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Experiences of arrangements for health, safety and welfare in the global container terminal industryReport submitted to the IOSH Research Committee

David Walters BSc (Hons) M Med Sci PhD

Emma Wadsworth PhD

Cardiff University

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Experiences of arrangements for health, safety and welfare in the global container terminal industry

Report submitted to the IOSH Research Committee

David Walters BSc (Hons) M Med Sci PhD

Emma Wadsworth PhD

Cardiff University

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TableofContents

TableofFigures 7Glossary 9Acknowledgements 10Executivesummary 111.Introduction 20

1.1 Containerterminals–patternsofgrowthandorganisation 201.2 Healthandsafetyincontainerterminals–whatweknowfrompreviousresearch 231.3 Indicativefindingsfromthepreliminarystudy 241.4 Theaimsofthepresentstudy 261.5 Outlineofthereport 30

2.ResearchMethods 31

2.1 Summaryofthepreliminaryproject’smethodologicalapproach 312.2 Datacollectionandliteraturereview 31

2.2.1 Researchinstruments 322.2.2 Globalandnationalleveldatacollection 322.2.3 Terminalleveldatacollection–thecasestudies 322.2.4 Ethicalapproval 33

2.3 Dataanalysis 332.4 Participants 33

3.Managinghealthandsafetyincontainerterminals–companyandterminalarrangements 38

3.1 Features of governance and management of OHS in global and national container terminalcompanies 393.1.1 GNT1 413.1.2 GNT2 443.1.3 GNT3 453.1.4 GNT4 463.1.5 FeaturesofgovernanceandmanagementofOHSinnationalcompanies 47

3.2 ThecharacterofarrangementsforOHSintheterminals 483.3 Translatingcompanypoliciesintoterminallevelarrangements 51

3.3.1Theterminals 513.3.2Healthandsafetyoutcomesandperformance 533.3.3Workerparticipationandconsultation 573.3.4Workorganisationandarrangementsforitsmanagement 603.3.5Outsourcing 61

3.4 Butfromtheworkers’perspective? 644.Workers’OHSExperiences 66

4.1 Surveyrespondents 664.2 Safetyexperiences 68

4.2.1 Perceptionsofsafetyrisk 684.2.2 Safetyincidents 694.2.3 Safetyoutcomes 71

4.3 Work-relatedhealthandwelfare 744.3.1 Perceptionsofhealthrisk 744.3.2 Healthandwelfare 754.3.3 Healthoutcomes 76

4.4 ExperiencesofOHSmanagement 80

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4.5 Workingconditions,workorganisationandarrangements 854.6 AssociationsbetweenOHSoutcomes,workingconditionsandOHSmanagement 88

4.6.1 AssociationsbetweenworkingconditionsandOHSmanagement 884.6.2 AssociationsbetweenhealthandsafetyoutcomesandbothworkingconditionsandOHSmanagementarrangements 89

4.7 Nationalterminaloperators 904.8 Summaryandconclusions 91

5.Addressing‘thegap’ 93

5.1 The character of arrangements made for the governance and management of OHS in containerterminals 93

5.2 The position of occupational health and safety management within wider strategies for managing thebusinessandoperationofcontainerterminals 99

6.Contextualdeterminantsofpractices–theroleofthestate,regulationandlabourrelations 106

6.1 Economiccontexts 1066.2 Regulatoryframeworksandenforcementpractices 1106.3 Labourrelationshistoriesandtheirinfluencesoncurrentpractice 1166.4 Summary 120

7.Conclusions 123

7.1 Theaimsofthestudyandthequestionsaddressed 1237.2 Business and management policies and occupational health and safety arrangements in container

terminals 1247.3 How effective were the strategies for addressing health and safety management in container

terminals? 1257.4 Howdoworkers’experiencesofOHSstrategiesandarrangementscomparebetweenterminalssituatedin

differentcountries? 1277.5 SituationaldeterminantsofOHSpracticesincontainerterminals 127

References 133Appendix 138

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TableofFigures

Table2.1:Questionnaireanddiarysurveyrespondents 34

Table2.2:Interviewparticipants(Generalinformation) 35

Table2.3:Interviewparticipants(DetailedInformation) 36

Table3.1:Thecasestudyterminals,theirregionsandoperators 38

Figure3.1:Employeeandcontractorhours(%)fortheAsiaPacificandEuroperegionsandthecasestudyterminalsforGNT1 42

Figure 3.2: Lost time injury frequency rates permillion hours worked for 2007 to 2012 for the Asia Pacific andEuroperegionsandthecasestudyterminalsforGNT1 43

Figure3.3:LosttimeinjuryfrequencyratesfordirectlyandindirectlyemployedGNT1workersfor2013toOctober 44

Figure3.4:Losttimeinjuryfrequencyratesper100workersworkedfor2009to2013fortheAsiaPacificandEuroperegionsandthecasestudyterminalforGNT2 44

Figure3.5:Lost time injury frequency ratespermillionhoursworked for2012and2013 forEuropeand thecasestudyterminalforGNT2 45

Figure3.6:Losttimeinjuryfrequencyratespermillionhoursworkedfor2012and2013forEurope,AsiaPacificandoverallforGNT3 46

Table3.2:EmploymentandunionisationlevelsinthecasestudyterminalsinthesecondAsiaPacificarea 59

Table4.1:Questionnairesurveyrespondentsjobs 66

Figure4.1:Proportion(%)ofrespondentsagedunder40andaged40orolderbyareaofemployment 67

Figure4.2:Proportion(%)ofrespondentswithlessthan10years’experienceand10years’experienceormorebyareaofemployment 68

Figure4.3:Proportion(%)ofrespondentsineachjobtypebyareaofemployment 68

Figure4.4:Proportions(%)ofrespondentsreportingpoorsafetyperceptionsbyareaofemployment 69

Table4.2:Mean(SD)safetyoutcomescorebyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype 71

Figure4.5:Meansafetyoutcomesscoresbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype 72

Table 4.3: Associations between high levels of adverse safety outcomes and area of employment, job type andemploymenttype 74

Table 4.4: Associations betweenhigh levels of adverse safety outcomes and job type and employment type in thesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals 74

Figure4.6:Proportions (%)of respondentswithhigh risk tohealthand ineffectivehealthmanagementbyareaofemployment 75

Table4.5:Healthandwelfarebyareaofemployment 76

Table4.6:Mean(SD)healthoutcomescorebyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype 77

Figure4.7:Meanhealthoutcomescoresbyareaofemployment,jobtypeandemploymenttype 78

Table 4.7: Associations between high levels of adverse health outcomes and area of employment, job type andemploymenttype 79

Table4.8:Associationsbetweenhigh levels of adversehealthoutcomes and job type andemployment type in thesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals 79

Figure4.8:Fatigueandstressbyemploymenttype–comparingfirstandlastshifts 80

Table4.9:OHSmanagementexperiencesbyareaofemployment 81

Table4.10:Mean(SD)combinedscoreforOHSmanagementarrangementsbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype 82

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Figure4.9:Mean(SD)combinedscoreforOHSmanagementarrangementsbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype 83

Table4.11:Associationsbetweenhigh levelsofpoorOHSmanagementarrangementsandareaofemployment, jobtypeandemploymenttype 84

Table4.12:AssociationsbetweenhighlevelsofpoorOHSmanagementarrangementsandjobtypeandemploymenttypeinthesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals 84

Table4.13:Workingconditions’experiencesbyareaofemployment 85

Table4.14:Mean(SD)combinedscoreforworkingconditionsbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype 86

Figure4.10:Meancombinedscoreforworkingconditionsbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype 86

Table 4.15: Associations between high levels of poor working conditions and area of employment, job type andemploymenttype 87

Table4.16:Associationsbetweenhigh levelsofpoorworkingconditionsand jobtypeandemployment type in thesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals 88

Table4.17:AssociationsbetweenhighlevelsofpoorworkingconditionsandOHSmanagementarrangements 88

Table4.18:AssociationsbetweenhighlevelsofadversesafetyandhealthoutcomesandbothworkingconditionsandOHSmanagementarrangements 90

Figure 4.11:Mean safety and health outcomes, OHSmanagement arrangement andworking conditions scores byterminaloperatorforthefirstAsiaPacificareaandEuropearea2 91

Figure5.1AbilitytoraiseissueswithahealthandsafetycommitteebyemploymenttypeinAP2(%) 104

Figure5.2:RepresentationbyanelectedhealthandsafetyrepresentativebyemploymenttypeinAP2(%) 104

Figure6.1:Theinfluenceofcontext 111

Figure6.2:LevelsofpoorhealthandsafetyoutcomesandworkingconditionsbyarrangementsforrepresentationinAsiaPacificarea2 117

Figure6.3:Contextandperformancebyterminal 122

TableA.1:AssociationsbetweenthevariablesofinterestandwithterminaloperatorinthefirstAsiaPacificareaandEuropearea2multivariatemodels 139

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Glossary

CBA CollectiveBargainingAgreementCSR CorporatesocialresponsibilityEU-OSHA EuropeanUnionOccupationalSafetyandHealthAgencyEWCS EuropeanWorkingConditionsSurveyGNTs GlobalNetworkTerminalsHR HumanResourcesILO InternationalLabourOrganisationITF TheInternationalTransportWorkers'FederationKPI KeyPerformanceIndicatorLTIFR LostTimeInjuryfrequencyrateLTIs LostTimeInjuriesMSDs MusculoskeletaldisordersOHS OccupationalHealthandSafetyPPE PersonalProtectiveEquipmentRTGC RubberTyredGantryCraneSD StandarddeviationTARPs TriggerActionResponsePlansTEU Twenty-footequivalentunitTT TruckTrailers

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Acknowledgements

This report was written by Professor David Walters and Dr Emma Wadsworth. It is the product ofresearchundertakenbyateamofresearchersworkingattheCardiffWorkEnvironmentResearchCentrebetween2013and2015.Inadditiontotheauthors,theteamincludedProfessorKajFrick,DrSyamantakBhattacharyaandDrSteveCowley,whoallundertookfieldworkandanalysisofdataforcasestudysitesindifferentpartsoftheworldandofferedfeedbackduringthewritingofthisreport.Althoughthefinalresponsibility for the content of the report rests with its authors, we acknowledge the substantialcontributionmadetothisworkbyourcolleagues.Inaddition,wearegrateful,asalways,fortheworkofVictoriaParkininthedesignandproductionofthisfinalversionofthereport,aswellasforherextensivesupportintheadministrationoftheprojectoverall,includingitsquestionnaireanddiarysurveys.Finally,weareverygratefultoalltheorganisationsandindividualswhotookpartinthisprojectbygivingus their time and by accommodating our research teams so generously on visits to their workplaces.

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Executivesummary

Thisreportpresentsthefindingsofastudyoftheexperienceofhealthandsafetyincontainerterminalsoperatedbynationalandglobalcompaniesinseveralcountries.Itexploresindicationsfromaprevious,preliminarystudyconcerningworkers’experiencesandtheeffectivenessofthemanagementsystemstosupport theirhealth, safetyandwelfareatwork. Itbuildson theearlier findingswithamore in-depthanalysis,usingbothquantitativeandqualitative researchmethods. Itdiscusses thenew findings in thecontext of an analysis of the relationship between corporate strategies for the governance andmanagement of occupational health and safety (OHS) and the national regulatory and socio-economiccontextsinwhichterminalsoperateandsuchstrategiesareimplemented.Altogether, we carried out case studies in 11 container terminals operated by six companies in fourcountries.TheterminalsweresituatedintwodifferentpartsofEuropeandintwodifferentareasoftheAsia-Pacific region. They included terminals operated by four of the largest GNT companies and twonational companies, one in Europe and one in Asia Pacific. Nine of the participating terminals wereoperatedbyGNTs,withtheothertwoterminalsrunbynationaloperators.

Findings Thefindingsoftheresearchconcerninggovernanceandmanagementofoccupationalhealthandsafetyinthecompaniesandterminalswestudiedarebasedonanalysisofcompanydocumentationandinterviewswith company and terminal management. Our respondents included senior company and terminalmanagerswithresponsibility foroperations, forsafetyandhealth,and foradvisingonthesemattersatboth corporateand terminal levels.They focuson the characterof thearrangements for implementingcompanystrategiesonhealthandsafetyandthesystemsinplaceforitsdeliveryandprovideanaccountof theiroperation,asperceivedby thecompanyand terminalmanagement.Wealsoconsider trends intheavailablecompanydataconcerningthehealthandsafetyoutcomesofthesearrangementsand,asfaras it ispossibletodoso,comparethesetrendswiththefindingsofotherresearchonhealthandsafetyoutcomesincontainerterminals.The findings on workers’ experiences of these arrangements for the governance and management ofhealthandsafetyweredrawnfromdatagatheredinaquestionnaire-basedworkersurvey.Overall,therewere1849dockworker respondents to this survey,with an additional 120 completing a diary of theirexperiences in relation to selected indicators of health, safety andwelfare.We analysed transcripts ofnew interviewswithworkersand their representatives ineach terminalandre-analysed transcriptsofsimilarinterviewswithworkersandtheirrepresentativesfromourpreviouspreliminarystudy(thetwostudiesincludedmanyofthesameterminals).Altogether178peopletookpartinaninterview,including76aspartofthecurrentproject.Weoutlinebelowsomeof thekey findings, first from thedataobtained frommanagers and theirOHSadvisers,followedbythatobtainedfromworkersandtheirrepresentatives.

a) Companyapproachestomanagingsafety

The findings confirm that approaches taken by most of the global and national terminal operatorstowards the governance andmanagement of health and safety have several features in common. Theyaimed to address risks fairly systematically through undertaking risk assessment and introducingengineering or administrative controls in relation to both plant and processes consequent to thisassessment.Therewerestandardoperatingprocedurestakingaccountofsafetyissuesinrelationtomostoperational activities and maintenance of safety critical plant and equipment according to scheduled

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specifications. Information, informal training, supervisionanddirect consultationwithworkerson riskmanagement were provided through tool-box talks and similar activities at the start of shifts. Moretraining was provided to new staff, and updated for continuing staff, by both formal and informalarrangements.Inparallelwiththeseroutinejobsafetyarrangements,thesafetymanagementsystemsinplace in all the terminals contained various elements to ensure continuous improvement, includingproceduresforinformationcollectionanddisseminationonsafetyissues,allowingboththemonitoringofperformance and timely interventions when required. The Safety (and Environment) Departmentspresent inallof theterminalsservicedthesearrangements,aswellasprovidingadvice, trainingandinsome cases participating in the surveillance of safety behaviours. Generallymanagers in the terminalsbelievedthesearrangementstobe‘fitforpurpose’.Manyofthesefeaturesarewidelyconsideredtobegoodpracticeincurrentthinkingonmanaginghealthand safety and are generally implemented to a greater or lesser extent in large organisations witharrangementsinplaceforsafetymanagement.Amongthedriversofcorporateapproachestohealthandsafetytakenbythecompaniesstudied,ahigh-profileboard-roomlevelcommitmentto ‘zeroharm’wasinfluential. Itwas transposed into operational practice through amix of attention to an organisational‘vision’ of achieving high performance and continuous improvement in health and safety outcomes;improvements in organisation safety culture, health and safety competencies, training and skills ofpersonnel and measurable performance targets for health and safety. At the same time notions ofaccountabilityforsafetyandhealthwereinstilledamongworkersandmanagersalike.Whilethereweresome differences in the detail, most of the companies in the study followed this prescription at thecorporatelevelandrequiredadherencetoit intheoperationalpracticeswithintheirterminals.Equallyinfluentialwere theeffectsof internationalandnationalvoluntarystandardsonOHSmanagement thathelpedtostimulateandsupporttheadoptionofafairlysimilarmanagementsystemsapproachtohealthandsafetybyallthecompaniesstudied.Thesezeroharmcorporatesafetyandhealthstrategiesareassociatedwithastronglybehaviour-orientedapproach to the operation of terminal level arrangements for health and safety management. In thisrespect our present study confirmed indications evident in the previous study. Terminal levelarrangementsemphasisedthepromotionofa‘safetyculture’attheworkplace,changedsafetybehavioursamongworkersandsurveillanceoftheadherencetoterminalsafetyrules,achievedthroughinstruction,trainingandsupervisiononsafeworkingprocedures. Inkeepingwithobservationsonbehaviour-basedapproachesgenerally,while therewasawidelyheldviewamongworkersandmanagersalike that thehealthandsafetymanagementsystemshadimprovedinrecentyears,prioritywasaffordedtosafetyasopposedtohealthorwelfare.Leadershipfromthecorporatelevelontheobjectiveofachieving‘zeroharm’madeasignificantimpact,evident,forexample,inthewaysinwhichmanagersinallterminalsstressedtheimportanceofaimingforzerolosttimeinjuriesand,asasteptowardsthis,systematicallyreportingandinvestigatingallincidents,regardless of severity. However, despite the emphasis on incident investigation, interviews confirmedotherfindingsfromthepreviousstudyindicatingthatitwasrareforinvestigationsofroutineinjuriesandunsafe incidents to go beyond their proximal causes, focusing on individual human error or unsafebehaviours rather than possible underlying organisational or situational causes. This seemed to be aconsequence of the universal management conviction that following the requirements of the safetymanagementsystemcloselywouldmeanthataccidentssimplycouldnotoccur–aconvictionsupportedbytheirbehaviouralfoundationandreflectingthewidelyheldbeliefthatallaccidentsweretheresultofworkersfailingtofollowsuchprocedures–abeliefwhichinturnwasreinforcedbythecorporatefocusonchangingworkers’behaviourstoimprovesafetyculture.Theothersignificantfeatureofbehaviour-basedsystemsforhealthandsafetywhichiswidelydiscussedin the literature andwas also clearly in evidence in the present studywas that such systems tend toignore ormarginalise institutional arrangements for representation and consultationwithworkers ontheirhealthandsafety.Oursurveydatademonstrated thisveryclearlysomewith70%ofrespondentsgloballyhavingnohealthandsafetyrepresentativeordifficultyaccessingone.

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Finally in terms of corporate OHS strategies, although there were few female workers among theoperationalstaffoftheterminalswestudied,itiswidelyacknowledgedthattrendsinthedevelopmentofterminalworkopenthewayforemploymentofanincreasedproportionofwomeninthefuture.Despitethis,therewaslittleevidenceofstrategiesoractiononOHSmanagementinplacetosupportlikelyneedscreatedbysuchchange.

b) Companyapproachestomeasuringsafetyperformance

Performancewasmeasuredatcorporateandterminal level throughthecollectionof fatalityand injurydata. Consideration of this company data showed a mixed picture of performance but a generallyimproving trend was discernible. This finding has been anticipated by some industry observers whoarguethattheincreasedmechanisationindockwork,representedbycontainerterminalactivities,alongwith greater attention to health and safety management by operating companies, should result in animprovingtrendininjuriesandfatalities.However,wethinkthatlimitationsofreportingarrangementsindifferentterminalsindifferentpartsoftheworld,aswellastheexclusivefocusofthesearrangementson safety outcomes,meansomecaution iswarranted in the interpretationof thisdataasameasureofperformanceinrelationtohealthandsafetymoregenerally.

c) Workers’experiences

Such caution is further supportedby the findings of the study’s surveyofworkers’ experiences. Theseindicate considerably higher levels ofwork-related harm thanmeasured by company data, substantialdissatisfactionwiththenatureandoperationofarrangementsformanaginghealthandsafety.Therewasanequallystrongsensethathealthandsafetyeffectsassociatedwiththestructure,organisationandpaceof work in the terminals were missed by the systems in place for monitoring health and safetyperformance.InChapter4wegiveanaccountofthesefindings.Webeginwithadescriptiveaccountlargelydrawnfromtheanalysisofthesurvey.Wethenanalysethesefindingsinmoredetail,todevelopsomecompositesofthe variables examined, to enable us to show more clearly the variation between the experiences interminalsindifferentcountries,indifferentjobsandbetweenworkersindifferentmodesofemployment.Key points that emerge from our analysis of the health and safety experiences of workers globallyincluded:thefindingthat70%oftherespondentstothesurveyfelttheirsafetywasathighrisk,40%felttheseriskswereineffectivelymanagedandonethirdreportedtheyhadexperiencedsomekindofinjuryatworkinthepreviousyear.Slightlyfewerrespondentsfelttheywereathighriskofexperiencingwork-relatedharmtotheirhealth(60%),slightlymore(48%)felttheseriskswereineffectivelymanaged,andlevels of respondents reporting stress, mental fatigue and work-related illnesses were especially high(60%,65%and41%respectively).Overallthesurveyfindingsshowedthatworkersexperienceahigherincidenceofharmtotheirsafetyandhealththanrecordedbycompanyreportingprocedures,thatmanyof the more commonly experienced effects of the work involved in terminal operations on workers’healtharenotaddressedadequatelybythearrangementsforhealthandsafetymanagementandfurtherthattheprovisionsmadeforworkers’welfarearealsolimitedanddonotadequatelyprovideforworkers’needs.Moreover,asnotedabove,some70percentofrespondentshadeithernoworkerhealthandsafetyrepresentativeatallordifficultyinaccessingone.Boththesurveyandinterviewswithworkersandtheirrepresentativesindicatethatinterminalsinmoreadvancedeconomies,wherebothregulatoryrequirementsandtradeunionworkplaceorganisationwerebetterdeveloped,consultativearrangementsrequiredbylawweregenerallyinplace,butarrangementsseldomwentbeyond such requirements. Therewas also a strong indication inmanyof the interviewswithrepresentativesthattheyexperiencedvariousdegreesofhostilitytotheirrolefrommanagersandsupervisors.Thesurveyfindingswerecorroboratedbydatafrominterviewsinwhichworkerparticipantsexpressedconcernsabouttheirsafety,healthandwelfareandsuggestedthatarrangementsformanaginghealthand

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safetyat theirworkplacesonlypartially addressed their concerns.Comparisonswith surveydata fromother sources suggest that respondents’ experiences were worse than the average for other sectors.Furthermore, therewas a strong association between these negative health, safety andwelfare effectsandmeasuresofpoorworkorganisation,highworkintensityandpoorOHSmanagementarrangements.Theseresultswerenotuniformacrossalljobs,employmentarrangementsorgeographicallocationsandthe survey clearly identified a sub-group of respondents as being at particular risk. Thesewere foundamong the indirectly employedworkers doing jobs combiningquayside anddrivingwork in terminalssituatedinoneoftheareasintheAsiaPacificthatwasincludedinthestudy.Inshort,thestudy’ssurveyofworkers’experiencesofarrangementsformanagingtheirhealth,safetyandwelfare portrayed a rather different perception of the effectiveness of these arrangements to thatpresentedbybothcorporateandterminallevelmanagersandadviserswithresponsibilityforOHS.

Analysis MakingsenseofthestudyfindingsinvolvedexaminingevidenceofdissonancebetweenmanagementOHSarrangementsandtheworkers’experienceinthelightoftheinfluenceof:

• thecharacterofwiderorganisationalmanagementstrategiesoftheterminalcompaniesandtheplaceofOHSarrangementswithinthem;and

• theinfluencesoftheeconomic,regulatoryandlabourrelationscontextsinwhichtheterminalsweresituated

Inkeepingwithobservationsonbehaviourally-basedapproachesgenerally, thismeant thatwhile therewas a widely held view among workers and managers alike that the health and safety managementsystems had improved in recent years, the priority of these systemswas towardsmatters of safety asopposed to those ofworkers’ health or welfare. This focus is best understood as symptomatic of zeroharmcorporatesafetystrategiesmoregenerally,whereaconnectioncanbeseenbetweenbehaviourally-orientated arrangements for safety, the dominant discourse on ‘safety culture’ among managers andsafetyprofessionalsalikeatcorporateandprofessionallevelsandthehighprofileespousalof‘zeroharm’approaches in the board room. The attraction of these ways of conceptualising the governance ofimprovement inworkplacehealthandsafety forcorporate leadersandmanagers isarguablyrelatedtothe fact that focusing on changing workers’ behaviour (although managers’ behaviour may also beincluded), largely avoids questioning the implications forworkers’ health safety andwelfare, ofwidercorporate or managerial decisions on finance, work organisation and other business or operationalmatters. It therefore fits well with modern management and business leadership strategies that areintendedtomaximiseoperationalcostefficienciesandtheirprofitability,despitegrowingevidencefrommany industries that these approaches may have a negative impact on workers’ health, safety andwelfare.Weconsiderourevidenceconcerningtheeffectsofthisapproachonworkers’experiencesbelow.

a) TheplaceofOHSinorganisationalandbusinessmanagementstrategies

As we argue in some detail in Chapter 5, the business efficiencies associated with container terminaloperationmean that success in this highly competitive industry is determined by the speed and costefficienciesassociatedwithcargohandlingandthroughputatterminalsthat,inturn,drivetrendsbothinoperationalefficiency(includingautomation,manninglevels,shiftpatternsandsoon)andincorporatepreferencesforcontractingoutlabour.LookingattheresultsofthesurveyofworkersOHSexperiences,itseemsclearthatitwastheconsequencesofthesepracticeswhichlayattheheartofboththedissonancebetween the workers’ experiences and managers’ perceptions of the effectiveness of their health andsafetyarrangementsaswellasdifferencesobservedinOHSexperiencesinterminalslocatedindifferentpartsoftheworld.

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Since it seems likely that these prominent trends in business and organisational practices are set tocontinue,itisimportantthatcompaniesareawareoftheconsequencesandareabletotakethenecessarysteps tominimise theirnegativeeffectson thehealth, safetyandwelfareexperiencesof theirworkers.One strategy that might enable more preventive measures to be enacted could be through greaterengagementinensuringmorerobustfeedbackfromworkersconcerningtheeffectsofworkorganisation.There is awealth of research that points to the positive role of institutional arrangements forworkerrepresentationonhealthandsafety incontributing toachieving this.Yet, inourstudy, the terminals inwhich such arrangementswere least implementedwere the veryones inwhich thenegative effects ofthesetrendsinbusinessandorganisationalpracticeweremosthighlydeveloped.A second area in which companies might consider more systematic control is in relation to theirrequirements for themanagementofhealthand safetyarrangementsby contractors.While somegoodpractices were identified among the terminals we studied, overall there was inconsistency in theapproaches enacted by different terminals. Again, current research suggests that buyers in close andcollaborative supply relations with their supplying contractors – such as were the relations typicallyfound in container terminals – are in a strong position to influence not only the presence of OHSarrangementsamongcontractorsduringtheprocurementprocess,butalsotoinfluenceandimprovetheoperationofthesearrangementsintheactualworkcarriedonbycontractorson-site.Therewasevidenceinthepresentstudythatterminalsandterminaloperatingcompaniesmoregenerallywouldbenefitfromgreater attention to ensuring consistent best practice in these matters. In this respect there wasconsiderable room for better information sharing globally within and between terminals and theorganisationsrunningthem.

b) Nationaleconomic,regulatoryandlabourrelationscontexts

Whethercompaniesareglobalornational,theircorporatestrategiesonhealth,safetyandwelfareinthecontainerterminalsforwhichtheyareresponsibleareimplementedinverydifferentnationalcontexts.Wehaveargued inChapter6 that thesecontextsmoderateboth thenatureandoperationofcorporateapproaches.Thisisparticularlysoinrelationtotheeffectsofeconomic,regulatoryandlabourrelationscontexts on the approaches taken by terminal operating companies to managing safety, health andwelfareandworkers’consequentexperiencesofthoseapproachesandtheiroutcomes.Elements of all three of these contextual determinants have an important impact not only on thearrangements that terminaloperatorsmake toorganiseworkandmanagehealth, safetyandwelfare –and in some caseswhether arrangements are inplace at all – but also their effectiveness andvalue intermsoftheexperienceofworkers.Inshort,ouranalysisclearlyshowsthatwherethesecontextsprovideonlyaweakinfluenceontheautonomyofcompanyOHSpractice, that is,whereOHSis inthewordsofsome GNTs, ‘loosely regulated’, workers report more negative experiences of OHS than where thesefactorsaremorestronglyinevidence.Forexample,whereoutsourcingoflabouristheeconomic‘norm’,where regulatory frameworks and enforcement practices are not strong, and where labour relationshistorieshaveresulted inaweakervoice for labour,workers’experiencesofhealth, safetyandwelfarearrangementsaregenerallypoorerthanincontextswherethedevelopmentandinfluenceofsuchfactorsarestronger.Inaddition,wherethesecombinewithweakernationalexternalsupportsforOHSgenerally(interms,forexample,ofcompensation,insuranceandwelfaresystems),thenworkers’experiencesarepoorest. Such findings are in accordwith those of socio-legal scholarswho argue that the institutional(including regulatory) contexts within which modern global business operates are importantdeterminantsofbothmanagementpracticesandworkers’welfareand,asotherwritersmakeclear,suchcontextsarecriticalininitiativestoinfluencetheextentofcompliancewithlabourstandards. In Chapter 6 we tried to capture the essence of this influence of context on experience by plotting ameasure ofworkers’ OHS experiences against one of context by creating composite ‘performance’ and‘context’scoresforeachterminal.Thiswepointoutwasnecessarilyacrudeapproachbutthegraphicaldescriptionitprovidesisahelpfulrepresentationoftheseeffects(Figure6.3).Theimportantmessageitdeliversdemonstratestheimpactofcontext–andsuggeststhatwithoutstrongandeffectivelyenforced

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regulationandeconomicandlabourrelationsconditionsinwhichthebalanceofpowerbetweencapitaland labour is sufficiently evenly distributed to allow workers an effective voice, terminal operatingcompanieswill tend to favour productivity over the effectivemanagement of safety and, in particular,healthandwelfare.Wehaveshownthattheseoperators,andespeciallythoseworkingataglobal level,havethecapacitytoputeffectiveOHSstrategiesinplace,buttheygenerallydosoonlywhenthecontextsinwhichtheirbusinessunitsaresituatedobligethemto.

Conclusions Thedominantapproaches tohealthandsafetymanagementusedby the container terminal companiesstudiedwere elaboratebehaviourally focusedoccupational safetymanagement systems inwhich therewere only limitedworker involvement/feedback loops. These are incompletemodels even in terms ofaddressingroutineinjury,butareparticularlysointhattheyallowonlylowengagementwithpreventiveoccupationalhealthmattersandarerelativelyunresponsivetotheconsequencesofsignificantchangesintechnology and work organisation in this respect. These approaches also contribute to a majordisconnect/cognitivedissonanceobservedbetweenmanagementandworkerperceptionsconcerningtheeffectivenessofactionsonOHS.Thissaid,itisclearthatinatleastsomeoftheGNTsstudiedthereisevidenceofawarenessincorporateOHSadviceandgovernanceofthelimitedvalueofpreventionstrategiesbasedsolelyonthereductionofroutine injuries and more attention being paid to strategies that take account, for example, of lowfrequency/high impact incidents and integrated prevention strategies included in design/engineering,maintenance,riskassessment,TARPs(triggeractionresponseplans)etc.Thesearerelativelyrecentandas yet incomplete initiatives, and they would benefit from parallel further development and greaterengagementwithsystemsforworkerrepresentationandpreventiveoccupationalhealthmeasuresbothof which, aswe have pointed out, are underdeveloped inmost terminals and forwhich support fromcorporaterhetoricconcerningthefocuson‘zeroharm’doesnotappearespeciallyhelpful.WhileOHSarrangementsinplaceintheterminalsweresignificantlyinfluencedbythenationaleconomicandregulatorycontextsinwhichtheyweresituated,thepracticeofregulatoryinspectionwasitselfeitherunderdeveloped(andsignificantlysoinpoorercountriesinthestudy)or,equallyofconcern,suggestedby terminalworkers tobe less in evidence thanpreviously in some richer countries in the study.Thissuggestion,whichwastoalargeextentsubstantiatedininterviewswithregulatoryagencypersonnelaswell as by national enforcement data, is of some concern.Up to the present time, such inspection hadclearly been an important part of the influence on compliancewith national OHS requirements in theterminalssituatedinthesecountriesanditsreductioninrelationtotheseworkplaceswheresubstantialandseriousOHSrisksstillexistisdisturbing.Inshort,theconclusionfromouranalysisindicatesthatevenwherewefoundtheconditionsofcontexttobeat theirmostconducive, thereremainssignificantscope for improvement,particularly inrelation tothe management of workers’ health and welfare, alongside their safety, and the more effectiveinvolvementofworkersandtheirrepresentatives inthearrangements inplacetoachievethis. Inthesescenarios,bothcompanystrategiesforOHSgovernanceandthesurveillanceoftheensuingarrangementsfortheirdeliveryneedtocontinuetobeapriorityinthesupportofsafeandhealthyworkforallterminalworkers.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are drawn from the conclusions of the study. They address issues ofpolicy and practice on the governance and operation of arrangements to manage health, safety andwelfareatworkincontainerterminals.Itishopedtheycontributetoimprovingtherelevance,operationandoutcomesofthesearrangements.TheyaremadewithregardtothetripartitenatureoftheinterestinOHS in container terminals globally. That is, while they are addressed in the main to corporate andterminalleveloperation,othersareaimedatnationalregulationandregulatorypolicyandatimproving

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globalstandardsonOHSincontainerterminals.Allalsohaveimplicationsforthestrategyandpoliciesofthetradeunionsthatrepresenttheinterestsofworkersatbothcorporateandterminallevels.Whenmakingrecommendationsitiscustomaryforresearcherstoindicateaneedfor‘furtherresearch’,since it is also normal for the findings of research investigations to lead to additional questions. Thepresentstudyisnoexception.However,therecommendationsoutlinedbelowareconfinedtothosethataddresspolicyandpracticeandareofrelevancetoemployers,governments,internationalorganisationsandtradeunions.Theyincludethefollowing:• Sincetheresearchshowsthattherearesignificantdifferencesinhealth,safetyandwelfarepractice

andoutcomesbetweenterminalsoperatedbythesamecompaniesindifferentlocationsintheworld,itisrecommendedthatGNTsreviewthestrategiestheyhaveinplaceforthecorporategovernanceandmanagementofOHSwithaviewtoreducingthesedifferencesbylearningfromtheexperienceofwhatconstitutesgoodpracticeandwhatdrivesit.TheremaybearolehereforthedevelopmentofaCodeofPracticebyaglobalbodysuchas the ILO,whichcouldactasa suitable standard (seealsolaterrecommendations).

• Zero-harm strategies and behaviour-based safety (BBS) arrangements dominate the approaches

takentoOHSatcorporatelevelandintheterminalsstudied.Whiletherearesomebenefitstosuchsystems,theyhaveseveralacknowledgedweaknesses.Theseareinparticularevidentinrelationtoattentiontosafetyoverhealthandwelfareandinrelationtoquestionsofcommunicationandtrustbetweenworkers,theirrepresentativesandmanagement.Itisrecommended thateffortsaremadeto ensure that such weaknesses are addressed in corporate OHS systems. This means especiallyensuring thatOHSsystems inplaceaddressoccupationalhealthandwelfareaswellassafety, theypaygreaterattentiontotheorganisationalcausesofharmexperiencedbyworkersandtheyfurtherallow for improved communication between workers and managers. This includes improvedarrangements for consultation andparticipation ofallworkers onOHS and it is further importantthatsuchsystemshelpbuildtrustbetweenworkersandtheirmanagers,ratherthandistrust.

• Corporate governance of OHS in the operation of container terminals increasingly emphasises an

approachtoitsmanagementinwhichgreaterattentionispaidtounderstandingthecausesofcriticalincidents.Thisemphasisisvaluableanditisrecommendedthatitsfurtherextensionbesupported.Inparticular,moreattentioncouldbepaidtomanagementstrategiesassociatedwiththepreventionof low frequency/high impact (LF/HI) events. Here terminals could improve monitoringarrangements for these incidents and the greater development of trigger action response plans(TARPs)inrelationtothem.TerminaloperatorsmightalsoconsideradoptionofmostsuitableOHSindicatorsaswellastheestablishmentofdatabaseswhoseanalysismaycontributetotheadvanceofknowledge in the development ofmore ergonomic solutions for workers in ports. OHS indicatorscurrently used by container terminals are insufficient and mainly support a reactive rather thanproactive approach to incidents. Consideration could be given to more proactive and preventiveorientated approaches. Although some operators have made considerable progress with globalcommunications in relation to OHS in terminal operation, greater use of IT in achieving datacollectionanddisseminationinthisrespectshouldbeencouragedandgoodpracticesshared.

• WhilecontinuedreportingofLTIsisimportant,itisrecommendedthatKPIsthatareusedtomonitor

safetymanagementpracticebothatcorporateandterminallevelreflecttheissuesidentifiedabove.• There isastrongbodyofresearchevidencesupportingthecontributionof formalarrangementsto

representworkers’ interests to improving prevention outcomes. These arrangements are found inmanyhighrisksectorssuchasmining,thepetrochemicalindustry,constructionandsoon,buttheyaresignificantlyunderdeveloped inmanyof the terminalswestudiedand it is recommended thatthis be addressed in both corporate governance ofOHS and in terminal level arrangements in thefuture.

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• Manyof the experiences of harm reportedbyworkers in this study, but apparently not in routinecompanydata,concernhealthandwelfare.Itisthereforerecommendedthatcorporateandterminalstrategiesarereviewedwithaviewtoincreasingtheiremphasisonthesemattersinthefuture.

• It is further recommended that investigation of OHS performance and outcomes takes greater

accountoftheviewsofworkersconcerningorganisationalcausesofcommonlyexperiencedformsofworkrelatedill-health.

• The organisation of work and employment in the terminals reflects the increasing use of the

outsourcing of labour through arrangements with contractors. There are well-establishedconsequences for OHS arrangements and outcomes associatedwith these practices.Manywere inevidence in the terminals studied. It is recommended that companies review their strategies foraddressingtheseconsequencesandtakeactionsreflectingbestpracticeonOHSinrelationtotheuseofcontractors.Thesemightinclude:

o Reviewofthenatureofsupplychainrelationsbetweenterminaloperatorsandcontractors

inordertoidentifybettermeansofincentivisingimprovedOHSperformanceo FurtherreviewandrevisionofcorporateguidelinesontheextenttowhichOHSmanagement

requirements for contractors feature in arrangements for procurement and contractcompliance

o Greaterengagementwithmonitoringtoensurecompliancefromcontractorso InvestigationofincentivesforcontractorstoimproveOHSarrangementsandperformanceo Review and exploration of possible better arrangements for thewelfare of the contractor

workforceinsometerminalso Better arrangements for adequate representation of the interests of the contractor

workforce• In terms of corporate and terminal level actions, we have noted in the report that younger male

workers dominated employment in the container terminalswe studied. This is not surprising, butgiven the widely anticipated changes in the organisation of terminal operation in the future, it islikely that the participation of women in the labour force will increase. This will have someimplicationsforarrangementsforhealth,safetyandwelfare.Currentlythereislittleevidenceofthesebeing anticipated either by the corporate strategies for governance and management of OHS andwelfareor inarrangements for thesemattersat the levelof the terminals. It isrecommended thattheseimplicationsbeexploredatbothcorporateandterminallevels.

• Both national regulatory contexts and regulatory inspection practiceswere found to be important

determinantsofterminallevelOHSpractice.Inadvancedmarketeconomiestherewasaperceptionthat the presence of specialist regulatory inspection had a positive impact on terminal level OHSpractices.Thereisunderstandableconcernthatreductioninsuchpresencecausedbycutsinpublicspendingandreorganisedcompliancestrategies(commonlyexperiencedinmostofthesecountries)will result in negative outcomes and it is recommended that national authorities review theirstrategies in this area, andalso takeaccountof likely trainingneeds for inspectors involved in theinspectionofworkincontainerterminals.

• In the one lower-middle-income country included in the study, both the regulations ondockwork

andtheregulatoryinspectoratestoodatsomedistancefromengagementwiththeOHSmanagementarrangements employed within the terminals. It is recommended that, in this situation, nationalauthorities take steps to close this gap by bringing regulation in line with the process-basedregulatorymeasures forOHS nowwidely used globally, and by providing inspectorswith trainingand powers to engagewith OHSmanagement practices within the terminals. Theremay be somescope for supporting thiswith thedevelopmentofaCodeofGoodPracticeatglobal level,perhapsthroughtheagencyoftheILO.

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1.Introduction

Thisreportpresentsthefindingsofastudyoftheexperienceofhealthandsafetyincontainerterminalsoperatedbyarangeofnationalandglobalcompaniesinseveraldifferentcountries.Itisafollow-uptoaprevious study undertaken in 2011 and it explores indications from that study concerning theeffectiveness of themanagement systems to supportworkers’ health, safety andwellbeing in place inthese terminals (WaltersandWadsworth,2012). Itbuildson theearlier findingswithamore in-depthanalysis using a quantitative, questionnaire based survey together with the qualitative methods usedpreviously.Italsoundertakesadetailedanalysisofthenationalregulatoryandsocio-economiccontextsinwhichterminalsoperateinthedifferentlocationsstudied.InthisIntroduction,weexplainourrationaleforthestudy.Todoso,webeginbywayofbackgroundwithabriefoutlineofthedevelopmentofcurrentfeaturesoftheoperationofcontainerterminalsthatcanbeobservedgloballyandarewidelyheldtocontributetothesignificanceoftheirroleintheglobaleconomy.Weparticularlyfocusonthosefeaturesoftheirstructure,organisationandoperationthataremostlikelyto influenceOHS arrangements and outcomes and then outline the existing evidence concerning thesearrangements and outcomes, including summarising relevant findings from the previous study. Thisprovides a starting point for the present research which seeks to explore the relationship betweenorganisational arrangements for health, safety and welfare in container terminals and their widernational, regulatory, business and labour relations contexts. The central question addressed in thepresentworkconcernswhatdeterminesthehealthandsafetyoutcomesandexperiencesofworkers incontainerterminalsandwhatareeffectivemanagerialstrategiestoimprovethisexperience.

1.1 Containerterminals–patternsofgrowthandorganisation

Theintroductionoftheshippingcontainertransformedtheoperationsinvolvedinloadingandunloadingshipsbyallowinganincreaseinthemechanisationandautomationofcargohandling(Levinson,2006).This in turnstimulated thegrowthbothof specialisedvessels tocarrycontainersand terminalswhosesole function was to load and unload them, thus massively increasing the speed and efficiency intransferring containerised goods from ship to shore and vice versa. At the same time as thistransformation was taking place globally, ports themselves were undergoing significant change inownership,passingfrompublicentitiestopartlyorentirelyprivatisedones(Baird,2002).Inparallelandrelatedly,asthemanufactureandproductionofgoodsincreasinglyrelocatedtopoorercountries,worldtradeincreasedandtheroleofshippingastheprimaryformofinternationalbulktransportationofgoodsincreased with it. The need for fast and efficient cargo operations grew globally, requiring new orenlargedterminalsfortheexportofgoods,ofteninthepoorerpartsoftheworldtowhichproductionhadincreasingly relocated, others for their transfer while en route, and others for the importation of theproductsinthecontainersintothemarketsofadvancedeconomies.These changes contributed to the development of a global network of specialised container terminalsoperatedbyarangeofbothnationalandgloballogisticscompanies,themselvesoftencombiningterminalownershipandoperationwithothertransportandlogisticsinterests,includinginterestsinbothlandandsea transportation services. This development is well-known and has generated a large and detailedliterature(seeforexample;BrooksandCullinane,2007a;RodrigueandNotteboom,2011;BonacichandWilson, 2008, and many others). Less well known, although in evidence in the specialised researchliterature, is the impact these changes have had on workers, with the transformation of longstandingworkandemploymentpracticesaswellasofequallywell-establishedlabourrelationsproceduresandinsomecasesoftheregulatoryinfrastructureswithinwhichthesepractices,institutionsandproceduresareembedded.Theconsequencesofallthesechangesforworkers’experienceofsafety,healthandworkingconditions in container terminals have rarely been the subject of systematic study and it iswith these

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consequencesandhowtheymightbemanagedtosupportmorepositiveoutcomesforhealth,safetyandwelfarethatthepresentresearchisconcerned.Containerterminalsactas‘hubs’atwhichtransportationsystemsconverge.Costanddeliveryefficienciesin these ‘hubs’ are regarded as fundamental to the success of global trade. As a consequence furtherchanges have occurred in their location, structure and organisation to allow, for example, larger andfastershipswithreducedport-turnaroundtimestousethem.Associatedsavingsinoperatingcostshavebeen achieved through increased automation and mechanisation, and through the outsourcing ofdocksidelabour.Containerisationhasdictatedandencouragedtheuseoflargershipswithsmallercrews.Ithashelpedtoremovetheneedfora largeworkforce livingneardocksto loadandunload–enablingdocks to be re-located in less crowded port areas or new ports altogether. The road/rail networkassociated with containerships has also facilitated this, including removal of the need for largewarehousesatorneardocks–andalargeworkforcetoservicethese.Suchfacilitiesarenowoftenfoundinhubsatconsiderabledistancefromterminals.Theuseof‘justintime(JIT)managementtechniqueshasalsofurtherreducedwarehousingrequirements.Thecompaniesoperatingtheseterminalsincludeasmallnumberoforganisationsoperatingonaglobalscale, that, for the last decade, have controlled about half the world’s total container port capacity(Drewry, 2007). These global network terminal (GNT) operating companies dominate containertransportthroughtheircapacitytocontrolnotonlytheactivitiesofmanyindividualterminalsbutalsobyorganising this activity into operational networks globally. The four largest of them currently controlnearly200portsglobally,eachhavingannualthroughputbyequity(asmeasuredbyTEUlevelsfor2009)ofbetween31and45million(NotteboomandRodrigue,2011).Theyarealllargecompanieswithmulti-nationalinterests.Eachhasaglobalheadofficefromwhichbusinessandmanagementoftheorganisationisledandco-ordinated.Becauseoftheimportanceandwidespreadinfluenceofthesecompanies, inthepresentstudy,asinthepreviousone,wehavebeenparticularlyinterestedintheirapproachestomanagingthehealth,safetyandwelfareoftheirworkers.Tothisendweexaminedmanagementarrangementsandstrategiesforhealthand safety in four of the largest of these organisations at both global and terminal levels in severaldifferentnationalcontexts.Atthesametimemanysmallernationalorganisationsalsooperatecontainerterminalsinmostexportingandimportingcountries.Theytoofollowbroadlysimilartrendsinrelationtotheir business practice as well as in the structure and organisation of their terminals and in theemploymentpractices they adopt (seeReveley andTull (2008) for examples from theAsiaPacific andBrooksandCullinane(2007b)forexamplesinEuropeandNorthAmerica).Wehaveincludedexamplesofthesecompaniesandtheirterminalsinsomeofthesamenationalcontextsinwhichwehavealsostudiedtheactivitiesoftheglobalplayers.Asalreadynoted,withthedevelopmentofspecialisedterminalsforcontainertransportationinthenameof economic andbusiness efficiency, significant changeshave takenplaceboth in theway thatwork iscarriedout and in theway inwhichworkers are employed todo it. Thishasbeen achieved through amixture of technological change and new systems of work. In parallel, there has been a considerablereorganisation of contractual relationships in the employment of labour, with downsizing andoutsourcing of work activities within ports, increased casualisation of labour and greater presence ofcontractorlabour.Inadvancedmarketeconomiesthesechangeshaveoftenbeenimposeduponolderandwell-establishedpatternsofemploymentandworkorganisationresulting,amongotherthings, inlarge-scale redundancy alongside substantial revision and redefinition of long-standing work practices(Turnbull,2012).Suchchangeshavenotbeenwithoutconflictandhaveoftenbeenthesubjectoflongandbitter industrial disputes (Turnbull and Wass, 2007). The resulting structural and organisationalarrangements for employment and terminal operation are, therefore, frequently consequences ofcompromisesreachedintheresolutionofconflictbetweensocialorganisationandeconomicgrowthandefficiency.Inthissensetheyareinfluencednotonlybytheorganisationalandbusinessprioritiesoftheterminal companies involved, and the national economic and political strategies of the states inwhichthey are located, but also by the strategies of organised labour in its efforts to protect jobs andworkpractices(FairbrotherandGekara,2013).

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In poorer countries the changes frompreviouspractices havebeen as comprehensive as those in highincomecountries,andtheintroductionofnewformsofemploymentandworkarrangementshaveledtothesameconsequencesfortraditionalworkandemploymentpracticesasthoseexperiencedelsewhere.Perhapsbecauselabourorganisationinthesecountrieshasbeenconsiderablylesswellestablishedandthereforemorelimitedinitsinfluencethaninsomehigherincomecountries,thedisputednatureofthesechanges has been less conspicuous and the changes in employment practices, especially in relation tocontract labour, have beenmore extreme. In other situations, in both high and low income countries,state-ledprivatisationpolicies,whenappliedtoportactivities,haveassistedterminaloperatorstoreduceembedded resistance to change by granting them more freedom to build and operate entirely newfacilitiesinwhichtheyhavesucceededinintroducingnewformsofworkorganisationandemploymentpractices with less opposition from existing and embedded practices and their control by organisedlabour(Turnbull,2012).Organisationalpracticesincontainerterminalsarealsoinfluencedbynationalregulatoryprovisionsandthesystemsinplacetoachievecompliancewiththem.Bythiswemeannotonlythewiderstatesystemsand strategies to achieve economic growth, but also those aimed at social protection, including thosecovering,forexample,employmentprotection,labouradministrationandsocialwelfareaswellasthoseaddressingsafetyandhealthmorenarrowly.Despite international requirementsondockworksuchasILOConventions137and152,comparativeresearchindicatestherearelikelytobemajordifferencesinthe role of national contextual determinants of practices in dock work (see for example, Barton andTurnbull,2002)–asthereareinmostothersectors.ItcanbealsoanticipatedthesewillaffectthecontentandoperationofthosemadeforOHSspecifically(WaltersandWadsworth,2014).Recentde-regulatoryor re-regulatory trends in the governance of work and employment generally, as well as on OHSspecifically,allofwhichhavebeen introduced largely tostimulateeconomicgrowth, inmanycountriesmayhavehadfurtherandcontinuingeffectsontheroleofthesenationalcontextualinfluences.Containerterminalscanbedistinguishedbytheirfunctions,whichistoeitherserve:primarilyasgatewayportsactingas the interfacebetween thehinterlandof thecountries inwhich theyare locatedand themaritime routings of containerised cargo; or as transhipment ports for the transfer of cargoes frommaritimeroutings(NotteboomandYap,2012).Alltheterminalsinthepresentstudyweregatewayportsof one sort or another. Those in the EU were in ports primarily concerned with the inward flow ofcontainers, aswere those in one of the Asia Pacific regions studied. The EU ports and terminalswerefurther subject to the effects of EU-wide economic policies and plans concerning port and transportinfrastructure development, while those in the first Asia Pacific region mentioned were located in acountry administered federallywith a high degree of devolved autonomy at state level. The terminalsweresituatedintwodifferentstatesandsubjecttotheeffectsofbothfederalandstatepolicies.ThoseinthesecondAsiaPacificregionwerefairlyevenlybalancedintermsofinwardandoutwardmovementofcontainers. There were different national (and state/provincial) economic structures and policiesconcerningportdevelopmentinallofthecountriesinwhichtheterminalsweresituatedthatinfluencedtheir operation. This said, the over-ridingmotif of the economic and operational activities in all theterminalsand in thecompaniesoperating themwasoneof intensecompetition, towhichtheywereallhighly sensitive and which created strong and continuing pressures for increased productivity andoperationalefficiency.Aswith the position in the port industry globally, the economic policies of the countries inwhich theterminalswestudiedweresituatedandstaterequirementsconcerningrevenuesandportdevelopment,influencedtheiractivitiesandthenatureandimportanceofcompetitionwithotherportsnationallyandinternationally.Whilethegeneraldirectionofeconomicpoliciesinallthecountriesstudiedwastowardsgreater liberalisation and the removal of restrictive state controls on capacity and throughput, currentliterature indicated that ports and terminals in some countries remained subject to significantrestrictions in this respect (see for example; Hill, 2008). Increasingly demanding port securityrequirementscontributedfurtheroperationalchallengesforthespeedoftheflowofcontainersinandoutofalltheterminalsandports.

