie::lune 15,zWO

PROOF OF SERVICE

2

3

4

7 On the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated: I

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDMO

Stubblefield Properties v. Bonnie Shivley UDDS 1204130 and UDFS 1406978

5

6

1 NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

The undersigned is counsel for defendants & non-parties at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

1 [ ] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows: at the 1-22-13 OSC Hearing (short form)

13 I ** to presiding Judge Marsha Slough, to request reassignment of both consolidated cases to a new judge

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11

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[x] (By Fax) on 311311 5 Fax machine to numbers below used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4). I caused the machine to maintain a record of same

HartKing office fax 714-546-7457

[XI (By 2-day Mail) $1013a, 5201 5.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to: 16 - - 1 14

1 S

[ ] (By Electronic) to address below (by agreement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com to: nvilliamson@hkclaw.com (Appcndix included)

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21 [ ] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of Californiathat the above is true.

22 Executed in Santa Barbara CA on 3/13/15

Robert Williamson, HARTIKMG Judge Sachs, San Bemardino Superior Court, S-28 400 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900 247 W. Third Street, S-28 Santa Ana, CA 92707 San Bemardino, CA 924 15-02 10

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1 am familiar with mail collection in San Bemardino and the two-day mail service offered by the post office. I mailed the envelope at San Bernardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

- 2 - Notice of Unavailability of Counsel until after 4/3/35 & Motion to Disqualify Judge Sachs CCP $170.6

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24

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Making copies, faxing, preparing copies & envelopes

dclivcring to US Post Office & obtaining receipt

Home ComplaintslParties Actions Minutes Hearings Images Report

\ ' 1 Case Type: ..................................... ! ....... ... """_,l" -~ ------ --

Case Number: , S e w c

Case UDFS1406978 ................. - STUBBLEFIELD -VS- DUFFY ................................................. ", Action: j . (Choose) ' i .........................................................

HEARING RE: MOTIONS UNDER SUBMlSSlONlNEXT HEARING DATE 03/06/2015 - 4:30 PM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE. JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL - PROCEEDINGS: MOTIONS TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION ON 02/10/15 IS ORDERED VACATED. MOTIONS TO BE HEARD AT A DATE TO BE DETERMINED BY JUDGE SACHS (DEPT. S28).

COURT ORDERS THlS CASE TO SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER TO BE HEARD WITH UDDSi204130.

COURT ORDERS MOTIONS THAT ARE SET TO BE HEARD ON 03/18/15 IN DEPT. F7 TO BE RE- CALENDARED FOR 03/18/15 IN DEPT. S28 (SAN BERNARDINO) TO EITHER BE H E M D OR CONTINUED TOA DATE TO BE DETERMINED BY THAT DEPARTMENT.

THE COURT NOW ORDERS THlS CASE ASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT ( S28) FOR ALL PURPOSES. CLERK'S OFFICE TO NOTIFY PARTIES CLERK'S OFFICETO SEND FILE TO SAN BERNARDINO FOR NEXT HEARING ACTION - COMPLETE --- --- MINUTE ORDER END ===

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EXHIBIT 6

3/19f7.015 UDFS1406978Minllte Orders - San Bernardim Main

Home ComplaintslParties Actions Minutes Report Images r....---..-. ~ -,

Case Type: .'

1 -----..-I.-.--..- J --I---?

Care Number: I Searchj

Case UDFS1406978 _ l_l.-lI.-l..-.l_...l..._. - STUBBLEFIELD _ -VS- DUFFY __ Action: [(choose)

I . I .. _ J

MOTION RE: ORDER TO COMPEL STEPHEN C. ALLEN TO APPEAR & TESTlFYlMlSC FILED BY PLAINTIFF STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA 03/18/2015 - 8:30 AM DEPT. S28

MICHAELA SACHS, JUDGE CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPORTER REGINA VEGA 12612 COURT ATTENDANT MARY KILGORE - APPEARANCES: AlTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON JR PRESENT FOR PLAlNTlFFlPETlTlONER. PARTIES NOT PRESENT: NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY

PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD COURT TREATS NOTICE OF UNAVAlLABlLlN OF COUNSEL SUBMllTED BY AlTORNEY MCCARRON AS A REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE. - MAlTER IS CONTINUED DUE TO AlTORNEY MCCARRONS EMERGENCY SITUATION. COURT NOTES NO OPPOSITION TO MOTION FILED. COURT DOES NOT CONTINUE DUE DATES FOR FILING OF OPPOSITION.

COURT FURTHER STATES CHRONOLOGY OF CASE ON RECORD. COURT ADDRESSES FILING OF CCP170.6 FILED BY DEFENDANT. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AGAINST JUDGE SACHS IS DENIED. FOR ADDITIONAL COURT FINDINGS AND RULING SEE AlTACHED REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT. COURT ORDERS CSR REGINA VEGA TO PREPAREA TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS DATED 0311 811 5.

ADDITIONALLY, COURT CONTINUES TODAYS MOTIONS TO 4/10115. MOTION TO COMPEL SET 3119115 AND STATUS CONFERENCE SET 3/26/15 ARE BOTH CONTINUED TO 4111Yi5 ALL HEARINGS SET 4110115 WILL BE HELD AT 1:30PM.

HEARINGS: CURRENT HEARING CONTINUED TO 04/10/15AT 01:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28. VACATE SCUD HEARING SCHEDULED FOR 03/26/15 AT 08:OO IN DEPARTMENT S28. VACATE LBM HEARING SCHEDULED FOR 03/19/15 AT 08:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28.

LAW & MOTION RE: ORDER COMPELLING B.SHIPLEY-FILED BY PLAINTIFF SET FOR 04/10/15AT 01:30 IN DEPT. S28. HEARING RE: STATUS CONFERENCE SET FOR 04/10/15 AT 01:30 IN DEPARTMENT S28. NOTICE GIVEN BY JUDICIAL ASSISTANT CORRESPONDENCE COVERSHEET GENERATED TO MAIL COPY OF MINUTE ORDER 3/18/15 TO COUNSEL OF RECORD. ACTION -COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

EXHIBIT C

D. Chronological Summary of Judge Sachs' serial violations:

1. 2/10/14 Violation of CRC 3.1312 (prevailing party to prepare her judgment)

Judge Sachs refused to sign a judgment prevailing party submitted at the hearing.

Judge Sachs invited non-prevailing party's attorney to prepare the final judgment.

2. 2/19/14 Violation of Civil 6663(b) (power to vacate judgment expired in 60 days)

McCarron objected to revisiting a summary judgment order entered on 10121l13.

McCarron told Judge Sachs jurisdiction to vacate the order expired months ago.

3. 2/19/14 Violation of CRC 3.1 103: 3.1 12: 3.1 113. CCP 81005 (no motion notice

with basis for relief or Points & Authorities was filed as required) CCP 5 1005

4. 2/19/14 Violation of CRC 3.1312 (prevailing party $3 prepare judgments)

Minute Order recited "Counsel for Plaintiff to Prepare Judgment"

5. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to avplv the law-violation of due process

Judge Sachs thwarted McCarron from reciting objections on a transcript record,

depriving Shipley of an opportunity to be heard and an opportunity to object.

Disparate treatment-calling counsel "ma'am" instead of by her name or counsel.

6. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Auvlv the law- violation of due process

Judge Sachs actively advocated for Stubblefield by distorting prior findings of

two courts and allowing Stubblefield to paraphrase findings to alter its import.

7. 3/17/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Avvlv the law- violation of due process

Judge Sachs advocated for Stubblefield by inserting the words "or resident" into

his judge notes, and then giving the notes to Stubblefield's counsel for insertion

into the final judgment (a contrivance even Stubblefield didn't think of doing).

This violated Shipley's right to due process under federal and state constitutions.

The deck is stacked against a party where the Judge is the opponent's advocate.

8. 3/17/14 p w - violation of due process

Judge Sachs made a bizarre journal entry "jiles retained in department" which

enabled him to exercise exclusive control over which documents would be filed

or rejected. Judge Sachs then refused to accept the objections Shipley tried to file

on 3121114--only one day after Stubblefield submitted a debauched judgment

exparte to chambers on 3120114. This deprived Shipley of opportunity to object.

9. 3120114 Violated Local Rule 591.3 (no entry of judgment for 10 days)

Rule 591.3 was amended on 1/1/13 to afford opposing parties a chance to object

Stubblefield hued Legal Support Services to hand deliver a paraphrased final

judgment directly to chambers exparte on 3120114, without fust serving the

proposed judgment to opposing counsel, who represented prevailing party.

Judge Sachs signed the judgment the same day it was delivered [on 3/20/14]

without waiting even one day to afford Shipley an opportunity to object to form.

10. 3/21/14 Violation of Judicial Oath to Applv the law- violation of due process

Judge Sachs prevented Shipley from obtaining the judgment entered 3/20/14.

Shipley appeared 3 consecutive days to try to get it. [3/2 1/14,3/24/14,3125/14]

because his clerk had not scanned it to the online docket. Each time she appeared

in Dept. S-33 for a copy of the judgment she was told to return the following day.

Shipley was never able to obtain a copy of the judgment despite three attempts.

This was not one isolated incident or a few inadvertent mistakes. The 10 incidents

above displays a serial pattern of intentional violations of Codes of Civil Procedure,

Rules of Court, Statutes of Limitations, Local Rules, and the Judicial Code of Ethics.

By inserting the words "or resident" Judge S a c h paved the way for park owners to

evict residents directly on 5 days' notice, instead of proceeding against homeowners,

who can invoke statutory protections against arbitrary evictions under Civil 9798.55.

Former Panel quoted the trial court's finding verbatim on 2/14/13 as recited below:

Words .such us defendant were not in Panel's verbatim quote from a 2/14/13 transcript:

~t the hearing on PetRioner's mation far summary iudgment, the

found, am0119 otbr things, Ulat Civil Code section 798.75 does not apply on[y to

circumstances where cwner&lp is lrangferred. Rather, Me cDwt found Mat

Sedon 798.75, eubd~sion (c) "is not limiled in ih a~l icatbn, only in VFe

escrow, sale or transfer of a mobile home. It applies when an occupant of a

mahue home has no rwt of tenancy and is not otherwise en6tled la occupy the

mob@ home pursuant to this chapter. mats Civil Code 708,75(c). This chapter 4 CT 181:s top

When McCarron objected to Stubblefield's distortion Judge Sachs insisted it is accurate.

Ms. MMRRON: okay. What about the first three

sentences where they paraphrased it and they added the word

such as Defendant?

THE COURT: It is irrelevant.

MS. MMRRON: Why is it irrelevant?

THE COURT: Because that was Judge Aluarez' decision

h i c h was, in fact, overturned by the coun so whatever that

says it is really irrelevant.

MS. McCARRON: But why havesomething in there that

wasn't said? That is not nght.

THE COURT: 1 believe it is accurate. 4 RT 54:21 bottom

Judge Sachs consecrated Stubblefield's distortion by approving his paraphrased

conclusions in the final judgment to create a pretext that both courts found Shipley was

an unlawfil occupant not entitled to reside in Space 333 under park rules. Judge Sachs

mote the words or resident onto his copy of the judgment Stubblefield had submitted,

authorizing Stubblefield to proceed directly against residents under Civil §798.56(d).

McCarron asked why she could not file the order to avoid his paraphrasing. RT 60:25

The court responded " It is his motion, it is his work" &d offered to give us his copy.

The S-33 deputy made copies of the judgment with the Judge's notes on it. RT 61:l

PlAhtifl m y . P&

Y Civil Cndc scnion 798.56, mbbdivision (d) 4 RT 63 :

EXHIBIT D

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Pending Home ComplaintslParties Actions Minutes Heafings Case Report

Images

Case Type: v I 1--. .. -- --A

Case Number:

Case UDDS1204130 ~ - STUBBLEFIELD-V-SHIPLEY ~

~

Action: LL Choose 2 .... v J !

EX-PARTE MOTION RE: DEF EXPARTE APP FOR ORDER TO REPAIR OR REPLACE ELE 09/09/2014 - 9:30 AM DEPT. S28X

MICHAELA SACHS, JUDGE CLERK: WIMALA BLANCHARD COURT REPORTER LINDA BALDWIN 12453 COURT ATTENDANT MARY KILGORE - APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR BONNIE SHIPLEY. - PROCEEDINGS: NO FILE. PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD EX-PARTE HEARING IS HELD. EX PARTE APPLICATION ARGUED. COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED THE MOVING PAPERS AND OPPOSITION FILED 9/8/14. - COURT FINDS: EX PARTE ORDERS DENIED. FINDINGS ARE STATED ON THE RECORD. ACTION -COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

222 W . Hospitality Lane, 31d Floor, San Bernardino, ~ i 9 2 4 1 5 1 Phone: 909.386.8655 Fax: 909.382.3212

Department of Risk Management 1

I March 16,201 5 1

Nancy McCarron 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103-2044

Kenneth L. Hernandez Direclor

........ RE: Cl&mant .,,. N-ancy McCarron, ~ o n ~ j k ? ~ . S h $ ~ e y & Ste~he_n_~mn-_ Date of Loss. .......... .October 28. 201 4 Our File.. ................ 1 19658

Dear Nancy McCarron:

We are in receipt of your claim against the County of s i n Bemardino and are currently investigating the circumstances surrounding your claim. A decision regarding the County's liability will be made upon completion of the investigation or within 45 days of our receipt of your claim.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (909)386-8637.

Respectfully, . . ~ ,

a ~ & Liability Claims Rep II DEPARTMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT

Receipt of claim leuel

EXHIBIT 20

Case No ________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

Stubblefield Properties,

a California General Partnership, dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community,

Plaintiff v.

Nancy Duffy McCarron, Bonnie Shipley, et al, Defendants

_______________________________________

AFTER SUMMARY DENIAL OF WRIT PETITION TO COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION 2 Case E063118

Hon. Carol Codrington, Acting PJ [Exhibit A]

FOLLOWING SUMMARY DENIAL OF WRIT PETITION TO APPELLATE DIVISION OF SAN BERNARDINO SUPERIOR COURT

Hon. Elia Perozzi Case: CIVDS1502107

Trial Court: Hon. Kyle Brodie Case: CIVDS1417078

REFUSED TO RECLASSIFY CASE TO UNLMITED JURISDICTION WHERE DAMAGES SOUGHT & HOME TO BE SEIZED EXCEED $25,000

_____________________________________________________________________

DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY’s

PETITION FOR REVIEW IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED

Nancy Duffy McCarron CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane

Santa Barbara, CA 93103 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 Attorney for Petitioner, Bonnie Shipley

TELEPHONENO.: 805-450-0450 FU: NO (OPuMaII: 805-965-3492 E . M ~ I L ~ D D R E S ~ ( O ~ ~ O ~ L I ~ ) : nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

n r r ~ ~ ~ ~ FOR (Name]: Petitioner [Writ of Mandate. Prohibition and Review]

TO BE FILED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL APP-008

1 APPELWNTIPETITIONER: Bonnie Shipley I

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELUTE DISTRICT, DlVlSlON TWO

1 REspoNYENTmEAL IN INTEREST: Stubblefield Properties I

coun ol ~ppsa l care Number

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS

(Check one): a INITIAL CERTIFICATE SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE - - - - -

Notice: Please read rules 8.208 and 8.488 before completing this form. You may use this form for the initial certificate in an appeal when you file your brief or a prebriefing motion, application, or opposition to such a motion or application in the Court o f Appeal, and when you file a petition for an extraordinary writ. You may also use this form as a supplemental certificate when you learn o f changed or additional information that must be disclosed.

1. This form is being submitted on behalf of the following party (name): Petitioner

2. a. 0 There are no interested entities or persons that must be listed in this certificate under rule 8.208.

b. a Interested entities or persons required to be listed under rule 8.208 are as follows:

Full name of interested entity or person

Nature of interest (Explain):

(1) Stubblefield Properties, Partners Business BankcorpICA; see more- SEC filing Attachment 2

(2) Stubblefield Quail Point Company D. William Bader; Neal Baker; William Cozzo, Alan J Lane

(3) Eva Stubblefield Hazard, partner John E. ~uck\;orth; John Riddell; Robert L Nottingham;

(4) Arnold H Stubblefield, Gen Partner John L Ridell; James W Andrews; Ruth E Adell

(5) Thomas Parrish, General Partner Neil Deny,SB Cty Supr race; Bill Postmus;Dale Stubblefield

a Continued on attachment 2.

The undersigned certifies that t'he above-listed persons or entities (corporations, partnerships, flrms, or any other association, but not including government entities or their agencies) have either (1) an ownenhlp Interest of 10 percent or more in the party if it is an entity; or (2) a financial or other interest in the outcome of the proceeding that the justices should consider in determinlng whether to disqualify themselves, as deflned in rule 8.208(e)(2).

Date: 12-18-2014

Nancy Duffy McCarron 164780 (TYPE M( PRIM NAME)

Pap. 1 o r 3 ~ o r m ~ppmvsd mr OPUOMI urs CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS @I. Rules af court rv~er 82M. 8.488

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................ 2

Writ Issues Presented (2) ................................................................................................. 3

Statewide Urgency ........................................................................................................... 3

Petition, Authenticity of Exhibits, Beneficial Interest, Capacities ................................. 3

Urgency to Petitioner…………………………………………………………………. .. 4

IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED ............................................................................ 4

Statement of Facts and Procedural History ...................................................................... 4

No Adequate Remedy at Law, Prayer for Relief ............................................................. 5

Writ Petition Timely Filed ……………………………………………………….. ..... 5

Memorandum of Points & Authorities ............................................................................ 6

Standard of Review (De Novo) on Subject Matter Jurisdiction…………. .............. 6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ………………………………………………. .... 6

ARGUMENT I ................................................................................................................. 8

Court Should Have Transferred to Unlimited Jurisdiction Because Plaintiff Prayed for Damages Exceeding $25,000 & Property Value Exceeds $25,000….. ... 8 ARGUMENT II Appellate Panel Has a Duty to Prohibit Trial Court from Exceeding Jurisdiction by Enabling Unlawful Prosecution in Wrong Jurisdiction……… ..... 14 CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………….. 15

Certificate of Word Count, Verification of Counsel and Petitioner .............................. 16

Proof of Service ............................................................................................................. 17

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291 .......................................... 14, 15

Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 CA.3d 141 ...................................................... 13 Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 .......................................... 12 Becker v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 313 ......................................................................... 10 Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999) 69 CA.4th 354 .................................................... 13 Castellini v Municipal Court (1970) 7 CA3d 174 ……………………………………. 3 Deal v. Municipal Court, 157 CA.3d 996 .................................................................... 13 Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 CA.4th 32, 42 ............................................................ 6 Harris v. Seidel, 1 CA. 2d 410 at page 416 ................................................................... 10 Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155 ... 12 Lindsey v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 ........................................................... 13 Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 CA.4th 367 .......................................................... 13 Mehr v. Superior Court, supra, 139 C.A.3d 1044 ......................................................... 13 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ........ 11 Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385.................................................................... 12 Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CA.3d @ 20 .............................................................................. 6 Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803 .......................................................................... 12 Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 C.A. 4th 513, 517 ................................................................ 6 San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436 ....... 12 Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 C.A. 4th 223, 229–231 ......................................... 10 Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 257, 262 .................................................. 10 Warburton/Buttner v. Supr. Court (2002) 103 CA. 4th 1170, 1180............................... 6 Williams v Rosinsky Motor Co. (1955) 133 CA2d Supp 798, 284 P2d 979…………. 3

STATUTES

Constitution, Article VI, §§10, 11 ............................................................................. 3, 14 CCP §32 ....................................................................................................................... 6, 9 CCP §§85, 86, 88 ....................................................................................... 3,6, 8, 9, 10,14 CCP §396a(b) .......................................................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15 CCP §403.040(b) ............................................................................................................. 9 CCP §403.040(e) .................................................................................. 3, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15 CCP §403.080 .............................................................................................................. 7, 9 Civil Code §1717 ............................................................................................................. 5 Health and Safety Code §18007 .................................................................................... 13

3

WRIT ISSUES PRESENTED

Did Fourth District-Division 2 Panel err by not reversing Appellate Division Panel’s

denial of writ petition to compel a trial court to transfer a case to unlimited jurisdiction

where evidence showed the home to be seized and damages sought both exceed $25,000?

[trial court disposed the CCP §396a (b) motion to transfer by citing CCP §403.040 (e) as the dispositive code with no chance to research/brief or present oral argument on it]

Do Appellate Panels have a constitutional duty under Article VI, §§10, 11 to prevent

a trial court from exceeding jurisdictional limits circumscribed by CCP §§85, 86, 88?

STATEWIDE URGENCY

This petition affects every litigant who is deprived of a statutory right to unlimited

jurisdiction where damages sought and the amount in controversy exceed $25,000.00.

Arbitrary and capricious classification of cases renders CCP §§85, 86, 88 illusory.

Legislators never delegated concurrent jurisdiction over actions. CCP §§85, 86 & 88. 1

PETITION AUTHENTICITY OF EXHIBITS

1. Exhibits 1-6 are true copies of original documents on file with respondent court.

Exhibit 7 is the verified transcript of proceedings conducted on January 29, 2015.

BENEFICIAL INTEREST OF PETITIONER; CAPACITIES OF PARTIES

2. Shipley is defendant in an action pending in the Respondent Court below entitled,

Stubblefield Properties, CA General Partnership v. Nancy Duffy, Bonnie Shipley, et al

UDFS1406978, a summary eviction in which plaintiff seeks possession of the premises

and monetary damages exceeding $25,000 — the maximum for limited jurisdiction,

as shown on a Civil Case Cover Sheet plaintiff filed. 2 Plaintiff is Real Party.

