fairchild-republic a-10 thunderbolt ii
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airchild Republic IO
Thunderbolt
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P TO THEW RTHO[ j) \ cQ)(J
- - - - ( ~ \ ~ - - 1 ) ; ; ~ ~ L: _
A V I A T I O . N r S ~ SERIES
airchild Republic IO
Tliunilerbolt II
Peter Smith
You are SLOW A- J0, the F-I 6C screams,
You staRRer so I)ainfull), across the sk) ,
While Jsoar effortlessly five miles hiRh,
Jturn, and Jtwist, and Idive, and Jzoom,J tear a:;:ure sky wi th my transonic boom
The A- J0 says nothinR; just Roes on
killinR wnl<s; thwaninR the dictator s dreams.)
You are UGLY, A-JO, the F-J5E sneers,
StraiRht winRs, hiRh enRines, an anRldar Geek,My lines flow and blend, aerodynamic and sleek,PartinR the sunlit sky, with my roar and m flash,
While you crawl down in the mud,with the trool)S, in the hash.
The A- J0 says nothinR, just Roes on
cullinR tanks, caminR the enemy teaLl)
Yot are AWKWt ARD, -10,
the AI)ache whool)s l / [ ,
M blades take me an) lace , J m claimy, I m neat,
nd I I)ack quite a lJUnch, RtlllS and missiles coml)lete,
(While it s true that just one hit orinRs me doum in a /Jile,
) et you take hit after hit after hit, and still
kee/J fiRhtinR in style) .
The A-1O says nothinR, too btlS), with tanks,wrninR each victory into a rout )
Ymtare OLD, A-IO, thejSF boasts,
I m a fledRlinR, et er) thinR des irahie and wand,I can fly from adeck, I can fly from the land
I f Icould only fly from this drawinR hoard,
I d quickl) rel)lace ) Ol/,
Your da) is done, my da) is to come,just wait, you ll see it s tr 1C ) ,
The A I sa) s nothing, continues
chewinR Ul talll<s, wiling the et,i/ hom )
Yul) - the -10 sa) s nothinR; getson with the joh; she is only a COR
Without hraRRing, without fllSs,
without expecting nutch thanks,
KillinR Tanks, KillinR Tanks,KillinR Tanks, KILLI G T KS
The Gis on the gnJlmd wal e their arms in relief,
As T7 s cnonl)le, carlsinR the enem) hiRh wief. Still the A I 0 says nothinR, hra thinks to herself,
Just doin my joh hoy I , I m GLAD I m a HawR )
PETER C. SMITH, 2000
The Crowood Press
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knowledgementst puhlishedin 2000by
Crmvollli PressLtd
ry, Marlhorough
S 2HR
PererC. Smith 2000
rightsreserved. No part o thispuhlication may
reproduced or rran )lllittcd n ny form or y ny
electronic or mechanical Including
copy.recording,or any information :-,tllragc
rerril ·al ~ y ~ t I l l without p r m ~ i o n n writing
publishers.
C ataloguing-in-Publication Data
cataloguerecord(or thishook is anlilahle (rom
Brirish Lihrary.
1861263244
previouspage: An -10 teamin rrail
carrying 600USGallon drop ranks ro
rheir fCrry range. These aircraftare o the
th Tactical Fighter c quadron, hased ar Eidson
Nmional Archi\Ts, College Park, 11)
the memory o f C a p ta i n Richard
e S t or r , Captain t e ve n R i ch a rd
and Is t L i e u te n a n t Patrick B.
s o n, t h e A - O pilots who gave their
fighting viI.
Goudy Lac ,
headin :s .
and designed hI
Puhli,hing
Business P rk, Lamhourtl Woodland,
Rcrkshire.
tedand bound hI Bookcra(r, Midsummer orton.
I would particularly like to t h an k t h e fol
lowing for their unstinred aid, advice and
help in compilingthe chequered history of
the Warthog , and acknow ledge my deep
debt to their contributions to th is contin
uing story.
First and foremost, I am grateful to Dr
George M. Wat o n , w h o gavegracious per
mission t o q u ot e from his comprehensiv
history o f t he early day o f t h e A-IO pro
gramme, The A-10 Close Air U} } ort Air
craft an excellent ourcefor further investi
gation; alsoto MrGeorge C. Leavy, who was
on t he A- tO programme from the very
beginning, and is currently Senior Manager
on the A-IO Engineering Program at
orthrop Grumman, Bethpage, ewYork.
Thanks arealsodue to Rebecca Looney,
Curatorand Lynn V McDonald, Volunteer,radle of Aviation Museum, Garden City,
ew York;Commander Stephen J. Riordan
IV U S N R etd)and DrEllen Bicknell,Avi-
ation Archives, Bethesda, Maryland; Kent
A. Mitchell, Hagerstown Aviation Heritage
Museum, Hagerstown, Maryland, for per
mission toquote from hisbook Fairchild Air
craft 1926-/967; B ri an i cklas, a ti on al
Air Space Museum, Washington, DC, for
guidance on the 277 cubic feet repository
collection housing the Fairchild Industries
Inc. Collection 1919- 0) ; Linda Dela
torre, DVIC/JCW , March AFB, Califor
n ia ; K ir sten Tedesco , Deputy Direc tor l
C urator of Collections, Pima Air pace
Museum, Tucson, Arizona; Gene Jillson,
Johnson Controls, Inc., March ARB, Cali
fornia; Marcie T Green, Archivist,
AFHRA/R A , Maxwe ll AFB , A la bama ;
Kevin Kelly, Tucson, Ari:ona; Gina McAl
lister, VP CorporateCommunications, San
Antonio, Texas; im on W a tson, Aviation
Bookshop, London, for the special A-IO
nose-art photos, and others; Hugh Mor
gan, Beavercreek, Ohio; Mas te r S gt
M ic ha el . Comlrack, Idaho Air ational
Guard, GowenField, Boise, Idaho; Ru sellneddon, Curator, Armament Museum,
Egl in AFB , F lor id a; M ic ha el P p ec ia lc ,
Exe cu ti ve D ir ec to r, ew Eng la nd ir
Museum, Windsor Locks, Connecticut;
John Panoiski, Empire State Aerosciences
Museum, cota , New York; Martin Bow
man , o rwich; Wi ll i am Doone r, Curator ,
McClellan Aviation Museum, California;
Archie DiFante, Archives Branch, Depart
ment of t h e A i r Force, Maxwell AFB, Ala
bama; Sgt Kipp, Historian , 355 WG/HO,
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona; Frank A.
Hudson; Douglas R. ThaI , eniorA ccount
Executive, Public Communications Divi
sion, D ep ar t me nt o f t h e A i r Force, Wash
ington, DC; John . Marsh, Directorl ura
tor, Grissom Air Museum, Peru, Indiana;
Majo r Les li e S . J ackson , U AF Rtd, Air
Force History Support Office, BollingAFB,
Washington, DC; Freida Johnson, FFTCI
HO, Edwards Air Force Base, California;
Judy Bell, Department of the Air Force,
HQ Per so nn el e nt er , Randolph AFB,
Texas; mygood friend Kengo Yamamotofor
his photographs; Jose Cruz, Director, Fire
and Aviation Management, U Depart
ment of Agriculture , Forest ervice, Wash
ington, DC;Marie Puntillo , Departmentof
the Army, Office o f t he Chief of Public
Affairs, Washington, DC; Pete r Cal leja sand Ralph St rong , Archives Reference
Team, S mithsonianN ational A irand Space
Museum, Washington, DC; Staff Sergeant
Tracy Lynn Olcksak , H is tor ian, I04th
Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air ational
Guard, Barnes A GB, Westfield; Master
ergeant Kelly R. Mazezka, COIC, Public
Affairs, H Q A RP IP Denver, Colorado;
Major Rene Poche, 926 FWIP AS JRB,
New Orleans, Louisiana;James T Parker II
Archival Research International, Wood
bine, Maryland; D. Menard, Department of
t h e A i r Force, USAF Museum, Wright-Pat
terson AFB, Ohio; my good friend Peggy
Olds, anta Barbara, California; Raymond
L. Puffer, Ph.D, Historian, Air Force Flight
Test Center, Edwards AFB,California; Tom
N ewman,of the Archives Reference Team,
N ational A ir Space Museum, Washing
ton, DC; Diana Bache rt , U AF Museum,
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.
In addition, Iwouldlike to thank all the
k i nd a n d ever-helpful staff o f t h e Refer
ence Library at Bedford Central Library for
their unfailing assistance in trackingdown
obscure documents for m e; D er ri ck N .
T er ry , rA,Maryland A ir a ti on al G ua rd ,
I75th Wing, Baltimore, Maryland, for
information and photographs of that unit;
C had la ttery , for permission to u se h is
photographs; Peter E. Davisfor permission
to use his p h ot o gr a ph s; D on a ld
Sorensen; Roger Kline; Tony Thornbor
ough for h is photos; J. R. Ferguson, II
C I CLA BollingAFB, DC.
Peter C . S m it h
Rise ey Bedford UK, 2000
Introduction
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
13
14
15
6
17
Contents
VARYING ORIGI S
ARMY NEEDS VERSUS AIR FORCE DOCTRINEAAF S
THE A-X PROGRAMME
THE COMPETITIOYA -9 Versus YA-lO
POLITICS, POLITICS AND POLITICSThe A-7 A Trials
FAIRCHILD
THE A-I0 IS BORN
THE A-I0 DESCRIBED
THE TF34 TURBOFA
THE GAU-8 AVE GER GATLI G
PACKING A PU CHA-lOOrdnance
ITIAL DEPLOYME T PRODUCTIO A DTACTICS
FLYING THE MISSIO
FLUCTUATI G FORT E A D EW CO CEPTSThe YA-I0B, the OA-lO, LASTE
AIR RESERVE A D ATIO AL GUARD OPERATIO S
JUSTIFICATION AND VINDICATIONDesert Shield and Desert Storm
A STEADYI G PRESENCE
Post-GulfOperations
7
8
14
21
30
41
47
53
6
77
83
90
98
107
115
125
131
147
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18 POSSIBLE FUTURES 157
19 THE SAGA OFTHE I R ~ l G H T I N G lOs 166
20 PRESERVATIONS AND SURVIVORS 173
Appendix I Specifications 178
Appendix Friendly Fire 179
Notes 180
Glossary 186
Index 191
\11 Army fighting a ground warneeds close
slipport from the air, whether in offence or
ddence . The level to which thi require
1l1l nt should be fulfilled by an independent
,\II force has been the subject of the most
lllntroversial and long-lastingdiscussions in
he hriefhistory of air warfare. It is an argu
mcntthat has been running almost contin
uouslysince aircraft were first converted to
war purposcs. From as earlyas 9 7 when
wldcspread use of low-flyinggr ound strafing
hy the RFC r esul ted in heavy los se s of
ntrodu tion
aircraft and aircrews, the pros andcons have
been hotlydebated almostannually.
Prior to the development of t heA-I 0, a
host of aircraft had been u ti l i: ed in the
CA role. They weremainly fighter made
over as dive-bomhers (RAF, USAF, and
othe r s) , or original dive-bombers (Luft
waffe, US Mar in e Cor ps ), b u t various
attempts had been made to produce a one
job aircraft specifically for the role . In the
FirstWorld War, these included the British
Sopwith Salamander and German Junkers
Ju I and CLl, while the Soviet 2 and
Shturmovik and LuftwaffeHerschel H
aw the light of day in the Second W
War. The USA s firstserious attempt to
duce such an aircraft was the Thunder
Ii. I ts story is therefore special.
Subjected to all mannerof derisive
name - Hog or Hawg , Pointy-nose
Mach-snm ,among mhers - t heA-I
confounded all itscriticsandoutlasted
alternatives. It looks likcflying on wel
the twenty-first century.
Designed to operatefrom makeshiftrunways closeto the action two A lOs areseen parked on a simulated
Autobahn on th ir home base. USAF
7
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CHAPTER 0 E
Commando Wingon 20 December
Thi Wing was soon redesignated a
pecial O pe ra ti on s W in g a nd , o
August 1967, redesignated I pecialO
at ion Squadron , with Lieutenant C
mander John affell, Jr, taking
mandon 2 December 1967. On 5 Jan
1 96 6, I A i r Commando began opera
f r om Plc ik u A ir la s e .
Following ear ly s u cc e ss e s, a se
kyraider squadron - 6 ir
mando - was established at England
F or ce B as e as part of I A ir Comm
Wing. From August 1967, the i
duties o f t he squadron's pilots were
-I Hand A-IJ Skyraiders f ro m D
Monthan airbase over to t he U S
facility a t Quonse t Point, Rhode Is
The aircraft were refurbished, a nd
f low n b a ck to England FB. Eventu
fourteen pi lots, commanded by Lieute
Commander Repp, initiated a full re-
ing programme, which continued
Fehrll<lrY 196 . On completionof th is
transferred, via the un'ival cho
Clark FB, to Pleiku, Vietnam. Unde
command o f Command e r Wal la c
Ford, they had an establ ishment str
of twenty-five pilots, with 135 airme
mid-March, the squadron', twenty ai
were unloaded at Cam Ranh Bay from
e s cor t c a rr i er t ra ns por t s hi p a nd
squadron commenced operations·
The kyraider had enormous load-c
ingcapability and stayingpower, but be
increasingly vulnerable t o t he Comm
g r ou n d d e f en e s, w ith their AAA and
power. Extra protection for both pilo
powerplam became necessary, to give
degree of immunity in sucha dangerou
The wiet Union had set a p r ec e d
this type of flying armoured box durin
econd World War;developingstrong
aircraft defences of the irown, th ey h a d
the need carlyon.
The ovie t approach to lo w- lev
attack and ground strafing was mostcl
represented in the development and
the Ilyushin 11 2Slm l tovik
aircraft, wr e ce i\ e d w ide p u blic ity in the west a
t im e.\ I tw a s indeed a formidable weap
air warfare. Ithough of standard cons
tion and lacking the outstanding p
mance of its contemporary, the Petly
Pe-2 dive-bomber, which was faster
many f igh te r s, it w as an immensely s
and rugged. It could take considerable
ishment and also operate efficiently a
level. Itsorigins dated back to the un
factory performance o f t h e yeman
9
VARYING ORIGINS
aircraft, following the lead of the French in
Igeria wi th the Fennec, which had faced
little or no ground oppo ition and hadthus
been able to operate almost freely. Initially,
the same conditions might have applied
against the Vietcong but, as the Soviet
nion increased its supply and, later, the
orth Vietnamese regular army forces
engaged, with ophisticated 12.7mm cali
bre multi-barrel AAA and urface to Air
Missilesystems, the makeshift types rapidly
bec am e m or e a nd m or e vulnerable. The
increased firepower o f t he C ommu ni st
forces led to the early termination of the
projected light armed reconnaissance air
craft (LARA) project, which had calledfor
a relatively unsophisticated aircraft able to
operate with all three services (Air Force,
Mar in e Cor ps a nd N avy) , as wel l as the
Vietnamese. Although such an aircraft did
eventually appear, in the shape ofthe Rock
well OV-I 0 B ro nc o, i t w as u se d more as aforward air control F C) aircraft. Anoth
er interim measure h<lll to he <lliopted.
The French had a lso u se d thei r own
D ou gl as k yr ai de rs i n the CA role, and
the Vietnamese i r F or ce wa s supplied
w i th th is aircraft by the U A. It proved
such a great succe that the U AF it elf
eventually adopted the - I k yr ai de r.
