EXPLANATION IN THE SCIENCES

BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Editor

ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University

Editorial Advisory Board

ADOLF GRONBAUM, University of Pittsburgh

SYLVAN S. SCHWEBER, Brandeis University

JOHN J. STACHEL, Boston University

MARX W. WARTOFSKY, Baruch College of the City University of New York

VOLUME 128

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Plato, Timaeus

EMILE MEYERSON (dessin de A. Bilis)

All rights reserved

Copyright Editions Denoel et Steele

EMILE MEYERSON

EXPLANATION INTRE

SCIENCES

Translated from the French by Mary-Alice and David A. Sipfle

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

Library of Congress CataIoging-in-Publication Data

Meyerson. Emlle. 1859-1933. [De I'expllcatlon dans les sclences. Engllsh] Explanatlon In the sclences I Emlle Meyerson ; translated from the

French by Mary-Allce and David A. Slpfle ; wlth an Introductlon by p. cm. -- (Boston studies In the phllosophy of sclence ; v.

128) Translatlon of: De I'expllcation dans les sclences. Includes blbllographlcal references. ISBN 978-94-010-5511-6 ISBN 978-94-011-3414-9 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-3414-9 1. Sclence--Methodology. 2. Sclence--Phllosophy. 3. Explanatlon.

4. Logic. 1. Tltle. II. Serles. 0174.B67 voI. 128 [0175] 501 s--dc20 [501] 90-28236

ISBN 978-94-010-5511-6

printed on acid-free paper

AII Rights Reserved © 1991 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1991 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1 st edition 1991

No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,

including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD BY I. BERNARD COHEN

TRANSLATORS' ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS

COMMENTS ON DOCUMENTATION

PREFACE BY EMILE MEYERSON

BOOK ONE

THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER 1. SCIENCE DEMANDS THE CONCEPT OF THING Etymology of the tenn explication, 9. - Its customary meaning, 9. - The position of Comte and Mach, 10. - The metaphysics of positivism, 11. - The order of nature, 12. - The mathematical fonn of laws, 12. - Qualitative laws, 13. - The disappearance of genus, 13. - Water, 14. - The elements, according to Soddy, 15. - The ideal gas and crystals, 15. - Gersonides and St. Thomas, 16. - Law, an ideal construct, 17. - The law of inertia and Archimedes' principle, 18. - Relations in relation to us, 18. -Positivism and common sense perception, 19. - The "immediate data of consciousness," according to Bergson, 19. - The program of Mill and the true evolution of science, 20. - Physics forbids the intervention of the subject, 21. - Representational theories and abstract theories, 21. - Thennodynamics and kinetic theory, 22. - Thennodynamics and the concept of thing, 23. - Objects created by science, 23. - Theories and the essence of things, 24. - The pennanence of theoretical entities, 24. -Geometry and material solids, 25. - Burned sulfur and carbon,

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26. - Science destroys the world of common sense, 26. - Where does the metaphysics of laws come from? 27. - Science is not positivistic, 28.

CHAPTER 2. SCIENCE SEEKS EXPLANATION 32 The goal of science for Bacon, Hobbes and Comte, 32. - For Plato, Aristotle, Montaigne and Pascal, 32. - The divergence between Comte and Littn~, 33. - The thirst for knowledge, 33. -Newtonian gravitation, 34. - Explanation in biology, 34. - The Council of Brussels (The search for a physical theory, 35. -Einstein, 36. - Lorentz, Planck, etc., 37. - The phenomenologi-cal stance, 38. - What a positivist ought to have said, 39). - The scientist and the ordinary man, 39. - Magic, 39. - Explanatory science, 40. - Theory, a step in the direction of law, 41. -Rankine and Maxwell, 42. - Explanation and the concept of thing, 42. - The two tendencies, 43.

BOOK TWO

THE EXPLANATORY PROCESS

CHAPTER 3. DEDUCTION Cause, 47. - Sufficient reason, 47. - Bossuet's image, 48. - The necessity of the effect, 49. - Cause and law; efficient cause, 49. - Cause and reason, 50. - Cuvier (The interdependence of functions, 51. - The ruminants, their cloven hoofs and their horns, 52. - The organism and the geometric curve, 52. -Finalism in Cuvier, 54). - Logical content and temporal relation, 54. - The confusion, 55. - Cause and ontology, 55. - The weak foundations of theories: valence, 56. - Werner's system, 56. -Valence varies, 57. - Impact, 57. - The philosophers and Hume's demonstration, 59. - Fictitious entities in theories, 59.-Electrical theory, 60. - Ockham's razor, 61. - Theories are indispensable, 61. - Phlogiston and acidum pingue, 62. -Priestley, Cavendish, Scheele and Black, 63. - The role of Lavoisier, 63. - The prestige of theories does not come from the fundamental observations, 64. - It comes from the deduction, 64. - Deduction applied to laws, 65. - Introduction of logical necessity, 65. - It is a notion foreign to positivism, 67. - The

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same schema but different reasons, 67. - The theory disregards the ontological character of science, 68.

CHAPTER 4. RATIONALITY POSTULATED The postulate of rationality, 72. - Even positivistic science to some extent presupposes it, 72. - Comte and overly detailed investigation, 73. - Comte and Marioue's law, 74. - Phenomena beyond the reach of lawfulness, 74. - The world of atoms and subatoms, 75. - Statistics and the underlying phenomena, 76. -Temperature and Brownian motion, 77. - Comte' s real opinion, 77. - Laws must be knowable, 78. - Kepler's laws, 79. - The genesis of his discoveries, 79. - His field was particularly propitious, 80. - Nature and genus, 81. - The hierarchy of conditions, 81. - Balfour's "fibrous structure" of reality, 82. -The "subexistence" of laws for Bertrand Russell, 82. - Comte and stellar research, 83. - The scientist and the metaphysics of theories, 84. - The reality of theoretical entities, 85. - The true laws of nature, 85. - Laws follow theories, 86. - Kepler's laws and the Copernican system, 86. - Approximate laws, 87. - The "realism" of science for Bertrand Russell, 88. - Sufficient reason and rationality, 89. - The Stoics, 89. - Logical relation and temporal relation, 89. - Goblot's theory, 90. - The true reason for the anomaly, 91. - The Ionians, 92. - Aristotle's theory, 92. - The task of the physicist, according to Geminus, 94. - Analogy with Hegel, 94. - Galileo's adversaries, 94. -Progress through deduction, 96. - The forms of deduction, 96. -They are easily substituted for one another, 97. - Baconian empiricism, 97. - Method in physics, according to Bouasse, 98. - Method in the other sciences, 98.

CHAPTER 5. IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION The identity of antecedent and consequent, 102. - Leibniz and Plato, 102. - Tautological identity, 103. - Mathematical demonstration, 103. - Hegel: identity contains diversity, 104. -The necessity of contradiction, 105. - Hegel's position and the antinomies of Kant, 105. - Hegel and mathematical reasoning, 106. - The dialectic and the going beyond, 107. - Identity introduced, 107. - The square of the hypotenuse, 108. - The astonishment provoked by the demonstration, 109. - The

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equality is restricted, 110. - Poincare's cascade of equations, 110. - The proof and the concept for Hegel, 111. - Leibniz's opinion, 112. - The synthetic in mathematical proof, 112. - The active role of the intellect, 113. - The schema or process of identification, 114. - Genus in mathematics and in physics, 115. - Spontaneous identification and deliberate identification, 115.-The reason the mind resists the demonstration, 116. - The equality of cause and effect, 116. - Persistence in time, 117. -Diversification by space, 118. - Mechanism and substantial qualities, 118. - Implicit conservation and incomplete conserva-tion, 119. - What is conserved becomes a real thing, 120. - The peculiar dignity of the principles of conservation, 120. -Preformation, 121. - Leibniz and his contemporaries, 122. -Spermists and ovists, 123. - The moderns, 123. - Maeterlinck, 124. - The appeal of preformationism, 124. - Evolution and development, 125. - Explanation by displacement, 125. -Matter demands to be explained, 126. - The operations of the mind are intertwined, 127. - The influence of mathematics, 128. - Little evidence of it in the ancient atomists, 128. - Their theories derive from causal identity, 129. - Aristotle's tes-timony, 129. - Physical theory imposes identification, 130. - It suppresses the statement of the envisaged goal, 131. - The cause of the persistent, 132. - Substance and its qualities, 132. - The statement of the principle of sufficient reason, 133. - The connection between temporal cause and the cause of the permanent, 134. - The unity of matter, 134. - Rational matter is space, 135. - The properties of the ether, 135. - Matter having only geometric qualities, 136. - The world reduced to space, 136.

