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FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD
PROGRAMS
US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General
Report 14-34 September 2014
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires that Inspectors General conduct periodic assessments of charge card programs to identify and analyze risks of illegal improper or erroneous purchases and payments1 Generally the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector Generalrsquos (OIG) review found that these risks particularly regarding liability for costs resulting from employee misuse are higher to the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) for charge cards that are centrally-billed to the Department and relatively lower for charge card products that are billed to individual cardholders Our review also identified specific areas relating to charge cards where we believe the Department should take action to reduce its risks of illegal improper or erroneous purchases and payments including cardholder misuse
To perform this assessment we reviewed Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) policies and procedures as well as sample transactions relating to four different types of charge card purchasing methods covered by this report (1) purchase cards which are generally centrally billed accounts used to buy items and services (2) travel cards which are usually individually billed accounts used by employees to pay for costs associated with official travel (3) integrated cards which can be a combination of charge card types (purchase and travel) in a single account and (4) convenience checks which can be written from specially-designated purchase or integrated card accounts to pay for goods and services from vendors that do not accept charge cards
We found that in fiscal year (FY) 2013 the Departmentrsquos 47000 active purchase integrated and travel charge card accounts processed more than $900 million in procurement Purchase cards accounted for about $700 million (75 percent) of the total dollar amount travel cards accounted for more than 33000 (70 percent) of the total number of active charge card accounts
Regarding centrally-billed purchase travel and integrated cards our testing did not reveal specific instances of misuse However we identified more than 640 purchase travel and integrated card accounts that had recorded no charges for at least 180 days and therefore should be suspended or closed DOJ has closed most of the inactive purchase card accounts and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) told us that it reviewed the inactive integrated card accounts and suspended or closed those that were unnecessary We also found that the Departmentrsquos efforts to ensure regular reconciliations of purchase cards could be improved as could its efforts to ensure proper training regarding integrated and travel card accounts With respect to the purchasing methods included in this assessment centrally-billed card accounts present a relatively moderate risk for misuse that we believe will be largely mitigated once corrective action is taken to address the issues raised in this risk assessment
1 Pub L No 112-194 (2012)
i
Regarding individually-billed travel card accounts although we identified specific areas in which management and oversight can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because for these accounts the individual card holder not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
While we believe convenience checks are the charge card purchasing method that presents the highest risk of misuse we also note that they are much less frequently used than the other methods we examined in FY 2013 Department employees wrote 1000 such checks for a total of just over $500000 Nevertheless our review tested 50 high-dollar convenience checks with a total value of over $132000 and identified a total of 6 checks valued at $11679 that were either unallowable or unsupported because the employee wrote a check to a vendor that accepted charge cards the employee converted a check to cash or the employeersquos component could not provide an invoice or evidence of prior supervisory approval as applicable to use a convenience check to make a purchase
Finally we found that the risks to the Department are concentrated in employee misuse and not in fraudulent transactions This is because the servicing bank and not the government is liable to pay for fraudulent transactions
Our report contains detailed information on the results of our risk assessment and provides four recommendations to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to improve internal controls and help reduce the risk of fraud waste and misuse associated with charge cards
ii
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1
DOJ Charge Card Activity and Oversight 1
Risk Assessment Approach 2
Purchase Cards 3
Purchase Card Reconciliations 5
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts 5
Integrated Cards6
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts 6
Integrated Card Training 7
Convenience Checks 7
Travel Cards8
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts 10
Travel Card Misuse 11
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts 11
Travel Card Training 12
Conclusions 12
APPENDIX I ndash JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE
APPENDIX II ndash FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE
APPENDIX III ndash BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND
APPENDIX IV ndash OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND
Recommendations13
DRAFT REPORT 14
DRAFT REPORT 16
EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 18
SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT 19
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
Introduction
The Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) uses charge cards to procure goods and services Each DOJ component is responsible for maintaining internal controls that reduce the risk of fraud waste and misuse associated with charge cards The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires that federal agencies establish and maintain specific safeguards and internal controls to improve their charge card and convenience check programs1
In addition the Charge Card Act requires that Inspectors General conduct periodic risk assessments of agency purchase card or convenience check programs and periodic audits or reviews of travel card programs to analyze risks of illegal improper or erroneous purchases and payments
The Charge Card Act addresses four primary types of government purchasing methods relating to charge cards covered by this report (1) purchase cards which are generally centrally billed accounts used to buy items and services (2) travel cards which are usually individually billed accounts used by employees to pay for costs associated with official travel (3) integrated cards which can be a combination of charge card types (purchase and travel) in a single account and (4) convenience checks which can be written from specially-designated purchase or integrated card accounts to pay for goods and services from vendors that do not accept charge cards2
DOJ Charge Card Activity and Oversight
At the end of fiscal year (FY) 2013 DOJ had 9298 active purchase card accounts that reported over $705 million in activity during the fiscal year At the same time DOJ had 33249 active travel card accounts with over $194 million in activity and 3984 active integrated card accounts with over $38 million in activity In addition 85 DOJ employees had the authority to use convenience checks and wrote 1000 checks valued at more than $513000
Charge card programs require vigilant oversight to ensure the programrsquos integrity ensure the proper use of charge cards and reduce the risk of misuse to the agency Besides the card holders themselves other employees have been designated important charge card program oversight responsibilities
1 Pub L No 112-194 (2012)
2 Throughout FY 2013 JPMorgan Chase serviced the charge card program for the Department of Justice
Agency Program Coordinator DOJ and each component have at least one agency program coordinator (APC) with the ultimate responsibility of overseeing charge card programs and implementing policies and procedures governing charge card use APCs maintain access to all activity posted to individual charge card accounts through PaymentNet an online system provided by the servicing bank APCs serve as the primary liaison between their component and the charge card servicing bank and collect and transmit data regarding charge card use to DOJ and component leadership
Travel or Purchase Card Coordinator These employees assist the APC by regularly reviewing account activity reports to identify instances of potential purchase or travel card misuse
Approving Officials Approving officials are usually supervisors at the office or district level that must authorize charges before they are incurred and review monthly purchase card reconciliations and travel vouchers
Despite an inherent risk for misuse charge card programs offer an efficient method to purchase items and make payments With this understanding the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that federal agencies maximize charge card use to the extent practicable3 The Justice Management Division (JMD) which implements DOJ purchase and travel card policies has directed that all components try to use charge cards whenever possible in lieu of issuing purchase orders or relying on convenience checks or other third party drafts
Regardless of the type of purchasing method the servicing bank and not the government is liable to pay for fraudulent transactions In contrast the Departmentrsquos responsibility to pay for charges resulting from employee misuse largely depends on whether a particular account is centrally billed to the Department or individually billed to the cardholder For centrally billed accounts which include most purchase cards and some integrated cards the Department directly pays all charges on the account even if the charge constituted misuse4 For individually-billed accounts which include most travel cards and the integrated cards that are not centrally billed the cardholders are responsible to pay the balance of the accounts when they receive their monthly statements
Risk Assessment Approach
The objective of this risk assessment of DOJ charge cards was to address the Charge Card Act requirement to analyze the risk of illegal improper or erroneous charge card purchases and payments To conduct our review we applied the
3 See 48 CFR sect 13003(e) (2014) (pertaining to simplified acquisitions)
4 5 CFR sect1315 (2014) Centrally billed accounts are reconciled monthly The Department seeks to recoup the money of an erroneous or improper charge from card holders In addition an employee who abuses charge cards may be disciplined
2
internal control assessment framework promulgated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission5
To perform this assessment the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed Department-level policies and procedures in effect throughout FY 2013 When appropriate we relied upon the results of charge card program reviews that JMD performed as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123 Managements Responsibility for Internal Control We considered other component activity in two specific areas (1) for integrated cards we reviewed how the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) managed and used integrated cards because it is the only DOJ component to use integrated cards and (2) for convenience checks we assessed ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activity because these two components were responsible for issuing over 99 percent of convenience checks during FY 2013
Using the criteria identified in the Charge Card Act we assessed activity to determine whether safeguards and internal controls were present and functioned as intended In addition we reviewed the annual purchase and travel card audit status report to OMB to determine the impact of prior audit findings on DOJ charge card programs
Purchase Cards
Purchase cards are a primary procurement method DOJ uses to acquire goods and services Each DOJ purchase card account has a single transaction limit (usually $3000 for goods and $2500 for services) and monthly purchase limits Generally purchase card accounts are centrally billed and a component pays account balances automatically Exhibit 1 outlines the general steps that JMD purchase card account guidelines state need to be performed for every purchase card transaction
5 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control ndash Integrated Framework (May 2013) COSO is a joint initiative of five private sector organizations and is dedicated to providing leadership through the development of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management internal control and fraud deterrence
3
EXHIBIT 1 PURCHASE CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD purchase card policies
Each purchase must be approved by an approving official and obligated by a budget officer before the card holder can use a purchase card to buy a needed good or service Department-level charge card policies state that purchase card holders may be held personally liable for purchase card misuse
For this portion of our assessment we reviewed guidelines and procedures effective as of the end of FY 2013 and the results of JMDrsquos internal control assessment performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 We also analyzed a universe of nearly 300000 purchase card transactions (all DOJ purchase card activity between June 1 2013 and September 30 2013) and scored and ranked transactions to identify those with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous6
Our analysis and scoring of purchase card transactions identified 84 transactions across the Department most at risk of being illegal improper or
6 The scoring system methodology added a point to each transaction with the following elements (1) having a suspicious merchant name or merchant category code (2) processed using a mobile payment system such as Square (3) occurring on only one purchase card using a mobile payment system (4) occurring on a weekend (5) made using a convenience check (6) constituted a cash advance (7) exceeded the accountrsquos single purchase limit (8) totaled an even-dollar amount
4
erroneous and therefore meriting further review We contacted component-level APCs and requested the supporting documents related to the identified transactions The APCs provided supporting documents showing that the transactions were appropriate and received the required prior approval and that card holders complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Purchase Card Reconciliations
Purchase card statements must be reconciled by the card holder and reviewed by the approving official before the end of each month An adequate reconciliation includes a line-by-line review of all transactions on the monthly statement Each transaction must be supported by as applicable the purchase card transaction form showing prior approval and obligation of funds needed to pay for the purchase a receiving report and the invoice Approving officials are responsible for maintaining reconciled monthly statements As part of the OMB Circular A-123 review JMD found that purchase card holders did not always perform or approving officials did not review and maintain monthly reconciliations7
Because components automatically pay outstanding purchase card balances card holders and approving officials need to reconcile and review monthly statements carefully to ensure that the Department only pays for goods and services actually received We recommend that JMD periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account These reminders should reiterate that purchase card holders and approving officials can be held personally liable for improper purchases
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts
Inactive purchase card accounts that remain open for an extended period of time are susceptible to an increased risk of potential loss or misuse We reviewed account activity to identify specific inactive accounts
Our sample of purchase card account activity identified more than 200 DOJ purchase card accounts inactive for either more than 180 days or 365 days8 We note however that our sample covered the time period during the 2013 federal budget sequestration which likely limited purchase card activity across the Department and increased the number of inactive accounts
7 The results of JMDrsquos review of its purchase card reconciliations align with the findings of two previous OIG audit reports that identified instances in which approving officials at another DOJ component did not review card holder reconciliations US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit of the Financial Management of the United States Marshals Servicersquos Office in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Audit Report 13-24 (June 2013) and Audit of the United States Marshals Services Procurement Activities Audit Report 13-05 (December 2012)
8 Depending on the component a purchase card account is considered inactive if the account has remained unused for either more than 180 days or more than 365 days Our testing applied the same baseline of inactivity that the specific component used to define an inactive account
5
Additionally since the time of our review DOJ components have closed most of the inactive accounts we identified as required by the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan9
Among the more than 200 inactive purchase card accounts we identified were 6 non-JMD accounts that were unused because the card holder was no longer an employee or was on extended leave Although DOJ has since closed these six accounts we recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that the appropriate purchase card APCs receive notification when an employee with a purchase card leaves employment and promptly cancels all associated purchase card accounts
Integrated Cards
ATF uses integrated cards which can be used for different types of transactions (such as purchases or travel) depending on the designation of the account ATF policies and procedures delineate the types of purchases card holders may make based on that employeersquos official duties Integrated cards may be individually billed to the card holder or centrally billed to the agency depending on the merchant category code of the purchase Regardless of whether the account is individually or centrally billed the card holders are individually responsible for all transactions appearing on their account
Similar to our assessment of purchase cards we reviewed ATF integrated card use guidelines and procedures in effect during FY 2013 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of ATFrsquos integrated cards performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 To a universe of over 376000 integrated card transactions we applied the same methodology we used for the purchase card review to score and rank transactions with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous Although we did not identify any specific transaction to be at exceptionally high risk we judgmentally sampled transactions in the five integrated card accounts that recorded the most activity and determined that the card holders received the required prior approval and complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts
ATFrsquos Card Services Unit (CSU) assesses the appropriateness of card holder limits and opens suspends and cancels integrated card accounts In February 2013 CSU began receiving notices from PaymentNet regarding accounts with no transaction activity for 180 days Upon receiving this notification CSU officials told us that they follow up with the card holder to determine why there has been no account activity and depending on the reason provided CSU suspends or closes the account
9 The 2014 DOJ Charge Card Management Plan requires accounts that have been inactive for more than 365 days to be cancelled unless there is a business need to maintain the account and it remains in suspended status The final decision is made by the APC
6
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
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15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires that Inspectors General conduct periodic assessments of charge card programs to identify and analyze risks of illegal improper or erroneous purchases and payments1 Generally the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector Generalrsquos (OIG) review found that these risks particularly regarding liability for costs resulting from employee misuse are higher to the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) for charge cards that are centrally-billed to the Department and relatively lower for charge card products that are billed to individual cardholders Our review also identified specific areas relating to charge cards where we believe the Department should take action to reduce its risks of illegal improper or erroneous purchases and payments including cardholder misuse
To perform this assessment we reviewed Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) policies and procedures as well as sample transactions relating to four different types of charge card purchasing methods covered by this report (1) purchase cards which are generally centrally billed accounts used to buy items and services (2) travel cards which are usually individually billed accounts used by employees to pay for costs associated with official travel (3) integrated cards which can be a combination of charge card types (purchase and travel) in a single account and (4) convenience checks which can be written from specially-designated purchase or integrated card accounts to pay for goods and services from vendors that do not accept charge cards
We found that in fiscal year (FY) 2013 the Departmentrsquos 47000 active purchase integrated and travel charge card accounts processed more than $900 million in procurement Purchase cards accounted for about $700 million (75 percent) of the total dollar amount travel cards accounted for more than 33000 (70 percent) of the total number of active charge card accounts
Regarding centrally-billed purchase travel and integrated cards our testing did not reveal specific instances of misuse However we identified more than 640 purchase travel and integrated card accounts that had recorded no charges for at least 180 days and therefore should be suspended or closed DOJ has closed most of the inactive purchase card accounts and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) told us that it reviewed the inactive integrated card accounts and suspended or closed those that were unnecessary We also found that the Departmentrsquos efforts to ensure regular reconciliations of purchase cards could be improved as could its efforts to ensure proper training regarding integrated and travel card accounts With respect to the purchasing methods included in this assessment centrally-billed card accounts present a relatively moderate risk for misuse that we believe will be largely mitigated once corrective action is taken to address the issues raised in this risk assessment