The establi hment of 1Fighter quadron
(Commando) FS(C) at Bien Hoa ailfield,
significantly escalated intervention in
outh-East A s ia . O r ig ina lly , three U
Skyraidersquadronswere planned, in order
to give the necessary ' ti f fe ni ng ' o f t he
VNAF units. The first detachment, I
FS(C), commanded by Lieutenant Com
mander John M. Porter (la ter relieved by
Lieutenant Commander WilliamR. Eichel
berger), was based at Bien Hoa f ro m 8 J u ly
1963,as part of 34 Tactical Group. Its A-I E
Skyraiders arrived there on I M ay 1 96 4.
Redesignated 1 AirCommando quad
ron, Composite, thi unit became part of
6251 Tact i ca l F ighter W in g o n July
1965, before moving into 3 Tactical Fight
er Wing on 21 ovember 1965, and then ,
hy March 1 96 6, 14 A ir CommandoWing. Its dut ies oon expanded , from the
training of VNAF pilots t o much more
active participation in the war, flying psy
chological warfare, photo-reconnaissance
missions and, eventually, full combat
bomber missions.
On 15 August 1967,theunitwasrede
ignated as I Air Commando Squadron,
Fighter, commanded by Lieutenant Com
mander James R. Hildreth; i t w as r e or g a
nized once more to becomepar to f 56 Air
rh e o rt h A mer ic an A-36, an Alison
lllJ.:med Mustang fighter firred with Vul
dive brakes, introduced in 19 43,
I r,,\ \:d more valuable . This aircraft was
I . , t h f a ~ t and accurate, and served very 'at
I l.tltorily at icily, a lernoand Anzio in
I 4 ~ 4 4 and in Burma and China in the
.IItlC period. However, only 5 had been
11Idl; once they h ad b ee n u se d u p, the
l A F w as once more forced to rely on
liJ.:hter-bombers for CA .
Aftcrthe w a r a s p ec ial tudy into racti
1 d a ir power was set up, but the introduc
l I n o f t h e j et aircraft again led to argu
Itl, nt and counter-argument. During the
Ilcxt major inciden t , the K or e an W ar ,
there was again a n a cu te lack of aircraft
IIltahle for CAS duty. Again, there was
I1\lIch birrerness: the Armywanted heavy,
Illlirate and sustainable Marine-type air
IIpport, while theA ir Force jet pilots sim-
wanted dog-fight with MiGs. They
Illd no t w an t to get involved in ground
Ittack, o the r t h an in operations of the
illick 'in-bash-out' type, which were hoth
maccurate and meaningless.
Again the argument raged, b ut t he
r 'lIlt was t ha t, w hen t he V ie tn am \Var
hccame a full shooting w a r f o r the Ameri
m the most re liablea ircraft in support
ml : troops on th e ground was the slow and
rcllable, but accurate and enduring Doug
AD Skyraider. The N av y a nd
brine Corps had used the kyraider in
K o re a a decade or more earlier, and there
wasstill no US ir Fo r c e equivalent.
Severa l ' tud ies into Counter Insur
J.:cncy (COl ) aircraft had come u p w it h
various answers, bu t none w as r e ally s a tis-
lilctory. In the end, following the lead of the
V i et na me se i r F or ce (VN F), the US Air
Force was forced to adopt retired US avy
Spads , refit and refurbish t hem , and use
them in the ground-support role. The Army
was calling out for an aircraft that could
deli\ er varied and sustainable ordnance and
loiter over the barrie zone; only the Able
Dog firred the bill, but i t wa s to become
mcreasingly vulnerable a time went on.The rmywas 0 desperate for such an air
craft, and theA ir Force was so powerless to
,upplyit, thatthe Army eriouslycon idered
huying, training and utili:ing itsown aircraft
to do the job. Thi naturally raised hackle
w i th in theA i r Force, who considered CAS
tobe its job, even if ith a d nor produced the
aircraft to c a rr y it o u t. I tw a s time f or a h a sty
re-think on policy.
The orth American T-28Dtra iner was
converted f or use as a l ig ht ground-arrack
The r ol of close support had long been an
area of acute controversy in the SAil'
Force. Even in the I930s, when the
a v y w as s p ec ializ in g in the dive-bomber
as its main air weapon, t he U A F
shunnedthe concept. It continued pre
fer the low-level 'arrack' concept, which
w as a lso f a vo u re d b y the RAF a t t h e time.When the SA evenrua l ly became
embroiled in t he e co nd World W ar , i t
land forces came up again t the German
rubs in onh Africa, and found them
selve' stopped dead by t he m o n several
ocorions. There wa much recrimination
at the time' The only available a ircraft
t he U S AF h ad carry out close air sup
port - the Curtiss PAO fighter armed with
underwing bombs - proved b e O ta lly
inefficient and inadequate in this role.
ow, the requirement was a ground
arrack aircraft with the armoured pro
t ec ti on o f a n or he r e co nd World War
a irc r a t, the Soviet 11 2 or hrurmovik.
A modern equivalent , combining the
qualities o f t he AD a nd t he 11 2 was
thought to be the solution.
eneric the highly accurate North
American A-36A dive-bomber1, and
the Republic-linked original PA7D
Thunderbolt fighteraircraft, also of the
Second World Wa r, w e re considered to
be suirable precedents. Borh adopted
dive-bombing w it h bom bs and low
level arrack with rockets to strike at
German tanks.
3 . H istor ic: speciali:ed and Orally dedi
cated aircraft and weapons h ad b ee n
developed by the Junkers company, and
orhers, for theGerman A ir Fo rc e f r om
the First World War. ome, particular
ly h ad b ee n designed combat the
th reat p os ed b y tens o f t ho u a n ds o f
heavily armoured Sovie t tanks during
t he e co nd World War, the same threat
that hung l ike a nightmare v r all
N TO defence planning more than
thiny years later.
mmedi te nfluences
I Immediate: the S rmy needed a s pe
cially designed close support aircraft.
During the Vietnam Wa r, its neglect of
thiskind of airpowerhad led to a pauci
ty of suitable machine', and it hadbeen
forced to adoptthe semi-ohsolete avy
AD Skyraider pis On-engined aircraft.
The kyraider could carry an enormous
Otal and range ofordnance and could
loiter in the battle :one , bu t improved
AAA from enemy forces, and the intro
duct ion of SAMs, mean t t ha t i t wa s
proving vulnerable ground defences.
Three strands of h isto ry in fluenced the
metamorphosis that led the A-IO's
ultimate role as a d es tr oy er o f t a nk s
and armoured vehicles. They were the
following:
Influences
8
arying rigins
was nothing new aboutusingaircraft totry to destroytanks.Almost as soon as
British hadinventedthemand used them on theWesternFrontagainstGerman
hes.the Germans tr iedusing air powerto stopthem. Thisaerial photo. taken
raiin 9 7 shows two Br it i sh tanks in the roadthrough ahamlet af ter
strafed by machine gun firefrom Germanaircraft. Bundesarchiv MiliUirarchiv
-10 Thunderbolt \I affectionately
universally nicknamed the 'Warthog'
s inc e its inception - earned itself a
reputation as the tank-busting
ar excellence during theGulf War.
hype is necessary; the f ae ts s p ea k f or
Although the A-IO represent
j us t a s ma ll f r ac t io n of the combined
d Nations aerial armada that pound
Saddam Hussein s massive tank force, it
s c r e lite d with the majority o f t h e t an k
y a wide margin.
The A-I w as n o r, h o we v er , o r ig ina lly
a a dedicated rank-kill ing air
t . F ro m i ts e ar l ie st inception, it had
forced upon a reluctant Air Force by
needs of the Army o n t he ground and
Army s determination see those
e ds s at is fi ed . I t r ol e changed with the
and it metamorphosed into
supremearmour desnoyerknown today.
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V RYIN ORI INSV RYIN ORI INS
The originalThunderbolt, theRepublicP-47D wasused as a divebomberin northern
Europe between 1944-45. Here.·Chunky·. of the 358th FighterGroup. 9th Air Force,is
seen atHigh Haldenairfield. shortly before theNormandy D-Day landings in June1944.
Imperial War Museum. London
Although theGermans found thatthe 3.7cm Flak 18 Bard Kannanewas thebest tankkilling weaponfor their CAS Stukas,the llies preferred thebomb orthe unguided
rocket. Firedin salvoes ofeightfromunderwing racks. the standard3in rocket had a
601b warheador AP shot. These weaponswere popularbecause theyenabledthe
carrying aircraft, in thiscase a HawkerTyphoonfighter-bomber ofthe RAF s2 n d
Tactical Air Force.to stand offand delivera massivepunch,Against massedtargets
they provided abig hit, butwere highlyinaccurate weapons if f ired ata range
greater than1.000ft. Enormous claimswere madefor them in breaking up German
tank and AP columns in theaftermathof the Normandyfighting, butcareful analysis
afterwards provedthat mostof thedamagewas actuallyinflicted by cannon firing
afterwards.Nonetheless,their reputation.deserved or not. continued intothe post
war era. Imperial War Museum London
However, its claims to success fail
stand up to de ta i led and exper t sc
after those battles in which it estab
its reputation. Despite this, the le
had already been established and ha
ed to this day; the facts have fa iled
nish its image very much l
Orig ina lly bu il t a t Farmingdale,
Island, the Jug (as this monster was
tionately known) was built in huge
bers. [0. order to satisfy demand, pr
t ion had t o b e subcontracted out to
plant at Evansville, Indian(l, a nd t o
tiss-Wright at its Buffalo p lant . o
less, the PA70 was always most c
associated with Farmingdale, and
choice of name for its tank-busting s
sorwas therefore a logical one. [nev
the pilots who flew the new aircraft
up with their own way of referring
A-I 0, and it is surelyas the Warthog
this aircraft will always be known
The success of the P-47againstGe
a rmou r d ur in g t h e b re ak ou t from
beachheads and the Falaise Gap
ground-attack role, a nd t he wings were
also strengthened to carry the bomb loads
demanded. However, apart from a few
other refinements, such as the introduc
t ion of a bubble cockpit canopy, and la te r
improvements in engine power and range,
i t was s imi lar to the standard production
modeL For its day, it was a very largefight
er (lircraft, built (lfOLmd a single enormous
radial e ng in e, t he P ra tt Whitney R
2800-21 and -63. Armed with up to eight
0,50-calibre machine guns as all. intercep
tor, it could eventually tote up to 2,0001b
(91Okg) o f b ombs i nt o a ct io n a nd had
range e nough t o strike at all orthern
European targets from the UK.
The P-47D was a c la ss ic example of a
high-perforIn(lnce fighter aircraft having
the s t reng th and power to make the suc
cessful conversion into a fighter-bomber.
Another was its British contemporary, the
Hawker Typhoon. Both aircraft received
were acclaimed as tank-busters in battles
such as Morta in and Falaise, the PA70
with bombs, the Typhoon with rockets,
Ill. it alsoacted as a dive-bomberwhen all
ll 500 North American A-36 Apaches
Ih.ll had been bui l thad been used up.
rhe USA s main contribmion to the land
\\ oil i n Eur op e was mad e by t he 9 th A ir
Iwee, initially based on ailfieldsin the UK.
Ihi outfitworked in conjunction with the
IInl ish 2nd Tactical Air Force, which used
Il.lwker Typhoons equipped with rocket
Ill. hombs ( BombPhoons ) to fulfil one o f
their mainobjectives - direct (lnd indirect
llll e support by fighter-bombers o f t he
trInies in the f ie ld . A dec is ion had been
m,lde to concentrate long-range fighter
I Hnher protection on the North American
I' 51 Mustang and [Urn the more rugged and
I rl1ng PA 70 into l ground strafeI and dive-
Hnher. The first dive-bombing missionwas
wndueted by PA 70s on 15March 1944, by
1he 366th Fighter Group, (lgainst St Valery
.1IIfield. (After unreservedly rejecting the
\\h111e dive-bomber concept earlier in the\\011 , the realization that th is was in fact the
I ,1 way to achievethe mostaccuratedeliv
l ry of bombs might have caused redfaces in
the USAAF and theRAE The answer was
1lllplyto call it vertical bombirig instead )
In Apr il 1944, two Tac t ic al Air Com
mands were established to support t he US
11 and 3rd Armies respectively, once they
<ld gotashore in Normandy. At first, the P
47Dscarried relatively ineffectual paylmcls
lit 2501b (115kg) bombs, but loadingquick
ly escalated. Soon, combinations of 5001h
(230kg) bombs and 231b (I0.5kg) fragmen
Llrion bombs were being carried on racks
under the fuselage, and 1,0001b (454kg)
hombs werefound perfectly feasible for the
Thunderbolt. Two 500lh (230kg) bombs
lould be carried under the wings.
By June 1944, the time of the ormandy
IIlvasion, the USAAF had considerably
huilt up the IX and XIXTactical AirCom
mands. There were no less than twenty-one
.,quadrons of P47Os in the former, and fif
teen in the latterin time for operations.The
RAF h ad s ix te en s qu ad ro ns s im il ar ly
l quipped (as Thunderbolt l ls ) in the Far
East by t he e nd o f t h e war, while the Free
French Annee de A ir a ls o h ad s ev er al
(Jrou/Jes de hasse supplied with the PA70
to pelform the same role. The la tter rook
part in the further invasion ofSouth France
and operationsin thattheatre in theautumn
and winter of 1944. Units belonging to the
air forces of Brazil (in Italy 1944-45), Mexi
co and the USSR alsohad them.
The Republic PA 70 Thunderbolt vari
ant featured greater armour protection for
rhe p ilo t, which was neces sa ry for the
eneric nfluences
Its name is a red her r ing. The Republ ic
division of the Fairchi ld Corporation led to
unimaginativeAir Forceofficersgiving the
aircraft the historical, but not veryoriginal,
nameof Thunderbolt I l , i n a k ind of trib
u te t o t he S ec ond Wor ld War long-range
fighter, the Republic PA7 Thunderbolt.
The original Thunderbolt was a heavy,single-engined fighter aircraft designed to
escort Boeing B-17 Fortresses to Berlin.
With its great strength and power , i t was
pressed into s er vi ce i n 1944-45 as a
makeshift ground-attack aircraft armed
withboth bombs and rockets for European
ground-support operations following the
ormandy landings. As such, i twa sa sub
stitute for the true attack -type aircraft,
11-2 represented one- thi rd of the en ti re
Soviet warplane produ tion.
With improved armam nt, power and
tactics, and ava i lab le in overwhelming
numbers, the turmovik dominated close
air-support operations on the Eastern
Front between 1943-45and earned itselfa
legendary repu tat ion . [ t is little wonder
then that , a lmos t a quarter of a century
later, US designers should look h ar d a t
w ha t mad e t hi s a ir r af t s o outstanding.
this former medium bombunit was thrown
in to ba tt le w it h l it tl e o r no conversion
training for either aircrew or ground-sup
port complement. It suffered horrendous
losses, being reduced to a m er e three air
craft after just seven weeks of operations.
None the less, as t ime w en to n t he air
c ra ft p ro ve d i nv al ua bl e, a nd tactics
improved as numbers and expertise rose.