CHAPTER 6. THE IRRATIONAL The irrational, permanent limitation on explanation, 143. - The mathematical irrational, 143. - Sensation, 144. - Leibniz's "mill," 145. - The attitude of science, 145. - Mechanism, 146. -The specific energy of the nerves, 147. - Montaigne' s point of view, 147. - Hobbes' opinion, 148. - Impressions of light and impressions of sound, 149. - The maximum intensity of the sensation of light, 149. - Protests from the philosophers, 150. -The suicide of reason, 150. - This irrational is an a priori

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notion, 151. - The irrationality of diversity in Newton, 152. -His predecessors, 152. - Science partially explains diversity, 153. - Carnot's principle, 154. - The prototype of irreversible phenomena, 155. - Eternal return, 155. - The kinetic theory of Carnot's principle, 156. - Probable distribution, 157. - The box and the marbles, 157. - The warm body and the moving body, 158. - Change and probability, 158. - Arrhenius's hypothesis, 159. - The infinity of time and the infinity of space, 160. -Arrhenius's hypothesis and kinetic theory, 160. - The enigmatic given, 161. - The improbable initial distribution, 162. - Change understood as necessary, 162. - The reality of atoms, 163. -Ostwald's attacks, 164. - Atomic electricity, 164. - The victory of atomism, 164. - The diversification and unification of space, 165. - The analogy between the two irrationals of diversity, 166. - The chemical irrational, 167. - The chemical irrational and quanta, 168. - The unexpected irrational, 169. - Stellar motion, 169. - The unpredictable form of the future irrational, 170. -The elements and their explanation, 170. - Partial rationaliza-tion of the irrational, 171. - We shall never be able to deduce nature, 172.

CHAPTER 7. BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENA The finalist in biology, 177. - Vitalism, 177. - The struggle between vitalism and mechanism, 178. - The retreat of vitalism, 178. - Bichat's position, 179. - Modem day biologists, 180. -Explanations, established and future, 181. - The vitalist claim, 181. - The antivitalist thesis, 182. - Future biological irration-als, 182. - Analogy with the chemical irrational, 183. -Difficulty of determining the limits of the vital phenomenon, 184. - Hysteresis, tropisms, 185. - Liquid crystals, imitation of forms of life, 185. - Artificial fertilization, movements of the amoeba, 185. - Chemical synthesis, 186. - Animal energy, 187. - Grafting of dead tissues, 188. - Their reviviscence, 188. -What is alive in an organism, 189. - What a vitalistic demonstra-tion would be like, 189. - Difficulty of making our reason apply itself in a dry run, 190. - Montaigne's bladder stones, 191. -The vitalistic claim is premature, 192. - The weakness of finalism, 192. - The adversaries of evolutionism, 193. - The triumph of Darwin, 193. - Its causes, 194. - Finality implies

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consciousness, 195. - The difficulties of this supposition, 195. -The end must be in man's interest, 196. - Omnipotence and infinite bounty, 196. - A limited finality appears absurd, 197.-Finalism can be useful, 197. - Instinct and its reducibility, 198. - Final cause, the sanctuary of ignorance, 199. - Where Bacon was right against finalism, 200. - Delbet's act of faith, 201. -Driesch's explanation by geometry, 201.

CHAPTER 8. FORMS OF SPATIAL EXPLANATION A. Displacement from one body to another, 206. - Displacement of an immaterial principle, 206. - The attitude of modem physics, 207. - The depths of space, 208. - Le Sage's theory and radioactive bodies, 208. - B. Folding, 209. - C. Reduction in size, 209. - The properties of Euclidean space, 210. - The seed and the plant, 210. - Infinitely small organisms in Pascal, 211. - The flea and the elephant, 212. - The cell and the molecule, 212. - The molecular world, 213. - The submolecular world, 213. - Humanity's prescience and its limits, 214. - The upper limit of our world, 215. - Explanation by the infinitesimal has become more difficult, 216. - D. The properties of geometric figures, 216. - The ancient atomists, 216. - Des-cartes, 217. - Analogy with Lucretius, 218. - Boyle and Lemery, 218. - Stahl, 219. - Qualitative conceptions in chemistry, 220. - The attitude of chemists after Stahl, 220. -The concept of the chemical element, 221. - Constancy of the elements, 222. - Their essential properties, 222. - Affinity, 223. - Qualitative physics, 223. - It uses the concept of displace-ment, 224. - The way atoms are grouped, 224. - The chemistry of structure, 225. - Stereochemistry, 226. - Its merits, 227. -Bayer's valences, the new crystallography, 227. - Werner's octahedron, 228. - The prestige of this conception, 228. - The qualitative element in stereochemistry, 229. - The conceptions of Lavoisier and Prout, 230. - The system of Mendeleev and Moseley's discovery, 230. - The theory of Sir Joseph Thomson, 230. - E. Explanation by motion, 231. - The piston and the brake, 232. - Analogies with reduction in scale and immaterial principles, 232. - Absolute kinetics, 233. - The limits of this means of explanation, 234.

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CHAPTER 9. THE POSSIBILITIES OF SCmNTIFlC EXPLANATION 240 Possible combinations in Lucretius, 240. - The modems, 240. -The formula and the properties, 241. - The difficulties of the problem, 241. - Chromophores, 242. - Rationalization appears possible, 243. - New irrationals may crop up, 243. -Explanation of being and of becoming, 244. - Qualitative theories, 245.

CHAPTER to. THE STATE OF POTENTIALITY 247 Aristotle, 247. - The conservation of energy, 248. - Force, matter, 248. - Existence in itself for Hegel, 248. - The objects of common sense, 249. - The seed, the nation, 250. - Historical hypostases, 251. - A man's genius, 252. - Fiction can be useful, 252. - Color, 252. - Usefulness of historical hypostases, 253. -Potential existence and Ockham's razor, 254. - The germ, evolution, 255. - The degree of identity of the two terms, 255. -Easy return to naIve realism, 256. - Precision of the scientific notion, 257. - The notion of potentiality in Hegel, 257. - In Mnesarchus and in Spinoza, 258. - Reason and contradiction, 259.

BOOK THREE

GLOBAL EXPLANATION

CHAPTER 11. IIEGEL'S ATIEMPT The paradoxical appearance of the doctrine, 263. - Its prestige, 263. - The two logics and the two reasons, 264. - Hegel's predecessors, 265. - Schelling's claim, 265. - It does not bear on logic, 266. - The deduction of becoming, 266. - Logic and metaphysics, 267. - The deduction of reality, 267. - Paniogism, 268. - Nature is intelligible, 268. - Hegel's disciples neglect his Naturphilosophie and even his logic, 269. - What is of interest in the Naturphilosophie, 270. - Descartes's work and his achievements, 270. - Hegel's work is disconcerting, 271. - The magnet and the syllogism, 271. - The chemical process, 272. -Hegel and the school of Schelling, 272. - The scientific achievements of the philosophy of nature, 273. - The scientific sterility of the Hegelian theory, 273. - The infection of wounds,

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274. - The scope of deduction in Descartes and in Hegel, 274.-Contingency and play in nature for Hegel, 275. - Hegel and experimental science, 275. - Hegel's knowledge of science, 276. - The irrational in Hegel, 277. - Its relation to the irrational in Newton, 278. - Hegel appeals to direct sensation, 278. -Hegel tried to discipline the irrational, 279. - Mathematics and physical magnitudes, 280. - The Anderssein, 281. - Mathemati-cal demonstration, 281. - The law of falling bodies, 282. -Power in mathematics, 282. - Hegel's knowledge of mathe-matics, 283. - Mathematics governed by abstract reason, 284.-Philosophy must not imitate mathematics, 284. - The distinction between the two reasons is an anomaly, 285. - Rosenkranz's attitude, 285. - The source of Hegel's distinction, 286. -Scientific explanation rests on identity, 286. - This is a tautol-ogy, 287. - Science abuses hypothetical concepts, 288. - It is useless to try to explain a chemical reaction, 289. - The source of Hegel's epistemological opinions, 289. - Hegel's epistemol-ogy and his logic, 290. - What must be retained from Hegel's opinions and what must be rejected, 290. - The dialectical process, 291. - The quandary of the commentators, 292. - For Hegel the irrational is unique, 292. - Hegel's Vernunft does not exist, 293. - Is becoming reasonable? 293. - Trendelenburg's criticism, 294. - Evolution of the notion of becoming in McTaggart, 295. - It ends up with Parrnenides, 296. - Science and becoming, 296. - Science's successive compromises, 297.-Science does not conserve the irrational, 297. - One irrational or multiple irrationals? 298. - Everything seems to be connected, 299. - The irrational is unforeseeable, 299.