1 Pub L No 112-194 (2012)
i
Regarding individually-billed travel card accounts although we identified specific areas in which management and oversight can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because for these accounts the individual card holder not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
While we believe convenience checks are the charge card purchasing method that presents the highest risk of misuse we also note that they are much less frequently used than the other methods we examined in FY 2013 Department employees wrote 1000 such checks for a total of just over $500000 Nevertheless our review tested 50 high-dollar convenience checks with a total value of over $132000 and identified a total of 6 checks valued at $11679 that were either unallowable or unsupported because the employee wrote a check to a vendor that accepted charge cards the employee converted a check to cash or the employeersquos component could not provide an invoice or evidence of prior supervisory approval as applicable to use a convenience check to make a purchase
Finally we found that the risks to the Department are concentrated in employee misuse and not in fraudulent transactions This is because the servicing bank and not the government is liable to pay for fraudulent transactions
Our report contains detailed information on the results of our risk assessment and provides four recommendations to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to improve internal controls and help reduce the risk of fraud waste and misuse associated with charge cards
ii
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1
DOJ Charge Card Activity and Oversight 1
Risk Assessment Approach 2
Purchase Cards 3
Purchase Card Reconciliations 5
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts 5
Integrated Cards6
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts 6
Integrated Card Training 7
Convenience Checks 7
Travel Cards8
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts 10
Travel Card Misuse 11
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts 11
Travel Card Training 12
Conclusions 12
APPENDIX I ndash JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE
APPENDIX II ndash FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE
APPENDIX III ndash BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND
APPENDIX IV ndash OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND
Recommendations13
DRAFT REPORT 14
DRAFT REPORT 16
EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 18
SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT 19
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
Introduction
The Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) uses charge cards to procure goods and services Each DOJ component is responsible for maintaining internal controls that reduce the risk of fraud waste and misuse associated with charge cards The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires that federal agencies establish and maintain specific safeguards and internal controls to improve their charge card and convenience check programs1
In addition the Charge Card Act requires that Inspectors General conduct periodic risk assessments of agency purchase card or convenience check programs and periodic audits or reviews of travel card programs to analyze risks of illegal improper or erroneous purchases and payments
The Charge Card Act addresses four primary types of government purchasing methods relating to charge cards covered by this report (1) purchase cards which are generally centrally billed accounts used to buy items and services (2) travel cards which are usually individually billed accounts used by employees to pay for costs associated with official travel (3) integrated cards which can be a combination of charge card types (purchase and travel) in a single account and (4) convenience checks which can be written from specially-designated purchase or integrated card accounts to pay for goods and services from vendors that do not accept charge cards2
DOJ Charge Card Activity and Oversight
At the end of fiscal year (FY) 2013 DOJ had 9298 active purchase card accounts that reported over $705 million in activity during the fiscal year At the same time DOJ had 33249 active travel card accounts with over $194 million in activity and 3984 active integrated card accounts with over $38 million in activity In addition 85 DOJ employees had the authority to use convenience checks and wrote 1000 checks valued at more than $513000
Charge card programs require vigilant oversight to ensure the programrsquos integrity ensure the proper use of charge cards and reduce the risk of misuse to the agency Besides the card holders themselves other employees have been designated important charge card program oversight responsibilities
1 Pub L No 112-194 (2012)
2 Throughout FY 2013 JPMorgan Chase serviced the charge card program for the Department of Justice
Agency Program Coordinator DOJ and each component have at least one agency program coordinator (APC) with the ultimate responsibility of overseeing charge card programs and implementing policies and procedures governing charge card use APCs maintain access to all activity posted to individual charge card accounts through PaymentNet an online system provided by the servicing bank APCs serve as the primary liaison between their component and the charge card servicing bank and collect and transmit data regarding charge card use to DOJ and component leadership
Travel or Purchase Card Coordinator These employees assist the APC by regularly reviewing account activity reports to identify instances of potential purchase or travel card misuse
Approving Officials Approving officials are usually supervisors at the office or district level that must authorize charges before they are incurred and review monthly purchase card reconciliations and travel vouchers
Despite an inherent risk for misuse charge card programs offer an efficient method to purchase items and make payments With this understanding the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that federal agencies maximize charge card use to the extent practicable3 The Justice Management Division (JMD) which implements DOJ purchase and travel card policies has directed that all components try to use charge cards whenever possible in lieu of issuing purchase orders or relying on convenience checks or other third party drafts
Regardless of the type of purchasing method the servicing bank and not the government is liable to pay for fraudulent transactions In contrast the Departmentrsquos responsibility to pay for charges resulting from employee misuse largely depends on whether a particular account is centrally billed to the Department or individually billed to the cardholder For centrally billed accounts which include most purchase cards and some integrated cards the Department directly pays all charges on the account even if the charge constituted misuse4 For individually-billed accounts which include most travel cards and the integrated cards that are not centrally billed the cardholders are responsible to pay the balance of the accounts when they receive their monthly statements
Risk Assessment Approach
The objective of this risk assessment of DOJ charge cards was to address the Charge Card Act requirement to analyze the risk of illegal improper or erroneous charge card purchases and payments To conduct our review we applied the
3 See 48 CFR sect 13003(e) (2014) (pertaining to simplified acquisitions)
4 5 CFR sect1315 (2014) Centrally billed accounts are reconciled monthly The Department seeks to recoup the money of an erroneous or improper charge from card holders In addition an employee who abuses charge cards may be disciplined
2
internal control assessment framework promulgated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission5
To perform this assessment the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed Department-level policies and procedures in effect throughout FY 2013 When appropriate we relied upon the results of charge card program reviews that JMD performed as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123 Managements Responsibility for Internal Control We considered other component activity in two specific areas (1) for integrated cards we reviewed how the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) managed and used integrated cards because it is the only DOJ component to use integrated cards and (2) for convenience checks we assessed ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activity because these two components were responsible for issuing over 99 percent of convenience checks during FY 2013
Using the criteria identified in the Charge Card Act we assessed activity to determine whether safeguards and internal controls were present and functioned as intended In addition we reviewed the annual purchase and travel card audit status report to OMB to determine the impact of prior audit findings on DOJ charge card programs
Purchase Cards
Purchase cards are a primary procurement method DOJ uses to acquire goods and services Each DOJ purchase card account has a single transaction limit (usually $3000 for goods and $2500 for services) and monthly purchase limits Generally purchase card accounts are centrally billed and a component pays account balances automatically Exhibit 1 outlines the general steps that JMD purchase card account guidelines state need to be performed for every purchase card transaction
5 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control ndash Integrated Framework (May 2013) COSO is a joint initiative of five private sector organizations and is dedicated to providing leadership through the development of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management internal control and fraud deterrence
3
EXHIBIT 1 PURCHASE CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD purchase card policies
Each purchase must be approved by an approving official and obligated by a budget officer before the card holder can use a purchase card to buy a needed good or service Department-level charge card policies state that purchase card holders may be held personally liable for purchase card misuse
For this portion of our assessment we reviewed guidelines and procedures effective as of the end of FY 2013 and the results of JMDrsquos internal control assessment performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 We also analyzed a universe of nearly 300000 purchase card transactions (all DOJ purchase card activity between June 1 2013 and September 30 2013) and scored and ranked transactions to identify those with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous6
Our analysis and scoring of purchase card transactions identified 84 transactions across the Department most at risk of being illegal improper or
6 The scoring system methodology added a point to each transaction with the following elements (1) having a suspicious merchant name or merchant category code (2) processed using a mobile payment system such as Square (3) occurring on only one purchase card using a mobile payment system (4) occurring on a weekend (5) made using a convenience check (6) constituted a cash advance (7) exceeded the accountrsquos single purchase limit (8) totaled an even-dollar amount
4
erroneous and therefore meriting further review We contacted component-level APCs and requested the supporting documents related to the identified transactions The APCs provided supporting documents showing that the transactions were appropriate and received the required prior approval and that card holders complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Purchase Card Reconciliations
Purchase card statements must be reconciled by the card holder and reviewed by the approving official before the end of each month An adequate reconciliation includes a line-by-line review of all transactions on the monthly statement Each transaction must be supported by as applicable the purchase card transaction form showing prior approval and obligation of funds needed to pay for the purchase a receiving report and the invoice Approving officials are responsible for maintaining reconciled monthly statements As part of the OMB Circular A-123 review JMD found that purchase card holders did not always perform or approving officials did not review and maintain monthly reconciliations7
Because components automatically pay outstanding purchase card balances card holders and approving officials need to reconcile and review monthly statements carefully to ensure that the Department only pays for goods and services actually received We recommend that JMD periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account These reminders should reiterate that purchase card holders and approving officials can be held personally liable for improper purchases
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts
Inactive purchase card accounts that remain open for an extended period of time are susceptible to an increased risk of potential loss or misuse We reviewed account activity to identify specific inactive accounts
Our sample of purchase card account activity identified more than 200 DOJ purchase card accounts inactive for either more than 180 days or 365 days8 We note however that our sample covered the time period during the 2013 federal budget sequestration which likely limited purchase card activity across the Department and increased the number of inactive accounts
7 The results of JMDrsquos review of its purchase card reconciliations align with the findings of two previous OIG audit reports that identified instances in which approving officials at another DOJ component did not review card holder reconciliations US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit of the Financial Management of the United States Marshals Servicersquos Office in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Audit Report 13-24 (June 2013) and Audit of the United States Marshals Services Procurement Activities Audit Report 13-05 (December 2012)
8 Depending on the component a purchase card account is considered inactive if the account has remained unused for either more than 180 days or more than 365 days Our testing applied the same baseline of inactivity that the specific component used to define an inactive account
5
Additionally since the time of our review DOJ components have closed most of the inactive accounts we identified as required by the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan9
Among the more than 200 inactive purchase card accounts we identified were 6 non-JMD accounts that were unused because the card holder was no longer an employee or was on extended leave Although DOJ has since closed these six accounts we recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that the appropriate purchase card APCs receive notification when an employee with a purchase card leaves employment and promptly cancels all associated purchase card accounts
Integrated Cards
ATF uses integrated cards which can be used for different types of transactions (such as purchases or travel) depending on the designation of the account ATF policies and procedures delineate the types of purchases card holders may make based on that employeersquos official duties Integrated cards may be individually billed to the card holder or centrally billed to the agency depending on the merchant category code of the purchase Regardless of whether the account is individually or centrally billed the card holders are individually responsible for all transactions appearing on their account
Similar to our assessment of purchase cards we reviewed ATF integrated card use guidelines and procedures in effect during FY 2013 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of ATFrsquos integrated cards performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 To a universe of over 376000 integrated card transactions we applied the same methodology we used for the purchase card review to score and rank transactions with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous Although we did not identify any specific transaction to be at exceptionally high risk we judgmentally sampled transactions in the five integrated card accounts that recorded the most activity and determined that the card holders received the required prior approval and complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts
ATFrsquos Card Services Unit (CSU) assesses the appropriateness of card holder limits and opens suspends and cancels integrated card accounts In February 2013 CSU began receiving notices from PaymentNet regarding accounts with no transaction activity for 180 days Upon receiving this notification CSU officials told us that they follow up with the card holder to determine why there has been no account activity and depending on the reason provided CSU suspends or closes the account
9 The 2014 DOJ Charge Card Management Plan requires accounts that have been inactive for more than 365 days to be cancelled unless there is a business need to maintain the account and it remains in suspended status The final decision is made by the APC
6
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
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15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
Regarding individually-billed travel card accounts although we identified specific areas in which management and oversight can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because for these accounts the individual card holder not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
While we believe convenience checks are the charge card purchasing method that presents the highest risk of misuse we also note that they are much less frequently used than the other methods we examined in FY 2013 Department employees wrote 1000 such checks for a total of just over $500000 Nevertheless our review tested 50 high-dollar convenience checks with a total value of over $132000 and identified a total of 6 checks valued at $11679 that were either unallowable or unsupported because the employee wrote a check to a vendor that accepted charge cards the employee converted a check to cash or the employeersquos component could not provide an invoice or evidence of prior supervisory approval as applicable to use a convenience check to make a purchase
Finally we found that the risks to the Department are concentrated in employee misuse and not in fraudulent transactions This is because the servicing bank and not the government is liable to pay for fraudulent transactions
Our report contains detailed information on the results of our risk assessment and provides four recommendations to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to improve internal controls and help reduce the risk of fraud waste and misuse associated with charge cards
ii
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1
DOJ Charge Card Activity and Oversight 1
Risk Assessment Approach 2
Purchase Cards 3
Purchase Card Reconciliations 5
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts 5
Integrated Cards6
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts 6
Integrated Card Training 7
Convenience Checks 7
Travel Cards8
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts 10
Travel Card Misuse 11
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts 11
Travel Card Training 12
Conclusions 12
APPENDIX I ndash JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE
APPENDIX II ndash FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE
APPENDIX III ndash BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND
APPENDIX IV ndash OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND
Recommendations13
DRAFT REPORT 14
DRAFT REPORT 16
EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 18
SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT 19
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
Introduction
The Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) uses charge cards to procure goods and services Each DOJ component is responsible for maintaining internal controls that reduce the risk of fraud waste and misuse associated with charge cards The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires that federal agencies establish and maintain specific safeguards and internal controls to improve their charge card and convenience check programs1
In addition the Charge Card Act requires that Inspectors General conduct periodic risk assessments of agency purchase card or convenience check programs and periodic audits or reviews of travel card programs to analyze risks of illegal improper or erroneous purchases and payments
The Charge Card Act addresses four primary types of government purchasing methods relating to charge cards covered by this report (1) purchase cards which are generally centrally billed accounts used to buy items and services (2) travel cards which are usually individually billed accounts used by employees to pay for costs associated with official travel (3) integrated cards which can be a combination of charge card types (purchase and travel) in a single account and (4) convenience checks which can be written from specially-designated purchase or integrated card accounts to pay for goods and services from vendors that do not accept charge cards2
DOJ Charge Card Activity and Oversight
At the end of fiscal year (FY) 2013 DOJ had 9298 active purchase card accounts that reported over $705 million in activity during the fiscal year At the same time DOJ had 33249 active travel card accounts with over $194 million in activity and 3984 active integrated card accounts with over $38 million in activity In addition 85 DOJ employees had the authority to use convenience checks and wrote 1000 checks valued at more than $513000
Charge card programs require vigilant oversight to ensure the programrsquos integrity ensure the proper use of charge cards and reduce the risk of misuse to the agency Besides the card holders themselves other employees have been designated important charge card program oversight responsibilities
1 Pub L No 112-194 (2012)
2 Throughout FY 2013 JPMorgan Chase serviced the charge card program for the Department of Justice