1 Castellini v Municipal Court (1970) 7 CA3d 174; Williams v Rosinsky Motor Co. (1955) 133 CA2d Supp 798, 284 P2d 979 2 Exhibit 1, page 0

4

URGENCY TO PETITIONER

3. Absent intervention Shipley will have to defend a second sham summary eviction

in limited jurisdiction depriving her of a statutory right to be in unlimited jurisdiction.3

Plaintiff prayed for open-ended damages at a daily rate since February 2013 4 which

exceed $25,000 5 [the maximum amount in limited jurisdiction under CCP §§85, 86],

and where the value of the home to be seized in summary eviction exceeds $25,000. 6

Shipley will be homeless if plaintiff evicts her from a home she has lived in 3 years.

IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED 4. Shipley asks this court to issue a STAY of all proceedings until the petition is

resolved. The trial court denied stay below. The court continues to sign void orders

exceeding jurisdiction. Fontana UD Court transferred the case to the Justice Center

(Hon. Michael Sachs) but did not reclassify it to unlimited jurisdiction. Plaintiff still

files motions on truncated UD 5-day notice while court accepts them & sets hearings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 5. On 8/2/12 Stubblefield moved to evict Shipley---who was not his contract tenant,

but rather a co-resident of his contract tenant in UDDS1204130. 7 Stubblefield never

named or joined his contract tenant in that action. Shipley prevailed after an Appellate

Panel reversed the trial court’s denial of a summary judgment motion, and directed

the court to enter judgment on the merits for Shipley in civil case CIVDS1302013.8

Panel found the eviction unlawful because the authority Stubblefield cited in his notice

to vacate did not apply to Shipley as she was not a purchaser or transferee; and because

he lacked privity of contract with her since she was not his tenant. Id 3 California Constitution, Article VI, §§ 1, 10, 11, 13; CCP §§ 85, 86, 88. 4 Exhibit 1, page 00, Prayer, No. 3 5 Exhibit 2, page 11 6 Exhibit 2, page 11 7 http://openaccess.sbcourt.org/OpenAccess/civil/civildetails.asp?courtcode=X&case number=DS1204130&casetype=UD&mcnmsearch=Y&dsn= 8 http://openaccess.sbcourt.org/OpenAccess/civil/civildetails.asp?courtcode=X&case number=DS1302013&casetype=CIV&mcnmsearch=Y&dsn=

5

6. After losing 3 related appeals plaintiff prosecutes a new case in limited jurisdiction

where damages he prayed for and a property he prays to seize both exceed $25,000.00.

NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

7. Denial of motion to transfer/reclassify jurisdiction is not appealable. CCP § 904.1 9

Writ relief would avoid wasting significant party resources, court labor, and jury time.

Shipley is deprived of adequate discovery and trial preparation in limited jurisdiction.

If relief here is denied the homeowner may lose her mobile home and Shipley may be

evicted from the home she has lawfully occupied as co-resident for 3 years since 2012.

Shipley has no other adequate remedy at law for the relief sought in this petition.

WRIT PETITION WAS TIMELY FILED

8. Petition was timely filed within 20 days of 1/29/15 order. see CCP §403.080 .

Writs to Appellate Division & 4th District Court of Appeal were timely, as is this

Petition for Review is timely served within 10 days after entry of order. (Exh. A)

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays the Appellate Panel:

1. Issue an immediate STAY of proceedings pending outcome of Writ of Review.

2. Either (a) issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing Respondent Court to set

aside and vacate the orders below (refusal to transfer case to unlimited jurisdiction);

or (b) issue an alternative writ directing Respondent Court to show cause why it should

not be so directed, and upon return of the alternative writ, issue the peremptory writ

set forth in subparagraph (a) above; or (c) to direct any other appropriate relief.

Issue a writ prohibiting and restraining the limited jurisdiction court from proceeding

with an unlawful detainer action and order transfer to unlimited jurisdiction forthwith.

3. Award Shipley costs incurred in this proceeding and attorney fees under MRL,

Civil Code §1717, and any other basis in law for which she is entitled to attorney fees.

Respectfully submitted: _______________________________________ Nancy D McCarron, Attorney for Petitioner

9 Carlos Garau v. Torrance Unified School District, 137 Cal App 4th 192, 194-195

6

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STANDARD OF REVIEW [DE NOVO]

Where evidence is not in dispute, a determination of subject matter jurisdiction is a

legal question subject to de novo review. 10 The Court is not bound by a court below

but makes its own independent interpretation. 11 Minute order entered 1/29/15 recites

transfer was denied without reciting any rationale or any findings of fact. Exhibit 5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:

The court exceeded its powers by denying a transfer sought under CCP §396a (b)

and reciting CCP §403.040 (e) as the dispositive code, which no party cited or argued,

and with no opportunity to research or brief it, and without oral argument or objections.

Shipley cited CCP§396a (b) in the caption and body of her Notice of Motion to Dismiss

or Transfer to Unlimited Jurisdiction. Exhibit 2, 1:16 It recites in relevant part:

(b) If it appears from the complaint or affidavit, or otherwise, that the superior court or court location where the action or proceeding is commenced is not the proper court or court location for the trial, the court where the action or proceeding is commenced, or a judge thereof, shall, whenever that fact appears, transfer it to the proper court or court location, on its own motion, or on motion of the defendant, unless the defendant consents in writing, or in open court Id 12

The court was required to transfer the action to unlimited jurisdiction upon proof

that the damages demanded or value of property in controversy exceeds $25,000.00.

Discretion is not authorized where legislators use the word shall. Legislators defined

jurisdictional classification at CCP §32 and circumscribed limited jurisdiction to cases

where the amount in controversy is less than $25,000.00. [CCP §85, §86] All other

cases are litigated in unlimited jurisdiction. [CCP §88]. Legislators never authorized

concurrent jurisdiction or the power to arbitrarily classify based on a judge’s whim.

10 Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 CA.4th 32, 42; Warburton/Buttner v. Supr. Court (2002) 103 CA. 4th 1170, 1180 11 Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CA.3d @ 20; Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 C.A. 4th 513, 517 12 CCP §1235.060. Shall in a statute is mandatory; may is permissive.

7

A fortiori, legislators provided a remedy for arbitrary misclassification by enacting

CCP §403.080 which expressly authorizes a writ proceeding to the Appellate Division

to reverse whimsical misclassification. Discovery and trial preparation are severely

circumscribed by summary proceedings in limited jurisdiction courts where all cross

claims are barred, motions and depositions are set on only 5-days’ notice, and trial is set

on a mere 21-day notice. Shipley timely invoked CCP §403.080 to correct a manifest

injustice perpetrated by a biased judicial officer who is plaintiff’s de facto advocate.

Appellate Courts have a duty to prohibit a trial court from exceeding jurisdiction

and unlawfully prosecuting a case in the wrong jurisdiction. The illegal acts, coupled

with refusal to make findings on the evidence, and sua sponte disposition of a motion

by CCP §403.040(e)--an inapplicable statute never argue-- shows clear judicial bias.

The court stepped out of its role as independent arbiter and into a role of de facto

advocate by searching for a statute to “dispose” of a motion without making findings,

and without affording Shipley any opportunity to be heard or present oral arguments.

The court sabotaged Shipley by denying her motion on a statute which did not apply.

CCP§403.040(e) applies only to the converse fact pattern; i.e. where a party, or court

sua sponte, reclassifies a case from unlimited jurisdiction down to limited jurisdiction.

In fact §403.040(e) recites, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to require

the superior court to reclassify an action or proceeding because the judgment to be

rendered, as determined at the trial or hearing, is one that might have been rendered

in a limited civil case.” This case is not in San Bernardino Superior Court. It is in

the Unlawful Detainer Court in Fontana, Dept. 7, which is a limited jurisdiction court.

These biased acts violated the judicial officer’s oath taken when he was sworn in as

a judicial officer of the court; i.e. to “uphold the constitution and laws of California.”

The Appellate Panel has a duty to prohibit a trial court from exceeding its jurisdiction

by prosecuting a case in a limited jurisdiction court when the trial court was required

to transfer the case to unlimited jurisdiction under CCP$396a(b)—a mandatory code.

8

ARGUMENT 1 1. Court Should Have Transferred the Case to Unlimited Jurisdiction Because

Plaintiff Prayed for Open-Ended Damages (rent) already exceeding $25,000 and the Value of the Property (home to be seized) also Exceeds $25,000.00

A. To be treated as a limited civil case, the amount in controversy in an action or special proceeding cannot exceed $25,000.00 CCP §85(a)

“Amount in controversy means the amount of a demand or value of a property,

or the amount of a lien, or personal property, exclusive of attorney’s fees, interest &

costs.” CCP §85(a); §86(b). On October 3, 2014 Stubblefield filed a Civil Case Cover

Sheet praying for monetary damages and possession of premises. [Exhibit 1, page 0] :

Exh.1, page 0

In his prayer for judgment, at page 7 of the complaint, Stubblefield sought open-

ended damages for all rent past due since February 2013. [Exhibit 1, page 00]:

Exh.1, page 00

In a Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Shipley attached a Resident Account Statement

Stubblefield mailed to his contract tenant---showing past due rent of $25,653.66.

[Exh. 2, pg 11] The statement proved the open-ended damages Stubblefield prayed

for exceed $25,000.00. Shipley attached a certified copy of San Bernardino County

Tax Assessor’s print-out showing $27,800 as the value of the home. [Exh. 2, pg 12].

This proved the value of the property to be seized exceeds $25,000.00. The court

made no findings on the evidence, and did not allow oral argument on a statute the

court announced “disposed” of the motion to transfer the case to unlimited jurisdiction.

9

B. Transfer To Unlimited Is Mandatory If Party Shows Good Cause Why She Did Not Move Until After Answering; Court Must Reclassify if Case is or was Incorrectly Classified and Good Cause Exists To Transfer. CCP §403.040(b)

Shipley showed good cause. The motion recited she first moved for transfer as part

of her demurrer, which was denied by the court [Exh. 2, 3:18]. Shipley filed a separate

motion to transfer on 5 days’ notice [Exh. 2, 3:22]. The court found 5 days’ notice was

insufficient but authorized Shipley to refile a motion on 16 days’ notice [Exh. 2, 3:24].

Shipley refiled for a hearing on the merits with a review of evidence submitted. [Exh.

2, 3:26]. The hearing on the merits and evidence was held on 1/29/15. Exhibit 5

Shipley cited CCP§396a(b) in the caption and body of Notice of Motion to Dismiss

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or transfer to unlimited jurisdiction. Exh.2, 1:16

(b) If it appears from the complaint or affidavit, or otherwise, that the superior court or court location where the action or proceeding is commenced is not the proper court or court location for the trial, the court where the action or proceeding is commenced, or a judge thereof, shall, whenever that fact appears, transfer it to the proper court or court location, on its own motion, or on motion of the defendant, unless the defendant consents in writing, or in open court Id 13

The court had a mandatory duty to transfer the action to unlimited upon proof

the amount in controversy (damages demanded or value of property to be seized)

exceeded $25,000. Discretion is not authorized when legislators use the word shall.

Legislators defined jurisdictional classification at CCP §32 and circumscribed

limited jurisdiction to cases where the amount in controversy is less than $25,000.00

[CCP §85, §86] and all other cases to unlimited jurisdiction. [CCP §88]. Legislators

never authorized concurrent jurisdiction or delegated powers to arbitrarily classify.

A fortiori, legislators provided a remedy for arbitrary misclassification by enacting

CCP §403.080 which expressly authorizes a writ proceeding to the Appellate Division

or Court of Appeal to reverse whimsical and arbitrary misclassifications.

13 CCP §1235.060. “Shall” and “may” Shall is mandatory and may is permissive.

10

C. Amount In Controversy Continues To Provide A Basis For Reclassification 14

The Walker Test 15 continues to provide the method to determine the jurisdictional

amount in controversy for reclassification back down to a limited civil case, i.e.,

that the matter will necessarily result in a verdict below the jurisdictional amount. 16

“Finally, under Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262, we find that the trial court improperly reclassified this action as a limited civil case without evidence that the matter will "necessarily" result in a verdict below the jurisdictional amount required by statute for classification as an unlimited civil case.” Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 C.A.4th 223, 227

Walker and all published cases resolving classification present the opposite scenario;

they all involved fact patterns where a trial court reclassified from unlimited to limited

and the impaired party appealed the misclassification through a writ petition or appeal.

Jurisdictional basis was first set in 1934 in Harris v. Seidel, 1 CA. 2d 410 at page 416:

Ordinarily, jurisdiction depends upon the amount claimed in the ad damnum clause of the complaint……cite… It has been said "that any other rule would be fraught with uncertainties and mischiefs beyond the power of anticipation".…cite…. Likewise, it has been held that jurisdiction

does not depend in any way upon the amount which the plaintiff is finally held to be entitled to recover. In Becker v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 313, the court says: "The test of the jurisdiction of a court is ordinarily to be found in the nature of the case as made by the complaint and the relief sought…

It is elementary that the first question which must be determined by the trial court in every case is that of jurisdiction…

In Stern, supra, @ 229-231 the panel held a trial court abused its discretion

by failing to make requisite findings that the matter would necessarily result in

a verdict below $25,000. Stern held that a trial court must look to the prayer for the

amount in controversy; if there is any possibility (not probability) the award might

exceed the maximum for limited jurisdiction the case must be reclassified unlimited.

The prayer [Exh.1:00] and evidence [Exh.2:11-12] prove demand exceeds $25,000.

14 CCP §85(a), §86(a)(1), §403.010 et seq. 15 Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 257, 262 16 Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 C.A. 4th 223, 229–231

11

D. Whether Party Moves a Court Or It Raises a Jurisdictional Issue Sua Sponte,

It Must Give Litigants Opportunity to be Heard/Contest Reclassification. Stern 17

Shipley cited CCP§396a(b) in the caption & body of a Notice of Motion to Dismiss

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or transfer to unlimited jurisdiction. Exh.2, 1:16

She cited CCP §85 circumscribing amounts less than $25,000 to limited jurisdiction

and CCP §88 --- unlimited jurisdiction where amount in controversy exceeds $25,000.

Instead of making factual findings on admissible, authenticated evidence presented

with the motion, as required by Walker, supra & recently affirmed by Stern, supra the

court literally “pulled a rabbit out of his hat” to save his preferred party from transfer

by announcing the “dispositive statute” was CCP §403.040(e). Exh. 6, 8:19, transc.

Neither party cited or argued §403.040 in their moving and/or opposing papers.

A court may raise the issue of reclassification under CCP §403.040(e) sua sponte;

however, if it does so, the court must afford all parties an opportunity to be heard. 18

Here, the court simply announced a code neither party had cited or argued at all, and

when Shipley’s counsel tried to object the court rudely cut her off with a stern…No..

I’m ..not…Exh. 6, 9:1]. The court barreled into the next motion to rule upon; i.e.

the motion to compel home inspection and to compel Timothy McCarron’s affidavit.

This violated Shipley’s federal & state constitutional rights to due process by depriving

her of any opportunity to research the statute, present oral argument or object to it.

The United States Supreme Court has emphasized, on numerous occasions, that the

right to due process, at a minimum, guarantees citizens the right “to be heard” – that is,

an opportunity to present objections and arguments with regard to governmental

actions that may result in a deprivation of their life, liberty, or property. Mullane 19

17 Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal. App. 4th 223, 230–231 18 Stern, supra @ p.229-230 citing Walker v. Supr Court (1991) 53 C.3d 257, 261; Chahal v. Superior Court (1999) 73 CA.4th 399, 403; Kent v. Superior Court, supra, 2 CA.4th @1394 19 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)

12

The Mullane Court expressed the fundamental right to be heard as follows:

Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Id @ 313

see also, e.g., Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 466 (2000); Richards v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 517 U.S. 793, 797 n.4 (1996); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930)

Transcripts in this case show the court consistently allows plaintiff’s counsel to argue

ad nauseam uninterrupted, while consistently and rudely interrupting Shipley’s counsel.

If her counsel dares to utter “May I speak?” (to get a word in edgewise) she is promptly

admonished by the court in a loud voice, “No” or “Don’t interrupt.” Plaintiff’s counsel

is free to interrupt Shipley’s counsel and the court at his whim and has never been told,

“Don’t interrupt” or “No” when HE interrupts. The court is not even subtle in its bias.

A litigant must submit to the court’s control of the room, even if he is blatantly biased.

After a litigant has done so, he or she may demonstrate his legal errors on appeal. 20

Stare decisis mandates reversal when a court refuses to follow mandatory authority 21

E. Court Erred by Forcing Shipley to Defend Complex Issues in UD Court

Palmer 22 held mobile home tenancies cannot be terminated in summary proceedings:

...The summary proceedings for obtaining possession of real property outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable for termination of mobile home tenancies. Palmer 385

Palmer’s prohibition on summary eviction was later affirmed in Rich v. Schwab 23:

Our conclusion is also consistent with the holding in … (Palmer). In Palmer the court held the eviction requirements set forth in the MRL control over the less stringent requirements of the unlawful detainer law. (87 CA.3d at pp. 383-384.) Schwab @ 803

20 San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436 Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155 21 Auto Equity Sales v. Supr Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, [must apply stare decisis] 22 Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385 23 Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803

13

Although a court has discretion to preserve the benefits of summary proceedings,

it may not disregard a legitimate need for, and a right to, time to prepare and obtain

reasonable discovery in advance of a trial of complex issues on conflicting claims,

or require them to be tried within summary procedures designed for simple UD claims. 24

“…when complex issues of title are involved, the parties' constitutional rights to due process in the litigation of those issues cannot be subordinated to the summary procedures of unlawful detainer…the court abused its discretion.”… Moore @ 391-392

Error in trial proceedings is prejudicial when there is a "reasonable probability" that the error affected the outcome of the trial cites… Under the applicable test, the error was prejudicial. Moore @ 395

….refusal to permit trial of the issue of title outside of those summary procedures, was an abuse of discretion requiring the judgment's reversal Moore @396

Under stare decisis the court exceeded its powers when it refused to transfer the

case to unlimited jurisdiction with indisputable evidence the home is assessed at a

value exceeding $25,000. Exhibit 2, page 12. The home is not a “mobile” home.

Homes manufactured after 1976 are manufactured homes---not mobile homes.

Health and Safety Code §18007. Manufactured home (a) Manufactured home, for the purposes of this part, means a structure that was constructed on or after June 15, 1976… is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a single- family dwelling. [see also HUD Code ] 25

24 Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 CA.4th 367, 389; Deal v. Municipal Court 157 CA.3d 996; see Lindsey v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 [summary UD procedures are constitutionally acceptable only in straightforward issues of possession and incidental damages.] Id Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 CA.3d 141, Mehr v. Superior Court, supra, 139 C.A.3d 1044; Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999) 69 CA.4th 354; "the summary remedy of an unlawful detainer action was not the proper vehicle to litigate the complex issues of title in that matter. (Id, 364.)” 25 http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/ramh/mhs/faq

14

ARGUMENT II

Appellate Panel Has a Duty to Prohibit Trial Court From Exceeding Jurisdiction By Enabling the Unlawful Prosecution of an Action in the Wrong Jurisdiction. Acts exceeding jurisdiction, coupled with a court’s refusal to make findings on

the evidence presented with the motion, and its sua sponte announcement that is was

“disposing” the motion under CCP §403.040(e)---never cited nor argued shows bias.

The court is clearly acting as a de facto advocate for billionaire Stubblefield for

political reasons, to assure Stubblefield does not run a candidate against him when he

faces the next 6-year reelection. These acts violate an oath the judge swore to, after

being appointed to the bench, to “uphold the constitution and laws of California.”

The court stepped out of its role as independent arbiter and into a role of de facto

advocate by searching for a statute to “dispose” of the motion without making findings,

and without affording Shipley any opportunity to be heard or present oral arguments.

The court sabotaged Shipley by disposing her motion on a statute which did not apply.

CCP§403.040(e) applies only to the converse situation; i.e. a party, or court sua sponte,

moves to reclassify a case from unlimited jurisdiction back down to limited jurisdiction.

In fact §403.040(e) recites, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to require

the superior court to reclassify an action or proceeding because the judgment to be

rendered, as determined at the trial or hearing, is one that might have been rendered in

a limited civil case.” The case is not in superior court—but rather in Fontana UD court.

This panel has a duty under powers delegated by Article VI, §§10, 11 to prohibit

the trial court from exceeding delegated powers circumscribed by CCP §§85, 86, 88.

Acts exceeding jurisdiction must be restrained to ensure statewide uniformity. 26

The writ lies to prevent the exercise of any unauthorized power in a case or proceeding of which the subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction..

26 Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291

15

… Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction. Abelleira @ 291

CONCLUSION

The court exceeded its powers by denying a transfer sought under CCP §396a (b)

and reciting CCP §403.040 (e) as the dispositive code, which no party cited or argued,

and with no opportunity to research or brief it, and without oral argument or objections.

CCP§396a(b) imposes a mandatory duty on the court to transfer the case to unlimited

jurisdiction upon proof the amount in controversy [damages demanded or value of

property to be seized] exceeds $25,000. Legislators never authorized concurrent

jurisdiction 27 or delegated powers to arbitrarily classify cases on a judge’s whim.

CCP §403.080 authorizes a writ petition to reverse such arbitrary misclassification.

The appellate panel has a duty to prohibit a court from enabling unlawful prosecution

in the wrong jurisdiction. These acts exceeding jurisdiction, coupled with the court’s

refusal to make findings on evidence presented, and its sua sponte disposition of the

motion on CCP §403.040(e) which was never cited nor argued demonstrates clear bias.