CHAPTER 12. SCHELLING'S OBJECTIONS The chimerical nature of Hegel's undertaking, 311. - Schell-ing's Preface, 311. - One does not deduce what is negative, 312. - The driving force is the terminus ad quem, 313. - The transition between idea and nature, 313. - The causa sui, 314.-Kant's criticism, 314. - The prestige and the weakness of the Hegelian position, 315. - Hegel's palinodes, 315. - The apothegm of the real and the reasonable, 316. -'- Schelling's idealism, 317. - His philosophy of nature, 317. - The implica-tions of Schelling's attacks, 318. - The position of the

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philosophy of nature in the two systems, 318. - What exists, for Schelling, is given, 318. - The spiritualization of reality, 319. -The philosophy of nature is speculative physics, 320. - His attitude toward experience, 320. - ConfIrmation by experience declared necessary, 321. - The difference between the two Naturphilosophies, 321. - The given must nevertheless be recognized as consistent with reason, 322. - The identity of nature with the world of ideas, 323. - The philosophy of nature and transcendental idealism, 323. - The disciples, 324. - The solution cannot be complete, 324. - Schelling's oscillations, 325. - Maintaining the two points of view simultaneously, 325. - The problem of Schelling'S interrupted production, 327. - His precocity, 327. - The announcements that come to nothing, 328. - The explanations of Kuno Fischer and Hartmann, 328. -Brehier's explanation, 329. - The fragmentary character of Schelling's work, 330. - His annoyance at Cousin, 330. - The ambiguity of Schelling's doctrine disappears in Hegel, 331. -Cousin and Hegel's Encyclopedia, 332. - The source of his admiration, 333. - Schelling feels a continuity between himself and Hegel, 333. - Praise of Hegel, 333. - Simultaneous attacks, 334. - Positive and negative philosophy, 334. - The new system and the philosophy of nature, 335. - Hegel inspires Schelling to reconsider, 336. - Schelling's innate realism, 337. - The will, 337. - Schelling must have hesitated to "betray" the idealistic movement, 338. - He fInally resigned himself to it, 338. - The antiphilosophic reaction in Germany, 339. - The value of Hegel's enterprise, 339. - The complexity of Schelling's thought, 340. - Schelling's doctrine more human than Hegel's, 340.

CHAPTER 13. HEGEL AND COMTE

Hegel's attempt seems anachronistic, 350. - His POSItIVISm, 350. - Kepler's laws and the Newtonian reduction, 351. - The chemical elements, 352. - Science for Comte and for Hegel, 352. - Analogy with Kant, 353. - Hegel's margin and positive science, 353. - It is a mistake of degree, 354. - It is due to the spirit of the times, 354. - Cousin's attitude, 355. - Comte's influence, 356. - Hegel's scorn for nature, 357. - The stars compared to skin eruptions, 357. - The "logical arrogance" of

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the Hegelians, 358. - McTaggart's attitude, 358. - The humility of science, 359. - Hegel and Comte both disregarded ex-planatory science, 360.

CHAPTER 14. HEGEL, DESCARTES AND KANT 363 Experience in Descartes, 363. - The continuity of the deductive chain, 363. - The parentage of this conception, 364. - Hegel derives from Kant, 365. - What Kant deduced, 365. - Hegel extends the limits of deduction, 366. - Kantian deduction derives from Descartes, 366. - The Baconian evolution, 367. -Hegel is less bold than Aristotle, 368. - Trendelenburg's criticism, 369. - It would also apply to Descartes and Kant, 369. - The a priori separated out from experimental science, 369. -Necessity of this process, 370. - The attitude of the mechanist, 371. - Hegel's hope not unreasonable, 372. - The empiricist evolution and its claims, 373. - The scope of mathematical deduction in Kant, 373. - The discontinuity of scientific deduction, 374. - Galileo's attitude, 375. - The hypothesis in Newton, 375. - In Lavoisier, Priestley and Schelling, 376. -Cauchy, 377. - The abandonment of the mechanistic faith, 378. - The contribution of Bacon and Comte, 379. - The successes of theoretical science, 379. - They are won by the route Hegel condemns, 379. - Scientific explanation does not succeed everywhere, 380. - Nowhere can rationalization be complete, 381. - Mathematical deduction conforms to the order of things, 381. - Neither Descartes's nor Hegel's attempt was absurd, 382. - What explains the enormity of Hegel's failure? 383. - The sterility of Peripateticism, 383. - Science's abandonment of quality, 385. - The divorce between science and philosophy in Germany, 385. - The "science" constructed by philosophers, 386. - Science and philosophy cannot ignore on another, 386.-Bradley's attempt at a delimitation, 387. - Antiphilosophic reaction in Germany, 388. - The union of science and philosophy in Descartes, 388.

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BOOK FOUR

SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHIC REASON

CHAPTER 15. SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS What is the metaphysics of science? 395. - Common sense, 395. - Scientific reason destroys the world of common sense, 396. -The distinction between common sense and mechanism, 396. -Scientific claims contrary to common sense, 397. - The impossibility of a catholic doctrine in science, 398. - The four solutions proposed, 399. - Mechanism, 399. - The attitude of the physicist, 400. - Energeticism, 401. - Its difficulties, 401. -The thrust of science toward atomism, 402. - Transcendental realism, 402. - Mathematical idealism, 403. - The Marburg school, 404. - The idealistic affirmation, 404. - The carbon atom, 405. - The "spiritualization" of science in Schelling, 406. - The divergent paths of science and philosophy, 407. -Sensible reality, 407. - Science and philosophy can approach each other on specific points, 408. - Science and mathematical idealism, 409. - The corporeity of geometrical figures, 409. -Panalgebrism and pangeometrism, 410. - The complete deduction of mathematics, 411. - The mathematical form of knowledge, 412. - Realistic and idealistic arguments drawn from mathematics, 412. - Concrete numbers, 413. - Aristotle's arguments against mathematicism, 414. - Mathematical physics, 414. - The world as necessary and the disappearance of coefficients, 415. - The irrational and quality, 416. - The future irrational, 417. - The mental attitude of the biologist, 417. - The mathematical form of the irrational, 418. - The absolute beginning and the intervention of the divinity, 419. - Pushing the assumption back, 419. - The limits of this pushing back, 420. - The panmathematical illusion and its source, 421. -Idealism and positivism, 421. - Positivism and Hegelianism, 422. - Deductive positivism, 423. - Deduction from the principles, 424. - Deductive positivism is an idealistic concep-tion, 425. - Positivism and mathematical idealism, 425. - The passage from idea to being, 426. - Reality reconstructed by means of mathematical concepts, 426. - Multiple transitions, 427. - Gradations of the transition for Hegel, 428. - The

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ataraxia of science, 429. - The individual scientist, 429. - His convictions fluctuate, 430. - Common ideas, 431. - Urbain's testimony, 431. - The conceptions are implicit, 432. - Common sense modified, 433. - Philosophic theory and scientific construction, 433.