The famous Circle of Death shallowdive
approach, which replaced the low-level
attack, was introduced later in the war and
quickly p roved a mos t succe ss fu l way of
decimating German Panzer columns. The
striking power of the 11-2 was much
increased by the VYa high-velocity20mm
cannon, which could open up most Ger
man tanks with ease. The reintroduction
of the rear gunner a lsogavea better mea
sure of defence from German fight rs
attacking from behind, while the fitting
during 1942 o f t he more powerful 1,750
hI AM-38F was another step forward,
resulting in the 1I-2m3 sub-type. With the
evacuat ion of many aircraft factories to
safety beyond t h e U ra l Mount ai ns , a nd
with Stalin s force and power behind it,
product ion numbers soared. Relatively
s imp le in construction, Shturmoviks, like
T-34 tanks, were tu rned ou t in enormous
numbers as the war went on. By 1945, the
Sukhoi Su-2, which l ed in [Urn to the
for all. extremely specialized air
to fulfil the ground-attack role; the
lt was the BSh-2, Bronirovann)1 Shtur-
(or armoured assault ).
BSh-2 was to combine the heaviest
armour protection, with simplicity
toughness of construction. Its enor
engine would haul it through the sky
carry intoaction a heavyforward-firing
h ine-gun armament of four ShKAS
guns, mounted in the wings,along
unguided rocket-projectiles , such as
RS-82 andthe laterRBS-82 and ROFS
2, exclusively for ground-attack work.
performance, rear-gun protection and
other considerations went by the board
a focus on this principal mission.
Ilyushin took up t h e c ha ll en ge a nd
up with a twin-seatdesign witha sin
engine, t h e AM-38 in-line, rated at
The outer portions o f t he air
ft , n ose, t ai l , r ea r fuselag e and wings
basically ofstandard metal construc
while the core of the 11-2 was virtual
all. armoured box that encased the vitals
the mach ine, the pi lot sarea, the engine
tment, the fuel tanksand the radi
(At Stalin s insistence, the design
altered f rom a two-seater to a s ing le
ter, to economize on space.) The box
built of 7mm armour plate; this was
to a maximum of 12mm thick
behind the pilot, which was nowthe
vulner(lblearea, given tha t the re was
rear gunner.
By the time the 11-2 entered service, the
po ten tia l had been considerably
:Ulced by the adop t ion of two ShVA K
cannon, with 100 rounds per gun,
p la ce of two of the wing-mounted
guns,with upto eight RS- 2 rock
being carried on underwing racks. The
craft had all. in ternal bomb-bay but, in
the underwing capacity in place of
kets , up to 1,3201b (600kg) of bombs
taken into battle. The speed wasof
l imited- some 270 mph (430km/h)
about the best - but this was no tcon
important. The range on this total
dedicated t ac ti ca l a ir craf t was a mere
miles (590-720km) at most.
When theSoviet Union was invaded by
in June 1941, only a small num
of turmoviks were available. Their
st taste of action was on 26 June 1941,
four turmovoi vialJolk (ShAP or
o und t ta ck A ir R eg imen t) w en t i nt o
ion over the Berezina River. With all.
d strength of sixty-five aircraft,
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V RYINGORIGINSV RYING ORIGINS
Left The Junkers Ju 87G Gustav , with itstwo underwing 3.7cmF ak 18 Bard Kannane,
servedfrom 1943 to 1945. It hada common l i nk wi th Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv
f o r med l ed b y Oberleutnant Otto
with Hauptmann Hans-Karl S t ep po
Erprobungsstelle as his second-in
mand. Experienced pilots were selec
take the aircraft into combat.
Despite the fact that all extra
equipment, such as dive brakes co
tional bomb racks and t he like
str ipped,it was found that the alread
Stuka was made even slower and sl
less manoeuvrable w it h t he se ca
empla ced . However , thes e were th
craft that were selec ted, a longwith t
1298-2, to equip the new Panzer ageon the Eastern Front. They f ir st saw
bat a t t h e huge tank battle of K u r sk i
1943 (Operation Zicadelle They
formed well especially whenconcen
as one force under the commandof H
mann Hans-Ulr ich Rudel, and s
many victories. With conventional S
dropping b om bs to suppress thedefences, the Gusravs attacked the S
tanks, mainly from the rear or sides
theirarmour was thinner, and knocke
a great number.
Like most skills t he a rt o f rank b
was o ne t ha t had to he acquired.
pilots like Rudel himself proved na
ly adep ta t i t; b y the end of the war h
personally killed more than 500
Others were almost as proficient, b
all provedso skilful. Nonethe less t
87G was without doubt, the tank-s
er supreme, and each dive-bomber
included one Panzer Jager Scaffel from
on until t h e e n do f t he war.
At the end o f t he war Rudel, a
others, f l ew h i s intact unit t o surr e n
the Americansand was subsequently
rogated. He thought his captors mig
interested in knowing how his slow
had been so su ccessf u l i n knocking o
many Soviet ranks; after all it was p
ly obvious to him that they w o ul d b e
for Stalin s attentions. He was listen
with complete scepticism, and the
claims w er ed i sm issed as N azi propag
Speed was everything to Western ai
a nd they could not conceive of sacri
mph foraccuracy. They really believe
an inherently inaccura te weapon su
an unguided rocke t proje ct i le cou
fi red f ro m a high-speed Thunderbo
Typhoon andh i t a target as small as a
ing tank. However, they refused to a
that cannon f ir e f ro m a slow-moving
couldachieve the same or indeed, fa
ter results. That attitude was no t to c
for m<lny ye<lrs.
(1.5kg) tungsten-cored, armour-pierc ing
explosive shel l , which had the abil i ty to
pene tra teSov iet tank armour60mmth ick
a t a n impac t angle o f6 0 degrees at a d is
rance of 100m. Upgraded versions were
capable of pier c ing 120mm thick a rmour
plating.
The weight of t h is weapon was 430lb
(270kg) and it had a length overall of
145 in ( 3, 6 20mm) . E ac h bmr el was 6ft
(180cm) i n l eng th and was f i tt ed w i th
streamlined pods which he lped w i th the
aerodynam ics and also p ro te ct ed t he
breech mechanism. An <lir inmke W l fit
ted in a bulbous cowl ing w i th a circular
fronta l aperture above the gunpod for the
gun s hydraulic oil hearer. Th e automati
cally fed six-round clips of shells were
loaded into horizontal trays that extended
from either side of the gun. They had fold
ing down hinged c aps t o t ak e t he clips.
The rounds carried were 14.5in 06.25cm)in l e ngth w i th a maximum diameter elf
1.9in (4 .75cm) . As well as the po in ted
nose a rmour-p ie r cing rounds, alternate
l oa di ng s c ou ld include b lunt- t ipped
rounds, BrandsprenggandatpatTOne (incen
diary) s e lf -de s truct ing tracer rounds,
which only igni te d i fa hit was scored on a
truck s fuel t an k, o r the S/Jrenggranat/Ja
trone i8 (high-explosive) round of self
destructing tracer for soft-skinned targets.
Various aircraft were tri<ll-fitted with a
variety ofanti-rank weapons to see which
was the most suitable and stable weapons
platform f o r i t. Among the aircraft finally
equipped were the Junke rs Ju88P tw in
engined bomber, which carried a hand
loaded, 75mm KwK 39gun under the fuse
lage; the Bf 110G.2R/1 and 4 twin-engined
fighters Zerswrer , which carried a s i ng l e
BK 37mm cannon, also benea th the fuse
lage; a nd t he Hs 129B-2/R4 twin-engined
ground-attack aircraft whi ch h ad p re vi
ously carried the two 20mm MG 151/20
cannon. Results varied, but in t he e nd t he
large Ju88 proved unsui ta b le in this role
and took heavy losses.
One o f t he trial aircraft thus fit ted, in
Decemher 1 94 2 wa s a Ju -87D Stuka ,
which had two of theseawesome wearons
slung benea th each wing ou tboard of its
fixed undercarriage legs. Experimenta ltes t
firings against captured Soviet tanks by
selected Stuka pilots g av e good ove ra ll
results a nd t h e i d ea w as t ak en t o t he bat
t l efi el d f o r more practical experiments in
real action conditions. In February 1943,
the Vem/chverband JUT Panzerkam/Jfung( experimen tal tank-fight ing un it ) W l
Illlwever the Germans had al so f o r eseen
tI\l need to provide a sp eci al i st ai r cr af t f or
tI\I role. Junkers had developed the J1 and
the CLI, which incorporated both a rmour
I rlltection and offensive capability against
1.1I\d forces in a dd it io n t o t he ir n orma l
l1lachine guns i n t he form of bundles of
crl nades. This w as m an if estl y the germ ofl Illse support.
One pioneer in the a rt o f using aircraft
III destroy tanks, or at leastdisable or ha lt
them, was Oberleutnant Robert Ritter von
(,reim. On I March 1918, while he was
,erving with the 34 (Bavarian) Jagdscaffel
11\ the great final German offensive on th e
Wes te rn F ro nt , h e a nd his wing-man,
VI:efeidwebel Putz attacked a Br i ti sh tank
llliumn, strafing them from 2,000ft
(600m) and successfully breaking up their
Ittack. 1twas the first rank-busting success
11\ aviation history. Von Greim was award
l·d the Pour Ie Merite f or h is action, and laidthe foundations on which the Luftwaffe
\\,;\S hu il t two dec ad es later. The Luft
\\ affe s forte was whole-hearted support for
the Army and it was this that gave them
the Blitzheig victories of 1939-41 . The ir
.mitudecontrasted with tha to f the Allies,
\ \ h o w er e reluctant to commit aircraft in
di re c t support of troops o n t he ground,
.1I\d, indeed, had buil t ha rd ly any a i rc r af t
that were capable ofdoing this.
Machine-gun strafing might have been
lifficient to str iptracksoff the tanks of the
British and French armies, andevenpene
Irate thearmourof some of the light tanks
deployed by these forces. However, such
me thods proved useless against the ar
moured monste rs encountered on the
EasternFront when Hitler rook up cudgels
.Igainst Stalin s Communist hordes in June
1941. TheT35B heavy tank with 50-mm
armour pla te , the KV-1 A heavy tank with
770101 thick armour, and even the far more
numerous T34/76A m ai n b at tl e t an k,
\ \ i t h i ts sloping armour up to45mm thick,
needed far greater penetrating power than
l hi s . A solution was hastily sought.
The answer was found in the conversion
o f t he 3 7mm Flak 18 (or Bard Kannone
3.7cm) cannon , an anti-aircraft gun de
,igned in the First World War which,
much improved, entered service with the
L uf tw af fe ; i n 1 93 3 a s the FI<l 18/36/37.
Although its slow tr<lverse m<lde it unsuit
able in i ts design role under test i t w as
found eminently suitable for conversion to
u seas an anti-tank weapon. With a m u zzl e
vclocityof2,820ft (855m) persecond,this
weapon fired a Minengranac/Jacrone 18 31b
Although primitive and s lo w by s ub se
quent standards, t h e t an k w as s u e ss fu l
when u t i li zed co r rect l y and spread fear
among the G erman infantry. Antidotes
were urgently required and one was the
introductionof specially armoured aircraft
thar could make low-level attacks in the
face of AA fire. Boththe G rmans and the
British produced such aircraft , and these
may also be considered as great-grandfa
thers of the A-I0.
Th e British answer was the Sopwith
Salamander, a t y pi cal biplane of the period
but d esi gn ed f r om the outset as a ground
attack machine. From the enginecompart
ment to the pilot s area there was some
armour protection (although proof against
small-arms fire only). This aircraft appeared
too l at er o takepart in <lny fighting but the
concept was sound enough. The Germans,
whose need to protect themselves from the
British tanks W l more pressing did ra the rbetter. As e a rl y a s \916, at Verdun, their
scout aircraft had been employed in the
ground-strafing role Schlachtscaffeln units)
with Halberstadt and Hannoverna aircraft.
the Fairchild-RepublicA-10ThunderboltII aircraft of the1970s- to kil l Soviet tanks
This pair arefrom the917th Tactical FighterGroup(AFRESI.
Natonal Archives Washington
Modern historians h av e t en ded to
ignore t he p re ce de nt o f t he J u- 87 G,
emphasiz ing instead the fact t ha t t he
Royal Air Force found its measure and
defeated it .6 The RAF undoubtedly
defeated the Ju87 in the Battle of Britain,
when i t w a s incorrectly u se d a s a strategic
weapon, but i t d id not defeat theS tuka in
the preceding Battle of France , which saw
the e jec t ion of all British f or ce s f ro m
Europe in a matte r o f a f ew w ee ks or in
subsequent c ampa igns in the Balkans. In
addi t ion , the RAF hardly ever if at all
encounte red the Gustav version, intro
duced in m id-1943, which fought a lmos t
a l l i ts battles o n t he Eastern Front, creat
ing h avoc among Sov ie t t an k columns.
The fact is that this a ircraft had a si g ni f i
cant influence on the A-lO s final and
most famous combat role.
The Ju-87G had a more d is tan t an te
ceden t, da ting back to the First World
War. Th is grim conflicthad seen the intro
duction, by the British Army, of the rank,
in an effortto break the hideous stalemate
of t rench warfare on the Weste rn Front.
c Influences
he Skyraider h ad b ee n t he basis on
the original A- 10 concept hadbeen
then s ur el y a more relevant
than the P-47D was to b e f o u nd
e n e xamini ng t he historic influence.
adventof theThunderbolt II no
had come closer to satisfactorily
that role than the Junkers Ju87G,
of the famed Stuka dive-bomber.
underwing cannon fired tungsten
shells that could pene tra te the
hide o f e ve n t he Sov ie t T-34 the
n ba tt l e t a nk of the Eastern Frontdur
theSecond World War.
the subsequent pursuit across North
Europe had led to propaganda and
i a hype that portrayed the PA7 as a
tank-busting aircraft. This, in
influenced subsequent post-war deci
to form the Tactical Air F or ce i n
and further affec ted policy adopted
heAir Force once i t h a d won its inde
from theArmy in the same year.
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ARMY NEEDS VERSUS AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AAFSS
CHAPTER TWO
my ee s Versus ir Force octrine
SS
Developed fromthe F 156 the F·5 provedmost suitablein itsdesigned role as a low-cost light fighter-
bomber.Althoughthe US Army was equallyimpressed when it conducted trials it was notpermittedto
operate them.The USAF combatevaluatedthemin Vietnam butthey werenotdeemedtough enough forthe
CAS role envisagedfor them. Smithsonian Museum Washington
evcntually to seeservice allover the
w ith licence-huilt versiolls heing bu
Canada, South Kmea, Spain, Switz
a nd T ai wa n in addition to US
machines. By June 1972, when produ
ceased, some 1,871 of various mark
been produced by Northrop, with a f
776 licence-built. They served with a
range o f ai r forces, i nc lu di ng t ho
Ethiopia, Greece, Iran , Libya, Mor
Norway, the Philippines, South K
South Vietnam, Thailand and Turke
U S A i r Force interestagain wanedaft
second prototype had taken t o t h e air
the third prototype was placed on
pending further consideration.
The breakthrough c am e o n 25
1962, w he n t he D ep ar tm en t o f De
000 stated t h at t he N -156F had
selected as the fighter for the Military
tance Program MAP) for supply to
NATO and S E A T O allies. American
numbers were to be allocated as t h e U
was the purchasing agency for the
gramme. It was also maderesponsiblef
training of Alliedaircrew at Williams
Arizona. On 9 Augus t 1962, t h e N
became the F-5A Freedom Fighter an
by the 2,500Ib.s.t. dry and 3,850Ib.s.t. after
burning J85-GE-5 powerpl<lllt.