The court acts as a de facto advocate for billionaire Stubblefield to assure his support

during his next 6-year reelection campaign. These biased acts violate the very oath he

swore when appointed to the bench to “uphold the constitution and laws of California.”

CCP §403.040(e) recites, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to require

the superior court to reclassify an action or proceeding because the judgment to be

rendered, as determined at the trial or hearing, is one that might have been rendered

in a limited civil case.” The section is inapplicable as it is the reverse of the facts here.

For the above reasons Shipley asks this panel to stay all proceedings and issue a writ

prohibiting the court from prosecuting this case in the wrong jurisdiction and

commanding the court to transfer the case to unlimited jurisdiction forthwith.

27 Castellini v Municipal Court (1970) 7 CA3d 174; Williams v Rosinsky Motor Co. (1955) 133 CA2d Supp 798, 284 P2d 979

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

The petition has 5.325 words including tables, in roman typeface, font 13. I relied on a word count generated by MS Word 2010 showing in the status bar.

Nancy ~ G f h ~ c ~ & r o n , Attorney for Bonnie Shipley

VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY

I, NANCY D MCCARRON, declare:

I am the Petitioner's attorney in this proceeding. I have read the foregoing Petition

for Review, and b o w the contents; the same is true of my own personal knowledge,

except as to those matters which are stated upon my information or belief, and as to

those matters I believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury, under the

laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and this

verification was executed at Santa Barbara, California.

VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER

I, BONNIE SHIPLEY, declare:

I am the Petitioner in this writ proceeding. 1-have read the foregoing Petition for

Writ of Mandate andlor Prohibition or Review and know the contents thereof; the

same is true of my own personal knowledge, except as to those matters which are

statcd upon my information or belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.

I declare under penalty of pe jury and Califomia law that the foregoing is true and

correct and this Verification was executed on the date below at Highland, California.

COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH DISTIUCT

, . . . .. DIVISION TWO ~ ,-.. - ~~

,~ . ..

ORDER

BONNIE SHIPLEY, Petitioner,

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDMO COUNTY,

Respondent;

(Super.Ct.Nos. CIVDS 1502107 & UDFS1406978)

The County of San Benardino

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, Real Party in Interest.

THE COURT +

The petition for writ of mandateiprohibition and request for immediate stay are DENED. \

-TON Acting P. J.

MAILING LIST FOR CASE: E063 1 18 ~- -- ---- - -

- - B6iie S k i p l e ~ 7 T T K e ~ u . i ~ r r~ ,=bbblEfie ld Pyopaies

Superior Court Clerk San Bernardino County 247 West Third Street San Bernardino, CA 9241 5

/ Nancy Duffy McCarron Law Office of Nancy Duffy McCarron 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93 103

-Robert. C-n . . --. - --

Hart I King 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, CA 92707

. -.

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO APPELLATE DIVISION

247 West Third Street, San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063 (909) 5213574

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO.

Respondent,

I STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, Real Party in Interest. 1

ORDER

The court having read and considered the merits of the Petition for Writ of Mandate filed on February 17,2015. the petition is DENIED.

The Hon. James J. Hosking and the Hon. Michael A. Knish concur. -.

&dJ. q* ELlA V..PIROZZI Assistant Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division

. Q

cc: Fontana Courthouse

I certify that co i s o e above Order were mailed to counsel of record as indicated on MA! 89 i&

- - - - -

Superior Court &ate of California Countp of B a n Pernarbino

Appellate Division DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 1 Writ # ClVDS 15021 07

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ~ . -. \..- -. .---

) Trial Court# UDFS 1406978 - . ----- -- . -. -~-- - .

The undersigned hereby declares: I am a citizen of the United States of America, over the age of eighteen years, a resident of the above-named State, and not a party to nor interested in the proceedings named in the title of the annexed document. I am a Deputy Appellate Clerk of said County. I am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. Correspondence would be deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business. On the date of mailing shown below, I placed for collection and mailing following ordinary business practices, at the request and under the direction of the Superior Court in and for the State of California and County above-named, whose office is at the Courthouse, San Bernardino, California, a sealed envelope which contained a true copy of each annexed document, and which envelope was addressed to the addressee, as follows:

JNANCY D. MCCARRON, ESQ. HART, KING & COLDRFN 950 ROBLE LANE 4 HURON CENTRE DRIVE, STE 900 SANTA BARBARA, CA 93103 SANTA ANA, CA 92707 %

FONTANA COURTHOUSE -. ---- - - - -- - HBPdORAEl=E KYLES.mMf-----------

Date and Place of Mailing: March 9, 2015, San-Bernardino, California.

Document Mailed: ORDER

I declare under penaltyof perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 9, 2015, at San Bernardino, California.

Deputy Clerk

/

Nancy D u e McCarron, 164780 950 Roble Lane

Santa Barbara, CA 93103 nancvduffvsb@vahoo.com

March 19, 2015

Clerk of the Court Fourth District Court of Appeal - Div. 2 Case No. UDFS1406978 3389 12th. Street Riverside, CA 92501 Stubbleifeld v. Nancv Duffv. et al

Attn: Belinda

Although the above online docket shows the above Fontana case was physically transferred last week to the Justice Center (Judge Sachs in S28) the case was not reclassified, and it is still being treated as a UD "under $10.000 damages" case, which is in complete violation of law. This case must be reclassified to "unlimited jurisdiction" as damages sought exceed $25,000 and value of property to be seized exceeds $25,000. (see brief). I wanted to clarifv this fact so as to avoid any argument this writ petition is moot because the case is now being heard in S28 Justice Center rather than Fontana. Plaintiffs Notice of a Discovery Motion shows it was set for March P9,2015, with a Proof of Service dated March 11, 2015 (mailed oniy 8 days before the hearing) [Exh. A] This pleading was accepted by the court clerk and scheduled on 8 daysinotice pursuant to CCP 31170.8 (5 days' notice in limited UD jurisdiction) rather than 16 days + 5 for mailing as required in unlimited jurisdiction, pursuant to CCP §1005(a). This is yet another reason why this case must be classified in unlimited jurisdiction to comport with due process. Three motions were served (52 pages, 102 pages, and 129 pages) for a total of 273 pages. Not even superman coula mount opposition to it in 5 days. This abuse has continued for 3 years now since 8/2/12. The case is now 15 volumes, 428 docket entries with a total of over 60 hearings. A case this complex should never be litigated in UD jurisdiction. The second case starting 1013114 wigbe deja vue, with 23 hearings already and 128 docket items after only 5 months. At some point this court must put an end to this abuse. This is the second sham complaint with no legal basis.

cc: Robert Williamson, Esq. (real.party's attorney) via US MAIL 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, CA 92707

'John H. Pentecost, Esq., Bar No. 99527 Robert G. Williamson, Jr., Es Bar No. Ryan J. Egan, Esq., Bar No. 2$836 HART KING A PRO k SSIONAL CORPORATION 4 Hutton Centre Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, California 92707 Telephone: (714) 432-8700 Facs~mile: (714) 546-7457

6

7

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES. a ) Case No. UDFS 1406978

Attorneys for Plaintiff STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California eneral partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILEHOME COMMU%ITY

8

9

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER

[Code of Civ. Proc.5 2025.010 et seq., t 1170.8; Cal. Rules o C t 3.13471

l2 E Z E 5 5 % 13 0 -- -

14 z y n 3 -

15 4 z w i 2s m u E

8 3 l6 s = 5 < " l7 *

19

20

2 1

[Filed concurrently with Separate Statement and Notice of Lodgment]

California general partnership dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS

Assigned for all u oses, Judge: Hon. Mic ae A. Sachs

MOBILEHOME COMMUNITY,

Plaintiff PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ORDER

v. COMPELLING DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY TO PERSONALLY APPEAR AND TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND NANCY B DUFFY aka NANCY DUFFY PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AT aka NANCY MCCARRON aka NANCY DE~OSITION; MEMORANDUM OF DUFFY-MCCARRON aka NANCY B.

DUFFY MCCARRON, BONNIE POINTS AND AUTHORITIES. SHIPLEY, and DOES 1 through lo, DECLARATION OF ROBER+G inclusive, WILLIAMSON, JR. IN SUPPORT THEREOF; REQUEST FOR

MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE

Defendants. AMOUNT OF $6,290.00 AGAINST DEPONENTANDHERATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON-

I DATE: March 19,2015 TIME: 8:30 a.m. DEPT: ,9287 ,

36568.02214819-1132-9314v.l PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ORDER

TO COMPEL TO APPEAR AND PRODUCE DOCUMEMS AT DEPOSITION

OF SERVICE rties v. DUB, et al. . UDFS1406978

, COUNTY OF ORANGE y of Orange, State of Califomia. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party

ddress is 4 Hutton Centre, Suite 900, Santa h a , California 92707-0507. ed the foregoing document(s) described as PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF

MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY TO TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AT

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF JR. IN SUPPORT THEREOF; REQUEST FOR MONETARY T OF $ 6,290.00 AGAINST DEPONENT AND HER ATTORNEY

MCCARRON to be served on the interested parties in this action as follows:

by placing U the original a m e copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated below or by sending a copy as stated and addressed below:

l o l SEE ATTACHED SER WCE LIST

11 0

,8- o w g 12 F Ct-4

22; 2 g 5 13

BY MAIL: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid Santa Ana, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in the affidavit.

5 5 2 ~ 52 Q 5 14 .<2u z cu

5 .O 5 4 15 - 893 iql BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an overnight delivery canier and addressed to the persons identified herein. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery canier.

8 5 16 <x

w 17

18

20

23 11 [State] I declare under penalty of perjury undm the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

BY EL.ECTRONIC SERVICE. Based on a corn order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification addresses listed herein on this date. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.

BY FACSIMILE: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I faxed the documents from a fax machine, at Santa Ana, Califomia, with the telephone number, (714) 546- 7457 to the parties andlor attorney for the parties at the facsimile transmission number(s) shown herein. The facsimile transmission was reported as complete without error by a transmission report, issued by the facsimile transmission machine upon which the transmission was made, a copy of which is attached hereto.

2 1

22

Executed on March &, 2015, at Santa h a , California. A

BY MESSENGER SERVICE: I served the documents by placing them in an envelope or package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed herein and providing them to a professional messenger service for service. A declaration by the messenger will be filed separately.

28 1 I

1 568.02214818-5208-8608v.l

PROOF OF SER VICE

3/15/2015 UDFS1406978 Minute Orders ­ San Bernardino Main

http://openaccess.sb­court.org/OpenAccess/civil/civilminutes.asp?courtcode=X&casenumber=FS1406978&casetype=UD&dsn=&actionseq=2&actiondate=201… 1/1

Home Complaints/Parties Actions Minutes PendingHearings

CaseReport Images

Case Type:

Case Number: Search

Case UDFS1406978 ­ STUBBLEFIELD ­VS­ DUFFY Action: (Choose)

HEARING RE: MOTIONS UNDER SUBMISSION/NEXT HEARING DATE 03/06/2015 ­ 4:30 PM DEPT. F7

KYLE S BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL ­ PROCEEDINGS: MOTIONS TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION ON 02/10/15 IS ORDERED VACATED. MOTIONS TO BE HEARDAT A DATE TO BE DETERMINED BY JUDGE SACHS (DEPT. S28). ­ COURT ORDERS THIS CASE TO SAN BERNARDINO JUSTICE CENTER TO BE HEARD WITHUDDS1204130. ­ COURT ORDERS MOTIONS THAT ARE SET TO BE HEARD ON 03/18/15 IN DEPT. F7 TO BE RE­CALENDARED FOR 03/18/15 IN DEPT. S28 (SAN BERNARDINO) TO EITHER BE HEARD OR CONTINUED TO A DATE TO BEDETERMINED BY THAT DEPARTMENT. ­ THE COURT NOW ORDERS THIS CASE ASSIGNED TO DEPARTMENT ( S28) FOR ALL PURPOSES. CLERK'S OFFICE TO NOTIFY PARTIES CLERK'S OFFICE TO SEND FILE TO SAN BERNARDINO FOR NEXT HEARING ACTION ­ COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END ===

UDFS1406978 Minute Orders - San Bemardino Main Page 1 o f 1

Pending Case Home ComplaintslParties Actions Minutes Hearings Report Judge's Notes Images

Case UDFS1406978 - STUBBLEFIELD -VS- DUFFY Action: (Choose) v

Case Type:

MOTION RE: TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FILED BY DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY 0112912015 - 8:00 AM DEPT. F7

V

KYLE s BRODIE, JUDGE CLERK: SHOSHONE NEAL BAILIFF: A. VELA

Case Number: 1 Search]

APPEARANCES: ATTORNEY ROBERT WILLIAMSON PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFIPETITIONER. ATTORNEY NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT.

PROCEEDINGS: PREDISPOSITION HEARING HELD MATTER ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED 10:21

THE COURT HAS READ THE REPLY MOTION TO DISMISS ACTION FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OR TRANSFER. ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF.

NANCY B DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY'S MOTION TO TRANSFER IS DENIED. 10:37 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR PRINTED. ACTION - COMPLETE === MINUTE ORDER END === === MINUTE ORDER END === === MINUTE ORDER END ===

PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

Stubblefield Properties v. Nancv Duffv. et a1 UDFS1406978

The undersigned is counsel for petitioneridefendant at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

On the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:

PETITION FOR REVIEW re: Denial of Motion to Re-CLASSIFY Jurisdiction to Unlimited

[ ] (By Personal Delivery)

[ ] (By Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4). I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.

[ ] (By Electronic) email address below @v ameement) & with copy to na~~cvduffvsb~vahoo.com

to: rwilliamson@,hartkinnlaw.com and reean@,hartkinglaw.com

[XI (2-dav Express Mail) 8 1013% 52015.5 CCP. I deposited it in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:

CA Supreme Cour t (original + 8 of petition + (Exh A Court of Appeal order 3/25/15) 350 McAllister Street, Room 1295 1 copy by electronic submission to CA SC San Francisco, CA 94 102 telephone (415) 865-7000

. d

4th District Court of AppcaI Appellate Division Presiding Panel Division Two San Bernardino Justice Center 3389 Twelfth Street 247 W. 31d. St.

%

Riverside, CA 9250 1 San Bernardino, CA 92415-0063 tel95 1-782-2500 fax: 95 1-248-0235 te1909-52 1-3574 fax 909-521-3563

Hon. Kyle Brodie, Dept. F7 Robert Williamson, Esq. for Real Party Fontana Division of SBSC HartKing - 17780 Arrow Blvd. 4 Hutton Drive, Suite 900 Fontana, CA 92335 Santa hi, CA92707 Te1909-320-5 134 fax 909-320-5049 te1714-432-8700 fax 714-546-7457

I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelope in the mail at San Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

[x] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true. Executed in San Bemardino CA on Aori12.2015

c w & uyi c ~ a n c ) Duffy Akarron, Attorney for Bonnie Shipley

EXHIBIT 2 1

APR 3 2015

foc3207 Case

STAY REQUESTED

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE DIVISION

BONNIE SHIPLEY, Petitioner,

v. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

Respondent;

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a CA General Partnership,

dba Momtain Shadows Mobile Home Community Real Party in Interest. -

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE, AND/OR PHOHIBITION OR REVIEW

. Exhibits (under separate -. -- - cover) , . =

Following Denial of Motion to Disqpalifjr Under CCP 5170.6

. UDFS 1406978 and LDDS 1204 13 0 (consolidated) Michael Sachs, Judge [S-281 (909)708-8699

Nancy D McCarron, CBN 164780 , '- - 950"Roble Lane J

Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 nancyduffisb@,vahoo. c m

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 Attorney for Petitioner

Case________________

STAY REQUESTED

In the Court of Appeal, State of California FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO

BONNIE SHIPLEY,

Petitioner v.

APPELLATE DIVISION SAN BERNARDINO SUPERIOR COURT

Respondent STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,

a CA General Partnership, dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community

Real Party In Interest

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE, AND/OR PHOHIBITION OR REVIEW

Exhibits (under separate cover)

Following Denial of Motion to Disqualify Under CCP §170.6

Case No. UDFS1406978 [limited jurisdiction] Michael Sachs, Judge [S-28] (909)708-8699

Nancy D McCarron, CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane

Santa Barbara, CA 93103 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 Attorney for Petitioner

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291 .......................................... 14, 15

Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 CA.3d 141 ...................................................... 13 Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 .......................................... 12 Becker v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 313 ......................................................................... 10 Berry v. Society of St. Pius X (1999) 69 CA.4th 354 .................................................... 13 Castellini v Municipal Court (1970) 7 CA3d 174 ……………………………………. 3 Deal v. Municipal Court, 157 CA.3d 996 .................................................................... 13 Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 CA.4th 32, 42 ............................................................ 6 Harris v. Seidel, 1 CA. 2d 410 at page 416 ................................................................... 10 Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155 ... 12 Lindsey v. Normet, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 64-66 ........................................................... 13 Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 CA.4th 367 .......................................................... 13 Mehr v. Superior Court, supra, 139 C.A.3d 1044 ......................................................... 13 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ........ 11 Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 CA.3d 377, 385.................................................................... 12 Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CA.3d @ 20 .............................................................................. 6 Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 CA.4th 803 .......................................................................... 12 Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 C.A. 4th 513, 517 ................................................................ 6 San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436 ....... 12 Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 C.A. 4th 223, 229–231 ......................................... 10 Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 257, 262 .................................................. 10 Warburton/Buttner v. Supr. Court (2002) 103 CA. 4th 1170, 1180............................... 6 Williams v Rosinsky Motor Co. (1955) 133 CA2d Supp 798, 284 P2d 979…………. 3

STATUTES

Constitution, Article VI, §§10, 11 ............................................................................. 3, 14 CCP §32 ....................................................................................................................... 6, 9 CCP §§85, 86, 88 ....................................................................................... 3,6, 8, 9, 10,14 CCP §396a(b) .......................................................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15 CCP §403.040(b) ............................................................................................................. 9 CCP §403.040(e) .................................................................................. 3, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15 CCP §403.080 .............................................................................................................. 7, 9 Civil Code §1717 ............................................................................................................. 5 Health and Safety Code §18007 .................................................................................... 13

3

WRIT ISSUES PRESENTED

Did Judge Sachs deny due process in a hearing denying Shipley’s valid motion to

disqualify him under CCP §170.6 (2)--two days after counsel notified him that she was

unavailable due to her brother’s unexpected death and her daughter’s hospitalization?

Was it abuse of discretion not to continue resolution until after counsel’s emergency?

Did Judge Sachs violate CCP §170.3 (a)(2) when, as Presiding Judge of Civil Cases in

Justice Center, he did not submit disqualification to Marsha Slough, the Presiding Judge?

STATEWIDE URGENCY

Petition affects every litigant who is deprived of a right to counsel at a crucial hearing,

conducted despite notification of her attorney’s unavailability due to family emergencies.

Our judicial system is based on the presumption a judicial officer will be fair and impartial.

Although a facially deficient disqualification motion may be stricken a judge should never

be allowed to rule on his own disqualification based on resolution of substantive issues.

The appellate court must intervene when a judge shows callous disregard and cruel bias.

PETITION

AUTHENTICITY OF EXHIBITS

1. Exhibits are copies of original documents on file in respondent court & dockets,

and a transcript of a disqualification hearing denying Shipley of a right to counsel.

BENEFICIAL INTEREST OF PETITIONER;

CAPACITIES OF PARTIES

2. Shipley is defendant in two consolidated cases pending in Respondent Court entitled,

Stubblefield Properties, CA General Partnership v. Nancy Duffy, Bonnie Shipley, et al

UDFS1406978, a summary eviction in which plaintiff seeks possession of premises and

Stubblefield Properties, CA General Partnership v. Bonnie Shipley, UDDS1204130, a

summary eviction seeking possession of premises. Plaintiff below is Real Party in Interest.

4

URGENCY TO PETITIONER

3. Absent intervention Shipley will be forced to submit to the jurisdiction of a Judge

in two consolidated cases, who has engaged, and continues to engage in intentional

serial violations of court rules, codes of procedures, and rules against Stare Decisis,

all to advocate for his preferred party Stubblefield; who has thwarted every effort

to obtain statutory attorney fees as prevailing party, and who has shown serial bias

against Shipley’s attorney, including denying disqualification, rather than continuing

the hearing until counsel returned from two family emergencies two weeks later, and

refusing to submit the Motion to Marsha Slough, Presiding Judge.

4. Under Stare Decisis bias is presumed when any part of a judge’s decision is

reversed on appeal. Hendershot v. Supr Court 1 Shipley had to appeal her own

victory when Judge Sachs let loser Stubblefield write a debauched final judgment.

Judge Sachs entered it immediately after Stubblfield’s runner delivered it directly to

chambers without giving Shipley any chance to object. Judge Sachs’ admitted this

in the transcript included under separate cover. [Exh. 6, pg 32:17] It was improper

for Judge Sachs to conduct Shipley’s hearing on 3/18/15 without counsel present to

argue and/or rebut misrepresentations Sachs packed into a transcript. A judge is not

authorized to file any opposition on writ petitions. Sachs’ attempt to nestle a

forbidden “opposition” into the 3/18/15 transcript is as transparent as a piece of glass.

It Judge Sachs intended to rebut bias, he had to file/serve a verified answer 10 days

after service of the motion. CCP §170.3(c) (5). Judge Sachs was able to present a

distorted version of the true facts while avoiding having to verify them under oath.