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There was considerable variation in the inland transport infrastructures to which the terminals werelinked,whichhad implications for theoperational flowsof containers.Generallyefforts to improve theefficienciesinterminalcapacityandthroughputleadtotherelocationofterminals(orthecommissioningof new ones) to new sites at some distance from the older ports and the port citieswhere theywerepreviouslysituated.Newroadandraillinkscanthenbedesignedandbuilttomaximiseefficienciesintheflowof goods to and from these relocatedornew terminals.However, all the terminals in thepresentstudywere located in older ports.While somewere increasingly in competitionwithmore favourablylocatedrivals, theiractivitieswereconstrainedbytheirphysical location,sometimesinorveryclosetoportcities,andsharedtransportationinfrastructures.Inparticular,theterminalssituatedinthesecondAsiaPacificareaweresituatedattheendsofextremelycongestedinlandtransportnetworks.Therehadbeeneffortsbythestate,theportauthoritiesandtheterminalcompaniestorelievecongestionandsomereorganisation of inland container storage and transfer had occurred in recent years (sometimes theGNTs had themselves invested in these improvements). Additionally, rail transportation supplementedthe transport infrastructure for some terminals but road transportwas theprincipalmeansofmovingcontainers,andoverallitsinfrastructureremainedpoorandwasasourceofconsiderableconcerntotheoperations management of the terminals as well as a major issue for the working conditions of theexternal truck drivers and a contributory factor to poor health and safety outcomes experienced bydriversandexposedterminalstaff,bothoutsideandinsidetheterminalsandattheinterfacebetweenthetwo.Patterns of employment and of work organisation in these establishments are therefore dynamic andsubject to the influence of changing national and global contexts as well as to the business andorganisationalstrategiesofthecompaniesinvolved.Itfollowsthatthenatureofworkhazardsandrisksto health and safetywill alsobe influencedby the combined effect of all these factors andwill changeapacewithdevelopmentswithineachof them.Amajorargument in thepresentreport, is thatbecausethesecombinationsresultindifferenteffectsindifferentcontexts,itisimportanttotakeproperaccountof them in an evaluation of arrangements to prevent work-related harm. As we outline below,unfortunatelywithonlyrareexception,mostofthelimitedliteratureonsafetymanagementincontainerportshas,todate,failedtodothis.

1.2 Healthandsafetyincontainerterminals–whatweknowfrompreviousresearch

The structural and organisational changes that have taken place in dock work as a result ofcontainerisationpresent someparadoxes for preventive health and safety. Itmight be anticipated thattheir introductionwould leadtoanoverallreduction in injuriesandcasesof ill-health intheportsthathandle containers. For those ports forwhich reliable information is available, at first sight thiswouldappeartobethecaseatleastasfarasinjuriesareconcerned(Sisson,2012).Thecompanylevelaggregatedata on injuries that were available in our previous study on container terminals also appeared tosupportthisnotionandsuggestedabroadlydownwardtrendinmanyregions.However,aswepointedoutinthatstudy,thelimitationsofthisdataweresuchthatthis,onitsown,itcouldnotbetakenasrobustevidenceofanimprovingpatternoverall(WaltersandWadsworth,2012:14).It is also not clear howmuch of this reduction is explained simply by there being fewer dockworkersemployedandhowmuch canbe attributed tomaking theirworkplaces safer.A general trend towardsreducingtheneedforheavymanuallabourthroughincreasedmechanisationoftasksformerlyconductedbyworkersmightbeexpectedtoyieldreductionininjuries.Additionally,therecenttrendtowardssemi-orcompleteautomationofcontaineroperations,alongwiththedeploymentofmanagerialstrategiestoimprovesafety, suchas systemsseparatingworkers from thevicinityofdangerousprocesses likeyardtransportand liftingoperations,mightact to reduce them further.However,despite theacknowledgedextentofchangeinthedesignandoperationofdocksideactivitiesandtheintroductionofmanagementsystemsforhealthandsafety,todatetherehasbeenlittleindependent,robuststudyoftheOHSoutcomesresulting from them. What exists, however, calls into question the widely held belief that they havenecessarily resulted in improved OHS outcomes and, in particular, suggests that the employment and

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organisationalchangesthataccompanythemmayhavegivenrisetoneworincreasedrisksofinjuryandill-health forsomeof thecurrent formsofwork incontainer terminals (see forexample,Fabianoetal.,2010;DarbraandCasal,2004).Unfortunatelythesestudies,whichattempttomeasuretrendsinreportedinjuries and at the same time take account of change in work organisation, are exceptional. Mostpublishedresearchoncontainerterminalsafetyhastendedtofocusontechnicalandengineeringdesignissuesormathematicalmodellingoftechniquesofriskanalysis(seeforexample;Mabroukietal.,2014;ShangandTseng,2010),whichgenerallydonotengagewiththelivedworkexperiencesoftheterminalworkers. Other published research has focused on soft issues of safety culture and leadership (see forexampleShangandLu,2009).Thisworktendstoreflectasimilarinterestinbehaviouralapproachestosafety that are predominant in the industry and pays scant attention to either their organisationalcontextsoroutcomes.Thelimitedapproachestounderstandingtheconsequencesforworkers’healthandsafetyofstructural,organisational and employment changes in terminals is unfortunate in the light of the large body ofevidence on the OHS consequences of these changes in other sectors. This research suggests thatoperating with a reduced and casualised workforce, with agency, contractor and directly employedworkersengagedon thesameworksite, isassociatedwith increasedvulnerability toaccidents, injuriesand ill-health (see Quinlan et al. (2001) and Quinlan and Bohle (2008) for reviews of the researchevidence).SuchchangespresentparticularchallengestothedeliveryofbestpracticeinOHSmanagementbecause they undermine many of the preconditions for its success – such as arrangements forcommunicationsbetweenmanagementandallworkers;co-ordinationandcontrol;andeffectiveworkerparticipation (Walters et al., 2013). There is a substantial body of research and writing on workingconditions and labour relations in modern container terminals (see above) which provides somecircumstantial evidence that the forms of work organisation and employment practices used by bothglobal and national companies in terminal operation may not be the most supportive of scenarios inwhich to deliver effective strategies to improve safety or health outcomes for workers. But, with theexceptionoftheresearchbyFabianoandhiscolleaguesreferredtoabove,thereislittlerobustempiricalstudy of the impact of these issues on the health and safety of terminal workers. It was with thisobservation in mind that we carried out our preliminary study of management arrangements for thehealth and safety ofworkers in globalised container terminals in different parts of theworld in 2011(WaltersandWadsworth,2012).Thefollowingsectionbrieflysummarisestherelevantfindingsfromthepreviousstudyandnotestheirimplicationsforthepresentresearch

1.3 Indicativefindingsfromthepreliminarystudy

Our previous study examined arrangements for managing health and safety in container terminalsoperatedbyfourlargeGlobalNetworkTerminal(GNT)operatorsintwohigh-incomecountriesinEuropeand in one middle-income country in Asia. Its aims were to explore the extent to which thesearrangements exemplified best practice and the perceptions of workers, their representatives andmanagersconcerningtheireffectiveness.Wesoughttoexplorehowthepoliciesandpracticesadoptedbythe GNTs took account of the effects of the restructuring of work and employment on OHS. As notedabove, the study was a preliminary one and the limitations of the time and resources available toundertake it meant that the data collection was limited to interviews with a small number (usuallyaround 20) of workers, their representatives and managers in each of the (6) terminals studied,supportedwithdocumentaryanalysisofOHSarrangementsandoutcomesamongthecompaniesandinthe terminals concerned, along with a small questionnaire-based global scoping study of trade unionrespondents. Despite itsmethodological limitations, the study produced indicative findings concerningperceptions of risks to health and safety and how they were managed at the global level and in theterminals in different locations, including arrangements for monitoring and feedback and those tofacilitateworkerrepresentationandconsultation.Respondents identified risks to health arising from the physical environment, including safety risksassociatedwithpoorworkplaceinfrastructure,andrisksarisingfrominadequateinformationconcerningthepossiblehazardousnatureof thecontentsofcontainers.Perceptionsof risksarising fromthework

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activitieswithinterminalswerealsofrequentlyarticulated.Thatis,riskswereperceivedtobeassociatedwiththeoperationalactivitiesinvolvedinloadingandunloadingshipsandthestorageandtransportationofcontainers.Althoughtherisksofheavyphysicalworkwerelessenedbythemechanisationof loadingandunloadingoperations,forsomeworkers,suchaslashers,theyremainedsignificant.Therewererisksseen to be involved in coming into contact with moving machinery and vehicles as well as thoseassociatedwithfallingobjectsandfallsfromheight.Increasedpaceandintensityofworknecessitatedbythe faster turn-around times in container ports was perceived by workers to increase the risks ofaccidents which, in some cases, they felt was exacerbated bymanning levels being adequate only for‘normal’ operational conditions. Risk of accidentswas also raised by pressure to increase ormaintainhigh productivity levels. Alongwith poor ergonomic design and long shift patterns,workers and theirrepresentatives believed this also increased the experience of musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs).Intensification of work was also associated with the risk of fatigue and in some cases with increasedstressaswell.There were differences of quality and scale in the risks perceived to be significant by participants interminals in high income countries compared with those in the lower-middle-income economy1 westudied. For example, risks associated with poor workplace equipment and infrastructure were morecommonly identifiedbyworkers in the latter country,who inadditiongenerally experiencedagreaterlevelofriskscommontobothhighandlower-middle-incomeeconomyterminals,suchasthoseresultingfromincreasedworkintensity.Thecontractorworkforce,whichisgenerallyproportionallyquitelargeinterminals inpoorercountries,wasregardedasbeingmorevulnerabletotheserisksthanweredirectlyemployedworkers-whichisconsistentwithresearchonOHSandcontractorsmoregenerally.Thereappeared tobeabroadsimilarity in theoverall strategies formanagingOHS inall the terminalsstudied, that were best characterised as behaviour-based approaches to achieving improved OHSperformance.Whiletheyalldisplayedsomefeaturestosuggesttheyhadbeenadaptedtolocalconditions,the companies determined the overall character of the safety management systems in place in eachterminal globally. Features in common included overall responsibility for safety being vested in theterminal’sseniormanagement–withaccountabilitytothecompanyglobally;asafetydepartmentintheterminal,chargedwithsupportingthedeliveryofasystemrolledoutatgloballevelandadaptedtosuitlocalconditions;strongemphasisonachieving improved ‘safetyculture’ throughbehaviourchange, thelatter exemplified by emphasis on the issue andwearing of PPE, training packages emphasising rulesconcerningsafeworkingprocedures,especiallythosedesignedtoseparateworkersfromthehazardsofmoving vehicles andmachinery on the terminal yards, systems for ensuring compliance through peermonitoring,supervisionandsoon;incidentandaccidentinvestigationandreportingprocedures;furtherproceduresforidentifyingandcommunicatingsafetyfailures;anddocumentedriskassessments,methodstatementsandstandardoperatingprocedures.AtthegloballevelthetradeunionrespondentsinthestudywelcomedtheengagementoftheGNTswithhealth and safety management. However, they were frequently critical of the systems introduced interminals as a result, suggesting they represented superficial and limited ways of tackling the OHSconsequences of drives to improve productivity performance and reformwork organisation, that theybelieved constitutedmany of the underlying causes of the accidents and ill-health experienced at theterminals.Theyarguedthatthehealthandsafetymanagementarrangementsinplacedidlittletopreventworkers feelingobliged to takerisks tomeetproductivityexpectations, that theyhadno impacton thework organisation issues causing fatigue, stress or musculoskeletal disorders, and that they wereperniciousinthewaytheylaidblameforsafetyfailingsonworkers,whoseemploymentwasprecariousandwhotriedtocarryoutactivitiesinwayssoasnottojeopardisetheirfragileemploymentsecurity.Workersandtheirrepresentativesintheterminalssharedtheseconcerns.Whilemostbroadlyapprovedofmanagerial initiatives to improve the ‘safety culture’of the terminalorganisation throughbehaviourchangestrategiesandeffortstobemoresystematicwithsafetymanagement,theyconveyedtheirsenseof the limitations of these approaches – especiallywith regard to their ability to reach the underlying

1 As defined by the World Bank 2015: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups

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causesofthework-relatedhealthrisks.Therewasalsoacleardistinction,particularlyintheterminalsinthe lower-middle-income country, between the effects of the approaches to health and safetymanagementasexperiencedbythedirectlyemployedworkforceandtheeffectsofthesameapproachesforthecontractorworkforce.Reportingarrangementsforaccidentsandincidentswereoftenregardedaslimitedintheireffectivenessbyworkersandtheirrepresentativesandparticularlywithregardtothosefor contractors and their workers. Again, there were differences in the experiences of respondents interminals located inhigh-incomecountriesand those in the lower-middle-incomecountry,withbetter-developedarrangementspresentintheterminalsintheformercountries.The experience of arrangements forworker representation and consultation on health and safetywasmixed.Again,thereweremarkeddifferencesbetweenpracticesinterminalsinhigh-incomecountriesandthose in the lower-middle-income country in the study, as well as differences between arrangementscoveringthedirectlyemployedworkforceandthoseofcontractors’workers.Thosefordirectlyemployedworkersinterminalsinhighincomecountrieswerethebestdeveloped,butevenheretheywereattimessomewhere short of the relevant requirements of national regulatory provisions. A critical differencebetween arrangements in these terminals and those in the lower-middle-income country studied wasfoundintheirdepthandformality,whichstronglyaffectedboththeirfunctionsandsustainability.Intheterminals in the lower-middle-income economy we studied, for example, while there was a generalallowancemadebythemanagementforworkers’representation,inrealitysuchrepresentationwasnotconsistent and the limited facilities to support it did not allow the representatives themselvesopportunityforsustainedengagementwithinvestigation,inspection,involvementinriskassessmentsorwithconsultationonchangesatworkandotheractivitiesconventionallyassociatedwithgoodpracticeinworkerrepresentationandconsultationonhealthandsafety.IneachoftheaboveareasofOHSmanagement,participantspointedtoissuesimplicitinthestructureandorganisationofwork,which fell outside thearrangements tomanageorbe consultedonOHS,orwereimpervioustothem.Theyalsoarguedthatinrelationtooutsourcingandcontractingoutespecially,thesamestructuralandorganisationalelementsnotonlymadeOHSmanagementmorechallenging,theyalsomaderegulatoryenforcementmoredifficult.Ineachofthesecases,theexperiencewasdifferentandfelttobemoreextremeintheterminalsinthemiddle-incomeeconomy.Thesefindingsthrowsomelightonhowworkersandtheirrepresentativesfeltabouttheconsequencesfortheirhealth,safetyandwelfareofchangesinthestructureandorganisationofworkandemploymentexperiencedincontainerterminals.Theyaresuggestiveofwhatmightbeexpectedgivenwhatisknownabouttheconsequencesofsimilarchangesinothersectorsandaddweighttofindings,suchasthoseofFabiano et al. (2010),which indicate that containerisation has not necessarilymade theseworkplacessaferandhealthierforeveryonewhoworksinthem.Theyare,however,onlyindicativefindingssince,aswehavemadeclear,theconstraintsoftimeandresourcespreventedamorerobuststudy.Forthisreasonin thepresent studywehavechosen to revisit the terminalswestudiedpreviously, alongwith severaladditional terminalswe did not study, in order to explore these indications in greater depth.We alsobroadened the scope of the study in some countries to include some terminals operated by nationalterminaloperators,aswellasthoseoperatedbythemainGNTs.

1.4 Theaimsofthepresentstudy

Putsimply,existingknowledgeoftheoccupationalhealthandsafetyconsequencesofworkincontainerterminalsissuggestiveoftrendsintwooppositedirections.Ontheonehand, itseemsclear that thechangeswroughtbycontainerisationmeanthat theheavyanddangerousphysicalworkundertakenbydockworkershasbeensubstantiallyreduced.Themuchreducedworkforcewithin the terminals not onlywork in environments inwhichmany of theirwork risks arereduced compared with previously, but the physical nature of these environments and the resourcesavailabletothelargecompaniesthatoperatethemalsocontributetothepossibilityofagreaterdegreeofsystematicmanagementoftheremainingriskstooccupationalhealthandsafetyincontainerterminals.

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There would seem to be some evidence of this in the improving injury and fatality rates claimed byterminaloperatingcompanies,althoughthedatahereareacknowledgedtobeinsufficientlyrobust.Ontheotherhand,atthesametime,theover-ridingconcernforspeedandcost-efficiencyinthehighlycompetitivebusinessenvironmentthatcharacterisescontainertransporthasledtotheadoptionofworkandemploymentpracticesthatahostofresearchstudiesinothersectorshaveidentifiedascontributingto poor health and safety outcomes – with disproportionately high levels of fatigue, stress andmusculoskeletaldisorderscontributingbothtopoorerhealthoutcomesandtoincreasedrisksofunsafeincidents and consequent injuries, aswell as to reduction inwelfare amongworkers in these sectors.Moreover, the business and employment practices adopted by many terminal operators for the samereasonsofcostefficiency, seek tooutsourceworkand lead tosituations inwhicha largeproportionofworkers in some container terminals are contractor labour.While these practices are known to affectboth the reporting and regulation of OHS outcomes, research in other sectors indicates theseworkersoftenexperiencepoorerworkingconditionsthanthosewhoaredirectlyemployedinthesameworksite.At the same time it is further acknowledged that it is often more difficult to deliver effectivearrangements formanagingandmonitoringworkers’healthandsafety in thecomplexworkplaces thataretheresultofthesebusinessandemploymentpractices.Astheprevioussectionshavemadeclear,indicationsofthisparadoxicalsituationhavebeenfoundinthelimitedresearchconductedonhealthandsafetyoutcomesincontainerterminals(suchasthatofFabianoetal.,2010).Theywere furtherevident in the resultsofourpreliminarystudy.Theaimof thepresentstudy, therefore, was to investigate these indications withmore in-depth and systematic research. Toachievethiswesoughttoaddressfivemainresearchquestions:

• HowandtowhatextentdothebusinessstrategiesandmanagementpoliciesofmajorglobalandnationalcontainerterminaloperatorstakeaccountoftheOHSofworkersinvolvedinthetransferofcontainers?

• What are their specific strategies for addressing health and safety management in container

terminalsandhoweffectivearethey?

• Whataredockworkers’OHSexperiencesofthesestrategies?

• How do these experiences compare in GNT terminals situated in different countries and interminalsthatareoperatedbylargenationaloperators?

• Whatdetermines the featuresof thehealthandsafetyarrangements inplace in thesedifferent

situations andwhat are the implications of this for good practice in improving the health andsafetyexperienceforworkersincontainerterminalsglobally?

To address these questions, the present study took as its central interest the operation in selectedterminals of workplace health and safety policies, strategies and arrangements adopted by the fourlargestGNToperatingcompanies.Inadditiontorevisitingthesameterminalsasinthepreviousstudy,tobroadenthereachofthestudythenumberoftheseGNTterminalsstudiedinthemiddleincomecountrywas increased, another terminal from a third high-income country was added, and two terminalsoperatedbynationalcompaniesintwoofthehighincomecountrieswerealsoincludedforcomparativepurposes.Inalltheseterminalsthepresentstudyexploredtheindicationsofthepreviousstudyfurther,withabroaderandmorein-depthanalysisoftheexperienceofhealthandsafetyarrangementsusingamixed-methodapproach inwhichqualitativemethods similar to thoseemployed in theprevious studywere integratedwith a quantitativequestionnaire-based survey and a detailed analysis of thenationalregulatoryandsocio-economiccontexts inwhich the terminalsaresituatedand inwhich theyoperate.These instrumentswereused togatherdataenabling furtherexplorationofworkers’healthandsafetyexperiences,therelationshipoftheseexperienceswiththesystemsinplacetomanagetheirhealthandsafety,aswellaswiththestructureandorganisationofworkintheterminalsinwhichthesesystemsand

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outcomes occur. The research additionally examined the moderating effects of different national andlabourrelations’contextsuponthesesystems,practicesandoutcomesintheterminalsconcerned.In the present research, we have first sought to understand the strategies and systems in place formanaging workers’ health, safety and welfare through scrutiny of company documentation andqualitative interviewswith senior personnelwith responsibility for safety and health at company andterminal levels. We have further examined available company data concerning the health and safetyoutcomesattheselevels.We probed workers’ experiences of these strategies and systems with a more systematic and robustinvestigationfacilitatedbytheuseofaquestionnaire-basedsurveyofasampleofworkersinvolvedwithkey operations in each terminal, in combinationwith further qualitative interviewswithworkers andtheirrepresentatives.Thisapproachhelpedelicitamorerobustunderstandingofthework-relatedhealthand safety experiences of dockworkers in container terminals globally. For example, the questionnairecontained a section on the experience of work safety in which we sought information concerningrespondents’experiencesinrelationtoperceivedworkrisks,personalinjuriesandincidentsthatmighthave led to injury,aswellas theconsequencesofsuch injuriesor incidents in termsofreporting themandtakingtimeoff.Anothersectiondealtwithexperiencesofwork-relatedill-health.Aswellasseekinginformationconcerning itsnatureandoccurrence in thecontainer terminals it alsoaskedabout takingtimeoffasaconsequenceofwork-related ill-health. Ina furthersectionweaskedaseriesofquestionsdesignedtoelicit informationconcerningparticular formsof ill-healthexperiencedbyworkers,suchasfatigueandstress,aswellasabout theworkpatternsandwork intensity thatmightcontributetosuchoutcomes. In thisway our questionnairewas aimed at generating information to enable us to inquirefurther into indicative findings on these matters in the previous study and gain a more robustunderstanding of the occurrence and causes of the health effects highlighted in the interviews in thepreviousstudy.It will be recalled that, in the previous study, participants among the workers and workers’representativesweinterviewedtoldusoftheirconcernswithmanagementstrategiesonmanninglevels,workintensity,shiftpatternsandsoon,thattheyfeltcontributedtopoorsafetyandhealthoutcomesinavariety of operational situations. In addition, workers and their representatives, especially from theterminals in the lower-middle-income country we studied, identified the precariousness of theiremployment and that of others as among the reasons for poor safety and health outcomes. Theyespecially pointed to the differences between the work conditions experienced by directly employedworkers and those employed by contractors. In the present, study we designed our sampling, surveyinstrumentsandinterviewschedulestoexplorethesemattersmorefully.Forexample,thequestionnairesoliciteddetailsoftheorganisationofrespondents’employmentandwork,including,employer,jobtype,shiftpatterns,breaks,workintensity,paymentsystemsandstaffinglevels.Wewerethusabletocomparea range of experiences of health and safety management; experiences of arrangements for workorganisationandtheirhealthandsafetyconsequences;andwewereabletodothesethingsforworkersdoingdifferentjobs,indifferentterminalsandamongthosewhoweredirectlyandindirectlyemployed.Turning tomanagementarrangements forhealthandsafety in the terminals ina littlemoredetail, thefindings from theprevious study suggested that thesearrangementswereessentiallybehaviour-based.Althoughoveralltheywereregardedfavourablybymanagersandworkersalike,thereweresuggestionsthattheywerelimitedinseveralrespects.Theseincluded,theextenttowhichtheyaddressedhealthandsafety concerns associated with work organisation issues and those where corrective action mightrequiresignificantfinancialinvestment.Theyalsoexhibitedconsiderablevariationintheextenttowhichthey supported participative approaches to health and safety management. Here again a morecomprehensiveandrobustpictureoftheperceivedstrengthsandweaknessesofthesearrangementshasbeen undertaken in the present study through the use and analysis of theworker survey in all of theterminalsstudied.Thequestionnaireaddressedtheworkers’experiencesof thesearrangementswithaseriesofquestionsconcerningtheprovisionofhealthandsafetyinformationandtraining,accessto,andknowledgeof,thesystemsandarrangementsinplaceformanaginghealthandsafety,assessingriskandmonitoringoutcomesaswellasquestionsconcerningtheexperienceofconsultationandrepresentation

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onallthesematters.Datagatheredfromthesurveyhavebeenanalysedtakingaccountofthatobtainedon the same matters from qualitative interviews with workers and their representatives in all theterminals.Thisallowedustocomparetheoutcomeofthisprocesswiththatderivedfromcompanyandterminalmanagementsourcesconcerningthearrangementsinplace.Thusarobustassessmenthasbeenmadeofthenatureandoperationofthesehealthandsafetymanagementarrangementsaswellastheirstrengthsandlimitationsinpractice.While it was not the intention of the study to compare performances between terminals or betweencompanies directly, in terms of understanding the reasons for variation in the experience of OHSarrangements,wehavefounditinstructivetobeabletocomparetheseexperiencesindifferentlocations,betweendifferentworkgroupsandbetweenworkerswithdifferentcontractualarrangements for theiremployment. For example, as the previous section made clear, our preliminary study indicated therewereconsiderabledifferencesbetweentheperceptionofworkplacehealthandsafetyarrangementsandoutcomes among directly employedworkers and among contractworkers – especially in terminals inpoorercountries.Ourextendeddatacollectioninthepresentstudy–particularlytheuseoftheworkersurveyonsamplesofoperationalworkersinalltheterminalswestudied–allowedmorecomprehensiveand reliable comparative analysis of thesematters.This in turn enabled some reflectionon the roleofoutsourcingandtheuseofcontractorsinthestructureandorganisationofworkincontainerterminalsandtheirconsequencesforhealthandsafetyarrangements,practicesandtheiroutcomes.Italsoallowedustocomparemoreeffectivelytheexperiencesofdifferentcategoriesofworkers(suchaslashers,craneoperators,truckdriversandsoon)inthesameanddifferentterminals.Itfurtherallowedustodiscuss,inlaterChaptersofthereport,theextenttowhichthecompaniesinvolvedinthisstudyhavebeenabletousemanagementstrategiesadoptedinothersectorstoincreaseleverageoncontractorsandminimisetheharmfuleffectsofthesepracticesonthehealth,safetyandwelfareoftheirworkers.Ourmethods alsomeanwe have been able to explore reasons for possible gaps between the aims ofsafetymanagementsystemsinplacebothgloballyandwithinterminalsandthereportedexperiencesandexpectationsofworkersinacomparativeway,becauseinadditiontodatacollectioninsidetheterminals,inthepresentstudywehavealsouseddatafromoutsidetheterminals.Therearetwomainsources.Ontheonehand,wehaveobtaineddocumentarymaterialoncompanyOHSstrategiesfromthreeofthefourGNTcompaniesinthestudyandundertakensecondaryanalysisofOHSperformancedatatheyprovided.We have enhanced this analysis with that of detailed qualitative interviews with senior companypersonnelwithresponsibilityforhealth,safetyandtheenvironmentcarriedoutattheglobalHeadOfficesofthreeGNTcompaniesandtwoofthenationalcompaniesinthestudy.Ontheotherhand,ineachofthecountries inwhich the terminalswestudiedare located,wehavecarriedout interviewswith themainregulatory agencies responsible for ensuring that terminal operations are in compliancewith nationalregulatoryrequirementsonhealthandsafetyindock-workandotherrelevantnationallabourstandardsondock-work.Throughthisapproachwewereabletoexaminetherelationshipbetweencompanystrategiesandthoseofnationalregulatorycontexts.Wehavefurtherdevelopedthiscomparativeapproachwithareviewofthe relevant literature on regulation and labour relations in dock-work in each country and wherenecessarywehaveundertakenfurtherinterviewswithkeyinformantsincludingtradeunionofficialsandothers with relevant contextual information. In this way we have explored some of the contextualdeterminantsof thevariationsweobservedinboththepreviousandthepresentstudyinmanagementandwork practices in terminals situated in different countries. This approach allowed us to return toaddressing the first of our research questions concerning the relationship between the managementpoliciesofmajorglobalandnationalcontainerterminaloperatorsandtheoccupationalsafety,healthandwelfare of their workers and it provided a better understanding of the importance of situational andcontextualinfluencesonOHSmanagementanditsoutcomes.

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1.5 Outlineofthereport

Chapter 2 of this report provides a detailed description of the methods we used to undertake ourresearch. It includes a further elaboration of the rationale for the mixed-method approach used, anoutlineofourquantitative,qualitativeandcontextualmethods,includingourapproachtoreviewingtheliteratureandusingdocumentarydatafromcompaniesandothersources,ourfieldresearchinstruments,theterminalsandcountriesselected,ourapproachtosamplingandadministrationoftheworkersurvey,and the qualitative interviews used in the study. We further describe the methods we used for bothquantitativeandqualitativedataanalysisandoutlinetheproceduresweadoptedtoensurethestudymetthecodeofresearchethicsrequiredbyCardiffUniversity.Chapters 3 and 4 provide an account of our findings. In Chapter 3 we start with the governance andmanagementofoccupationalhealthandsafetyinthecompaniesandterminalswestudiedbasedonouranalysis of company documentation and interviews with company and terminal management andsupervisors.Ourrespondentsincludedseniorcompanyandterminalmanagementwithresponsibilityforoperationsandforsafetyandhealth,aswellassupervisors.Weoutlinethecharacterofthearrangementsfor implementingcompanystrategiesonhealthandsafetyandthesystemsinplace for itsdeliveryandprovideanaccountoftheiroperation,asperceivedbythecompanyandterminalmanagement.Wealsoconsider trends in the available company data concerning the health and safety outcomes of thesearrangements and, as far as it is possible to do so, compare these trends with the findings of otherresearchonhealthandsafetyoutcomesincontainerterminals.InChapter4wegiveanaccountofthefindingsfromourquestionnairesurveyintheterminalswehavestudied. We begin with a descriptive account of our findings largely drawn from the analysis of thesurvey.Wegoontoanalysethesefindingsinfurtherdetail,todevelopsomecompositesofourvariablesto enable us to show more clearly the variation between the experiences in terminals in differentcountries, in different jobs and between workers in different modes of employment. We use ourqualitativeinterviewstoexplorethedetailofthesedifferencesinmoredepth.Chapters3and4thereforeprovideempiricalmaterialforfurtherdiscussioninChapter5.Inthischapterweseektoexplore,inthewayswehavedescribedabove,theexperienceofworkanditsmanagementintheterminalsandevaluatetheextenttowhichtheevidenceofthepresentstudycorroboratesorqualifiesthedisconnectsbetweensafetymanagementandworkers’healthandsafetyexperiencessuggestedininourpreviousstudy.Weevaluatetheextenttowhichthepresentstudyisabletothrowfurtherlightonthesupportsandconstraintsofeffectivepreventivehealthandsafetyincontainerterminalsgenerally.Thisleadstothefinalsubstantivechapterinthereportinwhich,inthelightofourfindings,wediscusswhatdeterminesthehealthandsafetyoutcomesandexperiencesofworkersincontainerterminals.Todothis,weplaceournationalfindingswithintheirwidereconomic,labourrelationsandregulatorycontexts.Weevaluatetheimpactofthesecontextsonthehealthandsafetyexperienceswehaveobserved.We end with conclusions concerning our findings overall and suggest some areas in which furtherimprovementsinarrangementsforthehealth,safetyandwellbeingofworkersemployedintheoperationofcontainerterminalsworldwidemightbeconsidered.

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2.ResearchMethods

Thissectiondescribes themethodsand instrumentsused incollecting thedata for thisprojectand theapproaches taken to its analysis. As the research builds on and extends themethodological approachtakeninourpreliminaryproject,(WaltersandWadsworth,2012),wesummarisethemethodswithwhichweconductedtheearlierwork.

2.1 Summaryofthepreliminaryproject’smethodologicalapproach

The aim of the preliminary study was to explore both qualitative and quantitative indicators of goodpractice inparticipativeapproaches tomanagingOHS inGNT-operatedcontainer terminals.Weusedamixed-methodsapproachtocarryoutatwo-level investigation.First,attheglobal level,wecarriedoutbothaquestionnairesurveyoftradeunionrepresentativesandasetofsemi-structuredinterviewswithasub-groupofthoserepresentatives.Wesought informationonhealthandsafetypolicies,strategiesandperformancefromtheheadquartersofthreeofthefourlargestGNTs2.Second,attheworkplacelevel,wecarried out six case studies in terminals operated by the four largest GNTs. In each case study weinterviewed key members of the management team, as well as workers and their representatives. Inaddition,werequestedterminallevelinformationonOHSstrategiesandperformance.Thepreliminaryproject,therefore,collectedquantitativeandqualitativedatagloballyandattheterminallevel.Thequestionnairedatawereusedindicativelyandinconjunctionwiththegloballevelinterviewstodescribetradeunionrepresentatives’perceptionsofthepresenceandeffectivenessofparticipativeOHSmanagement practices and prevailingworking and employment conditions in GNT-operated terminalsgenerally.This,coupledwiththegloballevelOHSperformancedata3,providedabackdroptothedetailedprofilesofthesixcasestudyterminals.Their inclusionofbothmanagementandworkers’perspectives,andcoverageofhighandmiddleincomeeconomies,allowedthepreliminarystudytoconsiderhowandatwhatlevelOHSmanagementinthecasestudyterminalswasdetermined,howitwasputintopracticeandhowitwasexperiencedbythoseitwasintendedtosafeguard,aswellastomakesomecomparisonsbetween GNT-run terminals operating in different economic and labour relations contexts andcircumstances.

2.2 Datacollectionandliteraturereview

Weundertookacomprehensivereviewof theresearch literatureonhealthandsafetyarrangements incontainerterminals,regulatoryprovisionsinthecountriesstudiedandtheeconomicandlabourrelationscontexts in which the terminals we studied were situated. In so doing, we considered trends in thedevelopmentofcontainerterminalsasoneelementinthereorganisationandrestructuringofdockworkgloballyinrecentdecades.In terms of data collection, the current study used a similarmixed-methods approach to build on thefindingsofourpreliminaryproject.OurintentionwastoextendthescopeoftheresearchbycarryingoutcasestudiesinmoreterminalsandincludingtwoterminalsrunbynationaloperatorsratherthanGNTsaswellasa furthertwomiddle incomeeconomyGNT-runterminals.Weincreasedthereachanddepthofthe researchbycarryingout surveysofworkers inall theparticipating terminals – including thosewestudiedinthepreliminaryprojectandthosethatwerenewtothecurrentstudy.

2 GNTs were initially approached through the ITF, which had established working relationships with the leaders of these companies. No such relationship existed with the fourth GNT at the time of either the preliminary or the current project. 3 These data, in practice, were limited and difficult to compare so were used purely descriptively.

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Data were collected at three levels. At the global or corporate level, we approached the safetydepartments in the headquarters of the three GNTs that provided data to the preliminary study4 andrequested furtherandupdated informationaboutOSHperformance(globallyorcorporately, regionallyand for the participating terminals) and about their strategic approaches to OHS management andgovernance,andthebusiness levelheadquartersofoneof thenationaloperators5.Tosupportandgainincreased understanding of these documentary and quantitative data and their provenance, weconducted semi-structured interviewswith those responsible for occupational health and safety at thecorporatelevelwhereverpossible.Forallsixcompaniesoperatingthecasestudyterminals,weobtainedpubliclyavailablematerialon theseareas.At thenational level,wecarriedout furthersemi-structuredinterviewswithkey informants, such as representativesof relevant inspectorates andport authorities.These interviews were designed to provide data on the national legislative, labour relations, socio-economicandotherrelevantcontextsinwhichtheterminalswereoperating.Lastlyattheterminallevel,datacollectionwasapproachedintwoways.Withinthesixterminalsthatparticipatedinthepreliminaryproject, we carried out surveys of the workforce but only carried out interviews if there were keypersonnelwho,becauseoftimerestrictions,hadbeenunabletotakepartinthepreliminarystudy.Intheterminalsthatwerenewtotheproject,inadditiontotheworkforcesurveys,semi-structuredinterviewswere carried outwithmanagers,workers and their representatives, to provide full datasets on all thecasestudyterminals.

2.2.1 Researchinstruments

Thesurveyschedules,interviewguides,participantinformationsheets,consentformsandprojectflyersusedinthestudyweredraftedanddesignedinaccordancewiththerigorousethicalstandardsrequiredbyCardiffUniversityandusingtheresearchteam’ssubstantialpreviousexperienceandparticularlythatgained in the preliminary project. The ITF and union officials from a number of the participatingterminals commentedonand tested the survey scheduleswithvolunteers, and their comments, adviceandrecommendationsweretakenintoaccountinthefinalinstruments.Thesurveysandinterviewguidescovered:OHSperformance,outcomesandexperiencesintermsofbothsafetyandhealth;OHSmanagement, includingsafetypracticesandworkingarrangements;andworkerrepresentation, consultation and involvement (see Appendix). For the interview guides, the detail andcoverage of these areaswere altered to fit the respondent’s background andposition (e.g. focusing onmanagement practices among representatives of terminals’ management teams, on individualexperiencesofOHSanditsmanagementamongworkers,andonnationalrequirements,monitoringandenforcement arrangements in relation to, for example, participation among national level keyinformants).

2.2.2 Globalandnationalleveldatacollection

Approachestoterminaloperatingcompaniesweremadeattheheadquarterslevel.Allsuchapproaches,aswell as those to key informants at the national level,weremade directly by the research team andwherever possible through contacts established by the research team during the preliminary project.Interviewswerecarriedoutface-to-face.

2.2.3 Terminalleveldatacollection–thecasestudies

For each of the participating terminals, regardless of whether or not they had been involved in thepreliminary project, consent for the case study was sought from the headquarters of the companyoperatingtheterminal(theGNTorthenationaloperator),fromthemostseniormanagerattheterminaland from the union officialswithin the terminalswhere unionswere active.Members of the research

4The fourth GNT was also approached at the corporate level but did not respond. 5 The other national operator was approached but declined.

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team spent several days in each participating terminal carrying out the fieldwork. This involved bothinterviewingandrunningand/orfacilitatingthesurveys.In each terminal, a questionnaire survey of the operationalworkforcewas carried out. Thenumber ofworkers targeted in each terminal varied for pragmatic reasons, butwe aimed to achieve a completedquestionnaire from between 15% and 50% of the workforce in each terminal. Our ideal approach toquestionnaire distribution was for the terminal’s management and union officials to agree to allowresearch teammembers toadminister thequestionnaire togroupsofworkersduringabreakorat thestartorendofashift.Thiswasnotalwayspossibleorpermitted,sovariousotherapproacheswerealsoused including: administration to individuals by research team members and/or workers’representativesinrestareasontheterminalsonanadhocbasis;andadministrationtogroupsofworkersby research teammembers and/orunionofficials outside the terminals andoutsideworkinghoursbyarrangementwiththeunionofficials.In some terminals,wewere also able to carry out a diary survey of limited groups ofworkers. Thesesurveyswereintendedtocollectworkers’experiencesoveranormalsetofshiftstogiveanindicationofday-to-dayworkplacehealthandsafety.Thisinvolvedworkerscompletingabriefsetofmeasuresbeforethestartofeachoneoftheirnormalsetofshifts.Weaimedtocollect10diariesfromeachoftwogroupsofworkers(byjobtype)fromeachterminalinwhichthediarysurveyswerecarriedout.Wherepossible,membersof theresearchteamintroducedthediarysurveytoparticipantsat thestartof theirworkingweekandcollectedtheschedulesbackfromthemattheendoftheirworkingweek.Wherethiswasnotpossible, for a variety of reasons, research team members briefed workers’ representatives or unionofficialsinthediarysurveyadministration.All the case study interviewsand surveysused theappropriate language for theareaandaccountwastakenoflocalterminologyandarrangementsintheguidesandschedules.

2.2.4 Ethicalapproval

EthicalapprovalforthedesignandmethodsusedintheprojectwasobtainedfromtheCardiffUniversitySchool of Social Sciences Research Ethics committee. After participants’ informed consent had beenobtained,interviewswerecarriedoutface-to-faceandwererecordedwhereverpossible.Therecordingswere transcribed and the transcriptions anonymised. Questionnaire and diary data were collectedanonymously(noidentifyingdatawererequested)andserialnumbersweregiventoquestionnairesanddiariesaftertheywerereturnedtotheresearchteam.Alldata(qualitativeandquantitative)werestoredinaccordancewiththerigorousstandardsrequiredbyCardiffUniversity.

2.3 Dataanalysis

Qualitativedatawerecodedusinga thematic frameworkandanalysed inNVIVOsoftware.QuantitativesurveydatawereanalysedusingbivariateandmultivariatetechniquesinSPSSsoftware.Ineachcase,theanalysesweredesignedtoconsiderandexploreOHSmanagementandperformanceexperiences,tomakecomparisonsbetweenregionsandeconomiesandbetweenworkersgroupedaccordingtotheir jobandemployment types. Quantitative OHS performance data have again been used purely descriptivelybecauseoftheirrelativelylimitednatureandproblemsofcomparability.

2.4 Participants

In total, case studies were carried out in 11 terminals. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 give details of the surveyparticipants and the interview participants respectively. Overall, 1849 dockworkers completed aquestionnaireand120completedadiary(Table2.1). Inaddition,178peopletookpart inaninterview,

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including76aspartofthecurrentproject6.ThisincludesthecasestudyandkeyinformantintervieweesdetailedinTable2.2,andthe8globallevelintervieweesrepresentingthesafetyteamsofGNTs1(N=1),2(N=1)and3(N=6).Our survey sampling strategy was intended to achieve representative numbers of respondents in keyoperationalpositionsineachterminal.Ideallyitaimedfor50%oftheoperationalworkforce.Inpractice,however,thiswasonlypracticalandpossibleintheterminalswithfewerworkers,sotargetsvariedfrom15-50%. As shown in Table 2.1, returns came close to these targets in most cases and significantlyexceededthemin twocases. Inone terminal inwhichreturns fell substantiallyshortofour target, thiswastheresultoflimitedco-operationfromtheterminalmanagement.

Table2.1:Questionnaireanddiarysurveyrespondents

AREA TERMINAL QUESTIONNAIRES %OFTARGET %OFWORKFORCE DIARIES

ASIAPACIFC

AP2T2 420 140 39 34

AP2T1 57 29 8 30

AP2T3 102 68 18 NA

AP2T4 196 196 37 4

AP1T1 221 67 34 25

AP1T2 169 91 46 9

EUROPE

EU1T1 363 97 48 NA

EU1T2 13 65 65 NA

EU2T1 60 46 12 NA

EU2T2 185 62 9 18

EU2T3 75 81 41 NA

TOTAL 1849* 85 25 120

*Includes2questionnaires from theEuropearea1 forwhich the terminal the respondentworkedat couldnotbeidentified.

6There was less than two years between the interviews for the current study and those carried out during the preliminary project, with current study interviewees asked about any changes that had taken place between the two projects. As our findings show, there was generally little change during this period and the more recent interviews corroborated all the main findings of those carried out as part of the preliminary project.

35

Table2.2:Interviewparticipants(Generalinformation)

INTERVIEWS PRELIMINARY CURRENT

MANAGEMENT 44 17

WORKERS 50 34

KEYINFORMANTS 8 25

TOTAL 102 76

OVERALL 178

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Table2.3:Interviewparticipants(DetailedInformation)

AREA ASIAPACIFIC

TERMINALS AP2T1 AP2T2 AP2T3 AP2T4 AP1T1 AP1T2

INTERVIEW

EES

MAN

AGEM

ENT

CURRENTPROJECT

3representingsafetyandhuman

resourcesdepartments

4representingtheoperations,

engineeringandsafety

departments

2representingtheoperationsandsafetydepartments 1representingthesafetydepartment

PRELIMINARYSTUDY

5representingtheoperations,engineeringand

safetydepartments

11representingtheoperations,

engineeringandsafetydepartments

N/A N/A N/A N/A

WORKERS

CURRENTPROJECT

5including2cranedrivers,2lashersand1

trucktrailerdriver

19including9stevedores,4technicians,2gantrycrane

operators,2safetyfacilitators,1forkliftdriverand1trainer(6werealsosafetycommittee

members)

9including4straddlecarrierdrivers,3stevedores,1safetyfacilitatorand1

towerclerk(3werealsosafetycommitteemembers,3werealsounionH&Srepresentatives,2werealsouniondelegatesand2werealso

safetyfacilitators)

PRELIMINARYSTUDY

9including5contracttrucktrailerdrivers,3cranedriversandagantrycraneoperator

8including5contracttruck

trailerdriversand3cranedrivers

N/A N/A N/A N/A

KEY

INFORMAN

TS

CURRENTPROJECT

5including3representingthedockinspectorate,1representingtheportsafetydepartmentand1representing

theharbourmaster

2including1unionofficialand1dockinspectoraterepresentative

7including5unionofficialsand2inspectoraterepresentatives

8including1unionofficialand7inspectoraterepresentatives

PRELIMINARYSTUDY N/A N/A N/A N/A

TOTAL 14 24 5 9 28 18

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AREA EUROPE

TERMINALS EU1T1 EU1T2 EU2T1 EU2T2 EU2T3

INTERVIEW

EES

MAN

AGEM

ENT CURRENT

PROJECT

1representingthesafetyandoperationsdepartments

6representingthesafetyandthecontractoperationsand

safetydepartments

PRELIMINARYSTUDY

7representingthesafety,operations,engineeringandhumanresources

departments

12representingthesafety,operations,engineering,

planningandITdepartments

9representingthesafety,operations,engineeringand

humanresourcesdepartments

N/A

WORKERS

CURRENTPROJECT

1contractstevedoreanduniondelegate

PRELIMINARYSTUDY

12stevedores(2werealsouniondelegatesand10werealsounion

activists)

6including2foremen,2lashersand2straddle

carrierdrivers

8including7stevedoresand1technician(4werealsouniondelegatesand2werealsosafetyrepresentatives)

7including3tugdriversand4

stevedores(2werealsouniondelegatesand4werealso

safetyrepresentatives)

N/A

KEYINFORMAN

TS

CURRENTPROJECT

2including1inspectoraterepresentativeand1managementrepresentative,whoisalsoasafetyexpertonthejointOHScommitteefor

theport

1inspectoraterepresentative

PRELIMINARYSTUDY

5including3unionofficial,aunionappointedemploymentagencysafetytrainingandarepresentativeofthe

employmentagencysafetydepartment

2unionofficials 1unionofficial N/A

TOTAL 26 21 18 9 6

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3.Managinghealthandsafetyincontainerterminals–companyandterminalarrangements

This Chapter presents our findings on the strategies and arrangements for the governance andmanagement of occupational health and safety as they were explained to us in interviews withrepresentatives of management and OHS support services in the companies operating the containerterminalswestudied.Wecarriedoutcasestudiesin11containerterminalsoperatedby6companiesin4countries(Table3.1).TheterminalsweresituatedintwodifferentpartsofEuropeandintwodifferentareasoftheAsia-Pacificregion.TheyincludedterminalsoperatedbyfourofthelargestGNTcompaniesand twonational companies, one inEuropeandone inAsiaPacific.Nineof theparticipating terminalswereoperatedbyGNTs(5byGNT1,2byGNT2,2byGNT3and1byGNT4),withtheother2terminalsrunbynationaloperators(Table3.1).

Table3.1:Thecasestudyterminals,theirregionsandoperators

REGION NATIONALAREA TERMINALOPERATOR TERMINAL

EUROPE

EU1GNT2 EU1T1

GNT3 EU1T2

EU2

GNT1 EU2T1

GNT4 EU2T2

National2 EU2T3

ASIAPACIFIC

AP1GNT1 AP1T1

National1 AP1T2

AP2

GNT1 AP2T1

GNT3 AP2T2

GNT1 AP2T3

GNT2 AP2T4The aim in this Chapter is to present a descriptive analysis of the strategic positions taken by thecompanies operating container terminals and to show how this strategy is turned into operationalarrangements for health and safety within the terminals themselves – that is, at the level of theworkplace.Additionallyweanalysecompanyinformationconcerninghealthandsafetyoutcomes,basedondatatheyhavegatheredonreportedinjuriesandfatalitiesamongworkersintheirterminalsinrecentyears.Using documentary sources and the transcripts of interviews conducted at company Head Offices, webeginwithaprofileofeachofthecompanieswehavestudiedandthepoliciesandarrangementsmadeatthecompanylevelforthegovernanceandmanagementofthehealth,safetyandwelfareofworkersintheterminalsundertheircontrol.Wefollowthiswithadescriptionoftheavailabledataonhealthandsafetyperformance–which,broadlyspeaking,wefindtobeindicative,notsomuchoftheperformanceitself,but of the limitations in what this data can reliably tell us concerning performance. Focusing on theterminals, we provide a brief description of the main features of each before exploring theirarrangementsfortheimplementationandoperationofcompanypoliciesandproceduresforhealthandsafetymanagement. Based on interviewswith the operational and health and safetymanagement andsupervisorsineachoftheterminals,weconsiderthegeneralcharacterofthemanagementsystemsandarrangements forhealth and safety that are inplace in the terminals and theirmainobjectives, before

39

examiningtheminmoredetail.Herewehavetakentheopportunitytoexplore,inmoredetail,aspectsofOHSmanagementwherethereappearedtobesomelevelofdisconnectbetweenarrangementsdescribedbymanagersandtheexperiencesofthemasdescribedbyworkersandtheirrepresentatives.Inthefinalsection of the chapter we summarise our findings and draw some broad conclusions concerning thecharacterofthearrangementswefound.