Agency Program Coordinator DOJ and each component have at least one agency program coordinator (APC) with the ultimate responsibility of overseeing charge card programs and implementing policies and procedures governing charge card use APCs maintain access to all activity posted to individual charge card accounts through PaymentNet an online system provided by the servicing bank APCs serve as the primary liaison between their component and the charge card servicing bank and collect and transmit data regarding charge card use to DOJ and component leadership
Travel or Purchase Card Coordinator These employees assist the APC by regularly reviewing account activity reports to identify instances of potential purchase or travel card misuse
Approving Officials Approving officials are usually supervisors at the office or district level that must authorize charges before they are incurred and review monthly purchase card reconciliations and travel vouchers
Despite an inherent risk for misuse charge card programs offer an efficient method to purchase items and make payments With this understanding the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that federal agencies maximize charge card use to the extent practicable3 The Justice Management Division (JMD) which implements DOJ purchase and travel card policies has directed that all components try to use charge cards whenever possible in lieu of issuing purchase orders or relying on convenience checks or other third party drafts
Regardless of the type of purchasing method the servicing bank and not the government is liable to pay for fraudulent transactions In contrast the Departmentrsquos responsibility to pay for charges resulting from employee misuse largely depends on whether a particular account is centrally billed to the Department or individually billed to the cardholder For centrally billed accounts which include most purchase cards and some integrated cards the Department directly pays all charges on the account even if the charge constituted misuse4 For individually-billed accounts which include most travel cards and the integrated cards that are not centrally billed the cardholders are responsible to pay the balance of the accounts when they receive their monthly statements
Risk Assessment Approach
The objective of this risk assessment of DOJ charge cards was to address the Charge Card Act requirement to analyze the risk of illegal improper or erroneous charge card purchases and payments To conduct our review we applied the
3 See 48 CFR sect 13003(e) (2014) (pertaining to simplified acquisitions)
4 5 CFR sect1315 (2014) Centrally billed accounts are reconciled monthly The Department seeks to recoup the money of an erroneous or improper charge from card holders In addition an employee who abuses charge cards may be disciplined
2
internal control assessment framework promulgated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission5
To perform this assessment the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed Department-level policies and procedures in effect throughout FY 2013 When appropriate we relied upon the results of charge card program reviews that JMD performed as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123 Managements Responsibility for Internal Control We considered other component activity in two specific areas (1) for integrated cards we reviewed how the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) managed and used integrated cards because it is the only DOJ component to use integrated cards and (2) for convenience checks we assessed ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activity because these two components were responsible for issuing over 99 percent of convenience checks during FY 2013
Using the criteria identified in the Charge Card Act we assessed activity to determine whether safeguards and internal controls were present and functioned as intended In addition we reviewed the annual purchase and travel card audit status report to OMB to determine the impact of prior audit findings on DOJ charge card programs
Purchase Cards
Purchase cards are a primary procurement method DOJ uses to acquire goods and services Each DOJ purchase card account has a single transaction limit (usually $3000 for goods and $2500 for services) and monthly purchase limits Generally purchase card accounts are centrally billed and a component pays account balances automatically Exhibit 1 outlines the general steps that JMD purchase card account guidelines state need to be performed for every purchase card transaction
5 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control ndash Integrated Framework (May 2013) COSO is a joint initiative of five private sector organizations and is dedicated to providing leadership through the development of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management internal control and fraud deterrence
3
EXHIBIT 1 PURCHASE CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD purchase card policies
Each purchase must be approved by an approving official and obligated by a budget officer before the card holder can use a purchase card to buy a needed good or service Department-level charge card policies state that purchase card holders may be held personally liable for purchase card misuse
For this portion of our assessment we reviewed guidelines and procedures effective as of the end of FY 2013 and the results of JMDrsquos internal control assessment performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 We also analyzed a universe of nearly 300000 purchase card transactions (all DOJ purchase card activity between June 1 2013 and September 30 2013) and scored and ranked transactions to identify those with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous6
Our analysis and scoring of purchase card transactions identified 84 transactions across the Department most at risk of being illegal improper or
6 The scoring system methodology added a point to each transaction with the following elements (1) having a suspicious merchant name or merchant category code (2) processed using a mobile payment system such as Square (3) occurring on only one purchase card using a mobile payment system (4) occurring on a weekend (5) made using a convenience check (6) constituted a cash advance (7) exceeded the accountrsquos single purchase limit (8) totaled an even-dollar amount
4
erroneous and therefore meriting further review We contacted component-level APCs and requested the supporting documents related to the identified transactions The APCs provided supporting documents showing that the transactions were appropriate and received the required prior approval and that card holders complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Purchase Card Reconciliations
Purchase card statements must be reconciled by the card holder and reviewed by the approving official before the end of each month An adequate reconciliation includes a line-by-line review of all transactions on the monthly statement Each transaction must be supported by as applicable the purchase card transaction form showing prior approval and obligation of funds needed to pay for the purchase a receiving report and the invoice Approving officials are responsible for maintaining reconciled monthly statements As part of the OMB Circular A-123 review JMD found that purchase card holders did not always perform or approving officials did not review and maintain monthly reconciliations7
Because components automatically pay outstanding purchase card balances card holders and approving officials need to reconcile and review monthly statements carefully to ensure that the Department only pays for goods and services actually received We recommend that JMD periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account These reminders should reiterate that purchase card holders and approving officials can be held personally liable for improper purchases
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts
Inactive purchase card accounts that remain open for an extended period of time are susceptible to an increased risk of potential loss or misuse We reviewed account activity to identify specific inactive accounts
Our sample of purchase card account activity identified more than 200 DOJ purchase card accounts inactive for either more than 180 days or 365 days8 We note however that our sample covered the time period during the 2013 federal budget sequestration which likely limited purchase card activity across the Department and increased the number of inactive accounts
7 The results of JMDrsquos review of its purchase card reconciliations align with the findings of two previous OIG audit reports that identified instances in which approving officials at another DOJ component did not review card holder reconciliations US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit of the Financial Management of the United States Marshals Servicersquos Office in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Audit Report 13-24 (June 2013) and Audit of the United States Marshals Services Procurement Activities Audit Report 13-05 (December 2012)
8 Depending on the component a purchase card account is considered inactive if the account has remained unused for either more than 180 days or more than 365 days Our testing applied the same baseline of inactivity that the specific component used to define an inactive account
5
Additionally since the time of our review DOJ components have closed most of the inactive accounts we identified as required by the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan9
Among the more than 200 inactive purchase card accounts we identified were 6 non-JMD accounts that were unused because the card holder was no longer an employee or was on extended leave Although DOJ has since closed these six accounts we recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that the appropriate purchase card APCs receive notification when an employee with a purchase card leaves employment and promptly cancels all associated purchase card accounts
Integrated Cards
ATF uses integrated cards which can be used for different types of transactions (such as purchases or travel) depending on the designation of the account ATF policies and procedures delineate the types of purchases card holders may make based on that employeersquos official duties Integrated cards may be individually billed to the card holder or centrally billed to the agency depending on the merchant category code of the purchase Regardless of whether the account is individually or centrally billed the card holders are individually responsible for all transactions appearing on their account
Similar to our assessment of purchase cards we reviewed ATF integrated card use guidelines and procedures in effect during FY 2013 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of ATFrsquos integrated cards performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 To a universe of over 376000 integrated card transactions we applied the same methodology we used for the purchase card review to score and rank transactions with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous Although we did not identify any specific transaction to be at exceptionally high risk we judgmentally sampled transactions in the five integrated card accounts that recorded the most activity and determined that the card holders received the required prior approval and complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts
ATFrsquos Card Services Unit (CSU) assesses the appropriateness of card holder limits and opens suspends and cancels integrated card accounts In February 2013 CSU began receiving notices from PaymentNet regarding accounts with no transaction activity for 180 days Upon receiving this notification CSU officials told us that they follow up with the card holder to determine why there has been no account activity and depending on the reason provided CSU suspends or closes the account
9 The 2014 DOJ Charge Card Management Plan requires accounts that have been inactive for more than 365 days to be cancelled unless there is a business need to maintain the account and it remains in suspended status The final decision is made by the APC
6
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
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It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1
DOJ Charge Card Activity and Oversight 1
Risk Assessment Approach 2
Purchase Cards 3
Purchase Card Reconciliations 5
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts 5
Integrated Cards6
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts 6
Integrated Card Training 7
Convenience Checks 7
Travel Cards8
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts 10
Travel Card Misuse 11
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts 11
Travel Card Training 12
Conclusions 12
APPENDIX I ndash JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE
APPENDIX II ndash FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE
APPENDIX III ndash BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND
APPENDIX IV ndash OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND
Recommendations13
DRAFT REPORT 14
DRAFT REPORT 16
EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 18
SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT 19
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
Introduction
The Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) uses charge cards to procure goods and services Each DOJ component is responsible for maintaining internal controls that reduce the risk of fraud waste and misuse associated with charge cards The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires that federal agencies establish and maintain specific safeguards and internal controls to improve their charge card and convenience check programs1
In addition the Charge Card Act requires that Inspectors General conduct periodic risk assessments of agency purchase card or convenience check programs and periodic audits or reviews of travel card programs to analyze risks of illegal improper or erroneous purchases and payments
The Charge Card Act addresses four primary types of government purchasing methods relating to charge cards covered by this report (1) purchase cards which are generally centrally billed accounts used to buy items and services (2) travel cards which are usually individually billed accounts used by employees to pay for costs associated with official travel (3) integrated cards which can be a combination of charge card types (purchase and travel) in a single account and (4) convenience checks which can be written from specially-designated purchase or integrated card accounts to pay for goods and services from vendors that do not accept charge cards2
DOJ Charge Card Activity and Oversight
At the end of fiscal year (FY) 2013 DOJ had 9298 active purchase card accounts that reported over $705 million in activity during the fiscal year At the same time DOJ had 33249 active travel card accounts with over $194 million in activity and 3984 active integrated card accounts with over $38 million in activity In addition 85 DOJ employees had the authority to use convenience checks and wrote 1000 checks valued at more than $513000
Charge card programs require vigilant oversight to ensure the programrsquos integrity ensure the proper use of charge cards and reduce the risk of misuse to the agency Besides the card holders themselves other employees have been designated important charge card program oversight responsibilities
1 Pub L No 112-194 (2012)
2 Throughout FY 2013 JPMorgan Chase serviced the charge card program for the Department of Justice
Agency Program Coordinator DOJ and each component have at least one agency program coordinator (APC) with the ultimate responsibility of overseeing charge card programs and implementing policies and procedures governing charge card use APCs maintain access to all activity posted to individual charge card accounts through PaymentNet an online system provided by the servicing bank APCs serve as the primary liaison between their component and the charge card servicing bank and collect and transmit data regarding charge card use to DOJ and component leadership
Travel or Purchase Card Coordinator These employees assist the APC by regularly reviewing account activity reports to identify instances of potential purchase or travel card misuse
Approving Officials Approving officials are usually supervisors at the office or district level that must authorize charges before they are incurred and review monthly purchase card reconciliations and travel vouchers
Despite an inherent risk for misuse charge card programs offer an efficient method to purchase items and make payments With this understanding the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that federal agencies maximize charge card use to the extent practicable3 The Justice Management Division (JMD) which implements DOJ purchase and travel card policies has directed that all components try to use charge cards whenever possible in lieu of issuing purchase orders or relying on convenience checks or other third party drafts
Regardless of the type of purchasing method the servicing bank and not the government is liable to pay for fraudulent transactions In contrast the Departmentrsquos responsibility to pay for charges resulting from employee misuse largely depends on whether a particular account is centrally billed to the Department or individually billed to the cardholder For centrally billed accounts which include most purchase cards and some integrated cards the Department directly pays all charges on the account even if the charge constituted misuse4 For individually-billed accounts which include most travel cards and the integrated cards that are not centrally billed the cardholders are responsible to pay the balance of the accounts when they receive their monthly statements
Risk Assessment Approach
The objective of this risk assessment of DOJ charge cards was to address the Charge Card Act requirement to analyze the risk of illegal improper or erroneous charge card purchases and payments To conduct our review we applied the
3 See 48 CFR sect 13003(e) (2014) (pertaining to simplified acquisitions)
4 5 CFR sect1315 (2014) Centrally billed accounts are reconciled monthly The Department seeks to recoup the money of an erroneous or improper charge from card holders In addition an employee who abuses charge cards may be disciplined
2
internal control assessment framework promulgated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission5
To perform this assessment the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed Department-level policies and procedures in effect throughout FY 2013 When appropriate we relied upon the results of charge card program reviews that JMD performed as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123 Managements Responsibility for Internal Control We considered other component activity in two specific areas (1) for integrated cards we reviewed how the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) managed and used integrated cards because it is the only DOJ component to use integrated cards and (2) for convenience checks we assessed ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activity because these two components were responsible for issuing over 99 percent of convenience checks during FY 2013
Using the criteria identified in the Charge Card Act we assessed activity to determine whether safeguards and internal controls were present and functioned as intended In addition we reviewed the annual purchase and travel card audit status report to OMB to determine the impact of prior audit findings on DOJ charge card programs
Purchase Cards
Purchase cards are a primary procurement method DOJ uses to acquire goods and services Each DOJ purchase card account has a single transaction limit (usually $3000 for goods and $2500 for services) and monthly purchase limits Generally purchase card accounts are centrally billed and a component pays account balances automatically Exhibit 1 outlines the general steps that JMD purchase card account guidelines state need to be performed for every purchase card transaction
5 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control ndash Integrated Framework (May 2013) COSO is a joint initiative of five private sector organizations and is dedicated to providing leadership through the development of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management internal control and fraud deterrence
3
EXHIBIT 1 PURCHASE CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD purchase card policies
Each purchase must be approved by an approving official and obligated by a budget officer before the card holder can use a purchase card to buy a needed good or service Department-level charge card policies state that purchase card holders may be held personally liable for purchase card misuse
For this portion of our assessment we reviewed guidelines and procedures effective as of the end of FY 2013 and the results of JMDrsquos internal control assessment performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 We also analyzed a universe of nearly 300000 purchase card transactions (all DOJ purchase card activity between June 1 2013 and September 30 2013) and scored and ranked transactions to identify those with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous6
Our analysis and scoring of purchase card transactions identified 84 transactions across the Department most at risk of being illegal improper or
6 The scoring system methodology added a point to each transaction with the following elements (1) having a suspicious merchant name or merchant category code (2) processed using a mobile payment system such as Square (3) occurring on only one purchase card using a mobile payment system (4) occurring on a weekend (5) made using a convenience check (6) constituted a cash advance (7) exceeded the accountrsquos single purchase limit (8) totaled an even-dollar amount
4
erroneous and therefore meriting further review We contacted component-level APCs and requested the supporting documents related to the identified transactions The APCs provided supporting documents showing that the transactions were appropriate and received the required prior approval and that card holders complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Purchase Card Reconciliations
Purchase card statements must be reconciled by the card holder and reviewed by the approving official before the end of each month An adequate reconciliation includes a line-by-line review of all transactions on the monthly statement Each transaction must be supported by as applicable the purchase card transaction form showing prior approval and obligation of funds needed to pay for the purchase a receiving report and the invoice Approving officials are responsible for maintaining reconciled monthly statements As part of the OMB Circular A-123 review JMD found that purchase card holders did not always perform or approving officials did not review and maintain monthly reconciliations7