Further disappointment followed when
N orthrop approached European aircraft
manufacturers- Faireyin England, Fokker
in the Netherlands, Fiat in Italy a n d S A B C
in Belgium - with the aim of licence-build
ing the N -156F for NATO. The talk was of
world-wide sales of 4,000 aircraft. Alas, it
came to n o th i ng , a n d t h e Lockhecd F-104
Srarfighter turned out to b e the final choice
for many of the se nat ion s. In addition,
fighter, orthrop still entertained hopes
that i ts less affluent allies might s ti ll b e
interested. On 25 February 1958, Northrop
t o ok t h e decision t o c o n ti n u e w it h t h e F-
156Fasa privateventure, takingadvantage
o f t he T3 8 c o nt r a ct t o h el p offset design
costs. Belatedly, the Air Force came to rec
ognize the low-cost benefitto itsallies and,
after inspecting a mock-up in 1958,
ordered one static test airframe a n d t h re e
prototypes under the designation o f t h e F-
156T Freedom Fighter.
The first N-156F made its maiden flight
on 30 J ul y 19 59 . I t was p ower ed by two
2 100Ib.s.t. General Electric non-afterburn
ing YJ85-GE turbojets, la ter to be replaced
the trainer version w h i ch b e ca m e t h eT
,8 Talon). T he U S Navy also t u rn e d t h e
projcct dow n flat. The d e ci s io n h a d b ee n
made to scrap the hundred or so escort car
ricrs t h a t h a d b e e n buiIt during theS econd
World War, a nd n ot t o replace them.T his
m c a nt t h a t a naval version would h a ve n o
homc base to work from; t he N av y was
looking for high-performance machines
for i ts giant new orrest l class carriers.
However, even i f two o f t h e A m er i ca n
armed forcessaw n o n e ed for a lightweight
I quipped with leading-edge slats and
fLuling-edge flaps.
A rmament f or t hi s lightw eight inter
Il ptot comprised a pair of upper nose
IIIlHlI ted M 39 2 0- mm c a nn on . A n A IM
IlL S idew inder point-and-shom missile
I <Hild be car r ied on stations located at
loth wingtips. Underwing pylons could
,Ilcollllllodate conventional free-falling
I(lInhs and mher weapons.
Despi te i ts advanced design, relative
I heapness a nd p ot en ti al , t he N -1 56
,dmost immediately suffered two serious
l (hacks. The Air Force, w h ic h w a nt e d
IlIgher, faster and bigger fighters, rejected
I h e w ho l e concept, although it did take
lightweight supersonic fighter. Sophisti
cated interceptors were, e v en t h e n, get
t i ng e v er larger a nd m or e c om pl ex , a nd
already passing out o f t he price range of
most countries in the Alliances. A· a result
of to ur s by Northrop representatives in
1955 they came up with a design for such
an aircraft, powered by a pair of G eneral
ElectricJ85 turbojets, originally developedto power the GAM- G reen Q uail decoy
drone. The main criterion for Cold-War
and C ommunist world-wide guerrilla tac
tics against democratic governments was
versatility, a nd t he N o rt h ro p c on ce pt
the -156F - was c a pa b le o f o p er a t in g
from short runways and makeshiftairstrips
in jungles and rough terrain, close t o t h e
a c ti o n, o r from escort car ri e rs for b as ic
maritime and convoy-protection duties.
With the finalization o f t h e design came
the N -156T , a tw o-seater advance trainer
version. T his seemed to represent an ideal
s ol ut io n a nd m uc h c on fi de nc e was
expressed in its future. The twojets o f t h e
propulsion plant were located close
together in the rear fuselage, being fed by
two lateral air i n ta k es o n t h e u n de r si d e o f
the fuselage, w it h t h e all-flying horizontal
tail mounted below the engines, low on
the fuselage itself. Fuselagedesign accord
ed t o t he area rule, with a narrow cross
section in the area o f t he wing, wh ich
resultedin a near-constant cross-section to
facilitate airflow over the whole aircraft.
The - 15 6 h a d very thin wings, w it h n o
d ih ed ra l o r a ng le o f i nc id en ce . T he se
wings were sw ept back 24 degrees at quar
ter-chord and were fitted with a leading
edge extension (LEX) a t e ac h wing root.
E ac h w in g was f it te d with s e aled f lap
ailerons, hydraulically powered, locatedat
mid-span a nd h ad s ingle - s lotte d, light
alloy flaps inboard of them. The continu
ous-hinge flaps along the leading edges
were of full-depth honeycomb build.
The -156F was equipped w ith remov
able wingtip fuel tanks, also area-ruled,
The Northrop N - 15 6 F c a me a b ou t as a
result of a detailed 1954 study ofthe needs
o f t h e m ai n Free World D efence groups,
ATO a nd S EA TO , for an affordable
Northrop N 156F
it a maximum speed of 408 mph
650km/h) and a cruise speed o f 3 6 8 m p h
590km/h). Wingspan was 33ft lOin, wing
area 184sq ft, fuselage length 29ft 4 i n a n d
height 9ft 5in. The aircraft had a range of
796 m il es ( I ,275km), adequate for the
Army s needs, and a servic e c e il i ng o f
39,200ft (11 ,500m). No armament was
carried, b u t t h e C es s na was quite capable
of being converted for a CAS role with the
i n st a ll a ti o n o f cannon a n d u n de r wi n g
racks for bombs and rockets - s t at e o f t h e
art for the 1950s.1t was certainly easy to fly
and proved very manoeuvrable at low
level. Whether i t would haveproven itself
tough enough for the role envisaged for i t
is more doubtful. o n e t h e less, the trials
were deemed a success, t h e A r m y declared
theC essna tobe ideal, a n d t h e ACDA and
the A r my A v ia t io n Board both recom
mcnding large procurement.
The Army s enthusiasm, not for the last
time, aroused t he Ai r Force s jealousy.
Quick to a c t a t any hint t h a t a n y part of its
recently acquired independence should be
taken from it, whether i t was interested in
that facet o r n o t, t h e U S A F m o ve d q u i ck
ly t o h av e t h e Army s idea quashed. The
three T 3 7 As were returned to t h e U S AF
i n 1 95 9 a n d t h er e the matter ended, for
the time being.The Vietnam War proved t h a t t h e A r m y
had been right a n d t h e A i r Force wrong on
this score, and the hasty adoption by the
U SA F o f the former Navy Skyraider, and
itssuccess, reinforced the fact that suchanaircraft was a necessity . The Army would
tryagain, but, in themean t ime, a new con
tender had arrived on the scene.
Tweetybird by i ts p il ot s - i ts
lbou s dua l s id e-by -s id e c oc kp it a ndforward fuselage reminded them
W a rn e r Brotherscanary - th is was a
n - en g in e d j e t t r ai n er b u il t in Kansas.
thesetting up ofP roject L ongA rm ,
e e o f t h e s e l i tt l e aircraft 56-3464, 56
56-3465) were obtained on loan
t h e U S AF in 1958 and flown to Fort
for a one-year trial period. The trio
given A rmy markings.
The Cessna 7A h a d t wo Continen
920Ib.s.t. J9-T9 turbojets, which gave
T-37A
Army s Advanced Aerial Fire Support
em A A F S S) originated in 1964, and
for seven years. Well beforcthis
, t h e A rm y had frequently expressed
dissatisfaction w i th t h e CA S providcd
the USAF, w h ic h s e em e d m o re c o n
d w ithhigh-altitude dog-fighting. Its
raft were becoming faster and larger,
less able to operate dow n in the mud
the A rmy w anted to see them. As
t h e l a t e 1950s, the A rmyA viation
a t D e ve l op m e nt A g en c y AC DA)
to work w it h t h e Test Board to seeif
s possible for t h e A rm y to operate its
fixed-wing air support, which would
moresuitedto its needs.
The parameters were clear: the aircraft
t o be able t o o p er a te mainly in the
e n v ir o n me n t o v er t h e immedi
battlefield; it h ad t o b e a b le to deliver
a wide var iety o f o r dn a nc e ; t o
off and land from primitiveand short
strips; it h ad t o be of rugged and
construction, in order to w ithstand
s at a high level of intensi
and should be simple to fly a n d m a in
Looking around at w hat was available
thc shelf , the ACDA decided that the
7A USAF version o f t h e 318)
t h e o n e aircraft that f i a ed t h e profile.
415
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RMY NEEDS ERSUS IR FORCE DOCTRINE - FSS IUIYNEEDS VERSUS IR FORCE DOCTRINE - FSS
Fiat G.91 was another ofthe lightweight fighter-bombertypes easyto handle and
ously considered by the US Army as a means ofoperatingtheir own
e airsupport. Smithsonian Inst tute Washington
The Hawker Siddeley P-II 27 Ke
was a u ni qu e a ir cr af t t ha t, e ve n
h ow ed g re at p ro mi se . I ts v er t ic al /
take-off a nd la nding V / T OL ) ability
it enormous potential, enabling i t t o op
not o n ly f ro m s ma ll a ilf ield s c los e t
f r on t line , but a lso f ro m m oto rw ay s
even f ro m a c le ar in g i n the ju ng le. I
end, that potential was not fully realized
the aircraft was steadily developed int
ea Harrier. The Harrier w ent on to ea
p lac e in combat aviation history, sho
down tw e nty A r ge ntinian aircraft d
the Fa lk lan ds c o nf lict in the e ar ly 1
b ut, in theend, it was not considered tough
enough for the forward air control FAC)
job in v ie w. I ts c as e w a not helped by the
fact that, during the trials, 0052 crashed,
killing Bignamini. This effectively termi
nated the tests and the surviving aircraft
wa sent b a ck to Germany in 1962.
P-1127 V-6) Kestrel
The Army was d e te r mi n ed t o make one
las t e f fo r t to g a in its o w n a i r support from
fixed-wing aircraft.
tested the prototype machine, Italian IIForce test pilot Riccmdo Bignamini.
Once th ey h a d a r r iv e d in the U , these
t wo a ir cr af t, a G .9 1 R- J c /n 0 52, L uf t
waffe number BD+102) and a G .9 1 R- 3 c /n
)065, Luftwaffe number EC+ 105), retained
the ir thr ee - s ha de d Luftwaffe camouflage
Lheme.For the tests, yellowwas painted on
the tail, after-fuselage and belly and under
Ideofthe nose, the word ARM Y appeared
white forward, a n d Army was paint
ed on a p a ne l on the tail.
The G.91 pelformed well, and itslimited
maintenance requirements were attractive,
A natural candidatefor the US Army s close air support was theBritish Hawker P 1127 Kestrel
whose VTOL capacitymeantthat it couldoperatefromthe most primitiveairstr ipsclose tothe front
line. Vehement opposition was voiced in Congress because the aircrah was British and theconcept
was pressuredout. Later the US MarineCorps gottheir licence built version ofthe Harrieraher a similar
fight on Capitol Hill. SmithsonianInst tute Washington.
Fiat G.91R-3
The Italian Fiat G.9IR-3 w as Eu ro pe s
answer t o t h e vexed questionof affordabil
ity . I n the late 1950s, ATO h el d a com
petition for lightweight strike aircraft; the
winner w as a p le as i ng d es i gn f ro m F ia t,
which appeared in 1 95 9.
A swept-wing, ingle-seater, poweredby a
s in gl e 2 ,2 70 kg B ri st ol r ph eu s 8 01 /0 2
engine, Fiat sG.91 hada wingspan of .56m,
a length of I . 29m, a height of 4m and a
wingarea of 6 4 2 m ~ Itsweight empty was
3 ,26 9k g , f ully la de n 5 ,67 0k g. I t h a d a top
speed of 1 ,09 0k m /h , a c e iling of 13,260m
and a r a ng e of I, 5 km. Its armament was
m o de s t, w ith ju st tw o 20mm cannon.
Despite coming o ut o n top in t h e c o m
petition, the G .9 1 w as not greeted with
m uc h e nt hu si as m by the European
nations. Only Italy, G reece and G ermany
employed t h em , a n d some 45 were con
structed. In J961, the U Army trialled
the aircraft along with t he o th er s a t Fort
Rucker, admiring the simplicity of its con
s t ru c ti o n a n d low maintenance require
ments in the field, and the fact that it
could operate o ut of p r im i t iv e l a nd i ng
strips. Two aircraft were ::lcquired o n l o an
from the Federal German Luftwaffe, They
wereflown to the SA as cargo of a -124
G lobemaster transport aircraft e ar ly i n
1961, along with German pilot and
groundcrew, a nd t he m an w ho had flight-
from the decks of many avy aircraft
carriers. Its compactness and suitability for
the Jol in hand, and i t u cc es s , im pr e ss ed
the troops on t he g r ou n d, a n d t he US
Army decided to tr ia l it against other con
t e nd er s. I n 1 96 1, t wo Skyhawks Eu os
3 and 14 49 ), w hi h w er e s u rp lu s
to avy requirement, w er e a q ui r ed and
modified to operate from rugged front-line
airstrips. The normal main undercarriage
w as r e pla c ed b y a tw in, high-flotation, 1011
pressurewheel system, and enlarged under
w ing f a ir ing s w e re f itte d to accommodate
rhis. As a f u rth e r a id to landing- in p r im i
tive conditions, a d ra g chute was abo fit
t ed , h ou se d in a canister below the rear
fuselage. Still in their original Navy mark
ings, the aircraft joined the trials at Fort
Rucker, w h er e t h ey p e rf o rm e d v er y w ell.
The rmy thought highly o f t h e m, b ut t h e
D oD p ut pressure on t hem to drop the
whole idea, and both aircraft were returned
to their original configuration and
returned to the Navy a t t he e nd of J961.
-4 A4D) was to prove an equally inspiredd e sig n, w ith the longest production life
1954-79) ofany Fre e Wo r ld m ilitar y je t. I t
served with t he U S Navy for twenty years,
f o ug h t in many battles with other nations,
asfar apart as Israel and Argentina, and was
still flyingfiftyyears on.
The motivation for its mall size and light
w e ig h tw a s in c r ea ing concernat the seem
ing ly in ev itab le r is e in w eig ht, dimension
and cost of contemporaryand planned fight
er aircraft. Much like orthrop, Heine
mann was convinced that this trend could
be reversed. However, when the avy was
p r es e nte d w ith the d e sig n, it w as a lre ad y
committed to s e ve r al f igh te rs and a ked
Heinemann to redesign the concept as an
aval Attack planewith nuclear capability.
This was done and the result proved a win
ner from the out et. Gradually, the aircraft
was developed for differentrol s and proved
sufficiently versatile to adapt to them all.
With a wingspan of 27ft 6in, a length of
3 9 ft 4 Xin and a height of only 15ft, the
Skyhawk w as a compact little aircraft, but
full o f d y na m it e . A n a l l- w ea t he r variant,
the 40-2 A-4C) made its debut flight
on 2J ugu t J959. This aircraft was
equipped with terrain clearance radar
TCR) h ou se d i n a n e x te n de d n o se , f or
sea-level or ground-hugging approach to
target zones. n autopilot w as f i tt ed f or
the f irs t tim e, to save on pilot fatigue on
long flights, a n d t h er e w as a s ys te m i nd i
catingangle ofattack, a s w e lla s a I m v- a lti
tude bombing system L B .
The 4 0- 2 , wi th its a ll-w e a the r a nd
night l ow -l ev el c ap ab il it y, s er ve d w i th
great distinction in the Vietnamese War
Skyhawk
What h a d b r ou g ht a b ou t this sudden
ge of heart by the Air Force I The
prototype N-156F w as te s te d e a rly in
2 by the A rmy under t he A A F
a s a p os i bl e candidate f or its
d -w in g C S a ir cr af t . W h il e t he ir
might be disdainful o f t he Army s
and t l lr n a blind eye to helicopter
lopment, the knowledge t h a t A r my
were testing out such sophisticated
r a nga la r m b ells in earnest.