3.1 FeaturesofgovernanceandmanagementofOHSinglobalandnationalcontainerterminalcompanies

Three of the four GNT companies had clear centralised arrangements in place for the governance andmanagementofsafety,healthandenvironmentmattersattheglobalcorporatelevel,whilethefourthwasrathermoredecentralisedinitsapproach.Policiesandarrangementsforhealthandsafetyinplaceatthecorporate level shared a number of common features. For example, generally, at Board level, acommitmentwasclaimedtoensuringthehealth,safetyandwelfareoftheworkforce,includingstrivingtoimprovehealthandsafetyoutcomestohelptoachievethis.Insomecases,overallresponsibilityforOHSwasstatedtorestwithnamedindividualsatthislevelandsystemswereinplacetoensurethatregularcorporatereportingofhealthandsafetymatters to these individualsoccurred.Eachof the threeglobalcompanieswiththesemorecentralisedarrangementsincludedaspecialcorporateunitdevotedtosafety,health and environment matters, with expertise that could be used to monitor and advise on thedevelopment andoperationof global company strategieswithin the terminals.At the same time, therewere further systems to ensure communication of OHSmessages from this level to that of individualbusiness units and, inmost cases, vice versa. Generally there seems to have been somemovement indevelopingandrefiningapproachesatthislevelintherelativelyrecentpastinseveralofthecompaniesin the study – and while there was a willingness among interviewees at the corporate level in thesecompaniestoexplaintheneedforsuchchange,atthesametimetheyalsofeltitwasperhapstoosoontocommentextensivelyontheeffectivenessofthesechanges.A key issue for all theGNT companies concernedhow theymanaged relationsbetween the company’sglobal corporate strategies and the capacity of the terminals they operated to be responsive to localconditions that affected their business. Policy and management arrangements for safety and healthreflected this tension in a number of ways and each of the four GNT companies determined forthemselvesthewaysinwhichtheyfoundasuitablebalance.Threeweresimilarinthegeneralcharacteroftheirapproachinthisrespect,whilethefourthappearedconsiderablymoredecentralised.Broadlyspeaking,thetwonationalcompanieshaddefinedresponsibilities,proceduresandarrangementsfor corporate governance and management of OHS at the company level as well as arrangements toimplementOHSmanagementsystemsintheterminalswestudied.In the following sectionswe explore in further detail theways inwhich these responsibilities for thegovernanceandmanagementofOHSweredeliveredatthecorporateandterminallevels.ThefourGNTcompaniesinthestudywereamongthelargestinvolvedinthecontainerterminalbusiness.Eachhadaportfolioof interestsincontainerterminalsandrelatedlogisticsactivities–aswellasotherbusinessactivities.Collectively theyareestimated tobe responsible for almosthalf of global containerterminalbusiness.Thegrowthofthesecompaniesandthemainfeaturesoftheirgovernance,structure,operationandbusinesshavebeenanalysedintherecentliteraturesummarisedinthepreviousChapter.Our investigations and discussionswithmanagers at the global level in these companies suggested nosignificantdeparturesfromthefeaturesalreadypresentedinthisliterature(seeforexample:BichouandBell, 2007; Parola and Musso, 2007; Notteboom and Rodrique, 2012) concerning their character,business,growthandgovernance. Ingeneral, therise toprominenceof theseGNTcompanieshasbeenbothcomparativelyrecentandrapid.Consequentlyallthecompaniesconcernedarerelativelynewtothebusiness of global networks of container terminals. Each developed from more localised businessinterests either in stevedoring, or as offshoots of shipping companies with interests in ports, or fromfinancial holdings companies initially investing in ports for revenue generation, which subsequently

40

developedbusinessinterestsintheoperationanddirectmanagementoftheircontainerterminalassetsglobally.The companies have all grown in size and business largely by taking advantage of opportunitiespresented by port privatisation schemes and as a result of container carrier companies seeking toimprove the support for their core business.Mergers and acquisitions have taken place alongside theexpansionofcontainerterminalsintonewlocations,andtheyhavealsobeendrivenbytheeffortsofthelargermaritime shipping companies to gain even bigger shares of themarket for carrying containers,with a resultant increasingly powerful role for these companies. This in turn has helped shape thebusinessoftheterminalsandcontributedtostevedoringcompaniesseekingalliancesoracquisitions inthebusinessofshipping, leadingtoadevelopmentofglobalnetworksof increasinglyalignedterminalsandshippinglinesinahighlycompetitivemarketthathasservedtofacilitatetheemergentdominanceofa relatively small number of large and powerful players such as are exemplified by the GNTs in thepresentstudy.Asnotedabove,threeofthefourGNTsstudiedhadarrangementsforleadershiponOHSatBoardlevel.They aimed to ensure the delivery of this leadership through measures with which the corporategovernanceofOHScouldbeimplementedinrelationtothebusinessunits(terminals)ofthecompanies.They all acknowledged that exercising governance over the delivery of their commitments was morestraightforwardintheterminalsoverwhichtheyheldoperationalcontrolandfarlesssointhose(smallernumbers of) terminals in which they held a business interest but did not have overall operationalcontrol7.TherewereseveralsimilarapproachesthatweresharedbythesethreeofthefourGNTsstudied.Insummarytheyinclude:

• Clear statements of corporate leadership, responsibility and commitment fromBoard andCEOlevel– forexampletherewasusuallyastrongpublicdeclarationofcommitmenttoprioritisingsafetyforterminalworkersfromtheBoardChairpersonorCEOthat,inatleastonecase,claimedprioritisationofsafetyandhealthofallworkersontheterminalregardlessofwhethertheywerethere as employees of the company or part of the contractor workforce that is a significantpresenceinmanyterminalsoperatedbythesecompanies.

• Leadershipcommitmentwasusuallysupportedwithasetofglobalstandardsthroughwhichthecorporategoalsweretobeachieved.Typicallytheyconsistedofasetofsimplestatementswidelypromulgatedtoallterminalsandcompanyemployees–oftendisplayedintheterminals’offices,corridors,canteensandrestfacilities.

• Arrangementswereinplaceatcorporateleveltoensureappropriateexpertisewasavailableto

monitorandadviseonthecompanyperformanceofhealthandsafetyacrosstheactivitiesofallthebusinessunits.Typically thisconsistedofasmallgroupofspecialiststaff (onaverage3-4),basedinthecorporateoffices,withresponsibilityforco-ordination,monitoringandadvisingonthecorporatesystemforOHSattheterminals.

• ThestructuresthroughwhichOHSwasgovernedandmanagedbetweenthecorporateofficeand

the business units varied. In one GNT there was a regional structure into which terminals indifferentregionsweregroupedandwithinwhich furtherexpertisewasavailable tosupportaswellasmonitorOHSactivitiesattheleveloftheterminalsandprovidefeedbacktothecorporatelevel.OthersperformedsimilaractivitiesbutthroughdirectlinksbetweenthebusinessunitsandthespecialistpersonnelatHeadOffice.

Allthecompanieshadsetsofproceduresinplacetoensurethecollectionofdataonsafetyperformanceanditsreportingtocorporatelevel.Usuallyspecialistsemployedatcorporatelevelprocessedthisdata,before its key elements were circulated more widely among the business units. Other proceduresrequired thereportingof serious incidentsor thosewithahighpotentialof severityand inmostcases

7Inalloftheterminalswestudied,theorganisationoperatingtheterminalhadoveralloperationalcontrol.

41

somemeansofcommunicatingusefulinformationconcerningthefuturepreventionofsuchincidentswasusedtoconvey ‘lessons learned’ toall the terminaloperators.Thesedatahadbeenusedglobally tosetterminallevelperformancetargetsonaccidentsandinjuries.AsfarascompanystrategiesconcerningOHSgovernanceoverallwereconcernedtherewereanumberofdistinctivefeaturessharedtoagreaterorlesserextentbythreeofthefourGNTsstudied.Ashasbeenthecaseinanumberofsectorsinwhichthereisarelativelyhighincidenceofseriousandfatalinjuries,suchasminingandconstruction,acknowledgementoftheneedtoaddresstherisksthatleadtosuchincidentshas been coupled with an awareness that they cannot be simply predicted from the analysis andinterpretationof trends in lost time injurydata.The resulthasbeen that recent revisionsof corporatestrategieshaveplacedgreateremphasisonachieving‘zeroharm’intheterminalswhich,asisusuallythecase with such strategies, is coupled with movement away from a traditional concentration oninterpretingandmonitoringtrendsinlosttimeinjuriestopayingmoreattentiontotheinvestigationandanalysisoflowfrequencyhighpotentialincidents.Wereturntoafurtherdiscussionoftheimplicationsofsuch ‘zeroharm’ strategies and theway inwhich the terminal companies operate them later. Firstweconsider arrangements for governance andmanagement in eachof the companies inmoredetail,withsomeofthemeasuresofperformanceoutcomesmadeavailablebythecompanies.

3.1.1 GNT1

GNT 1 employs over 30,000 people and operates over 60 terminals globally. It handlesmore than 60millionTEUsannually,andatthetimeofthestudywasplanningtodevelopandextenditsnetworkandcapacitysubstantiallyinthenextfewyears.Itssafetystrategyisgloballydriven.Aspartofthiscorporateapproach, the company’s headquarters rolls out management systems with specific processes andprocedures and runs regular campaigns and benchmarking exercises to measure its standing againstglobalstandardsandindustrybestpractice.Theglobalsafetyandenvironmentdepartmentleadsintheseactivities and is supported by a series of regional safety departments, throughwhich safety strategies,approachesandsystemsarecascadedtotheterminalsandOHSperformanceinformationisreturnedforcentral analysisandmonitoring.Thecompanycurrentlyhasglobal targetsof zero fatalitiesanda20%reduction in lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR)which it describes as having fallen by 37% since2009).Oneof itswaysofaimingtomeetthesetargetsacrossall itsterminalshasbeentoissueasetofglobalstandardsinrelationtosevenareasidentifiedashighaccidentpotentialworkactivities:pedestriansafety,handlingloads,workingatheight,mobileequipment,vesselsafety,engineeringandisolation.Eachstandardcontainsminimumcontrolmeasurestomitigatethepotentialforaccidents.Overtheeightyearspriortothestudy,GNT1had67fatalitiesglobally,allofwhichwereinoneoftheseareas.GNT1alsosetsglobal standards for ‘human capital’ global engagement programmes for risk management and itperiodically conducts global surveys of employees onmatters such as ‘engagement’ which are furthersupported by subsequent discussion seminars. The organisation describes its policies as meeting orexceedingnationalhealthandsafety legislationwherever itoperates, complyingwithallaspectsof theOHSAS18001internationalcertificationsystem,andincludesarequirementforallstaffandcontractorstomeethealthandsafetyrequirementsandparticipateincomprehensivetraining.Itsapproachincludes:health,safetyandenvironmentprogrammestoimproveunderstandingandstrengthenthesafetycultureatallterminals;safetyandenvironmentassessments;andthedeliveryofaccidentinvestigationtrainingto all terminals to enhance thequalityof investigations and improve riskmanagement.There is also aglobal commitment to creating a safe culture across all operations and regularly monitoring theimplementation of the safety strategy including employee training, regular audits and managementobjectivesinrelationtosafety.GNT1drawsattentiontoitszerotoleranceofconditionsandbehaviourscontributingtoworkplaceincidents.Itsviewisthatoperational,safetyandsecurityrisksaredecreasingthroughrigorousandcontinuousmonitoringbymanagementandbyhavingreviewprocesses,policies,guidancedocumentsandoperationalproceduresinplace.Overall,arecentannualreport indicatedthat52%ofGNT1’semployeeshaveworkedforthecompanyformorethanfiveyears.TheGNTdescribesitselfasadheringtolocallabourregulationsandstatutesbutemphasises that it is a singleorganisationwith commongoals, reinforcedwith commonapproaches to

42

reward,performancemanagementandsuccessionplanning.Anexampleofthisisitsrequirementthatattheterminallevelthatatleastoneoftheobjectivesthatearnsabonusmustbelinkedtoasafetymeasure.Intotal,abouttwothirdsofthecompany’spersonhoursareworkedbydirectemployeesandonethirdbycontractors.However,asFigure3.1shows,ratesfortheirAsiaPacificandEuropeanterminals,aswellasfor thecasestudy terminals ineachof thoseregions,variedsubstantially.Partialyear figures for2013suggestanincreaseintheproportionofhoursworkedbyindirectlyemployedworkersinEuropeandthecasestudyterminalEU2T1.

Figure3.1:Employeeandcontractorhours(%)fortheAsiaPacificandEuroperegionsandthecasestudyterminalsforGNT1

CompanydataonlosttimeinjuryfrequencyratesforGNT1showadeclinebetween2007and2012from16.5to7.3permillionhoursworked.Arecentannualreportsuggeststhatthishascontinued,withLTIFRfallingby12%to6.4in2013.Behindtheseratesareanincreaseinhoursworked(fromover85millionin2007 to approaching 100million in 2012) and a drop in absolute numbers of lost time injuries (fromnearly1500tounder500).Thesetrendswerebroadlymirroredintheregionalandterminalleveldata.However,therewerealsolargedifferencesinratesbetweentheregionsandterminals–rangingfromarateof84.8losttimeinjuriespermillionhoursworkedinterminalAP1T1tooneof0inAP2T1in2009and2012andinAP2T3in2009and2010.Inaddition,theAP1T1rateswereclosertothoseofterminalEU2T1andEuropeasawhole, suggestingadifferencebyeconomic incomearea rather thanby region(Figure3.2).Adifferenceofthisscalecallsintoquestiontheaccuracyofthedata,raisingthepossibilityofincompletereportingand/ordifferentreporting‘thresholds’interminalsbyeconomicincomearea.Itisalso significant because of the numbers of workers involved. GNT 1, for example, employs over 3000peopleinthesecondAsiaPacificareaalone(i.e.nottheAsiaPacificregionasawhole),

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

AP1T1 AP2T1 AP2T3 APC EU2T1 EU Overall

2012 2012 2013 to October 2013 to October

43

Figure3.2:Losttimeinjuryfrequencyratespermillionhoursworkedfor2007to2012fortheAsiaPacificandEuroperegionsandthecasestudyterminalsforGNT1

Limited data were available on lost time injury frequency rates to enable comparisons to be madebetweendirectlyandindirectlyemployedworkers.Thesecomparisonsshouldthereforebeapproachedwithgreatcaution,buttheysuggestahigherLTIFRamongthosewhowereindirectlyemployed(Figure3.3).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

AP1T1 AP2T1 AP2T3 APC EU2T1 EU Overall

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

44

Figure3.3:LosttimeinjuryfrequencyratesfordirectlyandindirectlyemployedGNT1workersfor2013toOctober

3.1.2 GNT2

GNT2handlesover60millionTEUsannually,increasingitsthroughputbynearly3%in2013.LikeGNT1,ithasastrategicapproachtohealthandsafetyglobally.Thisincludedrollingoutitssafety,securityandenvironmentmanagementsystemframeworktoallofitsterminalsandrecentlyholdinganorganisation-widesafetyweek.Consideringlosttimeinjuryfrequencyratesper100workersforGNT2showedsimilarpatternstothoseseen in the GNT 1 data in terms of both the downward trend in rates generally and the differencebetweenratesbyregion,aswellasindicatingthatboththeGNT’scasestudyterminals’trendswereverysimilartothosefortheregionsinwhichtheyweresituated(Figure3.4).

Figure3.4:Losttimeinjuryfrequencyratesper100workersworkedfor2009to2013fortheAsiaPacificandEuroperegionsandthecasestudyterminalsforGNT2

Some limiteddata also allowed comparisonsbetweendirectly and indirectly employedworkers.Againthese showed substantially higher lost time injury frequency rates per million hours worked among

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

Directly employed Indirectly employed

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

EU1T1 Europe AP2T4 Asia Pacific

45

indirectlyemployedworkerscomparedtothosewhoweredirectlyemployedwithinEuropeasawholeand in terminal EU1T1 (Figure3.5). This lends someweight to the suggestion from theGNT1data ofpoorerOHSoutcomesforindirectlyemployedworkers.Hereagain,however,thenumbersinvolvedwerevery small in the Asia Pacific region, adding to the concerns raised above about data accuracy andcomparabilitybetweenregionsandincomeeconomytypes.

Figure3.5:Losttimeinjuryfrequencyratespermillionhoursworkedfor2012and2013forEuropeandthecasestudyterminalsforGNT2

Fortheyears2009to2013,thereweresixfatalitiesintheEuropeandAsiaPacificregions,includingonein theAsiaPacific casestudy terminal.Therewere three ineachregion.Twooccurred in theyears forwhichdatashowingdirectlyand indirectlyemployedworkersseparatelywereavailable.Of these,bothwereinEuropein2013,withonedirectlyemployedandoneindirectlyemployedworkerkilled.

3.1.3 GNT3

GNT3employsover20,000peopleglobally, operatingover70 terminals inmore than60 countries. Ithandles over 30 million TEUs annually. It has a global approach to safety, with a recently appointedheadquarterslevelsafetyteamandnewadditionalresourcesfortraining,measurementsandbehaviourchange. It identifies risk management, leadership, technological innovation and learning as the coreelementsof itsstrategicapproach tosafety,describing itsapproachasoneofzero tolerance forunsafeacts in which everyone is expected to intervene. With perhaps the most well-developed strategicapproachtogovernanceandmanagementamongtheGNTs,GNT3characterisesitsapproachasfocusingonimprovingsafety,productivityandefficiencybyensuringthatemployeesbuildskills,capabilitiesandperformance while ensuring that their rights are upheld through the organisation’s global labourstandards. One of these covers employee working hours, which are now described as successfullymanaged,andanotherisaimedatensuringthatwagesmeetbasicneeds.Afurthersuchstandardcoversworkerrepresentation,andhereGNT3statesthat70%ofterminalshaveaworkplacecommittee,withparticipating employee-elected representatives, intended to improve workplace health and safety andpromote company-employee co-operation. The latest annual report says that the organisation willcontinuetoworktoachievegreaterglobalconsistencyandalignmenttolabourstandardsinalllocations,

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Direct Indirect Direct Indirect All All

2012 2013 2012 2013

EU1T1 Europe AP2T4 Asia Pacific

46

focusingonimprovingcommunicationsbetweenthecompanyanditsglobalworkforceaswellasbuildinglocalcapacityandworkingtointegratethestandardsmoreeffectivelyintolocalprocesses.TheGNT’sgoaliszerofatalities,anddeathshavecomedownfrom10in2011andfivein2012tothreein2013. Its ‘materialitymatrix’putssafetyat thehighest levelof importance toboth thebusinessand itsstakeholders,closeto issuessuchasemergency/spillsresponse.Themainsafetyrisksarecategorisedintofourareas–traffic,workingatheight,fallingobjectsandstoredenergy.Theseareaddressedbytheorganisation’sglobalminimumrequirementsforsafetywithwhichallterminalsmustcomply.Numbersof safety inspections and reviewshavebeen increased, andnewstandards in relation toworkpermitsandmachineryhaverecentlybeenimplemented.TheGNT’sownemployeeengagementsurveysuggestsits efforts are regarded favourablywithin theworkforce, with 81% of operations staff responses to aquestiononcompanycommitmenttoemployeesafetydescribedasfavourable.In relation to contractor organisations, GNT 3 describes them as actively involved in safety and listssupplychainpartnersascontributingtosafetyimprovement.Itsrecentglobalsafetyculturesurveywasmadeavailabletoallemployees,contractorsandthirdparties.Data for2011to2013(toAugust)suggest, like those forGNTs1and2,adownwardtrend in lost timeinjury frequency rates per million hours worked. However, it is important to note here that thesubstantialregional(incomeeconomytype)differencesintheGNT1and2dataarenotapparentintheGNT 3 data (Figure 3.6), suggesting that, in this case, more comparable reporting practices and/orperformanceinthetworegions.

Figure3.6:Losttimeinjuryfrequencyratespermillionhoursworkedfor2012and2013forEurope,AsiaPacificandoverallforGNT3

3.1.4 GNT4

GNT4operatesglobally,employingover30,000peopleandrunningover50terminalsinmorethan20countries.Itcurrentlyhasanoverallcapacityofnearly80millionTEUsannuallyandinthisrespectoftenfeaturesasthemarketleaderintermsofthroughputvolumesandnumberofterminalsincomparisonsofeconomicandbusinessprofilesamongGNTs(seeforexampleNotteboomandRodrigue,2012).However,itfunctionsratherdifferentlytotheotherGNTsanddoesnotappeartohaveawell-developedcorporatelevelOHSstrategy,preferringtoleavethemanagementofhealthandsafetytoindividualterminals.Attheglobal level it states that it observes international labour standards and laws in the areas inwhich itsterminalsaresituated,andthattherearededicatedworkplacesafetyteamswithintheterminalbusinessunits.

0

1

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Asia Pacific Europe All

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This said, there were perhaps some indications of change in this approach. For example, a relativelyrecent innovationwasa regional (European)safetycommittee thatmetat leasteverysixmonths.Thiswasseenbythechairofthecommitteeasamovetowardsmore‘globalthinking’,withparallelsinotheraspectsofthebusinesssuchastheengineeringandcommercialsides.Thecommitteerecentlydevelopeda set of minimum safety standards, most of which were based on regional and international (OHSAS18001)standardsandwhatthechairdescribedas‘generalbestpractice’.Theseweretobecirculatedtoterminals in the region thatwouldself-assessbyusing them,before individualbusinessunitsbegan toaudit each other. An audit tool for this purpose was in development, again based on internationalstandards(OHSAS18001).ThecommitteealsofeedsinformationonareassuchasOHSperformanceandbestpracticebacktoagloballevelcommittee.Thismovetowardsamorecorporateapproach,atleastattheregionallevel,wasseenasapositivechange,thoughGNT4continuestodifferfromitscompetitorsbynothavingaglobalheadofsafetyoracorporatestrategicapproach.Rather,regionalco-ordinatorswere‘lefttosupport,administerandadviseattheregionallevel’–whichmeantthattheregionalcommitteeshadtoactasthedrivingforceforchangeorimprovementonOHS.In contrast to the other GNT operators in this study, discussion of health and safety governance andmanagementinitspublishedcompanyliteratureisalmostnon-existentandperformancedatawerenotmadeavailabletotheresearchteambytheorganisation.

3.1.5 FeaturesofgovernanceandmanagementofOHSinnationalcompanies

Broadlyspeaking the twonationalcompanieshad inplacesystemsofgovernanceandmanagement forsafetyandhealththatmirroredthoseoftheGNTs,albeitonasmallerandlessformalisedscale.3.1.5.1 Nationaloperator1National operator 1 has an annual capacity approaching 4 million TEUs. Like GNTs 1 to 3, it has anorganisational levelstrategicapproachtosafety inwhich itdescribesthe involvementofemployees,aswellas training, competenceandeffectivesafetystandards,asessential.This includesacompany-widesetofhealthandsafetymanagementstandards.Keysafetypoliciesandleadinitiativesaredevelopedatheadquarterslevelonaregularbasis.ForexampleitsrecentcriticalsafetyessentialsprogrammeaimedatimprovingmanagementofthemostcriticalsafetyrisksandanewOHSsystemforimprovedtracking,notificationandmanagementofsafety incidents.Aprogrammeaimedatreshapingsafetycultureandasafety leadership training programme is also planned. A recent focus has also been on improvingemployees’ engagement and the implementation of OHS strategic plans around a common frameworkwith associated action plans that are tracked and reviewed at the divisional and headquarters’ levels.National 1 has six strategic safety objectives relating to: leadership andmanagement capability; safetymanagement systems; risk management capability; employee engagement; safety culture; andverification.Theorganisationhasanexecutivesafetycommitteewhichmeetsmonthlytodiscusssafetyperformanceandincidents,driveimprovementinitiativesandmakepolicydecisions.About15%ofexecutives’payislinkedtoimprovementsinsafety(recordableinjuryfrequencyrate).National1’sLTIFRfor2013fellby70%from2011,animprovementofover30%onthepreviousyear.3.1.5.2 Nationaloperator2National2operatesanetworkofsevenports.ItcurrentlyhasalesswelldevelopedcorporateapproachtohealthandsafetythanNational1,butisundergoingaperiodofchange.AtthetimeofwritingelementsofOHSmanagementwerestandardised.Theseincluded,forexample,hazardobservations,riskassessmentsandpermitstowork.Day-to-dayoperationalsafeworksystems,though,weredevelopedattheterminallevel.However,anobjectiveforthecomingyearwastobegintostandardisemoreelementsofoperations,training,safetyawarenessandsoon,firstregionallyandthenacrossthewholeorganisation,withaviewtostandardisingasmuchaspossibleandworkingtowardsasetofminimumstandards,whichmanagersexpectedtosavetimeandmoney.

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ThehumanresourcestrategyofNational2wastocontractoutitsoperationalworkforce.Todosoithadin place various requirements covering competitive tendering in which specification of OHSarrangements by contractors were included. Managers claimed that tenders had been refused on thegroundsthattenderershadnotmettheserequirements.Aspointedoutelsewhereinthisreport,thelowlevels of unionisation in the ports operated by the company had meant there had been only limitedresistancetothecompany’shumanresourcestrategies.Inoperationalpractice,therefore,asdetailedinsection3.3.5,theoverallgovernanceofhealthandsafetymatters remained the responsibility and role of National 2, and contractors worked to its safetymanagement system requirements for OHS policies and procedures, safe working practices and safesystems of work as well as risk assessments, but the day-to-day supervision of these systems wasundertakenbythecontractor,underthegeneraloversightofNational2.

3.2 ThecharacterofarrangementsforOHSintheterminals

Arrangements to deliver the corporate strategies of the companies included in the study towardsgovernance and management of health and safety at the level of the terminals are explored in thefollowingsection.Sincecontainerterminalsaresituatedindifferentpartsoftheworld,somevariationinlocalconditionsandnationalcontextscanbeanticipated.HowGNTsmanageoperationalpracticeswithinthese differently situated terminals and also how national companies in different countries do so isthereforeimportantindetermininghowsuccessfultheyareinachievingtheirobjectives.Webeginwithabriefoverviewofthecommonfeaturesofthesearrangementsacrossthedifferentlysituatedterminals,asmanagersandOHSadvisersdescribedthemtousduringourvisitstothesesites.FromtheseaccountsitwasclearthatarrangementsforOHSwerefoundedonstronglybehaviour-basedapproachestohealthandsafety.Ingeneral,themostseniorTerminalManagerheldoverallresponsibilityforthehealthandsafetyofworkersandtherewasaSafetyDepartmentineachoftheGNTterminalsaswell as in the nationally operated terminals and it played a pivotal role in the development,implementation, monitoring and review of their health and safety management systems andarrangements. Written policy statements on health and safety were in evidence and were generallyprominentlydisplayedormadeavailabletoworkers. Insomeoftheterminalstheyweresupplementedwith simple messages concerning key safety objectives, standards and so forth that were widelydisplayed. Therewas evidence of locally produced posters and slogans in the terminals, togetherwithheavy emphasis within the safety management systems themselves on achieving behaviour changetowardssaferworkingpracticesamongtheworkforceandinculcatinga‘safetyculture’atalllevelswithintheorganisationoftheterminals.Thesewereespeciallyinevidenceintheterminalsinthemiddle-incomecountrystudied,wheretherewerealsoindicationsthattheideaofinfluencingsafetybehavioursincludedattemptstoextendsuchinfluencebeyondtheterminalandintothecommunitiesinwhichworkerslive.Asimilar strategy was adopted by some of these terminals in relation to influencing the behaviour ofexternal truck drivers outside the terminal by focusing safety awareness activities on the depots andtruckstopswherethesedriverswerelikelytocongregate.AswellasadvisingonOHSandadministeringtheproceduresof thesafetymanagementsystems intheterminals,SafetyDepartmentswerealsotheformallinkbetweentheterminalsandtheirparentGNTsinrelationtosafetybothregionallyandglobally,whichinthecaseofthreeofthefourGNTs(GNTs1to3),as described in the previous section, constituted a fairly close and occasionally quite directiverelationship,while in the fourth (GNT4) theconnectionwasconsiderably looser.Therelationshipwasintendedasatwo-wayprocess.SafetyDepartmentsimplementedpoliciesandproceduresfromtheGNTand in addition they acted as a hub for information by inputting, downloading anddistributing, safetyperformance information to and from the global intranet. Senior management in each of the GNTterminalswereinclosecontactwiththeglobalcompanyinthethreeGNTsinwhichthecompanytookastrongco-ordinatingandleadershiprole.Inoneofthese,contactwasviatheregionalarrangementstheglobalcompanyhadmade,whileintheothertwoitwasamoredirectconnectiontotheheadoffice.Inall

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cases,therewaslittledoubtamongseniormanagementthattheywerelikelytobeheldaccountableforseriousincidentsattheterminalstheymanagedandthatthereweresystemsinplacetoeffecttwo-waycommunicationonsuchmattersbetweentheterminalandthecompanyHQ.Withinthehealthandsafetymanagementsystems,ingeneralalloperationalactivitywasintendedtobecovered by risk assessment and risk assessment formed the basis for the identification of the areas,operationsandprocesses that requiredattention in the terminals’ safetyproceduresandsystems.Riskassessmentswerenormallyreviewedfollowinganincidentoranychangeinoperationalprocedure,whilein some terminals procedures were in place to keep all risk assessments updated through a moresystematicandplannedreviewprocess.Management and supervisory interviewees from all terminals also referred to many specific safetypractices andmeasures within various broad groupings aimed at managing risks. These included, forexample: technicalmeasures, suchas theprovisionofcagesandharnesses for thoseworkingon topofcontainers; procedural measures, such as always carrying out lashing in pairs; measures relating toenvironmentalconditions,forexample,stoppingworkatspecifiedhighwindspeeds;andinfrastructuralmeasures,includingmaintenanceofterminalsurfacesandtheprovisionofergonomicequipment.Severalof themanagement intervieweesstressed thatanumberof thesemeasures involvedsignificantcost, interms of financial outlay but also, in some cases, in relation to reduced work speed and consequentproductivity–something thatwasconsideredworthwhile for thesakeof safety–andemphasised thattheircompanygloballyhadnolimitsontheirsafetybudget.In keeping with perceptions of the most significant risks, in all of the terminals a hierarchy of safeworkingstrategieshadbeenidentifiedinwhichtherisksassociatedwiththeoperationofmachineryandwith man-machine interfaces were recognised as among the most important and for which standardapproaches to riskminimisationwere applied (i.e. avoidance, for example, introducing pedestrian freezones,carryingoutrepairsintheworkshopratherthanin-situand/orstoppingworkcompletelyaroundtherepairsite;and,whereavoidancewasnotpossible,riskreduction, forexample jobrotation,regularmaintenanceinspectionandadherencetoPPErequirements).Againbehaviour-based strategies tended todominate these approaches andmanagement intervieweeswere generally of the opinion that all the possible structural and engineering controls had beenimplemented, leaving a strong focus on behaviour safety, and the view that the behaviour-orientatedproceduresandsystemsinplaceintheterminalsweresuchthatifeverybodyfollowedthemtherewouldnotbeanyharmfulincidents.Systems for recording and investigating incidents, injuries and near misses were also described andplayedamajorroleintheactivitiesofthesafetyandhealthdepartmentsineachoftheterminals.Thesedatawereaddedtobothlocalandglobaldatabases.In each terminal, training of two kinds supported these health and safetymanagement arrangements:induction training and on-going or refresher training. In general, induction training was relativelystructured and systematically administered. Where workers were directly employed, training wasgenerallyprovidedbytheterminals’SafetyDepartmentsandbythejointemploymentbodiesinEuropearea 1. For indirectly employed workers training was mainly the responsibility of the contractororganisation employing them. Again there was a significant difference in this regard between theterminals in high and middle income economies. In the terminals situated in the former, contractorsdeliveredtrainingprogrammesdevelopedbytheterminaloperatingorganisationsandforthemostpartwerealsousedfortheirownemployees.Oversight,prescriptionand,insomecases,awarenessofcontentof training for indirectly employedworkerswere significantly lower in the terminals operating in themiddleincomecountry.Thispatternofdifferencesbyregionofoperationandemploymenttypewasalsoapparent in relation to other areas, such as PPE provision and replacement. On-going training variedsignificantly from terminal to terminal - for some itwas formally applied to thewholeworkforcewithrefreshertrainingeverytwoorthreeyears,whereaselsewhereon-goingtrainingwassaidtobeprovided

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throughthedisseminationofsafetypracticeinformation(forexampleduringtoolboxtalksandpre-shiftbriefings)onspecificrisksandsolutionsasnecessary.At each of the case study terminals, therewas awidespread confidence in the arrangements’ effectivecoverageofkeyrisksfacedbyworkersandmanagerswerevocalabout,andcommittedto,deliveringthezero toleranceapproach to injuries thatwas the statedaimof the safetypoliciesof theirglobalparentcompanies. This helped reinforce the sense of the strong emphasis of OHS arrangements on safety asopposedtohealth.There were also systems in place for undertaking documented risk assessments, writing methodsstatements and producing standard operating procedures, all ofwhichwere held atmanagerial (or insome cases supervisory) levels and thought to be accessible or available as requiredby thoseneedingthem. Therewere accident and incident reporting systems in all these terminals aswell as targets forreportedinjuriesanditwasreportedthatregularmeetingsinrelationtohealthandsafetytookplaceatvarious levels, from work groups to terminal levels. While the preference for the structuring andoperationoftheterminallevelprovisionforOHSmanagementintheGNT-runterminalswasclearlythecompany model developed at global level, these arrangements were also influenced by widerrequirementsmadeintheportswheretheterminalsweresituated.Inmostcasessuchrequirementshadonlyalimitedeffectonthecompany’sstructuringandoperationofOHS,butinoneoftheEuropeanareasstudied,itsnationalportemploymentandlabourrelations’arrangementsdidhavemoreofanimpact.InthecaseofTerminalEU1T1inparticular,thismeantthattheportemploymentbodyplayedasignificantroleinOHSmanagementarrangementsbyproducingmandatoryhealthandsafetymanagementpoliciesanddetailedriskmanagementplans,aswellassafetyrulesforspecificareasandjobsacrossthewholeport,whichtheGNT-runterminalwasobligedtofollow.Beyondthearrangementsforengagingworkersindividuallythrougharangeofworkgroupandterminallevel meetings concerning safety and health, there were other arrangements for consultation withworkersrepresentativesonhealthandsafety.Generally,inalltheGNTandnationalcompanyterminalsinhighincomecountries,theformalsetupofthesefollowed,atleasttoaminimallevel,thatmandatedbynational (or state) regulation.Most commonly they involved the electionor selectionofworkerhealthand safety representatives and the constitution of a joint health and safety committee at theestablishment level. Representatives performed functions such as undertaking inspections, requestinginformation, making representations to managers on behalf of workers, but generally at a levelsomewhere below the entitlements in the relevant legislation. There were few cases where thesearrangements built on, and went beyond, what was provided for by regulation. There were somevariations in this pattern of appointment and functions observed in different terminals, such as thedifferencesinarrangementsforsafetyrepresentatives/championsbetweenthetwoGNT-runterminalsinAsia Pacific area 2, that were essentially made possible by historical differences in the legislativerequirementsinvolved.There was a significant difference between these formal arrangements in high income countries andthoseintheterminalinthemiddleincomecountrywestudied.Inthelattercase,generallytherewerenospecificallyelectedorselectedhealthandsafetyrepresentativesfromamongtheworkforce,nordidthehealth and safety committee function in a consultative way.Where such representatives were said toexist,theywerefarlesswell-establishedorcontinuousandwithfarfewerfunctionsorfacilitiesthantheircounterparts in thehigh incomecountry terminals. Inparticular, theywere far less likely tohavebeenelected byworkers, providedwith any training for their health and safety role, or given the time andfacilitiestocarryitout–includingbeingfreedfromdutiestoattendmeetingsandaffordedtheprovisionneededforconsultingwiththosetheyweresaidtorepresent.In the report of the previous study we noted that from the perspective of the workers and theirrepresentatives, theconcernsofmanagement forspeedandcost-efficiency in terminaloperationwhichdominated the highly competitive business environment of container transport coloured workers’experiencesofthearrangementsmadefortheiroccupationalhealth,safetyandwelfareatwork.Intheirview,thisinfluencecontributedtopoorhealthandsafetyoutcomes,especiallyinrelationtoissuessuch

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as fatigue, stressandmusculoskeletaldisorders, and it served to increase risksofunsafe incidentsandconsequentinjuries,aswellasreducingwelfare,amongworkers–andthishappeneddespitetherebeingarrangements inplace formanagingsafety.Moreover, therewasa furtherviewthat theoutsourcingofwork insometerminals,whichhadoccurred for thesamereasonsofcostefficiency,contributedto theexperienceofpoorerworkingconditionsandtheineffectivedeliveryofarrangementsformanagingandmonitoring workers’ health and safety in such situations. Therefore, as we detailed in Chapter 1, theprincipal aims of the present study were to further explore this apparent gap between the companyarrangementsforhealthandsafetyandworkers’experiences.HavingoutlinedthecommonfeaturesofthesystemsinplacetodeliverarrangementsforthegovernanceandmanagementofOHSas theywereexplained tous from theperspectivesof themanagersandOHSadviserschargedwiththistask,intheremainderofthischapterwedelivertheaimsofthestudybygivingmore detailed consideration to the understandings of managers and their advisers concerning theirapproachesinrelationtoafewkeyareasthatwereindicativeofthepossiblegapbetweenarrangementsandexperiences identified in theprevious study.Todo so ourexamination takesparticular accountofwhat managers and their advisers shared with us concerning the character and quality of theirarrangementstoensuretheprotectionofsafetyandhealth,includingtheirexperienceofsafetyincidentsandwork-relatedhealthandwelfareoutcomesinrelationtothearrangementstheyhadmadetomanagepreventionofharmandtheprotectionofworkersintheirterminals.Weexaminethesetwoareaswithaconsideration of managers’ views concerning key elements of the systems in place to manage OHSespecially in relation to job type, employment organisation and terminal location. We take a similarapproachinexaminingmanagers’perspectivesconcerningtherelationshipbetweentheorganisationofworkandworkingconditionsandexploremanagers’understandingsconcerningtherelationshipofthesematters with OHS outcomes and OHS management, again in relation to different jobs, employmentorganisation and terminal locations. This approach allows us also to set the scene for a furtherexaminationof thesame issues fromtheperspectiveof therespondents to the terminalworkersurveyanalysedinChapter4.

3.3 Translatingcompanypoliciesintoterminallevelarrangements

Allof thecasestudyterminalsaresignificantplayers inthebusinessofthesector.Thoughtheyvary insizeandcapacity,allareamongtheleadingterminalsfortheregionswheretheyaresituated.Theyalsoall operate within contexts influenced by national legislative, regulatory and labour relations’arrangements.ThoseinthefirstandsecondEuropeanareasaresubjecttoregional legislation;thoseinthe first European and second Asia Pacific areas operate under port level legislative and regulatoryarrangementsthat, inthecaseofthefirstEuropeanarea,alsoextendtolabourrelationsarrangements;while those in the first Asia Pacific area operate under different federal legislative and regulatoryjurisdictions.Beforeturningtomanagers’perspectivesontheirarrangementsforhealthandsafety,itisimportant to note some of the more significant elements of these varying contexts in which sucharrangementsoperatewithinthedifferentterminals.ThiswedobelowinSection3.3.1.

3.3.1Thebroadercontextsofoperationalmanagementarrangementsinthecasestudyterminals

InEuropearea1allportsarerequiredtosetupthejointbodiesthatemploydockworkersonaday-hirebasis.Employershiremostoftheirdockworkersbytheshiftfromaport-levelpool,thoughsometerminaloperators, including GNTs 2 and 3 which operate terminals EU1T1 and EU1T2 respectively, areincreasinglyemployingdockworkersmorepermanently,bybookingthemforatleast80percentoftheirmonthly shifts (although formally, they are still employed by the joint port authority). This appliesparticularlyfordockworkerswiththegreatestlevelsoftrainingandexperience.Sucharrangementsareallowedforunderthecomplexlawsgoverningportlabour.Nationallawsalsomeanthatdockworkcanonlybecarriedoutbyregistereddockworkerstrainedtoappropriate levelsbythese jointemployment

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bodies8.Asaresultofthesearrangements,itisgenerallyonlyforemenandsupervisors(andmaintenanceworkers, who are directly employed) who have direct contact with terminal operating companymanagers.ThejointemploymentbodiesalsooperatetrainingagenciesandmaybeactiveinOHSpolicydevelopmentandmonitoring–althoughespecially the lattervaries inextent.Theemploymentbody intheportinwhichEU1T2operateshasamuchlesserrolethanthatintheportinwhichEU1T1operates.Bycontrast,inEuropearea2thelackofportauthorityinfluencesonthecasestudyterminalsistheresultof privatisation of ports in the area that began in the 1980s. The country in which the terminals aresituated was in the vanguard of port privatisation. Following a period of bitterly contested industrialdisputesseveraldecadesago,therewasasubstantialdeclineinthedocklabourforcealongwithageneraldeclineintradeunionpresenceandpowerinmanyports.Inthedockswheretradeunionsmanagedtoretain theirorganising role,membership remainshighandunion representation is thenormal formofworkerrepresentation forwidercollectivebargainingaswellashealthandsafety issues.ThetwoGNToperated terminals here (EU2T1 and EU2T2) are among those with these types of labour relationsarrangements,whiletheportoperatedbythenationaloperatorinwhichEU2T3issituatedrepresentsanexampleoftheformerkind,inwhichtradeunionsarenolongeramajorpresenceattheworkplacelevel.All five European terminals are also subject to European legislation. Of particular relevance to theresearch are the requirements relation to theminimum protection level and systematic, participatoryhealthandsafetymanagementbasedonriskassessment.Althoughsubjecttothesamefederallevellegislation,theterminalsinAsiaPacificarea1arecoveredbydifferentstatelegislaturesandlabourinspectorates.Healthandsafetyregulationismainlymadeatstatelevelandhistoricallytherehavebeendifferencesofdetailinprovisionsbetweendifferentstates.Thiswastrue for the different jurisdictions in which the two terminals studied are located. However, recentreformsatfederallevelhaveresultedinasignificantlevelofharmonisationofthestatutorymeasuresinthe two states and currently the legislative requirements for health and safety arrangements in theterminals are similar. Nevertheless, variations in practice still result from the small but significanthistoricaldifferencesinregulatoryrequirements,someofwhichareparticularlyrelevanttoourresearch.For example, althoughOHS legislation has beenmoving towards a national uniformmodel, provisionsrelatingtosafetycommitteesandtheelectionofhealthandsafetyrepresentativesandtheirpowersarenewertotheareainwhichterminalAP1T1operatesthantotheareainwhichterminalAP1T2operates.Thishasanimpactonthearrangementsforworkerrepresentationintheterminals9.Lastly, the four terminals in the second Asia Pacific area operate in a country with a middle-incomeeconomy under the same national legislation and labour inspectorate monitoring. The terminals arelocatedintwoofthecountry’s11majorports.Overallcontainerterminalgrowthhasbeenrapidduringthelastfifteenyearsanddatasuggeststhat,from2000,containerhandlinginthemajorportsofthisareagrewfromaround2.22millionto7.5millionTEUsannuallyin2014.Case study terminalsAP2T1andAP2T2 (operatedbyGNT1andGNT3 respectively) are situated in amajorport thathasbeenprominent inprivatisedportdevelopment since themid-1990s following theopening up of the national economy to inward foreign investment. Terminals AP2T3 and AP2T4(operatedbyGNT1andGNT2)areinanotherportsome1300kilometresawayinwhichGNTshavealsoinvestedforsomeconsiderabletime.Thereissomeevidencetosuggestthattheproductivityoftheseandcontainerterminalsinothermajorportsinthecountryhasbeenachievedlargelythoughdownsizingofthelabourforce(De,2006).Eachport isoperatedbyaTrust,whichhassomeinfluenceoverhealthandsafetyarrangements inourcasestudyterminals.However, theextentof influenceof theseTrustsvaries,withthatcoveringAP2T1

8Thoughemployerscanhireotherworkersforunskilledjobsiftherearenotenoughregistereddockworkersavailable.9 At the time of the case study, health and safety representatives had yet to be elected in AP1T1, where the legislation was newer, but were in place in AP1T2.

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andAP2T2beingthegreater–forexample,extendingtoregularworkplaceinspectionsintheterminalsbytheon-siteporttrustinspectors.Thepoordevelopmentoftransportinfrastructurearoundtheportsinthecountrygenerally,especiallyinthoseconnectingtothemainrailandroadarteries,isafeaturethathasbeennotedtocontributetotheirlimitedeconomicperformance(VanMarle,2012).Forexample,mostofthecasestudyterminalsinothercountries had efficient automated systems throughwhich truck driverswere able to co-ordinate theirterminal visits and consequentlymostwere relatively short. By contrast, in the terminals in this arealargenumbersof loaded trucksand trailersvery frequentlywaited forextendedperiodsof timeat theroadsidewithminimal rest andwelfare facilities available to their drivers. This situation significantlyexacerbated the likelihood of the occurrence of serious health and safety incidents, both outside andinsidetheterminalgates, involvingtrucksandpedestrianworkersand, inat leastoneof theterminals,had resulted in fatalities. These are areas that we return to in later Chapters, but their influence onshaping the systems and proceduresmanagers in the case study terminals described are important tobearinmind.

3.3.2Healthandsafetyoutcomesandperformance

Ingeneral,managersinallofthecasestudyterminalsfeltthatOHSperformancewasgoodandthatthemanagement arrangements theyhadput inplace to achieve thiswere at the very least adequate,withmany seeing their terminal as exemplary in the sector. There was also a widespread view amongmanagers that incidents and injuries were almost exclusively the result of workers not followingprocedures,andacorrespondingviewthatcompliancemonitoring,coupledwithmovestominimiseman-machineinterfaces,havebeenparticularlysignificantinbringingaboutimprovingOHSperformance.Forexample, theheadofhealthandsafetyatEU2T2sawpeople–their lossesofconcentration,negligence,failuretofollowproceduresandlackofsupervision–asthebiggestsafetyriskattheterminal.Liketheircounterparts inmostof theothercasestudy terminals,managersherestressedtheirnoblameculture,making it clear that as longasworkershadnotbeennegligent then theywouldbehelped to improve,usually through retraining. Similarly, managers at AP2T2 felt that under-reporting had significantlyreducedfollowingtheintroductionofareportingschemeandtheiremphasisonnotblamingindividuals.ManagersatAP2T4explainedthattherehadbeentworecentfatalandoneseriousdisabilityincident,allofwhichtheyhadconcludedweretheresultofnon-compliancewithsafetyprocedures.Atthisterminal,managersfeltthatmonitoringcomplianceandsafetybehaviourwaspivotaltosafetyandexplainedthattheyhopedtoinstallCCTVinthenearfuture,suggestingthat ‘constantsurveillanceorpatrolling’mightfurther improve safety. Similarly, the operations managers at AP1T2 regarded the interface betweenpeopleandmachinesasthemostsignificantrisktheterminal’sOHSmanagementsystemwasintendedtoaddress.Managers here felt that the use of CCTV and a new system for recording all radio traffic hadsignificantlyimprovedincidentandnearmissinvestigations.Theirviewwasthattheindustrygenerallywasatoughone,withsomeinjuriesinevitableandalimitedtimethatpeoplecouldworkincertainareasbecause they ‘wear out’. The feeling was that the terminal had gone as far as was possible, withoutbecomingautomated,intermsofminimisingsafetyproblems.