Because components automatically pay outstanding purchase card balances card holders and approving officials need to reconcile and review monthly statements carefully to ensure that the Department only pays for goods and services actually received We recommend that JMD periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account These reminders should reiterate that purchase card holders and approving officials can be held personally liable for improper purchases
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts
Inactive purchase card accounts that remain open for an extended period of time are susceptible to an increased risk of potential loss or misuse We reviewed account activity to identify specific inactive accounts
Our sample of purchase card account activity identified more than 200 DOJ purchase card accounts inactive for either more than 180 days or 365 days8 We note however that our sample covered the time period during the 2013 federal budget sequestration which likely limited purchase card activity across the Department and increased the number of inactive accounts
7 The results of JMDrsquos review of its purchase card reconciliations align with the findings of two previous OIG audit reports that identified instances in which approving officials at another DOJ component did not review card holder reconciliations US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit of the Financial Management of the United States Marshals Servicersquos Office in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Audit Report 13-24 (June 2013) and Audit of the United States Marshals Services Procurement Activities Audit Report 13-05 (December 2012)
8 Depending on the component a purchase card account is considered inactive if the account has remained unused for either more than 180 days or more than 365 days Our testing applied the same baseline of inactivity that the specific component used to define an inactive account
5
Additionally since the time of our review DOJ components have closed most of the inactive accounts we identified as required by the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan9
Among the more than 200 inactive purchase card accounts we identified were 6 non-JMD accounts that were unused because the card holder was no longer an employee or was on extended leave Although DOJ has since closed these six accounts we recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that the appropriate purchase card APCs receive notification when an employee with a purchase card leaves employment and promptly cancels all associated purchase card accounts
Integrated Cards
ATF uses integrated cards which can be used for different types of transactions (such as purchases or travel) depending on the designation of the account ATF policies and procedures delineate the types of purchases card holders may make based on that employeersquos official duties Integrated cards may be individually billed to the card holder or centrally billed to the agency depending on the merchant category code of the purchase Regardless of whether the account is individually or centrally billed the card holders are individually responsible for all transactions appearing on their account
Similar to our assessment of purchase cards we reviewed ATF integrated card use guidelines and procedures in effect during FY 2013 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of ATFrsquos integrated cards performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 To a universe of over 376000 integrated card transactions we applied the same methodology we used for the purchase card review to score and rank transactions with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous Although we did not identify any specific transaction to be at exceptionally high risk we judgmentally sampled transactions in the five integrated card accounts that recorded the most activity and determined that the card holders received the required prior approval and complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts
ATFrsquos Card Services Unit (CSU) assesses the appropriateness of card holder limits and opens suspends and cancels integrated card accounts In February 2013 CSU began receiving notices from PaymentNet regarding accounts with no transaction activity for 180 days Upon receiving this notification CSU officials told us that they follow up with the card holder to determine why there has been no account activity and depending on the reason provided CSU suspends or closes the account
9 The 2014 DOJ Charge Card Management Plan requires accounts that have been inactive for more than 365 days to be cancelled unless there is a business need to maintain the account and it remains in suspended status The final decision is made by the APC
6
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
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Rp mo rho J~u) COOCS ith tho oon nwi~ oy l~ 1 i JMIJ wili v ti 1 gt0) PO to gtnO md cud hold wi c~ireJ mini w-J cortil i 01 ]Mf) id i =nltili 0 d_
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15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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17
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APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
FISCAL YEAR 2013 RISK ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHARGE CARD PROGRAMS
Introduction
The Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) uses charge cards to procure goods and services Each DOJ component is responsible for maintaining internal controls that reduce the risk of fraud waste and misuse associated with charge cards The Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (Charge Card Act) requires that federal agencies establish and maintain specific safeguards and internal controls to improve their charge card and convenience check programs1
In addition the Charge Card Act requires that Inspectors General conduct periodic risk assessments of agency purchase card or convenience check programs and periodic audits or reviews of travel card programs to analyze risks of illegal improper or erroneous purchases and payments
The Charge Card Act addresses four primary types of government purchasing methods relating to charge cards covered by this report (1) purchase cards which are generally centrally billed accounts used to buy items and services (2) travel cards which are usually individually billed accounts used by employees to pay for costs associated with official travel (3) integrated cards which can be a combination of charge card types (purchase and travel) in a single account and (4) convenience checks which can be written from specially-designated purchase or integrated card accounts to pay for goods and services from vendors that do not accept charge cards2
DOJ Charge Card Activity and Oversight
At the end of fiscal year (FY) 2013 DOJ had 9298 active purchase card accounts that reported over $705 million in activity during the fiscal year At the same time DOJ had 33249 active travel card accounts with over $194 million in activity and 3984 active integrated card accounts with over $38 million in activity In addition 85 DOJ employees had the authority to use convenience checks and wrote 1000 checks valued at more than $513000
Charge card programs require vigilant oversight to ensure the programrsquos integrity ensure the proper use of charge cards and reduce the risk of misuse to the agency Besides the card holders themselves other employees have been designated important charge card program oversight responsibilities
1 Pub L No 112-194 (2012)
2 Throughout FY 2013 JPMorgan Chase serviced the charge card program for the Department of Justice
Agency Program Coordinator DOJ and each component have at least one agency program coordinator (APC) with the ultimate responsibility of overseeing charge card programs and implementing policies and procedures governing charge card use APCs maintain access to all activity posted to individual charge card accounts through PaymentNet an online system provided by the servicing bank APCs serve as the primary liaison between their component and the charge card servicing bank and collect and transmit data regarding charge card use to DOJ and component leadership
Travel or Purchase Card Coordinator These employees assist the APC by regularly reviewing account activity reports to identify instances of potential purchase or travel card misuse
Approving Officials Approving officials are usually supervisors at the office or district level that must authorize charges before they are incurred and review monthly purchase card reconciliations and travel vouchers
Despite an inherent risk for misuse charge card programs offer an efficient method to purchase items and make payments With this understanding the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that federal agencies maximize charge card use to the extent practicable3 The Justice Management Division (JMD) which implements DOJ purchase and travel card policies has directed that all components try to use charge cards whenever possible in lieu of issuing purchase orders or relying on convenience checks or other third party drafts
Regardless of the type of purchasing method the servicing bank and not the government is liable to pay for fraudulent transactions In contrast the Departmentrsquos responsibility to pay for charges resulting from employee misuse largely depends on whether a particular account is centrally billed to the Department or individually billed to the cardholder For centrally billed accounts which include most purchase cards and some integrated cards the Department directly pays all charges on the account even if the charge constituted misuse4 For individually-billed accounts which include most travel cards and the integrated cards that are not centrally billed the cardholders are responsible to pay the balance of the accounts when they receive their monthly statements
Risk Assessment Approach
The objective of this risk assessment of DOJ charge cards was to address the Charge Card Act requirement to analyze the risk of illegal improper or erroneous charge card purchases and payments To conduct our review we applied the
3 See 48 CFR sect 13003(e) (2014) (pertaining to simplified acquisitions)
4 5 CFR sect1315 (2014) Centrally billed accounts are reconciled monthly The Department seeks to recoup the money of an erroneous or improper charge from card holders In addition an employee who abuses charge cards may be disciplined
2
internal control assessment framework promulgated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission5
To perform this assessment the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed Department-level policies and procedures in effect throughout FY 2013 When appropriate we relied upon the results of charge card program reviews that JMD performed as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123 Managements Responsibility for Internal Control We considered other component activity in two specific areas (1) for integrated cards we reviewed how the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) managed and used integrated cards because it is the only DOJ component to use integrated cards and (2) for convenience checks we assessed ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activity because these two components were responsible for issuing over 99 percent of convenience checks during FY 2013
Using the criteria identified in the Charge Card Act we assessed activity to determine whether safeguards and internal controls were present and functioned as intended In addition we reviewed the annual purchase and travel card audit status report to OMB to determine the impact of prior audit findings on DOJ charge card programs
Purchase Cards
Purchase cards are a primary procurement method DOJ uses to acquire goods and services Each DOJ purchase card account has a single transaction limit (usually $3000 for goods and $2500 for services) and monthly purchase limits Generally purchase card accounts are centrally billed and a component pays account balances automatically Exhibit 1 outlines the general steps that JMD purchase card account guidelines state need to be performed for every purchase card transaction
5 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control ndash Integrated Framework (May 2013) COSO is a joint initiative of five private sector organizations and is dedicated to providing leadership through the development of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management internal control and fraud deterrence
3
EXHIBIT 1 PURCHASE CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD purchase card policies
Each purchase must be approved by an approving official and obligated by a budget officer before the card holder can use a purchase card to buy a needed good or service Department-level charge card policies state that purchase card holders may be held personally liable for purchase card misuse
For this portion of our assessment we reviewed guidelines and procedures effective as of the end of FY 2013 and the results of JMDrsquos internal control assessment performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 We also analyzed a universe of nearly 300000 purchase card transactions (all DOJ purchase card activity between June 1 2013 and September 30 2013) and scored and ranked transactions to identify those with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous6
Our analysis and scoring of purchase card transactions identified 84 transactions across the Department most at risk of being illegal improper or
6 The scoring system methodology added a point to each transaction with the following elements (1) having a suspicious merchant name or merchant category code (2) processed using a mobile payment system such as Square (3) occurring on only one purchase card using a mobile payment system (4) occurring on a weekend (5) made using a convenience check (6) constituted a cash advance (7) exceeded the accountrsquos single purchase limit (8) totaled an even-dollar amount
4
erroneous and therefore meriting further review We contacted component-level APCs and requested the supporting documents related to the identified transactions The APCs provided supporting documents showing that the transactions were appropriate and received the required prior approval and that card holders complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Purchase Card Reconciliations
Purchase card statements must be reconciled by the card holder and reviewed by the approving official before the end of each month An adequate reconciliation includes a line-by-line review of all transactions on the monthly statement Each transaction must be supported by as applicable the purchase card transaction form showing prior approval and obligation of funds needed to pay for the purchase a receiving report and the invoice Approving officials are responsible for maintaining reconciled monthly statements As part of the OMB Circular A-123 review JMD found that purchase card holders did not always perform or approving officials did not review and maintain monthly reconciliations7
Because components automatically pay outstanding purchase card balances card holders and approving officials need to reconcile and review monthly statements carefully to ensure that the Department only pays for goods and services actually received We recommend that JMD periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account These reminders should reiterate that purchase card holders and approving officials can be held personally liable for improper purchases
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts
Inactive purchase card accounts that remain open for an extended period of time are susceptible to an increased risk of potential loss or misuse We reviewed account activity to identify specific inactive accounts
Our sample of purchase card account activity identified more than 200 DOJ purchase card accounts inactive for either more than 180 days or 365 days8 We note however that our sample covered the time period during the 2013 federal budget sequestration which likely limited purchase card activity across the Department and increased the number of inactive accounts
7 The results of JMDrsquos review of its purchase card reconciliations align with the findings of two previous OIG audit reports that identified instances in which approving officials at another DOJ component did not review card holder reconciliations US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit of the Financial Management of the United States Marshals Servicersquos Office in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Audit Report 13-24 (June 2013) and Audit of the United States Marshals Services Procurement Activities Audit Report 13-05 (December 2012)
8 Depending on the component a purchase card account is considered inactive if the account has remained unused for either more than 180 days or more than 365 days Our testing applied the same baseline of inactivity that the specific component used to define an inactive account
5
Additionally since the time of our review DOJ components have closed most of the inactive accounts we identified as required by the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan9
Among the more than 200 inactive purchase card accounts we identified were 6 non-JMD accounts that were unused because the card holder was no longer an employee or was on extended leave Although DOJ has since closed these six accounts we recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that the appropriate purchase card APCs receive notification when an employee with a purchase card leaves employment and promptly cancels all associated purchase card accounts
Integrated Cards
ATF uses integrated cards which can be used for different types of transactions (such as purchases or travel) depending on the designation of the account ATF policies and procedures delineate the types of purchases card holders may make based on that employeersquos official duties Integrated cards may be individually billed to the card holder or centrally billed to the agency depending on the merchant category code of the purchase Regardless of whether the account is individually or centrally billed the card holders are individually responsible for all transactions appearing on their account
Similar to our assessment of purchase cards we reviewed ATF integrated card use guidelines and procedures in effect during FY 2013 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of ATFrsquos integrated cards performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 To a universe of over 376000 integrated card transactions we applied the same methodology we used for the purchase card review to score and rank transactions with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous Although we did not identify any specific transaction to be at exceptionally high risk we judgmentally sampled transactions in the five integrated card accounts that recorded the most activity and determined that the card holders received the required prior approval and complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts
ATFrsquos Card Services Unit (CSU) assesses the appropriateness of card holder limits and opens suspends and cancels integrated card accounts In February 2013 CSU began receiving notices from PaymentNet regarding accounts with no transaction activity for 180 days Upon receiving this notification CSU officials told us that they follow up with the card holder to determine why there has been no account activity and depending on the reason provided CSU suspends or closes the account
9 The 2014 DOJ Charge Card Management Plan requires accounts that have been inactive for more than 365 days to be cancelled unless there is a business need to maintain the account and it remains in suspended status The final decision is made by the APC
6
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
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i
Rlt pngtlt Jhc JMU ron with thr rltCIllll-gtliltln Uri~ Fi YCHI (FY ) 101 j IMll II nd pcdlr - 0 111gt1gt0 cord 1Ilttltkt OlJ fO~ 0[[ 1 ltmpj~ lhe 1 1gtlt1lt1 o[po~liJrni~ lt1 Tk~in~ nugthl) t ~ili l i~ ltgtr y i 1 J U) iJ m 1 Rmiddot J 2 lIpJ OOl l1~ c-1 )ta4 lhn to =ro thot ~~rop I lto J APC gtl 1 ltJ wOIJh in 01 n1l I~e h bull rnr0 lt-lr i(c cmplo) =I ~fQmpll)- c1 II iO 1lt d ot RraquoltT IM JHl - wi h M n IM i~ ~ 2l l bull I 11 ) wi ll N IIgtlt n gt ( 1 W f middot1 r i l laquo( 10 det i ~ amppfltCflri LtK io~ AfC gtltI lmd fmI middot tltOO ITltgt om ploylaquo in bull ~ n I ployt 111 =-o-~ c ~ 00 Ull lt blt w ~ r nT lly JMn lt -~ i -ru ion ~TltI
H middotII 1 Wn w 10 II 1)( 11 01gt11 t iITlp l Plt= lbol U (~ 11(( -O i 1 -d II I r~ 1 lt-d lrgtioi~ wIoti onJ It) m iJU lily and Illli~ c~ hole do to T ~1 ~ ct ~ - IT~~ in
APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
Rp mo rho J~u) COOCS ith tho oon nwi~ oy l~ 1 i JMIJ wili v ti 1 gt0) PO to gtnO md cud hold wi c~ireJ mini w-J cortil i 01 ]Mf) id i =nltili 0 d_
It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
Agency Program Coordinator DOJ and each component have at least one agency program coordinator (APC) with the ultimate responsibility of overseeing charge card programs and implementing policies and procedures governing charge card use APCs maintain access to all activity posted to individual charge card accounts through PaymentNet an online system provided by the servicing bank APCs serve as the primary liaison between their component and the charge card servicing bank and collect and transmit data regarding charge card use to DOJ and component leadership
Travel or Purchase Card Coordinator These employees assist the APC by regularly reviewing account activity reports to identify instances of potential purchase or travel card misuse
Approving Officials Approving officials are usually supervisors at the office or district level that must authorize charges before they are incurred and review monthly purchase card reconciliations and travel vouchers
Despite an inherent risk for misuse charge card programs offer an efficient method to purchase items and make payments With this understanding the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that federal agencies maximize charge card use to the extent practicable3 The Justice Management Division (JMD) which implements DOJ purchase and travel card policies has directed that all components try to use charge cards whenever possible in lieu of issuing purchase orders or relying on convenience checks or other third party drafts
