expendable launch vehicle (elv) payload safety

Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Payload Safety

NASA ELV Payload Safety Program WorkshopDecember 3-4, 2014

Cal StaubusNASA ELV Payload Safety Manager

Ensuring the Safety & Enhancing the Success of ELV Payload Activities

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Payload Safety Process Working to Prevent the “Bad Day”

“and to Prevent a Bad Day From Turning Into Catastrophe”NOAA N-Prime


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• OSO primarily to study the sun, 8 lunched (1962 – 1975) Ball Aerospace

• Spin Test Facility (ESA 60) April 14, 1964

• Delta 3rd Stage (205 kg of solid fuel) just attached to OSO

• 11 workers in room when 205 kg of solid fuel in 3rd stage ignited from ESD spark

• All workers burned, 3 severely and died latter

CCAFS 1964 Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO) Catastrophe


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Payload Processing Related Incidents (Total: 95 since CY 1985)

Lifting/Handling50%

Processing5%

Electrical5%

Testing26%

Tool Drop5%

Toxics6%

Pyrotechnic3%


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• An element of OSMA – Delegated Program

• Program administration funded by OSMA

• Payload Safety Manager (Cal Staubus/KSC) and Agency Team (Bo Lewis, Judy Gari, Tom Moskios, Cami Vongsouthy): work issues that cut across projects and Centers, assist projects (PSWG), provide oversight

• Well defined payload safety process -implementation funded by each project

• Specific set of safety requirements

• Designed to work in concert with other range safety processes

NASA ELV Payload Safety Program Overview

SMAP


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NASA ELV Payload Safety Program

Program Benefits• Improves consistency of

payload safety practices

• Clearly defines safety review and approval process

• Identifies safety authorities and their responsibilities

• Improves communication

• Improves safety and risk decision-making process

MSL


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• Goddard and JPL continue to be NASA’s primary ELV payload development Centers

• Increasingly, other Centers are participating in and in some cases, leading NASA ELV payload projects

• This trend is expected to continue

• Recent Examples: Langley, Ames, Wallops, KSC, leading/participating in ELV payload projects

• Future Challenges:

Further Commercialization

Flying on foreign ELVs (e.g. JWST)

Ridesharing

Setting the Stage: Expansion of Payload Projects Throughout NASA

LDCM


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NASA ELV Payload Safety Program

Guiding Documents

• NPR 8715.7A, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Program

• NASA-STD 8719.24, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Requirements

GRAIL


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NPR 8715.7A ELV Payload Safety Program, Overview

NPR 8715.7 Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Payload Safety Program

MAVEN


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NPR 8715.7A ELV Payload Safety Program, Overview

• Effective February 24, 2014

• Purpose: Provide a structured process for ensuring NASA ELV payloads are designed, transported, processed, tested, integrated to launch vehicle and launched safely in support of mission success, consistent with NASA Payload Safety Policy

• Designed to ensure a consistent level of safety regardless of who leads/participates in the project

• Does not apply to payloads flown on crewed launch vehicles or payloads that will interface with the ISS

MAVEN


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• NPR 8715.7A now References NASA-STD 8719.24, NASA Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Requirements

P.4 Applicable Documents and Forms

• Added reference to NASA-STD 8719.24

• Removed all other references

Reference NASA-STD 8719.24 throughout NPR as necessary

Removed Section 2.5 Content of Deliverables

• NPR 8715.7A now refers to NASA-STD 8719.24 for all payload safety deliverables

Changes to NPR 8715.7 for Revision A


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• Added Sections:

1.5 Auxiliary Payloads Ridesharing on Launch Services Program Contracted Launch Vehicles

1.6 Payloads Not Using Launch Services Program Procured Launch Vehicle Services

1.7 Missions Involving Payload Recovery

2.3.1s (1) –(5) Address Return-to-Earth payload recovery

• Made numerous minor changes to improve process requirements clarity

• Added Hazard Report Form NF 1825

Changes to NPR 8715.7 for Revision A


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ELV Payload Safety Review Process


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ELV Payload Safety Review Process Interfaces


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Hazard Report Form – NASA FORM (NF) 1825http://kscsma.ksc.nasa.gov/ELVPayloadSafety/forms/NF1825.pdf

http://kscsma.ksc.nasa.gov/ELVPayloadSafety/forms/NF1825.pdf


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• Acceleration – Any mass that undergoes a change in speed or direction with enough force to damage equipment or personnel. This includes acceleration due to gravity.

• Asphyxiation – Any condition capable or displacing the oxygen content in air below 19.5%.

• Contamination – Release of gas, vapor, fluid, or particulate matter that is detrimental to personnel or spacecraft.

• Corrosion – Any condition capable of causing corrosion and degradation to the equipment, spacecraft, or personnel.

• Electrical – Exposure to any “live” electrical circuit causing shock, burn, or ignition of combustibles, and electrostatic discharge.

• Fire/Explosion – Initiation of flammable or explosive material.

• Impact – Contact with an object with enough force to cause damage or injury.

• Injury or Illness – Any condition that causes injury or illness to the personnel.

• Noise – Personnel exposure to noise that can cause an involuntary reaction, interference with communications, or damage to hearing.

• Pressure – Over-pressurization or container rupture causing whipping, fragments, or blast material.

• Ionizing Radiation – Exposure to radioactive material harmful to personnel.

• Non-Ionizing Radiation – Exposure of personnel and equipment to radio frequency sources, laser, and ultra violet, infrared, or intense visible light.