CHAP1ER 16. THE RATIONALITY OF THE REAL RECONSIDERED 437 The resemblance between Cartesian science and modern science, 437. - This would be an enigma if science were positivistic, 438. - It is explained by the role of deduction, 439. - Kant and rational mechanics, 439. - Plausible principles, 440. - They are not immutable, 440. - They yield to new principles, 441. - They cannot be part of the "metaphysical foundations," 441. - Partial agreement in science and in common sense, 442. -The process of common sense, 443. - Unconscious and conscious processes, 444. - The structure of the world of sensation, 444. - Perceptions independent of the self, 445. - The spatial form, 446. - The empiricist theory, 447. - It is inap-plicable to scientific conceptions, 447. - The objects of common sense change, 448. - Common sense ontology, 449. - The reaction of the individual to the environment, 449. - The theory of evolution, 450. - The postulate of perfect identity, 450. -Rationality and the elan vital, 451. - The rational and the useful, 452. - The intellectus ipse, 453. - The opposition between reason and sensation, 453. - Hope for agreement in Hegel, 454. - The opaqueness of physical fact, 455. - Comte's position, 455. - Hasty rationalization, 456. - The superior rationality of the mathematical, 457. - Laws and theories, 457. - Descartes's deduction and ours, 459. - The true task of the scientist, 459. -Science and its applications, 459. - The method of the scientist, 460. - The sterility of the Baconian program, 460. - Claude Bernard's observations, 461. - The testimony of our contem-poraries, 462. - The search for the fiber, 463. - Judiciary astrology, 463. - Natural astrology, 464. - Tables of measure-ments, 465. - One cannot observe all the conditions, 465. -Guyton de Morveau and phlogiston, 466. - His experiments on Prussian blue, 466. - They hold no interest for us, 467. - The pseudosciences, 468. - The calculation of probability based on statistics, 468. - Nonexistent compounds, 469. - The will to

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believe, 470. - The ineffective or noxious remedies of the past, 470. - The will to be cured, 471. - The search for the fiber and the internal link, 471. - Analogy, 473. - Dissimilarities between phenomena, 473. - The researcher dismisses them in his mind, 474. - The familiar phenomenon, 474. - The working of ordinary reason, 475. - Instinct, 476. - Communion with nature, 477. - What it would imply for the scientist, 477. - Clear ideas and obscure ideas, 478. - Condillac's affirmation, 479. - A decision and the reasons for it, 479. - The scientist who does research and the scientist who reports his results, 479. -Kepler's!olly, 481. - What is the source of Bacon's error? 481. - How it was able to persist, 482. - The value of clarity, 482. -The dignity of reason, 483. - Croce's position, 483. - The practical and science, 484. - What ail experimental result really is, 485. - What the generalization of the results of science leads to, 486. - The scientific gain from philosophic speculation, 486. - Incentives coming from the a priori side, 487.

CHAPTER 17. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOX The prestige of the positivistic conception, 492. - Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, 492. - The logical aspect: Leibniz, 493. - Condillac, 494. - The mind distorting fundamental identity, 494. - Stanley Jevons, 495. - The epistemological aspect: the atomists, 495. - One forgets the philosophic origin of atomism, 495. - Its continuity, 497. - The testimony of modem scientists, 498. - The philosophers, 498. - Zeller and Burnet, 499. - The principles of conservation, 500. - Inertia, 500. - The conservation of matter, 501. - The conservation of energy, 501. - Empiricist and aprioristic affirmations, 502. - The real essence of the principles: Leibniz, 503. - Kant, 503. - Poinsot, 504. -Hegel, Whewell, 504. - Wundt, 505. - Spir, 506. - He overex-tends the domain of deduction, 507. - Kroman, Tannery, 507. -Planck, Gaston Milhaud, 508. - Lalande, 509. - Kozlowski, 509. - Wilbois, Ward, 509. - The discontinuity of the develop-ment, 510. - Riehl, 511. - Hegel, 511. - His attack against science, 512. - The fundamental paradox of science, 513. -Science is theoretical and lawful at the same time, 513. - The concept of experimental knowledge is contradictory, 514. - The two currents coexist peacefully, 515.

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CHAPTER 18. THE ONENESS OF HUMAN REASON The intelligence itself is antinomic, 520. - Reason and sensa-tion, 521. - Science, philosophy and common sense, 521. - The diversity between science and philosophy, 522. - The round-about method of scientific reasoning, 523. - The concepts of philosophy and of science, 523. - Overly hasty deduction is antiscientific, 524. - Hegel's error compounded by his very virtues, 525. - The usefulness of the positivistic warning, 525. -Relations between science and philosophy, 526. - Common sense, 527. - The science of the past and its teachings, 528. -The planet Mars and phlogiston, 528. - The domination of the reigning theory, 529. - The fruit and the flower for Hegel, 530. - The outdated theory, 530. - The fruitful error, 531. - The continuity of theories, 532. - Hegel's thought, 533. - Comte and the history of the sciences, 533. - The variation in reason for Hegel, 534. - What such a supposition implies, 535. - Reason and new problems, 535. - The new element implicitly preexisted, 536. - The sphericity of the earth, 537. - The relativity of space, 537. - The spatialization of time, 538. -Hypergeometry, 538. - Duhem's condemnation is invalid, 540. - Despite Hegel, becoming remains irrational, 540. -Boltzmann's theory, 541. - Reason is antinomic but immutable, 542. - The catholicity of reason, 542.

APPENDICES

520

1. THE PRECURSORS OF HUMB 545 2. THE RESISTANCE TO LAVOISIER'S THEORY 546 3. THE FORMULA OF THE UNIVERSE IN LAPLACE AND IN

TAINE 563 4. ARRHENIUS'S THEORY AND OTHER SUCH EFFORTS 565 5. HEGEL'S POLITICAL ATTITUDE 566 6. THE PRESTIGE AND THE DECLINE OF HEGELIAN

PHILOSOPHY 570 7. ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE REASON IN HEGEL 573 8. HEGEL'S PANLOGISM 574 9. THE HEGELIANS AND HEGEL'S NATURPHILOSOPHIE 576

10. THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 577 11. HEGEL, SCHELLING AND CHEMICAL THEORY 579

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxi

12. HEGEL AND NATIONAL SCIENCE 582 13. HEGEL'S ARTISTIC SENSE AND SENSE OF RHYTHM 584 14. THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC AND EXPERIENCE 585 15. SCHELLING, HEGEL AND VICTOR COUSIN 586 16. THE IDENTITY OF THOUGHT AND REALITY IN SCHELLING 590 17. SCHELLING'S ANNOUNCED WORKS 592 18. CAROLINE SCHELLING 594 19. PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SCHELLING AND HEGEL 595 20. TYCHO BRAHE, ASTROLOGY AND THE MOTION OF THE

EARTH 600 21. NON-EUCLIDEAN SPACE AND PHYSICAL VERIFICATION 601

INDEX OF NAMES 605

FOREWORD

Emile Meyerson's writings on the philosophy of science are a rich source of ideas and information concerning many philosophical and historical aspects of the development of modem science. Meyerson's works are not widely read or cited today by philosophers or even philosophers of science, in part because they have long been out of print and are often not available even in research libraries. There are additional chevaux de !rise for all but the hardiest scholars: Meyerson's books are written in French (and do not all exist in English versions) and deal with the subject matter of science - ideas or concepts, laws or principles, theories - and epis-temological questions rather than today's more fashionable topics of the social matrix and external influences on science with the concomitant neglect of the intellectual content of science.

Born in Lublin, Poland, in 1859, Meyerson received most of his education in Germany, where he studied from the age of 12 to 23, preparing himself for a career in chemistry.! He moved to Paris in 1882, where he began a career as an industrial chemist. Changing his profession, he then worked for a time as the foreign news editor of the HAVAS News Agency in Paris. In 1898 he joined the agency established by Edmond Rothschild that had as its purpose the settling of Jews in Palestine and became the Director of the Jewish Colonization Association for Europe and Asia Minor.

These activities represent Meyerson's formal career. Informally, he was a voracious reader of philosophy and the literature of science and its history; and he soon became a major figure among French scholars interested in questions of philosophy, especially the philosophy of science, and the history of science. Although he held no academic appointments, he did become a member of an important circle of French intellectuals concerned with major issues of philosophy, the nature and history of science, philosophy of science, and social problems. His weekly "intellectual salon" in Paris became a pivotal point in discussions of all sorts of major questions of philosophy, notably those dealing with science. This intellectual community included the philosophers Leon Brunschvicg and Lucien Levy-Bruhl, along with the scientists Paul

xxiii

FOREWORD xxiv

Langevin and Louis de Broglie. Others who became part of his circle were the philosopher Andre George, the historian of religions Salomon Reinach, and the philosopher Henri Gouhier. Younger scholars attending these intellectual sessions came to include Helene Metzger-Bruhl (the niece of Lucien Levy-Bruhl) and Alexandre Koyre, both of whom were to make their mark as historians of science.2 Koyre's first major contribution to the history of science, his celebrated Etudes Ga/i!eennes was dedicated "to the memory of Emile Meyerson."3 In the opening paragraph, Koyre referred to "the philosophical interest and fruitfulness" of "the historical study of science," a facet of such studies that he said could be taken for granted "after the magisterial work of those such as Duhem and Emile Meyerson, Cassirer and Brunschvicg."