1 Hendershot v. Supr Court (Pac SoWest Invest., Inc.) (1993) 20 C.A.4th 860; Stegs Investments v. Superior Court (Sprecher) (1991) 233 CA.3d 572; Stubblefield Construction Co., Petitioner v. San Bernardino County, Respondent; City Of San Bernardino et al, Real Parties In Interest, 81 CA.4th 762 (2000)

5

5. Shipley notified the Presiding Judge of her intent to ask Attorney General Kamala

Harris to investigate Arnold Stubblefield’s continuous corruption and intimidation of

government officials, which we believe has infected the court system.

IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED

6. Shipley asks this court to issue an IMMEDIATE STAY of all proceedings until a

petition is resolved. The court continues to issue void orders ignoring CCP §170.4 (a).

Despite Shipley’s counsel’s request for a mere 3 week reprieve to grieve the death of

her brother, and help her daughter recover from a coma, at no hardship to plaintiff,

the callous, pitiless, cold-hearted Judge Sachs emboldened plaintiff to pummel Duffy

with 5 malicious motions (served on truncated notice) refusing to extend counsel any

extra time to oppose [Exh. 6, pg 47]; four frivolous motions against Duffy’s clients,

who have absolutely nothing to do with whether Duffy & Shipley can share her home.

1) 59-page MTC Chris Allen & $1,931.50 sanctions with perjured return of service.

2) 109-page MTC Steve Allen & $8,511.50 sanctions with perjured return of service.

3) 129-page MTC Bonnie Shipley & $6,290 sanctions sham against Shipley & Duffy.

4) 127-page MTC Nancy Duffy & $5,590 sanctions after answering all depo questions

5) 219-page Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens & $5,600 sanctions against Nancy Duffy

643 pages of Motions with a grand total $27,923.00 in sanctions requested.

Stubblefield’s so called “summary proceeding” in UD court in “limited jurisdiction.”

Stubblefield’s frivolous motions appear on Exh 1 (177 item docket – 5 volume case)

It is Stubblefield’s use of Superior Court Judges as “Weapons of Mass Harassment.”

HARASSMENT Round 2 (Exh.1) UDFS1406978; 177 entries-5 volumes-12 hearings

HARASSMENT Round 1 (Exh 2) UDDS1204130; 429 docket entries, 60 court hearings, 17 volume case file

Absent a STAY it will be physically and emotionally difficult for counsel to present

meaningful opposition on truncated notice to 643 pages---cheered on by Judge Sachs.

6

Shipley prevailed on Round 1 on May 6, 2013. For two years Shipley has been

trying to obtain statutory attorney fees as prevailing party under Mobile Home Law.

Sachs has thwarted every effort Duffy has made to obtain attorney fees since 2013.

Shipley will explain what has happened over three years of abuse in this court in a

written complaint to Attorney General Kamala Harris, with a request to investigate

Stubblefield’s use of local judges as “Weapons of Mass Harassment” to pummel any

person who challenges his sewer of corruption. We have endured three years of

relentess harassment --- as shown in Exhibits 1 and 2 in Star Court proceedings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

7. On 8/2/12 Stubblefield moved to evict Shipley---who was not his contract tenant,

but rather a co-resident of his contract tenant in UDDS1204130. 2 Stubblefield never

named or joined his contract tenant in that action. Shipley prevailed after an Appellate

Panel reversed the trial court’s denial of a summary judgment motion, and directed

the court to enter judgment on the merits for Shipley in civil case CIVDS1302013.3

Panel found the eviction unlawful because the authority Stubblefield cited in his notice

to vacate did not apply to Shipley as she was not a purchaser or transferee; and because

he lacked privity of contract with her since she was not his tenant. Id After losing

three related appeals plaintiff fraudulently prosecutes a new case in limited jurisdiction

where the damages prayed for and the property sought to be seized exceed $25,000.00.

NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

2 http://openaccess.sbcourt.org/OpenAccess/civil/civildetails.asp?courtcode=X&case number=DS1204130&casetype=UD&mcnmsearch=Y&dsn= 3 http://openaccess.sbcourt.org/OpenAccess/civil/civildetails.asp?courtcode=X&case number=DS1302013&casetype=CIV&mcnmsearch=Y&dsn=

8. Denial of motion to disqualify is not appealable. CCP $ 904.1 If relief is denied

Shipley may leave the homeowner may lose'her mobile home and Shipley may be

evicted from the mobile home she has lawfully occupied as co-resident for the past 3

years since 2012. Shipley has no other adequate remedy at law for the relief sought

in this petition.

WRIT PETITION WAS TIMELY FILED

9. Petition was timely filediserved 15 days after Denial (lO+5 mail) CCP $170.3(d)

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays the Appellate Panel:

1. Issue an immediate STAY of proceedings pending outcome of this writ petition.

2. Either (a) issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing Respondent Court to set

aside and vacate its March 18,20 15 order denying disqualification or (b) issue an

alternative writ directing Respondent Court to show cause why it sho* not be so

directed, and upon return of the alternative writ, issue the peremptory writ set forth in ;",

subparagraph (a) above; or (c) to direct any other appropriate relief as the court deems

necessary. Issue a writ prohibiting and restraining Judge Sachs from proceeding with

either of the two consolidated case. Include a directive

3. Award Shipley costs incurred in this proceeding and attorney fees under MRL,

Civil Code $1717, and any other basis in law forwhich she is entitled to attorney fees.

Respectfully submitted:

~ a n c ; D McCarron, Attorney for Petitioner

Carlos Garau v. Torrance UniJied School District, 137 Cal App 4th 192, 194-195 -?'

8

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STANDARD OF REVIEW [DE NOVO]

Where evidence is not in dispute, a determination of a legal issue is a legal question

subject to de novo review. 5 The Panel is not bound by a trial court but makes its own

independent interpretation. 6

APPEALABILITY & PROCEDURE TO APPEAL

Denial of a motion to disqualify is not an appealable order and may only be

challenged by a writ petition to the “appropriate court of appeal.” CCP §170.3(d)

Although Stubblefield filed and prosecuted this case in UD limited jurisdiction,

Judge Kyle Brodie just transferred this case to Department S28. There is nothing in

his transfer order indicating if this case has been reclassified to unlimited jurisdiction.

Accordingly, Shipley does not know where she should file a writ; i.e. in the Appellate

Division or Fourth District Court of Appeal. To avoid rejection for untimely filing,

Shipley files this writ petition in both courts, pending further clarification by the court.

Stubblefield is treating this case as if it remains in limited jurisdiction; i.e. his attorney

continues to serve discovery motions on truncated 5-day notice.

ARGUMENTS:

I. COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY DENYING ORAL ARGUMENT

The United States Supreme Court has emphasized, on numerous occasions, that the

right to due process, at a minimum, guarantees citizens the right “to be heard” – that is,

an opportunity to present objections and arguments with regard to governmental actions

that may result in a deprivation of their life, liberty, or property. Mullane 7

5 Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 CA.4th 32, 42; Warburton/Buttner v. Supr. Court (2002) 103 CA. 4th 1170, 1180 6 Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 CA.3d @ 20; Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 C.A. 4th 513, 517 7 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)

9

The Mullane Court expressed the fundamental right to be heard as follows:

Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Id @ 313

see also, e.g., Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 466 (2000); Richards v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 517 U.S. 793, 797 n.4 (1996); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930)

Once Judge Sachs realized McCarron’s brother had just died, and her daughter

was hospitalized in a diabetic coma, he should have continued the CCP §170.6(a)(2)

motion until after April 3, 2015 as she requested. Any compassionate person would

understand the emotional trauma a person experiences at the death of a close sibling,

and should understand the effect of a daughter on the edge of death on her mother.

Instead, Judge Sachs issued a perfunctory continuance of scheduled hearing dates

(from 3/18/15 to 4/10/15) but refused to continue dates for opposition---for the three

motions already set, and even accepted a FOURTH and FIFTH motion to be filed

while McCarron was grieving the death of her brother and tending to her daughter,

for 4/10/15-pummeling Duffy with yet another 127 pages and 219 pages in motions.

Shipley had 3 motions under submission in Department 7 in Fontana when Judge

Kyle Brodie transferred her case to Judge Sachs in S28. Stubblefield had 3motions.

Despite Duffy’s urgent need for continuance Sachs refused to vacate his motions.

Instead the court reset his 3 hearings to S28 to be heard on the same day as he set.

As to Shipley’s 3 pending motions, they were not re-set to S28 like he did for plaintiff.

Instead Shipley’s pending motions were vacated to impose a significant burden on

Duffy to re-submit her 3 extensive motions to compel over again. Sachs did the same

thing with Shipley’s extensive attorney fee motion. Sachs “vacated” her motion, then

refused to let McCarron re-notice the hearing based on papers already filed & served.

Sachs goes out of his way to create as many burdens as he can create for McCarron.

10

II. Sachs violated §170.3 (a)(2) when, as Presiding Judge of Civil Cases in Justice Center, he did not submit disqualification to Marsha Slough, the Presiding Judge?

In Rossco Holdings 8 the appellate court held disqualification occurs when the

facts creating disqualification arise, not when the disqualification is established,

and a disqualified judge’s orders are void, regardless of whether they happen t

have been legally correct. A party’s right to disqualify a judge, commissioner, or

referee for prejudice is automatic in the sense that the party’s good-faith belief in

the prejudice is sufficient without proof of any facts showing actual prejudice 9

The court in Bravo 10 held if a CCP§170.6 motion is timely filed in proper form,

the court must accept it without further inquiry, the disqualification is effective

immediately, and as a remedial statute the statute is liberally construed in favor of

the allowing the peremptory challenge and a challenge should be denied only if

the statute absolutely forbids it

The Supreme Court has stated courts must be conducted in a manner as will avoid

suspicion of unfairness. Prejudice, being a state of mind, is very difficult to prove

and, when a judge asserts that he or she is unbiased, courts are naturally reluctant to

determine he or she is prejudiced. To ensure confidence in the judiciary and avoid the

suspicion that might arise from the belief of a litigant that the judge is biased, the

Legislature could reasonably conclude a party should have an opportunity to obtain

disqualification of a judge for prejudice, on a sworn statement, without being required

to establish it as a fact to the satisfaction of a judicial body. 11

8 Rossco Holdings, Inc. v Bank of America (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 1353 9 CCP §170.6(a)(4); McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531 (judicial removal); Mayr v. Supr Court (1964) 228 CA.2d 60, 61 10 Bravo v. Supr. Court (2007) 149 CA. 4th 1489; Davcon, Inc. v. Roberts & Morgan (2003) 110 CA.4th 1355, 1360; Stephens v. Supr Court (2002) 96 CA. 4th 54, 6162 11 Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 693, 697

11

III. SACHS’ FINDING §170.6 (a)(2) DOES NOT APPLY IS CLEAR ERROR

In the transcript of the 3/18/15 hearing (Exh. 6, pg 36, ln 6) Judge Sachs

admits the Appellate Panel ordered him to strike the words “or resident’ from

the final judgment for Shipley, remarking it was “harmless error.” It was

hardly “harmless” to 675,000 mobile home residents, including Shipley,

who would be subject to arbitrary eviction under Civil §798.56(d) with Judge

Sachs insertion of those words into the judgment’s citation of the code section.

It was hardly “harmless” error when it caused McCarron another year’s delay in

obtaining attorney fees (Sachs refused to award them while case was on appeal as

to the words “or resident.) Sachs said he had “no jurisdiction,” as he also held when

he refused to order Stubblefield to restore utilities to the home after our electric pedestal

was mysteriously burned out. Again, Sachs said he had “no jurisdiction during appeal.”

However, when the shoe was on the other foot (Stubblefield asked for an order

expunging our valid lis pendens while the case was still on appeal) Sachs had no

problem with jurisdiction then. When we argued there was no jurisdiction Sachs held

there was jurisdiction to expunge it.

Sachs also argues the case was not reversed but rather one issue was reversed; i.e.

Judge Sachs was ordered to strike “or resident.” Sachs misrepresents the ruling.

Appellate panel found several other errors, but Sachs conveniently omitted them in the

transcript. They held he SHOULD NOT HAVE LET STUBBLFIELD WRITE

SHIPLEY’s final judgment in violation of court rules. He did that purely to advocate

for Stubblefield; to let HIM write the final judgment to convert him into a winner.

Panel also held he erred when he entered judgment without waiting 10 days for

objections in violation of Local Rules. As explained above, these errors were not

harmless. Duffy had to pursue another appeal, wait another year for fees, pay for

transcripts and spend hundreds of hours on research, writing, and oral arguments.

12

Three courts already found there does not have to be a “new trial” in order

for a party to disqualify a Judge under CCO §170.6(a)(2). Even if the Judge

only has to decide ONE ISSUE when the case is returned after an appeal, if the

Judge has to rule on ONE substantive issue a party is entitled to disqualify. 12

Stubblefield made this same argument and the appellate court granted relief;

i.e. Stubblefield was entitled to disqualify on remand. See footnote 12.

Citing Stegs, supra the Hendershot v. Supr Court (footnote 12) at page 864 holds:

[1] The issue, then, is whether our remand order upon Hendershot's section 908 motion for restitution called for a "new trial" within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (2). We conclude that it did. 864

The 1985 amendment to section 170.6 was prompted by concern that "... a judge who had been reversed might prove to be biased against the party who successfully appealed the judge's erroneous ruling at the original trial." (Stegs Investments v. Superior Court, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 575.) In Stegs, supra (fn 12) the appellate court held: "The legislative history of the 1985 amendment suggests that the applicability of [section 170.6] does not turn on ... whether the issue(s) to be resolved on remand are limited, but what the court must do to resolve them. … Our remand to the trial court was not for the purpose of causing it to perform a ministerial act, such as the execution of a mathematical calculation. It was, instead, for the purpose of receiving evidence and resolving a factual issue: whether, in paying the amount of the judgment against him, Hendershot acted for himself alone or for the Shadowood Corporation. The former law strictly limited motions for new trial to cases in which an issue of fact had been adjudicated, and denied its application to other cases, such as those in which a dismissal was ordered after a demurrer had been sustained, or where a judgment had been taken by default. (8 Witkin, Cal. Pro, supra, Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 22, p. 423.)

12 Hendershot v. Supr Court (Pac SoWest Invest., Inc.) (1993) 20 C.A.4th 860; Stegs Investments v. Superior Court (Sprecher) (1991) 233 CA.3d 572; Stubblefield Construction Co., Petitioner v. San Bernardino County, Respondent; City Of San Bernardino et al, Real Parties In Interest, 81 CA.4th 762 (2000)

13

That rule was repudiated more than three decades ago (see Carney v. Simmonds (1957) 49 Cal.2d 84 [315 P.2d 305]), and the remedy is now quite broad. (See 8 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 23, p. 424.) We see no reason why it should not receive a similar broad construction in this case, encompassing a post-trial reversal and remand for trial of a contested issue in which trial court discretion or fact determination is involved. Finally, our construction and application of the amendment is consonant with the established rule that section 170.6, in guaranteeing a litigant the extraordinary right to disqualify a judge, should be liberally construed to effect its objects and to promote justice. (See Nissan Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 150, 154 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 801] and authority cited.)

This case is on all fours with Hendershot, Stegs & Stubblefield v. Supr. Court.

Where a judge who was reversed, even on only one issue (Sachs was reversed on three

issues which the Panel found were “harmless errors.” These errors were not harmless

to us and 675,000 other mobile home residents subject to arbitrary eviction based on

the way Sachs wrote “or resident” into a statutory remedy applying only to owners.

Prejudice on the part of a judge was properly made a ground of disqualification

by CCP §170.6. Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 693, 696

The transcript at Exhibit 6 shows the court is not even subtle in its prejudicial bias.

A litigant must submit to the court’s control of the room, even if he is blatantly biased.

After a litigant has done so, he or she may demonstrate his legal errors on appeal. 13

Stare decisis mandates reversal when a court refuses to follow mandatory authority 14

13 San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436 Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155 14 Auto Equity Sales v. Supr Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, [must apply stare decisis]

14

IV Appellate Panel Has a Duty to Prohibit A Court From Exceeding Jurisdiction

Judge Sachs had stepped out of his role as independent arbiter and into a role of de

facto advocate by not forwarding the case to the presiding judge for reassignment and by

denying Shipley any opportunity to present oral arguments on disqualification.

This panel has a duty under powers delegated by our legislators in CCP §170.3 and

§170.4. Acts exceeding jurisdiction must be restrained to ensure statewide uniformity. 15

The writ lies to prevent the exercise of any unauthorized power in a case or proceeding of which the subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction..

… Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction. Abelleira @ 291

CONCLUSION

The court exceeded its powers by denying Shipley’s motion to disqualify, by

failing to continue the motion to give her a chance to present oral argument or object,

and by failing to submit the motion to Marsh Slough, Presiding Judge as mandated by

CCP §170.3 (a)(2), where he is Presiding Judge in Civil Cases in the Justice Court.

Judge Sachs intentionally ruled on the motion, despite absence of Shipley’s counsel,

as he thought due to her emergencies she would not be able to file a writ in 15 days.

The cruel and insensitive manner in which Judge Sachs handled McCarron’s motion is

the best evidence of the extreme bias an animus he holds toward attorney McCarron.

HE MUST BE REMOVED FROM BOTH CASES UNDER STARE DECISIS.

15 Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291

The petition has 4,629 word$ excluding tables, in roman typeface, font 13. I relied on a word count generated by MS Word 2010 showing in the status bar.

Nancy -LJ Duffy cCarron, Attorney for Bonnie Shipley

I, NANCY D MCCARRON, declare:

I am the Petitioner's attorney in this proceeding. I have read the foregoing Petition

for Writ of Mandate, and know the contents; the same is true of my own personal

knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated upon my information or belief,

and as to those matters I believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury,

under the laws of the State of Califomia that the foregoing is true and correct and this

verification was executed at Santa Barbara, California.

-- --- N m C Y D MCCARRON, Attorney for Petitioner

VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER

I, BONNIE SHIPLEY, declare:

I am the Petitioner in this writ proceeding. I have read the foregoing Petition for

Writ of Mandate andlor Prohibition or Review and know the contents thereof; the

same is true of my own personal knowledge, except as to those matters which are

stated upon my information or belief and as to those matters I believe them to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury and California law that the foregoing is true and

correct and this Verification was executed on the date below at Highland, Califomia.

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BEKNARDINO

StubbIefield Properties v. Nancv Dufi, et a1 UDFS1406978

The undersigned is counsel for petitionertdefendant at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

On the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:

Writ Petition and Exhibits re: Denial of Disqualification under CCP §170.6(2)

[ ] (By Pcrsonal Delivery)

[ ] (&y Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4). I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.

[ ] (By Electronic) email address below (by ameement) & with copy to nancyduffysb~vahoo.com

to: rwilliamsonc;i)hartkinalaw.com - and reganliiihartkinclaw- -

[x] (By US Mail) 8 1013a, 42015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:

APPELLATE DIVISION: ORIGINAL + 4 copies + Exhibits (Volume 1 of 1) RESPONDENT COURT: Judge Michael Sachs (petition only) 247 W. Third Street San Bemardino, CA 92415-0063

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL Original+4 copies + Exhibits (Vol 1 of 1) 3389 12th Street Riverside, CA 9250 1

Robert Williamson, Ryan Egan at IIartJKing Law Firm 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, CA 92707 714-432-8700 fax 714-546-7457

I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelope in the mail at Santa Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

[x] (STATE) I declare under penalty of pejury and laws of California that the above is truc. Executed in Santa Barbara. CA on March 3 1,2015

EXHIBIT 22

Nancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com Real Estate Broker Lic. #00853086

Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California General Partnership, dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY, et Defendant.

No trial date set:

Case No. UDFS 1406978 filed: 10-3-14

DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY's NOTICE OF AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Filed with Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts Declarations: Nancy Duffy McCarron, Bonnie Shipley; to be consider d with D's Request for Judicial Notice Date: April 4 2015 CCP $3437~; 592; 597; 1 170.7 Time: 8:30 a.m. CRC 3.1350; 3.1351 S28 [or to be announced] Evidence $545 1,452,453

PLEASE NOTE on the above date and time defendant BONNIE SHIPLEY will move the court for summary judgment based on above statutes and rules, P&A, P's admissions, court files and evidence.

I. Introduction [General Rules on Summary Judgment] (5-day notice in UD - CCP 51170.7)

In an action for recovery of real property, money claimed as due under a contract, or damages sought,

"where there are both issues of fact and law, the issue of law must beJirst disposed of." CCP $592.

It is the trial court's duty to determine the issue of law. ' Whether there is a triable issue of material

fact does not turn on a trial court's discretion. Under CCP §437c(c), a court must grant summary

judgment if all papers & affidavits submitted, together with all inferences reasonably deducible from the

evidence, and un-contradicted by other inferences or evidence, show there is noiriable issue, movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is a triable issue of material fact only if evidence would

allow a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of a party opposing the motion for summary judgment.