I n 1 96 1, t he A AF S tr ia ls f ina lly came
fruition w h en t h e Army revealed that it
comparative-testingfixed-wingaircraft
CA These tr ia ls, in vo lvin g g r ou n d
cesin realisticscenarios,were condu ted
year at Fo rt Ru k er , Alabama. The pro
N-156F s/n 5 9- 4 9 7 ) w as s p ec ially
in Army markingsfor the tests. The
m y p il ot conducting them expressed
m s elv es f a vo ur a bly imp r es s ed a f te r
but the orthrop was n o t t h e only
contender. The others included
Navy s ow n lightw e ight fighter, the
n t y b u t rugged Douglas A4D-2N ky
and two foreign designs, the Italian
G.91, and the British VTOL innova
the Hawker P-J 1 27 ,la te r to b e d e ve l
intothe magnificent Harrier.
f am ou D ou gl as A4D-2N kyhawk
another brilliant and enduring design
the brain of Ed Heinemann, who had
the avy the immortal SBD Daunt
and AD kyraider dive-bombers from
at EI egundo, California. The
16 17
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H WG MEN General JohnPaul McConnell US F
P -I 1 27 w as never exclusively tri
by the U A rmy but two Army
Lieutenant Colonel Lou Solt and
AI Johnson, were assigned, along
Great Britain and WestGermany, to
Tril ar t ite Eva lua t ion quadron ,se t up
1 April 1965 a t West Raynham, or
, U K. Three o f t he te st a ir cr a f t w e re
- the DoD w as l ea rl y interest
from the outset - although they initia l
ie d Br itis h X S s e ria l numbers. The
rmy pilots (who were, incidentally,
by ju st one avy a nd on e
Force pilot in the American cont in
expressed great enthusiasm. The
seemed t o p re se nt t he answer to
A r my s p ra ye r s: it w as able to operate
up in the front line, cheek b y jo wl
the t r oo ps i t w as supporting, and it
he maintained and flown hy Army
for immediate r m y a s sig n
There w o uld b e nowaitingtime forcover to arrive from distant airfields. It
the ideal forward deployment aircraft.
the Tripartite Evaluation reached
conclusion, in January 1966, the th ree
K es tr el s w e re shipped b a ck to Ed wa r ds
and a signed M il it ary erial num
6 4- 1 2 62 , 6 4- 1 2 64 and 64-1 265)
order to continue trials with all three
services.Whenthe FederalGer
Government decided to reject the
concept , thei r th ree a ir cr a f t w e re
shipped over to the U A , r ec ei vi ng
s er ia l 6 4- 1 2 66 , 6 4- 1 2 67 , 6 4- 1 2 6 .
P-II27 thenbecamethe XV-6A. The
became seven withthe arrival ofoneof
British Kestrels (XS-695), which was
US serial 64-18263 (but, in fact,
its o r ig ina l s er ial during the trials).
gain, the Kestrel showed up well, but,
the Army, neither the Air Force nor
Navy showed any sign of being
There were several reason for
o ne o f which was the faet t h at t h e
OL techniquedemanded a great deal
pilot. The skills would not b e e a sy to
and would require constant hon
Certainly, there were individual pilots
o had those s k ills , b u t no t enough of
m,and thea t tempt to manthe nell air
would complicate an already difficult
Another f a cto r w as a m a rk e dly
attitude towards the purchas
of any foreign aircraft, no matte r how
o r a dv an ce d, a nd even from a
asfriendly a Great Britain, on th e
o f ome members of the Congress
o ff icials in Washington, DCI, The
t at es M ar in es , for whom the
RMY NEEDS VERSUS IR FOR E DO TRINE FSS
P - 11 27 w as v it al , h ad to fight tooth and
nail against vehement opposition at home
even to obtain licence-built models. The
US A rmy had enough to contend with,
fighting the Air Force, and needed
COilgre s a nd t he DoDon i t s id e, s o i t d id
not go out of itsway to al ienate them.
The trial results of the aircraft that were
te s te d b y the Army w e re n u llif ie d b y the
DoD, which had been subjected to much
lobbying by Air Forceofficials. Eventually,
t he o rd er w en t o ut that t he A rmy was
banned from acqu ir ing any fixed-wing
systems at all; under the new remit,
on ly he l icopte r were permitted The
AAFSS had t o t ur n away from operating
its own <tircraft and turn to the rotary
options. All seven V - 6A s w e re g r ad u ally
pu t in to mothba l ls and, by t h e e n do f t he
decade, had been done away with.
A Rotary Solution
The competition to provide a r o ta r y s o lu
tion w as w on by the Lockheed AG-56A
Cheyenne helicopter , against opposition
that included Bell s scaled-down ver ion of
its Iroquois Warrior, a low-profile machine
with r e tr a t a ble skids. The d es i gn w as
based on two cockpitsmounted in tandem,
with a gunnerpositionedahead and below
the pilot. No proto type of th is hel icopter
was ever buiIt. The other con tender, the
i ko rs ky - 66 of 1964, was more innova
t ive . I t f e atu r ed the novel Rotorprop tail
rotor, which was designed to ro ta teon its
axis through 90 degrees and thus act in a
dual capacity as <tn anti-torque rotor or as
pusher, effectively transforming the heli
copter into a compound aircraft in c r uis e
condition.
An Army banned from having a fixed
w ing a irc r af t in it inventory was looking
or an all-round aerial fighting machine
an attack hel icopter (AH) - and the mean
est of them all was the Lockheed AH-56A
Cheyenne, de si gn ed in 1967 in direct
response t o t h e AAF Program. The first
prototype w<ts rolled ou to n 3 lay of tha t
year. It wasa large two-seater,with a single,
rigid, four-bladed ro tor coupled w i th <tn
anti-torque tail rotor and a three-bladed
pusher. The AH-56A was p ow er ed by a
single General Electri T64-GE-16 turbine
engine rated at 3 ,43 5 s h p, which g av e i t a
speed of214 kno t ( 24 6mph) .
The Cheyenne w as m a de meaner by i t
armament. n a ss oc ia te d r es ea rc h and
developmentproject, the XM51 Armament
18
Subsystem (1966-72), w ou ld h av e com
b in ed a M 5 40mm grenade launcher with
780 rounds of linked ammunition in a s tor
age drum wit h a ociated ammunition
chutes. The XM52 Armament ubsystem
(1966-72), the other associated R D pro
j e ct , w ou ld h av e g iv en her a h el ly t ur r et
mount ing the XM140 30mm g un w it h
2,010 rounds of linkless ammunition in a
storage drum w ith a c o n v ey o r. A th ird R D
project, an alternative to the XM 51 pack
age, was the XM53 Armament ubsystem
(1966-69), f or a chin-mounted XM196six
b ar re l 7 .6 2m m Minigun i th 1 1, 57 0
rounds of linkless ammunition in a s tor a ge
d r um w ith a c o nv e yo r .
Even the prototypes were equipped with
an XM62 30mm automatic gun housed in
a b e lly turret, and a lso f e atu r ed a chin tur
ret that could be equipped with either a
XM53 7.62mm Gatl ing mach ine gun
( Minigun ), o r an XM51 400101 grenadelauncher. The helicopter could also tote
additional hitting power in the form of
tube-launched, opti c al ly t r acked wire
command missiles (TOWs) a nd XM200
rocket launchers. The TOW weapon sys
tem w as p r im ar i ly a n a nt i- ta nk a nd
armoured vehicleweapon, withthe missile
being guided o n t o its target by the gunner,
whokept hisvisual sight cross-hairslocked
on to the object ive . Any f l igh t-path cor
rectionswere sent to the missile s brain by
two wires that paid out d ur in g flight.
ince it inception, the basic TOW has
been steadily improved through a er ic ,o f
marks, and TOW2A and TOW2B a r e c u r
rently produced.) Other packages for the
Cheyenne included a 2.75in (6.99cm)
rocket system with the M200 19-tube
rocket launcher, the M 1 gun pod, and the
M2 series Armament ubsystem.
The Cheyenne out-performed its two
r iva l but deve lopment and project ion
costs rose steadily. There were continual
d e la y s in the programme, as competitive
te sts w e re conducted wi th two la te r con
tenders, the Sikorsky S-67 Blackhawk,
which n appeared in 1 9 70 , and the Bell
309 King Cobra, which arrived a yearlater.
Sikorsky at first planned simply to mod
ify the -61 into a gunship, and then uti
Iize th is m od el a s the b as is fo r a n el l
AAFS contender. A long with Bell sKing
Cobr,l candid<tte, the BI<tckhawk under
took comparative trials again t the
Cheyenne in 1972 . In t h e e ve nt , n on e
came u p t o the Army final requirements.
Despite the act t ha t t he C he ye nn e
gave the Army a ll i t needed, and m o re , in
If anyman can lay claim to beingthe father of the A-1 O that man is GeneralJohn Paul
McConnell. USAF. A s A i r ForceChief of Staff. he was theone whofinally grasped the
CAS nettle and. after personalactive intervention.saw the A-X programme finallyini,
tiated. These moves followed a distinguishedcareerthatdated back to the early1930s.
Born on 7February 1908. in Booneville,Arkansas. to Dr S. P McConnell and hiswife
Dessau, John PaulMcConnell graduated from Booneville High School in 1923. In 1927.
he graduatedm gn uml ude from Henderson Brown lnowHenderson Statel College
at Arkadelphia, Arkansas, witha Bachelor of Science degree. Determined to followan
Army career, he enteredWest PointMilitaryAcademythe followingyear. andgraduat
ed tn 1932 as First Captain of the Corps of Cadets. From 10 June he was a 2nd Lieu·
tenant. but.wanting tobean aviator, he tookprimary flying training at Randolph Field,and advanced trainingat Kelly Field. both in Texas. He was duly awarded his wings in
1933 and on 1August was confirmed as a1st Lieutenant.
As a fighterpilot in the A rm y A i r Corps.McConnell was in his element. flying by the
seat of his pants in the wires-and-struts biplanes of the 1930s.He served in the 79th
PursuitSquadronat Barksdale Field, Louisiana. from November 1933to June 1937. and
then went onto serve first withthe 50thObservation SquadronatLuke Field, then asPost andGroup Adjutantwith the 5th Bomb Group at Hickam Field, Hawaii. until June
1939. He also broadenedhis knowledge beyond flying, taking on awidevariety of operational and administrationalassignments on the ground. In June 1939. he served as
Assistant Engineering Officer withthe 91 st School Squadron at Maxwell Field, Alaba
ma, before moving on to become Assistant Post Adjutant.January to July 1940.As atemporaryCaptain,McConnell becamethe Adjutant.Southeast Air CorpsTrainingCen
ter. and Aide to Brigadier GeneralW. R Weaver between July 1940 and January 1942.
a periodduring which the USA was thrust into the SecondWorld War. Promotion to
Major followed o n 1 5 July 1941. and to Lieutenant Colonel on 23 January 1942.
GeneralJohn Pau McConnell who originatedthe A X programmewhen Chief of-
Staff US F SmithsonianMuseum. WaShngton. DC
19
Through these appointments.McConnell retained contact withthe G i s o n the gro
and he never forgotwhat those men really wanted from the men in the sky.
McConnell served as AssistantExecutive in theoffice of the Chief of the Air F
in Washington, DC. between January andMay 1942. He observed at closequarters
workings of politics. and how it influenced the services.Promoted to full Colonel on
December1942. he was moved tothe post ofDeputyChief of Staff and Chief of S
HQ A r my A i r Force MFI Command responsible for technical trainingat Knollw
Field.North Carolina, between May1942 and September 1943. Next. he held thepof Deputy Chief of Staff. HQ MF Training Command, based at FortWorth. Texas.u
November 1943.
McConnell thenserved in keyAir Force positions in both Asia and Europe. add
aworld perspective andinsighttohis experience. Between November 1943 andF
ruary1944. he served as Chief of Staff of the China-Burma-India ICBI Air ForceTr
ing Command. based at Karachi in British India now PakistanI. and subsequentl
SeniorAir StaffOfficer and Deputy Commander,3rd Tactical Air Force. at Comilla. a
in India. He served in Asiafor the remainderof thewar. butdid notconfine himse
pushing paper around. McConnell took part in combat operations against the Jap
ese forces that were thenoccupying Burma and therefore knew CAS from the sh
end, as well as in theory.
ABrigadier Generalfrom 24 August. in September 1944, John McConnell beca
Senior Air Staff Officer. Southeast Asia Air Command, based then at Kandy, Cey
Inow Sri Lanka . While serving in Ceylon,he met WAC officerSally Dean, serving
the staff of Lord Louis Mountbatten.After adifficult wartime courtship,the couplemried in November 1946, and later had two sons. Bruce and Dorsey.
Following the successful end of the war. McConnell remained in the area. and
June 1945, became ActingDeputyChiefof Staff forOperations. Plansand IntelligeEastern Air Command, based at Chungking,China. In April 1946. he was made Se
Air Adviser to the ChineseGovernment. whilesimultaneously commandingtheAirD
sion, NankingHeadquarters Command. a post he helduntil June 1947. He sawat f
hand howthe Communist guerrillasoperated against conventional armies, andhow
power could counteract it. if usedcorrectly. In China it failed. butJohn McConnellh
meanwhile returnedhome to Washington, DC. where. in June 1947, he was appoinChief of the Reserveand National GuardDivision. HQ MF.
When theUSAFwascreated.John McConnell neverforgothis A rm y A i r Force ro
His next appointment. in May1948. was as Chiefof the Air Forces CivilianCompone
Group, andthiswas followed, in December of thesame year, by appointmentas Dep
SpecialAssistant to Chief of Staff, for Reserve Force. In July 1950he took passagEngland, where he became Deputy Commander, and then Commander.of the 3rd
Force. USAFE. Promotion to MajorGeneral followed on22 December 1950 and. in
followingMay.McConnellwasmade Deputy Commanderand Chiefof Staff.HQ 3rd
Division and 3rd Air Force. In May1951,he was additionallyassigned command of
7th Division of Strategic Air Command ISAC , and. in February 1952. was appoin
Commander 3rd Air Forceand 7thAir Division. BetweenMay1952 and March1953
reverted to Commander of the7th Air Division.
McConnell returned to the USA in April 1953to undertakea four,year touras Ditor of Plans at SAC HQ. Dffut AFB. Nebraska. In November 1957, he became comm
der of SAC s 2nd Air Force. based at Barksdale AFB. Louisiana. On 30 June 1959
was promoted to Lieutenant General and in August 1961. was appointedVice C
mander-in-Chief back at SAC HQ. Another promotion. to four-star rank full Gene
came on 1October1962, with his next European assignment.as Deputy C-in-C of
US European Command, based at Camp des Loges,France.
In August 1964.McConnell was appointedVice Chief of Staff of the USAF,
became Chief of Staff on 1 February 1965. In this capacity he again performed a drole, as amember of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, the principalmilitary advisers to the P
ident. the National SecurityCouncil and the Secretary of Defense, and also be
responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force for managingthe human and materesources of the USAF.
By thistime.JohnMcConnellhad wonan impressive numberof medals. includ
the Distinguished Service Medal. theLegionof Merit withthree oakleaf clusters,Distinguished Flying Cross. the Bronze Star. theAir Medal.and a host of foreignawa
also, including Commanderof the Orderof the BritishEmpire. the GrandCordon of
Hui 2ndClass)and theCollarOrder of Pao Ting 5th Classl.among many others.