Regardless of the type of purchasing method the servicing bank and not the government is liable to pay for fraudulent transactions In contrast the Departmentrsquos responsibility to pay for charges resulting from employee misuse largely depends on whether a particular account is centrally billed to the Department or individually billed to the cardholder For centrally billed accounts which include most purchase cards and some integrated cards the Department directly pays all charges on the account even if the charge constituted misuse4 For individually-billed accounts which include most travel cards and the integrated cards that are not centrally billed the cardholders are responsible to pay the balance of the accounts when they receive their monthly statements
Risk Assessment Approach
The objective of this risk assessment of DOJ charge cards was to address the Charge Card Act requirement to analyze the risk of illegal improper or erroneous charge card purchases and payments To conduct our review we applied the
3 See 48 CFR sect 13003(e) (2014) (pertaining to simplified acquisitions)
4 5 CFR sect1315 (2014) Centrally billed accounts are reconciled monthly The Department seeks to recoup the money of an erroneous or improper charge from card holders In addition an employee who abuses charge cards may be disciplined
2
internal control assessment framework promulgated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission5
To perform this assessment the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed Department-level policies and procedures in effect throughout FY 2013 When appropriate we relied upon the results of charge card program reviews that JMD performed as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123 Managements Responsibility for Internal Control We considered other component activity in two specific areas (1) for integrated cards we reviewed how the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) managed and used integrated cards because it is the only DOJ component to use integrated cards and (2) for convenience checks we assessed ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activity because these two components were responsible for issuing over 99 percent of convenience checks during FY 2013
Using the criteria identified in the Charge Card Act we assessed activity to determine whether safeguards and internal controls were present and functioned as intended In addition we reviewed the annual purchase and travel card audit status report to OMB to determine the impact of prior audit findings on DOJ charge card programs
Purchase Cards
Purchase cards are a primary procurement method DOJ uses to acquire goods and services Each DOJ purchase card account has a single transaction limit (usually $3000 for goods and $2500 for services) and monthly purchase limits Generally purchase card accounts are centrally billed and a component pays account balances automatically Exhibit 1 outlines the general steps that JMD purchase card account guidelines state need to be performed for every purchase card transaction
5 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control ndash Integrated Framework (May 2013) COSO is a joint initiative of five private sector organizations and is dedicated to providing leadership through the development of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management internal control and fraud deterrence
3
EXHIBIT 1 PURCHASE CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD purchase card policies
Each purchase must be approved by an approving official and obligated by a budget officer before the card holder can use a purchase card to buy a needed good or service Department-level charge card policies state that purchase card holders may be held personally liable for purchase card misuse
For this portion of our assessment we reviewed guidelines and procedures effective as of the end of FY 2013 and the results of JMDrsquos internal control assessment performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 We also analyzed a universe of nearly 300000 purchase card transactions (all DOJ purchase card activity between June 1 2013 and September 30 2013) and scored and ranked transactions to identify those with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous6
Our analysis and scoring of purchase card transactions identified 84 transactions across the Department most at risk of being illegal improper or
6 The scoring system methodology added a point to each transaction with the following elements (1) having a suspicious merchant name or merchant category code (2) processed using a mobile payment system such as Square (3) occurring on only one purchase card using a mobile payment system (4) occurring on a weekend (5) made using a convenience check (6) constituted a cash advance (7) exceeded the accountrsquos single purchase limit (8) totaled an even-dollar amount
4
erroneous and therefore meriting further review We contacted component-level APCs and requested the supporting documents related to the identified transactions The APCs provided supporting documents showing that the transactions were appropriate and received the required prior approval and that card holders complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Purchase Card Reconciliations
Purchase card statements must be reconciled by the card holder and reviewed by the approving official before the end of each month An adequate reconciliation includes a line-by-line review of all transactions on the monthly statement Each transaction must be supported by as applicable the purchase card transaction form showing prior approval and obligation of funds needed to pay for the purchase a receiving report and the invoice Approving officials are responsible for maintaining reconciled monthly statements As part of the OMB Circular A-123 review JMD found that purchase card holders did not always perform or approving officials did not review and maintain monthly reconciliations7
Because components automatically pay outstanding purchase card balances card holders and approving officials need to reconcile and review monthly statements carefully to ensure that the Department only pays for goods and services actually received We recommend that JMD periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account These reminders should reiterate that purchase card holders and approving officials can be held personally liable for improper purchases
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts
Inactive purchase card accounts that remain open for an extended period of time are susceptible to an increased risk of potential loss or misuse We reviewed account activity to identify specific inactive accounts
Our sample of purchase card account activity identified more than 200 DOJ purchase card accounts inactive for either more than 180 days or 365 days8 We note however that our sample covered the time period during the 2013 federal budget sequestration which likely limited purchase card activity across the Department and increased the number of inactive accounts
7 The results of JMDrsquos review of its purchase card reconciliations align with the findings of two previous OIG audit reports that identified instances in which approving officials at another DOJ component did not review card holder reconciliations US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit of the Financial Management of the United States Marshals Servicersquos Office in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Audit Report 13-24 (June 2013) and Audit of the United States Marshals Services Procurement Activities Audit Report 13-05 (December 2012)
8 Depending on the component a purchase card account is considered inactive if the account has remained unused for either more than 180 days or more than 365 days Our testing applied the same baseline of inactivity that the specific component used to define an inactive account
5
Additionally since the time of our review DOJ components have closed most of the inactive accounts we identified as required by the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan9
Among the more than 200 inactive purchase card accounts we identified were 6 non-JMD accounts that were unused because the card holder was no longer an employee or was on extended leave Although DOJ has since closed these six accounts we recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that the appropriate purchase card APCs receive notification when an employee with a purchase card leaves employment and promptly cancels all associated purchase card accounts
Integrated Cards
ATF uses integrated cards which can be used for different types of transactions (such as purchases or travel) depending on the designation of the account ATF policies and procedures delineate the types of purchases card holders may make based on that employeersquos official duties Integrated cards may be individually billed to the card holder or centrally billed to the agency depending on the merchant category code of the purchase Regardless of whether the account is individually or centrally billed the card holders are individually responsible for all transactions appearing on their account
Similar to our assessment of purchase cards we reviewed ATF integrated card use guidelines and procedures in effect during FY 2013 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of ATFrsquos integrated cards performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 To a universe of over 376000 integrated card transactions we applied the same methodology we used for the purchase card review to score and rank transactions with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous Although we did not identify any specific transaction to be at exceptionally high risk we judgmentally sampled transactions in the five integrated card accounts that recorded the most activity and determined that the card holders received the required prior approval and complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts
ATFrsquos Card Services Unit (CSU) assesses the appropriateness of card holder limits and opens suspends and cancels integrated card accounts In February 2013 CSU began receiving notices from PaymentNet regarding accounts with no transaction activity for 180 days Upon receiving this notification CSU officials told us that they follow up with the card holder to determine why there has been no account activity and depending on the reason provided CSU suspends or closes the account
9 The 2014 DOJ Charge Card Management Plan requires accounts that have been inactive for more than 365 days to be cancelled unless there is a business need to maintain the account and it remains in suspended status The final decision is made by the APC
6
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
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15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
internal control assessment framework promulgated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission5
To perform this assessment the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed Department-level policies and procedures in effect throughout FY 2013 When appropriate we relied upon the results of charge card program reviews that JMD performed as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123 Managements Responsibility for Internal Control We considered other component activity in two specific areas (1) for integrated cards we reviewed how the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) managed and used integrated cards because it is the only DOJ component to use integrated cards and (2) for convenience checks we assessed ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activity because these two components were responsible for issuing over 99 percent of convenience checks during FY 2013
Using the criteria identified in the Charge Card Act we assessed activity to determine whether safeguards and internal controls were present and functioned as intended In addition we reviewed the annual purchase and travel card audit status report to OMB to determine the impact of prior audit findings on DOJ charge card programs
Purchase Cards
Purchase cards are a primary procurement method DOJ uses to acquire goods and services Each DOJ purchase card account has a single transaction limit (usually $3000 for goods and $2500 for services) and monthly purchase limits Generally purchase card accounts are centrally billed and a component pays account balances automatically Exhibit 1 outlines the general steps that JMD purchase card account guidelines state need to be performed for every purchase card transaction
5 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control ndash Integrated Framework (May 2013) COSO is a joint initiative of five private sector organizations and is dedicated to providing leadership through the development of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management internal control and fraud deterrence
3
EXHIBIT 1 PURCHASE CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD purchase card policies
Each purchase must be approved by an approving official and obligated by a budget officer before the card holder can use a purchase card to buy a needed good or service Department-level charge card policies state that purchase card holders may be held personally liable for purchase card misuse
For this portion of our assessment we reviewed guidelines and procedures effective as of the end of FY 2013 and the results of JMDrsquos internal control assessment performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 We also analyzed a universe of nearly 300000 purchase card transactions (all DOJ purchase card activity between June 1 2013 and September 30 2013) and scored and ranked transactions to identify those with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous6
Our analysis and scoring of purchase card transactions identified 84 transactions across the Department most at risk of being illegal improper or
6 The scoring system methodology added a point to each transaction with the following elements (1) having a suspicious merchant name or merchant category code (2) processed using a mobile payment system such as Square (3) occurring on only one purchase card using a mobile payment system (4) occurring on a weekend (5) made using a convenience check (6) constituted a cash advance (7) exceeded the accountrsquos single purchase limit (8) totaled an even-dollar amount
4
erroneous and therefore meriting further review We contacted component-level APCs and requested the supporting documents related to the identified transactions The APCs provided supporting documents showing that the transactions were appropriate and received the required prior approval and that card holders complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Purchase Card Reconciliations
Purchase card statements must be reconciled by the card holder and reviewed by the approving official before the end of each month An adequate reconciliation includes a line-by-line review of all transactions on the monthly statement Each transaction must be supported by as applicable the purchase card transaction form showing prior approval and obligation of funds needed to pay for the purchase a receiving report and the invoice Approving officials are responsible for maintaining reconciled monthly statements As part of the OMB Circular A-123 review JMD found that purchase card holders did not always perform or approving officials did not review and maintain monthly reconciliations7
Because components automatically pay outstanding purchase card balances card holders and approving officials need to reconcile and review monthly statements carefully to ensure that the Department only pays for goods and services actually received We recommend that JMD periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account These reminders should reiterate that purchase card holders and approving officials can be held personally liable for improper purchases
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts
Inactive purchase card accounts that remain open for an extended period of time are susceptible to an increased risk of potential loss or misuse We reviewed account activity to identify specific inactive accounts
Our sample of purchase card account activity identified more than 200 DOJ purchase card accounts inactive for either more than 180 days or 365 days8 We note however that our sample covered the time period during the 2013 federal budget sequestration which likely limited purchase card activity across the Department and increased the number of inactive accounts
7 The results of JMDrsquos review of its purchase card reconciliations align with the findings of two previous OIG audit reports that identified instances in which approving officials at another DOJ component did not review card holder reconciliations US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit of the Financial Management of the United States Marshals Servicersquos Office in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Audit Report 13-24 (June 2013) and Audit of the United States Marshals Services Procurement Activities Audit Report 13-05 (December 2012)
8 Depending on the component a purchase card account is considered inactive if the account has remained unused for either more than 180 days or more than 365 days Our testing applied the same baseline of inactivity that the specific component used to define an inactive account
5
Additionally since the time of our review DOJ components have closed most of the inactive accounts we identified as required by the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan9
Among the more than 200 inactive purchase card accounts we identified were 6 non-JMD accounts that were unused because the card holder was no longer an employee or was on extended leave Although DOJ has since closed these six accounts we recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that the appropriate purchase card APCs receive notification when an employee with a purchase card leaves employment and promptly cancels all associated purchase card accounts
Integrated Cards
ATF uses integrated cards which can be used for different types of transactions (such as purchases or travel) depending on the designation of the account ATF policies and procedures delineate the types of purchases card holders may make based on that employeersquos official duties Integrated cards may be individually billed to the card holder or centrally billed to the agency depending on the merchant category code of the purchase Regardless of whether the account is individually or centrally billed the card holders are individually responsible for all transactions appearing on their account
Similar to our assessment of purchase cards we reviewed ATF integrated card use guidelines and procedures in effect during FY 2013 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of ATFrsquos integrated cards performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 To a universe of over 376000 integrated card transactions we applied the same methodology we used for the purchase card review to score and rank transactions with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous Although we did not identify any specific transaction to be at exceptionally high risk we judgmentally sampled transactions in the five integrated card accounts that recorded the most activity and determined that the card holders received the required prior approval and complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts
ATFrsquos Card Services Unit (CSU) assesses the appropriateness of card holder limits and opens suspends and cancels integrated card accounts In February 2013 CSU began receiving notices from PaymentNet regarding accounts with no transaction activity for 180 days Upon receiving this notification CSU officials told us that they follow up with the card holder to determine why there has been no account activity and depending on the reason provided CSU suspends or closes the account
9 The 2014 DOJ Charge Card Management Plan requires accounts that have been inactive for more than 365 days to be cancelled unless there is a business need to maintain the account and it remains in suspended status The final decision is made by the APC
6
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
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15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
EXHIBIT 1 PURCHASE CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD purchase card policies
Each purchase must be approved by an approving official and obligated by a budget officer before the card holder can use a purchase card to buy a needed good or service Department-level charge card policies state that purchase card holders may be held personally liable for purchase card misuse
For this portion of our assessment we reviewed guidelines and procedures effective as of the end of FY 2013 and the results of JMDrsquos internal control assessment performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 We also analyzed a universe of nearly 300000 purchase card transactions (all DOJ purchase card activity between June 1 2013 and September 30 2013) and scored and ranked transactions to identify those with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous6
Our analysis and scoring of purchase card transactions identified 84 transactions across the Department most at risk of being illegal improper or
6 The scoring system methodology added a point to each transaction with the following elements (1) having a suspicious merchant name or merchant category code (2) processed using a mobile payment system such as Square (3) occurring on only one purchase card using a mobile payment system (4) occurring on a weekend (5) made using a convenience check (6) constituted a cash advance (7) exceeded the accountrsquos single purchase limit (8) totaled an even-dollar amount
4
erroneous and therefore meriting further review We contacted component-level APCs and requested the supporting documents related to the identified transactions The APCs provided supporting documents showing that the transactions were appropriate and received the required prior approval and that card holders complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Purchase Card Reconciliations
Purchase card statements must be reconciled by the card holder and reviewed by the approving official before the end of each month An adequate reconciliation includes a line-by-line review of all transactions on the monthly statement Each transaction must be supported by as applicable the purchase card transaction form showing prior approval and obligation of funds needed to pay for the purchase a receiving report and the invoice Approving officials are responsible for maintaining reconciled monthly statements As part of the OMB Circular A-123 review JMD found that purchase card holders did not always perform or approving officials did not review and maintain monthly reconciliations7