An autodidact in philosophy, Meyerson was initiated into philosophy by reading the works of Charles-Bernard Renouvier, a philosopher also not much read nowadays. Renouvier was one of the two most original philosophical thinkers in France in the 19th century, the other being Auguste Comte. We may note that both of these philosophers were graduates of the Ecole Poly technique. The rigorous training they received at the Poly technique gave their writings on science a high degree of authenticity. This factor may explain the particular fascination that Renouvier had for Meyerson.

As a trained chemist, Meyerson was naturally interested in theoretical and philosophical reflections on chemistry and the theory and properties of matter. In particular, he became deeply impressed by studies on the history of early chemistry. He was also influenced by two philosophical works, Kristian Kroman's Naturerkenntnis (1883) and the writings of the Danish philosopher Harold Hoffding, who became a close friend and correspondent and was responsible for Meyerson's election to the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters in 1926.4

Meyerson's first philosophical book, perhaps the most influential of all his writings, was Identity and Reality.5 This work, originating in Meyer-son's reflections on the early development of chemistry, is basically a study in ontology. His program, as it developed from his work, has been described by H.W. Paul as "the unfulfilled one of Comte: to discover a posteriori the a priori principles guiding thought in the search for the nature of reality." George Boas has explained Meyerson's goal as follows: "to discover inductively the a priori principles of human thinking. By 'a priori' E. Meyerson ... means ... those principles by which the human mind has operated to date and which are not discovered by it in experience itself."6

xxv FOREWORD

Another significant book by Meyerson is his study of Einsteinian relativity and its philosophical significance. The original French edition appeared in 1925 under the title La deduction relativiste. An English translation, by D. and M.-A. Sipfle, was published in 1985, together with an important review by Albert Einstein.1 For many historians of science, Meyerson's most interesting and important work is his Du cheminement de la pensee (1931), a rich source of insight and information concerning almost every possible aspect of the development of science and its philosophy. Many of the notes or supplements outline significant topics in the history of scientific thought that have not as of now been explored much beyond the outlined suggestions made by Meyerson six decades ago. It is earnestly to be hoped that some intrepid translators will make this valuable resource available to readers in English.

The present work commends itself to us for a number of features. First of all, it is - like Meyerson's other writings - a tremendous repository of useful information and significant insights. Unlike most other philosophi-cal works drawing on science and its history, Explanation in the Sciences draws heavily on the history of chemistry for its examples. One feature that every reader will remark is the importance given to Hegel, whose ideas are discussed at greater length and in more variety than those of other philosophers. In the English and American philosophical pantheon,

-Hegel does not occupy the same high place that he is accorded by German and French thinkers. In fact, one of the remarkable aspects of the present work is the merciless way in which Meyerson exposes what he finds to be the basic scientific ignorance and lack of understanding of scientific principles that invade every aspect of Hegel's writings relating to scientific thought.

Like Meyerson's other books, Explanation in the Sciences is not just a philosophical work that draws heavily on a knowledge of science itself, since it also displays a deep and sure acquaintance with science's history. As such, it belongs to the great tradition of philosophers of science who really knew their scientific subject and who were serious students of the history of science, among them Ernst Mach (whose philosophical position Meyerson abhorred and attacked), Pierre Duhem, William Whewell, Federigo Enriques, and Leon Brunschvicg (who was especially learned in mathematics and its history)_

Meyerson's contributions to the philosophy and the history of science are still esteemed in France_ In 1960, the session on 26 November of the Societe Fran9aise de Philosophie was devoted to a commemoration of the

FOREWORD xxvi

centenary of the birth of "two French epistemologists" Meyerson and Gaston Milhaud (who, like Meyerson, was a deep and creative scholar in the area of the history of science as well as philosophy).8

In estimating the lasting influence of Meyerson, we must include his importance in the development of the thought and research of Alexandre Koyre who became Meyerson's leading protege, and of Helene Metzger-Bruhl, whose pioneering and penetrating studies of the development of chemistry in relation to the rise of modem science remain unparalleled interpretations of the founding of modem science. H.W. Paul has observed that "through the critical mediation and example of Koyre, it is likely that Meyerson has exerted more influence than is generally recognized." He reminds us that Koyre admitted that "this influence is not to be found in fidelity to the subtle dogma of the basic identity of human thought," as Meyerson believed; most of us "follow Koyre in recogniz-ing" that human thought exhibits "different structures in different historical periods." We may thus applaud Paul's sentiment to the effect that we should follow Meyerson's "great precept" and as historians "respect our predecessors who made errors and ... seek reasonable explanations of their mistakes as carefully as the explanations of their successes. "

Although the problems raised by Meyerson may not always seem at the forefront of current philosophical debates, his influence still penetrates many aspects of the history of thought. Most recently, Philip Mirowski has shown how Meyerson's ideas illuminate the most fundamental questions of modem "neo-classical" economics in relation to the borrow-ing of concepts and methods from physics and mathematics.9 Not only does Mirowski draw heavily on Meyerson's ideas as a guide to his interpretation but he even finds that Meyerson himself thought that the basic issues that he raised might have implications for economics, giving examples. 1o Here we see how fundamental contributions to thought continue to have a life of their own and to influence the development of many disciplines even beyond the range that founders like Meyerson himself might have envisaged.

I. BERNARD COHEN

xxvii FOREWORD

NOTES

1. For details concerning Meyerson's life, I have drawn heavily on the article on Meyerson by H. W. Paul in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography, vol. 15, pp. 422-425.

2. Although Helene Metzger became known primarily for her seminal studies of eighteenth-century Newtonianism, theory of matter, and chemical theory, her earliest work was in the philosophy of science. See her Les concepts scien-tifiques, avec une preface de Andre Lalande (paris: Alcan, 1925).

3. Published in French in Paris in 1939 (by Hermann), this work has been translated by John Metham under the title "Ga/i/eo Studies" (Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978). Sad to relate, in this English version the translator has misspelled Meyerson's name as "Myerson."

4. See Correspondence entre Harald H6ffding et Emile Meyerson (Copenhagen: Einar & Munksgaard, 1939).

5. Identite et realite (paris: Vrin, 1908; 2d ed., revised and enlarged, 1912; 3d ed., 1926) has been translated into English by Kate Loewenberg (London/New York: Macmillan, 1930). According to H. Paul (D.S.B., vol. 15, p. 425), Meyerson "considered the German translation of 1930, which has a long introduction by the mathematician Leon Lichtenstein, who spread Meyerson's ideas in Germany, better than the English."

6. George Boas: A Critical Analysis of the Philosophy of Emile Meyerson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1930); see also Thomas Kelly: Explanation and Reality in the Philosophy of Emile Meyerson (Princeton: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 1937). Also Silvestro Marcucci: "Filosofia, scienza e storia della scienza in Emilio Meyerson," Physis 3 (1961): 5-19 and Emile Meyerson -Epistemologia e filosofia (Turin, 1962).

7. The Relativistic Deduction, with an introduction by Milic Capek, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 83 (1985).

8. See Bulletin de la Societe Franr;aise de Philosophie 55 (1961): 51-116. 9. Philip Mirowski: More Heat than Light - Economics as Social Physics: Physics

as Nature's Economics (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), esp. pp. 5-8, 314-316. Although Mirowksi calls Identity and Reality "a now-dated book," he also declares that it was the most important work (the one whose "influence is most felt") in his analysis. In particular, Mirowski made use of Meyerson's discussions of conservation laws in Identity and Reality and his discussions of the tension in physics between "a search for identity and invariance" and "the acknowledgement of diversity and change." In Meyerson's view, according to Mirowski, "conservation laws were just a special case of the more sweeping postulate of the identity of things in time, a postulate he insisted was central to all human thought."