The purpose of summary judgment is to ascertain if the weighing procedures of a trial are necessary. 4

1 Aloha PaciJic, Inc. v. CA Ins. Guar. Assn. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 297,307; Armato v. Baden (1 999) 71 CA. 4th 885, 893; Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 CA. 4th 592,603; Monteleone v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1 996) 5 1 Cal. App. 4th 509, 5 14;

2 Fretland v. County of Humboldt (1 999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1490 Aguilar v. Atlantic RichJield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850

4 Chern v. BOA (1976) 15 C.3d 866,873; Convin v. LA Newspaper Svs Bureau (1971) 4 C.3d 842, 851; Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 C.3d 868, 874; Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet (1965) 62 C.2d 412,417

- 0 - Defendant's Summary Judgment Mot~on filed wth D's Separate Statement of Und~sputed Facts,

Declarat~ons of Nancy D McCarron and Bonn~e Shlpley to be cons~dered \nth D's Request for Jud~c~a l Notice

_________________________________________________________________________________ - 1 -

Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion filed with D’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, Declarations of Nancy D. McCarron and Bonnie Shipley to be considered with D’s Request for Judicial Notice

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When a court decides an issue of law it must apply controlling statutory interpretations, as they are

binding under Stare Decisis.5 The court must consider all evidence set forth in papers, unless objections

are sustained under CCP §437c(c) 6 and all deducible inferences from them. CCP §437c(c) 7 A trial

court may not weigh the evidence like a fact finder to determine whose version is more likely true. 8

Declarations must contain evidentiary facts on personal knowledge--not ultimate facts or conclusions. 9

An assertion based solely on conjecture or speculation is insufficient to avoid summary judgment. 10

Defendant can satisfy initial burden to show an absence of evidence by plaintiff’s admissions. 11

Plaintiff cannot raise new, un-pleaded issues in opposition papers or any issue based on speculation.12

Plaintiff may not rely on verified allegations in a complaint to show that a triable issue of fact exists;

plaintiff must set forth evidentiary facts showing a triable issue of material fact. CCP §437c(p)(1) (2) 13

Plaintiff may not create an issue outside of the pleadings. 14 Since plaintiff has a statutory duty to

respond to discovery, plaintiffs factually devoid answers showed plaintiff has no triable issue of facts.15

If defendant’s showing establishes facts justifying judgment, summary judgment must be entered. 16

5 Auto Equity Sales v. Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; State Farm Gen. Insurance v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA (2006) 143 CA. 4th. 1098, 1121 6 Tchorbadjian v. Western Home Ins. Co. (1995) 39 CA. 4th 1211, 1217; see also CCP §537.25[4] 7 Assad v. So Pac Tran. Co (1996) 42 C.A.4th 1609, 1612; Tchorbadjian, @1465; Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg (1996) 47 CA. 4th 1461, 1465; Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc. (1998) 65 CA. 4th 833, 841 8 Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 CA. 4th 832, 840 9 CCP §437c(d);Estate of Nelson (1964) 227 CA2d 42 10 Sanchez v. Swinerton, supra @ 1466; USC v Weiss (1962) 208 CA2d 759 [1 triable issue required] 11 Aguilar v. ARCO (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 CA. 4th 1283, 1302 12 Tsemetzin v. Coast Fed. S&L (1997) 57 CA.4th 1334, 1342; Coyne v Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257 13 Aguilar v. ARCO (2001) supra @ 850; Vesely v Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153,169; Arciniega v. Bank of San Bernardino (1997) 52 CA.4th 213, 224; Eisenberg v. Alameda News (1999) 74 CA.4th 1359, 1375; UC v. Supr Court (1996) 41 CA.4th 1040, 1044; Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. (1999) 69 CA.4th 64,69; Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 CA.4th 151, 162; Bacon v. South. Cal. Edison (1997) 53 CA.4th 854, 858 14 Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 CA. 4th 1242, 1253; Sutherland v. Barclays American Mortg. Corp. (1997) 53 CA. 4th 299, 317; Nash v. Fifth Amendment (1991) 228 CA. 3d 1106, 1116; see also GEICO v. Superior Court (2000) 79 CA.4th 95, 98 n.4; Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 CA. 4th 614, 629; Allyson v. Department of Transportation (1997) 53 CA. 4th 1304, 1318–1321 15 Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 CA. 4th 64, 71–80 16 FNB Mortgage Corp. v. Pacific General Group (1999) 76 CA. 4th 1116, 1126; Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Services (1999) 76 CA. 4th 521, 528; Tibor v. Superior Court (1997) 52 CA. 4th 1359, 1369; Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 CA.4th 1591, 1602

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Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion filed with D’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, Declarations of Nancy D. McCarron and Bonnie Shipley to be considered with D’s Request for Judicial Notice

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II. Judgment for Shipley is Required as the Only Issue Was Already Decided As a Matter of Law

An admission is extended a very high credibility value in determining whether a triable issue exists. 17

Defendant may rely on verified allegations which are conclusive concessions of the truth of a matter. 18

Plaintiff admitted at a 2/10/15 hearing, through counsel, there is only one issue, as recited by his counsel:

MR. WILLIAMSON: “The issue in this case, is whether, under the terms of Ms. McCarron’s lease, and the rules and regulations, regularly occupies the home in order to have a resident, co-resident, sub-lessee, live there who was under the park’s age restriction. In other words, a sub-lessee or co-resident, under the terms of the lease and the park rules and regulations, cannot reside there without the homeowner, the age-qualified prime owner staying there on a regular basis, living there on a regular basis. That’s the subject matter of

this action.” 2/10/15 Transcript [F7] Duffy Decl. Exh A, pg 10:20; pg 21:1

Express & implied covenants are questions of law decided by a court in summary judgment motions.19

Where the only material issue is a legal question the court must resolve it and grant summary judgment.

Morales 20 [if defendant owed a legal duty to plaintiffs to make sure their tenants obtained insurance in

the agreed amount]. Finding there was no duty the court entered summary judgment for defendant.

In Uram v. Abex 21 a trial court found, as a matter of law, plaintiffs’ exposure to asbestos claims were

barred by a statute of limitations [CCP §340.2] after reviewing the complaint for when injuries occurred.

The Supreme Court held a trial court may consider facts judicially noticed.22 CCP §437c authorizes

summary judgment based on judicial notice. 23 Summary judgment for defendant was affirmed where a

pilot’s responsibilities were established through federal regulations judicially noticed by a trial court. Id

If movant’s showing negates an element of the claim no other facts preclude summary judgment.24

Here, the only material issue presents a pure question of law; i.e. must the age-qualified prime owner

[McCarron] reside in a mobile home at all times while co-resident [Shipley] shares the mobile home?

17 D’Amico v. Bd of Med. Exam. (1974) 11 C.3d 1, 21-22; Thompson v. Williams (1989) 211 CA.3d 566 18 Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1120 19 Lundin Weber Co. v Brea Oil Co., Inc. (2004) 2004 Cal App LEXIS 435 20 Morales v. Fansler (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 1581, 1584 21 Uram v. Abex Corp. (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 1425, 1433 22 Parker v. 20th. Century-Fox Film Corp. (1970) 3 C.3d 176, 181 (breach of employment contract) 23 Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (1981) 115 Cal. App. 3d 431, 434 (wrongful death airplane crash) 24 Yurick, supra @ 1120

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Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion filed with D’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, Declarations of Nancy D. McCarron and Bonnie Shipley to be considered with D’s Request for Judicial Notice

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A. Rancho Santa Paula Mobile Homes v. Evans (1994) 26 CA.4th 1129, 1147 Must be Applied

Plaintiff’s sham complaint is purportedly based on Civil Code §798.56[d] authorizing eviction for:

(d) failure of homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or regulation of the park that is part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto.”…

“Nothing in this subdivision shall relieve the management from its obligation to demonstrate that a rule or regulation has in fact been violated.”

Plaintiff has the burden to prove Duffy failed to comply with a reasonable rule. It is a 3-Prong burden.

First, P must prove the rule is reasonable. Second, P must prove the rule is part of the rental agreement

or amendment thereto. Third, P must prove D violated the rule. If D negates Prong 1 there is no need to

ever reach Prong 2 or Prong 3. D negates Prong 1 of the test here as a matter of law as shown below.

Counsel glossed over Prong1 and 2 as if the 2010 anti-sublease rule had already been found reasonable,

had already been found to be part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto; and the only issue

in this case (to go to a jury) is whether Duffy violated a reasonable rule which is part of her agreement

or amendment thereto. Plaintiff fails on Prong 1 as a matter of law. The court must apply Stare Decisis.

The Appellate court in Rancho Santa Paula Mobile Homes v. Evans (1994) 26 CA4th.1129, 1147-48

already found an anti-sublease rule is unreasonable as a matter of law if it is applied without consent or

without the pre-existing tenant agreeing to modify her lease to incorporate the new anti-sublease rule.

Because of the high cost of moving mobile homes, they are anything but mobile….

However, as explained above, a rule prohibiting subleasing affects the very nature of the holding and may well cause the eviction of both the tenant and the mobile home owner. We hold that such a rule, when applied retroactively--that is, against a homeowner whose lease contains no such restriction and who has not agreed to the restriction--is contrary to the stated purpose of the MRL and is therefore unreasonable.

Respondent claims that the regulation he seeks to enforce does not prohibit subleasing, but only requires the owner to be one of the residents of the mobilehome. However, the restriction would permit subleasing only if the home remained unoccupied or if the homeowner were one of the occupants … it is essentially a prohibition of subleasing.

Respondent contends that the restriction did not operate retroactively because it was incorporated by law into the original lease. He argues that, since Civil Code, section 798.25 permits the making of new rules without the homeowner's consent, the homeowner in commencing the tenancy agrees to subsequently enacted rules.

However, the argument begs the question. To be valid and enforceable, the rule must be reasonable. A homeowner could not be expected to foresee a rule change effecting such a radical change in such an important condition of his tenancy. Insofar as it attempts to operate retroactively, such a rule is not reasonable. Evans @ 1147-1148

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Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion filed with D’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, Declarations of Nancy D. McCarron and Bonnie Shipley to be considered with D’s Request for Judicial Notice

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This court must apply Evans, supra because it is controlling authority. Evans held an anti-sublease

clause is unreasonable as a matter of law. Summary judgment must be granted when defendant negates

the first element of what a plaintiff must prove at trial. There is no need for trial where Pron1 is negated.

If a defendant is charged with speeding at 65 miles per hour, a judge has no power to invoke a jury to

decide if 65 mph is a reasonable speed as legislators already decided 65 is a reasonable maximum speed

The court cannot submit a legal issue to a jury when an appellate court already decided the legal issue.

This court must apply controlling authority of Evans, supra @ 1147-1148. This negates Prong 1 as a

matter of law; accordingly the court must grant summary judgment to defendants.

CHRONOLOGY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS:

1. It is undisputed Duffy executed a lease 1/5/2005 [Compl., ¶11,¶12-Exhibit 1; Duffy Decl. pg 1,¶ 1] __________________________________________________________________________________ 2. It is undisputed Community Guidelines (11/1/2000) applied; Cover Pg, Pg1, pg 15 (signature page)

Compl,¶13,¶14-Exh. 2 (age restriction= >40); Duffy Decl. pg 1,¶2 Exh.1a,1b,1c (cover, p.1, p.15) same

It is undisputed Duffy agreed to 2000 Community Rules when she executed her lease on 1/5/2005:

Complaint, Exh. 2, pg. 15, ¶13-14 Complaint, Exh. 2 “2000 Community Guidelines” shows 2nd resident need only be 40 years of age.

Complaint, Exh. 2, p.2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________

3. It is undisputed Duffy did not agree to 2010 Rules in 3/2010 as her signature & date lines are blank.

Compl, Exh. 3, pg 27

Plaintiff did not allege Duffy signed 3/10/2010 Community Rules, attached to complaint as Exhibit 3. ___________________________________________________________________________________

4. It is undiputed Duffy’s lease could not be modified absent written agreement or by operation of law

Compl, Exh.1, p.6, ¶29

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5. It is undisputed Bonnie Shipley still resides in Space #333 (Compl, pg.6,¶36; Shipley decl. p.3, ¶8

___________________________________________________________________________________

6. It is undisputed plaintiff admitted through its counsel on 2/10/15 at a court hearing (transcript on file)

there is only one issue in this case; i.e. whether Duffy must regulary occupy the mobilehome at all times

in order to share her mobile home with Shipley, who is over age 40 but not yet over age 55

Complaint, Page 3, ¶16; Duffy Decl. pg.3,¶13, Exh.7; 2/10 15 transcript on file in court

7. Under Civil §798.25(b) new park rule is enforceable after 6 months, but only if the rule is reasonable ___________________________________________________________________________________

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ALLEGE LEASE WAS MODIFIED BY OPERATION OF LAW

Since Clause 29 of Duffy’s lease prohibited modification of her lease absent written consent or by

operation of law, and Duffy did not consent to the new 2010 Community Rules, the only way Duffy’s

lease could be modified is by operation of law. This means that under Civil Code §798.25 (b) the new

park rule implemented in 2010 (anti-subleasing unless owner regularly occupies the home at all times )

must be reasonable. In order to evict a homeowner under an alleged violation of a “reasonable rule.”

Civil Code §798.56(d) statutorily imposes the burden of proof on plaintiff (park owner/manager) to

prove that a homeowner violated a “reasonable rule” that is part of the rental agreement or amendment.

(d) failure of homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or regulation of the park that is part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto.”…

“Nothing in this subdivision shall relieve the management from its obligation to demonstrate that a rule or regulation has in fact been violated.”

Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegation that Duffy’s 2005 lease was “modified” by “operation

of law” in 2010 or at any time during her tenancy. The Evans court held that an anti-subleasing rule

could not be enforced against a pre-existing tenant if not incorporated in her original lease. Such ex post

facto application is unconstitutional and unreasonable as a matter of law. Evans @ 1148. This court

must apply Stare Decisis [Evans] and grant motion for summary judgment as a matter of law.

Plaintiff cannot prove Duffy agreed to be a prisoner within the 4 walls of her mobilehome in order to

be entitled to have a coresident share her home. There is no admissible evidence by way of affidavit that

plaintiff can counter with to show otherwise. Plaintiff cannot rely on naked allegations in its complaint.

Plaintiff must counter with admissible facts in affidavits showing a triable issue of material fact.

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Declarations must contain evidentiary facts on personal knowledge--not ultimate facts or conclusions. 25

An assertion based solely on conjecture or speculation is insufficient to avoid summary judgment. 26

Defendant can satisfy initial burden to show an absence of evidence by plaintiff’s admissions. 27

Plaintiff cannot raise new, un-pleaded issues in opposition papers or any issue based on speculation.28

Plaintiff may not rely on verified allegations in a complaint to show that a triable issue of fact exists;

plaintiff must set forth evidentiary facts showing a triable issue of material fact. CCP §437c(p)(1) (2) 29

NO LEASE CLAUSE CAN DEPRIVE TENANT DUFFY OF HER RIGHTS UNDER MRL

Even if plaintiff could show a lease provision in Duffy’s lease which precluded the sharing of her

home with a co-resident, unless she occupied the home at all times (be a virtual prisoner within 4 walls)

such lease clause would not be enforceable as a matter of law under MRL statutes and case law below:

Civil Code §798.19. Waiver of homeowner rights void (Mobile Home Residency Law) No rental agreement for a mobilehome shall contain a provision by which the homeowner waives his or her rights under the provisions of Articles 1 to 8, inclusive, of this chapter. Any such waiver shall be deemed contrary to public policy and void. Civil Code §798.34 (b) Guests; Provision of live–in health or supportive care (MRL) A homeowner who is living alone and who wishes to share his or her mobilehome with one person may do so, and a fee shall not be imposed by management for that person.

Otanez v. Blue Skies Mobile Home Park (1991) 1 CA 4th.1521 (first sentence) holding:

We hold that the tenant need not live in the premises full-time in order to be a resident Notwithstanding the court’s holdings in Evans, supra that a park rule requiring a homeowner to

occupy the home at all times in order to have a sub-tenant share the home was, in essence, a prohibited

anti-subleasing rule, and that all such anti-subleasing rules were unreasonable as a matter of law, the

court in Otanez, supra held that a tenant need not live in the premises full-time in order to be a resident.

25 CCP §437c(d);Estate of Nelson (1964) 227 CA2d 42 26 Sanchez v. Swinerton, supra @ 1466; USC v Weiss (1962) 208 CA2d 759 [1 triable issue required] 27 Aguilar v. ARCO (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 CA. 4th 1283, 1302 28 Tsemetzin v. Coast Fed. S&L (1997) 57 CA.4th 1334, 1342; Coyne v Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257 29 Aguilar v. ARCO (2001) supra @ 850; Vesely v Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153,169; Arciniega v. Bank of San Bernardino (1997) 52 CA.4th 213, 224; Eisenberg v. Alameda News (1999) 74 CA.4th 1359, 1375; UC v. Supr Court (1996) 41 CA.4th 1040, 1044; Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. (1999) 69 CA.4th 64,69; Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 CA.4th 151, 162; Bacon v. South. Cal. Edison (1997) 53 CA.4th 854, 858

_________________________________________________________________________________ - 7 -

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Secondly, our Attorney General issued Opinion No. 11-703 on 7/23/13 holding the following:

“…with the possible exception of rentals to park employees under appropriate

circumstances that satisfy the requirements of Civil Code section 798.23(b), if the management of a mobile home park has enacted rules and regulations generally prohibiting mobile home owners from renting their mobile homes, then park management is also bound by these same rules and regulations.” see Civil Code §798.23(a) SHIPLEY ASKS THE COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF HUD WEBSITE

The Supreme Court held a trial court may consider facts judicially noticed.30 CCP §437c authorizes

summary judgment based on judicial notice. 31 Summary judgment for defendant was affirmed where a

pilot’s responsibilities were established through federal regulations judicially noticed by a trial court. Id

In applying mandatory authority of Evans, supra prohibiting anti-subleasing park rules, Shipley

asks the court to take Judicial Notice of HOPA.95 pdf (Housing for Older Citizens) which provides

exemption for over-55 park owners from complying with Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of 1968

[anti-discrimination codes prohibiting a landlord from refusing to rent to families with children].

HOPA.95 pdf is posted on HUD’s website: http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/library/hopa95.pdf

The pdf is a 17-page “Questions & Answers” for park owners and tenants to use to understand how the

exemption works; i.e. 80% of park residents must be over 55 in order to qualify to maintain exemption.

Page 10 contains hypothetical No. 22 which is the idential fact pattern to Shipley’s sharing lease:

“Question 22

Are there circumstances under which a 55 or older owner/tenant might be temporarily absent from a dwelling without affecting the exemption status of the community/dwelling?

Answer

Yes. For example, the 55 or older occupant may be on vacation, hospitalized, or absent for a season without affecting the exempt status of the community. The resident may, if he/she wishes, allow a younger relative or a house sitter under 55 years if age to live in the unit during this absence. In either event, the unit would be included in the calculation of the 80 percent occupancy requirement as long as the dwelling is not rented out, the owner/tenant returns on a periodic basis, and maintains legal and financial responsibility for the upkeep of the dwelling.”

30 Parker v. 20th. Century-Fox Film Corp. (1970) 3 C.3d 176, 181 (breach of employment contract) 31 Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (1981) 115 Cal. App. 3d 431, 434 (wrongful death airplane crash)

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PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO Stubblefield Properties v. Bonnie Shipley UDDS1204130 The undersigned is counsel for defendants at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 On the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated: Defendant Shipley’s MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, and Request for Judicial Notice with Declaration of Nancy Duffy, attaching also Declaration of B. Shipley

[ ] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows: [ ] (By Fax) on 1-23-13 Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machine to maintain a record of same. [ ] (By Electronic) to address below (by agreement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com to: rwilliamson@hkclaw.com (Appendix included) [x] (By US Mail) §1013a, §2015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to: Robert Williamson, Hart|King 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, CA 93103 I am familiar with mail collection in San Bernardino and the two-day mail service offered by the post office. I mailed the envelope at San Bernardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit. [ ] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true.

Executed in Santa Barbara CA on 3/27/15.

_______________________________________________ Nancy Duffy McCarron, Attorney for Bonnie Shipley

Nancy Dnffy McCarron CBN 164780 Law Office of Nsncy Dujfy McCarron 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, C A 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancyduf@sb@yahoo.com

Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley

SUPEWOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California General Partnership, dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home. Community

I'laintiff, v.

NANCY DUFFY, BONNIE SHJFLEY, et a1 Defendants

SEPARATE STATEMENT OF FACTS SUPPORTING SHIPLEY's MOTION FOR SOMMARY JUDGMENT Filed with Se~arate Statement of Undis~uted Facts Declarations: Naacy DufQ McCarron, Bonnie Shigley

DEFENDANT BONNIE SEUPLE SUPPORTING BONNIE SHIPIXY'S MOTION F'OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FACTS

1 : Du@ & P's authorized agent signed a lease on 1/5/05 attached to complaint as Exhibit 1

2: Community Guidelines (1 1 /1/2000) applied; Zover Page, Pagel, page 1 5 (signature page)

3: DuRy did not signlagree to 2010 Corn. Rules

4: D u w s lease could not be amended absent written modification or by operation of law

5: Bonnie Shipley still occupies Space #333

6: P admitted via counsel to only 1 issue in case whether Durn must occupy at all time to share with Shipley, who is over 40 but not yet age 55

7: Under Civil §798.25(b) new rule is enforced after 6 months, but onlv if the d-

- l - SEPARATE STATEMENT OF FACTS Supporting Shipley's Summary Judgment Motion

PROOF OF SERVICE 1

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11 On the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

c o u N n OF SAN BERNARDINO

Stubblefield Proverties v. Nancy Duffy. et a1 UDFS 1406978

7

8 The undersigned is counsel for defendant at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

l 2 II [x] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows: at the 1-22-13 OSC Hearing

10

11

SHIF'LEY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT with Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, Declarations of Nancy Duffy McCarron and Bonnie Shipley

l6 11 [XI (By Mail) §1013a, $2015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to: 2-day mail

13

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Robert Williamson, HartlKing 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, CA 92707

[ ] (By Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4) I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.