“…one of the big things that’s helped, that’s really helped in the incident investigations is thecameras. Cameras don’t lie. You know, you talk to three people, you’ll get three differentinterpretationsofan event, but the camerashavebeen fantastic.Andalsowe’vegotanewradiosystemwhereitrecordsalltheconversationswhichisfantastictoo,peopleforgetyouknow,heatofthemoment,thingslikethat…”[SafetyManager,AP1T2]

Managersinallofthecasestudyterminalsalsotalkedabouttheinvestigationofincidents,includinghighpotential nearmiss incidents, and the analysis of their causes, at the terminal level. In addition, safetydepartmentmanagersineachterminaltookpartintheirterminaloperatingorganisations’arrangementsforsharingthisinformation.Therewere,however,variationsinhowallofthistookplace,reflectingboth

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thecontextsinwhichterminalswereoperatingandtheiroperatingorganisations’strategicapproaches.Forexample,theemploymentbodiesintheports inwhicheachEuropearea1terminaloperatedhadasignificantroleinthecollectionofperformancedataandinincidentinvestigations.InEU2T1,reportsweremadetotheGNTgloballyand,dependingonincidentseverity,alsotothenationallabour inspectorate. Here managers suggested that the inspectorate took matters seriously, includingconcernsreportedbyworkers,visitingfairlyregularly–somethingtheyfeltwasnotnecessarilythecaseelsewhereintheworld.ThisreflectedaviewheldbymanagersinbothEuropeanareasandinAsiaPacificarea1.Forinstance,managersatAP1T2explainedthattheterminalcompliedwithnationalrequirementsforreportingincidentsofacertainseverity,followingwhichtheinspectoratewouldinvestigate,withtheinvestigationinvolvingahealthandsafetyrepresentative.Inaddition,healthandsafetyrepresentativeswere able to issue a notice to stop work they saw as dangerous (again resulting in an inspectorateinvestigation),withworkersalsoabletocontacttheinspectoratedirectlyabouttheirconcerns.Insomecases,forexampleAP1T1andAP2T1,bothofwhichwereoperatedbyGNT1,corporatelysharedinformationonincidentsandwasalsomadeavailabletoworkers.Datasharingextendedtoareassuchasmanagers’ safety interactionswithworkers, PPE compliance, handrail compliance, nearmiss reportingandclose-outofincidents,thatwerefurtherlinkedintoKPIs.ManagersinEU2T1explainedthattheyencouragedallthoseontheterminaltoreportall incidentsandnearmissesandwereconfidentthatmostdidso,suggestingfurtherthatworkerswerecomfortableaboutlettingthemknowaboutanyissuesorconcernsgenerally.ThiswasaviewthatmanagersinallofthecasestudyterminalsinbothEuropeandAsiaPacificshared.In many terminals, managers had been given corporate level guidance on incident investigation. Forexample, at AP2T2managers explained that investigations followed a standard format put in place byGNT3,thathadstartingcreating‘simulatedincidents’displayedonscreensintheterminalforallworkerstosee.However,thereweresomeapproachestotryingtoreduceincidentsandinjuriesthatwerespecificto individualterminals.Forexample, theoperationsmanageratEU2T2describedaradicalapproachtotryingtoreducevehicleincidentsintheterminalthathefelthadbeenpersistentlyhighforsometime.Inadditiontofittingsomevehicleswithspeedlimiters,thisinvolvedputtingvehiclesthathadbeeninvolvedinanincidentonatrailer‘bloodandall’attheentrancetotheterminal,forallexternaltruckdrivers,aswell as workers, to see. Following this, incidents stopped, and vehicle maintenance costs weresubstantially reduced.On thewhole, this individuality reflected thedegree of autonomy terminals andtheirmanagementteamshadindesigningapproachestotheoperationofOHSmanagement(aswasthecase forEU2T2,whichwasoperatedbyGNT4which tookamuchmore ‘hands-off’ approach than theotherGNTs),ortheextentofthefreedomtheyhadtoadaptcorporateapproachesattheterminallevel.Where terminals’ had a (partially) outsourced workforce, responsibility for incident investigation andmanagementvaried.Forexample,interminalEU2T3,wherealldockworkerswereindirectlyemployed,allincidentsandaccidentswerereportedtothecontractorandthenontoNational2.AlthoughNational2tracked and monitored this information, incident investigations were carried out by the contractor.Nevertheless,thesafetymanagerstressedthatintheeventofanyseriousincidenthisdepartmentcarriedoutaninvestigation:

“…the investigation for general incidentswill be doneby the third-party labour providers. But atany point where the business – being (names company) – feels there’s a risk to the business, orsubstantial enough to cause concern – that somebody’s been seriously injured, or theremight besomesortofliabilityonthebusiness–myteamwillthencarryoutafullydetailedinvestigation.Andobviouslythecontractgivesusfullauthoritytodoso.”[National2SafetyManager,EU2T3]

However, at the organisational level, information about incidents at National 2 terminalswere sharedregionallyandnationallyandinsomecaseswhereanindustryinterestwasperceivedalsopassedontothe national trade association. The area of outsourcing, and its implications for the arrangements

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terminals’management teamsmade formanagingOHS, isonewe return to ingreaterdetail in section3.3.5.3.3.2.1 HealthoutcomesAll the arrangements described above focus primarily on safety and inmost casesmanagers felt thatpolicies in thisareararelychanged.However, thedegree towhichwelfareandhealthwere included inthose arrangements, or acknowledged as being an area for future development, varied substantiallybetweenthecasestudyterminals,asdidtheirrespectiveoccupationalhealtharrangements.Inthemainthis reflected local contexts and traditions. So in Europe, for example, the terminals in Area 1 usedexternaloccupationalhealthservicesinaccordancewiththelegalrequirementinplacethere,whilethoseinArea2,wheretherewasnosuchrequirement,usedamixof in-houseandexternalprovisionswhichvariedintheirarrangements,coverageandreachfromterminaltoterminal.AsimilarlymixedapproachappliedinAsiaPacificArea1,whileinAsiaPacificArea2,terminalspredominantlyusedexternalmedicalsupportforexaminationsandemergencies.Thegreatestdegreeofawarenessandprogress inrelationtoextendingsystemsto incorporatewelfareand health were apparent in the terminals in Europe and those in Asia Pacific area 1. This generallyreflectedleadershipandpersonal‘ownership’oftheareaattheterminallevelratherthancorporatelyledstrategyorgovernance.Forexample,atthetimeofourfirstvisittoterminalEU2T1,whichwasledbyaterminalmanagerwhowas strongly committed to leading on OHS himself (by chairing joint health and safety committeemeetings), managers explained that a section on health had been added to the OHS policy relativelyrecently as part of the terminal’s wider strategy of broadening its coverage of workers’ health andwelfare. They stressed that their medical standards (for example, for pre- and post-employmentscreening)weredevelopedattheterminalratherthanfollowingacorporateapproach.Atthattime,theterminalwasintheprocessofproducinganumberofhealth-relatedpolicies,forexampleonMSDs(ithadcarriedoutavibrationstudyandwasnow includingamusculo-skeletal functionassessment in itspre-employmentmedical)andmentalhealth(includingstressanddepression).Theterminalhadcontractedanorganisationwhichfollowsupemployeesonsicknessabsence.Theaimwasdescribedasassistingtheoccupationalhealthdepartmenttoreferworkerstoaphysiotherapistorpsychologistasearlyaspossiblein any MSD or mental-health related absence. The department was preparing a booklet on healthpromotion and injury management and prevention to cover areas including fatigue and MSDs (againindependentof theGNTglobally).TheHRmanagerdescribedrecentlyhavingwrittenpolicies forareasincludingwellbeing and stressmanagement, aswell as a stress risk assessment (whichwas based onstandards produced by the national labour inspectorate), explaining that these were produced inconsultationwithworkers’representatives.Elsewhere in these high-income area terminals,whilemost provided someon-site occupational healthservices,therewasgrowingawarenessamongmanagementoftheneedtodomoreinrelationtohealth.Forexample,managersinEU2T2feltthathealth-relatedissues,suchasfatigueandstress,werecoveredinrefresherandinductiontrainingtoamuchlesserdegreethansafety-relatedissues.Similarly,thesafetymanager at AP1T1 felt that there was insufficient emphasis on occupational health in the OHSmanagementsystem,explainingthattherewasnofitnesstoworkprocess.Thefocusofthehealthpolicyat the terminal was primarily on noise, eye safety and UV exposure. Managers referred to the recentinvolvement on the terminal of a national organisation focusedondepressionparticularly amongmenthat provided on-site mental health awareness programmes, while the terminal itself providedprogrammesforassistingworkerswithworkandpersonalemotionalandpsychologicalproblems.TheoperationsmanageratAP1T2regardedmanualhandling(amonglashers)andMSDs(amongdrivers)as the second and third greatest risks risk the terminal’s OHS management system was intended toaddress,explainingthatthesafeworkinstructionsweredesignedtospecifywaystominimisetheserisks.For instance, risks associated with lashing, which was identified as one of the most risky jobs, were

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tackled throughmanual handling training, advice on pre-work stretches, toolbox talks andworking inpairs, job rotation (between lashing and straddle driving), and the provision of on-site physiotherapy.They explained that drivers had set periods of driving and break time (90 minutes and 30 minutesrespectively).Thesewereareasthatwereincludedintheterminal’senterpriseagreementwiththeunion.TheportlevelagreementcoveringEU1T1specifiedwhichcategoriesofdockworkercoulddowhichjobs–somethingthatmanagerswerekeentochange,preferringtohavemulti-skilleddockworkerswhocanmovefromonejobtypetoanother.TheyarguedthatthiswouldreduceMSDrisksbybeingergonomicallybetterfordockworkers.Managersinthemiddleincometerminals,oftenreferredtoawareness-raisingcampaigns,manyofwhichextendedbeyondtheterminal.Forexample,thesafetydepartmentatAP2T1wasresponsibleforhealthcampaigns (such as arranging for doctors to visit the terminal and give advice), as well as for safety,healthandenvironmentalawareness-raisingcampaignsaimedattruckdrivers,workers’familiesandsoon.Theyalsoreferredtotheergonomicimprovementsmade,forexample,tocranechairs.Inthisregard,they stressed that crane drivers were trained on a simulator to use appropriate postures and thatreferralsweremadeforanydriverssufferingfrom,forexample,backproblems.Similarly,AP2T2managersreferredtoofferingeye,dentalandhealthcheck-upsaswellastoprovidingregularyogasessionsandacanteen,andthereis, inpreparation,apolicyonviolenceintheworkplace.However,whilesomemanagersattheterminalfeltthatfatiguewasanissueasit‘justaddsontosafetyproblems’,othersfeltthatitwasnotaproblemasworkersweregivensufficientresttimeandfacilities,explainingthattheterminalmetnationalworkingtimeregulations.Inaddition,mostmanagersfeltthat,withtheintroductionofergonomicequipmentandmotivationalandpromotionalsessions(suchasyoga),theterminalhadnoMSDproblems,explainingthattherehadbeennoseriouscasesofbackpain inthefivetosixyearspriortoourpreliminarystudy.Likewise,AP2T4managersfeltthatstresswaslowerintheirterminalthaninotherterminalsbecauseoftheprovisionsofrelief,breaksandmeals.MSDsweredescribedasnotbeingaproblemattheterminalbecausetheworkforcewasyoung–withveryfewworkersover30.Theterminalalsoprovidedwelfare(canteen) and recreational facilities (including chess and setting up cricket and volleyball teams toencourage team spirit). When asked about fatigue among crane drivers, the operations managerexplainedthatworkerswereprovidedwithergonomicallysoundchairsandwereencouragedtoreporttirednesstothesupervisor.Hesaidthatstaffinglevelswerearrangedsothattherewerefiveorsix‘spare’workerswhocouldberotatedtoreducefatigueandstresslevels,somethingthatwaspossiblebecauseofthecomparativecostoflabourinthearea:

“HerethemanpowercostislowsoIcanaffordtohavetwoadditionalmenontheshiftwhowillgoaroundrelievingpeople.…theworkforcehereisveryyoung.Mostofmyoperatorsareintheirearly20s…”[GeneralManager,AP2T4]

Owingtothecurrentunder-utilisationofAP2T3, themanagers’viewwasthatoperationssuchasthoseinvolvingcranesandtruck-trailersinloadingandunloadingwerenotexcessivelydemanding.Generallyin this terminal, (aswithAP2T4), thedirectlyemployedworkforcewascomparativelyyoungandwell-educated,withtertiary leveleducationalqualifications.Accordingtomanagement, thiswasadeliberatestrategyaimedatrecruitmentofabetterqualifiedworkforce.Amedicalinsuranceschemewasavailableto the directly employed workers at the terminal that, in the view of the managers was a generousscheme.In essence, the high-income terminals led the way on the extension of OHS arrangements to coverworkers’ health andwelfare. In these terminals, this varied from relatively recent and fairly extensiveattemptstoincludehealthandwelfareinpolicies,toanawarenessthatthisisasareainwhichtherewasstill much work to be done. In the middle-income terminals, the reluctance to acknowledge possiblehealtheffectswasrelativelycommon,andevenwheretheywereacknowledgedtheemphasistendedto

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beonawareness-raisingasopposedtopreventivepolicyorprocedures.Importantlyhowever,corporateleadershipwasnotobviousinanyoftheinitiatives,withtheexceptionofAP1T2whereproceduresandpoliciesonareasincludingbullyingandharassmentweredescribedasbeingledfromthecorporatelevelbyNational 1’sHR department – though a numberwere linked to legislation or to other stakeholderssuchastheunionsandmostwereaimedattacklingorpreventingproblemsonanindividualbehaviourbasisratherthanonconsideringtheoftenorganisationalsourcesoftheproblems.

3.3.3Workerparticipationandconsultation

Managers inallof the terminalsdescribed thevariousways inwhich theydisseminated information toworkers. These usually included some combination of, for example, toolbox talks, posters, videos,newsletters,emailsandaccesstoelectronicinformation,withvariationstendingtoreflectterminalleveldifferencesinresources.Thearrangementsforrepresentativeworkerparticipationandconsultationthatmanagersdescribed,variedsubstantially. In themain, this reflected thedifferent legislativeand labourrelationscontextswithinwhichtheterminalswereoperating.InEuropearea1,wheretheportsinwhichbothEU1T1andEU1T2aresituatedwerestronglyunionised,with practically all dockworkers members of one of two or three main unions. Elected unionrepresentativessatontheport-widejointhealthandsafetycommittees(althoughtheoneforEU1T2hadanarrowmandate,asmostOHSissueswerehandledwithineachterminal,inwhichtherearealsolocaljoint OHS committees) and the unions acted jointly in collective contract negotiations over workingconditions.Thesearrangementsreflectstrongnationalandsectorallabourrelations’traditionswhicharesupportedbyEuropean andnational legislation.Nevertheless, somedifferencesbetween the terminalsremainedbecauseofthedifferentlevelsofinfluenceheldbythetwoportemploymentbodies.InterminalEU1T1,wheretheemploymentbodyhasamuchbroadermandatethanthatforEU1T2,whiletherewasajointhealthand safety committeeat theport level chairedby the joint employmentbodywhichmeetsmonthly, there was no terminal level joint health and safety committee. Managers at the terminaldescribed consulting workers on safe work procedures but referred to some resistance to theirintroduction. They described regular six-monthlymeetingswith each category of dockworker but felttherewas little interest in thesemeetings,with fewworkersattending,andexpressedapreference fordirectcommunicationwithworkers,emphasisingtheirpolicyofencouragingallworkerstobringsafetyissuestomanagementthemselves.Arrangements at EU1T2 are similar, though there was also a terminal level joint health and safetycommitteeonwhichelectedunionrepresentativessit.Heretheterminal’ssafetymanagerdescribedhisdepartment’s approach asmore one of trying to reach agreements on safe working than formulating,issuingandenforcingprocedures.InEuropearea2,virtuallyallthoseinvolvedindockworkinterminalsEU2T1andEU2T2weremembersofasingleunion.Intheseterminalsrepresentationwasagainthroughelectedunionrepresentativeswhoweremembersof the terminals’ jointhealthandsafety committees.At terminalEU2T1 this committeewaschairedbytheterminal’smanagingdirectorandincludedrepresentativesofotherstakeholderssuchas thehuman resources andoccupational healthdepartments, the civil engineering contractor and theoperationsdepartmentofthecontractorworkforce.AtEU2T2,whichhadamuchlargerworkforce,eachofthefourshiftsattheterminalhaditsownjointsafetycommitteechairedbytheshiftmanager.Thesecommittees fed information into a container division committee, which in turn fed into the executivecommittee, chaired by the head of operations. In turn, informationwas fed back down through thesehierarchies, and here again all the committees included representatives of any other relevant bodies(suchasthepoliceforce).Managers at EU2T1 stressed thatworkerswere encouraged to provide feedback andbecome involvedwherever possible – for example in areas such as ongoing training. Senior managers talked aboutconsulting workers during the development phase of new procedures and practices, as well as thepurchaseofnewequipment(including,forexample,sendingsmallteamstootherterminalselsewherein

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theorganisationtoseeproceduresorplant inuseanddiscuss itwiththeircounterparts).Theirviewisthatthisprocess,andinparticulartheprovisionofinformationonwhycertaindecisionshadbeentaken,had enhanced workers’ ‘ownership’ and so acceptance of and compliance with newways of working.Theyalsoreferredtotheintroductionofsystemsforprovidingfeedbacktoindividualworkerswho,forexample,reportedafaultwithequipmentoradefectinthequaysidesurface.Themanagement view at bothEU2T1 andEU2T2,whereworkers and their representativeswere alsodescribedasbeinginvolvedinareassuchasriskassessmentandincidentinvestigation,wasthatworkersfeltveryinvolvedinalloftheterminal’ssafetymanagementarrangements.InalloftheseEuropeanterminalsinareas1and2,workers’healthandsafetyinterestswererepresentedbyelectedunionrepresentatives.Theserepresentativeswereprovidedwithtimeofffromtheirdutiesnotonlytoattendthejointhealthandsafetycommitteemeetingsbutalsotoprepareforthosemeetings.At terminalEU2T3,whereunionmembershipwasmuch lowerandthewholeworkforcewas indirectlyemployed, the arrangementsdescribedwere similar, but theway theywere explained asworkingwasdifferent. Here union representatives sat on the joint health and safety committee, as did any otherworkerswhowished to attend, aswell as representatives fromNational 2 and the port’s police force.However, managers made it clear that reps’ and workers’ attendance depended on operations and,further, that the union representatives were tolerated rather than seen as contributing to OHSarrangementsandmanagement:

“…werecogniseanumberofunionsafetyreps–mainly ‘causewehaveto…theproblemis... theydon’t talk toeachother.… I think theycould talkbetter.They’ll say,when theycome in, thatno-one’slisteningtothem,butunfortunatelytheydon’tunderstandhowbigbusinessworks,andIthinktheyjustthink“there’saproblem;let’sthrowapileofmoneyatit,it’llbedonetomorrow”andlife’sjustnotlikethat;soyouhavetoprioritise.Andit’slike...weencouragetheshopfloortoputhazardobservationsin,andthen...butsometimesyouneedcontinuoushazardobsforthesamehazard,forittoupscaleandthenbecomeagreaterpriority;itdependsonwhatitis…”[ContractorOperationsManager,EU2T3]

Nevertheless,managersfeltthatthecommitteedidprovidetwo-waycommunication.Theyalsodescribedan ‘improvement group’ which consisted of volunteer workers representing various groups (cranedrivers,stevedoresetc.)thatwasintendedtopassonworkers’concernstomanagers.However,theyfelt,although they had tried to encourage it, that this group did notwork verywell. Itwas also clear thatworkers and their representatives had significantly less, if any, involvement in areas such as riskassessmentandincidentinvestigationthantheircounterpartsintheothercasestudyterminalsinEuropearea2.Turning to Asia Pacific area 1, in both case study terminals (where virtually all dockworkers weremembersof the sameunion), as in those inEuropearea1 and terminalsEU2T1andEU2T2 in area2,regulatory requirements for terminal-level joint health and safety committees were met andrepresentationonhealthandsafetywasincreasinglybyelectedunionofficials.At AP1T1, in the event of a proposed change to any part of the OHS management system, managersdescribed a consultative process involving workers. For example, before a proposed change to aprocedure, managers put together a team involving workers and a safety facilitator to consider thechange and the work instructionmodification. Tiered documentation from policy procedures to workinstructionswas provided,withwork instructions providing basic task descriptions.When thesewereproducedorchanged,workerswhousethemwereusuallyinvolvedintheirdevelopmentand/orreview.Workerswerealsoinvolvedinriskassessmentsandtheterminalhadaworkerengagementprogrammedesigned to get workers involved – for example by putting together a team to work on the recentdevelopment of standards (in relation tomirrors, seat belts etc.) for the terminal’s internal transportvehicles.

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Therewas,however,cleartensionbetweentheterminal’smanagementandtheunionatthetimeofourstudy.Forexample,thesafetymanagerdescribedcompliancewithPPEuseasatabout99%andfeltthatthe shortfall,which he regarded as larger than that for other safety critical industries such asmining,reflecteddockworkcultureandunioninsistencethatworkersshouldnotacceptdirectinstructionsfrommanagement. Similarly, the terminalmanager felt that the unionwas trying to use its involvement inindustrial relations meetings to buy in to health and safety discussions. Similar tensions were alsoapparentatAP1T2atthetimeofourcasestudy.The operations manager at AP1T2 described a recent dramatic reduction in incidents across theorganisation(National1)followingasignificantchangeoffocusatthehighestlevelofthecompany.Thenumberofhealthprofessionalsintheorganisationwassubstantiallyincreased,whichhefelthadledtoacascadingdownofemphasisontheimportanceofproactivityandworkerengagement.Thisinturnhadpromptedanincreaseinsafetywalksandtalkswithworkers,aswellasinconsultation.Hisviewwasthatthiscorporatechangehadbeeninstigatedforthreereasons:firstthechangeofthemostseniormanagers;seconda fatalityatasister terminal(whichhe felthadoccurredbecausetheworkerwasnot followingthesafeworkinstructions);andthirdthelegislativechangemakingbusinessownersliableforworkplaceincidents.InAsiaPacificarea2,uniondensityvariedsubstantially,asdidunionindependence(Table3.2),sincenotonlywere independentdockworkers’unionsnotpresent inallof theterminalsandpartytonegotiatedCollectiveBargainingAgreementsonly in some,but inmost cases the companieshad setup theirown‘company unions,’ making workers’ representation more complex and led to a situation in which themajorityofworkerswereeitherunrepresented,orrepresentedby‘companyunions’.Thishadanimpacton arrangements for representation and consultation, though the management view was that thesearrangementswereeffectiveandfunctionedwell.

Table3.2:EmploymentandunionisationlevelsinthecasestudyterminalsinthesecondAsiaPacificarea

TERMINALANDGNT

TOTALWORKFORCE

SIZE

PROPORTIONOFWORKFORCEINDIRECTLYEMPLOYED

UNIONDENSITYManagement

‘union’Independent

unionAP2T2,GNT3 1083 71% 23% 57%

AP2T1,GNT1 751 54% 56% 7%

AP2T3,GNT1 560 54% 20% 11%

AP2T4,GNT2 527 72% NA 14%AtAP2T1, forexample,whereunder10%of theworkforcewas representedbyan independentunion,managers explained that the joint health and safety committee meetings were attended by safetydepartment managers, the CEO, the heads of all the other departments and representatives of thecontractorsandeachgroupofdirectlyemployedworkersbyjobtype.Managersfeltthatrepresentativeswere willing to participate and provided useful feedback about the work. They explained thatrepresentativeswerekeptfreefromtheirdutiestobeabletoattendthemeetingsandwentontosaythatworkerswereinvolvedinanychangestoproceduresandequipmentpurchases.TerminalAP2T2hadthehighestproportionofindependentunionmembershipatover50%.Hereagaintherewasa jointhealthandsafetycommitteemeetingattendedbyworkersor theirrepresentativesaswellasmanagers.Managersdescribedthesemeetingsaswellattendedandinvolving‘healthydiscussion’and ‘not fault finding’but ‘fact finding’withaview to improvingexisting systems.Theyexplained thatworkerswereencouraged tocomeupwith theirown ideas, forwhich theywererewarded.Theywerehoping to re-instigate the port level safety meetings that used to take place, but at the time of ourpreliminarystudythishadnothappened.Workersortheirrepresentativeswereinvolvedininspections(for example of electrical substations) and in PPE procurement by being given equipment to try and

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provide feedback.The terminalhada systemof life expectancy forPPE (whichmanagers explained, insome instances,workershadchallengedandreduced).Theterminal’s ‘internal’unionwasdescribedasbeinginvolvedinthedevelopmentofpoliciesandpracticesonwhichitwasaskedtosignoff–atwhichpointtheycouldmakesuggestionsorraisesafetyissues,thoughmanagerssaidthatthiswasrare.AP2T4,however,hadnojointhealthandsafetycommittee.Managersexplainedthattherehadbeenoneinthepastthathadinvolvedworkers’representatives,butitwasnolongerinplaceasworkershadnotsupported it by attending meetings. Managers did refer to ‘regular dialogue’ which they felt coveredsafety issues. Therewas also a regularmanagers’ safety committeemeeting chaired by the terminal’sgeneralmanager.Theterminalhadasuggestionboxbutno-onehadmadeanysuggestions.Thesystemofdutysafetyinspectors,inwhichworkerscarriedoutinspectioninrotation,wasseenasmoresuccessfulfortworeasons.First,thoseinvolvedintheinspectionsweremoresafetyconsciousduringtheirnormalworkandsecond,theyprovidedafurtheropportunityforfeedback.Managersencouragedfeedbackandheldmonthlywelfaremeetingsatwhichdirectlyemployedworkerscouldairtheirviews,particularlyiftheregularchannels(reportingtoasupervisorwhoreportedtoamanager)hadnotresolvedtheissue.Overall, arrangements for representation and consultation appeared to be broadly similar in mostterminals, but in practice their operation varied within the prevailing labour relations contexts.Nevertheless,managersgenerallythoughtthatthesystemsinplaceintheirterminalworkedwell.Therewasatendency,inAsiaPacificarea2inparticular,toequatelackofengagementonthepartofworkerswithlackofinterestin,orperhapsevenneedfor,communication–despitethefactthatsafetycommitteemeetings (where they existed) tended to be arranged without reference to representatives’ ability toattend.

3.3.4Workorganisationandarrangementsforitsmanagement

Incomparisonwitharrangements formanagingsafety, therewereconsiderably fewerarrangements inplaceformanagingtheimpactofworkorganisation.Whenaskedaboutthisarea, therewasatendencyamongsomemanagers tosuggest that itwassomethingoverwhichtheyhadrelatively littlecontrolorabilitytoinfluence.For example, theport level agreement coveringEU1T1 specifies numbers of dockworkers required inteamsbothonthequaysideandon-boardvessels,withemployers liable forcontractual fines if theydonot follow the requirements. Heremanagers felt thatwhile following these stipulations, they kept thenumbersofdockworkerstoaminimum,atthesametimeensuringthattherewereenoughpresentforthe work to be done safely. They suggested that work was often carried out at high speed at theinstigationofworkerswhowantedtobeabletofinishearly.Somedidacknowledgethatonoccasiondockworkers may take on ‘economic responsibility’ themselves (by working at high speed because of aperception that thiswaswhatmanagementwanted, for example, to get a ship ready to leavewith theincoming tide),butstressed that thiswasagainst theirclear instructionsonalwaysputtingsafety first.Theysuggestedthatthisconflictbetweensafetyandproductivitywasdifficultforthemtohandlebecauseofthelongdistancebetweenmanagementandtheworkforce.Similarly,theEU2T2headofhealthandsafetyacknowledgedthattheterminal’s12hourshiftsonafouronfouroffpatternmightbeacontributoryfactorintermsof incidentsbycreatingfatigue,butstressedthat theworkforce liked this arrangement andwould resist any change to it, andwent on to describetrainingthroughwhichhefelt that ‘peoplearegiventhetools’.Heexplainedthattheterminal followedlocalworking time regulations, and that the occupational health department carried out nightworkerassessmentspartofregular(fiveyearly)medicalcheck-ups,whilethesafetydepartmentalsocarriedoutperiodicassessmentsofworkinghourstopreventexcessiveovertime.Aswasalsocommoninmanyoftheterminals,workersatAP1T1couldearnproductivitybonuses,whilemanagershadbonuseslinkedtotheirregionalOHSKPItargets.Thesafetymanageracknowledgedsomeincentive for shortcut-taking associated with the productivity bonus, but felt that this had been

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successfullyaddressedbymanagement’semphasisontheimportanceofnottakingshort-cuts(illustratedbyitsrecent‘don’tdieforadeadline’awareness-raisingprogramme).Heexplainedthathewascurrentlytrying to correlate safety performance andproductivity for each team to check on this,with a view topossiblydevelopingarewardscheme(probablyintheformofvouchers)inrelationtosafety.InAP2T1,wheremanagers stressed that safetyalwayscame first in thebalancebetweenbusinessandoperations and that employeesweremadeaware that safety shouldneverbe compromised, the safetydepartmentmanagerreferredtoatimemanagementsystemformonitoringanyinstancesofworkover12 hours. Similarly, AP2T4managers explained that the terminal followed ILO guidelines on workingtime. Thismeant ensuring thatworkers did not domore than48hours perweek, thoughon occasionworkersmightbeaskedtodomorebutthatthisneverexceeded62hours.Overall therewasrelatively little inwhatmanagers toldus that focusedonstrategies formanagingtheimpact ofwork organisation onworkers’ safety, health orwelfare. This is perhaps summed up by theoperationsmanagerforthecontractoratEU2T3:

“It’sjustthatthingshavechanged;youusedtobeabletojustclimbonthecontainerandyoucan’tdothatnow;it’sjuststeppingonthatchair’s“workingatheight”now…alotofthat’sdowntothemedia…“wherethere’sablame,there’saclaim”andstufflikethat.Sosafetyhasmovedon–it’shadtomoveon,rightlyorwrongly.…Ithinkitcanholdyouup,butitisobviouslythereforthegreatergood.There’snothingwrongwithHealthandSafety,it’sjusthavingtherightpragmaticapproach,isn’tit?”[ContractorOperationsManagers,EU2T3]

3.3.5Outsourcing

Insevenofourcasestudyterminals,thoseinEuropearea2andAsiaPacificarea2,atleastaproportionoftheworkforcewasoutsourcedandthishadimplicationsforOHSanditsmanagement.TurningfirsttoEuropearea2,asdescribedabovebothEU2T1andEU2T2havestrongtraditionsoffulldirectemploymentamongdockworkersbuteachhasexperiencedchangesinthisareainrecentyears.InEU2T1 approximately half the 400 strong workforce is directly employed by GNT 1. The rest of theworkforceissuppliedbyacontractorwhichhasbeeninplaceformanyyears.Withtheexceptionofcranedriving, indirectly employed workers can carry out all the same duties as their directly employedcounterparts,buttheyaremoreoftenusedinworkon-boardvesselsthandirectlyemployedworkers.Asa result, although most of the indirect workforce is multi-skilled, around 15-20% are only trained inpaddingandlashing.InterminalEU2T2atthetimeofthecasestudyatrialhadjustbegunofanindirectlyemployedworkforcein addition to the over 2000 workers directly employed by GNT 4. The senior union official at theterminalexplainedthatanyindirectemploymenthadbeenstronglyresistedbytheunionformanyyearsbutthat,inresponsetotheopeningofanewterminalrunbyarivaloperatorinthesamearea,atrialuseofcontractworkersalongsidethedirectlyemployedworkforcewasunderway.Heremanagersexplainedthat, in addition to more flexible contracts, some of these workers’ conditions were different – forexampletheycoulddriveforthreehourscontinuously,ratherthanthetwoandaquarterhoursallowableunderthecollectiveagreementthatcoveredthemainworkforce.Managersalsodescribedthesechangesasaresponsetocurrentcompetitionintheregion.In both these terminals, health and safetymanagementprocesses and arrangementswere extended tocover indirectly employed workers and the terminals’ management sought to influence contractorganisations in terms of OHS. Despite these efforts, however, there were some differences in theirworkingconditionsandarrangements(forexampleinrelationtoshiftpatterns,timeoffandbreaks),thatinterminalEU2T1hadledtoaviewamongtheseworkersthattheyaregivenpoorerqualityjobs.

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As described in section 3.3.1, the entire operationalworkforce at EU2T3 is outsourced. As in terminalEU2T1,thesinglecontractorhadbeeninplaceforsomeyears,butinthiscase,aspartofacompetitiveprocess, it periodically has to re-tender for the work. National 2 managers at the terminal felt thatoutsourcinglabourprovidedjobsecuritybecauseitreducedrunningandoverheadcosts.TheNational2safety manager explained that the contractor worked to National 2’s safety management systemrequirements.Thismeantthatpoliciesandprocedures,safeworkingpracticesandsafesystemsofworkwere driven by National 2, with day-to-day supervision of those systems by the contractor and anoverseeing perspective from National 2 shift managers, supervisors and safety department staff.Information was disseminated via a two-tier system, with National 2 holding daily briefings with thecontractorandthecontractorthenbriefingtheiroperationalteams.Thiswasdescribedasacontinuousloopofcommunication.National2alsosetthecontractoraseriesofoperations,finance,andhealthandsafetyKPIs,aswellasincludingrequirementsinrelationtocapacityforsafetymanagementinitstenderspecifications.National2managerswereabletostopworkanddismissworkers immediately,althoughmanagersexplainedthattheygenerallytooka‘coaching’approachorsimplynotifiedsupervisorsofanyminorissues.Theterminaloperatedahazardobservationsystemthroughwhichworkerscouldreportissuesandnearmisses. This information was checked and actions assigned by National 2, and all information wasavailable to both National 2 and the contractor managers. Contractor managers were confident thatworkersdidmakereports,particularlyiftheysawNational2spendingmoneyonimprovements.Therewasaviewamongthecontractormanagersthatworkerstrustedthatcontractormanagersdidasmuchastheycould toaddressconcernsbut that theywere limitedbywhatNational2woulddo.This reflectedtensionbetweenthecontractormanagerandNational2.Forexample,thecontractoroperationsmanagerexplainedthatNational2notifiedhimofitsrequirementsforthefollowingdaybetween13.00and15.00,with consequent difficulties for planning its guaranteed40hoursperweekofwork for all operationalstaff.Managersexplainedthat,asaresult,thoughtheytriedtogiveworkerssufficienttimeoffbetweenblocksofdayandnightshifts,andtriedtoensuretheyhadonedayoffineightortwoin12,thiswasnotalways possible (though they stressed that national requirements onworking timesweremet). Thesearrangementsmeant thatworkers called the contractormanagement team each afternoon to find outwhethertheywereworkingthefollowingday–meaningthatmanagersdealtwitharound200callseachdayonthisissuealoneandworkershadverylimitednoticeoftheirworkingarrangements.ManagementdescribedcommunicationwithNational2as‘abigproblem’astheorganisationassumedthecontractorhad lots of staff available to do anything at any time (for example, requesting extra staff above thestandardhiremaximumwhen theywanted tokeeponeof their clientshappy).They stressed that thisreflected the relationshipwith thosemiddlemanagers setting requirements on a daily basis, whereasthoseatthemoreseniorlevelwereseenasbeingmoreunderstanding.InAsiaPacificarea2,all thecasestudyterminals inthisregionwereoperatedbyamixof indirectanddirectly employedworkers and in each case indirectly employedworkersmadeup themajority of thetotalworkforce(seeTable3.2).Generally,mostofthecontractlabourwasaccountedforbyarelativelysmall number of contractors (fewer than10) that had a long-standing relationshipwith the terminals’management.Soalthoughsometurnoverisexperiencedamongcontractors,managersintheseterminalsfelt that hiring contractors was stable. The general approach to contracted out work suggested bymanagerswasthattheterminaloperationalactivities(i.e.managementandadministration, loadingandunloadingoperationsincludingcraneoperation,safetyservices,maintenanceandengineering)remainedunderthecontrolofdirectlyemployedworkers.Infact,outsourcingwasmoreextensivethanthisinallthe terminals. In addition to catering, cleaning, building and repair, it also included truck-trailer andlashing operations and therewas further outsourcing of rubber-tyre gantry crane operation andotherspecialisedwork.In most of these terminals, managers referred to systems for specifying safety requirementscontractually, against which organisations were monitored and if necessary, sanctioned. For example,AP2T1 safety managers explained that contracts included clauses covering aspects such as therequirementforannualmedicalsandamaximumshiftlengthof12hours.Contractworkerswereissuedwith a card after induction training, which expired after a year – to ensure they received refresher

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training. Managers stressed the importance of ensuring that contractors were aware that they had towork to AP2T1’s standards. They described terminating the contract with one organisation whichrepeatedly allowed workers to work extra hours. Similarly, at AP2T2 contractor organisations weremonitored to ensure that workers did not work excessive hours. Contracts included requirements inrelationtohealthandsafety(forexample,pre-workmedicalsandsubsequentregularmedicalreviews),and managers explained that they planned to include further mandatory requirements (for examplecoveringtrainingandtheneedtohavetheirownsafetyprogramme)inthefuture.ContractorswerealsoauditedbyAP2T2managers,andrequiredtohavetheirownsafetymanagerwhoactedasacontactpointfortheterminalmanagementteam,andwereencouragedtousethesamePPEprocurementagenciesastheterminal,toensureconsistency.AtAP2T3theprocurementproceduresalsorequiredspecificationofhealth and safety standards by tenderers. Managers indicated that they believed health and safetyrequirements on contractors had increased in number and rigour. There were special provisions tomanage contractors and theirworkers and amanagerwith responsibility for the oversight of this andrelationswithcontractors.Performance was monitored and occasionally contracts terminated if performance is deemedunsatisfactory. Qualifications of contractor employeeswere checked and training provided to all, withsatisfactorycompletionoftrainingrequired.ManagementatAP2T4soughttoinfluencehealthandsafetyamong contractor organisations by including non-negotiable terms in their contractors (for example,requiring contractor staff to undergo the terminal induction training to obtain a port pass as well asregularrefreshertraining,andrequiringeachcontractororganisationtohaveasafetyofficer.Ifthiswasnotpossible,havingsafetycheckssupervisedbytheterminal’smanagement;andrequiringtheuseofPPEandfollowingofsafetyrulesandprocedures).Inaddition,contractworkersatAP2T4weresubjecttothesamesafetysystemsandproceduresasdirectlyemployedworkers,includingbeingobligedtofollowthesameGNT2providedtrainingandhavingtheirworkinghoursmonitoredtopreventexcessworking,aswell as being subject to safety rewards and penalties, with violations further linked to contractors’payments.Managerswere clear that any health and safety problems experienced by contractworkerswerethecontractorganisation’sresponsibility.MostterminalmanagersintheAsiaPacificarea2casestudiessaidthattheycoulddisciplineindividualcontract workers for non-compliance. However, at AP2T2 managers explained that if they foundindividual contractor workers involved in unsafe work they went through the contractor rather thanapproachingtheworkerdirectly–exceptinthecaseofnon-useofPPE.AtAP2T4,intermsofmonitoringsafebehaviour,informationwasprovidedtoallcontractorganisationsconcerningsafebehaviourandtheprocedures for monitoring it. Incidences of unsafe behaviour were reported to the contract labourmanager and an inquirywould be conductedwith the supervisory staff of the contractor. Therewerefollow-upproceduresinplacetoaddressbreachesofthesafetysystemandarangeofpenaltiescouldbeappliedfromwarningsthroughtosuspensionsanddismissal.ManagersatAP2T4hadinstigateda jointinspectionsysteminwhichallcontractorshadtoparticipate.Thiswasdescribedbymanagersasbeingaresponse to poor safety monitoring and supervision by contractor managers. It involved fining thecontractororganisationsforworkers’breachesofregulations,suchasnon-useofPPE.Ifcontractorsweredeemedtobeatfaultinanincidenttheycouldberequiredtopayforanycostsincurred,andindividualworkers (direct or indirect)were issuedwithwarning letters.Managerswere clear that their currentapproachinrelationtocontractorswasnotparticipative:

“…the other safety aspect is the behavioural aspects. That’s where, for example, it’s morecharacteristichereandsomeofitismore,Iwouldsay,punitivewhichIthinkeventuallywillbecomemore participative.….basicallywe do have dialogueswith the contractors and thenwe discuss itand procedures that we are implementing but encouraging them to implement without forcingthem is notworkable at this point of time – here in[namesarea]. Sowehave to say youhave toimplement this … At this point of time… the people here are not ready to just adopt the safetypracticesvoluntarily.”[GeneralManager,AP2T4]

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There was also considerable variation in relation to the facilities and conditions afforded to contractworkersintheseterminals.Forinstance,inAP2T1theterminal’scanteenwasavailabletoall-indirectlyaswell as directly employedworkers. At terminal AP2T2,managers stressed that indirectly employedworkers had access to terminal facilities (such as the canteen, free 24 hour paramedic service, on-sitehealthcentre,andeye,dentalandhealthcheck-ups),aswellasgoingthroughasimilarinductionprocessand the same terminal-provided refresher training. Similarly, atAP2T3 employees of contractorswereeligibletobepartofanemployeeprovidencefundandtherewerechecksinplacetoensurebenefitswerepaid.Welfarefacilitiesforcontractors,however,wereprovidedincontainersdedicatedforthispurpose,and therewere toilet facilities and drinkingwater located near them.Managers said that the terminalcompanywaswilling and able to provide canteen facilities but explained that this had not been donebecause contract workers did not wish to pay for it (though there was a suggestion that it would beincluded in future contracts). AP2T4 managers also acknowledged that direct workers had betterconditions than indirect workers in terms, for example, of medical insurance but felt this was notsomething they could influence. They explained that while they would, for example, ask if a directemployeewasOKiftheylookedtiredduringatoolboxtalk,thiskindofmonitoringwasnotinplaceforcontractworkers.Arrangements forparticipationandconsultationalsovaried.Forexample,atAP2T1managersstressedthatrepresentativesof thecontractororganisationswere included in jointhealthandsafetycommitteemeetings.However, contractworkershad their own representatives and contractor organisationsheldtheir own health and safety committee meetings. At AP2T2, managers explained that the monthlycontractor meetings were run by terminal managers and attended by senior contractor staff andrepresentativesoftheirworkforce.Managersdiscussedanyunsafeactsandincidentsinvolvingcontractworkers, as well as passing on any other information, including from, for example, their monthlyinspectionofcontractors’vehicles.AtAP2T3thereweremonthlymeetingsbetweencontractorsandtheirworkers and the terminal management responsible for them during which they would be giveninformation concerning new projects, actions concerns and expectations. There were opportunities toraise issues at thesemeetings,whichwere generally attendedby some50 to 60 contractors and theirworkers.Terminalmanagersstressedtheimportanceofhearingtheviewsofcontractors.In essence,whileoutsourcingof labourwaspresent in the terminals inEuropearea2andAsiaPacificarea 2, there were differences between the regions in the way this was managed, reflecting nationalcontexts and, in particular, prevailing conditions in relation to outsourcingmore generally and labourrelations arrangements. On the whole managers expressed the view that they operated safetymanagementsystemsthatcaredforallworkers,includingthosewhowereemployedbycontractorsandtheyweredoingasmuchastheycouldtominimiserisktotheirsafety,healthandwelfare.Thesubsectionsabovethatmakeupsection3.3haveusedtheviews,perspectivesanddescriptionsofthemanagersthattookpartinourresearchtooutlinehowthepoliciesoftheorganisationsrunningthecasestudy terminalswere translated into terminal level arrangements, systemsandprocedures.From theirpointofview,asinthepreviousstudy,theseterminallevelarrangementsweregenerallyseenpositivelyanddescribedasbeingeffectiveandsufficient.

3.4 Butfromtheworkers’perspective?

The foregoingaccountprovidesa richdescriptionofhealthandsafetygovernanceandmanagementatbothcorporatelevelandwithinthebusinessunitsrepresentedbythecontainerterminals,asseenfromtheperspectiveofmanagers,supervisorsandoccupationalsafetyandhealthadvisers. Inthemain,theydescribedasetofsystemsthatappearedbroadlysimilar(thoughtherewereoften,infact,differencesinoperationandpractice,particularlyinrelationtoworkerparticipation)andwhichfocusedprimarilyonsafety–withrelativelylittleinclusionorcoverageofhealth,welfareandworkorganisation.Therewasageneral senseamong these interviewees that thearrangementsandsystems inplace in their terminalswereeffective–with,forexample,safetyperformanceseenasbeinggoodandarrangementsforworkerparticipationsasworkingwell.Theywereinclusive–suchthat,forinstance,systemsweredescribedas

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covering indirectly employed workers as far as was possible and they were sufficient – in that theycoveredalltheareasoverwhichmanagementcontrolwasperceived.Workers participating in the previous studywho experienced the operation of these arrangements, aswell as their trade union representatives, did not always share these perspectives. Indeed they werecriticalabouttheeffectivenessoftheprovisionsmade.Asimilarviewwassharedintheinterviewswithworkersandtheirrepresentativesinthepresentstudy.Inshort,inourqualitativedata,agapwasclearlyevidentbetweenwhatthesystemsinplacewereintendedtoachieveintermsoftheexperienceofasafeandhealthyworkenvironmentastheyweredescribedbythemanagersandthesafetyadviserswhowereresponsible for their operation and the ‘lived experience’ of this environment as presented to us byworkers and their representatives. The latter experience led our respondents to comment on theirterminals’provisionforOHSintworatherdifferentways.Ontheonehand,whiletheyacknowledgedtheexistenceofarrangementsandsystemsinplacetomanagesafety at the terminals, they questioned the effectiveness of these systems in terms of the extent ofprotection they offered to their safety, health andwelfare. Essentially, they presented a less optimisticviewoftheireffectivenessthanthatofferedbymanagersandtheywerecriticalofothereffectsofthesesystems in relation to their behaviourmonitoring anddisciplinary elements. A further consequence ofthese elements was that workers and their representatives clearly felt that the opportunities thesesystemsofferedthemtosharemoreeffectively theirconcernsandperspectivesonhealthandsafetyatworkwithmanagementwerequitelimited.Ontheotherhand, theconcernsfortheirhealth,safetyandwelfarethatemergedfrominterviewswithworkersandrepresentativeswerelessadenialoftheexistenceofthearrangementsforgovernanceandmanagement of safety and health that managers had described to us, and more a comment on theirapplicabilitytotheexperienceofworkintheterminals.Thatis,theygenerallydidnotdenytheexistenceof the arrangements described in the previous sections, nor doubt the visibility of the corporatecommitment to its goals for safe behaviours within the terminals. They did, however, question theirrelevancetotheeffectsoftheprimaryaimsofthebusinessesoperatingtheterminals,whichweretodosoinincreasinglyproductiveandcostefficientways.Manyrespondentsinboththepresentandpreviousstudyexpressedtheviewthattheseissuesweretheover-ridingconcernsthatdrovethecultureofworkwithintheterminals–andnotthatofthe‘safetyculture’promulgatedastheaimofgovernanceofsafety.This,theytoldusrepeatedly,hadresultedinmuchoftheirdailyexperienceofharmbeingentirelymissedbythesystemsinplacetopreventit.It was to explore the extent of these perceptions further that we undertook the questionnaire-basedsurveyoftheexperiencesofworkersandweturntoouranalysisofitsfindingsinthefollowingChapter.

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4.Workers’OHSExperiences

ThisChapterpresentsfindingsondockworkers’experiencesinrelationtosafety,healthandwellbeing,aswell as their experiences of the systems, procedures and arrangements in place in the terminals tomanagetheirhealthandsafetydescribed,usingtheperspectiveofmanagers,inthepreviousChapter.Theevidenceisdrawnfromouranalysisofthefindingsofthequestionnaire-basedsurveyweusedineachoftheparticipatingterminals.TheaimoftheChapteristopresentasufficientlydetailedaccount,basedonquantitative evidence, of the experiences of workers in the terminals we have studied to inform theevaluation of company arrangements globally, described in the previous Chapter to address thesematters.OurevaluationofthesearrangementswillbepresentedinsubsequentChapters–theobjectivesofthepresentChapterbeingsimplytopresentouranalysisofthisexperienceinrelationtoasetofissuesofhealthsafetyandwelfare–thatarguably,sucharrangementsshouldaddressandonwhichtherewereindicationsinthepreviousreportthattheremaybeagap(seeWaltersandWadsworth,2012:81-92).After giving some brief details about the survey respondents, we present descriptive accounts of thesurveyfindingsconcerningtheirexperiencesofwork-relatedsafety,healthandwelfare,andofthewayinwhichtheirhealthandsafetywasmanagedandtheirworkarranged.Thisisfollowedbyananalysisoftheassociations between workers’ health, safety and welfare and their working conditions and OHSmanagementexperiences.Thematerialobtainedfromtheorganisationsrunningthecasestudyterminalspresented in the previous Chapter suggested that the approaches taken by the terminal operatingcompanies to OHS governance and management are broadly similar, derived largely from strategiesdeveloped at a global level (at least as far as the GNTs were concerned); and further that OHSperformanceisgenerallyimproving,withterminalsindevelopingeconomiesshowingthelowestincidentrates.This implies thatworkers’ experiences shouldbe similar across theparticipating terminals,withrelativelyfewexperiencingincidentsandpotentialincidents.ThisChapter,therefore,assessesdifferencesandsimilarities,inparticularbetweenrespondentsfromthefourdifferentregionsincludedinthestudy.

4.1 Surveyrespondents

MostoftherespondentstothequestionnairesurveyworkedinterminalsoperatedbyGNTs(1619,88%)asopposedtocompaniesoperatingatanationallevel(230,12%).FindingspresentedinthisChapteraredrawnfromsurveyrespondentsworkinginGNT-operatedterminals.However,section4.7considershowresponses from thoseworking in terminals runbynationaloperators comparewith thoseof theotherrespondents.Virtuallyalltherespondentsweremale(1505,98%),andmostwereagedbetween20and50(20<30:458,29%;30<40:420,26%;40<50:420,26%).Itshouldbenotedherethateveryeffortwasmade toensure thatwomenwere included in thesurveyswhereverpossible, and further that,broadlyspeaking,thisgenderbalancereflectedthatwhichourresearchteamsobservedduringtheircasestudyvisitstoterminals.Abouttwothirds(931,60%)weredirectlyemployed,andmosthadbeenintheirjobforbetweenoneand15years(1<5years:411,26%;5<10years:453,28%;10<15years:313,20%).Mostworkedinjobsinvolvingcraneand/orhorizontaltransport,followedbyquaysideand/oronvesselworkandjobscombiningboththesesetsoftasks(Table4.1).

Table4.1:Questionnairesurveyrespondentsjobs N %

A:Quaysideoronthevessel(lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery) 415 26

B:Driving(craneoperationsand/orhorizontaltransport) 598 37

C:Maintenanceorotherroles 181 11

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D:JobscombiningAandB 419 26

TOTAL 1613 100Therewere,however,significantdifferencesinalltheseareasbyregionofemployment.Ofthe35femalerespondents, two-thirds (23, 66%) worked in the terminals in the first European area (chi-square =39.78, 3df, p<0.0001).This was consistent with our interviewees’ reports of the numbers of womenworking in the case study terminals. Almost all those who were employed by a contractor orsubcontractor (rather thanby theGNToperating the terminal)worked in the secondAsiaPacific areaterminals(514,99%).Ninety-sixrespondents,27%ofthoseworkinginthefirstEuropeanareaterminals,weredayhireworkers.Theyhavebeenincludedwith indirectlyemployedworkers forthepurposesofthe following analyses. Second Asia Pacific area terminal workers were also much more likely to beyoungerandtohavelessexperiencethantheirhighincomeeconomycounterparts(chi-square=530.15,3df,p<0.0001and476.45,3df,p<0.0001respectively;seeFigures4.1and4.2).AndasisclearfromFigure4.3,rolescombiningquaysideand/orvesselworkwithdrivingwereveryuncommonintheEuropearea1terminals and were most common in the first Asia Pacific area terminals (chi-square = 284.71, 9df,p<0.0001).The sample therefore can be considered as having features typical of what might be anticipated fordockworkers in container terminals situated in the three continents studied. Its profile reflects theeconomicandregulatorycontextsandlabourrelationstraditionsoftheareasinwhichtheterminalswereoperating (see for exampleTurnbull, 2012:517-548). Thehistorical role playedby organised labour inhelpingtodeterminepatternsofemploymentindock-work,alongsideitsresilienceinatleastsomedocksin the high income countries included in the study, combinedwith the regulatory frameworks withinwhich it is embedded in these countries, have been influential in explaining differences in relation togendermix,useofcontractworkers,ageprofilesandjobdemarcationpatternsobservedinthesample.Thepointtostresshereisthatthisisthenatureofthelabourforceemployedbythecontainerterminalscompaniestoworkintheterminalstheyoperate.Itisthesefeaturesthatthecompaniesneedtotakeintoaccount when designing health and safety management strategies and arrangements to protect andpromotehealth,safetyandwelfareamongworkers in thecontainer terminals.Weturnto theworkers’experienceofthesemattersnext.

Figure4.1:Proportion(%)ofrespondentsagedunder40andaged40orolderbyareaofemployment

0

20

40

60

80

100

EU1 EU2 AP1 AP2 All

Under 40 40 or more

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Figure4.2:Proportion(%)ofrespondentswithlessthan10years’experienceand10years’experienceormorebyareaofemployment

Figure4.3:Proportion(%)ofrespondentsineachjobtypebyareaofemployment

4.2 Safetyexperiences

Thequestionnairesurveymeasuredrespondents’safetyexperiencesintwoways.First,itcollectedtheirperceptionsinrelationtoriskstotheirsafetyandseconditfocusedonsafetyincidents.

4.2.1 Perceptionsofsafetyrisk

Perceptionsofrisktosafetyweremeasuredusingtwo5-pointscalesassessing:

• Theextenttowhichrespondentsthoughttheirsafetywasatriskbecauseoftheirworko 1=Notatall;5=Extremelyo Highrisktosafetywasdefinedasselecting4or5onthisscale

• The effectiveness with which respondents felt the health and safety policies, procedures and

practicescoveredthesafetyrisksintheirjobso 1=Notatalleffectively;5=Veryeffectivelyo Ineffectivesafetymanagementwasdefinedasselecting1or2onthisscale

0

20

40

60

80

100

EU1 EU2 AP1 AP2 All

Under 10 years 10 years or longer

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Quay/vessel Driving Maintance/other Quay/vessel & driving

EU1 EU2 AP1 AP2 All

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Overall,70%ofrespondentsfelttherewasahighrisktotheirsafetyand40%thattheriskstheyfacedtotheirsafetywereineffectivelycoveredbytheOHSmanagementarrangements.Theseproportionsfortherespondents as awhole group show high levels of concern amongworkers about their safety and thearrangementsinplacetoprotectit.Withineachofthesetwoareas,however,therewerealsosignificantdifferencesby regionof employment (chi-square=51.46, 3df, p<0.0001; and chi-square=213.77, 3df,p<0.0001respectively;Figure4.4).PerceptionsofhighrisktosafetyweremostcommoninthefirstandsecondAsiaPacific areas (over70% in each case– though it is important tonote thatoverhalf of therespondents in the twoEuropeanareasalso felt their safetywasathigh risk, indicatinggenerallyhighlevelsofperceivedrisktosafetyamongallgroups).ConcernsaboutineffectivesafetymanagementweremostcommoninthesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals–therateforrespondentsfromtheterminalsinthis areawas approximatelydouble that of the respondents from the regionwith thenext closest rate(Europearea1).