10. "The expression [of equivalence] is borrowed from the language of economics. When I affirm that such a thing is worth such a price, that means that I can buy it or sell it at that price ... " Quoted by Mirowski (p. 7) from Identity and Reality (1962 ed.), p. 283.

TRANSLATORS'ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This translation was supported in part by grants from the Faculty Development Endowment and the Faculty Research and Assistance Fund of Carleton College. We are very grateful to the College for its support.

We wish to thank Jackson Bryce, Roy Elveton, Jerry Mohrig, Richard Noer, Ross Shoger, and our many other friends and colleagues at Carleton College who gave freely of their time and wisdom and offered valuable advice when we shared translation problems with them. We also thank Sandra Allen, Carol Jenkins, Karen Menghini, Lisa Orlowski, Cindy Seger, and scores of anonymous librarians and library workers at the Bibliotheque Nationale and other libraries of Paris, and at libraries throughout the United States, for untold hours of work on our behalf.

M.-A. and D. A. SIPPLE

xxix

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIA nONS

The following frequently cited works are referred to in the text or the notes by abbreviated titles, as indicated below. The corresponding English translations are identified in the text and notes by the translator's name only. Other works, after an initial full citation in each chapter, will be identified by the author's name and/or short title only.

JOURNALS: Bull. Soc.fr. phil.: Bulletin de la Societefranr;aise de philosophie. Rev. gen. sci.: Revue generale des sciences. Rev. de meta.: Revue de metaphysique et de morale. Rev. phil.: Revue philosophique de la France et,de [' erranger. Scientia: Scientia, including early volumes published under the title Rivista di scienza.

COLLECTIONS: Brussels Con!: La Theorie du rayonnement et les quanta, Reports and discussions of

the conference at Brussels, 30 Oct. - 3 Nov. 1911, under the auspices of E. Solvay, published by Paul Langevin and Louis De Broglie (Paris, 1912).

Idees modernes: Edmond Bauer, et aI., Les Idees modernes sur la constitution de la matiere (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1913).

Enc. merh.: EncyclopMie merhodique: Chimie, pharmacie et merallurgie (Paris: H. Agasse, Year 4 [of the First French Republic; 1796]).

Enc. merh., 1786: EncyclopMie methodique: Chymie, pharmacie et merallurgie (Paris: Panchoucke, 1786).

BERNARD, Claude: MM. exper.: Introduction a [,etude de la mMecine experimentale, ed. Sertillanges

(paris: F. Leve, 1900) [An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, trans. Henry Copley Greene (U.S.A.: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1927].

BERTHELOT, Rene: 'Sur la necessite': 'Sur la necessite, la finalite et la liberte chez Hegel,' Bull. Soc. fro

phil. 7 (1907) 115-118, and the discussion that follows, pp. 119-184).

COMTE, Auguste: Cours: Cours de Philosophie positive, 4th ed. (Paris: J.-B. Bailliere et Fils, 1887) [The

Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, freely translated and condensed, from the first ed., by Harriet Martineau (New York: Calvin Blanchard, 1858)]. We use Martineau's translation where it does not differ substantially from the original quoted by Meyerson. In cases where there is a substantial difference we provide a

xxxi

xxxii BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS

translation from the original; "cf. Martineau" identifies the corresponding passage in Martineau's free or abridged translation. Where there is no reference to Martineau at all, the quoted passage is not included in her translation.

CROCE, Benedetto: Ce qui est vivant: Ce qui est vivant et ce qui est mort de la philosophie de Hegel,

trans. Henri Buriot (Paris: Giard et E. Briere, 1910) [What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Macmillan, 1915)].

CUVIER, Georges: Histoire: Histoire des progres des sciences naturelles depuis 1789 jusqu' a nos jours,

in Oeuvres completes de Bujfon, Complement (Paris: Baudouin freres et N. Delangle, 1826).

DESCARTES, Rene: Oeuvres: Oeuvres, ed. Adam and Tannery (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1904). Principes: Les Principes de la philosophie, Oeuvres, Vol. 9 [Principles of Philosophy,

trans. Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983)]. Meyerson used the French version, while Miller & Miller worked from the Latin. We follow the Millers when possible, but give preference to the French when it diverges.

FISCHER, Kuno: Geschichte: Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1899 [Vol.

7] and 1901 [Vol. 8]).

HA YM, Rudolf: Hegel: Hegel und seine Zeit (Berlin: Rudolph Gaertner, 1857).

HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Meyerson usually cites the 18-volume edition of Hegel's Werke prepared by a group

of his friends after his death (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1832-1840) and, for the correspondence, Vol. 19 (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1887). The 1832-1840 Berlin edition of the Werke was republished in a facsimile edition, the 20-volume Jubiliiumsausgabe, edited by Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann, 1927-1930). The works have been rearranged in the Glockner edition, but the original pagination is provided at the top inner margin of each page. We refer to specific works by the abbreviated titles provided below, followed by the volume and page number of the 1832-1840 Berlin edition of the Werke as reproduced in the Jubiliiumsausgabe. We do so even in the one case in which Meyerson uses a different source. Although (see note 6, p. 141) Meyerson in fact worked from Wissenschaft der objectiven Logik (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1832), this edition is so rare that it would serve little purpose for us to reproduce its pagina-tion.

N. B.: To conform to Meyerson's usage (see Appendix 7) we have substituted "concrete reason" for "reason" and "abstract reason" for "understanding" where appropriate in the English translations listed below. Other such changes are identified in the notes.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS xxxiii

Briefe: Briefe von und an Hegel, Werke, Vol. 19 (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1887), Parts I and II (191 and 192) [Hegel: The Letters, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984)].

De Orbitis: De Orbitis Planetarum, Werke (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1832-1840), Vol. 16 ['G.W.F. Hegel: Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets (1801),' trans. Pierre Adler, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal [New York: New School for Social Research] 12 (1987-88) 269-309].

Enc., Logik: Encyc/opiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Part I: Die Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke, Vol. 6 [The Logic of Hegel, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1904)].

Hegel: The Letters: See Briefe, above. Naturphilosophie: Die Naturphilosophie, Werke, Vol. 7, Pt. 1 [7 Jl [Hegel's

Philosophy of Nature, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970)]. For the Foreword, see Michelet below.

Phiinomenologie: Phiinomenologie des Geistes, Werke, Vol. 2 [The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1949)].

Phil. der Geschichte: Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, Vol. 9 [Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (London: George Bell and Sons, 1902)].

Phil. des Geistes: Philosophie des Geistes, Werke, Vol. 7, Pt. 2 [72] [Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971)].

Phil. des Rechts: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke, Vol. 8, [Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942)].

Wiss. der Logik: Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke, Vols. 3-5 [Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969)].

LEIBNIZ: Opera: Opera philosophica quae exstant Latina Gallica Germanica Omnia, ed.

Johannes Eduardus Erdmann (Berlin: G. Eichler, 1840). Opuscules: Opuscules et fragments inMits de Leibniz, ed. Louis Couturat (Paris: Felix

Alcan, 1903). Translations used are from [Parkinson: Philosophical Writings, trans. Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson

(London: Dent / Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975)]. [Huggard: Theodicy, trans. E. M. Huggard (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951)]. [Alexander: The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, trans. H. G. Alexander (New York:

Philosophical Library, 1956)].

LOEB, Jacques: La Dynamique: La Dynamique des phenomenes de la vie, trans. from the 1906

German edition by A. Daudin and G. Schaeffer, with additions by the author (paris: Felix Alcan, 1908) [Dynamics: The Dynamics of Living Matter (New York: Columbia University Press, 1906)]. Neither the English nor the German text is a translation of the other, but the two texts deal with the same material and are quite similar. Where Meyerson's quotations have no exact counterparts in the English text we direct the reader to the corresponding passages with "cf." Where the English text is not mentioned there is no English counterpart.

xxxiv BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS

LUCRETIUS: De rerum nat.: De rerum natura. We have used the Ronald Latham translation, On the

Nature of the Universe (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1951).

McTAGGART, John McTaggart Ellis: Studies: Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1896).

MEYERSON, Emile: IR: Identite et realite (Paris: F. Alcan, 1926) [Identity and Reality, trans. Kate

Loewenberg (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930)].