[ ] (By Electronic) to address below @v ameement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com to: rwilliamson@hartkiglaw.com regan@hartkinglaw.com

22 [XI (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true. I I Executed in Santa Barbara CA on the date indicated below

20

2 1

r /

Nancy ~ u f @ h c ~ & o n , A'tt&mey for Bonnie s m e y "

I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelope in the mail at San Bemardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

- 2 - SEPARATE STATEMENT OF FACTS Supporting Shipley's Summary Judgment Motion

PROOF OF SERVICE

TATE OF CALIFORNIA, LOUNTY OF SAN BERNARDMO

tubblefield Proverties v. Bonnie Shivlev UDDS1204130

The undersigned is counsel for defendants at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

ln the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:

lefendant Shipley's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, nd Request for Judicial Notice with Declaration of Nancy Duffy, attaching also Declaration of B. Shipley

] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows:

] (By Fax) on 1-23-13 s ax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the lachine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.

] (By Electronic) to address below (bv agreement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com to: rwilliamson@hkclaw.com (Appendix included)

U] (By US Mail) $ 1013% $201 5.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:

Robert Williamson, HartlKiig 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, CA 93 103

am familiar with mail collection in San Bemardino and the two-day mail service offered by the post office. mailed the envelope at San Bernardiio, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed )valid if postal cancellation date is more than one day afterdeposit date on affidavit.

] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true. Executed in Santa Barbara CA on 312711 5.

?-fancy ~ u ~ c ~ " m o n , Attorney for sonhie Shipley

kfcndant's Summary Judgment Mouon fild unh U's Separec Statrmmt of Unll~sputcd kaca, Dcclaral~ons of Nancy D McCanon md Bonnlc Sh~plcy lo be coni~dcrcd ~ 8 t h D's Kequcsl for Jud~clal Voucc

qancy Duffy McCmn, CBN 164780 150 Roble Lane ants Barbara, CA 93 103 105-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 rancyduffusb@yahoo.com

ittomey for Stephen C. Allen

SLPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

Case No. UDFS 1406978 filed: 10-3-2014 California General Partnership, DECLARATION OF NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON

.ba Mountain Shadows Mobile Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment Hed with Iome CbmmUaity Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts

I3 Date: April %-& 2015 Time:&30 p.m.

Dept. S28 or to be announced

1, NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON, declare that I am defendant in pro per, attorney fir Bonnie Shipley,

nd make these statements based on personal knowledge, in support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

. On or about 1-05-2005 I bought a mobilehome at space #333 in plaintiffs park and signed a park

lease with plaintiffs authorized agent. Betsy Voss, who met with me to review papers on 1/5/05.

I. I signed 2000 Community Rules in effect when I bought the home on 1/5/05. (Exh. la, lb, Ic)

Page 1 of the rules, clause 2 recited that one person who signed the lease must be 55 (I was 55 then)

and all other residents must be a minimum of 40 years or older. I asked Betsy Voss about residents;

specifically, if I could share the home with another co-resident as I intended to use the home as a

second residence and office while in San Bemardino .as I had clients and business in the area.

Betsy Voss assured me I could have share the home, so long as the other residents were over 40

and I registered them as co-residents at the office. Betsy remarked that she had a live-in-boytliend

and her son living with her in her mobile home in the park. Betsy Voss said it would be no problem

I relied on representations. I saw Betsy with her boyfriend & son at Friday potlucks in the clubhouse

3. I had to subniit a "net worth" statement to "qualiw for ownershiplresidency, acknow1edging the

"minimum age requirement" was 40 years old. This was underlined on the form. (Exhibit Id).

- - 1 -

Declaration of Nancy DuRy McCarron supporting MSJ, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts

- 2 - Declaration of Nancy Duffy McCarron supporting MSJ, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts

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4. My life from Jan 2005 to Jan 2010 (5 years) was uneventful. I had a series of co-residents share

my home from 2005-Aug 1,2012 (7 years) [Exh. 2.1 [Last names redacted to protect their privacy].

Only the title and first two sentences are relevant as they show lease agreement was always to share the home--never as a sub-lease where I had no right of entry. Each co-resident fdled out a co-resident

applications, turned it into the park and was given a parking sticker for their vehicle from 2005-2012.

5. On ~ p r i l 13,2009 I got a letter from Community Manager Eva Stubblefield Hazard on co-residents.

As underlined on a net worth statement from Jan 2005, and Betsy Voss confirmed in 2005, Hazard

also confirmed a co-resident need only be over 40, complete a guest application, go to orientation,

receive approval and a parking sticker for their car. No co-resident was denied approval. [Exh. 31

6. On March 18,2015 Wendy Durr applied to be my co-resident after Jim Tate bought a unit. [Exh. 4-a]

As shown by date of birth on 311 8/10 Wendy was 50 when she moved in under our sharing lease.

She was born 5/8/59 so she would have turned 50 on 5/8/2009. She applied on 311 8/2010. Wendy

was approved by the park, and was my co-resident from March 2010 until the end of July 2012.

On June 13,2012 Wendy Durr notified me she had bought the mobile home next door. [Exh. 4-b]

Even though Wendy Durr was onlv 52 the owner authorized her to buy the mobile home next door. - I believe this was done intentionally because the park wanted to steal my mobile home by not

allowing me to share my residence with a co-resident. I could not afford to pay the full rent alone.

I believe this is part of a racketeering enterprise Stubblefield orchestrated to steal homes in the park

and convert them into a cash cow rental portfolio for himself. He wanted to eliminate all competition

7. In March 2010 the park hired a new law firm, HARTJKING, who represents park owners and helps

them orchestrate these racketeering enterprises whereby they steal mobile homes to convert to rentals.

To this end, HARTIKING attorneys replaced our 12-page benign park rules with a 50-page set of

onerous rules designed to drive everyone out. I did not sign or agree to new 2010 rules. [Exh. 5a-b-c]

This was attached to plaintiffs complaint as Exhibit 3. The fact that my signature does not appear on

the document is an admission by plaintiff that I never agreed to the new 2010 rules. I spoke out at a

clubhouse meeting in MarchlApril2010 and told Tom Parrish, a park managerbroker, that the rules

were unconstitutional and unenforceable. Parrish told me to sit down and shut up. Within a week he

filed a complaint with the city about my home & has engaged in a witch hunt against me since 2010.

Home values dropped from an average of $100,000 to $5,000 within 2 years, as shown on Wendy

Durr's email. [Enh. 4b].

1. After Wendy Durr moved out in the end of July 2012 I signed a lease with a new co-resident name Bonnie Shipley. The details about what happened to Bonnic Shipley are included in her declaration

from 20 13 attached here as [Exh. 6 a-dl Plaintiff filed a sham complaint to cvict Bonnie Shipley or

8/27/12 which plaintiff tenaciously prosecuted for 3 years as if millions were at risk. UDDSl205130

This resulted in 428 docket items, 60 court hearings, 16 volumes, and a 20-pg case summary report, ,

or 5 writ petitions and 4 appeals. The case is still open pending an award of attorney fees to Shipley

as prevailing party. Bonnie Shipley was the s rev ailing party now entitled to mandatory attorney feer

. After losing UDDS1205 130, a mysterious fire occurred in which the mobile home nearly burned.

Alert neighbors put the fire out and testified that it started in the electrical pedestal which supplies

electric to my mobile home, which was under the exclusive control of the park management.

0. Afta we repaired the damage and restored all utilities, and got a fmal signoff on the permit to

restore utilities from the DHC inspector, within 2 weeks plaintiff files this new sham complaint.

1. Plaintiff has no valid grounds to evict Bonnie Shipley and I, based on a new 2010 anti-subleasing

(anti co-resident) rule implemented in 2010 because I never agreed to the rules, and the rule cannot t

enforced against use because an appellate court has already found an anti-subleasing rule is not

enforceable unless the tenant agreed to it in their original lease. I never agreed to it in my lease.

2. Bonnie Shipley is nearly 54 years old, and well over 40. Before this case is over, through all the

anticipated appeals, she will be 55 and the entire case will become moot. Nonetheless, plaintiff fight

with malice aforethought to try to evict us with a vengeance. We are equally committed to defend.

3. I attended a hearing 2/10/15 in which plaintiffs counsel admitted there is only one issue in this

case; i.e. whether I can have a co-resident under 55 under MRL. [Exh. 7a-d; 7b: line 20; 7e line 11

4. I declare the above is true under penalty of perjury. Executed in Santa Barbara, California.

DATE: 3 /z?,& r I

Nancy Duffy McCarron -

- 3 - Declaration of Nancy D u e McCarron supporting MSJ, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts

EXHIBIT LIST

1 a-b-c-d Community Guidelines November 1,2000 - D u e signed and Net Worth Statement

2 Series of Co-residents Who Shared Mobile Home with Duffy (except Addie - didn't)

3 April 13,2009 Letter from Eva Stubblefield Confirming co-resident need only be 40

4 a Wendy Durr application for co-residency with Duffy at age 51 (under 55)

b June 13,2012 30-day notice Wendy bought mobile home next door &would be moving

Date of Birth (Exh. 4a) shows she is 51; 2 years later she is 53 but park lets her buy horns

5 a-b-c Shows 2010 Com. Guidelines (compl. Exh. 3) 5c plaintiff admits Duffy did not sign it

6 Declaration of Bonnie Shipley4etails of her co-residency and admits sharing agreement

Original on file in court 1/28/2013 (date stamp on top)

7 a-b-c-d Transcript 2/20/15 Plaintiffs counsel admits there is only one issue in the case

whether Nancy D u e McCarron can has a co-resident over 40 but under 55 share home

- 4 - Declaration of Nancy Duffy McCarron supporting MSJ, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts

Mountain Shadows klobilehome Community

Mountain Shadows Mobili-hme Community is designated as "ECoushg far Older Persons" and has miaimurn age requirements for residency

Equal Housing Opportunity we do business in accorrlance with

the Federal Pair Eoudng Lnrv

It & illegal to disoimiaale a g n h i any person becausn of race, color, religion, sex,

Lqndicap, f d a l status, or national origin

Mounlain Shadows Mobilehome Communjh '4040 Easl Piedmont Drive Highlnnd, Californin 92346

(909) 362-2400

1. INTRODUCTION

These Community Guidelines (frequently referred LO as " ~ I e s and regulations" in the California sclrutes known as the "Mobilehome Residency Law" m d orher stare laws) have been designed 10 encourage Residents to cooperate with the C o m u n i q Owner and hlmagenenl for the purpose o r promoting the enjoyment and convenience of all Residents in the Cammuniry. Because ours is a rnobilrhomr communiry. i t has unique conditions which must be recognized and dealt wirh in a fair and reasonable rnanncr, and applied End complied wirh on an irnpmlal basts. The spiril behind rhese guidelines is in the Clolden Rttlt: "Do unto others as you would have o[hers do unto you." We rrusl we will have yourcomplete coopcrarion not only to keep Community standards high and to maintain a happy and friendiy armasphere, but also co assure each resident a maximum of Convenience and comfon.

The fallowing Comrnuniry Guidelines arc apsrroryour Rental and Lease Agreements. Please read these Communiry Guidelines Carefully and keep them on file a!. they consrimte a binding agreement baween you and the management. All Cornrnuniw Guidelines of the Community will be inrcrprered and applied by management in a reasonable manner.

2. COMMUNITY STATUS

Maunrain Shadows Mobilehomc Communlry is designated as housing for older persons. A[ least one occupant, who has signed a rental vr lease agreement for Resident's homesitc, must be Fifty-five (55) years of age, and all other residentsmusr be a rninlmurn o f forty (40) years o f age or older.

3. USE OF FACILITIES AND DEFlNlTIONS

Residents and Guests have rhc right to use h e Hornesire and cornuni ty facilities only if they comply with h e x Community Guidclines and [he other provisions of h e Communiry's reddency documents. Guests. when using the Community facilirier, must at all times be accompanied by a Resident who has signed a Community Lcasc or Rental Aereement. Communiry Owner will attempt to promptly. equally and impmially obtain the cooperarion and compliance of all Residents with the Cornmuniry Guidelines and other conditions of residency. Resident rccognizeq, however. that Community Owner's abili~y lo obtain compliance is dependenr upon a number of facton, including the cooperation af all Residents and rheir guests, the n a m e and extent of Lhe failure m comply, the expense and pracricabiliry a f enforcement and the laws then .in effecr. Resident agrees therefore, chat the enforcemen1 of che Communiry Guidelines and conditions of tenancy are a private matter, between Owner and each Residenr indiv.idually. Resident agrees that he is not a third parry beneficiary of any other agreement between owner and any ather Resident i n h i s Community or the Carnmuniry Guidelines or the Communiry:r Rental or Lense .Igrmmenls. The defin'ifions and orher provisions of the paragraphs in the Cammuhiry's Rental and Lea% Agreements entitled "Definitions." 'Parries." and "Owners Approval'' apply ib rhesc Communl(y Guidelines. Borh "Pask" and "Community" mean Mountain Sl-tadows

The headi~rps m d lilies of the PGagispns within rhcse Cornrnuxiry Guidclincs are ~ncluded fo i purposes o f convenience only, and shaii no; affecl the construc[ion or inrerprera~i~n of m y provisions o f raid Cammuniv Guidelines.

I have read the Communiy Guidelines dais Narember I , ?DDD, and dgrcc ro comply with them.

Dated l & / / ~ < / d 4 Resident

Dated - Rrsidcnt

I . , . . : . . . l.k>r;!e cf b.: ,. :; ,A--. ... 1.- ...... , . .

"1 :::;,> . - . - , +:wimp, t:l Loan .. . . .;,r . . . , .: J ' < . . . . . . . . . . . - ,~. . . . . . . . .. .. C , ? ~ , I zcrc: . <$> t tt .. r t 7 . ..r, :- ..": c - - -

. . . . ..... C,ed:l Ci : i : -- Ac;l 1 !:: . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :. i.; , [ - . .

, . :, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . Accl ::.: : - -

NET WORTH 6TA-[ENIENT . .

. . i :E i:ildarslgned reqoes!s lile i ; l e ~ l a ~ ? ~ ; ~ ~ ? # i : !.: :;Iw:.- I,!. uuws r ; i r ~ ! ' ! :ci%ieilcec enil , -,, 3 , - L 7 - !. .-'

erj;;? : , . i la, lc~11~. The undersigned acknou!edgis il,a: ii: !I>.: ~ -c , ; t a e x ? xjr98i?r~t?' is F~,?cLI'sI! , . ., . . . . . . , . In inlanagemen! and the undersigned lt is subject ti: o:!~::ci,al !.;.!,lo i . ln ,~a,zs~~lo: i l 10: lile ,,, -+ .' <I L. , '

. , a',<,:' -':;;:P.!'S ,i\oblleliurrre as jlrovidad 3,. i l i? leecr, wire?ir!:>::'. . . . , , , . . lc-.i - .( - r k -, i- : '5rr ulide-sigrle" represfnls nn:! i;sria,l;s ill;?! I!>- ;i::.,.i: ,,?ru,l:.n!~m ,.: I!.:,? i81uJ correct; .,

;!::<; .... ,: .. !>=en made lor tile puioose o! i l ( ! ~ i o i , ~ ~ g rr?:;~Jei~i.y 81. hi:i;!t:!o8'r S!;a~!:!.hs '.l?i!ils ; i!,h~oi- '-;" ' """ - C r ~ i ; ~ : . > ~ l ~ . ~ r x l ~ ~ ~ ~ ? i n ~ llji) l l lanii~ei~l~nl cj1 ! l ~ e pall< - ! I , ? I V T , ? ~ ! : ; % ? > ! ..;a,< ::,~:!>~?:% !,:. $0 . , c ! . < : ,. r!iiy :, ' all illlo-malion o'le!eci an i l i ~s ?l)ji!,:-a:v11 ' . - P . , . . .-

RESIDENTIAL LEASE AGREEMENT

THLS RESIDENTIAL LEASE AGRJ35MENT is effective on 8/15/06 by and between Nancy D* (LANDLORD) and James E m (Temt). WHEREAS. hd10rd mei to share the p~mises o f 4 ~ 0 E. p i $ 3 hg S t . I, 2006. Tenimt

RESIDENT'IAL LEASE AGREEMENT

THIS RESIDENTJAL LEASE AGREEMENT is e&&ve on * by and between Nancy Dug, W m d ) and 3- m, ~ ~ t .

WHEREAS, Landlord agrees 10- the residence at 4040 E. Piedmont Drive, #333, Highland W o m i a , starring on August 12,21

'9

RESIDENTIAL LEASE AGREEMENT

This Residential Lease Agreement is effective Nov. 3,2007 by & bmeen Nancy Dug, (landlord) & Janice Lynn W-enant

WHEREAS, Landlord agrees tq-residence at 4040 E. Piedmont Drive , #333, figbland California, stairing on Nov. 15,2007 - --

RE$IDENTIAL LEASE AGREEMENT , THIS LEASE AGREEhEN is effective on June 23,2008 by and between Nancy D& b ~ d l m d ) and Jose Tenant.

(95 1-5263 142) - -C to ~ h p o n t Drive. #333. Highland California, startiag on July 1,2008

RESIDFNTIAL LEASE AGREEMENT THIS LEASE AGREFNENT is effective on by and bemeen Nancy D m W o r d ) and A a e T e n a n t

WIIEREAS, Landlord agrees t q a a residence at 4040 E. Piedmont Drive, #333, Highland W m i a , starring on March 16,20C -

RESIDmTIAL LEASE SHARE AGREE=

is effective March 18.2010 bvnnd h--- -..---I-- - - -

4040 E PIEDMONTDRNE. SPACE #4 . HIGHLAND, CALIFORNIA 92346 PHONE (909) 862-2400 2256 BRADFORD AVENUE . HIGHLAND, CALIFORNIA 92346 PHONE (908) 864-1522 -

April 13,2009

Dear Resident:

weare frequently asked about the length of time, according to the park rules, a guest may reside with a home owner. We have decided to answer these inquiries in this letter to all of oar residents.

The State of California Civil Code Provisions commonly referred to a# the Mobilehome Resideney Law (MRL) require that residents provide management with information on all persons staying with a resident over the 20 consecutive day grace period, or the maximum 30 days in a calendar year. This requirement is also in the Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community Guidelines. A daily guest fee of $20.00, when applicable, may be chrrged for a non-registered guest who stays loneer than those legal grace periods. If you have, or are planning to have guests reside with you longer than those limits, prior to the commencement of hisher stay, your guest must:

1. Be at least 40 years of age; 2. Complete the guest application package; 3. Have the Community guidelines explained during orientation; 4. Sign Community Guidelines & Guest Addendum, and 5. Receive management's written approval at orientation.

Mountain Shadows Mobilehome Community does provide n special lifestyle. It is the Resident's obligation to ensure that management has a record of all guests stayingwith yon beyond the gaee periods stated in the MRL. After that, the law is clear, and complying with the rules is quite simple.

Any guest (son, daughter, brother, nister, parent, friend, e t r ) must be registered with the park Failure to do so is a violation of the long-term lease and Community Guidelines.

Please contact the park oflice at 909-862-2400 with questions or to pick up the required documents. We hope this answers your questions.

Sincerely,

Eva Stubblefield Hazard Community Manager

. .

IUENTAL . . APPLICATION . .

Hoar long at this nddre-ss 22 Fieason for leaving + previous AddRss City S*.te-@

p&oap Lsadlords Name Phone #

How long at this address Reasrm fa leaving

A u t o Y r a M a k e %yn&Mode~ / P ~ v 4 ~taw~itense plate # 6 B!Fob

p ~ s m t ~mp~oyer LI.AJ~C/ position ~ 0 . h - 6CO - phone # ?bq 53% P ~ J 0 How long at job 5 0therinoornd~-

J h p l o y e r s A d d r e s a ? \ ~ ~ ~ L . D N L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ N m h r and type of Pets & ~ 6 j z you over been perry to an i;icri~n? [ I yes [

. . a

Name of b %% B - L7M. of A m t

Name o f b d Bnmch M. of Account

Name YIS. m-Rellerionship Phone #

I CERTIFY that answers givenherein are but and wmplae to the bcst of my howle&e. I authorh landlord to

Print Page 1 of 1

Subject: R e

From: Wendy (wdurr@aol.com)

To: nancyduffysb@yahoo.com;

Date: Wednesday. June 13,2012 9:01 AM

Sony nancy. Can't chat right now at work. This thing was an all of a sudden idea. And a good idea for me. Harmon and place is in excellent condition. Needing no repairs. There is another nice home in the park I am now hearing also In excellent shape. These homes are really being given away. Sad for the sellers. Good for those buying. I don't think u would want to sell for less than 5000.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 13,2012, at 8:11 AM, nancy duffy ~nancyduffysb@yahoo.com~ wrotc:

could you please call me ASAP as I would really like to sell my home and can provide financing as well. I really wish you would have let me know that you wanted to buy a unit. I would have worked with you to buy mine.

Nancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780 Attorney, Real Estate Broker, BBB Arbitrator, C.4 Notaty Public Cemfied Forenslc Loan Auditof, Propeq Manager 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103 nmqduffpsb@yahoo.com 805-965-3492 cell 805-450-0450

, . .., ... . .

To: Nancy Duffy <nancyduffysb@yahoo.com> Sent: Tuesday, June 12,2012 533 AM Subject:

Nancy I will be buying Lois Harmons home this month, therefore I am moving there in July. So I am giving my 30 days notice that I will be out of your place by July 1Gth ish. I have enjoyed living here and that is why I cannot pass up this great opportunity for me.