Figure4.4:Proportions(%)ofrespondentsreportingpoorsafetyperceptionsbyareaofemployment

4.2.2 Safetyincidents

Thequestionnaire asked respondentswhether theyhavebeen involved in any incidents inwhich theywereinjuredandinanynearmissesintheprevious12months.Intotal,onethirdofrespondents(33%)reportedhavingbeeninjuredinthepreviousyear.Mostcommonincidents were slip/trip/fall and body strains/manual handling (36% and 29% respectively of thoseinjured)andmost(83%)respondentsreportedthemtotheiremployer.Nearlytwo-thirds(60%)oftherespondentshadbeeninvolvedinanearmissandalittleoveraquarterofthese(27%)hadhadfiveormorenearmissesinthepreviousyear.Theseweremostcommonlyvehiclecollisionsandslip/trip/fall(46%and28%respectivelyofthosereportingoneormorenearmiss),andalittleoverhalf(57%)reportedthemostrecentnearmisstotheiremployer.These figuressuggest that incidentsresulting inorwith thepotential for injuryarerelativelycommon.This is further supported by data from the sub-set of our questionnaire respondents who completeddiaries.Here,infourconsecutiveshifts,anaverage6%ofrespondentspershiftreportedbeinginvolvedinanincidentinwhichtheywereinjuredand27%inanearmiss(ranges4-9%and20-32%respectivelyHowever,thediarydatamustbeconsideredwithsomecautionbecauseoftherelativelysmallnumbersinvolved.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

High risk to safety Ineffective safety management

EU1 EU2 AP1 AP2 All

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Thequestionnairesurveydatashoweddifferencesbyregion.Proportionatelymorerespondentsfromthefirst European area terminals and fewer respondents from the second Asia Pacific area terminalsreportedhavingbeeninjuredintheprevious12months(43%and24%respectivelycomparedto38%inthe first Asia Pacific area and 37% in Europe area 2; chi-square = 47.55, 3df, p<0.0001). Those in thesecondAsiaPacificareaterminalswereleastlikelytoreporttheseincidents(71%comparedto93%inEurope area 1, 89% in the first Asia Pacific area and 86% in Europe area 2; chi-square = 33.99, 3df,p<0.0001). Nevertheless, as we discuss below, the proportion of respondents from terminals in thisregion reporting injury was still substantially higher than the GNT supplied data described in thepreviousChapterwouldleadustoexpect.NearmissesweremorecommoninrespondentsfromthefirstAsiaPacificareaandsecondAsiaPacificareaterminals(67%and65%respectivelycomparedwith57%and43%respectivelyinEuropeareas1and2;chi-square=41.73,3df,p<0.0001).Inthiscase,thosefromthefirstEuropeanareaterminalswereleast likely to report theirnearmiss (46%compared to54% inEurope are2, 60% in the secondAsiaPacificareaand62%inthefirstAsiaPacificarea;chi-square=10.44,3df,p=0.02).Reporting levels are important because they determine the accuracy, and therefore reliability andusefulness of official company incident data. Our survey suggests that such data may underestimateinjuryratesbyalittleover15%,butthatthisunderestimatevariesbyregionfromunder10%tonearly30%.Aswouldbeexpected,nearmissorhighpotentialincidentdataarelikelytounderestimateworkers’experiencessubstantially.Ourinterviewdatasuggestthatthesedifferencestendtoreflectproblemswithreportingproceduresandsystemsand/orconcernsabouttheconsequencesofreportingincidents,whichwewilldiscussfurtherinthefollowingChapters.Itisworthbearinginmindtwoimportantpoints.Thefirst is thatwhatevermodelofhealth and safetymanagement is adoptedbya company– for example,whether it takes a traditional view of trying to reduce lost time accidents as an indicator of OHSimprovement or whether it distinguishes from this a more concentrated attention on safety criticalincidents.Successfuloutcomesfromeitherapproachdependuponthecomprehensivenessandqualityofthereporting.Asshowninmanyotherstudies,workersandtheirrepresentativesplayakeyroleastheeyes and ears of the system in terms of gathering intelligence on the occurrence of accidents andincidents. While some of the difference between our results and those obtained by the terminalmanagementsmay reflect differences inwhat is required to be reported andwhatworkers themselvesregardasaninjuryorsafetycritical incident, thesubstantialdifferencebetweenourfindingsandthosepresentedby the companies in termsof thenumberof these events suggests a considerabledegreeofunder-reportingoftheseincidentsisthecaseforalltheterminalsandthisshouldbeacauseforconcernatcompanylevel.Thisfindingfurthersuggeststhatinsomeoftheterminalstheissueofunder-reportingmaybemoresignificantthaninothers.Datafromtheinterviewswithworkers,theirrepresentativesandmanagersthatwediscussinthenextChapterhelpedtoidentifysomeofthereasonswhythismightbeso.ItisnotpossibletomakedirectcomparisonsbetweenthesesurveyfiguresandtheOHSperformancedatasuppliedbytheGNTs(seeChapter3).However,usingacrudeestimateof48hoursworkedperweekfor44 weeks per year, the survey LTIFR would be 154.1 per million hours worked. This is significantlyhigher than the top rate reported by the GNTs of 84.8 permillion hours worked, suggesting that theofficial data may significantly underestimate workers’ experiences of injuries. Of course these figuresmustbe treatedwithextremecaution.Forexample,wecanonlyestimatehoursworkedand,while thefiguresmaybeclosetorealityinEuropeareas1and2andAsiaPacificarea1,theymayunderestimatehoursworkedinAsiaPacificarea2.Notallinjuriesmayhaveresultedinofficiallylosttime–thoughwewouldarguethattheyshouldstillbecountedastheyrepresentworkers’experienceofinjury–andsomerespondentsmay have been injuredmore than once in the previous year. Nevertheless, they serve tohighlight the potential gap between company data and workers’ experience. Furthermore, while thedifferences inproportionsof our survey respondents reporting injurydo indicate experienceofhigherproportionsofwork injuries among those in theEuropean terminals as compared to those in theAsiaPacificones,thedifferencesarenowherenearwhatwouldbeexpectedbasedonthelosttimeinjurydataprovidedbyGNTs1and2inparticular,andtoalesserextentthatprovidedbyGNT3(seeChapter3).Ourfindings suggest it is those from the second Asia Pacific area in particularwith the lowest proportion(24%),with those from the firstAsiaPacific area (38%) closer to theEuropeanproportions.Thismay

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reflectthedifferenceinawarenessoftheexperienceofwork-relatedinjuriesbetweenthoseinhighandlower-middle-incomeeconomies. Italso implies that thedifferencesmaybemorecomplex thansimplyregional,witheconomytypealsobeingsignificant.

4.2.3 Safetyoutcomes

A composite safety measure was created to allow comparisons along a continuum of safety outcomeexperiences.This techniquewhich isdesignedtoreflectrealwordexperiencebytakingaholisticview,has been used extensively in occupational research to give a truer, more realistic representation ofworkplacesituations(see,forexample,vanStolketal.,2012aandb,Wadsworthetal.,2003,Smithetal.,2001, and Johnson et al., 1989). Here it has been applied to allow us to combine scores for severaldifferentmeasuresderived fromresponses todifferentquestions tocreateacompositemeasureof theissueofinterest.Inthiscasewewereseekingtoderiveanoverallmeasureofrespondents’perceptionofthe level of the safety they experienced in the terminals in which they worked. We therefore gavereporting:‘highrisktosafety’,‘ineffectivecoverageofsafetyrisks’,‘injuryintheprevious12months’and‘oneormorenearmissintheprevious12months’;eachascoreof1beforesummingthemtoproduceasinglemeasurerangingfrom0to4.Overall, themeanscorewas2.06(SD=1.14),with138respondentsscoring0and157scoring4.Again,thereweresignificantdifferencesbyareaofemployment,andalsobybothjobtypeandemploymenttype(F=23.33(3df)p<0.0001,F=20.61(3df)p<0.0001andF=92.24(1df)p<0.0001respectively),withthose in indirectemployment, jobs involving lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery work and in the second Asia Pacific area terminals having the highest scores (Table 4.2 andFigure4.5).

Table4.2:Mean(SD)safetyoutcomescorebyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype

SAFETY

OUTCOMES

MEAN SD

AREAOFWORK

AsiaPacificarea2 2.25 1.07

AsiaPacificarea1 2.04 1.05

Europearea1 1.98 1.21

Europearea2 1.54 1.14

JOBTYPE

Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliverywithcraneand/orhorizontaltransportdriving 2.25 1.03

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery 2.29 1.18

Craneand/orhorizontaltransportdriving 1.89 1.16

Maintenanceand/orother 1.64 1.01

EMPLOYMENTTYPE

Indirect 2.41 1.05

Direct 1.83 1.12

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Figure4.5:Meansafetyoutcomesscoresbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype

Binarybackwardstepwise logisticregressionwasthenusedtoconsidertheseassociationsfurther.Thesafetyoutcomemeasurewassplitatthemediantoindicatehighorlowlevelsofadversesafetyoutcomes.This showed independent associations between high levels of poor safety outcomes and area ofemployment, job type and employment type, after controlling for age and experience (these variableswere controlled for in the analyses because of the differences in age and experience between theterminals’workforces–withthoseintheAsiaPacificArea2terminalsyoungerandlessexperiencedthantheircounterpartselsewhere(seesection4.1)).Specifically,highlevelsofadversesafetyoutcomesweremorecommonamong:thoseinterminalsoutsideEuropeArea2;thosein jobsotherthanmaintenance;andthosewhowereindirectlyemployed(Table4.3).Repeating these analyses for each area of employment separately10 showed no significant associationbetweenhighlevelsofadversesafetyoutcomesandjobtypeanywhereexceptintheAsiaPacificarea2terminals. In order to explore this further, and given the close connection between job type andemployment type in thisregion, thesevariableswerecombined togiveasix levelmeasure(Table4.4).Thiswas strongly independently associatedwithhigh levelsof adverse safetyoutcomes. In addition, itshowedthatthoseindrivingjobswereaboutthreetimesmorelikelythanthoseinmaintenanceorotherroles (virtually all of whom were directly employed) to have high levels of adverse safety outcomesregardlessof theiremployment type,aswere those in lashingand/orreceivinganddeliveryroleswhowere also directly employed. It is important to note that direct employmentwasmuchmore commonamongthoseindrivingroles(63%)andmuchlesscommonamongthoseinlashingand/orreceivinganddelivery roles (18%). However, those in lashing and/or receiving and delivery roles who were also

10 The safety outcomes variable was split at the median separately for each region; employment type was only included in the models for Europe area 1 and the second Asia Pacific area; and jobs combining lashing and driving were included with lashing jobs in the model for Europe area 1.

.0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5

EU2 Driving Indirect EU2 Both Indirect

EU1 Maintenance Indirect AP2 Maintenance Direct AP1 Maintenance Direct EU2 Maintenance Direct

EU2 Both Direct EU2 Driving Direct

EU1 Both Direct EU1 Driving Direct

EU2 Lashing Direct AP2 Lashing Direct AP1 Driving Indirect

AP1 Both Indirect AP1 Both Direct

AP2 Driving Direct EU1 Maintenance Direct

EU1 Driving Indirect EU1 Lashing Direct AP1 Driving Direct

AP1 Lashing Direct AP2 Driving Indirect

EU1 Lashing Indirect AP2 Both Indirect

AP2 Lashing Indirect EU2 Lashing Indirect

EU1 Both Indirect

73

indirectlyemployedwereaboutsix timesmore likely thanthose inmaintenanceorotherroles tohavehighlevelsofadversesafetyoutcomes–a levelverysimilartothoseinrolescombininglashingand/orreceiving and deliverywith driving, virtually all ofwhomwere indirectly employed.While these oddsratiosarenotsignificantlydifferentfromeachother,probablybecauseoftherelativelysmallnumbersinsomecategories,theysuggestthereisagroupthatisparticularlyvulnerabletoadversesafetyoutcomes:those involved in lashing and/or receiving anddelivery – roles acknowledgedwithin the industry andidentified by our interviewees as being themost dangerous – who are also indirectly employed. Thisparticularly risky combination is one that only arises for respondents in the second Asia Pacific areaterminalsinourstudy.Asmanagersandworkersfrequentlytoldus:

“…themostlikely…accidentiscollisionbetweentwovehiclesleadingtoinjuries…secondisonthelasherswhileworkingonthevessel…”[HSSEManager,TerminalAP2T2]

74

Table4.3:Associationsbetweenhighlevelsofadversesafetyoutcomesandareaofemployment,jobtypeandemploymenttype

ODDSRATIO

CONFIDENCELIMITS DF,P

AREAOFEMPLOYMENT

Europearea1 1.00

3,0.001AsiaPacificarea1 1.08 0.69-1.69

Europearea2 0.46 0.30-0.72

AsiaPacificarea2 1.06 0.74-1.50

JOBTYPE

Maintenance/other 1.00

3,<0.0001

Driving 1.78 1.13-2.80

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery 2.92 1.80-4.71

Bothdrivingandlashing/receivinganddelivery 2.59 1.58-4.24

EMPLOYMENTTYPE

Direct 1.00 1,0.008

Indirect 1.55 1.12-2.14

Table4.4:AssociationsbetweenhighlevelsofadversesafetyoutcomesandjobtypeandemploymenttypeinthesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals

ODDSRATIO

CONFIDENCELIMITS DF,P

JOBANDEMPLOYMENTTYPE

Maintenanceorother(virtuallyalldirectlyemployed) 1.00

5,<0.0001

Drivinganddirectemployment 3.13 1.48-6.61

Drivingandindirectemployment 3.01 1.30-6.98

Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliveryanddirectemployment

3.09 1.21-7.92

Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliveryandindirectemployment

6.05 3.01-12.16

Bothlashingand/orreceivinganddelivery(virtuallyallindirectlyemployed)

6.08 3.06-12.08

Theanalysisofthedatafromthequestionnairesurveyindicatesthatrespondentsfelttheyexperiencedasubstantial levelofpoorsafetyoutcomesthatwasconsiderablygreater thanmightbeanticipated fromboththecompanyevidenceonOHSoutcomesandthearrangementsmadeforOHSmanagementattheseterminalsdescribedinthepreviousChapter.Itfurthershowsthatthereisvariationintheexperienceofsafetyoutcomesthatappearstobetheresultofboth jobtypeandthe formofcontractualemploymentarrangements.ThesefindingscorroboratethoseindicatedinthepreliminarystudyandwewillreturntoadiscussionoftheirimplicationsinfollowingChapters.

4.3 Work-relatedhealthandwelfare

Turningtorespondents’work-relatedhealthandwelfare,oursurveyagaincollecteddataonperceptionsofriskstohealthandonpersonalhealthandwelfare.

4.3.1 Perceptionsofhealthrisk

Perceptionsof risk tohealthweremeasuredusing two5-pointscalessimilar to thoseassessingrisk tosafety:

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• Theextenttowhichrespondentsthoughttheirhealthwasatriskbecauseoftheirworko 1=Notatall;5=Extremelyo Highrisktohealthwasdefinedasselecting4or5onthisscale

• The effectiveness with which respondents felt the health and safety policies, procedures and

practicescoveredthehealthrisksintheirjobso 1=Notatalleffectively;5=Veryeffectivelyo Ineffectivehealthmanagementwasdefinedasselecting1or2onthisscale

Overall 60% fell into thehigh risk tohealth category and48% into the ineffectivehealthmanagementcategory,andagainthereweresignificantdifferencesbyareaofemployment(chi-square=103.41,3df,p<0.0001 and chi-square = 232.62, 3df, p<0.0001 respectively). As Figure 4.6 shows, proportionsreportinghighrisktohealthandineffectivehealthmanagementwerehighestamongrespondentsinthesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals.

Figure4.6:Proportions(%)ofrespondentswithhighrisktohealthandineffectivehealthmanagementbyareaofemployment

4.3.2 Healthandwelfare

Respondents’work-relatedhealthandwellbeingweremeasuredon5scales:

• Theextenttowhichrespondentsfoundtheirjobstressfulo 1=Notatallstressful;5=Verystressfulo Highstressdefinedasselecting4or5onthisscale

• Levelofphysicaltirednessafteranormalsetofworkdays

o 1=Notatalltired;5=Verytiredo Highphysicalfatiguedefinedasselecting4or5onthisscale

• Levelofmentaltirednessafteranormalsetofworkdays

o 1=Notatalltired;5=Verytiredo Highmentalfatiguedefinedasselecting4or5onthisscale

• Havingexperiencedache,painordiscomfortotherthanasaresultofanaccidentthatwascaused

ormadeworsebyworkintheprevious12monthso 1ormoreinstancedefinedasmusculo-skeletaldisorder(MSD)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

High risk to health Ineffective health management

EU1 EU2 AP1 AP2 All

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• Sufferingfromanillnessorphysicalormentalproblemthatwascausedormadeworsebyworkintheprevious12months

o 1ormoreinstancedefinedaswork-relatedillnessAgaintherewerecleardifferencesbyareaofemployment,withrespondentsfromthesecondAsiaPacificarea terminalshaving thehighest ratesofhighstressandphysicalandmental fatigue, those fromAsiaPacificarea2andEuropearea2thehighestratesofMSDandrespondentsfromEuropearea2thehighestrates of work-related illness (high stress: chi square = 258.40, 3df, p<0.0001; high physical fatigue:173.12,3df,p<0.0001;highmental fatigue: chi square=78.57,3df,p<0.0001;MSD:11.23,3df,p=0.01;work-relatedillness:70.25,3df,p<0.0001;Table4.5).

Table4.5:Healthandwelfarebyareaofemployment

EUROPEAREA1

EUROPEAREA2

ASIAPACIFICAREA1

ASIAPACIFICAREA2 ALL

Highstress 48% 35% 39% 81% 60%

Highphysicalfatigue 48% 75% 73% 85% 73%

Highmentalfatigue 48% 65% 60% 74% 65%

MSD 28% 31% 21% 32% 30%

Work-relatedillness 46% 61% 46% 32% 41%Among those reportingMSDs,most (88%)had hadmore than one instance in the previous year,with23% having 20 or more. A little under half (45%) had reported the most recent instance to theiremployer.Similarly,amongthosereportingwork-related illnesses,most (85%)hadhadmore thanoneillnessinthepreviousyear,with37%reporting5ormore;andagain45%hadreportedthemostrecentillnesstotheiremployer.Mostcommonlyreportedwork-relatedillnessesweremusclepain/ache(46%)and fatigue/tiredness (38%), followed by stress/anxiety/depression, stomach/gastric andcold/flu/respiratory(28%,25%and24%respectively).Stomach/gastric work-related illnesses weremost common among respondents from the second AsiaPacificareaterminals(33%ofthosereportingawork-relatedillness,comparedto12%inEuropearea1,11% in the first Asia Pacific area and 19% in Europe area 2), which bears out the findings from theinterviews in our preliminary project inwhich respondents suggested that these illnesseswere linkedbothtoinadequatebreaksandwelfarefacilitiesandtopoorsurfaceconditionsandvehiclerepairanduse.RatesoffatiguewerelowestamongthoseinEuropearea2(20%comparedto25%inEuropearea1and43%and46% respectively in the first and secondAsiaPacific areas),while stress/anxiety/depressionwasmost common in the firstAsiaPacific area (47%compared to22% inEuropearea2,29% inAsiaPacificarea2and16%inEuropearea1).ReportingMSDsandwork-related illnessesvariedfrom35%and24%respectivelyinthefirstAsiaPacificareato51%inAsiaPacificarea2and55%inEuropearea2respectively, again suggesting the likelihood that any official company figures would significantlyunderstateworkers’actualexperiences.

4.3.3 Healthoutcomes

Using a similar approach to that applied to safety outcomes (see section 4.2.3), a composite healthoutcomescorewascreatedfromthemeasuresofhighstress,highphysicalandmentalfatigue,highriskto health, 1 or more MSD and 1 or more work-related illness in the previous 12 months and poorcoverageofhealthrisks.Totalpossiblescorewas7andoverallthemeanscorewas4.47(SD=2.05),with49respondentsscoring0and265scoring7.Againthereweresignificantdifferencesbyareaofwork,jobtype and employment type (F=75.87 (3df) p<0.0001, F=39.23 (3df) p<0.0001 and F=152.42 (1df)p<0.0001 respectively; Table 4.6 and Figure 4.7). Highest health outcome scores, indicating greaternumbersofadversehealthoutcomes,werefoundamongrespondentsworkinginthesecondAsiaPacific

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areaterminals,thoseinjobscombininglashingand/orreceivinganddeliverywithdriving,andthoseinindirectemployment.

Table4.6:Mean(SD)healthoutcomescorebyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype

HEALTHOUTCOMES

MEAN SD

AREAOFEMPLOYMENT

AsiaPacificarea2 5.23 1.87

AsiaPacificarea1 4.02 1.87

Europearea1 3.62 1.99

Europearea2 3.54 1.87

JOBTYPE

Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliverywithcraneand/orhorizontaltransportdriving 5.30 1.80

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery 4.49 2.03

Craneand/orhorizontaltransportdriving 4.21 2.04

Maintenanceand/orother 3.36 1.91

EMPLOYMENTTYPE

Indirect 5.29 1.84

Direct 3.94 2.00

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Figure4.7:Meanhealthoutcomescoresbyareaofemployment,jobtypeandemploymenttype

Exploringtheseassociationsfurtherusingmultivariateanalysesshowedthathighlevelsofadversehealthoutcomeswereindependentlyassociatedwithareaofemployment,jobtypeandemploymenttypeaftercontrollingforage,experienceandgeneralhealth(Table4.7).Specifically,thoseworkinginterminalsinAsiaPacificarea2weremorelikelythanthoseworkingelsewheretohavehighlevelsofadversehealthoutcomes, aswere those in jobs other thanmaintenance and thosewhowere indirectly employed. Aswiththesafetyoutcomesmeasure,modelsconsideringeachregionseparatelyshowedthattherewasnoassociationbetweenjobtypeandhighlevelsofadversehealthoutcomesinanyoftheareasexceptAsiaPacific2.However,withinthesecondAsiaPacificarearespondentgroup, itwasagainthose in indirectemploymentwhowereworking in roles combining lashing and/or receiving anddeliverywithdrivingthatweremostlikelytoreporthavingexperiencedhighlevelsofadversehealthoutcomes(Table4.8).

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

EU2 Lashing Indirect EU1 Both Direct

EU2 Both Indirect EU1 Maintenance Indirect

AP1 Maintenance Direct EU1 Lashing Indirect

AP2 Maintenance Direct EU2 Both Direct

EU2 Maintenance Direct EU1 Maintenance Direct

EU2 Driving Direct EU1 Driving Indirect EU2 Lashing Direct EU1 Lashing Direct EU1 Driving Direct

AP1 Both Direct EU1 Both Indirect

AP1 Driving Direct EU2 Driving Indirect AP1 Lashing Direct AP2 Lashing Direct AP2 Driving Direct AP1 Both Indirect

AP2 Driving Indirect AP2 Lashing Indirect

AP2 Both Indirect

79

Table4.7:Associationsbetweenhighlevelsofadversehealthoutcomesandareaofemployment,jobtypeandemploymenttype

ODDSRATIO

CONFIDENCELIMITS DF,P

AREAOFEMPLOYMENT

Europearea1 1.00

3,<0.0001

AsiaPacificarea1 1.25 0.79-1.97

Europearea2 0.81 0.54-1.22

AsiaPacificarea2 3.49 2.44-5.01

JOBTYPE

Maintenance/other 1.00

3,0.0001

Driving 2.94 1.91-4.54

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery 2.62 1.63-4.21

Bothdrivingandlashing/receivinganddelivery 4.66 2.82-7.68

EMPLOYMENTTYPEDirect 1.00

1,0.003Indirect 1.67 1.19-2.33

GENERALHEALTHBetter 1.00

1,0.02Poor 1.59 1.07-2.35

EXPERIENCELessthan10years 1.00 1,0.03

10yearsormore 1.42 1.04-1.92

Table4.8:AssociationsbetweenhighlevelsofadversehealthoutcomesandjobtypeandemploymenttypeinthesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals

ODDSRATIO

CONFIDENCELIMITS DF,P

JOBANDEMPLOYMENTTYPE

Maintenanceorother(virtuallyalldirectlyemployed) 1.00

5,<0.0001

Drivinganddirectemployment 4.46 2.02-9.06

Drivingandindirectemployment 5.45 2.46-12.10Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliveryanddirectemployment 2.98 1.17-7.56

Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliveryandindirectemployment 5.01 2.53-9.89

Bothlashingand/orreceivinganddelivery(virtuallyallindirectlyemployed)

19.95 9.96-39.97

HEALTHGood 1.00

1,0.01Poor 1.97 1.15-3.38

AGEUnder40 1.00

1,0.0640orolder 0.61 0.36-1.03

Thediarysurveyalsocollecteddataonfatigue,stressandMSD.Comparingrespondents’ratingsoftheirlevelsoffatigue,stressandMSDbeforetheirfirstandlastshiftsinablockofshiftssuggestedincreasesinall threeareasover theworkingweek. Indirectlyemployedworkershadhigher levelsofbothpre-firstand last shift fatigueand stress– and in the caseof stress, indirectly employedworkers’pre-first shiftstresslevelswerehigherthanthepre-lastshiftstresslevelsofthedirectlyemployedworkers,suggestingthat,intermsofstress,theseworkersarestartingtheirworkingweekfromapoorerpositionthanthatatwhichtheirdirectlyemployedcounterpartsarefinishing theirweek(Figure4.8).Whilethesedatamustbe considered with caution because of the relatively small numbers involved, they are nonetheless

80

supportive of our questionnaire survey findings suggesting poorer health outcomes for indirectlyemployedworkers,andsignificantwork-relatedfatigueandstressbuildingupoverasetofshiftsforallworkers.

Figure4.8:Fatigueandstressbyemploymenttype–comparingfirstandlastshifts

Takentogetherwiththefindingsonsafetyoutcomesreportedintheprevioussection,thissuggestshighlevelsofadversehealthandsafetyoutcomesamongallrespondents.Itisworthbearinginmindherethat,while the companies all had in place systems for reporting measures of safety such as injuries andincidents, theydidnothave suchwell-developed systems for collectingdataon the incidenceofwork-related ill-health. These high levels are therefore of particular concern, not least as the compositemeasures of adverse health and safety outcomes were correlated (Spearman’s rho = 0.48, p<0.0001),indicatingthathigherlevelsofpoorsafetyoutcomesarelikelytobeaccompaniedbyhigherlevelsofpoorhealthoutcomes.Inaddition,thefindingsmakeitclearthatsomegroupsareatsignificantlygreaterriskthan others, depending onwhere theywork, their job types and theway inwhich they are employed.These are issues towhichwewill return in followingChapterswhenwe consider the character of thearrangements formanaginghealthandsafety in the terminalsandgivesomeattention to theareas forimprovementindicatedbythisstudyanditspredecessor.We turn next to respondents’ experiences of arrangements for managing health and safety in theterminals.

4.4 ExperiencesofOHSmanagement

Respondents’experiencesofthearrangementsformanagingriskstohealthandsafetyintheparticipatingterminals were measured using a series of questions focusing on: health and safety training and theprovision of personal protective equipment (PPE); written policies and procedures; risk assessmentarrangements;andsystemsandpracticesrelatedtoworkerconsultationandrepresentation.Asalreadyexplained, these were designed to measure how closely respondents’ experiences of the OHSmanagementarrangementstheyworkedundermatcheduptowhatiswidelyacceptedasbeingasetofcross-sector best practices. Table 4.9 gives details of the responses on each measure by area ofemployment. There were significant differences on all 11 measures11. In most cases, the highest11 Staffing for safety: chi square = 116.69, 3df, p<0.0001; induction training: chi square = 24.53, 3df, p<0.0001; PPE: chi square = 203.73, 3df, p<0.0001; on-going training: chi square = 89.06, 3df, p<0.0001; access to written H&S policy: chi square = 382.22, 3df, p<0.0001; access to written H&S standard procedures: chi square = 468.74, 3df, p<0.0001; written long/irregular hours policy: chi square = 93.27, 3df, p<0.0001; written stress policy: chi square = 87.37, 3df, p<0.0001; risk assessment: chi square = 56.08, 3df, p<0.0001; consultation: chi square = 84.22, 3df, p<0.0001; health and safety committee: chi square = 573.78, 3df, p<0.0001; and health and safety representative: chi square = 292.49, 3df, p<0.0001.

0 0.5

1 1.5

2 2.5

3 3.5

4 4.5

First shift Last shift First shift Last shift First shift Last shift First shift Last shift

Direct employment Indirect employment Direct employment Indirect employment

Fatigue Stress

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proportionsreportingthelackofagoodpracticeOHSmanagementarrangementwerethoserespondentsworkinginthesecondAsiaPacificareaandEuropearea1terminals12.

Table4.9:OHSmanagementexperiencesbyareaofemployment

EUROPEAREA1

EUROPEAREA2

ASIAPACIFICAREA1

ASIAPACIFICAREA2

ALL

STAFFINGFORSAFETY Frequentlyinsufficient 11% 28% 25% 42% 31%

INDUCTIONTRAINING Noneprovided 7% 0% 3% 8% 6%

PPE Someorallreplacementcoststakenfromwages 11% 1% 1% 33% 19%

ONGOINGTRAINING Noneprovided 8% <1% 5% 20% 12%

ACCESSTOWRITTENH&SPOLICY Noneordon’tknow 76% 10% 30% 72% 58%

ACCESSTOWRITTENH&SSTANDARDPROCEDURES

Noneordon’tknow 75% 14% 36% 83% 64%

WRITTENLONG/IRREGULARHOURSPOLICY

Noneordon’tknow 90% 59% 78% 82% 80%

WRITTENSTRESSPOLICY Noneordon’tknow 94% 70% 83% 90% 87%

RISKASSESSMENTNoriskassessmentornoworkerinvolvementinriskassessment

90% 66% 73% 82% 80%

CONSULTATION

None(newproceduresintroducedwithoutwarningorworkerinvolvement)

74% 53% 51% 77% 69%

HEALTHANDSAFETYCOMMITTEE Noneordon’tknow 62% 24% 8% 86% 60%

HEALTHANDSAFETYREPRESENTATIVE Noneordifficulttoaccess 77% 37% 43% 85% 70%

Followingtheapproachusedforsafetyandhealthoutcomes(seesections4.2.3and4.3.3),acompositevariable indicting the number of poor OHSmanagement arrangements was produced, comprising themeasures inTable4.9.TotalpossiblecombinedOHSmanagementscore, indicatingthepoorestpracticeOHS management arrangements, was 12. Overall, the mean score was 6.31 (SD=2.85), with 27respondentsscoring0and6scoring12.Thereweresignificantdifferencesbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemployment type (F=178.61 (3df) p<0.0001, F=44.09 (3df) p<0.0001 and F=414.60 (1df) p<0.0001respectively; Table 4.10 and Figure 4.9). Again, thosewith the poorestOHSmanagement arrangementexperienceswere thoseworking in the Asia Pacific area 2 terminals, thoseworking in lashing and/orreceivinganddeliveryjobsandthoseinindirectemployment.Thesemeanscoressuggestthatthereissignificantroomforimprovementinalltheregionsincludedinthe project. Furthermore, some of the individual measures suggest particular areas of concern. Forexample,perceptionsofstaffinglevelsinrelationtoworkingsafelyareparticularlyhighamongtheAsia

12 This may be a reflection of the particular employment arrangements and practices in the terminals in this region (see Chapter 3), where arrangements made at terminal level elsewhere in our case studies are instead made at the port level. This may have resulted in respondents in this area interpreting questions differently to those elsewhere.

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Pacificarea2terminalrespondents,forwhomarrangementsforconsultationandrepresentationarealsoparticularly poor. Similarly, access to written health and safety policies and procedures is poor inparticularinEuropearea1andAsia.Therelativelyhighproportionsofrespondentsfromallfourregionsreportingnoaccesstopoliciesonworkinghoursand,inparticular,stressmanagement,alsounderlinetheunder-representation of the management of health risks within terminal operators’ health and safetymanagementarrangementsidentifiedbyourworkforceinterviewparticipants.Infact,stress,followedbyfatigue,were the secondand third risks respondentsmost commonly citedasones they facedatwork(identifiedby82%and81%respectively),behindback,neckorshoulderproblems(86%)andaheadofvehicleincidents,crush,fallandover-familiarity(79%,78%,77%and61%respectively),addingfurtherweight to the suggestion of a gap betweenworkers’ experiences and concerns in relation to risk andterminals’arrangementsformanagingit.

Table4.10:Mean(SD)combinedscoreforOHSmanagementarrangementsbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype

OHSMANAGEMENTARRANGEMENTS

MEAN SD

AREAOFWORK

AsiaPacificarea2 7.52 2.63

AsiaPacificarea1 4.35 2.25

Europearea2 3.63 2.13

Europearea1 6.67 1.91

JOBTYPE

Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliverywithcraneand/orhorizontaltransportdriving 7.00 2.74

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery 7.17 2.73

Craneand/orhorizontaltransportdriving 5.78 2.70

Maintenanceand/orother 4.52 2.65

EMPLOYMENTTYPE

Direct 5.18 2.74

Indirect 8.15 1.96

83

Figure4.9:Mean(SD)combinedscoreforOHSmanagementarrangementsbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype

Using binary logistic regression to consider these associations inmore detail (see section 4.2.3 for anexplanation of the approach used) showed independent associations between high levels of poor OHSmanagementarrangementsandareaof employment (with those in theEuropearea1andsecondAsiaPacific area terminals more likely to report high levels of poor OHS management arrangements thanthose in the firstAsiaPacificareaand inEuropearea2terminals), jobsotherthanmaintenanceand inparticular those combining lashing and/or receiving and delivery, with driving, andwith employmenttype (with those in indirect employment nearly three times as likely as their directly employedcounterparts to experiences high levels of poor OHS management arrangements) (Table 4.11).Consideringeachof theareasofemploymentseparatelyagainshowednoassociationbetween jobtypeandOHSmanagement arrangements outsideAsia Pacific area 2.Within the secondAsia Pacific area2terminals,however,thoseinthegroupidentifiedasmostvulnerabletopoorhealthandsafetyoutcomeswereagainmostlikelytoreporthighlevelsofpoorOHSmanagementarrangements(Table4.12).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

EU2 Both Indirect

AP1 Maintenance Direct

EU2 Lashing Direct

EU2 Both Direct

EU2 Driving Direct

AP2 Maintenance Direct

EU2 Driving Indirect

AP1 Driving Direct

AP1 Lashing Direct

AP1 Both Direct

EU2 Maintenance Direct

EU1 Both Direct

EU1 Maintenance Direct

EU1 Lashing Indirect

AP2 Driving Direct

EU1 Driving Direct

EU1 Lashing Direct

EU1 Driving Indirect

AP2 Driving Indirect

AP2 Lashing Indirect

AP2 Lashing Direct

EU1 Maintenance Indirect

AP2 Both Indirect

84

Table4.11:AssociationsbetweenhighlevelsofpoorOHSmanagementarrangementsandareaofemployment,jobtypeandemploymenttype

ODDSRATIO

CONFIDENCELIMITS DF,P

AREAOFEMPLOYMENT

Europearea1 1.00

3,<0.0001AsiaPacificarea1 0.10 0.05-0.18

Europearea2 0.07 0.04-0.13

AsiaPacificarea2 1.18 0.82-1.70

JOBTYPE

Maintenance/other 1.00

3,0.001Driving 3.16 1.96-5.10

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery 3.59 2.12-6.09Bothdrivingandlashing/receivinganddelivery 10.30 5.54-19.15

EMPLOYMENTTYPE

Direct 1.00 1,<0.0001

Indirect 2.96 2.01-4.34

Table4.12:AssociationsbetweenhighlevelsofpoorOHSmanagementarrangementsandjobtypeandemploymenttypeinthesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals

ODDSRATIO

CONFIDENCELIMITS DF,P

JOBANDEMPLOYMENTTYPE

Maintenanceorother(virtuallyalldirectlyemployed) 1.00

5,<0.0001

Drivinganddirectemployment 3.86 1.67-8.89

Drivingandindirectemployment 3.75 1.48-9.49Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliveryanddirectemployment 10.84 4.12-28.55

Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliveryandindirectemployment 9.00 4.07-19.88

Bothlashingand/orreceivinganddelivery(virtuallyallindirectlyemployed) 18.84 8.49-41.85

In sum, the analysis of the survey data suggests that there is significant room for improvement inarrangementsformanaginghealthandsafetyinalloftheregionsincludedintheproject.Intheeyesofrespondentstheirexperienceofthesearrangementsfallfarshortofthatwhichmightbeanticipatedfromthecompanyandterminalmanagers’descriptionspresentedinthepreviousChapter.Moreover,thereareparticularareasof concern in relation to theextentof communicationbetween terminalmanagementsand workers concerning these health and safety arrangements, as well as the extent of participativeapproachesadoptedininstitutingthem.Poorconsultation/feedbackisofparticularconcernbecauseasiswellestablishedinthecriticalsafetyliteratureattests,suchone-waysystemsareespeciallyvulnerabletofailurebecauseproblemsarelikelytonotbereportedletalonerectified(seeforexample,LeCoze2008;Hopkins2011).The analysis further indicates that experiences are not even across the different terminals,with thosesituatedinAsiaPacificarea2reportingpoorerexperiencesthanelsewhere,bothoverallandinrelationtoparticularformsofemploymentandjobtype.Again,thisanalysisraisesanumberofissuesthatwewillreturntointhediscussioninsubsequentChaptersconcerningouroverallassessmentoftheeffectivenessoftheterminalarrangementsandwaysinwhichtheymightbeimproved

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4.5 Workingconditions,workorganisationandarrangements

Thefinalsubstantiveareaofanalysisofthesurveydataconcernedworkingconditionsexperiencedintheterminals.Thequestionnairesurveyalsocollecteddataaboutrespondents’workingconditionsand thewayinwhichtheirworkwasorganisedandarranged.Inallweincluded13relevantmeasures.AsTable4.13shows,theirscoresonallofthesemeasuresvariedaccordingtoareaofemployment13.

Table4.13:Workingconditions’experiencesbyareaofemployment

EUROPEAREA1

ASIAPACIFICAREA1

EUROPEAREA2

ASIAPACIFICAREA2

ALL

SHIFTPATTERN Irregular 12% 34% 17% 6% 13%

SPLITSHIFTS Occasionalorregular 6% 27% 8% 13% 12%

NIGHT-WORK Occasionalorregular 15% 93% 94% 90% 76%

SHIFTLENGTH 10hoursorlonger 2% 9% 99% 68% 49%

BREAKS Nonescheduled 12% 4% 27% 71% 42%

PAIDHOLIDAYENTITLEMENT None 1% 1% 0% 20% 10%

WORKINGHOURSFITWITHCOMMITMENTS Poor 11% 48% 21% 74% 48%

JOBSECURITY Poor 16% 57% 14% 66% 45%

CONTENTMENTWITHBASICPAY Low 23% 18% 18% 86% 52%

STAFFINGFORTARGET Poor 12% 28% 43% 46% 35%

WORKINTENSITY High 64% 50% 56% 68% 63%

SATISFACTIONWITHWORKINGCONDITIONS Low 14% 50% 27% 70% 48%

SATISFACTIONWITHWELFARECONDITIONS Low 15% 32% 41% 74% 50%

Combining thesemeasuresallowedus tocreatea single itemworkingconditionsscorewithapossibletotalof13toindicatethepoorestconditionsand0toindicatethebest.Overall,themeanscorewas5.58(SD=3.08), with 39 respondents scoring 0 and 4 scoring 12 (none scored 13). Again, there weresignificant differences by area ofwork, job type and employment type (working conditions: F=427.89(3df)p<0.0001,F=138.39(3df)p<0.0001andF=468.20(1df)p<0.0001respectively;withlashersintheAsiaPacificarea2terminals indicatingtheywereexperiencingtheworstconditions;Table4.14,Figure4.10).

13 Irregular shifts: chi-square = 115.66, 3df, p<0.0001; split shift: chi-square = 61.91, 3df, p<0.0001; night-work: chi-square = 786.92, 3df, p<0.0001; shift length: chi-square = 814.71, 3df, p<0.0001; breaks: chi-square = 558.38, 3df, p<0.0001; paid holiday entitlement: chi-square = 164.83, 3df, p<0.0001; working hours fit with commitments: chi-square = 480.31, 3df, p<0.0001; job security: chi-square = 371.16, 3df, p<0.0001; contentment with basic pay: chi-square = 697.24, 3df, p<0.0001; staffing for targets: chi-square = 130.27, 3df, p<0.0001work intensity: chi-square = 31.10, 3df, p<0.0001; satisfaction with working conditions: chi-square = 358.35, 3df, p<0.0001; and satisfaction with working conditions: chi-square = 394.93, 3df, p<0.0001.

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Table4.14:Mean(SD)combinedscoreforworkingconditionsbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype

WORKINGCONDITIONS

MEAN SD

AREAOFWORK

AsiaPacificarea2 7.52 2.56

AsiaPacificarea1 4.52 2.06

Europearea2 4.62 1.72

Europearea1 2.02 1.60

JOBTYPE

Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliverywithcraneand/orhorizontaltransportdriving 7.61 2.81

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery 6.08 2.93

Craneand/orhorizontaltransportdriving 4.30 2.57

Maintenanceand/orother 3.68 2.30

EMPLOYMENTTYPE

Direct 7.56 2.88

Indirect14 4.32 2.49

Figure4.10:Meancombinedscoreforworkingconditionsbyareaofwork,jobtypeandemploymenttype

14 Includes Europe area 1 day hire

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

EU1 Maintenance Direct EU1 Driving Direct

EU1 Driving Indirect EU2 Driving Indirect

EU1 Lashing Indirect EU1 Lashing Direct

EU1 Maintenance Indirect AP1 Both Indirect

AP1 Maintenance Direct AP1 Lashing Direct

EU2 Maintenance Direct EU2 Both Indirect

AP1 Driving Direct AP2 Maintenance Direct

EU1 Both Direct EU2 Driving Direct

EU2 Both Direct AP1 Both Direct

EU2 Lashing Direct AP1 Driving Indirect

EU1 Both Indirect AP2 Driving Direct

AP2 Driving Indirect AP2 Lashing Indirect

AP2 Lashing Direct AP2 Both Indirect

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Consideringtheworkingconditionsmeasuresindividually,itisclearthatsomeofthewaysinwhichworkisorganisedarestronglylinkedtoregion.Forexample,longshiftsarealmostuniversalamongtheEuropearea1respondentsandverycommonamong thesecondAsiaPacificarea terminal respondents.Thesekindsofpatternslikelyreflectlongstandingtraditionsintheareasconcerned.However,theconsistentlyhigh levels of respondents reporting high levels of work intensity in all four regions is of particularconcern, and reflects a more general concern about rapidly increasing work intensity – with itsrecognisedhealthandsafetyconsequences(see,forexample,QuinlanandBohle,2008)–apparentbothinourqualitativefindingsandintheliteratureonthechangesthathavetakenplaceindock-workmoregenerally(see,forexample,GekaraandFairbrother,2013).Multivariate analyses again showed significant independent associations between high levels of poorworkingconditionsandareaofemployment,jobtypeandemploymenttypeaftercontrollingforageandexperience levels (Table 4.15). As with the models for health and safety outcomes and for OHSmanagement arrangements, when the regions were considered separately there were no associationsbetween jobtypeandworkingconditionsexcept in thesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals,whereagainthosein indirectemploymentandin jobscombininglashingand/orreceivinganddeliverywithdrivingwerebyfarthemostlikelytoreporthighlevelsofpoorworkingconditions.

Table4.15:Associationsbetweenhighlevelsofpoorworkingconditionsandareaofemployment,jobtypeandemploymenttype

ODDSRATIO CONFIDENCELIMITS DF,P

AREAOFEMPLOYMENT

Europearea1 1.00

3,<0.0001AsiaPacificarea1 12.16 5.34-27.71

Europe2 11.70 5.33-25.69

AsiaPacificarea2 93.69 44.49-197.29

JOBTYPE

Maintenance/other 1.00

3,<0.0001Driving 3.69 2.17-6.27

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery 8.43 4.61-15.41Bothdrivingandlashing/receivinganddelivery 12.78 6.87-23.77

EMPLOYMENTTYPE

Direct 1.00 1,<0.0001

Indirect 2.74 1.77-4.23

EXPERIENCEUnder10years 1.00

0.0310yearsorlonger 1.55 1.05-2.30

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Table4.16:AssociationsbetweenhighlevelsofpoorworkingconditionsandjobtypeandemploymenttypeinthesecondAsiaPacificareaterminals

ODDSRATIO

CONFIDENCELIMITS DF,P

JOBANDEMPLOYMENTTYPE

Maintenanceorother(virtuallyalldirectlyemployed) 1.00

5,<0.0001

Drivinganddirectemployment 2.74 1.31-5.75

Drivingandindirectemployment 4.71 2.11-10.53Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliveryanddirectemployment 9.92 3.96-24.90

Lashingand/orreceivinganddeliveryandindirectemployment 6.21 3.09-12.51

Bothlashingand/orreceivinganddelivery(virtuallyallindirectlyemployed) 65.85 30.03-144.42

EXPERIENCEUnder10years 1.00

0.0310yearsorlonger 1.92 1.07-3.45

4.6 AssociationsbetweenOHSoutcomes,workingconditionsandOHSmanagement

Theanalyses insections4.2to4.5aboveshowthatasubstantialproportionofoursurveyrespondentshave experienced high levels of adverse safety and health outcomes, poor OHS managementarrangementsandpoorworkingconditions.Theyhaveidentifiedasub-groupofrespondentsthatseemto be at particular risk in all four of these areas – indirectly employed dockworkers involved in jobscombininglashingand/orreceivinganddeliverywithdriving,thecombinationofwhichisuniquetothesecond Asia Pacific area terminals in our dataset. This section brings the findings from the four areastogether by consideringwhether poorworking conditions are associatedwith poor OHSmanagementarrangementsandadverseoutcomesareassociatedwithbothworkingconditionsandOHSmanagementarrangements.Thesamemultivariateapproachwasused.

4.6.1 AssociationsbetweenworkingconditionsandOHSmanagement

High levels of poor working conditions were strongly associated with poor OHS managementarrangements independent of area of employment, job type, employment type, age, experience andgeneral health (Table 4.17). Specifically, those who reported high levels of poor OHS managementarrangements were over 10 times as likely as those with low levels of poor OHS managementarrangementstoreportexperiencinghighlevelsofpoorworkingconditions.RepeatingtheseanalysesforeachareaseparatelyshowedthatthisassociationwassignificantinthefirstAsiaPacificarea,Europearea2 and Asia Pacific area 2 (OR=2.74 (1.40-5.37), 1df, p=0.003; OR=1.89 (1.04-3.42), 1df, p=0.04; andOR=7.02 (4.45-11.06), 1df, p<0.0001) and approached significance in Europe area 1 (OR=1.73 (0.94-3.19),1df,p=0.08).

Table4.17:AssociationsbetweenhighlevelsofpoorworkingconditionsandOHSmanagementarrangements

ODDSRATIO

CONFIDENCELIMITS DF,P

OHSMANAGEMENT Good 1.00 1,

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ARRANGEMENTS Poor 10.14 6.66-15.44 p<0.0001

AREAOFEMPLOYMENT

Europearea1 1.00

3,<0.0001

AsiaPacificarea1 38.56 13.66-108.88

Europearea2 54.27 20.30-145.06

AsiaPacificarea2 136.74 55.58-336.41

JOBTYPE

Maintenance/other 1.00

3,<0.0001

Driving 2.63 1.42-4.86

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery 8.83 4.56-17.10Bothdrivingandlashing/receivinganddelivery 7.53 3.80-14.90

HEALTHGood 1.00

1,0.01Poor 2.29 1.22-4.30

4.6.2 AssociationsbetweenhealthandsafetyoutcomesandbothworkingconditionsandOHSmanagementarrangements

High levels of perceivedpoor safety outcomeswere independently associatedwith bothpoorworkingconditionsandpoorOHSmanagementarrangementsaftercontrollingforareaofemployment, jobtype,employment type, age, experience and general health (Table 4.18).When the regionswere consideredseparatelytherewereindependentassociationsbetweenadversesafetyoutcomesand:

• Poor working conditions in the terminals in: Europe area 1 (OR=2.58 (1.32-5.07), 1df,p=0.006); the first Asia Pacific area (OR=4.04 (1.88-8.68), 1df, p<0.0001); andAsia Pacificarea2(OR=1.97(1.24-3.14),1df,p=0.004)

• PoorOHSmanagementarrangementsintheterminalsin:AsiaPacificarea2(OR=1.56(1.03-2.37),1df,p=0.04)

Similarly, high levels of poor health outcomeswere independently associatedwith both poorworkingconditions and poor OHSmanagement arrangements (Table 4.18).When the regionswere consideredseparatelytherewereindependentassociationsbetweenadversehealthoutcomesand:

• Poor working conditions in the terminals in: Europe area 1 (OR=3.15 (1.52-6.53), 1df,p=0.002); the first Asia Pacific area (OR=2.44 (1.16-5.13), 1df, p=0.02); Europe area 2(OR=3.75 (1.90-7.40), 1df, p<0.0001); and Asia Pacific area 2 (OR=3.91 (2.49-6.16), 1df,p<0.0001)

• Poor OHSmanagement arrangements in the terminals in: Europe area 2 (OR=2.04 (1.03-4.04),1df,p=0.04);withasimilarassociationsuggested forAsiaPacificarea1, thoughthisdidnotreachsignificance(OR=1.96(0.93-4.13),1df,p=0.08).

These analyses show that our composite measures of working conditions and OHS managementarrangements,intendedtoreflectmorecloselyworkers’overallworkplaceexperiences,aresignificantlyassociatedwiththeirOHSoutcomes.Thisisworthdrawingattentiontofortworeasons.First,itimpliesthatchangestooneortwoarrangementsorpracticesmighthaveconsiderableknock-oneffects.Thisisimportant, particularly in an environment in which, for example, some working conditions are lesspossibletoimprovethanothers(suchasthenecessityfornight-workontheonehandandstaffinglevelson the other). Second, the findings also suggest that GNTs’ relative emphasis on altering behaviour inorder to raise OHS performance levels in comparison with that on altering work, management andemploymentpracticesismissinganopportunitytoimproveworkers’OHSexperiences.