Despite his illustriouscareer. John McConnell always maintained the comm
touch.Whenthe A-X programme was still in its gestation period. hetook himself of
Vietnam to speak to the men who were doing the fightingeyeball-to-eyeball.He
tened to what theyhad to say. and.more importantly.acted upon i t .F ro m that pointA-10was on itsway.
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CHAPTERTHREE
- - - - - - -
The hi f r i val to the 1 on the Experimental Programme wasthe Northrop Y A ~ 9 a very different
conceptanddesign A fiercecompetition separatedthem S n 11 comesinto land atEdwards AFB
Smithsonian Institute Washington DC
loca t ion, dupl ica t ion and posi t ion in
such vulnerable units as f uel t a
hydraulic and avionics.';
The old Soviet Shcunnovil idea o
armoured box around the pilot wa ada
and updated, with the substitution of m
ern lightweight titanium in p la ce o f
bolted on steel plate of Stalin's facto
The Air Force was al 0 asked tocon
er h or t t ake- of f an d landings (ST
from primitive landing grounds; it was
thinking in terms of the jung le airstrip
the Vietnam War, but the T l capa
would later comeinto its own ina very
ferentscenario. There was a lack of fa it
free-falling bomb being delivered
suffic ientac uracyagainst pinpoint tar
to meet the requ irementso f CAS as
defined. Delivery in a dive was a tried
proven method, Iut was increasingly
of favour. The orth Vietnamese reg
army had begun deploying tanks in l
numbers, and s uc h t ar ge ts g ra du
assumed greater importance in t he
Force's thinking; bomb had nor had g
success against them in the past. la
cannon had, bu t theAmericanshad l
s t ag e in terms o f t h e V ie tn am War, and
relatively low opposition, that opposition
was rapidly g rowing and h ad t o be taken
i nt o a cc ount . Wh il e r et ai ni ng , o r e ve n
improving on the Spad s admirable quali
ties, the new aircraft was to be more than
100 mph (160km/h) faster, with a mini
mum speed of 350 mph ( 560km /h) .
Unlike contemporary makeshift fighter
bombers, the newaircraftwas t o h a ve t h e
in-built strength and design to withstand
punishment. Expensive je ts such as the
R ep ub li c F -I 05D T hu nd er ch ie f, t he
M cDonnell FAD Ph ant om and t he
Vought A-7 Corsair, which lacked such
features, were b ei ng b ro ught d own by
peasants a rmed with mult iple machin
guns. They were spend ing seconds , nor
hours, over the ta rge t zones.
The failure o f t he duelled systems of
the e aircraft to p rotect them fromsingle
strike losses was t he s ub je ct o f a special
s tu dy , f or which G en er al Dynamics,
Grumman, o r th rop and McDonne l l had
been approached on 2 May 1 96 7. The e
large organi:ations wer e a sk ed t o a pp ly
theirexperti e to ideas on the protection,
The Air Force's RFP
h X PrograDlDle
(,iven the task ofprovidingthe Armywith
the CA a i rc ra f t i t needed, the U AF
could shirk the issue no further, and
embarked upon a thorough and complete
evaluation. Those in the higher echelons
might still doub t the value and worth of
lich ;:In aircraft, or i ts p la ce i n modern
warfare, but they were determined that, if
they were to have such an aircraft, i t must
he the very best. In 1966, General John P
McConnell, the ir Force Chief of Staff,
lI1itiated the A-X (Attack Experimental)
programme. In March 1967, twenty-one
different aircraft companies were sent the
Air Force's Request for Propo sa l (RFP) ,
which embodied in general terms the lat-
est thinking on C r eq ui re me nt .'
The Air Force proposed an aircraft that
could m at ch t he load capacity o f t he
II1defatigable A-I kyraider (known
affectionately as the Heavy Hauler ), but
a lso o ffer the manoeuvrability at low
pe ed t ha t W;:lS nece ssa ry in order to
achieve accuracy on the target. Although
t he A ir Force was s t il l thinking at thi
hidden enemy, but t he F-5 had problems
delivering i t , for the 75 Ib (340kg) tanks
frequently hung up' during attacks, or
fa iled to separate from the pylons cleanly
in the shallow dives, caus ing damage to
the undersurfaces of the s lender wings.
A Ithough it h ad b ee n d e igned as a short
take-off aircraft, combat-loading to its
capacity was deemed e s sent ial i f i t was to
perform its CA duties adequately. The
loading cancelled out thi advantage, and
the aircraft truggl d sometimes to stagger
in to the sky. Itwa alsodifficultto achieve
the necessary levels of accuracy. Eye-sight
i ng wa g oo d enough, but the F 5 did not
have the all-round vision of the Spad; the
mounting position of the guns often
obscured the pilot's vision at the most cru
cial moments of a t ra fi ng r un , as smoke
emi siems clouded the wind hield .
Although this exper imenta l combat
usage o f t h e F-5 was declared a te hnical
success, and many Freedom Fighters were
later del ive red to the ou thV ie tname e, a
second combatdeployment by the AF
was vetoed by the 00 0 as not worthwhile,
a nd t h e 1 0t h Fighter Commando was dis
banded. Once more, t he USAF tur ne d
back to its instinctive placebo, the fa t jet
madeover into a trike aircraft, andadopt
e d t h e avy's A-7, as the Corsair-II.
However, the ne tt le would have t o be
grasped, and a ded ica ted CA aircraft
wouldhave tobe found.The USAir Force's
F 5 Vietnamese combat deployment ,
although brief,gavefurther weight tosome
les ons tha thad already been digested from
previous eras. The ideal machine had to b e
accurate, had topack a powerfulpunch,had
to be resistant to ground fire (increasingly,
sUlface-to-air, or AM capability), and had
t o h av e t he e ndur an ce n ec e s ary to s tay
overhead and low, a nd t o be on call. The
F 5 deployment, therefore, although not a
success, was not totally wasted.
A re luc tan t A ir For ce w as s pu rr ed
towards making a decision by among
other factors, the Congressional hearings
on CAS. During ep tember and October1965, th ree A ir Force generals and th ree
combat pi lots, with others, were interro
gated about closeair-support operations in
Vietnam. Thi was fol lowed bya damn
ingspecial sub-committee report on tacti
cal air support. The sub-committee criti
cized t he A ir For ce f or ' it s f ai lu re to
develop aircraft andequipment for'limited
war and closeair-support operations'I;.
With Congr es s a nd t he A rmy both o n
itsback, theA ir Force finally began to ;:ICt.
fitted to the aircraft'snose on the p or t sid
to extend itsrange and linger timeoverthe
battlefield. Instrumentchange were made
and a lead-computing gunsight replaced
the standard f ix ed opt ica l o rs igh t.
On 20 October 1965, painted in brown
and dual-tone greencamouflage, with light
grey undersurface, the F-5Cstook offfrom
Williams AFB. After a s taged f ligh t a cro s
the Pacific , they arrived a t t he Bien Hoa
airbase three days later, and flew their first
combat sortie that same day The first
twelve F-5C were later joined bya further
ix F-5As. Between October 1965 and
March 1966,theseaircraftflewsome2,5 0
combat sorties, mainlyCAS butwith fight
erand reconnaissance dutiesas well.
In the former duty , the F-5s carried
between2,000and 3,0001b (910-1 ,360kg)
of mixed ordnance, but were never risked
over North Vietnam. tandard procedure
were basic; the aircraft attacked ground
targets in a shallowdive, relying on pilots'
judgement for a im in g and r elea se . In
spring 1966, the 4503rd I ecame the I th
Fighter Commando Squadron , under the
3rdTactical FighterWing, and finally flew
some 3,500combat missions. Such inten
s iv e us age s oo n s hm ve d up the F-5's
strengths, and weaknesses, and revealed
that i t was not really the CAS aircraft the
A rmy (or t h eA i r Force) was looking for.
The little aircraft, although not strong
and tough in its construction,even withits
additional a rmou r, w as n imbl e a nd
manoeuvrable at low levels . I ts handling
qualitieswere such that i twasable to evade
much of the increasingly effective ground
fire that wasaimed at i t. I nd eed, i twa s to
clock up the least number ofdirect hits of
any je t aircraft in that conflict. I t was also
relatively simple to main tain and keep in
action, as i ts sortie rate proved, and, with
help from Northrop representatives on th e
ground, the e igh teen Freedom Fighters
employed by the 10th had a highavailabil
ity rating. These f ac to r r anked h ighly in
the CA table of desirable qualities.
On t he d own side, the aircraft's verylitheness brought its own penal ty. I t was
not able to carry, and therefore deliver, a
very heavy or accurate ordnance package
against the enemy. In t hi s r espect it
showed up poo rly aga ins t contemporary
jet support, and proved inferior t o t he
Douglas -IH Skyraider. In addition, the
F-5 could not compare either in range or
in vita l loiter factor.
apalm was oneof the prime anti-guer
r il la weapon s in jung le f igh t ing aga ins t a
Army's a t tempts to ob ta in its own
-wing aircraft t o p ro vi de t he CA
wasstill desperately needed had been
Now the pressure was on th e A ir
ce to come up with a satisfactory and
solution. Defense ecretary
t e rt M c a mar a i ns tru ct ed the Air
tose t to and re-build itsCA poten
, i n o rd er t o fill the gap lef t by the
of the A FSS p ro gr am . Al
it had sanctioned the F 5 for i ts
t he U SA F did not immediately
this optiononboard itself, o ther than
c ondu ct limited combat te ting in
Vietnam. The Air Force's request
200 F-5Cs and F-5Ds was finally sanc
by t he DoD on 26July 1965. This
thought I y many to beme rely a
for the few Air Force officers who
d in theconcept, led to the ukoshi
(Little Tiger) programme.
The first USAF commitment was the
on loan of five F-5A-15 and
en F-5A-20 aircraft from the MAP
They we re u ti li :e d by the
03rd Tac t ic al Figh ter Wing (TFW)
ch,on 29July 1965, formed the4503rd
t ical Fighter Squadron (TFS) (Provi
a l) for operational s e rv ic e t ri al s
T). Immediate needs led to these air
beingmodified for combat operations
outh-EastAsiaasF-5Cs;while this was
ng carried out by orthrop, selected
underwent conversion training
t he type at Williams AFB.
Modifications were dictated by t he A
experiences against the Vietcongamiorth Vietnamese regular army. Extra
protection for the pilot was
u t and some ninety poundsof this was
ked in , mainly along the underside of
forward fuselage below the cockpit.Jet
nable pylons were fitted to the under
of the wings, with ISO-gallon drop
being accommodated on the centre
and on either inboardpylon inservice
The rudder travel limiter was
oved. Inflight-refuelling probes were
Air Force Combat-Test
F S
of firepower, on 9 August 1972 the
AAF project was eventually
d off. The Army decided that such a
was toocomplex, andelectedto go for
ller, more sprightly advance attack
ter, typified by the newer Boeing
Series Apache.
20 27
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T HEA-X PRO GRAMME T HEA-X P R O G R ~ I ~ I
YA-lO.massive flaps lowered n undercarriage down.comesin to land duringearlytrialsat Edwards
AFB. National Archives. College Park. MD
of this, and instead opted for
large, in-builtweapon as the mostcost
ective way t o e qu ip t he future C S
They proposed an upgrade of the
Electric M-61 as a starting point.
oiter time was another major facror. It
considered impossible t o m at ch t he
er's ability here with any current
ne ,s ince the due l lingof any pow
was deemed essential for the air
ft 's survival. Two engines of sufficient
to l if t o ff the proposed aircraft
u ld requi re a large p rope ller , which
meanplacingthe engines well away
the fuselage. The si:e o f t he wing
h av e t o he increased, thus raising
maximum t<lke-off weight ahove the
(27,200kg) thar the Air Force
to be the top Iinc.
ome novel concepts were put forward
n attempt to solvethis problem, includ
t he o rt hr op proposal t o a dopt the
used by the Learfan executive jet
have two tu rbop rops coupled in the
tail. This was just oneof a series of
i l ed s tud ie s that followed during
0 and ledfinally t o t h e A-X. In the
, techno log ica l advances came to the
' s a id, with the development of high
ss ratio (H PBR) turbofan enginesused
civilianaircraft with greatsuccess. They
resented an answer to the combination
levels of manoeuvrahilit1 on which
Force would not compromise, cou
wi th maximum power, simplicity of
and reduced vulnerahility.I'
t ics and the Mission
r eg ard to ta t ic s, as long ago as the
195 s the embryo of inter-service
practice ofCA had beenkept
e with t he J oi nt Operations Center
) at PopeField, FortBragg, orthCar
. It was staffed by armypersonnel from
orps and ir Force pilots from Langley
Army Majo r Michae l J. Dolan
their often-forgotten work in test, revising and re-te ting the theory in
d e xe rc is es u ch as Portrex and
ar sen ice schoo\ , of horhrhe A rillY
Air Force SOllle thought was given ro
air doctrine in I c c t u r c ~ and occCl:: io la
x c r c e ~ Swarmcr anJ
pointed upthe need for the tr a in ingof
ArlllY in the use of a irpower in support of
< l t t a c k l ~
Lessons learnt then were taken out and
dusted. A brand-new series of detailedstud
ies was carried out, analysingall aspects of
the CAS mission, from the range of options
for which such aircraft woull be utilized,
the parameters within which the aircraft
would operate, and which attributes would
bes t cove r th em , to the probable scale of
enemy resistance a nd h ow t he effects of
that resistancecould be minimized.
It was f ou nd that the dominant role
would be the provision of close and accu
rate supporting fire and ordnance delivery
in the v icin ity of friendly ground forces,
and that secondary tasking a t h igher alti
tudeswas not essential. Giventhe required
hattlefield ope ra ti ng p ar amet er s o f a
I,000ft OOOm) ceiling, in weather condi
tion - that resulted in one-m ill' visibility,
comparative t and analysi of Korean
and Vietnam Waroperations clearly illus
trated that an aircraft with a v er y h ig hlevel of manoeuvrability, andan op timum
performance ar the low level, easily out
performed high-speed jet fighter-homber
typestasked for the same role. With regard
tn hostile ground re istance, there was a
wide and growingarray of oviet weapon
ry available to most hostileforce- likely tn
he encountered in the 1970s and Os.
These ranged from small optically guided
automatic we,lpons, quadruple 14.5mm
heavy machine guns, and mobile multiple
23mm, 27mm, 57mm, ) mm and 100mm
A a nd A -2 Guide li ne h ea t- se ek in g
missiles. In addition, there was the possi
ble threat f rom a i r- tn-a ir m is si le s f ir ed
from protecting interceptors.
Modifying the Requirements
I-laving determinedwhat wasrequired, the
U AF examined its current inventory . It
found that it d id not possess any aircraft,
o the r t ha n t he A -I Skyraider, that could
conduct efficient and effective CAS mis
sions, and meet such requirements or sur
vive such defences. 1The U AF attack aircraft at that time
included the A-I, A-26, F-I 0 and T-2 ,
w ith t he B-57 and the A-7D multi-pur
pose aircraft, the la tte r of which was pro
cured to fulfil bo th the CAS and interdic
tion missions.To these could be added the
F -I 05 a nd t he F-II], which were high
speed attack aircraft and in no waysuitable
for CAS a s i t had been redefin dY
Four years of study led the A ir Force to
mod ify i ts o rigina l p ropo sa ls somewhat .