MICHELET, Karl: Foreword to Naturphilosophie: Foreword to Hegel's Die Naturphilosophie, in Hegel,

Werke, Vol. 7, Pt. 1 [7d [Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, trans. M.J. Petry (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), 1:179-190].

PASCAL, Blaise: Pensees: Pensees et opuscules, ed. Brunschvicg (Paris: Hachette, 1917) [Pensees,

trans. A.J. Krailsheimer (Baltimore: Penguin, 1966)].

PLITT, Gustaf Leopold: Aus Schelling's Leben: Aus Schelling's Leben in Briefen (Leipzig: G. Hirzel,

1869-70).

ROSENKRANZ, Karl: Hegel als deut. Nat.: Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph (Leipzig: Duncker &

Humblot, 1870) [Hegel as the National Philosopher of Germany, trans. George S. Hall (St. Louis: Gray, Baker, 1874)]. Where there is no reference to Hall the German cited is not included in his translation.

Hegel's Leben: Hegel's Leben (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1844). Schelling: Schelling: Vorlesungen, gehalten im Sommer 1842 an der Universitiit zu

Konigsberg (Danzig: Fr. Sam. Gerhard, 1843).

SCHELLING, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von: Meyerson cites Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings Siimmtliche Werke (Stuttgart

and Augsburg: I.G. Cotta, 1856-1861. This was published in two series, which we will designate by I and II.

Aus den Jahrbiichern: Aus den Jahrbiichern der Medicin als Wissenschaft, I, 7:131-259.

Darlegung: Darlegung der wahren Verhiiltnisses des Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichteschen Lehre, I, 7: 1-126.

Einleitung zu dem Entwurj: Einleitung zu dem Entwurj eines Systems der Natur-philosophie, I, 3:269-326.

Erster Entwurj: Erster Entwurj eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, I, 3:1-268. Ideen: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, I, 2:1-343 [Ideas for a Philosophy of

Nature, trans. Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)].

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS xxxv

Phil. der Offenbar.: Philosophie der Offenbarung, II, 3:1-530. The first Book of this work (II, 3:1-174) is the Einleitung in die Philosophie der Offenbarung.

Transc. Idealismus: System des transcendentalen Idealismus, I, 3:327--634 [System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1978)].

Weltseele: Von der Weltseele, I, 2:345-583. Zur Geschichte: Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 1,10:1-200.

SPINOZA, Benedict: Ethics: The Ethics, The Chief Works of Spinoza, trans. R.H.M. Elwes (Bohn Library

ed.; reprint New York: Dover, 1951).

TAINE, Hippolyte: Les Philosophes classiques: Les Philosophes classiques du XIXe siecle en France,

lith ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1912).

TRENDELENBURG, Adolf: Log. Untersuch.: Logische Untersuchungen (Berlin: Gustav Bethge, 1840).

WALLACE, William: Prolegomena: Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and especially of his

Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894).

ZELLER, Eduard: Phil. der Griechen 2\: Die Philosophie der Griechen, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Fues, 1875),

Vol. 2, Pt. 1 [Plato and the Older Academy, trans. Sarah Frances Alleyne and Alfred Goodwin (London: Longmans, Green, 1888)].

Phil. der Griechen 22: Die Philosophie der Griechen, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Fues, 1875), Vol. 2, Pt. 2 [Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, trans. B. F. C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead (London: Longmans, Green, 1897), Vols. I and 2].

COMNrnNTSONDOCUMENTATION

Emile Meyerson's De l' Explication dans les sciences was first published in 1921, by Payot. Our translation follows the second (and final) edition (Paris: Payot, 1927).

Although Meyerson was a prodigious reader - in many languages - and obviously cared about his sources, there are a surprising number of errors in his quotations and his documentation. One has the impression that he worked from imperfect handwritten notes at best or from memory (impressive though that may be) at worst and that he did not recheck his sources. Since reproducing careless errors seems to us to serve no scholarly purpose, we have corrected quotations freely and without comment unless there is a significant difference between Meyerson's version and the original, in which case we have so noted. We have freely added bibliographic information not provided by Meyerson himself and have silently corrected obvious errors where possible.

In a few cases we have been unable to locate Meyerson's quotations on the basis of his documentation. In these cases we have simply reproduced his citations, noting obvious errors in brackets. Although we have often corrected or completed bibliographic material without introducing brackets, all unbracketed explanatory notes are Meyerson's. Where Meyerson himself has supplied bracketed material, we have so indicated. Bracketed material not otherwise designated has been added by the translators.

Where Meyerson quotes English sources in French, we have of course gone directly to the English source wherever possible, introducing ellipses or brackets as necessary. Where he quotes non-English works in French we have used standard English translations from the original language wherever possible, introducing ellipses or brackets as necessary. If his French version differs significantly from the standard English translation, we have substituted his language, explaining the discrepancy in the notes or, in some frequently recurring cases, in the note on bibliographic abbreviations above.

We have reproduced only Meyerson's italics, omitting both italics he has ignored in the sources he cites and italics introduced in the transla-tions we use.

M.-A. and D. A. SIPPLE

xxxvii

PREFACE

We believe we can make our work more accessible by summarizing our general plan in advance. In Book One we seek to establish that the current conception of science, which is positivistic, neglects two observations that seem to us to be fundamental, namely, on the one hand, the incontestable fact that science is essentially ontological, that it cannot dispense with a reality posited outside the self (Ch. 1) and, on the other hand, its equally clear tendency to go beyond the search for law to the search for explana-tion (Ch. 2). While suggesting that the scientific ontology itself can, in the last analysis, be considered as resulting from the need for explanation, we nevertheless begin Book Two by considering the two tendencies insofar as they conflict with one another, showing how scientific explanation actually ends up dissolving the external world into undifferentiated space. Indeed, what explanation seeks first and foremost is the deduction of the phenomenon from its antecedents, of which it must be the logical consequence (Ch. 3). That process obviously rests on a postulate, which is none other than the belief in the rationality of nature (Ch. 4), a rationality that can be realized only by applying to scientific reality the schema or process of identification (Ch. 5). This application is limited by the existence of the irrational, both in the physical sciences (Ch. 6) and - at least insofar as we are justified in formulating hypotheses in this area - in the biological sciences (Ch. 7). Within the vast area left for its action, scientific explanation is essentially spatial, and we study its forms (Ch. 8) and future possibilities (Ch. 9), going on to show how science manages, by the "state of potentiality," to create a semblance of explanation where identity is clearly lacking (Ch. 10).

In order better to grasp the nature and necessity of the process of destruction of reality by explanatory reason - so paradoxical at first sight - in Book Three we study the attempt at global explanation of nature due to Hegel (Ch. 11). The objections Schelling formulated against his rival then disclose the obstacle inevitably encountered by any purely idealistic interpretation of scientific reality (Ch. 12). A glance at the relations between Hegel's doctrine and that of Auguste Comte leads us to recog-nize that the two positions may have more points of contact than

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generally seems to be acknowledged (Ch. 13), while a comparison between the edifice built by Hegel and the analogous constructions of Descartes and Kant allows us to discern the feature these theories have in common, which is none other than the continuity of their deduction (Ch.14).

Book Four, finally, is devoted to an even closer study of the function-ing of scientific reason through a comparison with philosophic reason. After investigating science's true attitude toward philosophic systems (Ch. 15), we return (Ch. 16), in the light of what we have established, to the primordial question of the agreement between reason and reality already touched upon in Chapter 4. Then, having shown how the seemingly paradoxical character of our theory explains its belated appearance and discontinuous historical development (Ch. 17), we conclude by making an effort to establish that human reason, though antinomic by nature, is nevertheless one and the same in all domains and in all eras (Ch. 18).