Wendy

COMMUNITY GUIDELINES

of

Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community

March 1,2020

Mountain Shndows Mobile Home Community is designated as "Housing for Older Pers~ng '~ and

has minimum age requirementr for residency

Equnl Rousing Opportunity we do business in acegrdance with

the Federat Fair Housing Law

It is illegnl to discriminate against any person because of race, color, religion, sex,

I~mdicap, familial status, or national origin

Mountain Shndows Mobile Home Community 4040 East Pierlmont Drivc Highland, California 92346

(909) 862-2400

COMMUMTY GUIDELINES

I . INTRODUCTION

These Community Guidelines (frequently referred to as "rules and regulations" in the Cdifomia statures known as the "Mobilehome Residency Law" and other state laws) have been designed to encourage Residents to cooperate wit11 the Convnunity Owner and Management for the purpose of promoting the enjoyment and convenience of all Residents in the Community. Bcceuse ours is a mobilehome community, it hm unique conditions which must be recognized and dealt with in a fair and reasonable manner, and applied and complied with on an imnpa~tial basis. The spiril behind these guide)ines is in the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you." We trust we will have your cornpiete cooperation nat only to keep Conlmunity standards high and to maintain a happy and friendly abnospl~ere, but also to assure each resident a maxilnum of convenience and comfort.

The following Community Guidelines are a part of your Rental and Lease Agreements. please read these Cornmunity Guidelines carefully and keep them on file as they constitute a binding agreement hetwcen you and the management. All Community Guidelines of the Community will be interpreted and applied by management in a reasonable manner.

2. COMMUNITY STATUS

Mountain Shadows Mobile k10m Community is designmed as housing for older persons. At least one occupant, who has signed Community Rental or Lease agreement for Resident's Honlesite, must be fifty-five (55) years of age or older and all other residents must be aminimum offorty (40) years of age or older.

3. USE OF FACILITIES AND DEFINITIONS

Residents and Guests have the right to use the FIomesite and community facilities only if they comply 6 t h dlese Cornmunity Guidelines and the other provisions of the Community's residency documents. Guests, when using the Community facilities, inust at dl times be accompanied by a Resident who has signed a Community Lease or Rental Agreement Community Owner will nltempt to promptly, equally and impartially obtain the cooperation and compli~nce of dl Residents with t l ~ e Community Guidelines and other conditions of residency.

' Resident recognizes, however, that Community Owner's abiIity to obtain carnpliance is dependent upon a number of factors, including the cooperation of all Residents and lheir guests, the nature and extent of the failure to compiy, the expense and practicability of enforcement and the laws then in effect. Resident agfees therefore, that the enforcement of the Cormnunity Guidelines and conditions of tenancy are a private matter, between Owner and each Resident individually. Resident agrees that he is not a third party beneficiary of any other agreement between owner and any other Resident in this Community br the Community Guidelines or the Community's Rental or Lease Agreements. Tlie definitions and other provisions of the paragraphs in the Community's Rental and Lease Agreements entitled "Defioitions," "Parties," and "Owners Approval" a ~ l y to tllese Community Guidelines. Both "Park" and "Community" mean Mountain Shadowi Mobile I-Iome Community. "Owner" means the Owners of the pal<, including, hut no1 limited lo, the owners, partners, directors, representatives, officers, mployees and qents, and the management of the Park (herein referred to as either Community Owner,

5. A copy of the registration carj or cerlificdtc of titla issued by the Department of Housing and Community Development or other g o v m e n t agency for the mobilehome occupying the Homesite;

F. Proof of Rcsidcnt's insurance policy (orpolicies) on Resident's mobilehome:

G . Proof of age of Resident and all occupmts of Resident's mobilehome.

25. PARAGRAPH HEADWGS

The headings and titles of the paragraphs witldn these Community Guidelines are included for purposes of convenience only, and slioll not affect the construction or interpretation of any provisions of said Community Guidelines.

I have read the Community Guidelines pages 1 tlmugh 27 dated March 1 , 2010, and agree to comply with them.

Dated - Resident

Dated Resident

Dated Resident

Homesite No.

Nancy Dufe McCarron CBN 164780 Law Office of Nancy ~ u f f ~ McCarron 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancydu@sb@yahoo.com

Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTf OF SAN BERNARDINO . '

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, a California General Partnership, rlbaMountain Shadows Mobile Home Community

Plaintiff, v.

BONNIE SHIPLEY. Defendant

Case No. UDDS 12041 30 tiled: 8-27-12

DECLARATION OF BONNIE SHIPLEI 1 SUPPORTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION Filedlw Summary .ludgment Motion, Declarations of

1 Maurice Pricst & Nancy McCarron; Request for Judicial Notice and Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts

I Date: January 31,2013 1 Time: 8:30 am.

I, BONNIE SHIPLEY, declare:

original trial set: 12-10-2012 12- 10-20 12: court continued to 12- 1740 12 12-13-2012:ct vacated due to death P'B side No new trial date set

1. I make these statements based on personal knowledge Wr the purposes stated directly above.

Dept. S-32 Honorable Donald Alvarez

2. 1 am competent to make the staterhents and could testify to these statements if called as a witness.

3. On July 27,20 12 I executed a lease with Nancy Duffy McCarron (hereinafter "Duffy") to share her

residence at W c e 333,4040 E. Piedmont Drive. Highland, CA 92346. The lease I signed was entitled

,'RESIDENTIAL LEASE TO SHARd OCCUPANCY" in BOLD CAPS. Duffy made it clear that we

would he sharing the home when she was in Highland. I am 5 1 years old. D u e made it clear that it

was not a "sub-lease" or "sub-tenancy" butwas a sharing arrangement. The lease term was 6 months.

DufFy showed me P E & ~ Rule No. 2 which recited that at least one person who had signed an agreement .. ,

wiiji the park to lease a space must be -55 and all other residents must be at least 40 years old. DuRy

said she bought thehome . . at age 55 in 2005 and had maintained a lease with the park owner since 2005. ..

4. Duffy showed me h a lease executed with the park on 1-5-2005. We looked at Clause 10 together.

Clause 1 0 recited that Duffy was authorized to have one co-resident WITHOUT PARK APPROVAL.

Duffy said I would have to register with the park office as her new co-resident to obtain a parking

sticker for my vehicle. DufTy and I both believed there would not he a problem with the park owner as

Wendy Durr lited in Dulfy's home as co-resident for owr 2 years without incident from age 50 to 52.

We md with Wendy Durr before I inoved in, while Ms. Durr was still Living in the home, during the 1%

week of July 2012. Wendy Durr said it was a very nice place to live and she had no ~roblems there.

Wendy Durr told me she bought the home next door from friends who had relocated closer to family.

5. On 8/2/12 Duffy told me she was going to drive over to the office to pick up a "w-resident ppacket"

60m Hanna, *om D u e told me distributes them to new co-~esidents. A few minutes later Duffy

returned with a new co-resident package she said Hanna had given her for me to fill out and submit.

Duffy said it was the same package Wendy Durr had submitted to the owner when she moved in 20 10.

Duffy asked me to fill out the package, sign at the end, and return the package to the park office.

5, Duffy put one of her two parking stickers on my vehicle while I awaited a new sticker from the park.

Duffy departed after. b~inging me the packet. Later that afternoon (8-2-12) a man knocked on the door.

I answered the door, The man identified himself as Marvin Freeman. the park manager. I invited him

~nside and introduced myself. He loolied around and asked me my age. I said that I was 50 years old.

Mr. Freeman became hostile and told me I could no longer live there because I was not 55 years old.

Mr. Freeman said I had to move all of my stuff out the next day. I was so upset that I started to c ~ y .

Vlr. Freeman said if I wanted to live in the park I had to "find a sugar daddy over 55 to take care of me.

Mr. Freeman reached inside my open car window and ripped my parking sticker off a rear view minor

1. I applied for a civil harassment restraining order against Mr. Freeman and a hearing was set in 8-31

kt the hearing on the restrainii~g order. Mr. Freeman admitted making the remark about the sugar dadd!

aking my sticker off the rear view mirror, and also admitted that DWy was blacltlistd hy the lark owners. The court denied my application for a restraining order.

I. On August 9,2012 we delivered my completed application for co-residency to the park office.

never received a response From the park office denying or granting my application for residency.

1. I have no criminal record. While I was awaiting park approval a "5-day Notlce to Vacate" was

~osted on my door and in the fiont of the mobile home on a wall. I did not undmtand the notice

because it recited language about the park's right to eject a "purchaser" d ~ o moved in without first

tbtaining approval for residency. It could not have applied to me because I did not purchase the home

1

1

3

5

6

'

0

1

I showed me the bedroom and bathroom she uses while here in Highland. It had her two twin beds, her

10. I moved in as Duffy's co-resident, under Clause 10 of her lease, which recited that she had a right t

have a co-resident without park approval. Duffj' also showed me a copy of Civil Code §798.34(b)

which recited that any residenl had a right to a have a co-resident share her mobile home. Durn also

showed me a copy of the lease she signed with the park, and it showed that she had taken an a s s i g ~ l e n

of a lease from a Dorothy Buchanan who had taken an assignment from the first residents in the home.

These two assignments contained two lines with the words "resident" under them for signatures of mor

than one resident. Both sets of assignees showed two different residents, with different surnames.

It was obvious to us that 333 had a history of having co-residents which the park approved as residents

11. Subsequently a summons for "Unlawful Detainer" with a complaint entitled "Forcible Detainer"

was delivered to my home. It contained, as Exhibit A, a copy of the same notice (related to a purchase

which I had observed earlier posted on my door and on a wall in front of the mobile home.

12. Nancy Duffy McCarron is representing me in this case and also represented me in my petition for i

2

4

computer table with a computer hooked up to the internet by DSL she maintains in her name only.

restraining order against Marvin Freeman.

13. I have entered into my sixth month of residing in the mobile home at 333. On the first day I lookec

at the inside of the home the last week of July 2012, while Wendy Durr was still living there, Duffy

The bathroom she uses had her personal items, shower curtain, and towels. Many pieces of hmiture in

the home belong to her. We share them. During my six months hcre Ms. Duffy has regularly occupied

the mobile home. When she is here, Duffy usually stays overnight for two or three days at a time, and i

times stays for an entire week. Several times per month she arrives and lives here for several days.

14. We are good friends and enjoy each other's company. We cook and share many meals together.

Duffy has three computers, three printers and various ofice equipment she uses regularly while here.

All ofthe utilities are in Duffy's name and she pays them herself. Duffy pays the park's monthly rent.

Duffy receives mail here regularly. Duffy stays here overnight on her way to and from Big Bear Lake.

14. I declare the above statements are true under penalty of perjury and California law. Executed in

Highland, CA on January 22,2013,

BONNIE SHIF'LEY

- 3 - Declaration ofBomie Shipley Supporting Summar) Judgment

PROOF OF SERVICE

TATE OF CALIFORNIA,

:OUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

tubblefield Proverties v. Bonnie Shiplev UDDS1204130

The undersigned is counsel for defendant at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

)n the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:

DECLARATION OF BONNlE SHIPLEY supporting summary judgment

u] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows: at OSC hearing on 1-22-13

] (By Fax) Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine. 'ursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.

] (i3y Electronic) to address below @v ameement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com

to: rwilliamson@hkclaw.com (Appendix included)

] (By Mail) §1013a, 82015.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:

Robert Williamson, Hart, King & Coldren 200 Sandpointe, 4". Floor Santa Ana, CA 92707

am familiar with mail collection in San Bemardino. I deposited the envelope in the mail at San 5emardin0, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal :ancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true. Executed in San Bemardino CA on January 22,2013

- 4 - Declamtion ofBonnie Shipley Supporrinp Summary Judgment

SAN BERNARDINO SUPERIOR COURT

FONTANA, CA - DEPT F7 - HONORABLE KYLE BRODIE

SHORT TITLE: STUBBLEFIELD PKOPEKTIES VS. NANCY DLJFFY, ET AL

CASE NO. UDFS1406978 HEARTNG: February 10,2015 AM SESSION

APPEARANCES: ROBERT WILLIAMSON, ESQ., E- Plaid& NANCY DUFEY MCCARRON, ESQ. m t i n g Defendan&

(TRANSCRET OF AUDIO TAPE)

THE COURT: Good Morning.. .

WILLIAMSON: Good morning your honor.

THE COURT: OK, that's it. All right. Stubblefield v. ah, Duffy .. .. [longpause] .. . .

3n calendar today for three motions brought by dcfendant. I have read them. .. 1 have read the

11 oppositions.. .. and . . . Ms. McCarron, you want to speak to any of them?

11 MCCARRON: Well, your honor, 1 had a preliminary item that I would like to address

before we get started. I have three oppositions and I would like to have the court ask counsel

to identify which lawyer signed the pleadings because we continue to have the violation of um

128.7 CCP code, (a), 127,I mean, I'm sorry, 126.7 (a) that says every lawyer shall sign his or hc

name to the pleading. And every, and every single pleading, whether it's a motion or oppositior

I I has three lawyers' names under the line and then there's a squirrelly squiggly q, ah, so you don?

I I know which of the three actually signed it. So I would like to have an identification of which

lawyer signcd it.

THE COURT: the typical.. .as far as I'm aware.. . the typical custom ... everything ...

I don't know. ..I'm not saying everyone does it this way.. ..I'm not ..no, I don't know of any rulc

that requires it but.. .the last lawyer in the signature block is the one who signed it..

MCCARRON: Uh, well.. .

MCCARRON: They don't work.

THE COURT: I'm going to let him finish.

MCCARRON: OK.

WIL1,IAMSON: Counsel didn't address the deficiency of the notice itself. ... It didn't even

require a response. We objected to the notice, without waiving, nnd further responded, without

waiving the objection to the notice. It failed to comply with 203 1.10 with regard to time,

location, and where documents would be produced.

THE COURT: (sound of finger drumming or mouse rolling)

WILLIAMSON: It's not timely served under CCP 2013 [c], 2016.050. and 203 1.30 [c]2

there's unreasonable time and location for production [inaudible] in Santa Barbara.

THE COURT: (sigh)

WILLIAMSON: CCP 203 1.30 or 030 [c] 2. Again, with regard to counsel's argument that

it's incumbent upon the responding party to bring a motion for a protective order, instead of

filing objections, there's no authority for that. When the document demand is objected to, the

burden shifts to the propounding party under 3 lo., . . .203 1 .3 10(a) to the propounding party to

show cause why these documents are relevant to the subject matter of the action, how they woul~

tend to prove or support a defense, or disprove a claim by the plaintiff. There is ahsoIutely no

showing in this motion to that effect at all. With regard to the documentation, the interrogatorie!

which were completely deficient, do not comply with the code.. urn, or ancient move-in move-

out dates of other residents are irrelevant to this action. The issue in this case. is whether, under

the terms ofMs McCarron's lease. and the rules and regulations, ah, regularly occupy the home

in order to have ah a resident, co-resident, sub-lessee, live there who was under the park's age

restriction.

THE COURT: (several thumps)

HU&yi o w Z / 1 0 / 1 5 - p $ j O 10

I

,

!

WILLIAMSON: In other words, a sub-lessee or co-resident, under the terms of the lease

and the park rules and regulations, cannot reside there without the homeowner, the age-qualified

prime owner staying there on a regular basis, living there on a regular basis. That's the subject

matter of this action. Furthermore, I don't care how the amendment act, the Housing for Older

Persons is an exemption to a claim for familial discrimination. There's no affirmative defense ir

this action, that there's been a unfair housing practice based upon familial status. Neither Ms.

Shipley nor Ms. McCarron did bring that claim, because neither one of 'em was seeking to be

domiciled with a child under the age ... of 18 years of age. And, familial status is defined under

FHAA.

THE COURT: (metallic sound)

WILLIAMSON: So, at..it's a red herring to say oh well, we have, they have, we have, we

can prove, that they don't comply with the exemption. That's the same thing as saying, Judge,

you have to decide in the abstract, whether if a claim of familial-status discrimination was

brought, they couldn't prove their exemption. That is tantamount to an advisory opinion. And

it's not based on concrete fact or a claim under Title 8 of familial discrimination which both the

regulations and the case law that have recited it say, it has to bepending before we have an

obligation to prove that ah we comply with the terms of the statutory exemption the Housing for

Older Persons. The purpose, and we pointed this out in both, in Ms. McCarron's emails she had

mailed to us, is the reason she wants the move-in move-out and ages of every resident in the

park, and the name of every resident in the park, is so that she can gather this information for a

separate lawsuit that she is preparing that she says is a "R I C 0" action against the property

owner. That's the purpose in gathering this information. It's an ulterior purpose of not for

discovery in this case, just for use in some other case that she is preparing which is a manifest

abuse of discovery in this case. Thank you.

H m ay2/U)/15 - pug& 11

CEKI'IFICATJON

1, ro~..., do hereby c e r t i f y under penalty

o f perjury and the laws of t h e w e a t e o f c a l i f o r f i a , t h a t

the foregoing pages, comprise a f u l l , t rue , and c b r e c t

transcript of proceedings held i n the above-enti t l e d matter

on February LO, 2OLS.Executed i n Santa Barbara, ca l i forn ia

March 6, 2015.

PROOF OF SERVICE

TATE OF CALIFORNIA, OF SAN BERNARDINO

tubblefield P r m s UDDS1204130

The undersigned is counsel for defendants at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93103 805-450-0450 fa^ 805-965-3492

)n the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:

Mendant Shipley9s MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, separate Statement of Undi~puted Facts, nd Reauesl for Judicial Notice wit6 Declaretion of Nancy Duffy, attaching also Derlaration of B. Sbipley

] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows:

] (By Fax) on 1-23-13 Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the lachine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machi i to maintain a record of same.

] (By Electronic) to address below Lbv agreement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com to: nuilliamson@bkclaw.com (Appendix included)

$20 15.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:

Robert Williamson, HartlKing 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana CA 93 103

am familiar with mail collection in San Bemardino and the two-day mail sewice offered by the post office. mailed the envelope at San Bemardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed nvalid ifpostal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is me . Executed in Santa Barbara CA on 3/27/ 15.

# ? f l % , d w ~ a n k y Duffy M'cCarron, Attorney for Bonnie Shipley

- 1 - Rem~nl fnludieisl Notice wilh Shipley's Summsry Judgment Motion filed with D'n Separ5 StaWnvlt oFUndLpIlbd Fac4

D e d d o n n ofNancy D McCarmn wdBmnic Shipley

Nancy D u e McCarron, CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancydqsb yahoo.com Real Estate !8 roker Lic. #00853086

F I L E D SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO SAN E$ERI~JAi?SINO DISTRICT

+y &

mi-- d & d & d i i 7 JESSICA JOANIS, DEPU"P%

Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

~TUBBLEFELD' K o K R ~ I Case No. UDF S 1 406978 filed: 10-3-1 4 a California General Partnership, dba Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community Plaintiff,

v.

1 528 [or to be announcedl Evidence @451,452,453

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE FILED WITH DEFENDANT BONNIE SHIPLEY' s NOTICE OF AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

and Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts

NANCY DUFFY, BONNIE SHIPLEY, et a1 Defendant,

No trial date set:

-

Supme Court held a trial court may judicially notice facts ofi NSJ.' CCP $437~ also authorizes it.

Shipley asks to Notice HOPk95 pdf (Housing for Older Citizens) exemption for over-55 park owners.

HOPA.95 pdf is posted on HUD' s website: httpd/www. hud. ~ov/offices/fheo/librarly/hova95.pdf

The pdf is a 17-page "Questions & Answers" for park owners and tenants to use to understand how the

exemption works; i.e. 80% of park residents must be over 55 in order to qualify to maintain exemption.

Page 10 contains hypothetical No. 22 which is the idential fact pattern to Shipley's sharing lease:

Declarations: ancy Durn McCarron, Bonnie Shipley; Date: April 2015 CCP 9§437~; 592; 597i1170.7 P Time: B:30 a.m. CRC 3.1350; 3.1351

"Question 22 Are there circumstances under which a 55 or older owner/tenant might be temporarily

absent from a dwelling without affecting the exemption status pf the coinrnunity/dwelling? Answer Yes. For example, the 55 or older occupant may be on vacation, hospitalized, or absent for a season without affecting the exempt status of h e community. The resident may, if he/she wishes, allow-a younger relative or a house sitter under 55 years if age to live in the unit during this absence. In either event, the unit would be included in the calculation of the 80 percent occupancy requirement as long as the dwelling is not rented out, the ownerhenant returns on a ~eriodic basis, and maintains legal and financial responsibility for the upkeep of the dwelling."

I ' P

' Pmker v. 26fh. Century-Fox Film Corp. (1970) 3 C.3d 176, I8 1 (breach of employment contract) Stevens v. Cessnn Aircraff Co. ( 1 981) 11 5 Cal. App. 3d 431,434 (wrongful death airplane crash)

- 0 - Request for Judicial Notice with Shipley's Summary Judgment Motion filed with D's Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,

Declarations of Nancy D. McCamon and Bonnie Shipley

Questions and Answers Concerning the Final Rule Implementing

the Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995 (HOPA)

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the Federal Fair Housing Act), as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (the Fair Housing Act), prohibits discrimination in housing and real estate-related transactions based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap and familial status (in general, the presence of children under the age of 18 in the household). The prohibition against discrimination based on familial status became effective March 12, 1989. The Act contained a provision exempting "senior" housing from the prohibition against familial status discrimination.

The Housing for Older Persons Act (HOPA), signed into law by President Clinton on December 28, 1995, amended the housing for older persons exemption against familial status discrimination. The HOPA modified the statutory definition of housing for older persons as housing intended and operated for occupancy by at least one person 55 years of age or older per unit. It eliminated the requirement that housing for older persons have significant services and facilities specifically designed for its elderly residents. It required that facilities or communities claiming the exemption establish age verification procedures. It established a good faith reliance defense or exemption against monetary damages for persons who illegally act in good faith to exclude children based on a legitimate belief that the housing facility or community was entitled to the exemption.