22
Now i t was looking at a speed of 400 knots
(740km/h). I t h ad to comp romise on run
way length, to accommodate the largerair
craft that seemed to be coming out, and this
wa nowput at 4 OOOft (I ,200m). This, it
was argued, would be theamounto f runway
left available in a useable condition after a
pre-emptive oviet airstrikeagainst known
ATO bases. The M-6 1 wa n ow c on si d
ered too mall a weapon to ta kl the latest
(wiet armour and a much l arge r gun , a
30mm stunner w it h a much higher muzzle
velocity, was now thought more relevant.
BrigadierGeneral Thoma H. McMullen
was one s enio ro f fi c r who had first-hand
experience of what was needed. Later to
become Systems Program Director o n t he
A-I0 project,McM ullen hadspent a tourof
duty in Vietnam as one o f some 250 For
ward Air Controllers (FAC). You could not
h i t the enemy unless he could befound and
his position accurately pinpointed and the
s tr ik e a ir cr af t l ed t o h im . The role of
McMullen and his colleagues had been to
fly over enemy concentrations in a l ig ht
observation aircraft such as the Cessna 0IE 'Bird Dog' or the orth American OV
10 'Bronco'. They spent their time hunting
the e lu sive Vie tcong t roop in the jungle,
stooging over suspected areas at 1,000 to
I,500ft 000-450m), marking the enemy's
positions with smokebombs or white phos
phorous (WP) rockets, and then callingup
the air strike.
F rom h is own p er onal experience and
detailed study, BrigadierGeneral McMullen
produced the definitive criteria on which
the wholeA-X programme was subsequent
ly based. He listed five basic attributes that
such an aircraft must embody, and defined
them as follows below: '
• Re spon ivene ss
• L et ha l it y
• u rv iv ab il it y
• Simplicity
• Cost.
Necessary Attributes
spons iv n ss
McMullen defined responsiveness as the
ability to support ground troops with a sig
nificant ordnance load and range. The basic
view of the soldier on the ground was that
close airsupportwasanextensionof his own
supporting firepower a nd a n integral ele
men t o f any land fighting. Foreshadowing
what was to come in t he G ul f War,
McMullen stated that any CA pilot must
have the ability visually to identify friend
from foe. His own role inVietnamhad been
relativelysimple; there, the air environment
had been passive, and FACscould be used
to direct battle operations with no fear of
interception by hostile aircraft. This would
certainly not be the casein Europe.
McMullen's viewwas that, ina majorbat
ric in w hi ch the l ine between opposing
forcesinvariably becomesblurred, airstrikes
d ir ec ted a t a set of map coordinates alone
would not bereliable: 'Pilotsmust beable to
enemy positions and, in addition, must
be able to lo iter so that as the local scene
changes they can provide immediate sup
port.' Here, McMullen was echoingthe cry
ofthe Korean War 'Dough-Boys',given elu
cidarion by General Mark W. Clark:
Th e aircrafr which i, to pJ ll\ ide close tactical
,uppon ,hould he deSigned ,pecifieJiII for thatIlll iun and lol he c o m p r o l 1 l l ~ c d hy a rrim<lry
requlfI:mcnt to engage in ,ur-tn- llr hattlc: .. Ide
ally, ta c rical , upport design, , hould be t h e c o
o r di n at e d e f fo n o f ho th g r ound officer, (\\ ho
c a n s l ar e t h e r c q l l i r c m e n t ~ as the) would
, r a re the reLjuirelllenr fman ani l lc ry piece) and
air { l t r i c c r ~ (who CCill reconcile t h c ~ c require
Il l l l lh with engineering Illnirarion,,). 4
To g i e t he n ew CAS aircraft the required
ability to stay over the harrlezone for long
periods, McMullen insisted that it had to
be capable of operating from forward
airstrips ra ther than from sophisticated
airbases far t o t h e rear.
ethalily
In McMullen s theory, lethality was the
ability to destroytargets while patrolling a
large area. During the course of this, 'sec
ondary or collateral damage had to be
minimized. There had to be confidenceon
the ground that incoming aircraft would
not make g ro ss e rror s in their ordnance
delivery. McMullen held that radar bomb
ing wasaccurate,but not accurate enough
for the CAS mission'. He reiterated that
the prime directive was the ability o f t h e
pilot to sec what he was hitting.
Lethality had to in lude the capability to
take out a w id e r an ge of enemy targets.
McMullen acknowledged that tanks were
the most difficult ground target to hit andde-troy. Tanks could be destroyed by the
stand-off Maverick television (electro-opti
cal) guided missile sy tem with terminal
homing, when therewasadequatelight con
trast to distinguish the target. The US
Navy's Rockeye free-fall c1u t er h omb,
which contained 247 2.1 in bomblet s,
designedfor use again t tanks and armoured
vehicles, was considered effective against
t anks , only in the 'a rea sense '. However,
w he n t ho se t an ks w er e c lo se t o f ri en dl y
23
ground forces, something with more p
sionwas a requirement, hence the adop
ofthe 30mmgun.
All-weathercapability was the ideal
CAS aircraft, but the overriding pri
was the abiIity of the pilot to see the en
especially when bad weather condit
(common enough over central Europ
well as sial reduced visibility to afew h
dred yards. Acceding to the SAF stu
cited by McMullen, European opera
conditions were such that a CAS air
operating within a I OOOft OOOm) cei
with one-mile visibility, would be op
t ional for 85 per cent o f t h e t im e. h
such an aircraft be safely operated b
that I OOOft (30 m) c ei li ng , i t w ou ld
possible to deliver napalm at 300 ft (9
urvivabilily
The new CAS aircraft needed to beab
survive hitsfrom the massedarray of potialground fire, and return safely to bas
McMullen's view it was far more desir
to have a system that cou ld take se
damage but still keep functioning, tha
rely onan aircraft whose chances of surv
depended solely o n n ot being expose
return fire. Such a machine would be im
tent in any CA scenario envisa
McMullen accepted that in central Eur
with the high concentration of radar, h
seeking missiles and heavier-calibre A
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Ti lE A X P R O G R ~ I ~ I THE A X P R O G R ~ I ~ I
esrab Jshed by Jow·amude level rum manoeuvre reqUlfemenr
6,500lb
undetected, and they also had the tel
advantage of economy. The airflow
ducedhad the spin-offeffect of reducing
infra-redsignature of the aircraft, increa
its immunity to seeker missiles.The cha
of ground particle damage when opera
from primitiveairstrip wered creased.
General Electric had begun vigorousl
pushits T64 and TS engines s ince the
A-X proposal in March 1967, but airfr
companies had been i n d is us si on w
Garre tt abou t i ts n ew turbo fan eng
Among others con sid ered were Ali
Division of General Motors, Contine
Motors and RollsRoyce of Derby,UK. P
& Whitney prepared a package of eng
candidates that i tw as t o o f fe r t o the w
ners ofthe preliminarydesignstudies. H
ever, two main choices had been s tudie
the General Electric TF- 34 and the V
Lycoming FI 2 - and their respectivem
itswere to beadjudged in tria ls on the
selected competitive prototypes.
On I May 197 , Colonel Jame
Hildebrandt wa- appointed ystem Prog
Director and hief of the X yst
ProgramOffice. The next stage was reac
on 7 August, when just six o f t he twe
companie s responded to tI e A-X R
Fairchild-Hiller Corporation, the Boe
Company, orthrop Corporation, Ce-
Aircraft Company, General Dynami s C
poration and Lockheed Aircraft Corpo
tion. The others de l ined to bid , consi
ing the package uneconomical.The six
were then carefully crutini:ed by a bo
under Colonel Hi Idd randt, a nd , o n
October 1970, the Source election Ad
sory Committee briefed its findings to
ource Selection Authority ( e cretary
theA ir Force, Robert C. eamans, Jr),
the commanders of the Air Force y ste
Logistic and Tac ti a l Air Commands.
17 December, the A-X Sys tem Prog
Director presented a source selection br
ing to the Defense Systems Acquisit
Review Council (D ARC)l\
In the mean time, the weapon arou
which the successfuI con tender wasdesign the A-X aircraft was ready for t
der in i ts turn . On 16 November, t h e
Force relea ed to industry requests forp
posals for the GA - 30mm canno
The ompetitive
Prototype Phase
The D RC accepted the factspresented
it, a knowledged that the need for the A
Martin hadbeen active in the CAS areafor
nearly two years. -The final draft requirement calledfor an
a ir craf t w ith a targe t weigh t of 35,0001b
(IS,876kg) able to haul 9 ,5001b (4,309kg)
of varied ordnance into action. An overall
unit cost, including Research and Develop
ment (R D), of 1.4million was the opti
mum budget requirement for a proposedsix
hundred a ir craf t. n inf lat ion contingency
buffer of 15 per cent was built in.
Included in the requirement was a high
level of manoeuvrability under a 1 ,000 ft
OOOm) cloud ba e and a rad iu s of 250
miles (400km), plus the ability to loiter in
the battle zone for two hours;a turn diam
e ter o f I m ile or less; and, to allow the air
craft to work c lo se t o t he front line from
'au t e re forwa rd bae s ' , a maximum take
off d istance of 4,0 Oft (I nOm ' bu t n o
more than 6,000ft [I, ml . The power
plant had to b e 'state ofthe art'; thechoice
was l ef t t o the contestants , a l though the
Air Force made a strong recommendation
for twin turbofans in the range of 7,000 to
10, OOlb (3J.l-44.5k ) of thrust. Ord
nance load to be in ex ess of 6,0001b
(2,730kg) and a gross weight allowanceof
20,000-25,000Ib (9,100-11,370kg), 'but
not more than 30,00 Ib ll3,650kgJ'1I.
Hughes Aircraft Company considered
bidding for the avionics package as a prime
cons t ruc to r and the A ir Force officials at
Aeronautical Systems Di vision expressed
a desire to obtain prime bidsfrom avionics
f irms for f i rs t -round s tud ie s, b ecau se of
their usually excellent capability in sy'
tems analysis. For production, they would
revert to a support role. mong th e t en
avionics firms invited by the A ir Force to
a bidders' conferenceat Wright-Patterson
AFB, Autonetics Division o f o rt h Ame r
ican and Hugheshad already flight-tested
equipment suitable for the A-X, while
Sperry, Westinghouse and International
Business Machines (IBM) werealso active
participants.
The AF studies into propulsion
options had comedown infavour ofthe turbofan, which offered a numberof attra tive
options to the CA profile. Their simplici
ty of des ign, w ith lack of propeller and
reduction gearing, made them a compara
tively easy sy tem to install, maintain and
replace in the field, part o f t he rationale
o f t he A-X. Such engines cou ld be f it te d
c lo se r to the aircraft's centrelin giving
economy of profile. The very high-bypa s
fans were relatively quiet, increasing the
chance of a low-level approach remaining
Prototype Deve lopment (CPD) scheme,
o ne o f t h e firs t times such a scheme was
used. T hi s m ea nt t ha t two contractor
would compete on the Prototype Develop
ment Program and, after sixteen months,
would receive instruction for the full-scale
development production phase proposals.
Once these proposals had beenevaluated,
there wou ld be a f ly -o ff s taged between
both companies' prototypes and, depen
dant upon the analysis of this, the final
contractor wouldbe selected. Thisscheme
ensured the maximum testing of compet
ing sy tems, as e n h ri ne d t he A ir Force's
Systems Management Directive.'
The cost-plus (incentive) scheme intro
duced by Secretary of DefenseMelvin Laird
hroke new ground in abandoning the prac
tice of concurrence of theentiresystem (air
craft, powerplant, weaponry, av ion ic , and
so on). It introduced the now-familiar 'fly
hefore-buy' method, whereby all the sepa
rate components were individually put out
to competitive tender and evaluated before
final purchase. This, alongwith the need to
keep toa fixed timetable that was ubjec t to
step-by-step evaluation, and the possibility
of following an 'off-the-shelf' philosophy,
r es ul ted in a development process that
would be longer than hitherto, but couldbe
precisely controlled. Thus, the aircraft, the
engines and the main Gatling gun anna
ment a ll h ad to come together only after
they had been separately developed, tested
and approved. Then, the system could be
trialied and examined asa whole.
The R P and the ids
On Z7 April 1970, the A ir Force y stems
Command established the A-X Sy temPro
gram Office ( PO) in the Deputy for Sys
tems Management, eronautical ystems
Division, Wright-PattersonAFB, to oversee
and co-ordinate this complex series of oper
ations. This preliminary move wasfollowed,
on 8 May, by the ir Force distributing an
RFP for the competitive prototype phase ofthe A-X aircraft to twelve different compa
nies: Beech, Bell, Boeing-Vertol Division,
Cessna, Fairchild-Hiller' Republi via-
tion Division, General Dynamics/Convair,
Grumman ircraft Engineering Corpora
t ion, Lockheed-California ompany, Ling
Temco-Vought(LTV), McDonnell Aircraft
Corpo ra ti on , o rt h Ame ri ca n v ia ti on '
Los Angeles Division a nd o rt hr op orair
Division. Douglas Aircraft at Long Beach
and Martin decided nor to hid, eventhough
To help deal with thecost factor on th e A
X i t was decided to adopt a Competitive
Establishingthe Programme
2. Musthave the capability of identifying,
attacking and destroying targets of a
fixed or fleeting nature in v ery c lo se
prox imity to friendly ground forces.
3. Must have a high degree of survivabili
ty on themodern battlefield and should
operate effectively in t he a tt ac k o f
ground target.
4. must possess an all-weather navigation
capabilityand simple targetacquisition
equipment.
5. Must possess its ownstrategic and tac
tical mobility and be fre of the require
ments for e labora te and vu lnerab le
fixed facilitie .
6. M us t have effective c ommand and
control equipment.
The A-X design requirements, including
the ha ic flight de ign weight (BFDW)
were ident i fi ed in a development concept
paper (DCP)' see table below).
The original spe ification stated flatly
that 'c10 e air support i best performed by
a slow-flying dive-bomber ;.
It w en t o n t o c al l f or a r ad iu s o f 2 50
miles (400km) and a l oa d f ac to r of 3.5
from an aircraft cruising at 275 knots. The
desired take-off capabili ty remained the
combat-lifting of a ful l r ange of ordnance
- eighteen Mk 2 (500Ib) bombs and
1,350 rounds of 3 mm an,munition -with
suffic ient fuel for a 50-mile (80-km) flight
to the ba tt le zone, thirty minutes ofcom
bat, and a 15 -mile (Z40-km) homeward
leg , from a 4,000ft (I ,200m) runway. '
5.0
1.65 I/. nautical mie nm) radius turn
1.2 ,I,nm radius turnl
3.2 fnm radius turnl
6,OOOh/mn
250/2
73
5.0
STRENGTH
Limit load factor BFDW)
Limit load factor maximum weightl
PERFORM N E
Instantaneous 1300kt. BFDW)
Sustained 1150kt, BFDW)
Sustained 1150kt, 18 Mk 82 bombs)
Sustained 1175kt. BFDW)
Rate of clmb 1275kt,BFDW)
Radius/loiter with 18 Mk 82 bombs)
Useful load,fuel and ordnance
1 OOOfl groundturn, take-off and landingl
l Must be quickly available for employ
mentand responsive to the needs ofthe
rmy commander.
inimum A-X performance capability
ummary of esign Requirements
The final view o f w ha t t he ideal c1ose
support manned aircraft system would look
like to US F was summed up as follows:
during a major engagement . o thing has
changed ince. Congress then, a now,
was questioning the v er y n ee d f or the
F to develop a brand-new, and very
specialized, one-role aircraft, in addition to
this programme. They failed to understand
the requirements, nor could they under
stand w hy a multibillion-dollar intercep
tor, designed to fight many miles up, could
not also d ro p down to n ea r z er o f ee t t o
deliver ordnance. The same arguments
that persisted in the 1930s persist today.