• Temperature – Departure above or below normal temperatures that can cause skin burns, structural degradation, or equipment malfunction.

• Toxic – Materials that pose hazards of health effects, fires and explosions, or reactivity.

Payload Hazard Groups


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NASA-STD 8719.24 ELV Payload Safety Requirements Overview

NASA-STD 8719.24 Expendable Launch Vehicle

Payload Safety Requirements


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• Developed jointly by NASA and U.S. Air Force Range Safety representatives

Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements

NASA safety standards.

AF letter

• NASA-STD 8719.24 is approved for use by NASA and Air Force Range Safety in lieu of AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements for NASA Payloads



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• Purpose of NASA-STD 8719.24

Ensure the safety of the public, launch area, payload processing facility, and launch complex personnel and resources

Ensure all aspects of prelaunch and launch operations adhere to applicable public laws

• NASA-STD 8719.24 has two parts: a Base Document and an Annex Document.

The Base Document provides guidelines for tailoring the requirements.

The Annex Document contains the actual technical safety requirements that are to be tailored.


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• Annex: consists of 4 Volumes from 91-710 applicable to NASA ELV payloads

Volume 1: Policies and Procedures

Volume 3: Payload and Ground System Requirements (Design)

Volume 6: Ground and Launch Personnel, Equipment, Systems, and Material Operations Safety Requirements (Ground Operations)

Volume 7: Glossary of References and Supporting Information


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NASA-STD 8719.24 Annex

C = CompliantNC = Not CompliantT = TailoredN/A = Not ApplicableI = Information or Title

Safety requirements


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Changes to NASA-STD 8719.24

• Volume 1 Attachment 5 provides the list of expected Payload Safety Introduction Briefing (PSIB) presentation information

• Added Return-to-Earth and Sample Recovery requirements• Removed the after arrival 1.1 X MOP COPV pressure test (Vol. 3,

12.2.5.3.2) Verify pre-ship pressure testing Must ensure compliance with a Mechanical Damage Control

Plan• Added Vol. 3, 12.2.5.1.7. The operating strain in the fiber shall be

below 50% of the ultimate fiber strain at burst during ground processing and flight operations. May exceed 50% during proof testing when personnel are not present.

• Corrected grounding and bonding resistance values to coincide with NASA-STD- 4003 Electrical Bonding for NASA Launch Vehicles, Spacecraft, Payloads, and Flight Equipment (Vol. 3, 11.2.1.8, 12.1.12.1) 1.0 milliohm vs. 100 milliohms


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• Low point drain capability for hypergolic propellant systems changed to Off-load capability and off-load service valves (Vol. 3, 12.8.1.1 & 12.8.1.2)

• Pyrovalve Policy for hazardous pressure systems (Vol. 3, 12.1.2.6) Waiting to reference a NASA Pyrovalve Specification For now following Shuttle payload policy for pyrovalves

• Comply with Category A ordnance device requirements in Chapter 13

• Provide at least three electrical inhibits to control opening of flow control devices

• Designed, analyzed, and undergo a comprehensive development and qualifications program

• Added Hazard Report Form


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• Split the Catastrophic definition in Vol. 7

Catastrophic Hazard (payloads prelaunch) – fatal injury, loss of spacecraft, launch vehicle, or ground facility

Catastrophic Hazard (payloads post-launch) – only pertains to mishap causing fatal injury or loss of flight termination system

• Corrected numerous typos and clarified some requirements without changing the intent

NuSTAR


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ELV Payload Safety Program Websitehttp://kscsma.ksc.nasa.gov/ELVPayloadSafety/default.html

http://kscsma.ksc.nasa.gov/ELVPayloadSafety/default.html


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• Cal Staubus, NASA ELV Payload Safety Manager

Work: 321-867-8757

Cell: 321-289-6286

[email protected]

• Jennifer Holland, Senior Safety Engineer, ManTech KSC

Work: 321-867-9723

[email protected]

Questions & Contacts

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]


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Pyrovalve Policy

• 12.1.2.6. The design, fabrication, qualifications, testing and hazard controls related to hazardous pressure system components and component housings such as tubing, welded joints, piping and fittings, pressure systems and safe payload processing. Provided that the requirements of this document are met and a Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) approach is employed, structural failure of these types of components or component housings (i.e., rupture or leakage) shall not be considered mechanical single failure points. Hazardous pressure systems containing normally-closed pyrovalves as flow control devices shall comply with Category A ordnance device requirements established in Chapter 13 of this volume. At least three independent electrical inhibits shall control the opening of flow control devices in hazardous systems.


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QUESTIONS?

QUESTIONS ?


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Pyrovalve Policy

• 12.1.2.6.1. All normally closed pyrovalves shall be designed, analyzed, and undergo a comprehensive development and qualifications program in accordance with approved project drawings, specifications, standards, tests, and all other pyrovalve requirements documents.

• 12.1.2.6.1.1. The pyrovalve internal flow barrier must be fabricated from a continuous unit of nonwelded parent-metal.

• 12.1.2.6.1.2. The pyrovalve’s valve structure must preclude inadvertent operation as a result of exposure to all potential environmental conditions.

• 12.1.2.6.1.3. Details of the pyrovalve design and test methods used to ensure system integrity shall be adequately addressed in the safety data package and appropriate hazard reports for PSWG review.

• 12.1.2.6.2. When the failure of pyrovalves used in hazardous pressure systems may lead to a catastrophic hazard, at least one additional mechanical inhibit shall be provided in series with the pyrovalve.