In skimming through this summary table of contents, a reader at all familiar with our previous work (Identite et realite, 2nd ed., Paris: Payot, 1912 [Identity and Reality, trans. Kate Loewenberg, New York: Macmil-lan, 1930]) will easily perceive that the two books have many points in common. Indeed, our area of research has remained unchanged: our concern is still the theory of knowledge. Nor has our method varied: we again seek, insofar as possible, to identify the essential principles of thought by considering the processes followed by scientific reason. We try, however, to reach our conclusions (which are somewhat broadened) by a different route than the one we followed in our first work. At that time we had treated the schema of identification as merely heuristic, taking pains to go on to demonstrate, by an analysis of scientific theories, that our understanding of the role of this principle in fact offered the key explaining both the present state of science and its historical evolution. This way of presenting the thesis, which attempts to reach a conclusion about the logic of the sciences entirely a posteriori, seems to have led more than one reader astray, and highly competent critics, while in general receiving our efforts favorably, appeared to disapprove of our method. For this reason we asked ourself if it was not possible to arrive at the same result in a more strictly logical way, trying to analyze the mechanism of scientific thought more directly. Since in this way the process of identification comes to be connected with the general tendency to deduce nature, to understand it as rational, as necessary, perhaps its

PREFACE 3

role in scientific reasoning will be found to be better justified. In any case, this way of envisaging the problem has the advantage of

posing it in a more general form than we had done previously. Thus we have been able to tum our attention in the present work to modes of explanation that do not strictly fit into the framework of science, at least as it is understood today. It is true that in our earlier work we had already examined nonmechanical theories, especially qualitative theories, but these were still conceptions whose rigorously scientific character was unquestionable. On the other hand, we had completely omitted any attempt at logical (or pseudological) explanation of nature, such as that which provides the basis for Aristotle's theory or for the attempts of the German philosophers of nature; or at least we had considered the Peripatetic doctrine only insofar as, by an obvious detour, it had given rise to a true qualitative physics. Our procedure in the present work allows us to fill this gap, if only in part.

One could no doubt claim that since these processes of explanation are very remote from those we today recognize as valid, an examination of them could teach us nothing useful about contemporary scientific reasoning. But that would be to disregard the essential principle of the oneness of reason, a principle that will receive new confirmation through our final observations - or so we believe. Thus we dare to hope that the reader will be willing to recognize with us that modes of reasoning which at first sight seem completely strange, altogether inconsistent with those to which we are accustomed, nevertheless often have more than one thing in common with them and can thus serve to reveal motives that might be likely to remain hidden to us. This is the case, in particular, for the theories set forth by the man whose philosophic reputation - to say the least - is one of the most resounding of all: Hegel.

The reader will see in the ensuing pages what we mean to gain from an examination of Hegel's work. He will see how this powerful mind was able, straight away so to speak, to fathom, at least partially, the real guiding principles of scientific thought, and how then, carried away, as it were, by the very strength of his intellect and by his boundless confidence in his own powers, he used these accurate and profound views as the foundation for a monstrous monument. But even the errors in his thought sometimes contain valuable lessons. For as a result of the seriousness and the tireless tenacity with which Hegel pursues his ideas to their ultimate conclusion, as a result of the sincerity with which he expounds them and his profound disdain for any consideration drawn from common sense -

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one of his English disciples has aptly said that Hegel seeks "to enlighten by provoking us"l - his deductions often lay bare the true and hidden motives of our thoughts.

A philosophy is an attempt to reconcile us with ourselves or, if one prefers, given that our reason is what it is, to reconcile the "realities" that assail us from various sides. Thus it has value above all in terms of the whole, the system, and one cannot profitably criticize it or attack it except by considering the system in its totality, at least by its main features. Now that is not at all what we try to do insofar as Hegel's system is concerned; on the contrary, we study only a strictly limited part of it from a particular point of view. In other words, we in no way pretend to have refuted him. In the pages that follow, the reader will no doubt find more than one passage that might seem to suggest a pretension of this sort; but that is a simple lack of perspective, so to speak, which we have not been able to rectify. We mean to set it right here, once and for all, by begging the reader to add the necessary reservations wherever they seem indicated. Repeating them each time would have been tedious and would only have further complicated a subject already sufficiently difficult to elucidate.

The same remarks are at least as applicable for other writers we mention in the course of our work. The reader familiar with these great names will sometimes think our portraits of these men bear little resemblance to those he remembers from his studies, that our treatment in a manner of speaking deforms these figures by too one-sided a vision, by the bias of an artificial perspective that distorts the proportions, exaggerat-ing one particular trait, generally considered secondary, at the expense of what the best critics deem the most essential content of the doctrine. But these are not after all meant to be mirror images. To use a metaphor borrowed from the world of art, we do not intend to shape figures in the round; what we want, rather, is to make a rough sketch that captures an attitude toward this problem of scientific explanation, which is the only thing that interests us here. We thus dare lay claim to some indulgence on the part of the reader and beg him not be too quick to condemn us if, at first glance, the gesture seems exaggerated, overstated - as in the outline of a Quaternary animal or in a Japanese drawing. Even the titles of our chapters are sometimes more elliptical than a title has the right to be. When he reads 'Hegel, Descartes and Kant,' the reader will kindly remember that we shall by no means study the relations between these three thinkers in general; rather we shall limit ourself to comparing their epistemologies and, in particular, the way in which they considered the

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explanation of the physical phenomenon, especially insofar as this conception seems likely to cast light on the attitude of contemporary science.

Our book, as the title indicates, is based on a theory of science. Consequently, when we venture beyond this, onto the terrain of pure metaphysics, it is always the conceptions of science that provide our starting points and our supporting evidence, and, insofar as possible, we consider everything from this perspective. Thus, when we refute this or that doctrine, when we declare it inadmissible, what we really mean is that it could not be reconciled with the way in which science considers these matters. Now there do exist other "realities" than those of the material world and of science - the English neo-Hegelians in particular never tire of insisting on this point, and with good reason. And since, on the other hand, our reason never fully resigns itself to not understanding, the efforts of a monistic metaphysics, one that seeks to conceptualize the world from a single point of view, are and always will be ageless. We do not at all aspire to put an end to them - even if they should plunge into the paths of romantic idealism, indeed even into those of Hegelianism. We only wish to make as clear as possible to future creators of systems the obstacles they will have to overcome, and our highest ambition will have been fulfilled if our works are recognized as being a part of the prolegomena to any future metaphysics.

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In view of the close connection between the present work and our previous book, we are frequently obliged to refer the reader to the latter. In other cases we have felt the need to summarize briefly what we had presented there and finally, in a few cases, especially when we found it necessary to add new developments to these earlier treatments, we were able to find no better alternative than to reproduce passages almost word for word. We apologize for this, as well as for the unavoidable disparity in the procedures we have used here.

Nor have we been able to avoid a multiplicity of citations and references, any more than we could in our earlier book for that matter; they constitute a necessary evil in a study where one means to seek the inner mechanism of thought by examining the thought of others and its historical evolution. This is especially true because, since our point of view differs from that generally taken by historians of science and of

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philosophy, and since our attention is frequently drawn to questions that did not interest them much at all, we are, in cases of this sort, forced to go beyond textbooks and resumes to the original works themselves. Here erudition is not an extraneous matter nor a vain ornament; it is an integral part of the very substance of the search.

We also realize that the history of the sciences, as we are obliged to present it, will appear chaotic and disconcerting. Indeed, it is not possible to recount it in any continuous way; nevertheless, we have tried to do so in Appendix 2, with regard to a precise moment in the evolution of chemistry, and there the reader will see what led us to make this excep-tion. But everywhere else historical detail is cited only as an illustration of the working of this or that deep-seated reasoning process. Now these processes, which we have done our utmost to isolate, constantly combine with one another in real thought processes, so that a given phase of history is capable of providing examples of quite distinct mental ten-dencies. Therefore the reader will frequently have the impression of hearing the same things discussed in very different tenns. Obviously that is also an unavoidable drawback of the method we have chosen. If it is even more noticeable here than in our previous work, it is because we mean to go somewhat more deeply into the procedures of scientific thought and to analyze them more thoroughly, so that we are forced by that very fact to show that these procedures are more tightly intertwined.

The present book incorporates (in Chs. 1 and 15) a large part of the work published in the Revue de meta physique et de morale 23 (January 1916) under the title 'La Science et les systemes philosophiques.'

In preparing the present work for publication, we have received evidence of esteem and friendship which we could not value more highly. Andre Lalande and Desire Roustan both consented to read over our manuscript in its entirety and have provided extremely important critical commentary from which we have done our best to profit. Leon Robin kindly helped us with the interpretation of Plato's texts. May we express our gratitude to them here.

July 1920 EMILE MEYERSON

NOTE

1. [James Hutchison Stirling, The Secret of Hegel (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1898), p. xlix.]