Because components automatically pay outstanding purchase card balances card holders and approving officials need to reconcile and review monthly statements carefully to ensure that the Department only pays for goods and services actually received We recommend that JMD periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account These reminders should reiterate that purchase card holders and approving officials can be held personally liable for improper purchases
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts
Inactive purchase card accounts that remain open for an extended period of time are susceptible to an increased risk of potential loss or misuse We reviewed account activity to identify specific inactive accounts
Our sample of purchase card account activity identified more than 200 DOJ purchase card accounts inactive for either more than 180 days or 365 days8 We note however that our sample covered the time period during the 2013 federal budget sequestration which likely limited purchase card activity across the Department and increased the number of inactive accounts
7 The results of JMDrsquos review of its purchase card reconciliations align with the findings of two previous OIG audit reports that identified instances in which approving officials at another DOJ component did not review card holder reconciliations US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit of the Financial Management of the United States Marshals Servicersquos Office in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Audit Report 13-24 (June 2013) and Audit of the United States Marshals Services Procurement Activities Audit Report 13-05 (December 2012)
8 Depending on the component a purchase card account is considered inactive if the account has remained unused for either more than 180 days or more than 365 days Our testing applied the same baseline of inactivity that the specific component used to define an inactive account
5
Additionally since the time of our review DOJ components have closed most of the inactive accounts we identified as required by the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan9
Among the more than 200 inactive purchase card accounts we identified were 6 non-JMD accounts that were unused because the card holder was no longer an employee or was on extended leave Although DOJ has since closed these six accounts we recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that the appropriate purchase card APCs receive notification when an employee with a purchase card leaves employment and promptly cancels all associated purchase card accounts
Integrated Cards
ATF uses integrated cards which can be used for different types of transactions (such as purchases or travel) depending on the designation of the account ATF policies and procedures delineate the types of purchases card holders may make based on that employeersquos official duties Integrated cards may be individually billed to the card holder or centrally billed to the agency depending on the merchant category code of the purchase Regardless of whether the account is individually or centrally billed the card holders are individually responsible for all transactions appearing on their account
Similar to our assessment of purchase cards we reviewed ATF integrated card use guidelines and procedures in effect during FY 2013 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of ATFrsquos integrated cards performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 To a universe of over 376000 integrated card transactions we applied the same methodology we used for the purchase card review to score and rank transactions with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous Although we did not identify any specific transaction to be at exceptionally high risk we judgmentally sampled transactions in the five integrated card accounts that recorded the most activity and determined that the card holders received the required prior approval and complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts
ATFrsquos Card Services Unit (CSU) assesses the appropriateness of card holder limits and opens suspends and cancels integrated card accounts In February 2013 CSU began receiving notices from PaymentNet regarding accounts with no transaction activity for 180 days Upon receiving this notification CSU officials told us that they follow up with the card holder to determine why there has been no account activity and depending on the reason provided CSU suspends or closes the account
9 The 2014 DOJ Charge Card Management Plan requires accounts that have been inactive for more than 365 days to be cancelled unless there is a business need to maintain the account and it remains in suspended status The final decision is made by the APC
6
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
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15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
erroneous and therefore meriting further review We contacted component-level APCs and requested the supporting documents related to the identified transactions The APCs provided supporting documents showing that the transactions were appropriate and received the required prior approval and that card holders complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Purchase Card Reconciliations
Purchase card statements must be reconciled by the card holder and reviewed by the approving official before the end of each month An adequate reconciliation includes a line-by-line review of all transactions on the monthly statement Each transaction must be supported by as applicable the purchase card transaction form showing prior approval and obligation of funds needed to pay for the purchase a receiving report and the invoice Approving officials are responsible for maintaining reconciled monthly statements As part of the OMB Circular A-123 review JMD found that purchase card holders did not always perform or approving officials did not review and maintain monthly reconciliations7
Because components automatically pay outstanding purchase card balances card holders and approving officials need to reconcile and review monthly statements carefully to ensure that the Department only pays for goods and services actually received We recommend that JMD periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account These reminders should reiterate that purchase card holders and approving officials can be held personally liable for improper purchases
Inactive Purchase Card Accounts
Inactive purchase card accounts that remain open for an extended period of time are susceptible to an increased risk of potential loss or misuse We reviewed account activity to identify specific inactive accounts
Our sample of purchase card account activity identified more than 200 DOJ purchase card accounts inactive for either more than 180 days or 365 days8 We note however that our sample covered the time period during the 2013 federal budget sequestration which likely limited purchase card activity across the Department and increased the number of inactive accounts
7 The results of JMDrsquos review of its purchase card reconciliations align with the findings of two previous OIG audit reports that identified instances in which approving officials at another DOJ component did not review card holder reconciliations US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit of the Financial Management of the United States Marshals Servicersquos Office in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Audit Report 13-24 (June 2013) and Audit of the United States Marshals Services Procurement Activities Audit Report 13-05 (December 2012)
8 Depending on the component a purchase card account is considered inactive if the account has remained unused for either more than 180 days or more than 365 days Our testing applied the same baseline of inactivity that the specific component used to define an inactive account
5
Additionally since the time of our review DOJ components have closed most of the inactive accounts we identified as required by the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan9
Among the more than 200 inactive purchase card accounts we identified were 6 non-JMD accounts that were unused because the card holder was no longer an employee or was on extended leave Although DOJ has since closed these six accounts we recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that the appropriate purchase card APCs receive notification when an employee with a purchase card leaves employment and promptly cancels all associated purchase card accounts
Integrated Cards
ATF uses integrated cards which can be used for different types of transactions (such as purchases or travel) depending on the designation of the account ATF policies and procedures delineate the types of purchases card holders may make based on that employeersquos official duties Integrated cards may be individually billed to the card holder or centrally billed to the agency depending on the merchant category code of the purchase Regardless of whether the account is individually or centrally billed the card holders are individually responsible for all transactions appearing on their account
Similar to our assessment of purchase cards we reviewed ATF integrated card use guidelines and procedures in effect during FY 2013 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of ATFrsquos integrated cards performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 To a universe of over 376000 integrated card transactions we applied the same methodology we used for the purchase card review to score and rank transactions with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous Although we did not identify any specific transaction to be at exceptionally high risk we judgmentally sampled transactions in the five integrated card accounts that recorded the most activity and determined that the card holders received the required prior approval and complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts
ATFrsquos Card Services Unit (CSU) assesses the appropriateness of card holder limits and opens suspends and cancels integrated card accounts In February 2013 CSU began receiving notices from PaymentNet regarding accounts with no transaction activity for 180 days Upon receiving this notification CSU officials told us that they follow up with the card holder to determine why there has been no account activity and depending on the reason provided CSU suspends or closes the account
9 The 2014 DOJ Charge Card Management Plan requires accounts that have been inactive for more than 365 days to be cancelled unless there is a business need to maintain the account and it remains in suspended status The final decision is made by the APC
6
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
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15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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17
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APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
Additionally since the time of our review DOJ components have closed most of the inactive accounts we identified as required by the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan9
Among the more than 200 inactive purchase card accounts we identified were 6 non-JMD accounts that were unused because the card holder was no longer an employee or was on extended leave Although DOJ has since closed these six accounts we recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that the appropriate purchase card APCs receive notification when an employee with a purchase card leaves employment and promptly cancels all associated purchase card accounts
Integrated Cards
ATF uses integrated cards which can be used for different types of transactions (such as purchases or travel) depending on the designation of the account ATF policies and procedures delineate the types of purchases card holders may make based on that employeersquos official duties Integrated cards may be individually billed to the card holder or centrally billed to the agency depending on the merchant category code of the purchase Regardless of whether the account is individually or centrally billed the card holders are individually responsible for all transactions appearing on their account
Similar to our assessment of purchase cards we reviewed ATF integrated card use guidelines and procedures in effect during FY 2013 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of ATFrsquos integrated cards performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 To a universe of over 376000 integrated card transactions we applied the same methodology we used for the purchase card review to score and rank transactions with elements indicative of being illegal improper or erroneous Although we did not identify any specific transaction to be at exceptionally high risk we judgmentally sampled transactions in the five integrated card accounts that recorded the most activity and determined that the card holders received the required prior approval and complied with transaction and billing limits and reconciled statements as required
Inactive Integrated Card Accounts
ATFrsquos Card Services Unit (CSU) assesses the appropriateness of card holder limits and opens suspends and cancels integrated card accounts In February 2013 CSU began receiving notices from PaymentNet regarding accounts with no transaction activity for 180 days Upon receiving this notification CSU officials told us that they follow up with the card holder to determine why there has been no account activity and depending on the reason provided CSU suspends or closes the account
9 The 2014 DOJ Charge Card Management Plan requires accounts that have been inactive for more than 365 days to be cancelled unless there is a business need to maintain the account and it remains in suspended status The final decision is made by the APC
6
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
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AST~ANT T ~~M()R llnNPRAT ~0R Airon
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
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It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
During our review of ATF integrated card accounts we identified more than 400 accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity We brought this issue to the attention of CSU officials who stated that these accounts may have been inactive before the notification process began in February 2013 Because the system did not retroactively notify CSU regarding accounts with more than 180 days of inactivity CSU was not aware of the status of these accounts
While we confirmed that the 400 inactive accounts had no outstanding balances we believe that accounts that remain inactive for extended periods of time present an increased risk of being misused CSU officials told us that they have reviewed the accounts and suspended or closed those that it deemed unnecessary
Integrated Card Training
ATF policies require that new card holders complete a charge card training course within 60 days after being issued a card In addition current integrated account holders must complete a refresher training course every 3 years ATFrsquos Financial Management Division (FMD) is responsible for tracking the training status of each ATF employee LearnATF the electronic training system used by ATF can be programmed to prompt card holders to take refresher training through e-mail alerts Using this method the card holders and their supervisor will continue to receive notifications until the training is completed
When ATF conducted its FY 2013 OMB Circular A-123 review it found that 4 out of 30 tested integrated card holders did not take the required training or could not provide evidence they received the training In response ATF stated that it would suspend accounts of employees who did not take the required training We believe that ATFrsquos plan to suspend these accounts constitutes an important step towards mitigating the risk of integrated card misuse
Convenience Checks
Convenience checks provide a method by which specially designated card holders may procure goods and services from merchants who do not accept charge cards The servicing bank issues convenience checks to designated card holders who individually maintain them and use them to make purchases However because convenience checks lack many of the internal controls usually associated with charge cards and incur additional fees (usually equal to 2 percent of the purchase amount) Department-level guidance states that convenience checks should only be used as a payment method of last resort APCs designate the card holders who may write convenience checks on an employee-by-employee basis and only 85 DOJ employees have been granted the authority to write convenience checks
During FY 2013 DOJ issued a total of 1000 convenience checks ndash 719 at ATF 277 at the FBI and 4 at other DOJ components The combined value of these checks was over $513000 Because of the concentration of convenience checks
7
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
~tr)rrcT
AST~ANT T ~~M()R llnNPRAT ~0R Airon
) k M ~ 1) R I~ IIlt Off t1To In - GltIgtlaquoal naf Rp~ f i ql y I Q 13 Riltk (ln ept Qr nrtm nt or JlJI i ( ho ned lmgOJn
TIl II dgt 10 (igt ome of raquo hlllplaquoor Ocnl (010 1 d-ft rlort FiLI YCfl20IJ RbIlt AU IIflliUI1111n or ~ i (hor 1 PBIf
11 J 1 - Dm (11))) 1- VI h ~ ~~ DIG I oJ 1 oJgt LI ioHo~iIlJ( 100 0 tbe 0 1( th ITCCIllIllltnJH nlt 10 Iigtlt J MD
R m d koo I Prlolti iaoiJy Wo lniodm 10 bo lh JlU1u5c cw hddlt w Plroinjj d I i onli n ~ I 1 r 1~ ~ I i n~ ~ I Y ili iT ltf)
i
Rlt pngtlt Jhc JMU ron with thr rltCIllll-gtliltln Uri~ Fi YCHI (FY ) 101 j IMll II nd pcdlr - 0 111gt1gt0 cord 1Ilttltkt OlJ fO~ 0[[ 1 ltmpj~ lhe 1 1gtlt1lt1 o[po~liJrni~ lt1 Tk~in~ nugthl) t ~ili l i~ ltgtr y i 1 J U) iJ m 1 Rmiddot J 2 lIpJ OOl l1~ c-1 )ta4 lhn to =ro thot ~~rop I lto J APC gtl 1 ltJ wOIJh in 01 n1l I~e h bull rnr0 lt-lr i(c cmplo) =I ~fQmpll)- c1 II iO 1lt d ot RraquoltT IM JHl - wi h M n IM i~ ~ 2l l bull I 11 ) wi ll N IIgtlt n gt ( 1 W f middot1 r i l laquo( 10 det i ~ amppfltCflri LtK io~ AfC gtltI lmd fmI middot tltOO ITltgt om ploylaquo in bull ~ n I ployt 111 =-o-~ c ~ 00 Ull lt blt w ~ r nT lly JMn lt -~ i -ru ion ~TltI
H middotII 1 Wn w 10 II 1)( 11 01gt11 t iITlp l Plt= lbol U (~ 11(( -O i 1 -d II I r~ 1 lt-d lrgtioi~ wIoti onJ It) m iJU lily and Illli~ c~ hole do to T ~1 ~ ct ~ - IT~~ in
APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
Rp mo rho J~u) COOCS ith tho oon nwi~ oy l~ 1 i JMIJ wili v ti 1 gt0) PO to gtnO md cud hold wi c~ireJ mini w-J cortil i 01 ]Mf) id i =nltili 0 d_
It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
no flaquolt B mllon tip (Ill) Rltgtpo til Offilt of ~ lIosplaquotOT cnJ hdit of tk r a1 Y c GIJ lfuk ~ t of
lHpan_t r J tirlt C1ool Card P Rltgtpo to Rtpon RKo datio
RtponRKo _datio1-4 1muretcardboldon_towrilo~_
ODd tbltir ~ officials Ipoundlt awa- pltriodicaUy fmIiDdltd of comm cbod ~opprovaI~
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IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
usage at ATF and the FBI we concentrated our testing on these two components We judgmentally sampled 50 high-dollar convenience checks (25 from each) to ascertain whether the checks complied with established policies governing their use and were properly approved and reconciled to monthly purchase card or integrated account statements The sampled checks had a total value of over $132000 or 25 percent of the value of all convenience checks written during FY 2013
According to FBI and ATF policy convenience checks may not be used to obtain cash pay fines or penalties reimburse employees purchase goods and services that could be obtained with a purchase card or circumvent procurement controls (such as making split purchases to bypass individual transaction limits) Nevertheless we sampled 50 convenience checks and identified
1 ATF convenience check with a total value of $2000 written to a vendor who at the time of purchase did not accept the charge card as payment
4 ATF convenience checks totaling $8668 that lacked supporting documents evidencing items or services purchased and required CSU approvals
1 FBI convenience check for $1011 to an employee who converted the funds to cash to pay a speaker fee to a covert individual10
Considering these issues we reviewed how the FBI and ATF implemented their convenience check guidelines and procedures At ATF a card holder must first justify in writing that the particular vendor does not accept charge cards for payment and the card holderrsquos supervisor then reviews and approves the justification prior to purchase At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks after the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity Under either approach we believe that individual card holders and their approving officials would benefit from periodic reminders of convenience check rules We therefore recommend that the FBI and ATF ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Travel Cards
DOJ components provide travel cards to employees who expect to incur official travel expenses such as transportation and lodging Most of the travel cards we reviewed had a billing cycle limit of $15000 Unlike purchase cards most DOJ travel card accounts are individually billed to and must be paid by the card holder As shown in Exhibit 2 employees receive reimbursement for authorized expenses only after preparing and submitting a travel voucher following official travel
10 The FBI provided to us an analysis of its Draft System User Guide to show that this policy did not permit another method in which to pay the fee to the covert individual because the individual was not associated with a particular undercover operation The FBI told us that it plans to revisit its policies to provide more specific guidance that addresses this type of scenario
8
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
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15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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17
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APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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202~~middot1707_
n- ~
18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
EXHIBIT 2 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTION STEPS
Source OIG summary of JMD travel card policies
All travel costs must be estimated approved and obligated before an employee begins official travel Employees have 5 days after a trip ends to submit a voucher detailing actual costs for reimbursement Employees must pay off travel card account balances within 25 days from their statement closing date regardless of whether they have been reimbursed for travel expenses Although DOJ maintains no liability for costs stemming from employee travel card misuse and the servicing bank is responsible for fraudulent charges not made by the travel card holder employees may not use their travel card to make purchases unassociated with official travel Employees intentionally misusing travel cards may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal
We reviewed travel card guidelines and procedures in effect at the end of FY 2013 that govern how employees at JMD and the Departmentrsquos Offices Boards
9
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
~tr)rrcT
AST~ANT T ~~M()R llnNPRAT ~0R Airon
) k M ~ 1) R I~ IIlt Off t1To In - GltIgtlaquoal naf Rp~ f i ql y I Q 13 Riltk (ln ept Qr nrtm nt or JlJI i ( ho ned lmgOJn
TIl II dgt 10 (igt ome of raquo hlllplaquoor Ocnl (010 1 d-ft rlort FiLI YCfl20IJ RbIlt AU IIflliUI1111n or ~ i (hor 1 PBIf
11 J 1 - Dm (11))) 1- VI h ~ ~~ DIG I oJ 1 oJgt LI ioHo~iIlJ( 100 0 tbe 0 1( th ITCCIllIllltnJH nlt 10 Iigtlt J MD
R m d koo I Prlolti iaoiJy Wo lniodm 10 bo lh JlU1u5c cw hddlt w Plroinjj d I i onli n ~ I 1 r 1~ ~ I i n~ ~ I Y ili iT ltf)
i
Rlt pngtlt Jhc JMU ron with thr rltCIllll-gtliltln Uri~ Fi YCHI (FY ) 101 j IMll II nd pcdlr - 0 111gt1gt0 cord 1Ilttltkt OlJ fO~ 0[[ 1 ltmpj~ lhe 1 1gtlt1lt1 o[po~liJrni~ lt1 Tk~in~ nugthl) t ~ili l i~ ltgtr y i 1 J U) iJ m 1 Rmiddot J 2 lIpJ OOl l1~ c-1 )ta4 lhn to =ro thot ~~rop I lto J APC gtl 1 ltJ wOIJh in 01 n1l I~e h bull rnr0 lt-lr i(c cmplo) =I ~fQmpll)- c1 II iO 1lt d ot RraquoltT IM JHl - wi h M n IM i~ ~ 2l l bull I 11 ) wi ll N IIgtlt n gt ( 1 W f middot1 r i l laquo( 10 det i ~ amppfltCflri LtK io~ AfC gtltI lmd fmI middot tltOO ITltgt om ploylaquo in bull ~ n I ployt 111 =-o-~ c ~ 00 Ull lt blt w ~ r nT lly JMn lt -~ i -ru ion ~TltI
H middotII 1 Wn w 10 II 1)( 11 01gt11 t iITlp l Plt= lbol U (~ 11(( -O i 1 -d II I r~ 1 lt-d lrgtioi~ wIoti onJ It) m iJU lily and Illli~ c~ hole do to T ~1 ~ ct ~ - IT~~ in
APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
Rp mo rho J~u) COOCS ith tho oon nwi~ oy l~ 1 i JMIJ wili v ti 1 gt0) PO to gtnO md cud hold wi c~ireJ mini w-J cortil i 01 ]Mf) id i =nltili 0 d_
It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
no flaquolt B mllon tip (Ill) Rltgtpo til Offilt of ~ lIosplaquotOT cnJ hdit of tk r a1 Y c GIJ lfuk ~ t of
lHpan_t r J tirlt C1ool Card P Rltgtpo to Rtpon RKo datio
RtponRKo _datio1-4 1muretcardboldon_towrilo~_
ODd tbltir ~ officials Ipoundlt awa- pltriodicaUy fmIiDdltd of comm cbod ~opprovaI~
fBI Rltgtpo to RKo datio 1-4 eom Tbe FBI will ~idoe DOtice to_ CltJIlmc cbod _ tbltir cnifJiDl mrcn (io 11 iDfl of6ciab) to prltnidoe _--spltriodicaIlyImliDl_of~cbltd~
IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
and Divisions (OBD) should use travel cards11 We also considered the results of JMDrsquos internal control review of travel cards it performed in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 In addition we analyzed a universe of over 300000 JMD and OBD travel card transactions during FY 2013 and applying the same methodology we applied to purchase card transactions scored and ranked those travel card purchases based on transaction elements that increased the risk of a transaction being illegal improper or erroneous We also reviewed account level activity to identify accounts that were inactive for over 180 days at the time of our review
Former Employees with Active Travel Card Accounts
Department-level travel card guidelines require that component-level travel card coordinators cancel travel card accounts whenever an employee leaves government service Out of more than 30000 active travel card accounts we identified 42 active travel card accounts that belonged to former employees Among these accounts the period of time between the card holder separation date and the date of our testing (June 24 2014) ranged from 267 days to 613 days Although we did not identify activity on these active accounts following separation we found five accounts with unpaid balances ranging from $7 to $1227
JMD officials told us that travel card coordinators might not always be notified when a card holder leaves employment Although liability for travel card charges ultimately falls to the card holder or the servicing bank not the Department active travel card accounts of separated employees nevertheless increase the risk of travel card misuse We therefore believe that a stronger department-wide control is necessary to ensure the closure of travel card accounts associated with separated employees As part of our similar recommendation above regarding purchase card accounts associated with separated employees we also recommend that JMD update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a travel card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated travel card accounts
11 The term OBD includes the Office of the Attorney General Office of the Deputy Attorney General Office of the Associate Attorney General Community Relations Service Executive Office for Immigration Review Executive Office for US Attorneys Executive Office for US Trustees Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Office of Information Policy Office of Legal Counsel Office of Legal Policy Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Professional Responsibility Office of Public Affairs Office of the Inspector General Office of the Pardon Attorney Office of the Solicitor General Office of Tribal Justice Office on Violence Against Women Professional Responsibility Advisory Office and US National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington)
We excluded the Office of the Inspector General as a part of our assessment of JMD and OBD travel card risk
10
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
~tr)rrcT
AST~ANT T ~~M()R llnNPRAT ~0R Airon
) k M ~ 1) R I~ IIlt Off t1To In - GltIgtlaquoal naf Rp~ f i ql y I Q 13 Riltk (ln ept Qr nrtm nt or JlJI i ( ho ned lmgOJn
TIl II dgt 10 (igt ome of raquo hlllplaquoor Ocnl (010 1 d-ft rlort FiLI YCfl20IJ RbIlt AU IIflliUI1111n or ~ i (hor 1 PBIf
11 J 1 - Dm (11))) 1- VI h ~ ~~ DIG I oJ 1 oJgt LI ioHo~iIlJ( 100 0 tbe 0 1( th ITCCIllIllltnJH nlt 10 Iigtlt J MD
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i
Rlt pngtlt Jhc JMU ron with thr rltCIllll-gtliltln Uri~ Fi YCHI (FY ) 101 j IMll II nd pcdlr - 0 111gt1gt0 cord 1Ilttltkt OlJ fO~ 0[[ 1 ltmpj~ lhe 1 1gtlt1lt1 o[po~liJrni~ lt1 Tk~in~ nugthl) t ~ili l i~ ltgtr y i 1 J U) iJ m 1 Rmiddot J 2 lIpJ OOl l1~ c-1 )ta4 lhn to =ro thot ~~rop I lto J APC gtl 1 ltJ wOIJh in 01 n1l I~e h bull rnr0 lt-lr i(c cmplo) =I ~fQmpll)- c1 II iO 1lt d ot RraquoltT IM JHl - wi h M n IM i~ ~ 2l l bull I 11 ) wi ll N IIgtlt n gt ( 1 W f middot1 r i l laquo( 10 det i ~ amppfltCflri LtK io~ AfC gtltI lmd fmI middot tltOO ITltgt om ploylaquo in bull ~ n I ployt 111 =-o-~ c ~ 00 Ull lt blt w ~ r nT lly JMn lt -~ i -ru ion ~TltI
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
Rp mo rho J~u) COOCS ith tho oon nwi~ oy l~ 1 i JMIJ wili v ti 1 gt0) PO to gtnO md cud hold wi c~ireJ mini w-J cortil i 01 ]Mf) id i =nltili 0 d_
It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
no flaquolt B mllon tip (Ill) Rltgtpo til Offilt of ~ lIosplaquotOT cnJ hdit of tk r a1 Y c GIJ lfuk ~ t of
lHpan_t r J tirlt C1ool Card P Rltgtpo to Rtpon RKo datio
RtponRKo _datio1-4 1muretcardboldon_towrilo~_
ODd tbltir ~ officials Ipoundlt awa- pltriodicaUy fmIiDdltd of comm cbod ~opprovaI~
fBI Rltgtpo to RKo datio 1-4 eom Tbe FBI will ~idoe DOtice to_ CltJIlmc cbod _ tbltir cnifJiDl mrcn (io 11 iDfl of6ciab) to prltnidoe _--spltriodicaIlyImliDl_of~cbltd~
IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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0
TO gt gt1 Roymond 1 ~-l ~ I i-1 in ir i
s~ i
Beoudet ~ 0
In ~ i oft
~ o~ GlntTal ~ ~ ~ for ~ i -Audit
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18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
Travel Card Misuse
Our scoring and ranking of over 300000 travel card transactions identified 412 potentially questionable charges totaling $9335112 From this population we judgmentally selected a sample of 35 transactions with a value of $10730 based on high-dollar amounts and vendor descriptions Based on our review of documents provided by components regarding these charges we identified the following seven transactions totaling $1196 each of which related to expenses incurred by employees who were not in official travel status at the time of the charge
EXHIBIT 3 TRAVEL CARD TRANSACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES NOT ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL
Transaction Date Description
Amount ($)
10202013 Cash advance 282 4132013 Restaurant 196 1262013 Restaurant 186 11172012 Dry cleaning 170 2162013 Cash advance 142 912013 Restaurant 110 8242013 Restaurant 110
Total $1196 Source OIG analysis of travel card activity
We confirmed that the charges listed above have been paid in full Department officials also told us that at least three of the transactions listed in Exhibit 3 had been identified by travel card coordinators and supervisors before we notified them of the questionable charge and that all employees who knowingly made the above transactions outside of travel status have been counseled or otherwise disciplined
Centrally-Billed Travel Card Accounts
A subset of travel card accounts is referred to Government Transportation Accounts (GTA) and is centrally billed documented and paid like purchase cards DOJ components establish GTAs to pay for travel expenses incurred by non-Department employees or employees who do not have a travel card Examples of individuals we found whose travel costs are paid with GTAs include witnesses guest speakers and new employees
Each componentrsquos APC is responsible for overseeing and assigning GTA account access The travel card coordinator must reconcile GTA charges each billing cycle We reviewed GTA activity and sampled 10 high-dollar transactions based on merchant description and found that all sampled transactions were supported and allowable We did not identify any GTA activity associated with employees assigned an individually billed travel card
12 We focused our review on charges that were greater than $75 because travelers are not required to attach to the travel voucher invoices for most claimed expenses that are less than $75
11
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
~tr)rrcT
AST~ANT T ~~M()R llnNPRAT ~0R Airon
) k M ~ 1) R I~ IIlt Off t1To In - GltIgtlaquoal naf Rp~ f i ql y I Q 13 Riltk (ln ept Qr nrtm nt or JlJI i ( ho ned lmgOJn
TIl II dgt 10 (igt ome of raquo hlllplaquoor Ocnl (010 1 d-ft rlort FiLI YCfl20IJ RbIlt AU IIflliUI1111n or ~ i (hor 1 PBIf
11 J 1 - Dm (11))) 1- VI h ~ ~~ DIG I oJ 1 oJgt LI ioHo~iIlJ( 100 0 tbe 0 1( th ITCCIllIllltnJH nlt 10 Iigtlt J MD
R m d koo I Prlolti iaoiJy Wo lniodm 10 bo lh JlU1u5c cw hddlt w Plroinjj d I i onli n ~ I 1 r 1~ ~ I i n~ ~ I Y ili iT ltf)
i
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APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
Rp mo rho J~u) COOCS ith tho oon nwi~ oy l~ 1 i JMIJ wili v ti 1 gt0) PO to gtnO md cud hold wi c~ireJ mini w-J cortil i 01 ]Mf) id i =nltili 0 d_
It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
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RtponRKo _datio1-4 1muretcardboldon_towrilo~_
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17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
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h
- lt001gtlt1 f SoO ~ ~ Koloi bull
202~~middot1707_
n- ~
18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
Travel Card Training
DOJrsquos charge card management plan requires that employees receive travel card training that outlines the proper use of travel cards before they obtain a travel card In addition the plan states that all card holders should receive a refresher training session every 3 years The web-based training provided to card holders instructs employees on the proper use of travel cards underscores their individual liability for improper travel card use outlines what constitutes an unallowable expense and explains how to dispute a fraudulent or incorrect charge with the servicing bank After completing training employees must certify to their APC that they received the required training
We selected a judgmental sample of 20 card holders from the travel card accounts that our testing found included charges that may be indicative of misuse From each travel card holder we requested copies of their travel card training certificates from the components Of the 20 sampled travel card holders 17 either did not take or their components were not able to provide evidence that they received the required training prior to receiving their travel cards Some employees told us that they did not know they needed to take the training while others stated that they remembered receiving training sometime after new employee orientation
We believe that components must ensure that employees certify that they have received training regarding the proper use of travel cards and track these certifications We therefore recommend that JMD work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Conclusions
Our testing did not identify illegal improper or erroneous transactions pertaining to centrally-billed purchase integrated and travel card accounts We identified numerous open accounts that had been inactive for a significant period of time but DOJ has closed the inactive purchase card accounts and ATF told us that it is working to close inactive integrated card accounts The relatively moderate risk of misuse regarding centrally-billed purchase and integrated card accounts will be largely mitigated once JMD ensures that card holders perform and supervisors review monthly reconciliations and both JMD and ATF improve their respective tracking of purchase and integrated card training
Our testing of convenience checks identified several instances in which card holders did not use convenience checks properly or maintain required supporting documents Based on these results we believe that convenience checks present a higher risk of misuse than purchase or integrated cards and that the Department should periodically remind card holders with the authority to write convenience checks of the policies governing their use
12
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
~tr)rrcT
AST~ANT T ~~M()R llnNPRAT ~0R Airon
) k M ~ 1) R I~ IIlt Off t1To In - GltIgtlaquoal naf Rp~ f i ql y I Q 13 Riltk (ln ept Qr nrtm nt or JlJI i ( ho ned lmgOJn
TIl II dgt 10 (igt ome of raquo hlllplaquoor Ocnl (010 1 d-ft rlort FiLI YCfl20IJ RbIlt AU IIflliUI1111n or ~ i (hor 1 PBIf
11 J 1 - Dm (11))) 1- VI h ~ ~~ DIG I oJ 1 oJgt LI ioHo~iIlJ( 100 0 tbe 0 1( th ITCCIllIllltnJH nlt 10 Iigtlt J MD
R m d koo I Prlolti iaoiJy Wo lniodm 10 bo lh JlU1u5c cw hddlt w Plroinjj d I i onli n ~ I 1 r 1~ ~ I i n~ ~ I Y ili iT ltf)
i
Rlt pngtlt Jhc JMU ron with thr rltCIllll-gtliltln Uri~ Fi YCHI (FY ) 101 j IMll II nd pcdlr - 0 111gt1gt0 cord 1Ilttltkt OlJ fO~ 0[[ 1 ltmpj~ lhe 1 1gtlt1lt1 o[po~liJrni~ lt1 Tk~in~ nugthl) t ~ili l i~ ltgtr y i 1 J U) iJ m 1 Rmiddot J 2 lIpJ OOl l1~ c-1 )ta4 lhn to =ro thot ~~rop I lto J APC gtl 1 ltJ wOIJh in 01 n1l I~e h bull rnr0 lt-lr i(c cmplo) =I ~fQmpll)- c1 II iO 1lt d ot RraquoltT IM JHl - wi h M n IM i~ ~ 2l l bull I 11 ) wi ll N IIgtlt n gt ( 1 W f middot1 r i l laquo( 10 det i ~ amppfltCflri LtK io~ AfC gtltI lmd fmI middot tltOO ITltgt om ploylaquo in bull ~ n I ployt 111 =-o-~ c ~ 00 Ull lt blt w ~ r nT lly JMn lt -~ i -ru ion ~TltI
H middotII 1 Wn w 10 II 1)( 11 01gt11 t iITlp l Plt= lbol U (~ 11(( -O i 1 -d II I r~ 1 lt-d lrgtioi~ wIoti onJ It) m iJU lily and Illli~ c~ hole do to T ~1 ~ ct ~ - IT~~ in
APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
Rp mo rho J~u) COOCS ith tho oon nwi~ oy l~ 1 i JMIJ wili v ti 1 gt0) PO to gtnO md cud hold wi c~ireJ mini w-J cortil i 01 ]Mf) id i =nltili 0 d_
It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
no flaquolt B mllon tip (Ill) Rltgtpo til Offilt of ~ lIosplaquotOT cnJ hdit of tk r a1 Y c GIJ lfuk ~ t of
lHpan_t r J tirlt C1ool Card P Rltgtpo to Rtpon RKo datio
RtponRKo _datio1-4 1muretcardboldon_towrilo~_
ODd tbltir ~ officials Ipoundlt awa- pltriodicaUy fmIiDdltd of comm cbod ~opprovaI~
fBI Rltgtpo to RKo datio 1-4 eom Tbe FBI will ~idoe DOtice to_ CltJIlmc cbod _ tbltir cnifJiDl mrcn (io 11 iDfl of6ciab) to prltnidoe _--spltriodicaIlyImliDl_of~cbltd~
IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
bull bull 0 0 us bull bull opartmont bull ~ bull middot of bull I I J~tl bullbull
I n ~ r 11gt1 Tgtbocco
Fimm -~ L i~ 8~ nd
hpbiC I ii- - ~
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q ~ I - ~ ~
l II-- -- SEP191DH ~ ~ --
lt
lt
MEMORANDUM ~ sect 0 ~ ~ g g 1 lt
0
TO gt gt1 Roymond 1 ~-l ~ I i-1 in ir i
s~ i
Beoudet ~ 0
In ~ i oft
~ o~ GlntTal ~ ~ ~ for ~ i -Audit
~
bull FROM ~ ~
gtlt
i
gt nmiddot nmiddot
Mod gt W_
A_ 9~
H )
Dmctor ll~
g
1
if~
~
( ~ o Of 51
lie ~ bull 0 ofMlfTnt f SliWECT c c -bull r 0
~Q
of
~~~ AH
~ ~ l Roopoooo l 1 n~
~~
OJ
~~~ klsptotOl Gen Ci ~
~ ~ ofthlt FisaJ
~1
Offk -Review
~~i
c of ea1 (DIG) s ~if r Ycu ~cn
~~~ ~~
lOll ~g1
middoti ~~ Ri I - h AgtSIIlltJlt ~r
H l -of III
Deporlrnent ~ of ielt ji
H
ClIoamp oil Cord PO -l o I I
Hi
Hi TIli ~ mdon
10j ~~I __
lSo ~ i
~_oo 10
~8[]
providt
i
~1
1~ ~ ~ if tho ~ ~ -I t ~~
-
j~
Bure
f~lZ
~
T_~
T
of
~~
A
~FI~
lcohol -
~~~~
~t 1OO ~ ~
LB
[If
co I firelirru
[i~ ~ ~~
iiw
L~-i
and ii Explo
I
i gt- laquopOllSlt to Ibe
~co
[~~ ~
iO
Off
oh
l
ofIno g ~ [ Genetol ~ n olIlIllODdotioos~ ~ tho evWlt of Dop1Itm i of JU5Iice [DOJ) ~ Otor ~ ~
Cord ~trot ~ Th obiti ~ ofthis [ rrxnndom ~_~ ~ the
~ i lo pOyilto ~~
bull respone middot ~- 0 bull bull J 6~
10 o~~
mrondolioo ~ i -- S
[a
foor stht o l- l-allltoI ~ C
1- A
IT_ fi
S
F F EwUfl ~J
~i5 i ~ -tilO1 eatli IKlld
~~ it 5 s
lt~
~~ authori=l ~-l to nmiddot
sect~
no
1Iitlt - convmlltnc 0
~sect
0 ~i
~i
omiddot i~
H
bullbull hecks
og
middotrr I
~-~ and bull
i
Ulltir PIIltovinll
~ il
il
oflkialgt- _ ~
and pcriodiltOlh ~
WMC [ rn1odcd i ~ of a -
cooy sen -~
clgtk Ol-~
rcotrioti ODd Koval ~ bull ~
equiremonts i-~
[ll
_0
~ sect ~~
-
- ~ ~H
bull )-A I
~~[ll IT a IIG ~
~~~
~ ~l~~
~l~~
witgt ~ ~ ills
ml
[oil
i5S- ~
~
co~iltlD [1
~H~ p )-
AT eurrltntly ~ i ha [ a directi
~ ri io pi wiIilth
~ bull bull tiro ho ~
[~ ~
8 CIIId Joolden or ~Ol1tborizcd -~~[
10 2~~
~
~
rite
~ - f
p
s-
_
n
q 0 coo~oi j
i
~h
~i
~
iO
-
dechnd
1 pL
-~ ~
s-s
J
r~
thir ~~
~
Itovi~ d oUkigt ~- ~
sI
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bull _ onJ ~ p1iOltliclI) ~ 11
-
11mroirdJ e ur g 01
g
II lt
lt [ - _not l sect Oltk sect anwaJ ill
luilOOeIttlt ~-i
~ i
~~
iO
Finoll) ~ ATF ro-lk 3 ~ -18 ~- ~
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M ond ~m
~
bull ~
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middot~
s U_~~
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s ~H
Soolld
s~
~
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Sir
~il rejjOfd lt
l~ i i lt
~il qutioo1 Ii iAt tbIlI1ltIIlO ~ r pl i Ii eo] ~ r fr ~ bullbull 10 i ~ ~ - bull ~-ot
h
- lt001gtlt1 f SoO ~ ~ Koloi bull
202~~middot1707_
n- ~
18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
ATF officials told us that they have reviewed and suspended or closed unnecessary inactive accounts With regard to individually billed travel cards although we identified specific areas in which the management and oversight of travel card accounts can be improved ndash including travel card transactions that occurred when employees were not on official travel status ndash we determined the overall risk to the Department of illegal improper or erroneous transactions to be low because the individual card holder and not the government is liable to pay balances in full and on time
Recommendations
We recommend that JMD
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card APCs and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
We recommend that the FBI and ATF
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
13
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
~tr)rrcT
AST~ANT T ~~M()R llnNPRAT ~0R Airon
) k M ~ 1) R I~ IIlt Off t1To In - GltIgtlaquoal naf Rp~ f i ql y I Q 13 Riltk (ln ept Qr nrtm nt or JlJI i ( ho ned lmgOJn
TIl II dgt 10 (igt ome of raquo hlllplaquoor Ocnl (010 1 d-ft rlort FiLI YCfl20IJ RbIlt AU IIflliUI1111n or ~ i (hor 1 PBIf
11 J 1 - Dm (11))) 1- VI h ~ ~~ DIG I oJ 1 oJgt LI ioHo~iIlJ( 100 0 tbe 0 1( th ITCCIllIllltnJH nlt 10 Iigtlt J MD
R m d koo I Prlolti iaoiJy Wo lniodm 10 bo lh JlU1u5c cw hddlt w Plroinjj d I i onli n ~ I 1 r 1~ ~ I i n~ ~ I Y ili iT ltf)
i
Rlt pngtlt Jhc JMU ron with thr rltCIllll-gtliltln Uri~ Fi YCHI (FY ) 101 j IMll II nd pcdlr - 0 111gt1gt0 cord 1Ilttltkt OlJ fO~ 0[[ 1 ltmpj~ lhe 1 1gtlt1lt1 o[po~liJrni~ lt1 Tk~in~ nugthl) t ~ili l i~ ltgtr y i 1 J U) iJ m 1 Rmiddot J 2 lIpJ OOl l1~ c-1 )ta4 lhn to =ro thot ~~rop I lto J APC gtl 1 ltJ wOIJh in 01 n1l I~e h bull rnr0 lt-lr i(c cmplo) =I ~fQmpll)- c1 II iO 1lt d ot RraquoltT IM JHl - wi h M n IM i~ ~ 2l l bull I 11 ) wi ll N IIgtlt n gt ( 1 W f middot1 r i l laquo( 10 det i ~ amppfltCflri LtK io~ AfC gtltI lmd fmI middot tltOO ITltgt om ploylaquo in bull ~ n I ployt 111 =-o-~ c ~ 00 Ull lt blt w ~ r nT lly JMn lt -~ i -ru ion ~TltI
H middotII 1 Wn w 10 II 1)( 11 01gt11 t iITlp l Plt= lbol U (~ 11(( -O i 1 -d II I r~ 1 lt-d lrgtioi~ wIoti onJ It) m iJU lily and Illli~ c~ hole do to T ~1 ~ ct ~ - IT~~ in
APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
Rp mo rho J~u) COOCS ith tho oon nwi~ oy l~ 1 i JMIJ wili v ti 1 gt0) PO to gtnO md cud hold wi c~ireJ mini w-J cortil i 01 ]Mf) id i =nltili 0 d_
It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
no flaquolt B mllon tip (Ill) Rltgtpo til Offilt of ~ lIosplaquotOT cnJ hdit of tk r a1 Y c GIJ lfuk ~ t of
lHpan_t r J tirlt C1ool Card P Rltgtpo to Rtpon RKo datio
RtponRKo _datio1-4 1muretcardboldon_towrilo~_
ODd tbltir ~ officials Ipoundlt awa- pltriodicaUy fmIiDdltd of comm cbod ~opprovaI~
fBI Rltgtpo to RKo datio 1-4 eom Tbe FBI will ~idoe DOtice to_ CltJIlmc cbod _ tbltir cnifJiDl mrcn (io 11 iDfl of6ciab) to prltnidoe _--spltriodicaIlyImliDl_of~cbltd~
IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
bull bull 0 0 us bull bull opartmont bull ~ bull middot of bull I I J~tl bullbull
I n ~ r 11gt1 Tgtbocco
Fimm -~ L i~ 8~ nd
hpbiC I ii- - ~
~
I
~ ~
~ bull 0 i i sect
q ~ I - ~ ~
l II-- -- SEP191DH ~ ~ --
lt
lt
MEMORANDUM ~ sect 0 ~ ~ g g 1 lt
0
TO gt gt1 Roymond 1 ~-l ~ I i-1 in ir i
s~ i
Beoudet ~ 0
In ~ i oft
~ o~ GlntTal ~ ~ ~ for ~ i -Audit
~
bull FROM ~ ~
gtlt
i
gt nmiddot nmiddot
Mod gt W_
A_ 9~
H )
Dmctor ll~
g
1
if~
~
( ~ o Of 51
lie ~ bull 0 ofMlfTnt f SliWECT c c -bull r 0
~Q
of
~~~ AH
~ ~ l Roopoooo l 1 n~
~~
OJ
~~~ klsptotOl Gen Ci ~
~ ~ ofthlt FisaJ
~1
Offk -Review
~~i
c of ea1 (DIG) s ~if r Ycu ~cn
~~~ ~~
lOll ~g1
middoti ~~ Ri I - h AgtSIIlltJlt ~r
H l -of III
Deporlrnent ~ of ielt ji
H
ClIoamp oil Cord PO -l o I I
Hi
Hi TIli ~ mdon
10j ~~I __
lSo ~ i
~_oo 10
~8[]
providt
i
~1
1~ ~ ~ if tho ~ ~ -I t ~~
-
j~
Bure
f~lZ
~
T_~
T
of
~~
A
~FI~
lcohol -
~~~~
~t 1OO ~ ~
LB
[If
co I firelirru
[i~ ~ ~~
iiw
L~-i
and ii Explo