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Table4.18:AssociationsbetweenhighlevelsofadversesafetyandhealthoutcomesandbothworkingconditionsandOHSmanagementarrangements

ODDSRATIO

CONFIDENCELIMITS DF,P

HIGHADVERSESAFETYOUTCOMES

OHSMANAGEMENTARRANGEMENTS

Good 1.00 1,p<0.0001Poor 2.11 1.43-3.12

WORKINGCONDITIONSGood 1.00 1,

p<0.0001Poor 3.51 2.28-5.40

AREAOFEMPLOYMENT

Europearea1 1.00

1,p<0.0001

AsiaPacificarea1 0.98 0.54-1.78

Europearea2 0.38 0.20-0.70

AsiaPacificarea2 0.45 0.26-0.78

JOBTYPE

Maintenance/other 1.00

0.08

Driving 1.71 0.96-3.04Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery

2.18 1.20-3.96

Bothdrivingandlashing/receivinganddelivery

1.73 0.94-3.19

EXPERIENCEUnder10years 1.00

0.0910yearsorlonger 1.37 0.95-1.99

HIGHADVERSEHEALTHOUTCOMES

OHSMANAGEMENTARRANGEMENTS

Good 1.00 1,p<0.0001Poor 2.80 2.01-3.90

WORKINGCONDITIONSGood 1.00 1,

p<0.0001Poor 5.30 3.71-7.56

JOBTYPE

Maintenance/other 1.00

3,p=0.04

Driving 1.96 1.18-3.24Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery

1.32 0.76-2.30

Bothdrivingandlashing/receivinganddelivery

1.65 0.93-2.93

4.7 Nationalterminaloperators

AlltheanalysesinthesectionsabovearebasedonthedatafromtherespondentsworkinginterminalsoperatedbyGNTsonly.Twofurtherterminalsrunbynationaloperators,oneinthefirstAsiaPacificareaandoneinEuropearea2,participatedintheproject.Itisimportanttorememberherethat,asdescribedin Chapter 3, all dock-work in the Europe area 2 national operator run-terminal is carried out byindirectlyemployedworkers.ComparingtheGNT-andnationaloperator-runterminalsunivariately(i.e.withoutcontrollingforfactorssuchasageandworkexperience),inthefirstAsiaPacificarearespondentsintheGNT-runterminalshadsignificantly lower mean health outcomes, OHS management arrangements and working conditionsscores(F=14.52,1df,p<0.0001;F=3.75,df,p=0.05;andF=27.63,1df,p<0.0001respectively;Figure4.10)andweresignificantlylesslikelytohavehealthoutcomes,OHSmanagementarrangementsandworkingconditions scores above themedian for the region as a whole (47% and 61%, chi-square = 6.09, 1df,p=0.01; 49% and 71%, chi-square = 13.83, 1df, p<0.0001; and 51% and 62%, chi-square = 4.35, 1df,

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p=0.04respectively).Among theEuropearea2 respondents,however,although thepatternof findingswas the same forOHSmanagement arrangements andworking conditions (F=10.77,1df, p=0.001; andF=15.58,p<0.0001respectively;Figure4.11;and50%and71%,chi-square=6.26,1df,p=0.01;and48%and65%,chi-square=4.42,1df,p=0.04respectively),themeanhealthoutcomesscorewassignificantlyhigher for the GNT-run terminals’ respondents (F=3.79, 1df, p=0.05; Figure 4.10) and the proportionabove the median was also higher for GNT-run terminal respondents, though this did not reachsignificance(51%and37%,chi-square=2.14,1df,p=0.14).RepeatingthemultivariatemodelsforthefirstAsiaPacificareaandEuropearea2describedinsections4.2to4.6abovewiththeinclusionofadummyvariableforterminaloperatortypeshowedthatmostoftheseassociationsremainedaftercontrollingforotherfactors.IncomparisonwiththosefromtheGNT-runterminals,respondentsfromtheterminalsrunbynationaloperatorsweremorelikelytoreporthighlevelsofpoorOHSmanagementarrangementsinboththefirstAsiaPacificareaandEuropearea2,morelikely to report high levels of poorworking conditions in the first Asia Pacific area, and less likely toreport high levels of poor health outcomes in Europe area 2 (see Appendix, Table A.1). The latter isprobablyareflectionoftheprofileoftheworkforceinterminalEU2T3.Theseworkerswereallindirectlyemployedandweresignificantlyyoungerandhadlessworkexperience15thantheircounterpartsintheGNT-runterminals(EU2T1andEU2T2),mostofwhomweredirectlyemployed.Taken together, these findings suggest that the relationships between working conditions, OHSmanagementandOHSoutcomesaresimilarforGNT-andnationaloperator-runterminals.However,theysuggestthatthoseworkinginnationaloperator-runterminalsgenerallyexperiencehigherlevelsofpoorworkingconditionsandOHSmanagementarrangements.

Figure4.11:Meansafetyandhealthoutcomes,OHSmanagementarrangementandworkingconditionsscoresbyterminaloperatorforthefirstAsiaPacificareaandEuropearea2

4.8 Summaryandconclusions

The findings in this Chapter suggest that substantial proportions of survey respondents have poorworkplacehealthandsafetyexperiences incontainer terminals–be those in relation to theirpersonalsafety and health, the management of the risks they face at work or the way in which their work isorganisedandarranged.Intermsofsafety,70%felttheywereathighrisk,40%felttheseriskswereineffectivelymanagedandonethirdhadbeeninjuredinthepreviousyear.Whileforhealth,althoughslightlyfewerrespondentsfelttheywereathighrisk(60%),slightlymore(48%)felttheseriskswereineffectivelymanaged,andlevels15In the national operator run terminal, 80% of respondents had less than 10 years’ experience compared to 32% for the GNT run terminals (X2 = 47.88, 1df, p<0.0001) – and in fact 64% had less than 5 years’ experience (compared to 12%). Similarly, 72% were under 40 compared to 28% of those in the GNT run terminals (X2 = 38.67, 1df, p<0.0001) – with 50% were under 30.

0

2

4

6

8

Safety Health OHS management Working conditions

AP1 AP1 EU2 EU2

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ofrespondentsreportingstress,mentalfatigueandwork-relatedillnesseswerehigh(60%,65%and41%respectively).Thesefindingsarecorroboratedbythequalitativedatafromourstudiesinwhichmanyoftheworkerparticipantsexpressedconcernsabouttheirsafetyand,inparticular,theirhealth,andthewayinwhichtheseweremanaged.Theyalsoidentifiedwork-relatedimpactontheirhealthandwelfare(forexample in the form of stress and fatigue), that research from other sectors of industry has shown isassociatedwithchangesinthewayinwhichworkisorganisedandmanaged(suchasincreasesinflexibleorcontingentworkpatternsandemploymentarrangements, increases in job insecurityandworkpaceand a decrease in control overwork (see, for example; Quinlan et al., 2001; Quinlan andBohle, 2008;Walters et al., 2011), as being increasingly common and inadequately addressed by arrangements formanagingworkplace risk. Comparisonswith data from other sources suggest that respondents to oursurveyareworseoff thanothers.Forexample,data from the5thEuropeanWorkingConditionsSurvey(EWCS) (EUROFOUND, 2010) show that, amongmale respondents in European workplaces generally,only29%felttheirhealthorsafetyand18%theirwelfarewereatriskbecauseofworkandjust26%saidtheyexperiencedstressatworkalwaysormostofthetime.ThesurveyalsosuggestedthatmanyrespondentsexperiencehighlevelsofwhattheyperceivetobepoorOHSmanagementarrangementsandworkingconditions. Inparticular they felt thatsucharrangementsfailedtoprovideadequatelyfortheirvoicetobeheard.Forexample,overtwo-thirdsofrespondentssaidtheywere not consulted about the introduction of newprocedures and70%hadno health and safetyrepresentativeorhaddifficultyaccessingone.Inaddition,theybelievedthatthearrangementsfortheirhealth,safetyandwelfarefailedtoaddresstheissuesofworkorganisationandwelfarethatwerecriticaltohealthandwelfare.Forexample,63%hadhighlevelsof jobintensityandhalfweredissatisfiedwiththeirworkplacewelfareconditionsandarrangements.Thereseemstobetherefore,substantialroomforimprovementinrelationtohealthandsafetymanagementarrangements,includingthoserelatingtotherepresentation and consultation of workers on these arrangements, as well as in work organisationalissues that affectwelfare (andmay indirectly also affect safety). Relatedly, a substantial proportion ofrespondents(31%)feltstaffinglevelswerefrequently inadequateforworktobecarriedoutsafelyand35% of respondents felt that theywere frequently inadequate forwork to be completed according totargets,indicatingconsiderableroomforimprovementheretoo.Strong associations between all of these areas (that is, between working conditions and workplacearrangements for managing health and safety, as well as between OHS outcomes and both workingconditions and OHS management arrangements) were, expected and were borne out by the surveyfindings.However,thesamefindingsalsosuggestedthatincreasedemphasisonchangingaspectsofOHSmanagement and workplace arrangements, as opposed to focusing mainly on changing workers’behaviour,hasthepotentialtoimproveworkers’OHSexperiencesoverallaswellasterminal levelOHSperformance–somethingwereturntointhefollowingChapter.Lastly, the findings clearly identified a sub-group of the respondents as being at particular risk. Thesewere indirectly employed workers doing jobs which combined quayside and driving work – acombinationthatwasonlypresentintheAsiaPacificarea2terminalsinoursurvey.Thisfindingsuggeststhat global approaches by GNTs to OHS governance and management do not produce similar OHSconditions,arrangementsandoutcomesindifferentcontexts.Italsocallsintoquestionthecompanydataidentifying those in developing economy terminals as having better OHS performance – a reflection,perhapsat thewidestend,of themoregeneralgapourresearchhas identifiedbetweenthesedataandworkers’day-to-dayOHSexperiences.In the following Chapter we explore these issues further, discussing what helps to determine them,especiallyinrelationtothenationalcontextsinwhichtheyareexperienced,andwefurtherconsiderhowthe arrangements in place to support positive health and safety outcomes in the terminals might beimprovedinthelightofthefindingspresentedinthisChapter.

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5.Addressing‘thegap’

The major findings of this study indicate that while detailed strategies and arrangements to managesafety and health are adopted bymost global and national container terminal operators, there remainmajorgapsbetweentheseapproachesandtheoutcomesandeverydayexperiencesofhealth,safetyandwelfare shared byworkers in container terminals operated by these companiesworldwide. They alsoconfirm indications that the patterns of such experiences and outcomes are not consistent acrossterminalssituatedindifferentpartsoftheworld.Ourprevious study focusedonmanyof the same terminalsas those included in thepresent studyandcametosimilarconclusions.Thekeydifferencebetweenthe twostudies is found,notsomuch in theirconclusionsonthesematters,but intheevidencewehaveobtainedandanalysedduringtheprocessofreaching them. The earlier study was based on interviews with managers, workers and theirrepresentatives in the terminals as well as on interviews with union officials globally. It thereforeconcerned the perceptions of a small number of key informants of health and safety in containerterminals and of the arrangementsmade by companies tomanage this experience.While the presentstudyalsoincludessuchinterviewswithkeyinformants,andseeksevidenceofoccupationalhealthandsafetyandthearrangementstomanageit,itdoessobydrawinginadditionontheanalysisofasurveyofnearly two thousand respondents among the container terminals studied globally. It therefore addssubstantialquantitativepowertoitsanalysisoftheevidenceontheexperienceofoccupationalhealthandsafetyissuesincontainerterminalsgloballyandthearrangementsmadetomanagethem.There are threemain areas inwhich factors that influence the outcomeswe have observed are to befound.Theyare:

• the nature of the strategies adopted by the terminal companies for the governance andmanagement of arrangements made for the safety, health and welfare of the workers in theterminals

• thepositionoftheseapproacheswithinthewiderstrategiesadoptedbythesamecompaniesformanagingtheoperationoftheirterminals

• the national contextual determinants of practices to support the health, safety andwelfare of

workersincontainerterminalslocatedindifferentpartsoftheworld–inparticularinthislatterrespect,theregulatoryandlabourrelationscontextsofsuchpractices.

InthisChapterwefocusondiscussingreasonsforthefirsttwoofthesegroupsofinfluencingfactors,andwilladdressthethirdinthefollowingChapter.

5.1 ThecharacterofarrangementsmadeforthegovernanceandmanagementofOHSincontainerterminals

AswenotedinChapter3,theapproachestakenbymostoftheglobalandnationalterminaloperatorsinour study towards the governance and management of health and safety have several features incommon. They aimed to address risks fairly systematically through undertaking risk assessment andintroducingengineeringoradministrativecontrolsinrelationtobothplantandprocessesconsequenttothisassessment.Therewerestandardoperatingprocedurestakingaccountofsafetyissuesinrelationtomostoperationalactivitiesandmaintenanceofsafetycriticalplantandequipmentaccordingtoscheduledspecifications.Information,informal ‘training,’supervisionanddirectconsultationwithworkersonriskmanagement was provided through tool-box talks and similar activities at the start of shifts. Other

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training was provided to new staff and updated for continuing staff by both formal and informalarrangements.Inparallelwiththeseroutinejobsafetyarrangements,thesafetymanagementsystemsinplace in all the terminals contained various elements to ensure continuous improvement, includingproceduresforinformationcollectionanddisseminationonsafetyissues,allowingboththemonitoringofperformanceand timely interventionswhen required.TheSafety (andEnvironment)Departments thatwerepresentinalloftheterminalsservicedthesearrangements,aswellasprovidingadvice,trainingandinsomecasesparticipatinginthesurveillanceofsafetybehaviours.Generallymanagersintheterminalsbelievedthesearrangementstobe‘fitforpurpose’.Manyofthesefeaturesarewidelyconsideredtobegoodpracticeincurrentthinkingonmanaginghealthand safety and are generally implemented to a greater or lesser extent in large organisations witharrangementsinplaceforsafetymanagement.However,aswedetailinChapter4,theperceptionoftheoperation of these arrangements and the engagement of workers with them that was evident in theresultsofthesurveyofterminalworkerswasatvariancewiththeviewsofmanagers.Overalltherewasaview thatarrangements forOHSmanagementwere less thansatisfactoryand fell far shortof the idealdescribed by terminal managers. For example, nearly one third of respondents described the level ofstaffing to support theeffectiveoperationof thearrangements inplace tomanagehealthandsafetyattheir place ofwork as insufficient. The greatest proportion of respondentswith this viewwas in AsiaPacific area2 (42%).The surveydata showed that experiencewasnotuniform,with certain job types(like receiving and delivery work and lashing), types of employment (such as contract workers asopposedtodirectlyemployedworkers)andregions(especiallyterminalsinAsiaPacificArea2)reportingpoorerexperiencesthanothers.Therewasalsoafarhigherincidenceofwork-relatedharmreportedbyrespondentsinthesurveythanwassuggestedbythecompanydata.Thiswastrueforinjuries(andnearmisses),butespeciallyforwork-relatedill-healthsuchasfatigue,stressandMSDs.In characterising the drivers of corporate approaches to health and safety taken by the companiesstudied, it is notable from earlier chapters that most recently, a high-profile board-room levelcommitmentto‘zeroharm’hasbeenparticularlyinfluential.AsdetailedinChapter3,thisistransposedinto operational practice through amix of attention tomission statements inwhich the organisation’sleadershipmakesclearits:‘vision’ofachievinghighperformanceandcontinuousimprovementinhealthandsafetyoutcomes;effortstoachieveon-goingimprovementsinorganisationsafetyculture;effortstoimprovehealthandsafetycompetencies, trainingandskillsofpersonnel;andmeasurableperformancetargets for health and safety. At the same time notions of accountability for safety and health amongworkersandmanagersalikeareinstilled.Whilethereweresomedifferencesinthedetailsofexactlyhowtheydidso,threeofthefourglobaloperatorsinthestudyfollowedthisprescriptionatthecorporateleveland required adherence to it in the operational practices within their terminals. The two nationalcompaniesdidlikewise,althoughlessconspicuously.Equally widespread and influential have been the effects of international and national voluntarystandardsonOHSmanagement.Thesehavehelpedtostimulateandsupportthewidespreadadoptionofamanagementsystemsapproachtohealthandsafetythatsharessimilar featuresasthosesummarisedaboveandhasbeen implementedwidely,especially in largerorganisations.Theterminalcompaniesallseemtohavefollowedthistrend.Among the most emblematic of the procedures underpinning such systems were those for riskassessment,andmanagersandhealthandsafetyadvisorsinterviewedintheterminalscommentedonthesignificance of these procedures in the workplaces for which they had responsibility. However, therespondentstothesurveywerefarlessconvincedconcerningitsplaceortheirengagementwithitintheterminals in which they worked. Eighty per cent of them indicated that there was either no riskassessmentpresentinrelationtotheirwork,orif ithadbeenpresent,theassessmenthadnotinvolvedthem.Analysisof the interviews inboth thepresentandpreviousstudysuggests thata reason for thisdisturbing lack of awareness of risk assessmentmay have been related to the approach taken by theterminalmanagement towards riskassessment rather than its completeabsence from theirhealthandsafetymanagementstrategies.Whilemanagersbelievedtheyoperatedaparticipatoryapproach,thiswasnottheexperienceofeithertheworkersortheirrepresentativeswhowerequiteclearthatrarelywere

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they consulted or involved in the process of risk assessment at the terminals. Aswewill discuss, thebehaviour-basedcharacterofarrangementsinplaceforsafetyinalltheterminalswouldtendtopromotesuchperspectives.Alongsidethepromotionofa‘zeroharm’approachandconcomitantinterestinsafetyculturementionedabove,anotherfeatureofcurrentstrategywasashiftinemphasisinthemonitoringofsafety,awayfromthe collection and collation of LTIs and the measurement of performance standards against them(althoughthisstilltookplace)andtowardsgreaterattentiontotakingaccountofincidentsthathadnotnecessarilyresultedinharmbutwhichhadahighpotentialtocauseseriousharm:

“…weneedtobemoreproactiveabout…andthat iswhatwearenowtryingtodrivetowardssohowdowegetourterminalstoseeapotential incidentbeforeithappens,rightsowearelookingmoreatthenearmisseswearelookingattheobservations…whenpeopleseesomethingunsafedotheyactuallydosomethingaboutit‘causewehaveahistoryofpeopleprobablyseeingalotbutnotdoinganythingabout it andwewant to change thatmind set so, sowehavebeendoinga lotofcommunicationcampaignsandstuff…”[Globallevelsafetyadviser(1),GNT3]

This reflects current practice elsewhere and especially in high-risk industries such as petro-chemicals,energy extraction and supply and construction,where safetymanagement theory holds that there aresignificantdifferencesbetweenthecausesofmajorincidentsandthoseofmoreroutineLTIs.Followingfrom this, it is argued that concentration onmeasures of the reduction of LTIswill not lead to betterpreventioninrelationtomoreseriousincidents.Thereforeitisthoughttobeimportanttoconcentrateonthe recording and investigation of such events in order to promote organisational learning concerningtheir causes, and through this, their future prevention. This thinking was evident in several of theapproachestothegovernanceofhealthandsafetyamongtheGNTsatcorporatelevelthatarediscussedinChapter3aswellasinterminallevelOHSinformationcollectionanddissemination.

“…wehave…LTIcalculatedonthebasisofthatandthenwehavethosespecialcategorieswhicharenearmisseswithhighpotentialsonothinghappeningcouldpotentiallyhavebeenafatality,greenincidents are less thanLTIs so therewas actual incidents, actual injurywhich could have been ahighpotential, LTIswithahighpotentialand fatalitiesand thenwehave some sortof frequencycalculationsforthatspecific…categorywhichistheLTIswithhighpotentialbecausethisisoneofthethingswewanttofocusonalotrightnow.Alsoseeingif,ifanLTIcouldhaveledintoafatalitysowhetherwecouldalmostpredictLTIsgoingdownandthepotentialsgoingdown…andthis isoneoftheimportantnumbersforussowhetherthesenumbersgoingdownsothefrequency….ofLTIswithhighpotentialandglobally…andthisissomethingwe’relookingforifthatnumberfrompreviousyearsandwell themostreliabledatawehavestarted in2012sowearealsocomparingwhether thesenumberswerereducing inaona rolling frequency soayear todatebutalsoonamonthlybasis…”[Globallevelsafetyadviser(2),GNT3]

Afurtherfeatureofthesestrategies,alsoofrecentorigin(andachangethatseemstohaveoccurredsincethepreviousstudy),wasthegreateremphasisattachedto ‘accountability’reported in interviewsat thecorporatelevelintheGNTs.Insomecasestheexamplesthatwereusedtoillustratethischangeinvolvedrelations between terminal managers and the company head office concerning accountability of theformerforpoorOHSperformanceorseriousincidentswithintheirterminals.InotherinterviewswithmanagersandOHSadviserswithinterminals,aswellaswithworkersandtheirrepresentatives, it was clear that the same emphasis on accountability was applied to surveillance ofunsafeactsorfailuretofollowsafetyproceduresamongterminalworkers.Itwasclearfrommanyoftheinterviews with workers and their representatives in both the present and previous study that suchapproachessubstantiallyreduceworkers’feelingsoftrustintheterminalmanagement’scommitmenttotheirhealth,safetyandwelfare,despitetheassurancesconcerninga‘noblameculture’beingatthesametimeespousedintheterminal.Inthisrespect,ourfindingsconfirmHopkins’(2005)critiqueofbehaviour-

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based safety systems inwhich, aswedetailed in theprevious report (pages85-87), hepointsout that‘wheresuchdistrustexists it ispointless foremployersto introducesuchprogrammes.Theevidence isthattheywillfail’.Despitethisconclusion,suchsystemswereinwidespreaduseand,asisevidencedbybothsurveyandinterviewanalyses,theywereperceivedbyworkerstobebothhostiletotheirinterestinjobsecurityandofonlylimitedvalueinaddressingtheirhealthandsafetyconcerns.

“Theydosafetyobservationswhichallmanagershavegottodo,butthat’stogettheirbonustobehonest,they’reonakeyperformanceindicator,aspartoftheirKPIwillbetheyhavetodosomanyinspectionsayearorobservationsayear,but that’s justgoingdownandvisiting the ship if it’saniceday,theywon’tcomeontheshipat4o’clockinthemorning,inFebruary.They don’t know how you work or what your safety is, they ask you as they’re looking around.Theytendtocheckthephotocopieronthemdays,andsayyesthat’srunning.…someofthepeoplethat are doing it, they’re notworth the paper they’rewritten on, to be quite frank, because theydon’tknowwhatthey’relookingfor…”[Stewards/Dockworkers,EU2T1]

Theemphasisonchanging‘safetyculture’intheorganisationthatistheleitmotifof‘zeroharm’strategiesusually implies bringing about changes in attitudes and behaviours of the personnel working in theestablishments inwhich these strategiesarebrought tobearonce theyareadoptedat corporate level.Notionsof‘performancestandards’and‘accountability’forsafetyfurtherimplymonitoringsafety-relatedbehaviours–whether intheformoftheappraisalofmanagers’achievementofperformancetargetsonsafetyorthroughsurveillanceofworkers’adherencetoworksafetyrules.Inothersectorswheresimilarstrategies are found, observers have noted that in combination, the ‘zero harm’ orientation of OHSgovernanceandthemanagementsystemsapproachtoitsdeliveryproduceasetofarrangementsthatarestronglybehaviour-based incharacter (see forexampleQuinlan(2014)onmining;andFrick(2011) inothersectors).Theseeffectswereevidentinmanyofthecompaniesandterminalswestudied.Whatwasalsoapparentinthesecompaniesandterminalswasthatthefocusoftheirattentiontogovernanceandmanagement was weighted towards safety rather than occupational safety, health and welfaremanagement. Other researchers have pointed to similar orientations elsewhere and have argued thattheyarea functionofthecorporatefocusonbehaviour-basedapproaches.Tosupportthispoint, inthepreviousstudywequotedFrickandKempa(2011)whostatethatinsuchsystems:

“Safetyisgivenmuchmoreattentionthanhealth,despitethefactthatdiseasescausefarmoreill-health than accidents do. The prevention described more often revolves around control of ‘safe’proceduresthantheprescribedupstreampreventionofeliminatingrisksatthedesignstage…”

Quinlan (2014)makes the same point and suggests a connection between the focus on behaviourally-orientated arrangements for safety at work within establishments, the dominant discourse on ‘safetyculture’ among managers and safety professionals alike and the high profile espousal of ‘zero harm’approaches at board room level. He points to the attraction of these ways of conceptualising thegovernance of improvement in workplace health and safety for corporate leaders and managers. Heargues that its focus on changing workers’ behaviour (although managers’ behaviour may also beincluded)does littletoquestionthetenetsofmanagerialistthinking,or involveexaminingcorporateormanagerial decisions on finance, work organisation and operation. It therefore fits very well withinmodernmanagementleadershipmodels,andhefurtherpointsoutthatthereisnowevidencefrommanyindustriesthattheseapproachesmayhaveanegativeimpactuponworkers’healthandsafety.Thiswasessentiallythesituationintheterminalswestudied.Asalreadynotedinboththepresentandprevious study, a behaviour-based approachwas seen to characterise the arrangements for safety andhealthinalloftheterminals.Inkeepingwithobservationsonbehaviour-basedapproachesgenerally,thismeant thatwhile therewasawidelyheldviewamongworkersandmanagersalike that thehealthandsafety management systems had improved in recent years, priority in the systems we examined wasaffordedtosafetyasopposedtohealthorwelfare.Leadershipfromthecorporatelevelontheobjectiveof

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achieving ‘zeroharm’hadclearlymadeasignificant impact,evident, forexample, in theways inwhichmanagement interviewees from all the terminals stressed the importance of aiming for zero lost timeinjuriesand,asasteptowardsthis,systematicallyreportingandinvestigatingallincidents,regardlessofseverity.However, despite the emphasis on incident investigation, interviews confirmedother findingsfrom the previous study indicating that it was rare for investigations of routine injuries and unsafeincidentstogobeyondproximalcauses.Thatis,whilstinvestigationsestablishedwhohaddonewhatandwhen,andwhetheranyequipmentfailurehadbeeninvolved,theydidnotgenerallylookatsystemicordeeperorganisationalcausesorcontributionstohumanerrororunsafebehavioursonwhichtheytendedto focus. This seemed to be a consequence of the universalmanagement conviction that following therequirementsofthesafetymanagementsystemcloselywouldmeanthataccidentssimplycouldnotoccur– a conviction supported by their behavioural foundation and reflecting thewidely held belief that allaccidents were the result of workers failing to follow such procedures – a belief which in turn wasreinforced by the corporate focus on changing workers’ behaviour to improve safety culture. But ofcourse,asbothourownsurveyandthecompanyinjuryandincidentdatashow,work-relatedinjuriesandfatalities,aswellasill-health,didoccurinalltheterminalswestudied.Onethirdoftherespondentstothesurveyindicatedthattheyhadreceivedawork-relatedinjuryduringthepreviousyear.Andnearlytwothirds had been involved in a near miss. There were considerable variations between terminals indifferent regions, but generally the figures analysed in Chapter 4 suggest both that the experience ofinjuries byworkersmay be considerably higher than that reported in the company data, and that theroutinecausesofwork-relatedharmweretobefoundinissuesthatwerenotgenerallyinvestigatedandwhichwereembeddedinthewayworkwasorganisedandtheterminalsoperated.16Despite this,managersbelieved that thehealth and safetymanagement arrangements inplace in theirterminals covered themost significant risks faced byworkers. Theywere proud of these systems andarrangements and committed to their continued improvement and the improvement of safetyperformance through systems such as inducting new workers into the safety culture of the terminalthroughtraining,thenmonitoringandsupervisingtheiradherencetoitsrequirements.Workersandtheirrepresentatives,whobroadlyagreedthatthesystemsandarrangementswereeffectiveinaddressingsafebehaviour within the terminal, generally shared this pride and commitment but pointed out that thearrangementsaddressedonlypartoftheirconcerns.Inparticular,aswediscusslaterinthisChapter,theydidnotaddresstheirexperienceofwork-relatedill-health.In the report of the previous study we presented a critique of behaviour-based safety managementstrategiesdrawnfromtheliterature.Insummary,wesuggestedthatthefindingsofresearchandcriticalliterature indicate that there are several factors in common that help to explain failures of safetymanagement systems adopting a behaviour-orientated approach. For example there is a consensus inpublishedresearch(seeforexampleFrickandKempa’s(2011)review)thattheapplicationofthesetypesofsafetymanagementsystemswithinorganisationsoftenresultsin:

• Preoccupationwithsafetyratherthanwithsafety,healthandwelfare

• Focusonthebehaviourofindividualsratherthanwithorganisational,operationalorsituationalissues

• Approachesthatover-emphasisestrategiesandpracticesofpapercompliance

• Focus on top down instructive communication, with resulting inadequate feedback loops to

managersfromtheirsubordinates,workersandtheirrepresentatives

16 Comparison between company data on LTIs and our survey data is somewhat unreliable because, given the many well-known social and economic determinants of injury reporting, we know we are not comparing like with like. Nevertheless our data suggest substantial under-reporting in company data. The company data are all lost time injuries. In our data, 35.4% of those injured did not stop work, 13.5% continued later the same day, 9.1% took 1 to 3 days off, 13.1% 4 to 7 days, 6.8% 8 to 14 days, 7.4% 15 to 28 days, and 14.7% 29 days or more. So overall, 21% of respondents were injured and took at least some time off, as opposed to the 33% who were injured per se.

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• Inadequate attention to the health and safety consequences of work organisation and workprocessesandtothatofchangeswithinthem

ItisevidentfromthefindingsinChapter3thatallthesefeatureswerepresentinthesystemsinplacetomanageheathsafetyintheterminalsand,moreover,theyweretheresultoftherequirementsofcompanylevelhealthandsafetygovernance.Aswehaveseen,theywereevidentintheexperiencesofworkersinthepresentstudy–boththosereportedbyrespondentswhotookpartinthequestionnairesurveyandintherecordsofthemoredetaileddiscussionoftheseexperienceswiththeresearchersduringinterviewswithworkers and their representatives. The analysis in Chapter 4 corroborated the conclusions of theprevious study in this respect and demonstrated the same significant gap between the perceptions ofcorporate leadership and management and those of terminal workers. Both the qualitative andquantitative evidence supports conclusions that featuresof the safetymanagement systems inplace inthe terminals such as those above served to undermine the delivery of an experience of effectivemanagementofhealth,safetyandwelfareforworkers.Asalreadynoted,therewasaconsiderablelevelofworker dissatisfaction with the OHS management arrangements they experienced, which was evengreaterforthoseincertainhighriskactivities(suchaslashingand/orreceivinganddeliveryworkinAsiaPacificArea2).Theoverallscoreonthecompositevariableweconstructedto indicatepoorhealthandsafetymanagementinChapter4confirmedthis.Thiscompositevariablewasmadeupof12measuresofOHS management arrangements, with a higher score indicating poorer OHS management. The meanscoresforthefourstudyareasrangedfrom3.63inEuropeArea1to7.52inAsiaPacificArea2,withanoverallmeanof6.31,indicatingthat,whiletherewassubstantialregionalvariation,respondentsfromallareas felt arrangements were lacking in a number of the areas included in our composite measure.Additionally, while good communication within organisations is often argued to be a key requisite ofhealthandsafetymanagementsystems(SeiboldandShea2001,CongerandKanungo1998),itisnotablethat theevidencepresented inChapter4makesplainthatmanyrespondentshadnotexperiencedthis.Forexample,onaccesstoinformationconcerningthepreventivepoliciesorproceduresthatunderpinnedthesafetymanagementsystemsinplaceintheterminals,betweenhalfandtwothirdsofrespondentstothesurvey indicatedtheyeitherhadnoaccessto thesewrittensafetypoliciesorprocedures,orsimplydidnotknowaboutthemdespitetherepeatedclaimbymanagersthattheywereavailabletoall.Theevidenceindicatesthattheaimofcorporategovernancetoeffectimprovedhealthandsafetyintheterminals throughfocusingonzeroharmstrategiesandchangingsafetyculture isatbestonlypartiallyeffective.Arguably,twomainfeaturesservetoundermineitsaim.First,theapproachistoalargeextentself-limited by its focus on safety – as opposed to health, safety andwelfare - and it therefore fails toaddressmanyoftheworkers’concernsthatarearticulatedinbothChapter4ofthepresentreportaswellasinthepreviousstudy.Forexample,nearly90percentofrespondentstothesurveyindicatedthattherewasnoterminalpolicyonwork-relatedstressattheirplaceofwork,oriftherewastheywereunawareofit. Yet a large proportion of operational workers in the same survey indicated stress to be a healthoutcomethattheyexperiencedasaconsequenceoftheirwork.Second,whiletheremaybe‘lowhangingfruit’tobeharvestedintermsofsafetyimprovementsthroughusingthisapproach,ultimatelythelackoftrustandthemarginalisationofinstitutionalarrangementsforrepresentativeworkerparticipationwithinsuchsystemsservetounderminetheircredibilityintheeyesofworkersandtheirrepresentatives,asbothstudiesdemonstrate.Forexample,inthepresentstudy,incontrast towhatmanagers claimed concerning thewidespreadpractice of consultation, 60per cent ofrespondentstothesurveyhadnohealthandsafetycommittee(ordidnotknowiftherewasahealthandsafetycommittee).Withregardtoinstitutionalarrangementsfortheselectionofandaccesstohealthandsafetyrepresentatives,42percentofrespondentssaidtheyhadnohealthandsafetyrepresentative.Ofthosethatdidhaveahealthandsafetyrep,nearlyhalf(48percent)felttheywerenoteasytoaccessand18percentreportedthattheywerenotelectedbyworkers.However,thepatternsofthesearrangementsvariedconsiderablybetweenterminalsandbetweenregions,withthoseinadvancedmarketeconomiesinEuropeandAsiaPacific considerablybetterprovided for in this respect than the respondents in theAsiaPacific area2 terminals.Wewill return to this comparativeaspect later in thisChapter,but thesedifferencesappeartoberelatedtoamixtureofregulatorysupportforworkerrepresentationonhealthandsafetyandtheresilienceoftheinstitutionsoforganisedlabourindifferentnationalcontexts.These

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observationswerefurtherborneoutbycommentsmadebyworkersandtheirrepresentativesconfirmingthefindingsontheroleoftheseinstitutionalarrangementsfromthepreviousstudy.

“What you’re describing suggests there’s … a union strategy to increase howmuch workers areinvolvedinthewaythathealthandsafetyismanaged.Yes,absolutely,we’veempowered,youknow,thedelegatesandwiththeunionbackingtotakeonthese issues.…We’ve also got legislative, you know, support aswellwith the OH and S act… soyou’vegotthatsortofadditionalbackup.”[DelegateandTeamleader,AP1T2]

“Whatunion?Wejustrelyonthegoodwillofthelocalagentofourcontractor,evenifhestopsoursalarieswehavenoonetoturnto.”[Lasher,AP2T3]

Althoughtherhetoricofzero-harmapproachestoOHSarrangementsidentifiesOHSasa‘corecorporatevalue’andindicatesthenecessityof its integrationintothecoreaimsandmanagementfunctionsofthebusiness,inpracticethesamezero-harmapproachservedtomoderatethisinseveralimportantrespects.A combination of focus solely on safety with a behaviour-based orientation towards achievingimprovement,meantthatmuchoftheunderlyingbusinessandorganisationalcontributiontocreatingapoorworkingenvironment forsometerminalworkers felloutside theremitof thestrategies forsafetyandhealthandwasthereforeignoredbythem.Weexploretheextentoftheseeffectsnext.

5.2 Thepositionofarrangementsforoccupationalhealth,safetyandwelfarewithinwiderstrategiesformanagingthebusinessandoperationofcontainerterminals

There isa largebodyofresearchevidencedrawnfromavarietyofsectorsandcountriesthat indicatesthatseveralnowwell-establishedtrendsinmodernorganisationalmanagementhavefeaturesincommonwhichleadtoharmfuleffectsforworkers’health,safetyandwelfare(seeforexample;Benachetal.,2007;Quinlanetal.,2001;QuinlanandBohle,2008;Underhill andQuinlan,2011;Waltersetal.,2013).Theyincludetheoutsourcingoforganisationalactivitiestocontractorsonthegroundsofcostandshort-termbusinessefficiency;thede-structuringoforganisationswithincreasingdevolutionofauthorityawayfromcentralisedhierarchicalstructurestolooserassociationsofbusinessunitsarrangedinflattermatrixstyleorganisational structures; the increased emphasis on short-term business performance targets, theirmeasurementand their influenceon thecareerprogressionofmanagers;an increasedprioritisationofvalue chain relationships and a resulting increased porosity in the boundaries between organisations.Thesehaveoccurredalongside aparallel decline in the significanceof the legalnexus surrounding theemployment relationship and by extension, a decline in the influence of collective approaches toemploymentrelations;andallhavecontributedtoincreasedinfluenceofconsiderationswithinbusinessrelationshipsuponworkplacepractices.Itiswellknownthatthesefeaturesleadto,interalia,thereductionofemploymentsecurity,greaterfocusonpriceanddeliveryoutcomesandstrongerpressuretoincreaseworkintensity,whileatthesametimepresenting a host of challenges for conventional approaches to communicating and managingarrangements foroccupationalhealthandsafetywithinorganisations.Researchershavenoted that themulti-employer worksites that result from contracting work out to contractors and subcontractorsproducesscenariosinwhichitisdifficulttomanageOHSandmakearrangementstoprotectallworkersattheworksite.Thisisespeciallytrueforthoseworkersattheendsofthemulti-layeredcontractingandsubcontractingchainsthatmaybepresentwithinsuchworksites.Sucharrangementsalsooftenresultinthe presence of companies on site with fewer resources to address OHS management than the largecompanies to which they are contracted, and further to place these contractors under considerablepressuretodeliveraccordingtounrealisticpriceandtimescheduleswhichcompromisehealthandsafety

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(see,forexample,JamesandLloyd,2008).Thedevolvingoforganisationalauthoritywithinlargeformallycentralised andhierarchical organisations to flattermatrices ofmore loosely associatedbusiness unitshasbeennotedtocontributetoseriousproblemsofmanagerialauthorityonissuesofOHSaswellastoareductioninresourcesforspecialistOHSserviceswhichwereformerlyheldcentrallywithintheselargeorganisations. Indeedtherehavebeenanumberofaccountsof thecauseofmajor incidents identifyingfailures of communication and management and disorganisation resulting from such organisationalstructuresassignificantamongthecausesoftheseevents(see:LeCoze,2008;Hopkins,2011;Hopkins,2012;Woolfson,2013).Althoughwedidnothavesufficientaccesstothecompaniestostudythesefeaturesindetail,theywerepresent in varying degrees in the companies included in the present study. It is likely that theycontributed to the organisational position occupied by arrangements for the governance andmanagementofOHSwithin thesecompaniesandthat theyhelpedexplain thestrategicapproachtakentowardsthegovernanceandmanagementofOHSwithinthebusinessunitsforwhichthecompaniesheldoverallresponsibility.Forexample,outsourcingofdock labour isawell-establishedpattern interminaloperationglobally,drivenbycorporatestrategiesconcerningcostefficiencies.Itwasadoptedinalloftheterminals in the study inwhich resistance from existing regulation and/or organised labour had beenovercome.Devolvedbusinessautonomyforindividualterminals–thebusinessunitsofthecompanies,tousetheircorporateappellation-wasalsoaclearstrategyadoptedtovaryingdegreesbytheGNTsinthestudy.Inoneofthem, itsprogressionwassuchthat,aswenotedinChapter3, thereappearedtobenoobviouscorporate level infrastructure inplace for thegovernanceof terminal levelOHSarrangements,whileintheotherthreetherewereindicationsthatthezeroharmapproachtowardsthegovernanceofarrangements for safety management at the terminals was the way in which corporate governanceattemptedtoexert its influenceoverotherwisesemi-autonomousbusinessunits,but insodoing,aswehave argued in the previous section, the meaning of ‘occupational health, safety and welfare’ wasconsiderablynarrowedtothatof‘safety’.InChapter4weobservedthat60percentofterminalworkerswhotookpartinoursurveybelievedthereto be a high risk to their health from their work in the terminals, with stress and fatigue also beingreportedbyover60percentofrespondentsinthesurvey.HighlevelsofadversehealthoutcomeswereespeciallyassociatedwithworkintheAsiaPacificarea2terminals,withmostoperationaljobsandwithindirect employment.Experienceofpoorhealthoutcomeswasalsoassociatedwithhigh levelsofpoorsafetyoutcomes.Thissuggestsseveralthings.First,widertrendsinorganisationalmanagementthatwereevidentintheterminalshelptocontextualisearrangementsforthegovernanceandmanagementofOHSreported previously and help explain their results. Our survey findings show that respondents clearlyregardtheirhealthtobeatsomerisk,andespeciallysoinrelationtoexposuresthatthearrangementsforsafetycontributeverylittletopreventing.Itiswellestablishedintheliteraturetowhichwehavereferredthatwork-relatedhealthoutcomesreportedinthesurvey,likehighlevelsofstressandfatigue(aswellashighlevelsofotherssuchasmusculoskeletaldamageandgastrointestinalproblems),areassociatedwithfeaturesofworkorganisation,suchasthepaceofwork,theextentofrepetitivetasksandthedegreeofdecisionlatitudeallowed,aswellaswithissuesofemploymentsecurityandthelike.Thesearemattersthataredictatedbythewiderorganisationalandoperationalmanagementoftheterminalcompaniesandare outside the influence of behaviour safety strategies – or indeed efforts to influence ‘safety culture’withintheterminals.Itisalsointerestingtonotethatintheregioninwhichtheseoutcomesweremostpronounced,trendsinemploymentpracticeshavebeennotedbyotherstomeanthat:

“….workersarecasualemployeesthatcometotheportforshortperiods…Theseworkersarehiredbyprivatecontractorswhoofferpoorpay,poorsafetyconditionsandnolongtermbenefits….…thereare considerable social costs associatedwith the process of port redevelopment,which are beingbornebytheworkforce.Therationalisationofworkforcenumbers,increasedcasualizationandde-unionisationofportlabourareleadingtoworseningconditionsofemployment.”(Hill,2008:164-165)

It isworthnotingherethatalthoughtherewerefewfemaleworkersamongtheoperationalstaffoftheterminalswestudied, it iswidelyacknowledgedthat the trendtowardsgreaterautomationof terminal

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workandconsequentremovalofat leastsomeoftheheavyphysicalstrainsassociatedwithdockworkopensthewayforemploymentofanincreasedproportionofwomenintheterminallabourforceglobally.ThishasimplicationsfortheOHSmanagementstrategiesadoptedbycompanies,notleastinrelationtothoseaimedatworkers’welfare.Howeverwesawlittleevidenceofeitherstrategiesoractionstakentoaddresstheseimplicationsinanyoftheterminals.Rather,theimplicationsofourinterviewsurveywerethat in those terminalswherewomenwere employed, they felt generallywell-accepted by theirmalepeers but had had to struggle to achieve basic welfare provisions. As the example below shows, theinterventionof(inthiscasemale)unionworkers’representativescouldbeparticularlysignificant.

“…whenI firststartedthereI feltvery,verywelcomedandfitted in…there’schallengesaswell…that’sjustthewayitiswhenthere’sonly16ofyouinamaledominatedworkplacesometimesyougo in and you feel a bit like you’re on your own…But, generally, people are pretty friendly andwelcoming… [Achievingappropriate facilities]wasa real struggle…theygaveus these changingroomsandthe…whataretheycalled,youknow,menstruating…allthatsortofstuff,wasreally,reallybelowparlikedisgustingactually…Ihadtoreallyarguewiththecompanyforquiteawhiletoget themtoupgrade it…wehad tohave likea fightwith the supervisoranddraghim inandmakehimlookatitanditwaslikekindofhumiliating…theyendedupimprovingitabitand…atonepointtheyputinquitecheapplumbing…anditprobablywasn’tevenuptoregulationandofcourse itwasanightmarethewomen’stoiletswerefloodingandIkeptgoingtothemanagementandtheykept(.)actuallyaccusingthewomenofbeing…wellIdon’treallywanttousethewords…andagainitbecamequiteembarrassingcauseitbecamereallypublicinsteadofthemjustdealingwith it andwe ended up having amassive fight about it and actually the personwhomade thebiggest differencewasoneof theguyson theOH&S committee, ourguys, our electedguys… if ithadn’t been for ourOH&S guys Iwouldn’t have, you know, been able to get anything done to behonest…becauseIappealedtothemanagers,andIappealedtotheHRdepartmentandtheydon’tcare,they’rejustsocheap,youknow?”[Stevedore,AP1T1]

InChapter4weanalysedsurveydataonworkorganisationandworkingconditionsthataredeterminedbyoperationalmanagementstrategies.Todosoweaskedsurveyrespondentsquestionsconcerningshiftpatterns, rest breaks, paid holiday entitlements, working hours, job security, work intensity, andsatisfactionwithbasicpayandbothworkingandwelfareconditions.Theresultsdemonstrateahighlevelofworkintensity inall theterminals,withworkers inEuropeandAsiaPacificarea2experiencing longshifts;athirdoftherespondentsinAsiaPacificarea1experiencingirregularshiftpatterns;aswellasalargeproportionofrespondentsinbothEuropeandAsiaPacificexperiencingnightwork.Arguably,theyarefundamentaltothewiderbusinessandoperationalstrategiesthatdriveproductivityintheterminals.However, they are allwork experiences that have been associatedwith poor health outcomes such asstress,fatigueandMSDsintheliterature.Significantly,theyareallissuesthatarelargelyignoredbythesafety management arrangements in place in the terminals. The lack of any conspicuous preventivestrategiesthattakeaccountofthesemattersisfurtherreflectedinouradditionalfindingalsoreportedinChapter 4 that those who reported that they experienced high levels of poor OHS managementarrangementsattheirplaceofworkweretentimesmorelikelytoalsoreportexperiencinghighlevelsofpoor working conditions, suggesting that they perceived the arrangements for health and safetymanagementattheirworkplaceasfailingtoaddresstheirconcernsabouttheirworkplacehealthissues.The survey findings therefore confirmed the concerns expressedbyworkers and their representativesthat were reported in the previous study, and again in the interviews with workers and theirrepresentativesinthepresentstudy.Inbothcases,theprevailingopinionofworkersandrepresentativeswasthat,whilesafetyarrangementsintheterminalswereconspicuousandhadsomeimpactonthesafebehaviourofworkers,theydidnotpreventarangeofnegativeeffectsontheirhealth,safetyandwelfarethatweretheresultofthewayinwhichworkwasorganisedtomaximisetheproductivityoftheterminaloperations.Sincetheybelievedthatmaximisingproductivitywasthecorporatepriority,abeliefthatwasreinforced by their everyday work experiences, it is perhaps not surprising that workers and theirrepresentatives looked somewhat askance at the companies’ efforts to protect their health, safety andwelfarethroughbehaviourchangetechniquesandmonitoringtheirsafebehaviour.

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In our analysis in Chapter 4, we went on to create a combined score for our indicators of workorganisationandworkingconditionsandweconsideredassociationsbetweenthiscombinedscoreandtheareasinwhichterminalsweresituated,thetypeof jobheldbyrespondentsandwhethertheyweredirectlyemployedbytheterminalcompaniesoremployedbycontractorsintheterminalsinwhichtheyworked.Weconfirmed findings thatwere indicated in theprevious study, aswell asby the interviewsconducted with workers and their representatives in the present study. As is detailed in Chapter 4,multivariateanalysesof thesedata showedsignificant independentassociationsbetweenhigh levelsofpoor working conditions, job type, area of employment and employment type. Workers employed bycontractorsinAsiaPacificarea2terminalsinjobscombininglashingand/orreceivinganddeliverywithdrivingwerebyfarthemostlikelytoreporthighlevelsofpoorworkingconditions.Jobssuchaslashinganddrivingarewidelyacknowledgedtobeamongthemostphysicallydemandingincontainer terminals and so, inmanyways, these findings are not surprising.What is important is thatwheretheseactivitieswereundertaken,itwasinthemainbyworkersemployedbycontractors,andtheworkingconditions theyexperiencedwereamongst thepoorest.Hereagain these findingscorroboratethe analysis of interviewswithworkers in thesepositions in both thepresent andprevious study andsuggestthatthecorporatestrategiestooutsourcetheseactivitiestocontractorshasastronglynegativeeffect on their experience of the resultingworking conditions.While the behaviour change techniquesadoptedby terminalmanagers to improvesafety in thesesituationsapplied to thecontractworkersaswell as the directly employed workers in the terminals, and indeed both managers and workersinterviewed frequently cited examples of actions taken to address safety behaviours seen among thecontractworkers,thesestrategiesdidnotaddresstheirhealthortheirwelfarewiththesamedegreeofscrutinyorsupport.Theperceptionofworkersintheseterminalswasthathereagaincorporateprioritiesplaced operational cost efficiencies and productivity over concern for the health or welfare of theseworkers.Atitsextreme,intheseterminalsmanyoftheworkerssuchaslashers,whowereemployedbycontractors and who experienced the poorest conditions of safety, health and welfare, were alsotemporarymigrantworkers.Theycametotheterminalsofteningroupsfromthesamevillages locatedveryfarawayinentirelydifferentpartsofthecountry.Theyoftenspokeadifferent languagetothatofthedirectlyemployedterminalworkersandmanagers.Atthesametimetheeducationandliteracylevelsamongthisgroupappeared tobequitemixed.They lived inovercrowdedandpoorhousingconditionsandwere dependent on themiddle-menwho organised their economicmigration for the provision ofbasicamenitiesandtransport.Assuch,likeeconomicmigrantsgenerally,theyfeltthemselvestobedisempoweredandtheirsecurityofemployment to be extremely vulnerable. Their health and safety concerns were among those thatgenerally went unrepresented at work, but at the same time their feelings of vulnerability and theprecariousnessoftheiremploymentpreventedthemfromseekingrepresentationonsuchmatters.Theredid not appear to be strategies in place in the terminals to address thesematters. Managers were ofcourseawareofthechallengesofdealingwithhealthandsafetyissuesinrelationtocontractorsandtheirworkers. In the Asia Pacific area 2 terminals, where contractor employees formed themajority of theterminalworkforce,theyindicatedthattherewerevariousstrategiesinplacetoensurethatcontractorsadhered to the management’s OHS requirements. They included specifications on health and safetyrequirementswithinthecontractitself,inductiontrainingonsafetyforallcontractworkersonarrivalatthe terminal and the extension of communication, monitoring and supervision of compliance withrequirementsonsafetybehaviourstoallworkers,includingthoseofcontractors.Workersfoundtobeinbreach of these requirements were referred to their employers for further training or discipline asappropriate. Managers also talked about regular meetings with contractors or their representativesduringthecourseofthecontractedwork,atwhichsafetyissueswereregularlyraisedandaddressed.We were unable to investigate the effectiveness of these arrangements systematically. However,interviewswithworkers,includingthosewithcontractworkers,suggestedthattheywereonlypartiallyeffective, withmanyworkers complaining about the excessive focus on surveillance of behaviour andmuchlessattentionbeinggiventootherelementsofcompliance.Ifthecombinedfindingsofthesurveyandinterviewsaretakenintoaccount,itisclearthatcontractorisationposessomemajorchallengesfor

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the achievement of improvedworking conditions formanyworkers and the strategies adopted by theterminal management to date fell somewhat short of overcoming these challenges. The researchliteraturesuggeststhatwhileageneralworseningofemploymentconditions, includingthoseforhealthand safety, are commonly experienced as a result of the contractorisation of labour in dock-work andelsewhere,thereisalsoanemergentsetofstrategiesthathelptooffsetsuchdeterioration.Forexample,asWaltersandJames(2011)identified,buyersofthesetypesofservicesareofteninstrongpositionstoinfluencetheconditionsunderwhichtheserviceisdelivered,especiallywhenitsdeliverytakesplaceinworksitesundertheircontrol.Theyhavefurthershown(seeJamesetal.,inpress)thatsuchinfluencehasthepotentialtobemosteffectiveinvaluechainrelationshipsthatarerelationalratherthantransactional.Itwas these types of relationships thatweremost typical of the ones found in the Asia Pacific area 2terminals,wherecontractorprocurementtendedtoengagerelativelysmallnumbersofcontractorsonaregular and renewed basis, establishing the long-term partnership style relational associations withlabour suppliers that have been shown elsewhere to lend themselves to the kinds ofmore developedstrategies to influence contractor compliancewith health and safety requirements. This is the case forexample in construction, food and transportation (see also; Walters et al., 2013; James et al., 2014;Sampson et al., 2014), and itwould seem that terminal operators still havemuch to learn from theseexperiences.Inshort,thisisanareainwhichcorporategovernanceofhealthandsafetyarrangementscouldbecomemore engaged.Research in other sectorswould suggest that substantial improvements in theworkingconditionsofcontractworkersliewithinthereachofsuchcorporateinfluence.Greaterattentioncouldbeappliedtothedevelopmentofcorporatestandardsconcerningthesematterswithoutnecessarilyriskingexcessiveinterferencewiththefreedomofbusinessunitstomanagetheirownaffairs inrelationtothefinancialandorganisationalaspectsoftheirbusinessrelationswithcontractors.However,researchalsoshowsthatthedriversofsuchengagementarenotsolelycorporateonesbutalsocomefromthewiderenvironment in which businesses are situated. This is an observation to whichwewill have cause toreturninthefollowingsection.Another area that is quite strongly affected by contractorisation and which was also evident in thepresentandpreviousstudiesconcernstheextentandqualityofworkerparticipationinhealthandsafety.ItisclearfromourfindingsinChapter4thattheinstitutionalarrangementsforworkerconsultationonhealth and safety were least developed in the same terminals as those with high levels of indirectlyemployed workers (i.e. those employed by contractors) – all of which were in Asia Pacific area 2.Interviews with workers and their representatives in both studies indicated that these arrangementswerealmostnon-existentamongtheworkersofcontractorsintheterminalsinthisarea.ThisisstarklyillustratedinFigures5.1and5.2,whichrepresentafurtheranalysisofoursurveydataanddemonstratethat,while representationand consultationwasgenerallypoor in the terminals in the region, thiswasespeciallysoforworkersemployedbycontractors,whereover90percenthadnosafetycommitteeandalmost 90 per cent said they had no elected health and safety representative, despite the rathermorepositiveportrayalgivenbymanagers.