Ouestion 1 For the purpose of HOPA, what is a housing community or facility? What are some typical examples of a housing, community or facility?

Answer A housing community or facility is any dwelling or group of dwelling units governed by a common set of rules, regulations or restrictions. A of a single building may not be considered a housing facility or community. Typical examples include: a condominium association; a cooperative; a property governed by homeowners or resident association; a municipally zoned area; a leased property under common private ownership; a manufactured housing community, a mobile home park.

** HUD INTERNET VERSION **

Ouestion 2 May an owner of single family houses that are dispersed throughout a geographical area, and who is not otherwise exempt under the Fair Housing Act, qualify as a "housing community or facility" and claim the exemption?

Answer No. The common use of the terms "housing community" and "facility" applies to dwelling units which are in the same location and have some relationship to each other. The dwelling units in a housing community or facility must share a common set of rules, policies, and procedures, that is applied to all of thc dwellings in the community or facility. Further, although there is no required stated minimum number of dwelling units that must be present for the exemption to apply, there must be a sufficient number of dwelling units to constitute a "community" or "facility" in the common meaning of those terms. One single family dwelling or a duplex would not qualify as a "housing community or facility."

Ouestion 3 What must a housing community or facility do to qualify for the 55 or older housing for older persons exemption?

Answrer In order to qualify for the exemption, the housing community/facility must satisfy each of the following requirements:

a) at least 80 percent of the occupied units must be occupied by at least one person 55 years of age or older per unit;

b) the owner or management of the housing facility/community must publish and adhere to policies and procedures that demonstrate an intent to provide housing for persons 55 years or older; and

c) the facility/community must comply with rules issued by the Secretary for verification of occupancy through reliable surveys and affidavits.

Ouestion 4

** HUD INTERNET VERSION **

What are some examples of the types of policies 5 ,:.d procedures that would demonstrate an intent to provide housing <.a7.. persons 55 years of age or older?

Answer Examples include:

a) the written rules, regulations, lease provisl-ns, deed or other restrictions,

b) the actual practices of the owner/manage::,;:;~t of the housing facility/community used in the enforcem~&of the rules;

c) the kind of advertising used to attract prospective residents to the housing facility/community as well as the manner in which the facility/community is described to prospective residents;

d) the housing community's/facility's age verification procedures, and its ability to produce, in response to a familial status complaint, verification of required occupancy.

Ouestion 5 May a housing facility or community advertise as "adult" housing and still demonstrate the intent to be housing for older persons?

Answer Use of the word "adult" or "adult community" in an advertisement, sign or other informational material, or when describing the facility or community to prospective renters or purchasers or members of the public, does not demonstrate an intent to be housing for older persons as defined by the final rule. The use of these terms, on the other hand, does not destroy the intent requirement of HOPA. If a facility or community has clearly shown in other ways that it intends to operate as housing for older persons, and meets the 80% requirement, and has in place age verification procedures, the intent requirement can be met even if the term "adult" is occasionally used to describe it. The Department will look at the totality of the circumstances in the investigation of a complaint alleging that the facility or community does not qualify as housing for older persons.

** HUD INTERNET VERSION *'

Question 6 How many days after the effective date of the final rule implementing HOPA does a facility/community have to develop routine procedures for determining the occupancy of each unit, including age verification?

Answer The housing community/facility has 180 days after the effective date of the rule, May 3, 1999, to develop the appropriate procedures that should constitute a part of its normal leasing and purchasing procedures. However, if a housing facility or community is not now but intends to become eligible for the exemption, it should not delay development of appropriate procedures.

Question 7 What information should a housing provider include in its survey of residents in order to calculate whether the community or facility meets the 80% requirement of HOPA?

Answer The owner or manager should obtain the total number of units in the housing community or facility. From that number, the following units should be excluded from the calculation of the 80% requirement:

a) the number of units that have been continuously occupied by the same household since September 13, 1988, and the household did not contain and does not currently contain at least one person over the age of 55;

b) the number of unoccupied units (see question 22);

c) the number of units occupied by employees of the housing facility or community who are under 55 years of age, and who provide substantial management and maintenance services to the housing facility or community

d) the number of units occupied solely by persons who are necessary or essential to provide medical and/or health and nursing care services as a reasonable accommodation to residents.

** HUD INTERNET VERSION **

The owner or management then should calculate the percentage of the remaining number of units that are occupied by at least one person age 55 or over as of the date of the survey or the alleged date of violation of the Act.

Ouestion 8 What is considered reliable age verification documentation?

Answer The following documents are considered to be reliable for age verification: birth certificate, drivers license, passport, immigration card, military identification, or any other state, local, national or international documentation, provided it contains current information about the age or birth of the possessor.

Ouestion 9 Is there any other documentation that would be considered reliable for age verification?

Answer Yes. A self certification in a lease, application affidavit, or other document signed by an adult member of the household asserting that at least one occupant in the unit is 55 years of age or older will satisfy this requirement.

Ouestion 10 What recourse is there for the owner or management of the housing community or facility if the occupants in the household refuse to cooperate in providing documentation regarding their age?

Answer The housing/community facility may, if it has sufficient evidence, consider the household to be occupied by at least one person who is 55 years or older. Statements made under penalty of perjury from third party individuals who have knowledge of the age of the occupants of a household may be used when the household itself refuses to cooperate by providing age verification. Other information, such as statements indicating age in prior applications may be acceptable. In addition, the facility/community may base its decision on government documents such as census data. The census data referred to is household censuses that are conducted by many cities and towns.

** HUD INTERNET VERSION **

Ouestion 11 How frequently should a honsing/community provider update its lists of occupants to be in compliance with the age verification requirements of HOPA? Are there any consequences if a housing provider fails to update its list of residents?

Answer HOPA requires that a housing facility/community re-survey its lists of residents every two years to ensure that the 80% requirement is met. A housing community's or facility's failure to survey or re-survey its list of occupants in accordance with its age verification procedures does not demonstrate intent to housing for older persons, and could jeopardize the housing community's status as 55 or older housing.

Ouestion 12 How long should a housing communitylfacility retain its records of survey information that show it meets the 80 percent requirement?

Answer The records referred to in Answer 9 above need to be kept as long as the housing community/facility intends to proffer its exempt status.

Ouestion 13 Are the surveys and affidavits used to gather information about the facility's/community's residents admissible in an administrative or judicial proceeding under the Fair Housing Act?

Answer Yes.

Ouestion 14 What does the ratio or percentage of 80120 portion of housing mean?

Answer HOPA requires that at least 80 percent of the occupied units must be occupied by at least one person 55 or older. The remaining 20 percent of the units may be occupied by persons under 55, and the community/facility may still qualify for the exemption.

** HUD INTERNET VERSION "

Ouestion 15 Is it lawful to advertise or market the 20 percent portion of the units not required to be occupied by at least one person 55 years of age or older to prospective tenants/purchasers under age 55 and to families with children?

Answer Yes. However, the marketing must be done in a way that identifies the facilitylcommunity as housing intended for older persons. Advertising and marketing must not be inconsistent with the intent. Further, the facility/community needs to plan with care any attempt to sell or rent the entire 20 percent portion of the remaining units to incoming households under age 55, because it could risk losing the exemption if some occupants over 55 die, with surviving spouses or heirs who are under 55 years of age. Such planning should address notice to incoming households under the age of 55 regarding how the housing provider will proceed in the event that the 80% requirement is endangered.

Ouestion 16 May a housing facilitylcommunity impose an age limitation more restrictive than that required by HOPA and qualify for the 55 or older exemption?

Answer Yes. For example, the housing facility/community may require that at least 80 percent of the units be occupied by at least one person 60 years of age or older. The housing facility/cornmunity may require that 100% of the units are occupied by at least one person 55 years of age or older, or that 80% of the units be occupied exclusively by persons aged 55 or older. However, the facility/community should review other state and local laws, including fair housing laws that may prohibit discrimination based on age, before establishing policies and procedures restricting occupancy based on age, or affecting survivors' rights to property, that are not covered under HOPA.

** HUD INTERNET VERSION **

Ouestion 17 If a housing facility or community meets the requirements of HOPA but permits up-to 20 percent of the units to be occupied by families with children, may the facility/community impose different terms and conditions of residency on those families with children who reside there?

Answer Yes. If a housing community/facility qualifies under HOPA as housing for older persons, the community/facility is exempt from the Act's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of familial status. The housing community/facility may restrict families with children from benefits of the community, or otherwise treat family households differently than senior households, as long as those actions do not violate any other state or local law. However, the community/facility is not exempt from the provisions of the Act that prohibit discrimination against any resident or potential resident on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or disability. - Ouestion 18 If a 55 or older occupant dies and leaves hisher property to a surviving spouse or heir@) under the age of 55, what rights, if any, do the survivors have to possession?

Answer The right to possession by a surviving spouse or heir is not governed by the HOPA or the Fair Housing Act. Whether an underage heir or surviving spouse can occupy the unit upon the death of the 55 or older occupant is a matter of state/local law or custom, and generally is governed by private contractual agreements between senior housing developers and the individuals who purchased or rented the dwelling. The provision in the Act permitting 20 percent of the units to be occupied by persons under 55 is intended, in part, to prevent a housing facility/community fiom losing the exemption due to situations where there are surviving spouses and underage heirs when the 55 or older occupant dies.

Ouestion 19

** HUD INTERNET VERSION **

In the event that the sole 55 or older occupant dies, and a surviving spouse or heir remains in the unit, is the surviving occupant counted in the 80 percent or the 20 percent portion of tbe units needed to meet the criteria for housing for older persons?

Answer The surviving occupant must be counted in the 20 percent portion.

Ouestion 20 How should a housing provider count, for the purpose of meeting the 80120 occupancy requirement, attendants or health care providers needed for the reasonable accommodation of the disability of an occupant (including family members under the age of 18)?

Answer The attendant or health care provider or family care provider is excluded from the calculation in its entirety. This is true whether the live-in person resides in the same unit with the disabled occupant or in a separate unit. Neither circumstance adversely affects the exemption of the housing facility/community.

Ouestion 2 1 How is the calculation for the 80120 percent requirement affected if a 55 or older individual purchases a dwelling in a senior housing facilitylcommunity, vacates the unit, and allows an underage adult relative to move in for an indefinite length of time?

Answer In calculating whether a communitylfacility meets the 80 percent requirement, it is the occupants of the dwelling units who are counted, not the owners. In this example, the current resident, the underage adult relative, would be counted in the 20 percent portion. Similarly, if a 55 or older ownerloccupant decided to vacate a unit for an indefinite period of time and to an underage individual, the current occupant would be counted in the 20 percent portion.

" HUD INTERNET VERSION **

Ouestion 22 Are there circumstances under which a 55 or older ownerltenant might be temporarily absent from a dwelling without affecting the exemption status of the community/dwelling?

Answer Yes. For example, the 55 or older occupant may be on vacation, hospitalized, or absent for a season without affecting the exempt status of the community. The resident may, if helshe wishes, allow a younger relative or a house sitter under 55 years if age to live in the unit during this absence. In either event, the unit would be included in the calculation of the 80 percent occupancy requirement as long as the dwelling is not rented out, the ownerltenant returns on a periodic basis, and maintains legal and financial responsibility for the upkeep of the dwelling.

Question 23 Can a housing communitylfacility that does not now meet the 80 percent occupancy requirement take any action to become eligible?

Answer Yes. For a period of one year after the rule became effective (May 3, 1999), a housing provider may reserve all new, vacant and/or unoccupied unitsldwellings for occupancy until 80 percent of the unitsldwellings are occupied by at least one person 55 years of age or older. This does not mean that the dwellingslunits must be held off the market; indeed, marketing the units as 55 and over units during the transition period may be done as those units become vacant.

Question 24 During this transition period, may a facility/community refuse to rent or sell to families with children in its effort to qualify as housing for older persons?

Answer Yes. If, during the one year period the facilitylcommunity demonstrates its intent to be housing for older persons through advertising and revisions to or development of rules and procedures, and adopts age verification procedures, it may refuse to rent or sell to applicants based on their familial status. Of course, the facilitylcommunity may have to meet the requirements of state and local laws with respect to making the changes required for the transition in its covenants or other instruments binding on the property.

* * HUD INTERNET VERSION * *

Ouestion 25 Can the facility/community evict families with children during the transition period for the purpose of becoming housing for older persons?

Answer No. However, the housing facility/community can renew or not renew leases for families with children if doing so does not represent a change in its practices or does not violate state or local landlord tenant law. Additionally, while the facility/community may not take any measures deliberately designed to discourage families with children from continuing to reside in the community, nothing prevents the offering of positive incentives that might lead some families to seek housing elsewhere.

Question 26 What if a 55 or older housing provider, at the end of the transition period, does not succeed in meeting the 80 percent occupancy requirement?

Answer At the expiration of the one year period, all units/dwellings must be marketed and made available to the public in general, including families with children. Additionally, all restrictive operations policies which may impact negatively on families with children must be rescinded.

Ouestion 27 When does HUD become involved in determining whether a 55 or older housing community or facility is in compliance with HOPA requirements?

Answer HUD's involvement begins in one of two ways: 1) when a person allegedly injured on the basis of familial status files a complaint against a housing facility/community and the respondent claims the exemption as a defense; or 2) when HUD commences a Secretary-initiated investigation or files a complaint based on information it has that indicates the need for an investigation.

* * HUD INTERNET VERSION * *

Ouestion 28 When must a person claiming to be injured by a housing communitylfacility because of familial status file a complaint with the Department in order for the complaint to be timely?

Answer The comulaint must be filed no later than one year after the alleged discriminatory act occurred or was terminated

Ouestion 29 Can a household which does not fall within the Fair Housing Act's definition of familial status file a complaint challenging a housing provider's attempt to provide housing for older persons?

Answer No. The family cannot file a familial status complaint because it does not meet the definition of familial status.

Ouestion 30 Can an owner of a dwelling file a complaint based on familial status if the owner is being impeded in the ability to sell or rent the dwelling because the housing facility/community is claiming to be 55 and over housing but does not meet the requirements for the exemption?

Answer Yes, if the owner has affirmatively undertaken to rent or sell his property and can establish that the housing communitylfacility illegally (is not qualified housing for older persons) interfered with the owner's ability to do so, belshe can file a familial status complaint. Other complainant parties could include the family with children seeking to rent or buy but was denied the opportunity, as well as any real estate agent involved in the transaction.

* * HUD INTERNET VERSlON **

Ouestion 3 1 If an individual files a complaint based on familial status and the housing community/facility claims the exemption as a defense, who has the burden of proving, that the community/facility is in compliance with HOPA requirements?

Answer The community/facility housing provider has the burden of proving that it was in compliance with HOPA requirements on the date of occurrence of the alleged act or incident of discrimination.

Ouestion 32 Can a corporate entity avail itself of the good faith reliance against monetary damages if the housing community/facility is found not to be in compliance with the HOPA requirements?

Answer No. The governing board, management company, or corporate entity of the housing facility/community is liable if the facility/community fails to meet the requirements, and cannot claim a good faith reliance defense against monetary damages. The legislative history of HOPA shows that in creating the good faith reliance defense, Congress intended to protect individual persons, such as individual members of boards of governing homeowners associations and real estate agents relying on information provided by the housing providers of senior housing.

Ouestion 33 Since individuals, including individual members of a homeowners association or a board of directors, can use the good faith reliance against monetary damages, under what conditions might that occur?

Answer An individual is not liable for monetary damages if the person acted with a good faith belief that the housing facility/community qualified for a housing for older persons exemption. Such a person must have knowledge, from an authorized representative, that the facility/community asserted in writing that it qualified for the older persons exemption before the date on which the alleged discrimination occurr~d. An authorized representative may be an

* * HUD INTERNET VERSION **

individual, committee, management company, listing agent, owner or other entity.

Question 34 Under what circumstances may an individual not use the good faith reliance defense?

Answer An individual is not entitled to the good faith defense if he or she has actual knowledge that the facility/community does not or will not qualify as housing for older persons, despite the fact that helshe received written assurances to the contrary from an authorized representative of the housing provider.

Ouestion 35 Is an individual insulated from a liability claim for disseminating information to others regarding the facility's/community's exemption claim?

Answer An individual who claims the good faith reliance defense based on hisher actual knowledge and a written assertion from an authorized representative of the facilitylcommunity may disseminate such information to others. Those others may include real estate agents, multiple listing services, advertisers and other print media who may, in turn, rely on the assertions of the individual from whom they received the information, unless they have actual knowledge that information is not accurate.

Ouestion 36 Is a publisher (newspaper or other print media) liable for damages under the Fair Housing Act for accepting for publication an advertisement for 55 and older housing if the community/facility is found not to be in compliance with HOPA?

Answer No. Newspaper publishers and other print media that rely on the assertions of the housing provider are not liable unless they have actual knowledge that the housing does not qualify for the exemption.

** HUD INTERNET VERSION **

Ouestion 37 Does HUD certify that a housing, facility/community is housing for older persons?

Answer No. Neither the Fair Housing Act nor HOPA authorizes the Department to certify whether a particular housing facility or community meets the qualifications for housing for older persons.

Ouestion 38 If a developer is building new housing that is intended to be for persons 55 and over, how should the new units be marketed and occupied as the facility/community is being developed?

Answer Newly constructed housing for first occupancy after March 12, 1989 (including a facility or community that has not been occupied in its entirety for at least 90 days prior to re-occupancy due to renovation or rehabilitation), must be marketed as housing intended for older persons. It does not have to have at least one occupant in each occupied unit who is age 55 and over until at least 25 percent of the units are occupied.

Question 39 How are state and federal fair housing laws that prohibit age discrimination affected by HOPA?

Answer Neither the Fair Housing Act nor HOPA covers age discrimination. Neither of these federal laws supersede or otherwise affect state or local laws that prohibit age discrimination. Housing community/facilities always should check all relevant state, local and federal laws, and any requirements imposed as a term of governmental financial assistance before implementing policies and procedures that limit the eligibility of its residents.

* * HUH UDERNET VERSION * *

Question 40 Must state or local governments that have been determined to have substantially equivalent laws to the Fair Housing Act change the laws under which they operate in order to be identical to HOPA?

Answer No. States and local governments with fair housing laws that have been determined to be substantially equivalent to the federal law may have no exemption from familial status discrimination for housing for older persons, or may have more stringent requirements to meet an exemption than does HOPA.

Question 41 Must a housing community/facility file or register a declaration of intent with the state or local unit of government in order to claim its exemption as housing for older persons?

Answer HOPA does not require this. However, the state or local government might require the housing community/facility to register its intent to be housing f o ~ older persons. The facility/community should consult the appropriate governmental body for requirements in this regard.

Question 42 Must a resident of a 55 or older housing community/facility join the homeowner's association?

Answer The Fair Housing Act does not require this. HOPA does not require this. This is an example of an issue or aspect of senior housing communities that is generally governed by independent law, deed restriction, or other legally enforceable documents.

** HUD INTERNET VERSION **

Question 43 Would HUD apply HOPA retroactively to a familial status claim of discrimination that occurred prior to December 28,1995, when HOPA was signed into law?

Answer No. If the alleged violation occurred prior to December 28, 1995, the Department's investigation of a pending complaint will determine whether the community/facility met the requirements for the housing for older persons exemption, based on the regulations that were in effect at the time of the alleged violation.

Ouestion 44 How does the Fair Housing Amendments Act senior housing, exemption, and HOPA, affect eligibility requirements for federally funded housing programs.

Answer The Act and HOPA do not affect statutory or regulatory provisions of federally assisted housing programs. For example, neither HOPA nor the Act change the definition of "elderly family"' in federally assisted housing programs. HOPA does not permit a HLJD funded public housing provider to designate a project as an "elderly project" without HUD review and approval as mandated by existing regulations. HUD funded housing that is designated as elderly housing may not, because of HOPA, admit households that are not statutorily eligible for the housing. No public housing development that is not designated as an elderly development by statute or program regulation may exclude families with children even if at least 80% i f the units are occupied by at least one person age 55 or older. Federally assisted housing providers should continue look to existing program statutory and regulatory requirements to determine tenancy of those developments.

* * HUD INTERNET VERSION * *

PROOF OF SERVICE

lTATE OF CALIFORNIA, 2OUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

itubblefield Proverties v. Bonnie Shivley UDDS1204130

The undersigned is counsel for defendants at: 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

In the date recited below the undersigned served the below document in the manner indicated:

)efendant Shipley's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, md Reauest for Judicial Notice with Declaration of Nancy Duffy, attaching also Declaration of B. Shipley

] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows:

] (By Fax) on 1-23-13 Fax machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the nachine. Pursuant to Rule CRC, 2008 [c](4. I caused the machine to maintain a record of same.

] (By Electronic) to address below [bv aereement) & with copy to nancyduffysb@yahoo.com to: nvilliamson@hkclaw.com (Appendix included)

X] (By US Mail) 51013a, 5201 5.5 CCP. I deposited the documents in a pre-paid stamped envelope to:

Robert Williamson, HartlKing 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 Santa Ana, CA 93 103

am familiar with mail collection in San Bernardino and the two-day mail service offered by the post office. mailed the envelope at San Bernardino, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed

nvalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true. Executed in Santa Barbara CA on 3/27/15.

$&fJ/,. 6- ~ a n L ~ Duffy ~ c ~ a r r o n , Attorney for Bonnie Shipley

- 1 - Request for ludieial Notice with Shipley's Summary Iudgment Motion filed with D's Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,

Declarations of Nancy D. MeCarron and Bonnie Shipley