I
i gt- laquopOllSlt to Ibe
~co
[~~ ~
iO
Off
oh
l
ofIno g ~ [ Genetol ~ n olIlIllODdotioos~ ~ tho evWlt of Dop1Itm i of JU5Iice [DOJ) ~ Otor ~ ~
Cord ~trot ~ Th obiti ~ ofthis [ rrxnndom ~_~ ~ the
~ i lo pOyilto ~~
bull respone middot ~- 0 bull bull J 6~
10 o~~
mrondolioo ~ i -- S
[a
foor stht o l- l-allltoI ~ C
1- A
IT_ fi
S
F F EwUfl ~J
~i5 i ~ -tilO1 eatli IKlld
~~ it 5 s
lt~
~~ authori=l ~-l to nmiddot
sect~
no
1Iitlt - convmlltnc 0
~sect
0 ~i
~i
omiddot i~
H
bullbull hecks
og
middotrr I
~-~ and bull
i
Ulltir PIIltovinll
~ il
il
oflkialgt- _ ~
and pcriodiltOlh ~
WMC [ rn1odcd i ~ of a -
cooy sen -~
clgtk Ol-~
rcotrioti ODd Koval ~ bull ~
equiremonts i-~
[ll
_0
~ sect ~~
-
- ~ ~H
bull )-A I
~~[ll IT a IIG ~
~~~
~ ~l~~
~l~~
witgt ~ ~ ills
ml
[oil
i5S- ~
~
co~iltlD [1
~H~ p )-
AT eurrltntly ~ i ha [ a directi
~ ri io pi wiIilth
~ bull bull tiro ho ~
[~ ~
8 CIIId Joolden or ~Ol1tborizcd -~~[
10 2~~
~
~
rite
~ - f
p
s-
_
n
q 0 coo~oi j
i
~h
~i
~
iO
-
dechnd
1 pL
-~ ~
s-s
J
r~
thir ~~
~
Itovi~ d oUkigt ~- ~
sI
~~ or bull
bull _ onJ ~ p1iOltliclI) ~ 11
-
11mroirdJ e ur g 01
g
II lt
lt [ - _not l sect Oltk sect anwaJ ill
luilOOeIttlt ~-i
~ i
~~
iO
Finoll) ~ ATF ro-lk 3 ~ -18 ~- ~
~ ~ M
~ i ~ ~ ~ ~c lotck ~ =trictioo i
M ond ~m
~
bull ~
-~
quirltmon_ 1~~
middot~
s U_~~
~
s ~H
Soolld
s~
~
~I
Y have ~ ~ on) bull i i
Sir
~il rejjOfd lt
l~ i i lt
~il qutioo1 Ii iAt tbIlI1ltIIlO ~ r pl i Ii eo] ~ r fr ~ bullbull 10 i ~ ~ - bull ~-ot
h
- lt001gtlt1 f SoO ~ ~ Koloi bull
202~~middot1707_
n- ~
18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
SEP 1 U 4
1F~)~~ITHJ1 FOR RA y)1O~n J HAUJ)iT
~tr)rrcT
AST~ANT T ~~M()R llnNPRAT ~0R Airon
) k M ~ 1) R I~ IIlt Off t1To In - GltIgtlaquoal naf Rp~ f i ql y I Q 13 Riltk (ln ept Qr nrtm nt or JlJI i ( ho ned lmgOJn
TIl II dgt 10 (igt ome of raquo hlllplaquoor Ocnl (010 1 d-ft rlort FiLI YCfl20IJ RbIlt AU IIflliUI1111n or ~ i (hor 1 PBIf
11 J 1 - Dm (11))) 1- VI h ~ ~~ DIG I oJ 1 oJgt LI ioHo~iIlJ( 100 0 tbe 0 1( th ITCCIllIllltnJH nlt 10 Iigtlt J MD
R m d koo I Prlolti iaoiJy Wo lniodm 10 bo lh JlU1u5c cw hddlt w Plroinjj d I i onli n ~ I 1 r 1~ ~ I i n~ ~ I Y ili iT ltf)
i
Rlt pngtlt Jhc JMU ron with thr rltCIllll-gtliltln Uri~ Fi YCHI (FY ) 101 j IMll II nd pcdlr - 0 111gt1gt0 cord 1Ilttltkt OlJ fO~ 0[[ 1 ltmpj~ lhe 1 1gtlt1lt1 o[po~liJrni~ lt1 Tk~in~ nugthl) t ~ili l i~ ltgtr y i 1 J U) iJ m 1 Rmiddot J 2 lIpJ OOl l1~ c-1 )ta4 lhn to =ro thot ~~rop I lto J APC gtl 1 ltJ wOIJh in 01 n1l I~e h bull rnr0 lt-lr i(c cmplo) =I ~fQmpll)- c1 II iO 1lt d ot RraquoltT IM JHl - wi h M n IM i~ ~ 2l l bull I 11 ) wi ll N IIgtlt n gt ( 1 W f middot1 r i l laquo( 10 det i ~ amppfltCflri LtK io~ AfC gtltI lmd fmI middot tltOO ITltgt om ploylaquo in bull ~ n I ployt 111 =-o-~ c ~ 00 Ull lt blt w ~ r nT lly JMn lt -~ i -ru ion ~TltI
H middotII 1 Wn w 10 II 1)( 11 01gt11 t iITlp l Plt= lbol U (~ 11(( -O i 1 -d II I r~ 1 lt-d lrgtioi~ wIoti onJ It) m iJU lily and Illli~ c~ hole do to T ~1 ~ ct ~ - IT~~ in
APPENDIX I
JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVISION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
14
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
Rp mo rho J~u) COOCS ith tho oon nwi~ oy l~ 1 i JMIJ wili v ti 1 gt0) PO to gtnO md cud hold wi c~ireJ mini w-J cortil i 01 ]Mf) id i =nltili 0 d_
It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
no flaquolt B mllon tip (Ill) Rltgtpo til Offilt of ~ lIosplaquotOT cnJ hdit of tk r a1 Y c GIJ lfuk ~ t of
lHpan_t r J tirlt C1ool Card P Rltgtpo to Rtpon RKo datio
RtponRKo _datio1-4 1muretcardboldon_towrilo~_
ODd tbltir ~ officials Ipoundlt awa- pltriodicaUy fmIiDdltd of comm cbod ~opprovaI~
fBI Rltgtpo to RKo datio 1-4 eom Tbe FBI will ~idoe DOtice to_ CltJIlmc cbod _ tbltir cnifJiDl mrcn (io 11 iDfl of6ciab) to prltnidoe _--spltriodicaIlyImliDl_of~cbltd~
IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
bull bull 0 0 us bull bull opartmont bull ~ bull middot of bull I I J~tl bullbull
I n ~ r 11gt1 Tgtbocco
Fimm -~ L i~ 8~ nd
hpbiC I ii- - ~
~
I
~ ~
~ bull 0 i i sect
q ~ I - ~ ~
l II-- -- SEP191DH ~ ~ --
lt
lt
MEMORANDUM ~ sect 0 ~ ~ g g 1 lt
0
TO gt gt1 Roymond 1 ~-l ~ I i-1 in ir i
s~ i
Beoudet ~ 0
In ~ i oft
~ o~ GlntTal ~ ~ ~ for ~ i -Audit
~
bull FROM ~ ~
gtlt
i
gt nmiddot nmiddot
Mod gt W_
A_ 9~
H )
Dmctor ll~
g
1
if~
~
( ~ o Of 51
lie ~ bull 0 ofMlfTnt f SliWECT c c -bull r 0
~Q
of
~~~ AH
~ ~ l Roopoooo l 1 n~
~~
OJ
~~~ klsptotOl Gen Ci ~
~ ~ ofthlt FisaJ
~1
Offk -Review
~~i
c of ea1 (DIG) s ~if r Ycu ~cn
~~~ ~~
lOll ~g1
middoti ~~ Ri I - h AgtSIIlltJlt ~r
H l -of III
Deporlrnent ~ of ielt ji
H
ClIoamp oil Cord PO -l o I I
Hi
Hi TIli ~ mdon
10j ~~I __
lSo ~ i
~_oo 10
~8[]
providt
i
~1
1~ ~ ~ if tho ~ ~ -I t ~~
-
j~
Bure
f~lZ
~
T_~
T
of
~~
A
~FI~
lcohol -
~~~~
~t 1OO ~ ~
LB
[If
co I firelirru
[i~ ~ ~~
iiw
L~-i
and ii Explo
I
i gt- laquopOllSlt to Ibe
~co
[~~ ~
iO
Off
oh
l
ofIno g ~ [ Genetol ~ n olIlIllODdotioos~ ~ tho evWlt of Dop1Itm i of JU5Iice [DOJ) ~ Otor ~ ~
Cord ~trot ~ Th obiti ~ ofthis [ rrxnndom ~_~ ~ the
~ i lo pOyilto ~~
bull respone middot ~- 0 bull bull J 6~
10 o~~
mrondolioo ~ i -- S
[a
foor stht o l- l-allltoI ~ C
1- A
IT_ fi
S
F F EwUfl ~J
~i5 i ~ -tilO1 eatli IKlld
~~ it 5 s
lt~
~~ authori=l ~-l to nmiddot
sect~
no
1Iitlt - convmlltnc 0
~sect
0 ~i
~i
omiddot i~
H
bullbull hecks
og
middotrr I
~-~ and bull
i
Ulltir PIIltovinll
~ il
il
oflkialgt- _ ~
and pcriodiltOlh ~
WMC [ rn1odcd i ~ of a -
cooy sen -~
clgtk Ol-~
rcotrioti ODd Koval ~ bull ~
equiremonts i-~
[ll
_0
~ sect ~~
-
- ~ ~H
bull )-A I
~~[ll IT a IIG ~
~~~
~ ~l~~
~l~~
witgt ~ ~ ills
ml
[oil
i5S- ~
~
co~iltlD [1
~H~ p )-
AT eurrltntly ~ i ha [ a directi
~ ri io pi wiIilth
~ bull bull tiro ho ~
[~ ~
8 CIIId Joolden or ~Ol1tborizcd -~~[
10 2~~
~
~
rite
~ - f
p
s-
_
n
q 0 coo~oi j
i
~h
~i
~
iO
-
dechnd
1 pL
-~ ~
s-s
J
r~
thir ~~
~
Itovi~ d oUkigt ~- ~
sI
~~ or bull
bull _ onJ ~ p1iOltliclI) ~ 11
-
11mroirdJ e ur g 01
g
II lt
lt [ - _not l sect Oltk sect anwaJ ill
luilOOeIttlt ~-i
~ i
~~
iO
Finoll) ~ ATF ro-lk 3 ~ -18 ~- ~
~ ~ M
~ i ~ ~ ~ ~c lotck ~ =trictioo i
M ond ~m
~
bull ~
-~
quirltmon_ 1~~
middot~
s U_~~
~
s ~H
Soolld
s~
~
~I
Y have ~ ~ on) bull i i
Sir
~il rejjOfd lt
l~ i i lt
~il qutioo1 Ii iAt tbIlI1ltIIlO ~ r pl i Ii eo] ~ r fr ~ bullbull 10 i ~ ~ - bull ~-ot
h
- lt001gtlt1 f SoO ~ ~ Koloi bull
202~~middot1707_
n- ~
18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
plt 3 of 1 tolt 11 A~an-IJjraquo~oJ 00lt110 hl Slli~C I ~I mn fliH ~lt T lh om )fthe IMpltctOr (imo1 lull Rpo ~ li ~ 1 y Oil Rd 1lt~~ - iltIOun oj ti ella Cr1lrwryq
Rp mo rho J~u) COOCS ith tho oon nwi~ oy l~ 1 i JMIJ wili v ti 1 gt0) PO to gtnO md cud hold wi c~ireJ mini w-J cortil i 01 ]Mf) id i =nltili 0 d_
It ) 11- que-~ pleaoo mlt 00 (~O2) ll ltmiddot3lUl or _TOYOOlS (( 11 0 AII-7 l))rlt11 IJieltW fi Still_ ]tD m (102) 616-52 H
15
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
no flaquolt B mllon tip (Ill) Rltgtpo til Offilt of ~ lIosplaquotOT cnJ hdit of tk r a1 Y c GIJ lfuk ~ t of
lHpan_t r J tirlt C1ool Card P Rltgtpo to Rtpon RKo datio
RtponRKo _datio1-4 1muretcardboldon_towrilo~_
ODd tbltir ~ officials Ipoundlt awa- pltriodicaUy fmIiDdltd of comm cbod ~opprovaI~
fBI Rltgtpo to RKo datio 1-4 eom Tbe FBI will ~idoe DOtice to_ CltJIlmc cbod _ tbltir cnifJiDl mrcn (io 11 iDfl of6ciab) to prltnidoe _--spltriodicaIlyImliDl_of~cbltd~
IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
bull bull 0 0 us bull bull opartmont bull ~ bull middot of bull I I J~tl bullbull
I n ~ r 11gt1 Tgtbocco
Fimm -~ L i~ 8~ nd
hpbiC I ii- - ~
~
I
~ ~
~ bull 0 i i sect
q ~ I - ~ ~
l II-- -- SEP191DH ~ ~ --
lt
lt
MEMORANDUM ~ sect 0 ~ ~ g g 1 lt
0
TO gt gt1 Roymond 1 ~-l ~ I i-1 in ir i
s~ i
Beoudet ~ 0
In ~ i oft
~ o~ GlntTal ~ ~ ~ for ~ i -Audit
~
bull FROM ~ ~
gtlt
i
gt nmiddot nmiddot
Mod gt W_
A_ 9~
H )
Dmctor ll~
g
1
if~
~
( ~ o Of 51
lie ~ bull 0 ofMlfTnt f SliWECT c c -bull r 0
~Q
of
~~~ AH
~ ~ l Roopoooo l 1 n~
~~
OJ
~~~ klsptotOl Gen Ci ~
~ ~ ofthlt FisaJ
~1
Offk -Review
~~i
c of ea1 (DIG) s ~if r Ycu ~cn
~~~ ~~
lOll ~g1
middoti ~~ Ri I - h AgtSIIlltJlt ~r
H l -of III
Deporlrnent ~ of ielt ji
H
ClIoamp oil Cord PO -l o I I
Hi
Hi TIli ~ mdon
10j ~~I __
lSo ~ i
~_oo 10
~8[]
providt
i
~1
1~ ~ ~ if tho ~ ~ -I t ~~
-
j~
Bure
f~lZ
~
T_~
T
of
~~
A
~FI~
lcohol -
~~~~
~t 1OO ~ ~
LB
[If
co I firelirru
[i~ ~ ~~
iiw
L~-i
and ii Explo
I
i gt- laquopOllSlt to Ibe
~co
[~~ ~
iO
Off
oh
l
ofIno g ~ [ Genetol ~ n olIlIllODdotioos~ ~ tho evWlt of Dop1Itm i of JU5Iice [DOJ) ~ Otor ~ ~
Cord ~trot ~ Th obiti ~ ofthis [ rrxnndom ~_~ ~ the
~ i lo pOyilto ~~
bull respone middot ~- 0 bull bull J 6~
10 o~~
mrondolioo ~ i -- S
[a
foor stht o l- l-allltoI ~ C
1- A
IT_ fi
S
F F EwUfl ~J
~i5 i ~ -tilO1 eatli IKlld
~~ it 5 s
lt~
~~ authori=l ~-l to nmiddot
sect~
no
1Iitlt - convmlltnc 0
~sect
0 ~i
~i
omiddot i~
H
bullbull hecks
og
middotrr I
~-~ and bull
i
Ulltir PIIltovinll
~ il
il
oflkialgt- _ ~
and pcriodiltOlh ~
WMC [ rn1odcd i ~ of a -
cooy sen -~
clgtk Ol-~
rcotrioti ODd Koval ~ bull ~
equiremonts i-~
[ll
_0
~ sect ~~
-
- ~ ~H
bull )-A I
~~[ll IT a IIG ~
~~~
~ ~l~~
~l~~
witgt ~ ~ ills
ml
[oil
i5S- ~
~
co~iltlD [1
~H~ p )-
AT eurrltntly ~ i ha [ a directi
~ ri io pi wiIilth
~ bull bull tiro ho ~
[~ ~
8 CIIId Joolden or ~Ol1tborizcd -~~[
10 2~~
~
~
rite
~ - f
p
s-
_
n
q 0 coo~oi j
i
~h
~i
~
iO
-
dechnd
1 pL
-~ ~
s-s
J
r~
thir ~~
~
Itovi~ d oUkigt ~- ~
sI
~~ or bull
bull _ onJ ~ p1iOltliclI) ~ 11
-
11mroirdJ e ur g 01
g
II lt
lt [ - _not l sect Oltk sect anwaJ ill
luilOOeIttlt ~-i
~ i
~~
iO
Finoll) ~ ATF ro-lk 3 ~ -18 ~- ~
~ ~ M
~ i ~ ~ ~ ~c lotck ~ =trictioo i
M ond ~m
~
bull ~
-~
quirltmon_ 1~~
middot~
s U_~~
~
s ~H
Soolld
s~
~
~I
Y have ~ ~ on) bull i i
Sir
~il rejjOfd lt
l~ i i lt
~il qutioo1 Ii iAt tbIlI1ltIIlO ~ r pl i Ii eo] ~ r fr ~ bullbull 10 i ~ ~ - bull ~-ot
h
- lt001gtlt1 f SoO ~ ~ Koloi bull
202~~middot1707_
n- ~
18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
The Honorable Michael E Horowitz InspelOr General Office of the Inspector General US Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington DC 20530
Dear Mr Horowitz
us Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D C 20535-0001
September 24 2014
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your office s report entitled Fiscal Yeur 20 J 3 Risk Assessmenl of Deparmenl of Jusice Charge Card Programs
We are pleased you found At the FBI designated officials review convenience checks afier the purchase as part of the monthly reconciliation review In addition the FBI centrally performs a quarterly review of all convenience check activity
We agree periodic reminders of convenience checks rules are helpful for cardholders and approving officials In that regard we eoncur with your one recommendation for the FBI
Should you have any questions please feel Irce to contact me We greatly appreciate the professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter
Sincerely
Y(Wllt A1J v-v Laura R Ingber Section Chief External Audit and Compliance Section Inspection Division
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
16
no flaquolt B mllon tip (Ill) Rltgtpo til Offilt of ~ lIosplaquotOT cnJ hdit of tk r a1 Y c GIJ lfuk ~ t of
lHpan_t r J tirlt C1ool Card P Rltgtpo to Rtpon RKo datio
RtponRKo _datio1-4 1muretcardboldon_towrilo~_
ODd tbltir ~ officials Ipoundlt awa- pltriodicaUy fmIiDdltd of comm cbod ~opprovaI~
fBI Rltgtpo to RKo datio 1-4 eom Tbe FBI will ~idoe DOtice to_ CltJIlmc cbod _ tbltir cnifJiDl mrcn (io 11 iDfl of6ciab) to prltnidoe _--spltriodicaIlyImliDl_of~cbltd~
IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
bull bull 0 0 us bull bull opartmont bull ~ bull middot of bull I I J~tl bullbull
I n ~ r 11gt1 Tgtbocco
Fimm -~ L i~ 8~ nd
hpbiC I ii- - ~
~
I
~ ~
~ bull 0 i i sect
q ~ I - ~ ~
l II-- -- SEP191DH ~ ~ --
lt
lt
MEMORANDUM ~ sect 0 ~ ~ g g 1 lt
0
TO gt gt1 Roymond 1 ~-l ~ I i-1 in ir i
s~ i
Beoudet ~ 0
In ~ i oft
~ o~ GlntTal ~ ~ ~ for ~ i -Audit
~
bull FROM ~ ~
gtlt
i
gt nmiddot nmiddot
Mod gt W_
A_ 9~
H )
Dmctor ll~
g
1
if~
~
( ~ o Of 51
lie ~ bull 0 ofMlfTnt f SliWECT c c -bull r 0
~Q
of
~~~ AH
~ ~ l Roopoooo l 1 n~
~~
OJ
~~~ klsptotOl Gen Ci ~
~ ~ ofthlt FisaJ
~1
Offk -Review
~~i
c of ea1 (DIG) s ~if r Ycu ~cn
~~~ ~~
lOll ~g1
middoti ~~ Ri I - h AgtSIIlltJlt ~r
H l -of III
Deporlrnent ~ of ielt ji
H
ClIoamp oil Cord PO -l o I I
Hi
Hi TIli ~ mdon
10j ~~I __
lSo ~ i
~_oo 10
~8[]
providt
i
~1
1~ ~ ~ if tho ~ ~ -I t ~~
-
j~
Bure
f~lZ
~
T_~
T
of
~~
A
~FI~
lcohol -
~~~~
~t 1OO ~ ~
LB
[If
co I firelirru
[i~ ~ ~~
iiw
L~-i
and ii Explo
I
i gt- laquopOllSlt to Ibe
~co
[~~ ~
iO
Off
oh
l
ofIno g ~ [ Genetol ~ n olIlIllODdotioos~ ~ tho evWlt of Dop1Itm i of JU5Iice [DOJ) ~ Otor ~ ~
Cord ~trot ~ Th obiti ~ ofthis [ rrxnndom ~_~ ~ the
~ i lo pOyilto ~~
bull respone middot ~- 0 bull bull J 6~
10 o~~
mrondolioo ~ i -- S
[a
foor stht o l- l-allltoI ~ C
1- A
IT_ fi
S
F F EwUfl ~J
~i5 i ~ -tilO1 eatli IKlld
~~ it 5 s
lt~
~~ authori=l ~-l to nmiddot
sect~
no
1Iitlt - convmlltnc 0
~sect
0 ~i
~i
omiddot i~
H
bullbull hecks
og
middotrr I
~-~ and bull
i
Ulltir PIIltovinll
~ il
il
oflkialgt- _ ~
and pcriodiltOlh ~
WMC [ rn1odcd i ~ of a -
cooy sen -~
clgtk Ol-~
rcotrioti ODd Koval ~ bull ~
equiremonts i-~
[ll
_0
~ sect ~~
-
- ~ ~H
bull )-A I
~~[ll IT a IIG ~
~~~
~ ~l~~
~l~~
witgt ~ ~ ills
ml
[oil
i5S- ~
~
co~iltlD [1
~H~ p )-
AT eurrltntly ~ i ha [ a directi
~ ri io pi wiIilth
~ bull bull tiro ho ~
[~ ~
8 CIIId Joolden or ~Ol1tborizcd -~~[
10 2~~
~
~
rite
~ - f
p
s-
_
n
q 0 coo~oi j
i
~h
~i
~
iO
-
dechnd
1 pL
-~ ~
s-s
J
r~
thir ~~
~
Itovi~ d oUkigt ~- ~
sI
~~ or bull
bull _ onJ ~ p1iOltliclI) ~ 11
-
11mroirdJ e ur g 01
g
II lt
lt [ - _not l sect Oltk sect anwaJ ill
luilOOeIttlt ~-i
~ i
~~
iO
Finoll) ~ ATF ro-lk 3 ~ -18 ~- ~
~ ~ M
~ i ~ ~ ~ ~c lotck ~ =trictioo i
M ond ~m
~
bull ~
-~
quirltmon_ 1~~
middot~
s U_~~
~
s ~H
Soolld
s~
~
~I
Y have ~ ~ on) bull i i
Sir
~il rejjOfd lt
l~ i i lt
~il qutioo1 Ii iAt tbIlI1ltIIlO ~ r pl i Ii eo] ~ r fr ~ bullbull 10 i ~ ~ - bull ~-ot
h
- lt001gtlt1 f SoO ~ ~ Koloi bull
202~~middot1707_
n- ~
18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
no flaquolt B mllon tip (Ill) Rltgtpo til Offilt of ~ lIosplaquotOT cnJ hdit of tk r a1 Y c GIJ lfuk ~ t of
lHpan_t r J tirlt C1ool Card P Rltgtpo to Rtpon RKo datio
RtponRKo _datio1-4 1muretcardboldon_towrilo~_
ODd tbltir ~ officials Ipoundlt awa- pltriodicaUy fmIiDdltd of comm cbod ~opprovaI~
fBI Rltgtpo to RKo datio 1-4 eom Tbe FBI will ~idoe DOtice to_ CltJIlmc cbod _ tbltir cnifJiDl mrcn (io 11 iDfl of6ciab) to prltnidoe _--spltriodicaIlyImliDl_of~cbltd~
IIIi ~
17
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
bull bull 0 0 us bull bull opartmont bull ~ bull middot of bull I I J~tl bullbull
I n ~ r 11gt1 Tgtbocco
Fimm -~ L i~ 8~ nd
hpbiC I ii- - ~
~
I
~ ~
~ bull 0 i i sect
q ~ I - ~ ~
l II-- -- SEP191DH ~ ~ --
lt
lt
MEMORANDUM ~ sect 0 ~ ~ g g 1 lt
0
TO gt gt1 Roymond 1 ~-l ~ I i-1 in ir i
s~ i
Beoudet ~ 0
In ~ i oft
~ o~ GlntTal ~ ~ ~ for ~ i -Audit
~
bull FROM ~ ~
gtlt
i
gt nmiddot nmiddot
Mod gt W_
A_ 9~
H )
Dmctor ll~
g
1
if~
~
( ~ o Of 51
lie ~ bull 0 ofMlfTnt f SliWECT c c -bull r 0
~Q
of
~~~ AH
~ ~ l Roopoooo l 1 n~
~~
OJ
~~~ klsptotOl Gen Ci ~
~ ~ ofthlt FisaJ
~1
Offk -Review
~~i
c of ea1 (DIG) s ~if r Ycu ~cn
~~~ ~~
lOll ~g1
middoti ~~ Ri I - h AgtSIIlltJlt ~r
H l -of III
Deporlrnent ~ of ielt ji
H
ClIoamp oil Cord PO -l o I I
Hi
Hi TIli ~ mdon
10j ~~I __
lSo ~ i
~_oo 10
~8[]
providt
i
~1
1~ ~ ~ if tho ~ ~ -I t ~~
-
j~
Bure
f~lZ
~
T_~
T
of
~~
A
~FI~
lcohol -
~~~~
~t 1OO ~ ~
LB
[If
co I firelirru
[i~ ~ ~~
iiw
L~-i
and ii Explo
I
i gt- laquopOllSlt to Ibe
~co
[~~ ~
iO
Off
oh
l
ofIno g ~ [ Genetol ~ n olIlIllODdotioos~ ~ tho evWlt of Dop1Itm i of JU5Iice [DOJ) ~ Otor ~ ~
Cord ~trot ~ Th obiti ~ ofthis [ rrxnndom ~_~ ~ the
~ i lo pOyilto ~~
bull respone middot ~- 0 bull bull J 6~
10 o~~
mrondolioo ~ i -- S
[a
foor stht o l- l-allltoI ~ C
1- A
IT_ fi
S
F F EwUfl ~J
~i5 i ~ -tilO1 eatli IKlld
~~ it 5 s
lt~
~~ authori=l ~-l to nmiddot
sect~
no
1Iitlt - convmlltnc 0
~sect
0 ~i
~i
omiddot i~
H
bullbull hecks
og
middotrr I
~-~ and bull
i
Ulltir PIIltovinll
~ il
il
oflkialgt- _ ~
and pcriodiltOlh ~
WMC [ rn1odcd i ~ of a -
cooy sen -~
clgtk Ol-~
rcotrioti ODd Koval ~ bull ~
equiremonts i-~
[ll
_0
~ sect ~~
-
- ~ ~H
bull )-A I
~~[ll IT a IIG ~
~~~
~ ~l~~
~l~~
witgt ~ ~ ills
ml
[oil
i5S- ~
~
co~iltlD [1
~H~ p )-
AT eurrltntly ~ i ha [ a directi
~ ri io pi wiIilth
~ bull bull tiro ho ~
[~ ~
8 CIIId Joolden or ~Ol1tborizcd -~~[
10 2~~
~
~
rite
~ - f
p
s-
_
n
q 0 coo~oi j
i
~h
~i
~
iO
-
dechnd
1 pL
-~ ~
s-s
J
r~
thir ~~
~
Itovi~ d oUkigt ~- ~
sI
~~ or bull
bull _ onJ ~ p1iOltliclI) ~ 11
-
11mroirdJ e ur g 01
g
II lt
lt [ - _not l sect Oltk sect anwaJ ill
luilOOeIttlt ~-i
~ i
~~
iO
Finoll) ~ ATF ro-lk 3 ~ -18 ~- ~
~ ~ M
~ i ~ ~ ~ ~c lotck ~ =trictioo i
M ond ~m
~
bull ~
-~
quirltmon_ 1~~
middot~
s U_~~
~
s ~H
Soolld
s~
~
~I
Y have ~ ~ on) bull i i
Sir
~il rejjOfd lt
l~ i i lt
~il qutioo1 Ii iAt tbIlI1ltIIlO ~ r pl i Ii eo] ~ r fr ~ bullbull 10 i ~ ~ - bull ~-ot
h
- lt001gtlt1 f SoO ~ ~ Koloi bull
202~~middot1707_
n- ~
18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
i
APPENDIX III
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT
bull bull 0 0 us bull bull opartmont bull ~ bull middot of bull I I J~tl bullbull
I n ~ r 11gt1 Tgtbocco
Fimm -~ L i~ 8~ nd
hpbiC I ii- - ~
~
I
~ ~
~ bull 0 i i sect
q ~ I - ~ ~
l II-- -- SEP191DH ~ ~ --
lt
lt
MEMORANDUM ~ sect 0 ~ ~ g g 1 lt
0
TO gt gt1 Roymond 1 ~-l ~ I i-1 in ir i
s~ i
Beoudet ~ 0
In ~ i oft
~ o~ GlntTal ~ ~ ~ for ~ i -Audit
~
bull FROM ~ ~
gtlt
i
gt nmiddot nmiddot
Mod gt W_
A_ 9~
H )
Dmctor ll~
g
1
if~
~
( ~ o Of 51
lie ~ bull 0 ofMlfTnt f SliWECT c c -bull r 0
~Q
of
~~~ AH
~ ~ l Roopoooo l 1 n~
~~
OJ
~~~ klsptotOl Gen Ci ~
~ ~ ofthlt FisaJ
~1
Offk -Review
~~i
c of ea1 (DIG) s ~if r Ycu ~cn
~~~ ~~
lOll ~g1
middoti ~~ Ri I - h AgtSIIlltJlt ~r
H l -of III
Deporlrnent ~ of ielt ji
H
ClIoamp oil Cord PO -l o I I
Hi
Hi TIli ~ mdon
10j ~~I __
lSo ~ i
~_oo 10
~8[]
providt
i
~1
1~ ~ ~ if tho ~ ~ -I t ~~
-
j~
Bure
f~lZ
~
T_~
T
of
~~
A
~FI~
lcohol -
~~~~
~t 1OO ~ ~
LB
[If
co I firelirru
[i~ ~ ~~
iiw
L~-i
and ii Explo
I
i gt- laquopOllSlt to Ibe
~co
[~~ ~
iO
Off
oh
l
ofIno g ~ [ Genetol ~ n olIlIllODdotioos~ ~ tho evWlt of Dop1Itm i of JU5Iice [DOJ) ~ Otor ~ ~
Cord ~trot ~ Th obiti ~ ofthis [ rrxnndom ~_~ ~ the
~ i lo pOyilto ~~
bull respone middot ~- 0 bull bull J 6~
10 o~~
mrondolioo ~ i -- S
[a
foor stht o l- l-allltoI ~ C
1- A
IT_ fi
S
F F EwUfl ~J
~i5 i ~ -tilO1 eatli IKlld
~~ it 5 s
lt~
~~ authori=l ~-l to nmiddot
sect~
no
1Iitlt - convmlltnc 0
~sect
0 ~i
~i
omiddot i~
H
bullbull hecks
og
middotrr I
~-~ and bull
i
Ulltir PIIltovinll
~ il
il
oflkialgt- _ ~
and pcriodiltOlh ~
WMC [ rn1odcd i ~ of a -
cooy sen -~
clgtk Ol-~
rcotrioti ODd Koval ~ bull ~
equiremonts i-~
[ll
_0
~ sect ~~
-
- ~ ~H
bull )-A I
~~[ll IT a IIG ~
~~~
~ ~l~~
~l~~
witgt ~ ~ ills
ml
[oil
i5S- ~
~
co~iltlD [1
~H~ p )-
AT eurrltntly ~ i ha [ a directi
~ ri io pi wiIilth
~ bull bull tiro ho ~
[~ ~
8 CIIId Joolden or ~Ol1tborizcd -~~[
10 2~~
~
~
rite
~ - f
p
s-
_
n
q 0 coo~oi j
i
~h
~i
~
iO
-
dechnd
1 pL
-~ ~
s-s
J
r~
thir ~~
~
Itovi~ d oUkigt ~- ~
sI
~~ or bull
bull _ onJ ~ p1iOltliclI) ~ 11
-
11mroirdJ e ur g 01
g
II lt
lt [ - _not l sect Oltk sect anwaJ ill
luilOOeIttlt ~-i
~ i
~~
iO
Finoll) ~ ATF ro-lk 3 ~ -18 ~- ~
~ ~ M
~ i ~ ~ ~ ~c lotck ~ =trictioo i
M ond ~m
~
bull ~
-~
quirltmon_ 1~~
middot~
s U_~~
~
s ~H
Soolld
s~
~
~I
Y have ~ ~ on) bull i i
Sir
~il rejjOfd lt
l~ i i lt
~il qutioo1 Ii iAt tbIlI1ltIIlO ~ r pl i Ii eo] ~ r fr ~ bullbull 10 i ~ ~ - bull ~-ot
h
- lt001gtlt1 f SoO ~ ~ Koloi bull
202~~middot1707_
n- ~
18
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20
APPENDIX IV
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to the Departmentrsquos Justice Management Division (JMD) Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) JMDrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix I The FBIrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix II and ATFrsquos response is incorporated in Appendix III The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the report
Recommendation
1 Periodically issue reminders to both purchase card holders and approving officials regarding the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 periodic reminders will be sent to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations for every active account
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD sends reminders to purchase card holders and approving officials emphasizing the importance of performing and reviewing monthly reconciliations
2 Update the DOJ Charge Card Management Plan to ensure that appropriate purchase card agency program coordinators (APC) and travel card coordinators receive notification when an employee with a charge card leaves employment and promptly cancel all associated charge card accounts
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that it will update the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and work with components to determine appropriate notifications for APCs and travel card coordinators when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
This recommendation can be closed when (1) JMD updates the FY 2015 Charge Card Management Plan and (2) APCs and travel card coordinators receive notices when an employee with a charge card leaves employment
19
3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
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3 Work with other DOJ components to implement a process that ensures component APCs receive and track all travel card training certifications so they can identify and prompt card holders due to receive required travel card refresher training
Resolved JMD concurred with our recommendation JMD stated in its response that JMD will work with other DOJ components to ensure that travel card holders receive required training and that appropriate personnel maintain certifications
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that JMD worked with DOJ components to ensure that required training is completed and certifications are maintained by appropriate component personnel The evidence provided should include documentation of any new guidance or procedures implemented
4 Ensure that card holders authorized to write convenience checks and their approving officials are aware and periodically reminded of convenience check restrictions and approval requirements
Resolved The FBI and ATF concurred with our recommendation The FBI stated in its response that it will periodically notify authorized convenience check holders and their approving officials regarding convenience check restrictions and requirements ATF stated in its response that it will also periodically remind card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials on the restrictions and approval requirements
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI and ATF send periodic reminders to card holders authorized to write convenience checks and approving officials regarding the restrictions and approval requirements
20