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Figure5.1AbilitytoraiseissueswithahealthandsafetycommitteebyemploymenttypeinAP2(%)

Figure5.2:RepresentationbyanelectedhealthandsafetyrepresentativebyemploymenttypeinAP2(%)

Even where workers were members of autonomous trade unions, they were not recognised by theiremployersandhadnoplatformfromwhichtomakerepresentationsabouthealthandsafetymattersthatwereofconcerntothem.Consultationonhealthandsafety,whenitoccurredinthesecontexts,wasgenerallyintheformofdirectconsultationbetween individualworkersand their supervisors,managersoremployers (dependingonthesizeofthecontractingorganisation)orwithsupervisorsormanagersfromtheterminalcompany.Inall these situations the quality of this so called ‘consultation’ was strongly affected by the powerimbalancebetweenthepartiesandgenerally the feelingsofvulnerabilityand insecurityof theworkersconcernedmeantthattheydidnotfeelabletoofferobservations,raiseissuesorofferopinionsonhealthandsafetymatterstheyfeltwouldcontradictthoseheldbythecontractororterminalmanagement.

“Yousee Iama strongunion follower.The [GNTA]managersdon’t likemeasa result.Everyoneknowsmeasthedifficultone.Sotheyareespeciallyharshonme.EvenifIstepoutofmyTTtochecktyreconditionandpressuretheysupervisorwillshout‘Heyyougoinsideyourvehicleatonce’.”[TruckTrailerDriver,AP2T2]UnionrepresentativessaidthattheyhadnothingtocontributeinsuchmeetingsasintheirviewtheH&Scommitteeisamatterofmanagementissueandnothingtodowiththem.[AP2T1]

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Overall, thepositionoccupiedbycorporate strategies for thegovernanceandmanagementofworkers’occupational health, safety and welfare in relation to wider corporate strategies for managing thebusiness and operation of container terminals limits their coverage to a rather narrow aspect ofwhatmightbeconsideredthe‘workenvironment’inamoreholisticsense.Despitetherhetoricconcerningthecentrality of a commitment to preventive health and safety in the core corporate business values andpractices,whathasemergedintheorganisationswestudiedhasbeenthepresenceofanunderstandingofOHSwhichdoesnotconflictwiththeprinciplesofprofitmaximisationadoptedatthecorporatelevelandwhich is limited to a focus on arrangements for the governance andmanagement of safety at theterminals,andtoaparticularformofsuchgovernanceinwhichnotionsofdeveloping‘safetyculture’andbehaviour modification predominate. This largely ignores a range of occupational health and welfareissuesthatareessentiallytheconsequenceofcorporatebusinessandoperationalstrategiesandpracticesaimedatincreasingtheproductivityandprofitabilityoftheterminals.Theseissuesareamongthosethatworkersregardashavinganinfluenceontheirhealthandwelfareaswellasontheirsafety,buttheyliebeyond the reach of corporate approaches that are largely focused on achieving behaviour changes inrelationtosafety.We found the impact of these strategies to bemoderated by the national contexts inwhich theywereenacted.We discuss this influence on the health, safety andwelfare experience and the arrangementsmadetosupportitattheterminalswestudieddifferentpartsoftheworldinthefollowingChapter.

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6.Contextualdeterminantsofpractices–theroleofthestate,regulationandlabourrelations

Recent research findings have pointed to the wider contextual determinants of what occurs withinworkplace health and safety management practices. For example, in a recent large European surveyaddressingworkplaceOHSmanagement practices in all EUmember states conducted on behalf of theEuropeanUnionOccupationalSafetyandHealthAgency(EU-OSHA), itwasobservedthatdifferences inthedegreeofimplementationandoperationofhealthandsafetymanagementmeasuresrequiredbyEUDirectives inworkplaces indifferentEUmemberstatesremained,evenafterdeterminantssuchassizeandsectorhadbeentakenintoaccount(Waltersetal.,2013).FurtherworkcommissionedbyEU-OSHAdemonstratedthattherewereseveral featuresofthenationalpolitical,regulatory,economicpolicyandlabour relations contexts in which these workplaces were situated that were especially significant ininfluencing the operation of process-orientated OHS regulation within workplaces (Walters andWadsworth, 2014). This finding was further borne out in a series of papers analysing these contextswithin several different EU states, including the UK (Wadsworth andWalters, 2014), Sweden, (Frick,2014),Latvia(WoolfsonandVanadzins,2014),Spain(GarciaandBenavides,2014)andCyprus(BoustrasandEconomides,2014).Inallcases,thecomplexinterplayofeconomic,regulatoryandlabourrelationsstylesandstructureswithinEUmemberstateswasshowntohelptodeterminethenatureofthesystemsinplaceinthesecountriesgoverningandsupportingOHS,whichinturnwereprominent in influencingtheextentoftheuptakeofsupranationalmeasuresattheleveloftheworkplace.Thesefindingshavesomesalienceinrelationtothepresentstudy.Thecontainerterminalsthatwereitsfocus were situated in four different countries. Each had different regulatory structures andarrangements for occupational health and safety, as well as different economic histories, policies andinfrastructures. They also each had different policies, histories and current practices in relation tonational patterns of labour relations generally, as well as for those in dock-work more specifically.Corporate strategies for health and safety governance and management in the companies wereimplementedwithin these different national contexts in the terminalswe studied.Not surprisinglywefound such contexts to be significant mediators of the outcomes of these approaches and importantdeterminants of the differenceswe observed in the health and safety experiences of theworkers thusaffected.Inthischapterweoutlinetheeffectsofthesecontextsonthehealthandsafetypracticesandoutcomesintheterminalswestudiedandwesuggestamodelwethinkishelpfulinexplainingthedynamicbetweenthese effects and those of corporate global governance of OHS pursued by most of the companiesoperatingtheseterminals.

6.1 Economiccontexts

As pointed out in Chapter 1, both the economy and the nature of the economic policies for portdevelopmentofthecountriesinwhichthecontainerterminalsweresituatedhaveasignificantcontextualbearing on arrangements for their operation. The four countries in which the terminals were locatedwere all large economies. Two were member states of the EU, but with quite different economic,regulatoryandlabourrelationssystems,onewasanadvancedmarketeconomyinAsiaPacificwhiletheother was a large lower-middle-income country elsewhere in the Asia Pacific region. The economiccontexts in which the terminals operated in all four countries were therefore quite different. Thesedifferences,aswellasthoseinNationaleconomicstrategiesforportdevelopment,playedafurtherroleindetermining terminal structure and operational practices. Thiswas seen both in the arrangements forgovernanceandmanagementofhealthandsafetyandinthedegreeoflatitudeavailabletotheterminalcompaniesinimplementingandoperatingcorporaterequirementsinthisrespect.

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ThecorporateoperationalstrategiesoftheGNTsincludedinthestudywereglobalandoftenrelationalnot only to local and regional competition but also to that of the global interests of the companies.Managersandworkersalikewerehighlyawareofthevolatilityofthemarketinrelationtothecontainertradeinwhichtheywereinvolvedand,thechangeablebusinesspositionoftheterminalsinwhichtheyworked.Thisresulted inasubstantialemphasison issuesofproductivityandefficiency in termsof thecapacityandthroughputofcontainersintheterminals;anawarenessthatpervadedtheirapproachestohealthandsafety.We pointed out in Chapter 1 that there have been broad trends that characterise port developmentduringtheeraofeconomicglobalisation,ofwhichtheuptakeofthetransportationofgoodsincontainershasitselfbeenone.Thishastakenplaceintandemwithothers,includingageneralmovementfrompublicto private ownership of ports, increased mechanisation and substantial downsizing of port labour,coupledwithitsoutsourcing,allaimedatfacilitatingincreasedthroughputandefficiencies,toenabletheeconomiesoftheirhostcountriestobetterengagewitheconomicglobalisation.These trendshavealsohelped facilitate the increased reachof investment innationalport facilitiesbycompanieswithaglobalcorporate interest in thecontainer trade,notonly in theoperationofnationalterminalsbutalsothatofglobalnetworksofterminalsandtheirfurtherinvolvementinthebusinessofmaritime and land transport too. As we also pointed out this has resulted in economic and businessdominance by a small number of global operators in the industry, four ofwhichwere included in thepresentstudy.AstheliteraturereviewedinChapter1makesclear,nationaleconomicpoliciesconcernedwithportefficiencies,inwardinvestmentandimprovingthecapacitytoexportandimportgoodshave,invariousways,helpedtofacilitatethisdevelopment.Whilethesebroadtrendsareobservedglobally,therearesignificantdifferencesinthedetailofthewayinwhich theyhavebeen addressed in bothnational economicpolicies and their operational results. ThissituationinfluencesthepresentpositionoftheterminalsincludedinourstudyandhelpsexplainsomeofthedifferencesbetweenthemthatweobservedintermsofthearrangementsforOHSmanagementandhowworkersperceivedthem.Overwhelmingly,themostsignificantoftheeconomicinfluencestowhichtheyweresubjectwasthatoftheintensityofcompetitionforbusinessthatwasadriverofthemanagerialconcernwith operational efficiencies andwhich, in turn, causedworkers and their representatives tobelieve theyneeded tobe responsive todemands for fast turnarounds in the loadingandunloadingofships,thattookprimacyoverworkrelatedhealthorsafetyissues:

“Forthefirsttime…wewillhave60sub-contractorsonsite…andthat'sthefirsttimewe'vegoneanddonethat…andwe'realsoemployedanother60peopleontheevenmoreflexibletermsthanthe current floaters… so againweare lookingat greater flexibility because our challenge in thelightofcompetitionin[ourcountry]…sooneoftheconsiderationswehavetohaveisbouncingtheworkhoursandalltheothercriteria,wealsohavetomakeourselves,sothatwecancompetewiththepricewithourcompetitorswhoarerippinggreatbiglumpsoutofus,fromapriceperspective…[terminalsinourandneighbouringcountries]…they'requitecapableoftakingmajorlinesfromusandleavinguswithfewvessels,youknow,wehavetobealerttoallthechallenges.”[Operationsmanager,EU2T2]

AswesawinChapter3,managersfelttheykeptthenumbersofdockworkerstoaminimumwhileensuringthatthereweresufficientworktobedonesafely.Somealsoacknowledgedthat,onoccasion,dockworkers may work at high speed because of a perception that this was what managementwanted,butstressedthatthiswouldneverbecondonedorencouraged.The possibility of further automation was another consequence of the drivers for greater economicefficiency. Although automation was not significantly present in any of the terminals in our study,managerswerewell awareof suchdevelopments in rivalports, andworkersand their representativesperceived itasapotential threat to future jobsecurityandonereason forhighworkdemands in theirnon-automated terminals.Thiswasespecially the case in theEUportsaswell as inAsiaPacific area1

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wheretheautomationofrivalportsnearbywasbothadvancedandwellknown.AllfourEuropeanGNTcasestudyterminalsandtheoneoperatedbyanationalcompanyincludedinthestudyweresituatedinaregion inwhichtherewassignificantcompetitionbetweenterminals, includingbetweenthecasestudyterminals,whichgaverisetosignificantconcernaboutindividualjobsecurityandthefutureviabilityoftheterminalsamongtheworkersemployed inthem.Similarscenarioswereevident intheterminals inAsiaPacificarea1:

“There's, at the moment there's a bit of concern and threat if you like, like some people werethreatened, the talk of automation coming in. … So I think that's, I think that's constantly onpeople’smindshere.”[Storesco-ordinatoranddelegate,AP1T1]

Differences in economic policy contexts observed in the national situations of the terminals includeddifferentstrategiesandspeedswithwhichthemovefrompublicownershiptootherformsofownershiphadtakenplaceinthecountriesconcerned.Amongtheadvancedeconomiesinthestudy,theseincludedthe situation in Europe area 2 where the host country was in the vanguard of national economicstrategies to liberalise its economy, and major reforms in the ownership and operation of its ports,including in some cases, outsourcing labour, had been supported in economic policies. For one of theterminals, theprivatisationandcompletere-organisationof theportby itsnationaloperatingcompanyhad enabled the terminal to outsource all of its operational labour to a contractor. The relationshipbetweentheoperatorandthecontractorwasastableoneandhadbeeninplaceforanumberofyears,butthepracticeofhavingtore-bidperiodicallyfortheworkwasregardedbymanagersasdestabilisingandkeptpressureonthemtoensurecostswereminimised.InChapter4wenotedthatwhileoursurveymeasuresonhealthandsafetyoutcomessuggestabetterperformanceintheterminalrunbythenationaloperator incomparisonwith thoserunby theGNTs, thismayhavebeenaconsequenceof theyoungeragerangeandmorelimitedtimespentindock-workoftheemployeesconcerned.MeasuresonhealthandsafetymanagementsuggestedthatarrangementswereperceivedtobepoorerbythecontractedworkersintheterminaloperatedbythenationaloperatorthaninthoserunbytheGNTs.Thiscouldhavebeenareflection of the comparative remoteness of the contracted workers from these terminal levelarrangements,causedbylimitedcommunicationbetweentheterminaloperatorOHSmanagementteamandthecontractedworkforce.AstheOHSmanagerrathersurprisinglyconfessedwhenaskedaboutshiftpatterns:

Interviewer:Andwhatpatternofshiftsdotheydo?Howmanydaysonand...Respondent:I’mnotentirelycertain.[SafetyManager,EU2T3]

IncontrastinEuropearea1,asdetailedinChapter3,manyofthetraditionalinstitutionsofdocklabourhadadaptedsuccessfullytotheefficienciesrequiredtocompetesuccessfullyinthenewpoliticaleconomyandtheimpactofchangehadproducedquitedifferentportstructuresinwhichtheterminalcompanieswestudiedwerenowembedded.AsnotedinChapter4,respondentstooursurveygenerallyreportedabetter experience ofwork environment, health and safetymanagement andworking conditions in theterminalsinthiscountrythanelsewhere,andinChapter3wedetailedsomeoftheoperationalreasonswhythismayhavebeenso.InAsiaPacificarea1,aswesawinChapter3,thereweresomedifferencesbetweenthetwoterminalswestudied in terms of theways inwhichOHSmatterswere addressed.However,while these differencesmayhavebeen attributable to the influences of the different states inwhich theywere located, itwasregulatory rather than economic policies thatwere themain drivers of this variation. Reforms in portownership had not initially led to the privatisation of either of the ports inwhich the terminalswerelocated but to their corporatisation (although subsequent further commercialisation of the ports washelpingtoshiftthisprocesstowardsprivatisation).Asalargelower-middle-incomecountry,AsiaPacificarea2hasaverydifferenteconomicprofiletotheothersinthestudy.Itisalargeandcomplexeconomywithaverylargepopulation,asubstantialpartof

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which continues to suffer considerabledeprivationacross the full rangeof social, economicandhealthindicators. It has at the same time undergone a relatively recent phase of rapid industrialisation,technological and economic growth and continues to strive to deepen its integration in the globaleconomy. While there has been rapid economic growth, it has been uneven in its pace and location,resultinginhugedifferentialsinwealthdistributionandintheextenttowhichinfrastructuralandsocialdevelopmenthasmatchedthisuneveneconomicgrowth.Thesemacro-levelissueshavehadanimpactonthe operation of container terminals in many ways. Public ownership of ports, and the institutionalmodels fortheirgovernanceandoperation,werewidelyregardedas inefficientandaconstraintontheabilityofportstocompeteeffectively, limitingtheirflexibilityandmarketresponsiveness.Recenttimeshave seen considerable consequent privatisation, liberalisation and efforts to commercialise existingports,alongsidethedevelopmentofnewprivateports,jointventuresandothernewlybuiltportfacilitiessituatedawayfromcitiesandcongestedtransportinfrastructures.Thesepolicieshavehelpedencourageinvestment from global operators as well as boosting the development of contractorisation andweakeningtheroleoforganisedlabourwithintheworkplace.Considerable investmentandoperationalroles in theprocessofportdevelopmenthavebeenplayedby thebiggestGNTs, including those in thepresentstudy.Althoughtheterminalswestudiedinthisareawerealllocatedinolderportsdatingfromtheeraofpublicownershipandtheremnantsoftheinstitutionalmodelsfortheirgovernancestillexisted,they were all operated by GNTs with the freedom to manage their operations according to globalcorporatemodels.Thissaid,therehasbeenmuchcriticismofsclerosiswithintheeconomyandtheconsequentunevenpaceofportmodernisationinthecountry.Aswehavealreadymentioned,majorproblemsareacknowledgedinrelationtotheefficientoperationofthetransportinfrastructuresofwhichportsareapart.Thesearetosomeextenttheresultofthecontinuationofintransigentandout-datedportgovernanceandrevenuearrangements. They are also a consequence of underinvestment in transport infrastructures and theresultofpoorqualityintheestablishedserviceswithwhichtheterminalsareobligedtointeract.Withintheir terminals the GNT operators were able to adopt corporate management strategies largelyunhindered by local contexts but thewider national economic environment and its interfacewith theterminaloperations,wasamajorchallengeforthecompaniesandhadanimpactonboththeoperationofthe terminalsandtheirarrangements formanaginghealthandsafetywithin theminseveral importantwaysmentionedinChapters3and4.Forexample,thetransportbottlenecksreferredtopreviouslywereregardedasindirectlyresponsibleforseriousaccidentsandincidentsinvolvingbothterminaloperatorsand truck drivers. Lack of education and other poor economic, social and health indicators in thecommunitiesinwhichmanytruckdriversandoperationalstafflivedwereregardedbymanagersasbeingresponsibleforunsafebehaviourswithintheterminalaswellasamongexternaltruckdriversvisitingtheterminals.Theabsenceofeffectiveoccupationalhealthservicesandwidespreadsupportforoccupationalsafetyoutsidetheterminalswerefurthercontextualfeatures.Outreachworktoeffectchangeinthisrespectwasattemptedbysometerminalmanagementsaswellasbeingadvocatedinthecorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)agendasoftheGNTsatcorporatelevel.Someof the contractworkers employed in the terminals, and especially those in relatively low skillmanualtaskssuchaslashing,wereeconomicmigrantsdrawntothisworkbytheprospectofhigherwagesthanwerepossibleintheareasinwhichtheylived,whichwereconsiderabledistancesaway.Thisresultedindistinctgroupingsofworkersineachoftheterminalswhonotonlyundertookdifferenttasksandwerecontractoremployeesbutwhooftenspokeadifferentlanguagefromtheotherworkersandmanagersatthe terminal – with consequent heightened levels of risk in relation to safety issues requiring goodcommunication.As the resultsof the survey inChapter4 indicate, itwasamong thisgroupofworkersthat the highest levels of work-related injury, ill-health and dissatisfaction with health and safetymanagementarrangementswereseen.Inshort,therefore,althougheconomicandeconomicpolicycontextsareperhapsdifficulttomeasureintermsof theirdirect impactonhealthandsafetyarrangementsandoutcomes, there seems littledoubtthat thesewider contexts do have an important impact. They are among the influences on differencesobserved in the operation of these arrangements and their outcomes in terminals situated in differentpartsoftheworld.Assuchitisnecessarytotakeaccountofthemwhentryingtounderstandthenatureof

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the experience of health, safety and welfare for workers in these different terminals, as well asacknowledging their implications for improving arrangements to prevent injuries and ill-healthwithinthesewidercontexts.

6.2 Regulatoryframeworksandenforcementpractices

Inasfarastheyapplydirectlytothearrangementsforhealthandsafetyintheworkplacesinthestudy,regulation and regulatory enforcement are in some respects more tangible measures of nationaldeterminantsofOHSpracticethanaretheeconomicpolicycontextsdiscussedtheprevioussection.Allofthe countries included in the study had such measures in place, as well as regulatory inspectoratescharged with ensuring duty holders’ compliance with them. However there was variation both in thenatureofthesemeasuresandintheroleofregulatoryinspectioninachievingcompliance.Atthegloballevel,thecontainerterminaloperatorstalkedoftheirterminaloperationsbeinglocatedeitherin‘heavilyregulated’or ‘lightlyregulated’countries.InourstudytheformerwererepresentedbythehighincomeadvancedmarketeconomiesofEuropeandAsiaPacificarea1,whileAsiaPacificarea2representedthelatter.Regulatorymeasuresonthehealthandsafetyarrangementsforcontainerterminalswereessentiallyoftwo types. In all the advancedmarket economies in the study therewere broadly similarly orientatedprovisionsinplaceatnationallevelthatprovidedprocess-basedrequirements,normallyonemployers,tomanagehealthandsafetysystematically,withcompetentadvice,havingregardtothenatureoftherisksoftheestablishmentandtheworkundertakenthereandtoconsultwiththeirworkersonthesematters.TheseprovisionsweregenerallyinkeepingwithinternationaltrendsinOHSregulationinrecentdecades,inwhich the specification standards of prescriptive regulation that previously characterisedmostOHSstatutes have givenway tomore ‘goal setting’, process-basedmeasures addressing responsibilities forOHSmanagement.Inadditiontothesebroadbasedprovisions,asecondtypeofregulatorymeasurestillin evidence were those more specific regulations that applied to dock-work, found in delegatedlegislation, suchas specific regulationsonaspectsofdock-work, someofwhichpre-dated theprocess-basedregulationandwhichweremoreprescriptiveinnature.Generally,thelatterhadbeenthesubjectofrepealandremoval inrecentregulatoryreforms,asderegulatorystrategies inkeepingwithneo-liberaleconomic policy reforms aimed at creating improved conditions for economic growth andcompetitiveness weremore widely deployed. As pointed out in the previous section, there was somevariationbetweencountriesintheextenttowhichthisoccurred.FinallytherewereCodesofPracticeandregulatoryguidancenotesconcerningsomeoftheoperationalactivities intheterminals.Thelatterhadno legalstatus,although implementationwasconsidered tobeevidenceofgoodpractice. In the lower-middle-incomecountryinthestudy,regulatoryprovisionsappearedtobemoreoftheprescriptivetype,withaspecificsetofprovisionsfordockworkwhich,aswenotebelow,determinedinspectionactivitiesandwhichinspectorsdidnotfeelempoweredtogobeyond.A further point to note concerning regulatory influence is that this does not act in isolation. In eachcountryitisoneelementofthewidernational‘healthandsafetysystem’,whichinfluencesthenatureofworkplacepracticesandtheiroutcomes.Otherelementsofthesysteminclude:thesupportprovidedbynational institutions foreducation,research, trainingand informationdissemination inrelationtoOHS;occupational health and safety services, professional practitioners, their institutions and the like; thecourts and legal services and compensation litigation; social security and social welfare systemsaddressing issues of compensation, rehabilitation and return towork. They further include employers’organisations and trade unions, and the services they provide for theirmembers on health and safetymatters;aswellasthoseofinsuranceassociations;publicadvicecentresandinformationservices;andsoon. These in turn are embedded in and relate to the wider systems for economic, health and socialwelfare, including the roles of the main institutional actors such as employers’ organisations, tradebodies,tradeunionsandthestateapparatusforpolicymakinganditsdeliveryinrelationtohealthandsafetyatwork.WehaverepresentedthesecontextsinFigure6.1,thatforsimplicity,positionsworkplacehealthandsafetypracticewithintheterminalsatthecentreofaconstellationofinfluencesinwhichthatof corporate governance and management influences (represented by the arrows at the base of the

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diagram)actdirectlyupontheterminalsinthewayswehavedescribedinthisreport,buttheireffectsaremediated and moderated by a constellation of national influences (represented by the overlappingrectanglesthatsurroundthecentrallyplacedsquarerepresenting‘Terminallevelpractice’).Outcomesinrelationtopracticethereforevarybylocationaccordingtothebalancebetweentheseinfluences.

Figure6.1:Theinfluenceofcontext

And, aswe have argued previously, it is the differences in this ‘system’, including those in relation toregulation and regulatory inspection, which help determine the nature and extent of its workplaceinfluence. There were several such differences evident in the present study. They weremost obviousbetween what, at the corporate level, some GNTs referred to as the ‘lightly’ and ‘heavily’ regulatedcountries. In essence, while the three advancedmarket economies had elements of all of the supportrepresented in Figure 6.1 present in their national systems, the lower-middle-income country did not.Moreover,suchprovisionthatitwasabletomakeofferedonlylimitedhelptoworkersandwasequally(ifnotmore) limited in its capacity to influence thepracticesof the terminal companymanagements. Forexample, theroleof thecourts, compensation, socialwelfareprovisionandsoon,wasunderdevelopedand negligible in either the support offered to compensate injuredworkers or in influencing company

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strategies for theirprevention.Theextentand influenceofoccupationalhealthandsafety servicesandtheroleprofessionalpracticeonOHSexternaltotheterminalsininfluencingpracticeswithinthemwasalso negligible. While regulation made provision for occupational health services in ports and evenspecified preventive functions, there was little evidence of its presence or use beyond a role indetermining fitness for work and emergency treatment. Similarly, neither insurance associations oremployers’andtradebodieshadmuchinfluenceonactivitiesinrelationtohealthandsafetywithintheterminals.Tradeunionsalsolackedspecificsupportservicesor informationservicesfortheirmembersand, while they were active at various levels in attempting to represent the interests of the terminalworkers, as we will discuss further in the next section their role was limited by their weak labourrelationsposition. Insuchcircumstances thecombinationofexternalpressures thatcurrentsocio-legalscholars argue to be responsible for the effective application of regulationwas a veryweak influenceindeedfortheterminalssituatedinAsiaPacificarea2.

“The union leader also pointed out that they were fully aware of the issues. Although they hadbroughtmany concerns to the attention of themanagement in 2008 nothing has changed since.Neitherthecontractornortheterminalmanagersarewillingtolistentotheplightsofthecontractworkers.Nofollowupfromthegovernmentorthedocksafetyinspectorseither.”[AP2T2]

NationalarrangementsforlabourinspectioninAsiaPacificarea2dividedthecountryintoregions.Theterminalsinthestudywerelocatedintwodifferentregionsandtherewasspecialistinspectioninbothofthese regions for OHS matters under the provisions of the relevant legislation, by which inspectors,interviewedduringthestudy,felttheirinspectionswerebound.Thatis,thespecificationstandardsfoundintherelevantregulationsconcerningplantandequipmentinusewithintheterminalsandsafeworkingprocedures,wheretheywerealsospecified,wereasignificant focusfor inspection,aswerethewrittenrecordsconcerningthesethingsandotherdocumentationthatregulationsobligedduty-holderstokeep.Inspectors believed themselves less able to address matters that were not thus specified. This wasparticularly significant because they further indicated that such unspecified matters included thearrangementsmadebytheterminaloperatorsforOHSmanagement.Under regulatory prescription they were able to investigate incidents that had caused fatalities andinjuries.Inspectionscouldextendtomattersonboardshipsiftheywerelikelytobearisktothesafetyofdockworkers. They investigated complaints, including those received from workers. They said bothreactiveandproactivevisitsweremadebutdidnothaveapredeterminedratio for these.Nordidtheyappear to undertake targeted inspections. Visits to the terminals could be by arrangement with theterminalmanagementortheymightbeunannounced.Theydidnotmakeanyspecialprovisiontomeetrepresentatives of workers, although in one region the interviewee indicated that the trade unionssometimescametotheofficesofthelabourinspectoratetodiscussissues.However,theimpressionwasgiventhatsuchvisitswerenotentirelywelcomedbytheinspector.Generallyitwasfeltthatevenwithoutmakingspecificarrangementstodoso,inspectorswouldbelikelytomeetworkersasamatterofcourseduringtheirvisits,whichtheysuggestedweremadetwoorthreetimesaweekonaverage.Theyhad thenormalpowersof labour inspectors to issueadministrativenotices that requireremedialaction,aswellaspowerstostoporprohibitdangerousworkand,asaLabourInspectionDepartment,toprosecute seriousviolations.Theykept recordsof all these actions and indicated thatoverall statisticsconcerningthemwerepublishedinannualreports.However,suchstatisticswerearrogatedinwaysthatmadeitimpossibletodeterminetheextentofactionstakeninrelationtoanyofthecasestudyterminals.Whiletheinvestigationofincidentsleadingtoinjuriesandfatalitiesareclearlyimportant,lookingatthefindings in Chapter 4 it appears that a significant role for inspection in relation to health and safetymanagementwouldbeusefulintheAsiaPacificarea2terminals.Yettheinspectorsinterviewedforthestudyindicatedverylittleengagementinthesematters.Theyseemedunawareoftheextentofthehealthissues such as stress, fatigue, MSDs and gastrointestinal issues that were identified by a substantialproportion of respondents from these terminals or that the contractworkers,whowere a substantialproportionoftheterminalworkers,experiencedalargerproportionofthesethandidworkerswhowere

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directly employed (or indeed, that a greater proportion of injuries were also experienced by contractworkers). In one of the regions the inspectors said they believed that workers who worked forcontractorsattheterminalswereactuallymoreexperiencedthanthosethatweredirectlyemployedandthereforemorelikelytoworksafelyasaresult.Generally the inspectors suggested that they were happy with the terminal arrangements concerninghealth and safetymanagement and supported the behaviour-orientated approach these arrangementsadopted.Indeed,theyseemedtoregardthecontainerterminalsasexemplaryinthisrespect.However,asnoted above, they did not inspect the health and safety management systems within the terminalsbecause,althoughtheywereawarethatsuchsystemsexisted,theybelievedthemtobeoutsidetheremitoftheirinspectionpowers.Perhapsnotsurprisingly,giventheprescriptivenatureofwhattheybelievedtobethesepowers,therewasnosignoftheirengagementwithmethodsofinspectionthatwouldaidinthe compliance behaviour of contractors and here too they appeared satisfied that the managementsystemsadoptedbytheterminalmanagementwerefitforpurposeinthisrespect.Managersintheterminalsreportedarathermixedexperienceoftheseinspections.Forsome,whiletherewasanacknowledgementoftheexistenceofboththedocksinspectorsandtheirinspectionactivities,aswellasthatofobligationsonthecompanytoco-operatewiththem,therewas littlesuggestionthattheoutcomes of such inspection were of significant influence on the operation of their arrangements forhealthandsafetyat the terminals,not leastbecauseofaperception thatany formofenforcementwasveryrare:

Interviewer: ...hasheshownanypoweroranyauthoritylatelytostopwork,suchasthisisunsafe,don’tdoit?Respondent:Ohno.…Theygiveadviceon,improvementnotice.…Buttheydon’tjust,theynotstop…And in the last twentyyearsnoneof the [AsiaPacificarea2]porthasgivennotice to stop thework.[SafetyManager,AP2T1]

Othersweremorechallengedbytheinterventionsofinspectors,especiallyinrelationtotheirroleintheinvestigation of incidents that had caused injuries. Here there was a suggestion that inspectors weresomething of a hindrance to the effective functioning of incident investigation as well as claimsconcerning inappropriateactivitiesontheirpart.Workersandtheirrepresentativeswere lessmixed intheirviewsoftheroleofinspection.Inboththepresentandthepreviousstudy,theywereunequivocalconcerning both the limited presence and effectiveness of inspectors in influencing health and safetymattersattheterminal.

Interviewer:Thereseemstobeaverycooperativeworkingrelationshipbetweentheinspectorate.Respondent:Yes.…Theybeinganindependentgovernmentbodythey’vealsogottheirownpoliciesand it’s our duty – it’s only our duty to complywithwhat is their requirement. Sowework verycloselywiththem,yes,thereisnoconflictornothinglikethis.[OperationsManager,AP2T4]

Interviewer:whenyouhaveavisitfromtheseinspectorsdotheydotheygiveyouinstructionsabouthowthingshavetobeimproved?Respondent:nowhentheywilltakeavisittoourterminaljusttheywillgiveusinformationforthescopeoftheimprovementaftervisitestablishingwhatisthescopefortheimprovement[Trainer,AP2T2]

Interviewer:haveyoueverseenthedocksafetyinspectorwanderingarounddoinghisinspections?Respondent:Idon’t.[RTGOperator,AP2T1]

Averydifferentportraitofexternalregulatoryinfluenceisapparentattheterminalsinadvancedmarketeconomies. Firstly of course, the elements of the wider system supporting health and safety were far

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moreinevidenceinthesecountriesandregulationandregulatoryinspectionoccurredwithinthiswidercontext. Regulatory inspectorates had the conventional range of statutory powers, similar to thosedescribedabovefortheAsiaPacificarea2regulators.Theyundertookbothreactiveandproactivevisitstotheterminalsandinvestigationofcomplaintsandincidentsthathadcausedinjury.They also undertook inspection campaigns focussed on specific risks, based on evidence of particularproblems.Historicallytherehadbeenspecialistinspectorsorgroupsofinspectorsfordock-work,inallofthe areas in the study, although the current trend in some was towards more generalist approaches.Regulationwasprocess-basedandthereforeembracedduty-holders’arrangementstomanagetherisksofworkintheterminals.Inspectorswere,inthemain,abletousetheirpowersinseveralwaysthatweremore commensurate with inspecting the arrangements for managing health and safety within thecontainer terminalswithin their jurisdiction.Moreover, theroleofconsultationwithworkersandtheirrepresentativeswas prominent in both the regulatory provision and in the arrangementsmade at theworkplaceandthereforealsomorelikelytoreceivethebenefitofinspectors’scrutiny.This said, we found considerable variation in the extent to which these occurred in practice duringinspection visits. Workers in both the previous and present studies indicated that health and safetywithintheirworkplaceswouldbenefitfromagreaterengagementwithinspectors.Differences were seen between advanced market economies in the detailed nature of regulatorypractices,theirwidersupportandtheirinfluence.Forexample,sincetheterminalsinEuropeareas1and2operatedwithinEUmemberstatestheyweresubjecttoEuropeanlegislationandthereforewerebothbound by the requirements of EU Directives concerning health and safety – and in particular by themeasures on systematic health and safety management that were found in the Framework Directive89/391/EECwhich is essentially the regulatorymodel for OHSmanagement for the EU, and providesworkers inallEUmemberstateswithacommonminimumlevelofprotection fromwork-relatedrisks.Although thepreciseway inwhich its legislativeprovisionsare translated intonational legislationandworkplacepracticevariesbycountry, industrysector,organisationsizeandsoon, theDirectiveobligesallemployerstotakeappropriatepreventivemeasurestomakeworksaferandhealthier.Specifically,itskey elements centre on the principle of risk assessment within a participative health and safetymanagement system, which places responsibility upon employers to manage their health and safetyarrangements inways that areboth competent andparticipative.Therewere, therefore, similarities intheprevailingarrangementsforparticipationandrepresentationinEuropeanareas1and2,aswehaveseen previously, such as requirements for employers’ responsibilities for health and safety plans andpolicies, riskassessment,workerrepresentationonhealthandsafetyandsoon,butalsodifferences inthewaysinwhichthesesystemsandarrangementsweremanaged.Eachhadfurther,moreprescriptive,regulationsspecifyinghealthandsafetyrequirementsspecifictodockwork.Thegeneralcharacterofthenationalhealthandsafetysystemsinthetwocountrieswereverydifferentandthisresultedinavarietyofdifferencesevidentinrelationtoregulatoryinspectionattheleveloftheterminals. For example, in European area 2 the dock-work regulations were among many regulatorystandardsthathadbeendeemednolongernecessaryandregulatorygovernanceas‘highrisk’nolongerregarded dock-work as ‘high risk’. Inspectorate numbers had been substantially reduced by publicspendingcutsandremaininginspectorswereincreasinglyrequiredtoperforminspectionactivitiesinamore ‘business friendly’ manner. At the same time, fewer inspectors meant fewer inspections werepossibleandasaresultforseveralyearstheregulatoryagencyhasbeenexploringarangeofadditionalmeans to improve workplace health and safety practices. Essentially these were more focused onextending the influence of the regulatory agency by providing leadership and co-ordination on goodpracticethroughadvisoryapproachesandliaisonwithkeyorganisationalintermediaries.InthisAreatoo,the level of port privatisation was well-advanced and the terminal studied had a high level ofindependencefromotherportinstitutionsasaresult.Therewasnoevidenceinourstudytosuggestthatany of this contributed support for health and safety practices in the terminals studied and some thatindicatedithadledtofeelingsofpoorercommunicationandareductionofthetrustthatworkersfeltforregulatoryinspectors:

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“…tobefair…ifthehealthandsafetyinspectoriscominghere,hewouldnormallyletmeknow.Hewouldwrite tome, if hewrites anything to the company, he copiesme in. Sohedoesgiveus theinformation…Butit’sgoingtogetworsebecausethey’rebeingcut,andthey’restartingtocharge…theywon’tbedoinginspectionsanymore.Itwillmorereactivebecausethey’reonlygoingtocomeinifthere’saseriousaccident.SoIdon’tthinkwe’llbeseeingasmuchofthem,unlesswecalltheminspecificallyorifthere’saseriousaccident.”[SeniorShopSteward,EU2T1]“Notveryhappywiththe[labourinspectorate]…becauseIbelievetheycosyuptomanagementtoomuchor to thecompany toomuch.With theworkforce thesize thatwehave,when the inspectorcomesdownIwouldexpecthimtomakeaphonecallandsay,“Wearegoingtobeontheport.Ifyoutheunionwanttocomeandseeus,pleasedo”or,“Canwecomeandseeyoutohavea10minutechat?”…forthemnottoevenhavethemannerstocomeandspeaktouswhentheyvisit,Ithinkiswrong.Theyvisitourheadofsafetyonaregularbasis.Theysitdownhavecupsoftea,allthatkindofstuff.…Andsomaybethatiswhytheydon’tcomeandseeme,becausetheyaretooclosetoourmanagement.”[SeniorShopSteward,EU2T2]

This contrasted with practice in Europe area 1 where national legislation transposed the FrameworkDirective in 1996, and as in other EUmember states, gave its provisionswidespread effect, but otherolder (though repeatedly revised) provisions also covered health and safetymatters in dock-work. Inaddition, in this country, regulatory provisions relating to employment and employment conditions indock-worksupportedthefunctioningofquitespecificarrangementswithinthelargerofthetwoportswestudied in thisarea.Portpolicyand legislationweredevolved to regionswithin the countrywith theirown parliaments and legislatures. Characteristic of the general arrangements for port labour was theestablishment by a Port Labour Act of both national and local (in relation to larger ports) jointcommittees,withpowers tomakeport labourregulations.Collective labouragreementsexistedatportlevel,concludedwiththenationalorlocaljointcommittees,theyhadtheforceoflawwithinthesituationtowhichtheyappliedand,significantly,onlyregisteredportworkersmayperformdock-work.Inshort,the position of port labourwithin this country is deeply embeddedwithin both the national and locallabourrelationsandregulatorytraditions.Ithasprovedquiteresilientinthefaceofpressuresforchangethathavetransformedsucharrangementselsewhere(asisthecase,forexample, inEuropearea2)andresulted in some rather different arrangements for the governance and operation of OHS, even interminals operated by GNTs. Therefore, commercialisation of dock-work activities had taken a verydifferenttrajectoryinthisareaandasaresultport-wideinstitutionsremainedofcentralimportanceintheorganisationofwork,includinginthearrangementsmadeforhealthandsafety.

“It follows from the fact that the employer is responsible for employees. The dockerswork underspecial regulations, which are very special indeed. Ultimately, they [the firms-employers] areresponsibleforthesafetyoftheirdockers.Andin{nameofterminal}thatisadirectresponsibilityofeachfirm.Theemployerknowsthatheisresponsibleandthathemustalsohavehisownpreventionservicetocareforhispeople.”[EU1T2inspector]

In this respect, there was far greater significance attached to the role of both external and internalpreventionservicesaswellasthatofliaisonbetweeninspectors,tradeunionrepresentatives,thoseoftheprevention services, employers and regulatory inspectors at several levels of organisation from theterminalworkplacesthroughestablishmentlevelandthroughtotheleveloftheportoverall.Whenitwaseffective,suchliaisonenabledinformationsharingbetweenworkers,theirrepresentativesandmanagers,givingfeedbackonOHSissues,withtheinputofspecialistadvicefromOHSpractitionersandinspectorsand a participative approach towards the dissemination andmonitoring of good practice. This clearlytranslated into closer contact betweenworkers, their representatives and inspectors, contact thatwasgenerallyregardedasbeneficialinimprovingOHSpractices.Asoneinspectorputit:

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“Ifwedoaninspection,weaskforthembuttheyarenotalwaysavailable.Thereisshift-workand...Actually, it'smuchmore contact toupon their request, orat the level2meetings (i.e. joint safetymeetings in the port). Or at level 1 meetings also, that happens. I have told them: if you havesomethingyouneedmetocheck,justcontactme.Mostlyitisthusthroughthemcontactingme.”[EU1T2inspector]

InAsiaPacific area1, asoutlinedpreviously, the two terminalswere situated indifferent jurisdictionsand subject to different laws and inspection authorities as a result. While there were some minordifferencesbetweentheirexperiencesofbothregulationandinspection,overalltheregulatoryinfluencewassimilartothatinotheradvancedeconomies.Giventhattheinfluenceofregulatorycontextwasamajordeterminantofhealthandsafetypracticesandoutcomes within the terminals it was of concern that representatives of the regulatory inspectionagencies and the inspectors themselves, who were interviewed in all of the countries studied drewattention to limitationsof theroleof inspection.While thenatureof thequalitativedata thusgathereddoes not allow for systematic comparison, it was clear that these limitations were essentially of twokinds. In the advanced countries, while there were still strategies in place for the inspection of OHSarrangements and their management in place and inspections often undertaken by inspectors withexperienceandparticularexpertiseinrelationtodock-work,therewereindicationsofvaryingdegreesofchange,bothwithregardtotheuseofmoregeneralinspectionandinspectors,aswellasreductioninthefrequencyandextentofinspection.Aswehaveindicated,thiswasparticularlyevidentinEUarea2butitwasalsomentionedbyregulatoryinspectorselsewhere.Thesecondkindofexperiencewasfoundinthelower-middle-incomecountryinthestudywhere,asindicatedabove,theinspectorsthemselvesdidnotengagewith theOHSmanagementarrangements inplace in the terminalsbecause they felt themtobebeyondthescopeoftheprescriptiveregulationthattheywerechargedwithenforcing.Finally,oneofthekeydifferencesbetweenapproachesadvocatedbytheterminalcompaniesatcorporatelevel,andwhichalsocharacterisesthefeaturesofvoluntarystandardsonOHSmanagementgenerally,isthe extent to which they adopt a behaviour orientated approach and, relatedly, the limited extent towhichtheyprovidefortheinstitutionalrepresentationofworkers’interestswithinthisapproach.Inthistheydiffermarkedly from the regulatory requirements on systematic approaches toOHSmanagementthatapplyintheadvancedmarketeconomiesinwhichmostoftheterminalswestudiedweresituated,aswellasfromglobalstandardsintheformofILOConventionsanditsguidanceonOHSmanagement.Inthereportofthepreviousstudywenotedthat,accordingtotheILO:

“TheILOguidelinesarequiteclearthattheoccupationalsafetyandhealthmanagementsystemwillnot function properlywithout the existence of effective social dialogue,whether in the context ofjoint safety and health committees or other mechanisms such as collective bargainingarrangements.Workersand their representatives shouldbegiven theopportunity, throughdirectinvolvementandconsultation,tofullyparticipateinthemanagementofOHSintheorganization.”

Wehaveshowninthepresentstudythatsuchdialogueissupportedbyspecificregulatoryrequirementsand the wider contexts in which the ‘health and safety system’ is embedded in the advanced marketeconomiesinthestudy.Thisisasignificantdeterminantofboththecharacterandoutcomesofpracticeswithin the terminals. In this, the role of labour relations is important and it is to this contextualdeterminantofOHSactivitiesandoutcomeswithintheterminalsthatweturntonext.

6.3 Labourrelationshistoriesandtheirinfluencesoncurrentpractice

In the previous study we suggested that one of the key differences we found between terminals inadvancedmarket economies and those in lower income countrieswas the extent of the arrangementstheymade for representing workers’ interests in health and safety.We discussed the nature of thesearrangements, the contribution they made to improving health and safety, the barriers to theirdevelopmentwehadidentifiedandsomeoftheconsequencesforeffectivehealthandsafetymanagement

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that resulted from thisunder-developmentor absence. In keepingwith thekey findingsof research inothersectors,wefoundthatwherearrangementstorepresentandconsultwithworkerswereincludedinthesystemsformanaginghealthandsafetyattheterminalsandgenuinelysupportedbymanagers,andwhere workers representatives were properly trained and given sufficient facility time to undertakerepresentationalfunctions,theconsensusamongourintervieweeswasthatthiscontributedsignificantlytotheeffectiveoperationofthesystemsinplaceformanaginghealthandsafety.Theywerefurtherabletocontributean independentvoice forworkers’concerns,bringingadifferentperspectiveontheworkenvironmenttotheattentionofmanagers,andtorepresentworkers’interestswhentherewasconflictonhealthandsafetymatters.Hereagain,thesefindingswerenomorethanthosethatwouldbeanticipatedfrom reading the research literature on worker representation in other sectors, which generallyconcludes thatarrangements formanagingOHSaremoreeffectivewhenthey includethose forworkerrepresentation and consultation, which in turn are supported by regulatory provisions, managementcommitmentandappropriatelytrainedandinformedparticipants.Wehavetriedtoexploretheseeffectsfurtherbyexaminingtheextentofrepresentationandconsultationmore empirically and considering its associationwithmeasures of goodmanagement practice inOHS.Amongrespondentsworking inGNT-runterminals, thosewhoreportedtheyhavenohealthandsafetyrepresentativeornothavingeasyaccesstosucharepresentativehadsignificantlyhigherlevelsofpoorsafetyoutcomes,poorhealthoutcomesandpoorworkingconditionsthanthosewhoreportedhavingahealthandsafetyrepresentative17.Comparingthosereportinghavingnohealthandsafetycommitteeornotknowingiftherewasahealthandsafetycommitteewiththosereportinghavingahealthandsafetycommitteeshowedasimilarpattern,as isdemonstratedbytheresults forAsiaPacificArea2shownin(Figure6.2).

Figure6.2:LevelsofpoorhealthandsafetyoutcomesandworkingconditionsbyarrangementsforrepresentationinAsiaPacificarea2

Thesequantitativefindingsareentirelyinkeepingwiththefindingsfromtheinterviewsconductedinthepreviousstudy,andarefurthercorroboratedbyinterviewsinthepresentstudy.Bothsetsofinterviewswithworkers indicated the importance the role of representation and consultation in addressing theirconcerns on health and safety in theirworkplaces.Moreover, aswe saw in Chapter 5, opportunity forsuchrepresentationandconsultationtooccurwasfurtheraffectedbythenatureofthearrangementsforemployment at the terminals studied, with a major difference between the experience of directlyemployedworkersandthosewhowereemployedbycontractors,forwhomaccesstoelectedhealthandsafetyrepresentativesorabilitytoraisemattersatjointhealthandsafetycommitteeswasminimal.

17 2.23 compared with 1.67, F(1, 1395)=76.32, p<0.0001); 4.92 compared with 3.50, F(1, 1315)=148.39, p<0.0001); 6.26 compared with 4.12, F(1, 1303)=146.90, p<0.0001) respectively.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

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No rep/hard to access

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Working conditions Health Safety

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However, liketheeffectivenessofregulationandregulatory inspection,effectiveworkerrepresentationand consultationonhealthand safety conditionsdonotoccur in a vacuumand the supportive contextwithwhich theireffectiveness isassociated is theresultofacombinationof factors thatgobeyondthemereprovisionforconsultationattheworkplace.Thiswasamplyillustratedintheterminalswestudied,wherewedemonstrated inboth thisand theprevious study thatmeasures forworker consultationonhealth and safetymatterswere best developed in the terminals in those countries inwhich organisedlabourcontinuedtoplayasignificantroleindeterminingpayandconditionsofworkmoregenerally,andwheretheyweresupportedinsodoingbyaregulatoryframework,collectivebargainingagreementsandthewidereconomicandlabourrelationscontextsinwhichtheiractivitieswereembedded.A brief digression into the history of port labour in the countries we studied confirms this. Capitalintensified cargo handling activities that are typified by the development of container terminals havecome about at the same time as a constellation of other reforms in the ownership, organisation andoperation of ports that both drive, and have been driven by, the features of economic globalisation towhichbothcapitalandstateshavesubscribedduringthepastseveraldecades.Generally,efficienciesthusachieved inoiling thewheelsofglobal tradehavebeenmadepossibleat theexpenseof thenumberofworkersemployedintheseactivities,whichhavesteadilyreducedatthesametimeasthemechanisationcharacteristicofcontainerisationhas increased.Buttheconstellationsofchangethatareemblematicofthesedevelopmentsworldwidehavenot takenplace inexactly the sameways, timesorwith the sameresultsineveryportineverycountryinwhichtheyhaveapplied.Thefeaturesofcontextsuchastheoneswe have so far considered in this Chapter, aswell as others such as the relative power of labour, thepoliticalcomplexionof thestateat thetimeofchange,questionsofeconomicdependencies, thehumanresourcestrategiesofglobalcompaniesandsoon,haveinfluencedtheiroutcomes.Thebroadresultisarange of arrangements inwhich container terminals have different degrees of independence from theinfluence of the ports in which they are situated and a range of different kinds of relationship withorganised labour, the latter applying even when the terminals have been purposefully constructed inentirelynewandprivatesitesoutsidetheinfluenceofthestructuresandproceduresofestablishedports.Thisvariationwasevidentintherangeofterminalswestudied,withdifferentpatternsoflabourrelationsevidentbetweencountriesandevenbetweenterminalswithincountries.Amongtheadvancedmarketeconomiesinwhichtheterminalsweresituated,itwasclearlythecasethattradeunionshadbeenamajorhistoricalpresenceineachoftheportsinwhichtheterminalswestudiedweresituated.Thedifferentdirectionsthatportdevelopmenthastakeninthesecountrieshelptoexplainsome of the current differences in the position and influence of trade unions on matters of labourrelationswithin the terminals, including those on health and safety. For example, in Europe area 2, aperiodofbitterly fought industrialdisputesresulting inmajordefeats fororganised labour thathelpeddefinethefutureroleoftradeunionsintheeconomyoverall,hasresultedinadisparatelabourrelationssituationinthecountry’sports.Insome,suchasthoseoperatedbytheGNTs,whileworkforcenumbershad reduced substantially and with them, union power, the trade unions had managed to negotiatecollectivebargainingagreementsthathelpeddeterminethepayandconditionsofworkfortheremaininglabourforce.Theycontinuedtoberecognisedbytheiremployersforthepurposeofcollectivebargainingandweretheprincipalsourceofrepresentationforemployees,includingonmattersofhealthandsafety.In contrast in the terminalmanagedby thenational operator, terminal labourwas contracted out andunionrepresentationwasrelativelyweak.Verydifferently, inEuropearea1, inoneof theGNT-operatedterminals,asdescribed inChapter3, thevestiges of the dock labour scheme prior to containerisation were still in evidence.While there werefewerworkers currently thanpreviously,overall the former schemeshadbeensuccessfullyadapted tothedemandsofcommercialisation.Organisedlabourretainedastrongpositionintheorganisationoftheportoverallaswellasintheterminalwestudied.Itwashelpedbytheregulatoryframeworkgoverningtheworkattheterminalsandretainedastrongpresenceinallthebipartiteandtripartitestructuresandprocessesfortheparticipativemanagementofhealthandsafetythatwerepresent inboththeterminalandthewiderport.Inthesecondterminalinthisarea,essentiallythesamearrangementshadalsobeenmaintained,albeitonamuchsmallerscalecommensuratewiththesmallersizeofboththeterminalwestudiedandtheportinwhichitwassituated.Thereweredifferencesindetailintheprecisenatureofthe

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arrangements in the two ports, but in as far as they affected the representation and consultation ofworkersonhealthandsafetytheyresultedinthesameoveralleffectandtradeunionrepresentationonhealthandsafetywaswell-integratedintoall thebipartiteandtripartitestructureswithintheportandterminal,enablingthestatutorymeasuresonworkerrepresentationonhealthandsafetytobemoreorlessappropriatelyimplemented.Thesituation in theadvancedeconomy inAsiaPacificarea1containedelementsofboth theEuropeanexperiences–thecurrentpositionintheterminalswastheresultofpreviousbitterlycontestedandhighprofiledisputes.Followingthese,thepositionofthetradeunionsinrelationtotheorganisationofworkin the ports in which the terminals were situated, as well as within the terminals themselves, hadundergoneconsiderablechanges.Thissaid,asdescribedinChapter3,theworkforceinboththeterminalshadremainedhighlyunionisedandtheunionhadretainedsignificantinfluenceonhumanresourceissuesconcerningtheemploymentandrolesofworkers.Becausetheterminalswere located indifferentstatejurisdictions,untilrecentlythestatutorymeasuresapplyingtoworkerrepresentationtowhichtheyweresubjecthadbeenslightlydifferent,whichresultedinslightlydifferentapproachesbeingappliedineachterminal. However, at the time the study was undertaken, these measures had been harmonised andappropriatechangeswereintheprocessofbeingintroducedwithintheterminals.Relationsbetweenthetradeunionsattheterminalsandmanagersremainedhostileanditwasinthisclimateoflabourrelationsthatthearrangementsforhealthandsafetyhadbeenmade.Suspicionfelttowardsthebehaviour-basedmanagement arrangements implemented at the terminalswas strongly evident in the interviewswithworkersandtheirrepresentatives:

“[National1]werequiteopenandtheysaid,"here'sablokefromDupontandhe'sgoingtorolloutanew safety system". Relatively obvious from that point onwhat the score is - rewards, reporting,givingpeopleupinreporting,andthemsortofthings.Rightfromtheverywordgo-... Justtookapositionthatifthereisanyrewards,weburnthem.Wewillripthemup,collectively,andnoonewillreport,excepttothedelegate,andthedelegatewillputineveryreport,andyoucaneffectivelywipeoutthecapacity.”[Unionleader,AP1]

“…agood investigationwill gounderneath these things to seewhy theremightbea contributingfactor… surfaces, there’s the shiftwork fatigue…generally I think thatmost of the contributingfactorsareidentifiedIdon’tthinkgenerallythatthey’realladdressedproperly…theonesthatarecheapertoaddresstheygetdone.Theonesthatyoucanattributeblameandpeopletheonesthatareinvolvedinaccidentsthey’retheonesretrainedformalre-training…franklywegotaHRthatareverypunitiveand it seems theywant tobuildupwarning lettersonpeople’s files so they candismissasmanypeopleaspossiblesotheydon’thavetopayredundancypayments…”[SafetyfacilitatoranddelegateAP1T1]

Interviewer:Butwouldaninvestigationgetatthat[underlyingreasonsforbehaviour]orwoulditstopatthatbehaviour?Respondent:Look,Idon’thavetoomuchfaithininvestigations,becauseI’veseentoomanythings.Ithinktheinvestigatorwillcomeupwiththereasonandthentryandjustifyit,youknow,probablythereversewayofsomething,thewayitshouldbe,youknow,butIdon’tthinkit’sasobjectiveasitshouldbelet’ssay.[ElectriciananddeputydelegateAP1T1]

Thismayreflectthedistrustthatworkers’representativesheldformanagerialinitiativesmoregenerally,which was a consequence of the long-standing climate of poor labour relations evident within theterminals.Despite(orperhapsbecauseof)thishowever,occupationalhealthandsafetymattersplayedaprominentroleintradeunionactivitiesandtherewassignificantinvolvementofunionrepresentativesatalllevelsofjointarrangementsforhealthandsafetywithintheterminals.Arguably,ourdatashowtheywere effective in protecting the health and safety interests of workers in a hostile labour relationsclimate.

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ThesituationintheAsiaPacificarea2terminalswasinstarkcontrasttothatoutlinedfortheterminalsinadvanced market economies. In all the terminals in Asia Pacific area 2, the trade union position wasconsiderablyweakerthanthatinanyoftheunionisedterminalsinEuropeorAsiaPacificarea1.Inmanyoftheseterminalsthenationallyacknowledgeddockworkerstradeunionwasnotrecognisedandtherewas no Collective Bargain Agreement in place. Even where the union had been recognised, and aCollectiveBargainingAgreementwasinplace,accordingtothetradeunionrepresentativesandworkersinterviewed in both this and the previous study, this was no guarantee that its measures concerninghealthandsafetymatterswereimplementedinwaysthattheyfoundsatisfactory.Indeed,intheonecase,identifiedinthepreviousstudy,ofaterminalinwhichsuchanagreementwasinplaceatthetimeofthefieldwork,tradeunionrepresentativesfortheterminalwereabletofurnishthestudywithaportfolioofdocumentedcomplaintsconcerninghealthandsafetymattersthathadnotbeenaddressed.Atthetimeofthepresentstudy,thiswasstillthecase,buttheCollectiveBargainingAgreementhadlapsedandanewone was not yet agreed. In most of these terminals there were no arrangements in place to enablerepresentationofworkers’interestsonhealthandsafetythroughelectedrepresentativeswithtimeandsupport facilities to perform this function. Evenwhere health and safety committees had a seat at thetableforworkersand/ortheirrepresentatives,generallytheywereinconsistent,whichoftenmeantthatifanyworkersattendedatall,theywerelikelytobedifferentpersonsateachmeetingbecausetheyweregiven no facility or time to represent their colleagues. Their availability depended on down times andtherewas little possibility to use regular attendance atmeetings to raise and follow through concernsabouthealthandsafety.Aswesawpreviously,therewasalsonorecognisedrepresentationonhealthandsafetymattersamongthe contractworkers thatmade up themajority of theworkers in these terminals.Where individualsbelonged to tradeunionsandwereactive in them, theywereawareof theirvulnerability towhat theyregardedasvictimisationbymanagement.Asourdatashow,inthesescenariosworkerrepresentationonhealthandsafetymattersmadelittleimpactontheoperationofarrangementsforitsmanagement.Atthesame time, itwas in theseworkplaceswhereworkers experienced the poorestworking environmentsand the greatest incidence of self-reported harm. It was also where they felt least supported by thearrangementsformanaginghealthandsafetyconditionsattheirworkplace.What is important is that the wider labour relations situation affected not only the existence ofarrangementsforworkerrepresentationandconsultationonhealthandsafetyintheterminals,butalsothequalityoftheiroperation.Moreoveritwasthenationalcontextsinwhichtheterminalsweresituatedthatwerethemaindeterminantofboththesematters.Therewasnoevidenceinthestudythateitherthecorporate governancepolicies for health and safety or themanagement strategies of the companies toimplement andoperate themwouldhave included them in theirprovision forhealth and safety at theterminalsintheabsenceofthesecontextualinfluences.Indeed,iftheexperienceoftheterminalsinAsiaPacific area 2 is taken into account, there was a strong suggestion that without such a contextualinfluence,therewasnoplaceforsucharrangementswithincorporatemanagementstrategies,andamoreunilateral,top-downapproachtotheengagementofworkersonhealthandsafetymatterswaspreferred.

6.4 Takingaccountofcontext

Following the lead of recent work highlighting the significance of the wider context in determiningworkplace health and safety management practice, this Chapter sought to consider the impact ofeconomic, regulatory and labour relations contexts on the approaches taken by terminal operatingcompanies to managing safety, health and welfare and workers’ consequent experiences of thoseapproachesandtheiroutcomes.Ourfindingsmakeitclearthatelementsofallthreeofthesecontextualdeterminantshaveanimportantimpactnotonlyonthearrangementsthatterminaloperatorsmaketoorganiseworkandmanagehealth,safety and welfare – and in some cases whether arrangements, are in place at all – but also theireffectiveness and value in terms of the experience of workers. In short, the prevailing economic,regulatory and labour relations contexts associated with where terminals are situated moderate the

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approachtheorganisationsoperating those terminals take toOHSmanagement,andsoalso thehealth,safetyandwelfareofdockworkers.OuranalysisclearlyshowsthatwherethesecontextsprovideonlyaweakinfluenceontheautonomyofcompanyOHSpractice,thatiswhereOHS,inthewordsofsomeGNTs,is ‘loosely regulated’, workers reportmore negative experiences of OHS than where these factors aremore strongly in evidence. For example, where outsourcing of labour is the economic ‘norm’, whereregulatory frameworks andenforcementpractices arenot strong, andwhere labour relationshistorieshave resulted in a weaker voice for labour, workers’ experiences of health, safety and welfarearrangementsaregenerallypoorerthanincontextswherethedevelopmentandinfluenceofsuchfactorsarestronger.Andfurther,wherethesecombinewithweakernationalexternalsupportsforOHSgenerally(in terms, for example, of compensation, insurance and welfare systems) in the ‘perfect storm’, thenworkers’ experiences are poorest. Such findings are in accord with those of socio-legal scholars whoarguethattheinstitutional(includingregulatory)contextswithinwhichmodernglobalbusinessoperatesareimportantdeterminantsofbothmanagementpracticesandworkerwelfare(ShortandToffel,2010).AsLockeetal.(2013),andotherwritersmakeclear,suchcontextsarecriticalininitiativestoinfluencethe extent of compliance with labour standards (see also; Riisgaard and Hammer, 2011; Locke et al.,2007). Wehavetriedtocapturetheessenceofthisinfluenceofcontextonexperiencebyplottingameasureofworkers’OHSexperiencesagainstameasureofcontext.Todothis,foreachcasestudyterminalwefirstsummedourcompositemeasuresofworkers’experiencesofsafetyoutcomes,healthoutcomes,workingconditionsandOHSmanagementarrangements(derivedinChapter4).Wethensummedfourmeasuresofcontextforeachterminal.Thesewere:thepercentageoftheworkforcethatwasnotrepresentedbyanindependentunion;thepercentageoftheworkforcethatwasindirectlyemployed;acomparativeestimateofthedegreeofdevolutionofportownershipalonga‘continuum’fromfullyprivatisedtowhollyinpublicownership, with the former scoring highest; and a further comparative estimate of the maturity ofnational OHS governance systems, including the presence of prevention services, again along a‘continuum’ with higher scores indicating greater immaturity. This gave composite ‘performance’ and‘context’scoresforeachterminal.Finally,scoresonboththesemeasureswerecreatedforeachofthefourareasof thestudybyaveraging their respective terminal scores.This is,necessarily, a crudeapproach,withthecontextmeasureprovidingaverybroadapproximationof thecontext inwhichourcasestudyterminalswereoperating.Nevertheless,thoughtheresultsmustbeapproachedwithappropriatecaution,wethinkthegraphicaldescriptionofourfindingsthatitprovidesishelpful(Figure6.3).ItsuggeststhatthepoorestconditionsareexperiencedinterminalsinAsiaPacificarea2.ThoseinAsiaPacificarea1andEurope areas 1 and 2 are broadly similar. The important message, however, is not how terminalscompare but rather the impact of context – suggesting that, without a strong and effectively enforcedlegislative steer and economic and labour relations conditions inwhich the balance of powerbetweencapital and labour approaches equality, terminal operating companieswill tend to favour productivityover effective safety and, in particular health and welfare, management. Such organisations can puteffective strategies inplace, but theygenerallyonlydo sounder certain conditions. Furthermore, evenwhereconditionsareattheirmostconducive,thereisstillsignificantscopeforimprovement,particularlyinrelationtothemanagementofworkers’healthandwelfare,alongsidetheirsafety,aswellasintermsofthewayOHSoutcomesandperformancearemeasured.

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Figure6.3:Contextandperformancebyterminal

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7.Conclusions

Thisstudyofarrangementsforthegovernanceandmanagementofhealth,safetyandwelfareatworkinaglobalised industryhasexploredtheextentof theprotectionofworkers’healthandsafetyandsupportfor theirwelfare incontainer terminalsoperatedbyseveralcompanieswithglobal terminaloperations(GNTs) as well as two others with national terminal operating interests. It used a mixed-methodsapproachtodatacollectionandanalysisinwhichdatafromrespondentstoaquestionnaire-basedsurveywere analysed alongside documentary evidence and detailed interviews with workers, theirrepresentatives,managers and other key informants. In this respect it built on an earlier studywhichfocusedonmanyofthesameterminalsasthoseincludedinthepresentstudy(WaltersandWadsworth,2012).Thekeydifferencebetweenthetwostudiesisinnatureandextentoftheevidencetheyobtainedandanalysed.Thefirststudywasbasedoninterviewswithmanagers,workersandtheirrepresentativesintheterminalsandoninformationobtainedfromunionofficialsglobally.Itconcernedtheperceptionsofa relatively small number of key informants of health and safety in container terminals and of thearrangementsmadebycompaniestomanagethisexperience.Thepresentstudyincludedinterviewswithkeyinformantsandsoughtevidenceofoccupationalhealthandsafetyandthearrangementstomanageit,butithasdonesoinadditionbydrawingontheanalysisofasurveyofnearlytwothousandworkersincontainer terminals globally. This has added substantial quantitative power to the analysis of theevidenceontheexperienceofoccupationalhealthandsafetyandthearrangementsforitsmanagement.Thesurveywasadministered toworkers ineachof the terminals included in the studyandconcernedtheir experiences of safety, health and welfare outcomes, OHS management arrangements, workorganisation andworking conditions.Managers in health and safety critical roleswere interviewed intheseterminals,aswereaselectionofworkersand(wheretheywerepresent)theirrepresentatives.Atcorporate level, documentation on company arrangements and outcomes for health and safety wasobtained and key informants interviewed concerning corporate governance and management of OHS.Representativesofregulatoryinspectoratesineachofthecountriesinwhichtheterminalsstudiedwerelocated, alongwith other key informants such as trade union officials,were interviewed to enable theinvestigationtobesetwithinwiderthenationalandglobalcontextsframedbyeconomic,regulatoryandlabourrelationssystemsandpracticesontheonehand,andtheglobalcorporatemanagementstrategiesofterminaloperatorsontheother.Analysisofthelargequantityofdatacollectedwasundertakenusingappropriatequantitativeandqualitativemethods.ThepresentChapter summarises the findingsof thisanalysisandourconclusionsconcerningitsimplications.

7.1 Theaimsofthestudyandthequestionsaddressed

Thestudyaddressedfivemainresearchquestions.AsstatedintheIntroduction,theywere:

• Howandtowhatextentdothebusinessstrategiesandmanagementpoliciesofmajorglobalandnationalcontainerterminaloperatorstakeaccountoftheoccupationalhealthandsafety(OHS)ofworkersinvolvedinthetransferofcontainers?

• What are their specific strategies for addressing health and safety management in container

terminalsandhoweffectivearethey?

• Whataredockworkers’OHSexperiencesofthesestrategies?

• How do these experiences compare in GNT terminals situated in different countries and interminalsthatareoperatedbylargenationaloperators?

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• Whatdetermines the featuresof thehealthandsafetyarrangements inplace in thesedifferentsituations andwhat are the implications of this for good practice in improving the health andsafetyexperienceforworkersincontainerterminalsglobally?

In summary, keypoints on thehealth and safety experiences ofworkers globally included: the findingthat70percentoftherespondentstothesurveyfelttheirsafetywasathighrisk,40percentfelttheseriskswere ineffectivelymanaged and one third reported they had experienced some kind of injury atwork in thepreviousyear.Slightly fewerrespondents felt theywereathighriskofexperiencingwork-relatedharmtotheirhealth(60percent),slightlymore(48percent)felttheseriskswereineffectivelymanaged, and levels of respondents reporting stress, mental fatigue and work-related illnesses wereespeciallyhigh(60percent65percentand41percentrespectively).Overallthesurveyfindingsshowthat workers experience a higher incidence of harm to safety and health than recorded by companyreporting procedures, that many of the more commonly experienced effects of the work involved interminaloperationsonworkers’healtharenotaddressedadequatelybythearrangementsforhealthandsafetymanagementandthattheprovisionsmadeforworkers’welfarearelimitedanddonotadequatelyprovide forworkers’ needs. These findingswere corroborated by data from interviewswhereworkerparticipantsexpressedconcernsabouttheirsafety,healthandwelfareandsuggestedthatarrangementsformanaginghealthandsafetyattheirworkplacesonlypartiallyaddressedtheirconcerns.Comparisonswith surveydata fromother sources suggest that respondents’ experienceswere comparativelyworsethan the average elsewhere. Therewas a strong association between these negative health, safety andwelfareeffectsandmeasuresofpoorworkorganisation,highworkintensityandpoorOHSmanagementarrangements.Theseresultswerenotuniformacrossalljobs,employmentarrangementsorgeographicallocationsandthesurveyclearlyidentifiedasub-groupofrespondentsasbeingatparticularrisk.ThesewerefoundamongtheindirectlyemployedworkersdoingjobscombiningquaysideanddrivingworkintheAsiaPacificarea2terminals.These findingshelp to informthestudy’s conclusions in relation to theresearchquestions it setout toaddress,asbrieflyoutlinedinthefollowingsections.

7.2 Businessandmanagementpoliciesandoccupationalhealthandsafetyarrangementsincontainerterminals

While terminal operating companies have strategies in place for the governance and management ofhealth,safetyandwelfare,workersandtheirrepresentativesperceivedthesearrangementsonlypartiallyaddressingtheirexperienceoftheeffectsoftheirworkupontheirhealth,safetyandwelfare.Mostoftheterminaloperatingcompanieshadcorporatestrategies forzeroharmOHSarrangements inplace.Theywere especially evident among the larger GNT operators and they were disseminated across all theirterminals. At the same time, these global approaches to OHS governance and management wereaccommodatedwithinwiderbusinessandmanagementpriorities thatstronglyemphasisedoperationalarrangements for productivity and cost efficiencies in the highly competitive business of terminaloperation.AsisclearfromthedetailedaccountsgiveninChapters4and5,thearrangementsforOHSdidnotfullyengagewiththeconsequencesofthesewiderstrategiesfortheworkenvironmentexperiencedbyworkers.Thiswasespeciallysoforhealth,safetyandwelfareconsequencesarisingfromthestructureandorganisationofworkandemployment,andwasevidentintheexperiencesoftherespondentstothesurveyandinthedetailedaccountsgivenbytheworkersandtheirrepresentativeswhoparticipatedininterviews.Itwasseen,forexample,intheseexperiencesinrelationtostaffinglevels,shiftpatterns,workintensity, rest breaks andwelfare facilities, all ofwhichwereperceivedbyworkers tohave significantconsequencesfortheirhealth,safetyandwelfare.Itwasapparentthatcorporatesafetystrategieslargelyfailedtoaddressarangeofoccupationalhealthandwelfareissuesthatwereessentiallytheconsequenceofcorporatebusinessandoperationalpracticesaimedatincreasingtheproductivityandprofitabilityofthe terminals. These issues were among those that workers regarded as having an influence on theirhealthandwelfareaswellasontheirsafety,buttheylaybeyondthereachofcorporateapproachesthatwerelargelyfocusedonachievingbehaviourchangeinrelationtosafety.

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This focus on behaviour-based safety strategies effectively limited the coverage of the arrangementsderived from corporate zero harm strategies to a rather narrow interpretation of what might beconsideredthe‘workenvironment’inamoreholisticsense.Despitetherhetoricconcerningthecentralityof a commitment to preventive health and safety in the core corporate business values and practices,whatemerged intheorganisationswestudiedwasthepresenceofanunderstandingofOHSwhichdidnot conflict with the principles of cost-efficiency, profit maximisation and competition adopted at thecorporatelevel,becauseitwaslimitedtoafocusonarrangementsforthegovernanceandmanagementofsafety at the terminals, and to a particular form of such governance inwhich notions of developing a‘safetyculture’largelythroughbehaviourmodificationstrategiesaimedatworkerspredominated.

7.3 Howeffectivewerethestrategiesforaddressinghealthandsafetymanagementincontainerterminals?

The consideration of the company data concerning safety outcomes presented in Chapter 3 shows amixed picture of health and safety performance but a generally improving trend is discernible. Aswenoted in the Introduction, this is a finding anticipated by some industry observerswho argue that theincreasedmechanisation indock-work, representedbycontainer terminalactivities,alongwithgreaterattention to health and safety management by operating companies, together should result in animproving trend in injuries and fatalities. In contrast, the findings from the study’s survey ofworkers’experiencesindicatetheexistenceofconsiderablyhigherlevelsofwork-relatedharmthanaremeasuredbycompanydata,substantialdissatisfactionwiththenatureandoperationofarrangementsformanaginghealthandsafetyandanequallystrongsensethathealthandsafetyeffectsassociatedwiththestructure,organisationandpaceofworkintheterminalsweremissedbythesystemsinplaceformonitoringhealthandsafetyperformance.Assessmentoftheeffectivenessofcorporatestrategiesforthegovernanceandmanagementofhealthandsafetyinthecontainerterminalsneedstotakesomeaccountofthelargegapbetweenthesetwoviewsofthe performance of these strategies and the arrangements they engendered. The survey data stronglysuggestthatwhat ismeasuredbycompanydata isonlyoneverynarrowindicatorofOHSperformanceand theeffectivenessof companystrategies.Evenwithin thismeasure thereare furtherquestions thatneed to be asked concerning reliability since, as we point out in Chapter 3, the considerableinconsistenciesintheavailabledataindicateapreponderanceofreportingeffectswhichwarrantcautionintheirinterpretation.Seen in the light of the findings from the survey of workers’ experiences, andwith the benefit of thequalitative analysis of material from the detailed interviews with workers and their representativesdiscussedinChapter5,theeffectivenessofcorporatestrategiesandarrangementsforsafety,healthandwelfaremustbequestioned,especiallyinrelationtoworkers’experienceofhealthandwelfare.Itseemsclear from these findings that the company arrangements documented in Chapter 3 only partiallyaddressed this experience.Moreover, if the findings from the survey and interviewswithworkers andtheir representatives are considered in the wider context of research concerning health and safetyconsequencesof change in the structureandorganisationofwork inother sectors, theyare consistentwith the findingsofwider literature.Aswepointedout in the Introductionandagain inChapter6, theoverwhelming evidence from research points to the conclusion that the pattern of work structure,organisationandpacewitnessedinthecontainerterminalsisconsistentwiththatshowntocontributetoincreasesinpoorhealthandsafetyoutcomes.In the Introduction we indicated that there are few robust studies of health and safety outcomes incontainerterminals.Thisismainlybecausetheunreliabilityoftheavailabledataandtherapidchangesthat have taken place in the ownership, structure, organisation and operation of container terminalsmakeitespeciallyhardtoundertaketimeseriesstudieswithreliabledatathatenableassessmentoftheeffectsofchange.Oneexception is theworkofFabianoetal (2010) inwhichadetailedstudyof injurydatathatwasunusuallyavailablefromoneportduringaperiodofgrowthincontainerisationshoweda

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relationship between increases in the frequency of incidents of injuries and that of change in workorganisationandworkforcecharacteristics.There is a clear need for similar further detailed research to monitor health and safety outcomes incontainerterminalsmoreaccurately.However,thefindingsofthepresentstudyaresufficienttosuggestthat arrangements for health and safetymanagement should take amore holistic account ofworkers’experiences. They further suggest that companiesmight find it helpful tomake arrangements to listenandrespondmoreeffectivelytoworkers’voice.Oneoftheweakestelementsofcurrentarrangementsforhealthandsafetymanagementthatwasidentifiedinthepresentresearchconcernstheextenttowhichthesystemsinplacecouldbesaidtobetrulyparticipativeandfacilitaterepresentationandconsultationwithworkersconcerninghealthandsafetymatters.Sucharrangementshavebeenshownbyresearchstudiesfrommanycountriestohaveapositiveeffectonhealthandsafetyoutcomes(seeWaltersetal.(2012)forarecentreviewofthisliterature).However,theworker survey in the present study confirmed the poor development of arrangements for therepresentation and consultation of workers on health and safety. Our survey indicated that manyrespondentsfeltthatOHSarrangementsfailedtoprovideadequatelyfortheirvoicetobeheard,with70percentof respondentsgloballyhavingnohealthandsafety representativeordifficultyaccessingone.Both the survey and interviewswithworkers and their representatives indicated that in terminals inmoreadvancedeconomies,wherebothregulatoryrequirementsandtradeunionworkplaceorganisationwere better developed, consultative arrangements required by lawwere generally in place, but theseseldomwentbeyond such requirements. Therewas also a strong indication inmanyof the interviewswithrepresentativesthattheyexperiencedvariousdegreesofhostilitytotheirrolefrommanagersandsupervisors and, while it was clear that they received strong support from their trade unions toundertake their representational roles, management did not always receive their representations onbehalfoftheircolleaguesconstructively.As we discussed in Chapter 5, it is also important to bear in mind here the implications for OHSmanagement strategies of the potential increase in the number of femaleworkers in operational roleswhich may result from the greater automation of container terminals. In our research we saw littleevidenceofstrategiesoraction tomeet theneedsof thosewomencurrentlyworking in thecasestudyterminals, suggesting that there is as yet little awareness of the need to consider and address theseimplications.Overall,thestudyconfirmedthefindingsofthepreviouspreliminaryresearchweconductedonmanyofthe same companies and terminals (see Walters and Wadsworth, 2012, especially pp 85-89) whichindicated that behaviour-based safety systems characterised the arrangements for health and safetymanagement in all of the terminals we studied, andwere equally characteristic of the corporate OHSstrategies of the companies operating them. Such arrangements have been shown in many previousstudies to have some important limitations. These were amply demonstrated in our previousinvestigationandcorroboratedbyourfindingsinthepresentstudy.Amongthemwasthefactthatthesesystems were largely antithetical to making adequate provision for worker representation andconsultation. Instead, as is not uncommon with such systems, they favoured arrangements for directconsultationwithworkers, avoiding representational arrangements unless obliged to do otherwise byregulatory provisions and the presence of trade unions. As a result, even where such arrangementsexisted (as they did in most of the terminals in advanced economies), their success was generallyproportional to the strength of organised labour at the terminal. In this situation in the terminalsgenerally, thevalueofparticipativesystemstoprovidefeedbackinformationonthenatureofrisksandthemonitoringofarrangementstomanagethem–widelyacknowledgedinstudiesofthesearrangementstobeanimportantpartoftheircontributionto improvedOHSperformance–wasunderdevelopedandundervaluedintermsofitscontributiontotheOHSmanagementsystemsinplace.

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7.4 Howdoworkers’experiencesofOHSstrategiesandarrangementscomparebetweenterminalssituatedindifferentcountries?

Chapter4presentedfindingsfromtheanalysisoftheworkersurveyshowingindependentassociationsbetweenpoorsafetyandhealthoutcomesandareaofemployment,jobtypeandemploymenttypeaftercontrolling for age and experience among the respondents working in GNT-operated terminals. HighlevelsofadversesafetyoutcomesweremorecommonlyexperiencedinterminalsinthefirstandsecondEuropean areas and Asia Pacific area 2; those in jobs other than maintenance; and those who wereindirectly employed (Chapter 4, Table 4.3). It is acknowledged in the industry that workers in jobsincluding the heavy physicalwork involved in lashing, receiving anddelivery aremore likely to sufferphysicalharm than thoseemployed inotherworkwithin the terminals and thiswasborneoutbyourresults. The survey results also show that these workers were more at risk when employed bycontractors and, as we have already pointed out, there was a sub-group of respondents – workersemployed by contractors, doing jobs combining quayside and drivingwork (a combination only foundwithintheAsiaPacificarea2terminals)–whoseOHSexperienceswereespeciallypoor.InadditionthereweredifferencesbetweenGNT-operatedterminalsinrelationtoseveralofthemeasuresof health and safetymanagement in the survey, againwith the respondents in the Asia Pacific area 2terminals reportingmorenegativelyconcerning theirexperienceof thesemeasures thanwasgenerallythe case elsewhere. This was especially true for measures concerning whether there were sufficientstaffinglevelsforsafework,aswellasoneffectiverepresentationandconsultationonhealthandsafety.Againrespondentsinjobsinvolvinglashingandreceivingordeliveringgoodsandundertakenbyworkersemployedbycontractorsweremorelikelytoreportnegativelyontheirexperienceofhealthandsafetymanagementmeasuresthanthoseinotherjobs.Thepresenceofpoorworkingconditionsassociatedwithacombinationofshiftpatterns,arrangementsforrestbreaks,longhours,jobinsecurity,workintensity,andsoon(for the fullcombinationseeChapter4Table4.13),werealso foundtobemoreprevalent insomelocations,forsomejobtypesandforindirectemployment.Inshort,theanalysisofthestudyoverallindicatedagenerallypoorexperienceofOHSoutcomesandofthe effectiveness of OHS management arrangements to address these experiences. There was alsovariationbetweenterminals,jobstypesandformsofemployment,butthemostsubstantialdifferencesintheextentandqualityofthisexperienceoccurredbetweenrespondentsworkinginterminalssituatedinhigher income countries in Europe and Asia Pacific area 1 and those in terminals in a lower-middle-income country located in theAsiaPacific area2. Thedata inChapter4describes thesedifferences indetail. They were found in most of the indicators of health and safety outcomes, in the respondents’experiencesofrepresentationandconsultation,aswellasintheirappreciationoftheeffectivenessofthearrangementsinplacetomanagetheirhealth,safetyandwellbeingandprovidefortheirwelfare.Therewerefurtherdifferencesinexperiencesofworkorganisationandworkintensity,thatcontributedtotheirpoorexperiencesofhealthandsafety,aswellasinthearrangementsfortheiremployment–therewasafargreaterproportionofworkerswhowerenotemployedbytheterminaloperatorbutbycontractorsworkingwithintheterminalsamongrespondentsfromAsiaPacific2area,whofaredlessfavourablyinrelation to all the above measures than did directly employed workers in the same terminals. It isimportant toaccount for thesedifferentexperiencesof thepracticeofOHSamongworkers indifferentjobs in terminals in different locations who are employed under different arrangements and doingdifferent types of jobs since, as Chapter 3 indicates, therewas relatively little difference in the overallcorporateapproachtogovernanceandmanagementinofmostofthecompaniesstudied.

7.5 SituationaldeterminantsofOHSpracticesincontainerterminals

In Chapters 5 and 6we argued that therewere threemain sets of influences that helped explain theexperiences summarised so far. They included the nature of the strategies for the governance andmanagementofarrangementsforthesafety,healthandwelfareintheterminalsthatareadoptedbytheterminal companies operating them; the position of these approaches within the wider corporatebusinessandmanagementstrategiesemployedbythesecompaniestoconductthebusinessofcontainer

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terminal operation; and a set of determinants provided by economic, regulatory and labour relationscontexts,whichvariedintheireffectsaccordingtowhereterminalswerelocated.Wehaverepresentedthese inFigure6.1. Startingwith the companyapproaches,wehave shown that although theGNTandnational containercompanies implementa setofproceduresandpractices for safetymanagement thatarewidely acknowledged as good practice, they are of a particular character. Their key features are aprominent display of rhetoric concerning ‘safety leadership’ at the corporate level, which promotesadoptionof safety governance strategies thathave theobjectiveof achieving ‘zeroharm’ in relation tocompany safety performance through accountability for the delivery of (largely behaviour orientated)safetymanagement procedures and a ‘safety culture’ among themanagement andworkforce of all thecompany’sbusinessunits.UsingtheresultsofouranalysisandsituatingthemwithinthewiderresearchonOHS,wehaveargued that thisapproachresults in theadoptionofabehaviour-orientatedapproachtowardssafetymanagement,whichgenerallyoverlookswork-relatedhealthandwelfare issues,tendstoassumeacommoninterestincompanyvaluesandrelatedly,tendstoprovideonlytoalimitedextentfortheinstitutionalrepresentationofautonomousworkers’interests.Intheserespectstheapproachdiffersmarkedly fromtheregulatoryrequirementsonsystematicapproaches toOHSmanagementapplying intheadvancedmarketeconomiesinwhichmostoftheterminalswestudiedweresituated,andalsofromglobalstandardssuchasthoseadoptedinILOConventionsandguidanceonOHSmanagement.In Chapter 5 we pointed out the attraction of these ways of conceptualising the governance ofimprovement in workplace health and safety for corporate leaders and managers. Their focus onchangingbehaviourdoesnot question the tenets ofmanagerialist thinking, or assumptions concerningthe ubiquity of shared company values. Nor does it require critical examination of corporate ormanagerialdecisionsonfinance,oronthestructure,organisationandoperationofworkandthewayinwhich business is conducted – nor does it accept a connection between thesematters and the health,safetyandwelfareofworkers.Yet,aswehavepointedoutinpreviouschapters,thereisnowawealthofresearch that indicates that these structural, organisational andbusiness featuresofmoderncorporateoperation do have negative impacts upon workers’ health and safety. They result in organisationalstructuresandproceduresthatarearguablylessabletodeliverthenecessarycontrolstopreventeverydayharmtoworkerscausedbythewayworkisorganised,aswellasbeingimplicatedamongthecausesof more high profile events such as process safety disasters which result in major harm to workers,hardware,thepublicandtheenvironment.OHSgovernanceandmanagementstrategiesthatignorethiscanthereforeatbestachieveonly limitedresults intermsof the improvementof thehealth,safetyandwelfareofworkersaffectedbytheconsequencesofthesewidercorporatestrategies.Thissaid,thecorporatesafety,businessandorganisationalstrategiesarenotappliedinavacuumand,aswe detail in Chapter 6, aswell as being affected by the dictates of the business environment inwhichcontainerterminalsoperate,thecorporateapproachestoOHSmanagementthatarerepresentedbythebroadarrowatthebaseofFigure6.1areappliedinterminalsincountriescharacterisedbytheirdifferenteconomic,regulatoryandlabourrelationscontexts.Ourargument,whichisalsosupportedbyresearchinothersectors,suggeststhatitisthemoderatingeffectsofthesecontextsthathelpdeterminedifferencesinthenatureandexperienceofhealthandsafetypracticeintheoperationofcontainerterminalssituatedin different parts of the world. By plotting our combined composite measures of health and safetyexperiences in the terminals against a contextual measure made up of scores describing prevailingconditions inrelationto levelsofoutsourcingandunionisation,degreeofdevolutionofportownershipandmaturityofOHSgovernancesystems,weareabletoshowtherelationshipbetweentheminFigure6.3.Thiseffectivelydemonstrateswhatperhapswemightanticipate– thatpoorestOHSconditionsareexperiencedinterminalsinpoorercountries,inwhichtheeffectsofregulatoryinfrastructuresareweak,as is the influence of organised labour, and the economy is relatively underdeveloped but politicallysupportiveofbothgaininginvestmentandfacilitatingimprovementsinthelogisticsofthenationalroleinglobal trade throughhosting the operationof global container terminal interests.As Figure6.3 shows,plottingthesamerelationshipsfortheterminalslocatedinadvancedeconomiessituatestheminbroadlysimilar positions, with far better OHS status achieved for workers. It is worth noting here that it isworkersinterminalsituatedinthemosthighlyregulatedoftheeconomieswestudied,whichisalsotheone with strongest forms of organised labour, who score most favourably in terms of the composite

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scores for their health safety,welfare and their satisfactionwithmanagement arrangements for thesethings.AsweconcludedinChapter6,theimportantmessagehereisnothowterminalscompare,butrathertheimpactofcontext.Thissuggeststhatwithoutstrongandeffectivelyenforcedregulationandeconomicandlabour relations conditions in which the balance of power between capital and labour is sufficientlyevenlydistributedtoallowworkersaneffectivevoice,terminaloperatingcompanieswilltendtofavourproductivity over effective the management of safety and, in particular, health and welfare.. We haveshown that these operators, and especially those working at a global level, have the capacity to puteffectiveOHSstrategiesinplace,buttheygenerallyonlydosowhenthecontextsinwhichtheirbusinessunitsaresituatedobligethemto.While it is obviously important that attention is drawn to the gap between the experience ofarrangements for OHS in terminals in countries with very different economic regulatory and labourrelationscultures,practicesandstanding,itisalsoimportantnottolosesightofthefindingthatinnoneof the terminals included in thepresentstudywere thearrangements inplace topreventwork-relateddeaths,injuries,orill-health,orthosedesignedtoaddressworkerswelfare,seentobeidealintheeyesofthe workers that, after all, had the most direct experience of them. In this respect, there are someworryingtrendsevidentinthewayinwhichcostefficienciesdrivepatternsintheorganisationofworkand employment. As we discussed in Chapter 5, two main issues are of most concern. One is thedevolutionoforganisationalstructurestolooselycoordinatedcollectionsofbusinessunitswithvaryingdegreesofautonomyintheconductoftheiractivities.Theconcernsherearewhetherappropriatelevelsof control, monitoring, communication and feedback are available to manage the delivery of effectivepreventivestrategyonhealthandsafetyatthelevelofthebusinessunitsunderthesearrangementsandwhether appropriate advice to do so is retained within organisations adopting these structuralapproaches.Wewereunabletoexaminethesearrangementssufficientlyclosely inthepresentstudytodraw firm conclusions, but we did notice substantial variation between different companies in theserespects.The second issue concerns the widespread practice of outsourcing terminal operational activities tocontractors.Thiswasamajortrendintheorganisationofworkinthecontainerterminalswestudied.Itisapracticethathasbeenstronglyandsofarrelativelysuccessfullyresistedbyorganisedlabourinsomecountries but it is clear that at a corporate level this approach is likely to continue to grow, and haveincreasingimpact,atterminallevelstoo.Theproblemsforhealthandsafetymanagementthatstemfromincreased contractorisation, resulting in multi-employer worksites, subcontracting, poor managementcommunication,priceanddeliveryconstraintsandsoonarenowwell-documentedinmanysectorsandwe have referred to this literature elsewhere in the report.Many of these problemswere seen in theexperiences we have discussed in the terminals we studied. Less ubiquitous, however, were effectivemeans of addressing them – although there were examples of good practices among some terminalmanagements concerning, for instance, the inclusion of health and safety measures in contractorprocurement processes and in monitoring arrangements for contract compliance. Examination ofresearchfindingsconcerningthesepracticeselsewheresuggeststhatthecontainerterminalindustrymaystillhavemuch to learn fromother sectors.Thisappliesnotonly to the strategiesofmanagement,butalsotothoseoforganisedlabourandregulatoryinspectors.Ifpracticesofoutsourcinganddown-sizingofthedirectlyemployedworkforcearesettocontinue–andthereiseveryindicationthatinthecontainerterminal industry, as elsewhere, this is likely to be the case – then it follows that the strategies ofregulatorsandtradeunionsneedtokeepabreastofthesedevelopments.Therewaslittlesignofthisinthe container terminals we studied. However recent research literature indicates that such strategieshave been implemented in other sectors and can be relatively effective (see, for example, James et al.,2014;Weil, 2014;Wright and Brown, 2013). There are thereforemodels of good practice that all keyplayersinthecontainerterminalindustrycouldexplore.

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7.6 Recommendations

The following recommendations are drawn from the conclusions of the study. They address issues ofpolicy and practice on the governance and operation of arrangements to manage health, safety andwelfareatworkincontainerterminals.Itishopedtheycontributetoimprovingtherelevance,operationandoutcomesofthesearrangements.TheyaremadehavingregardtothetripartitenatureoftheinterestinOHS in container terminals globally. That is,while they are addressed in themain to corporate andterminalleveloperation,othersareaimedatnationalregulationandregulatorypolicyandatimprovingglobalstandardsonOHSincontainerterminals.Allalsohaveimplicationsforthestrategyandpoliciesofthetradeunionsthatrepresenttheinterestsofworkersatbothcorporateandterminallevels.Whenmakingrecommendationsitiscustomaryforresearcherstoindicateaneedfor‘furtherresearch’,since it is also normal for the findings of research investigations to lead to additional questions. Thepresentstudyisnoexception.However,therecommendationsoutlinedbelowareconfinedtothosethataddresspolicyandpracticeandareofrelevancetoemployers,governments,internationalorganisationsandtradeunions.Theyincludethefollowing:• Sincetheresearchshowsthattherearesignificantdifferencesinhealth,safetyandwelfarepractice

andoutcomesbetweenterminalsoperatedbythesamecompaniesindifferentlocationsintheworld,itisrecommendedthatGNTsreviewthestrategiestheyhaveinplaceforthecorporategovernanceandmanagementofOHSwithaviewtoreducingthesedifferencesbylearningfromtheexperienceofwhatconstitutesgoodpracticeandwhatdrivesit.TheremaybearolehereforthedevelopmentofaCodeofPracticebyaglobalbodysuchas the ILO,whichcouldactasa suitable standard (seealsolaterrecommendations).

• Zero-harm strategies and behaviour-based safety (BBS) arrangements dominate the approaches

takentoOHSatcorporatelevelandintheterminalsstudied.Whiletherearesomebenefitstosuchsystems,theyhaveseveralacknowledgedweaknesses.Theseareinparticularevidentinrelationtoattentiontosafetyoverhealthandwelfareandinrelationtoquestionsofcommunicationandtrustbetweenworkers,theirrepresentativesandmanagement.Itisrecommended thateffortsaremadeto ensure that such weaknesses are addressed in corporate OHS systems. This means especiallyensuring thatOHSsystems inplaceaddressoccupationalhealthandwelfareaswellassafety, theypaygreaterattentiontotheorganisationalcausesofharmexperiencedbyworkersandtheyfurtherallow for improved communication between workers and managers. This includes improvedarrangements for consultation andparticipation ofallworkers onOHS and it is further importantthatsuchsystemshelpbuildtrustbetweenworkersandtheirmanagers,ratherthandistrust.

• Corporate governance of OHS in the operation of container terminals increasingly emphasises an

approachtoitsmanagementinwhichgreaterattentionispaidtounderstandingthecausesofcriticalincidents.Thisemphasisisvaluableanditisrecommendedthatitsfurtherextensionbesupported.Inparticular,moreattentioncouldbepaidtomanagementstrategiesassociatedwiththepreventionof low frequency/high impact (LF/HI) events. Here terminals could improve monitoringarrangements for these incidents and the greater development of trigger action response plans(TARPs)inrelationtothem.TerminaloperatorsmightalsoconsideradoptionofmostsuitableOHSindicatorsaswellastheestablishmentofdatabaseswhoseanalysismaycontributetotheadvanceofknowledge in the development ofmore ergonomic solutions for workers in ports. OHS indicatorscurrently used by container terminals are insufficient and mainly support a reactive rather thanproactive approach to incidents. Consideration could be given to more proactive and preventiveorientated approaches. Although some operators have made considerable progress with globalcommunications in relation to OHS in terminal operation, greater use of IT in achieving datacollectionanddisseminationinthisrespectshouldbeencouragedandgoodpracticesshared.

• WhilecontinuedreportingofLTIsisimportant,itisrecommendedthatKPIsthatareusedtomonitor

safetymanagementpracticebothatcorporateandterminallevelreflecttheissuesidentifiedabove.

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• There isastrongbodyofresearchevidencesupportingthecontributionof formalarrangementstorepresentworkers’ interests to improving prevention outcomes. These arrangements are found inmanyhighrisksectorssuchasmining,thepetrochemicalindustry,constructionandsoon,buttheyaresignificantlyunderdeveloped inmanyof the terminalswestudiedand it is recommended thatthis be addressed in both corporate governance ofOHS and in terminal level arrangements in thefuture.

• Manyof the experiences of harm reportedbyworkers in this study, but apparently not in routine

companydata,concernhealthandwelfare.Itisthereforerecommendedthatcorporateandterminalstrategiesarereviewedwithaviewtoincreasingtheiremphasisonthesemattersinthefuture.

• It is further recommended that investigation of OHS performance and outcomes takes greater

accountoftheviewsofworkersconcerningorganisationalcausesofcommonlyexperiencedformsofworkrelatedill-health.

• The organisation of work and employment in the terminals reflects the increasing use of the

outsourcing of labour through arrangements with contractors. There are well-establishedconsequences for OHS arrangements and outcomes associatedwith these practices.Manywere inevidence in the terminals studied. It is recommended that companies review their strategies foraddressingtheseconsequencesandtakeactionsreflectingbestpracticeonOHSinrelationtotheuseofcontractors.Thesemightinclude:

o Reviewofthenatureofsupplychainrelationsbetweenterminaloperatorsandcontractors

inordertoidentifybettermeansofincentivisingimprovedOHSperformanceo FurtherreviewandrevisionofcorporateguidelinesontheextenttowhichOHSmanagement

requirements for contractors feature in arrangements for procurement and contractcompliance

o Greaterengagementwithmonitoringtoensurecompliancefromcontractorso InvestigationofincentivesforcontractorstoimproveOHSarrangementsandperformanceo Review and exploration of possible better arrangements for thewelfare of the contractor

workforceinsometerminalso Better arrangements for adequate representation of the interests of the contractor

workforce• In terms of corporate and terminal level actions, we have noted in the report that younger male

workers dominated employment in the container terminalswe studied. This is not surprising, butgiven the widely anticipated changes in the organisation of terminal operation in the future, it islikely that the participation of women in the labour force will increase. This will have someimplicationsforarrangementsforhealth,safetyandwelfare.Currentlythereislittleevidenceofthesebeing anticipated either by the corporate strategies for governance and management of OHS andwelfareor inarrangements for thesemattersat the levelof the terminals. It isrecommended thattheseimplicationsbeexploredatbothcorporateandterminallevels.

• Both national regulatory contexts and regulatory inspection practiceswere found to be important

determinantsofterminallevelOHSpractice.Inadvancedmarketeconomiestherewasaperceptionthat the presence of specialist regulatory inspection had a positive impact on terminal level OHSpractices.Thereisunderstandableconcernthatreductioninsuchpresencecausedbycutsinpublicspendingandreorganisedcompliancestrategies(commonlyexperiencedinmostofthesecountries)will result in negative outcomes and it is recommended that national authorities review theirstrategies in this area, andalso takeaccountof likely trainingneeds for inspectors involved in theinspectionofworkincontainerterminals.

• In the one lower-middle-income country included in the study, both the regulations ondockwork

andtheregulatoryinspectoratestoodatsomedistancefromengagementwiththeOHSmanagement

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arrangements employed within the terminals. It is recommended that, in this situation, nationalauthorities take steps to close this gap by bringing regulation in line with the process-basedregulatorymeasures forOHS nowwidely used globally, and by providing inspectorswith trainingand powers to engagewith OHSmanagement practices within the terminals. Theremay be somescope for supporting thiswith thedevelopmentofaCodeofGoodPracticeatglobal level,perhapsthroughtheagencyoftheILO.

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Appendix

1.TableA.1:Associationsbetweenthevariablesof interestandwith terminaloperator in the firstAsiaPacificareaandEuropearea2multivariatemodels2.Samplequestionnaire3.Samplediary

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TableA.1:AssociationsbetweenthevariablesofinterestandwithterminaloperatorinthefirstAsiaPacificareaandEuropearea2multivariatemodels

MODEL AREA SECTION ASSOCIATION

SAFETYOUTCOMESWITHJOBTYPES

AsiaPacificarea1 4.2.3 Jobtype:3df,

p=0.02

Maintenance/other 1.00

Driving3.26(1.30-8.16)

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery

1.35(0.48-3.82)

Bothdrivingandlashingand/orreceivinganddeliver

2.48(1.00-6.21)

OHSMANAGEMENTARRANGEMENTSWITHJOBTYPE

AsiaPacificarea1 4.4

Jobtype:3df,p=0.006

Maintenance/other 1.00

Driving3.50(1.42-8.64)

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery

6.55(2.25-19.09)

Bothdrivingandlashingand/orreceivinganddeliver

2.60(1.06-6.41)

Terminaloperator:1df,p=0.009

National 1.00

GNT0.50(0.30-0.84)

OHSMANAGEMENTARRANGEMENTSWITHJOBTYPE

Europearea2 4.4

Terminaloperator:1df,p=0.02

National 1.00

GNT0.41(0.20-0.84)

WORKINGCONDITIONSWITHJOBTYPE

AsiaPacificarea1 4.5

Terminaloperator:1df,p=0.02

National 1.00

GNT0.59(0.38-0.92)

WORKINGCONDITIONSWITHJOBTYPE

Europearea2 4.5 Jobtype:3df,

p=0.03

Maintenance/other 1.00

Driving1.21(0.43-3.39)

Lashingand/orreceivinganddelivery

2.74(0.93-8.10)

Bothdrivingandlashingand/orreceivinganddeliver

1.08(0.36-3.30)

WORKINGCONDITIONSWITHOHSMANAGEMENT

AsiaPacificarea1 4.6.1

Terminaloperator:1df,p=0.05

National 1.00

GNT0.58(0.33-1.01)

OHSmanagementarrangements:1df,p<0.0001

Good 1.00

Poor5.18(3.02-8.89)

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MODEL AREA SECTION ASSOCIATION

WORKINGCONDITIONSWITHOHSMANAGEMENT

Europearea2 4.6.1

OHSmanagementarrangements:1df,p=0.004

Good 1.00

Poor2.24(1.29-3.89)

SAFETYOUTCOMESWITHOHSMANAGEMENTANDWORKINGCONDITIONS

AsiaPacificarea1 4.6.2

OHSmanagementarrangements:1df,p=0.04

Good 1.00

Poor1.97(1.04-3.71)

Workingconditions:1df,p<0.0001

Good 1.00

Poor4.59(2.40-8.81)

SAFETYOUTCOMESWITHOHSMANAGEMENTANDWORKINGCONDITIONS

Europearea2 4.6.2

Workingconditions:1df,p=0.03

Good 1.00

Poor1.91(1.07-3.40)

HEALTHOUTCOMESWITHOHSMANAGEMENTANDWORKINGCONDITIONS

AsiaPacificarea1 4.6.2

OHSmanagementarrangements:1df,p=0.007

Good 1.00

Poor2.42(1.27-4.62)

Workingconditions:1df,p<0.0001

Good 1.00

Poor4.04(2.13-7.64)

Terminaloperator:1df,p=0.05

National 1.00

GNT0.53(0.29-1.00)

HEALTHOUTCOMESWITHOHSMANAGEMENTANDWORKINGCONDITIONS

Europearea2 4.6.2

OHSmanagementarrangements:1df,p=0.05

Good 1.00

Poor1.96(1.01-3.79)

Workingconditions:1df,p<0.0001

Good 1.00

Poor3.70(1.92-7.12)

Terminaloperator:1df,p=0.05

National 1.00

GNT3.33(1.00-11.11)

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