In 1974, p re s u re to economize, or lose
the whole package, dominated thinking
o n t he A-X and led t o much discu sion
with the manufacturers and suppliers. The
C aircraft design, motivated by single
mindedness and l a ck ing re li a nc e on
sophisticated avionics, did not include the
expensive add-on tha t migh t have been
considered vital to the airsuperiority fight.
The A-X was always designed to cost.
Even so, Congressional pressure, some
times politically motivated, ensured that
t he A - I was to suffer a long, and some
times painful, gestation period. At each
step of the programme, the developers had
t o f ig ht two opponent groups: the 'five
miles-high' school ofthought, verypower
ful w ithi n t he A ir Force, and politicians
who were either uneducated in defence
matters, orwho had theirown axe togrind.
defined the fifth element for theasoverallcost ofthe system. Although
pert inen t to the actual combat role , it
none the l es , a v it al f ac to r, and one
has cont inued to dominate the A-I
mme to the present day. Jt was recog
even in 1974, that the costs of high
formance fighter aircraft, l ike all other
nssystems, wereescalatingalarming
Fdoubted that it would get the
even for the low numbers of such
aft required to maintain airsuperiority
need to keepsucha CA aircraftin the
and maintaining a h igh sor ti e r ate was
vital. Any aircraft that, through its
design or maintenance and ser
profile, spent most of i ts time on th e
und, was a wasted asset and was, effec
outof action as much as if ithad been
damaged. The fast-moving ground
e env is aged , w ith huge columns of
tanks bulldozing their wayacross the
h German plain toward the Channel,
not allow for any dilatory response.
foresaw that a commanderwould
to deploy his CAS aircraft rapidly to
forward area, and have them loiter and
over the battle :one, seeking targetsof
o n t he ground, thus reducing
flying toand from the ba e fields.
followed that maintenance times on
new A-X had to be as lowas possible.
t ur na ro und t ime on the g ro und
refuelling, rearming and essential ser
- needed to be k ep t t o a thirty
window. Keeping the ground skills
uired to achieve this objective was a
factorin reliability and asim
n would help with thi , as wou ld
in-built capacityto achieve 3,500 flight
r be tween e sential engine change.
powerplantof the aircraftitself had to
y easy on spare-part renewal and
s ibi Iity.
the aircraft would be 'exposed to
heavygroundfire and despite
of the protect ion tha t can be l u i lt i n,
rateswill probably be high'.
manoeuvrability would minimize
ability of enemy defences to 'lock on'
aircraft, and this made it anoth
s ential attribute to t he A -X design.
u e ofstand-off weaponry,such as the
erick , would also give it an edge.
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THE X PROGR MMETHE X PROGR MME
The roll out ofthe A-Xfrom Fai rchil d s facility in 1972 Natona Archves. Colege Park MD
essential requirements for continued de
opmentand operation test production.
A l l was now ready for the final fl
e va lu at io ns t o e e w hi ch design wo
come o ut o n top of the A-X competiti
YA-IOtook to the airand,a month later, in
August 1972, the RFP r e p o ns e w er e d u e
back from the contractors. By I A ugu st ,
the Air Force had completed and released
proposal instructions (PI) containing all
Thevery first test flight o f t h e initial prototype 71-1369 over Edwards AFB California with test pilot
Howard Sam Nel son atthe hel m o n 1 0 May 1972 Natona Archves Washington DC
chief t es t p ilot Howard Sam e lson . II
thus beat it contenderinto the air by twen
ty days; the orthrop YA-9 f lew f rom
Edwards o n 30 May, piloted by te I pilot
Lew Nelson. On 21 July 1972, the second
On I March 197 t h e A i r Forccdesignat
ed the t wo A- X prot ot yp es as the
Northrop A - 9 a n d the Fairchild A-IO. In
June 197 j the U AF awarded lettercon
tracts t o t h e G en er al Electric Company
a nd t h e Phi cn Ford Corporation for the
competitive development of the GAU
gun systcm and practice ammunition.
E ngine de ign lagged further behind, and
i twas not until 9 January 1972 that t h e A i rForce negotiated t he A VC O Lycoming
contract for development o f t hc FlO
LD I00 turbofanengine.
By October 1971, the engineering
designs h ad b e en completed a nd t he full
scale development/production RF P was
released to the prototype contra tors the
fol lowing p ri \. On 1 May 1 97 2, the pro
totype YA 1O made its debut flight a t t he
Air Force FlightTest Center, EdwardsAFR,
California , flown by Republic Division
Full-Scale Developm nt
and Production
The centralization of a ll in fo rma t ion
appertaining to the A-X programme was
established, via the PO, with t he A ir
Force, whichguaranteed its full and impar
tia l d issemination. Direct communication
b et we en o rt h ro p a nd Fairchild was forbidden. This wa to ensure the upholding
of an cnshrined policy en uring n o u n du e
advantage could benefitone orother ofthc
contractor-, eithcr by governing a c ti o n o r
by any misinterpretation of the rules,
whether by accident or design. HO\\,e\'er,
hoth designers were free to initiate design
changes, should th ey be deemed cssential,
pnl\ ided they keptthem w ithincontext of
the specifics as laid dow nin theircontracts,
as originated or assubsequentlynegotiatcd,
agreed and incorporated thereinY
ompetition
and the contractorshad toensure that they
did their utmost to meet theT goals. This
stric ture also related to t he o t he r major
componentsofthe system. Forexample, the
Armament Development and Test Center
ADTC), developing the 30mm Gatling
gun, was obliged to co-ordinate efforts with
the gun cont rac tor s v ia the programme
office to ensure a two-way flow of infonna
tion. Likewise, co-ordination ofthe parallel
development ofthe avionics systcm, which
was to p rovide c le ar -a ir and all-weather
capability,was the responsibilityof theS P O .
Moral a wel l as financial obligations were
spelled out. C olonel H ildebrandt specified
four basic programme objecti\ es, which
were in order of priority):
• 63233F-development
• 27131 F - A-X squadrons - active
.52519F- A- Xsquadr ons- Ai r ation-
al Guard A N G )
• 329A - weapons system;
1. Development of a clo,'cair-support sys
tem capable of performing the mission
within established cost goals.
2. Maintenance of a healthy a nd fa ir
c om pe ti ti on b et we en t he two CPP
contractors.
3. Assurance of visibility by the Air Force
o f t h e contractors' progress and by the
contractors of the Ai r Force 's pro
gramme goals.
4. Definition of procedures u sed in con
duct of CPl) e ffor t for the benefit of
other programmes using a similarman
agement approach.;1
evelopment
U AF Headquarterslaid down all theA-X
pelformance goals. Any deviationsfrom this
couldonly come about fromdecisionstaken
by a panel of adjudicators from the Joint
Contractor and t h e S cc r et a ry o f Defense.
W it hi n t he fixed param tel's of allocated
funding, the SystemsProgram Office(SPO)
How diIigently these admirable objectiy
wou ld b e c ar ri ed out by the company
remaincd to be seen. or was th is the end
of attempts to provide both a tight control
and a level playing field .
The U AF laid dow n ground rules that
guided the prototype phase in respect ofbothdevelopmentand competition.
Obligationsand
Objectives
relationship around the in-house G overn
ment target'for overall funding of the A-X.
A: long as th is overriding Federal restric
tion was kep t to, the , A F had the flex i-
bility todivide the funds into cost element ,
tailored t o t h e needs ofthe A-X programme
itseIf Trade -o ff s cou ld be made between
these element , w ithout further reference
to, or approval hy the Office of the eere
tary of Defen:e (OSD).
The elements selected for the A-X by
t h e A i r Forcewere as follows:
beenproven, and therefore gave the go
for the Competitive Prorotype Phase
development. On I Decembe r 1970,
eamans announced the choice of
competing contractors: Fairchild-Hiller
on's Republic A\'iation Di\'ision,
New York, a n d t h e orth
Division, of Haw
a. Eachwasawardedwith a
contract.
plancalled for twoprotorypes from
competitors. Northrop s propos
on cost-cutting, and its propos,ll
m or e mod es t than Fairchild's. The
contracts reflected this differ
N or t hr o p, u n de r Contract No.
657-71-C-306, was awarded 28.8 mil
II following its choice ofthe Lycoming
turho(an engine. Fairchild, opting (or
higher-thrust, but moreexpensiveCen
Electric TF-34 to power its larger air
t , was a l lo ca ted 41.2 mil l ion, under
o. F3 3657-71-C-308. As t he
e s th emse lve s were Covernment
on 9 J,lIluary 1972, under C ontract
F33-657-C-0135, the S AF awarded
Lycoming 26.5 million cost-plus
e-fee to develop its FIOO-LD-IOO
includingfull qualification tests).
3 ovember 1972, a fixed-priced
contract, o. F33-657 73-C
betweenthe A ir Force and
Electric Company, of Lynn, Mass
tts, for the qualification testing of
TF- 34.This wasre-negotiated in March
to incorporate d e ve l op m en t a n d
of th ilTy-two enginesfor a cost of
7 million.';
C o m pe t i ti v e P r ot o ty pe Phase
P ) o f the A-X programme was given
funding limitations by t he U SA F
a Sy stems Management Directive
on 5 May 1 97 1. 1' A unit flyaway
of 1.4 million 1970 Financial Year,
dollars) was re-specified for the pro
aircraft; this figure wasbased upon
l requirement of six hundred aircraft
at a r at e of twenty <lircraft per
Year-hy-year fund allocation wasmi ll ion in FY 1 97 0, 2 7. 9 i n FY 1971,
4 7. 9 in FY 1972, reducing to a rail-off
in FY 1973 of 7.6 million.
A-X p rogramme was a lso the first
AF weapon d e ve l op m en t u n de r t h e
DTC) concept. nder
the average unit flyaway cost target,
by the ecrerary of Defense, was
soleobjective. Through this, the U AF
t h e G o v er n m en t (represented by the
adopted a customer/provider
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ION LINE AT FAIRCHILD REPUBLIC.
raphscourtesy of Farch d Repub c Archves
of Avaton Museum Garden City New York
Production linein full swing with 111 and
foreground andwing assemblyarea in the
Left The wing sections on trolleys.
Below A 10 production in ull swing.Looking down theline.
op left The AftSectionShopin Building 17
op right The A 10 Engine Line.
Above left The individual work w lkw ys for final assembly on the
production line.
Above Working on the internal systems ofthecombinedforward and rear
fuselage sections.
Left Nearingcompletionwith various access panelsopenfor work.
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/
THE COMPETITION - YA VERSUS YA·IO
CHAPTER FOUR
Dr Grossman, amember of the Amercan Institute o
Aeronaut Astronaut and Amercan Mathematicians
Associaton, still lves in New York Cty. where heha
worked as a management consultant since1981.
Photo courtesy of Fairchid-Republc Archives,
Crade of AviatonMuseum, Garden City New York
landing gear. Because the resultant wi
height w as s m all, t he l an di ng g em w
shorter and therefore sturdierand simpl
and could be optimum-positioned for
safer and more table wide-track underca
riage. Again, this offered great advanta
HAWG MEN Norman Grossman
Dr Norm an Grossman, recognized f or his pioneering
work i n t h e f ield o f design, producton and testing of
high-performancemilitaryaircraft and aircraft systems,
was involved with the A 1 0 project throughoutmost of
its turbulent life.
Born in New York Cty on 3 November1922, Norman
Grossman waseducatedatNew York University, becom
ing a Bachelor of Aeronautcal Engneerng in 1943. He
became thePrncipal Resdent Engneer of Repubc Avi
aton, and thenFairchid Industres, Inc., between 1946
and1951, beng awarded hs Masters degree in 1948.
In 1951, Grossmanwas appointed Assistant Project
E ng n ee r, a nd i n 1 95 5 he became Staff Engineer at
Fairchid-Republc. In addition, he inspired a new gen
eraton by lecturing in Mathematicsat Adelphi Colege
from 1951 t o 1953. In 195B, Grossman became Chief
Electronics Engneer, a post h e h e d unti 1962,when,
with Fairchid s expansion. he became Manager Res
Division 1962-64), andt hen Assistant Genera Man
ager, from 1964 to 1968.
Grossman also found time to contnue hs academic
work, acquiring a PhD in Mathematics i n 1 95 8. a nd
later working at the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute,
Farmingdale Campus for ten years from1965.
Grossmans next appointment was in 1968, when he
became Vice President of theFairchid organizaton. A
year later he was made President. a post he held until
1975. With the reorganizaton of Fairchid, following
the USAF re vie w o f wo rking p ractce s, on 20 March
1975 Grossman replaced Chares C ol s as Chairman
and ChiefExecutve Offcer, a post he hed until 19BO.
Birds of many colours Seen here at Edwards AFB, California, is aline up of all six pre-production A-l0
with their various test paint colourings. Natonal archives,Washington DC MD
could be keptactivew hile essential rearm
ing, ammunitioning and fuelling could he
safely carried out by ground teams.
As w ell a s clearing the underw ing sur
faces forstores capacity, the configuration
f re ed u p the s a me a r ea for h a ng i ng t h e
Fairchild YA IO
The Y A- IO , d e sig ne d to m ee t t he same
ohjectives as the Y A- 9, w as a much largeraircraft, but there was much common think
ing in the derail. The off-the-shelfapproach
was as much in evidenceat Fa ir c hild a s it
was a t N or t hr o p, e v en with regard t o t he
selection o f t h e engine. The General Elec
tric TF34 h a d o r ig ina lly b e en the selected
powerplant for the N a vy s Lo ck h ee d S- 3 A
Viking carrier-based, anti-submarine war
f ar e d e sig n. The TF34 was a lso a non
afterhurning turbofan, but had t he m uc h
higher rating of9,275Ibof th r us t s tatic s e a
level) that was considered necessary to lift
and manoeuvre the much heavier YA-IO
which weighed 23, OOlb 1 , 2 0k g e mp ty,
45,600Ib/20,730kg maximum take-off gross
weight).
It was the posi tion ing of the twoengines
o n t h e Fairchild prototype - h ig h u p above
andbehind the wing oneither side the rear
fuselage - that most struck the eye_ This
configuration provided a n um be r o f
important advantages. Keeping the wing
and hody unencumbered enahled the
YA-IO partly t o e m ul a te i ts s p iritu al p r e
decessor t h e A - I kyraider, a llowing m a x
imum underw ing pylon provision for ord
nance stowage.0
less t h a n e l ev e n suchstations could he featured.
Automatic by-products of such a h ig h
engine mounting location meant a higher
degree o f i m mu n it y f r om f o re ign object
damage F O D ) w hen working o u t o f prim
itive,unsurfacedairstrips. eparation from
the f u se lag e a llow e d a le ve l of one-shot
powerplant destruction immunity, should
ground fire cause the di integration of one
unit> The nature of the system also led to
an improved turnaround time; engines
YFJ 02-10-100 non-afterbuming engines.
These wererated at 7,5001b thrust, some 15
per cent less t ha n t h e TF-34. To compen
s a te f or the lack of thrust, orthrop pro
posed to increasewingspan by7ft 2.5m) to
m ee t t he Air Force specification. The
engines were halfthe length o f t h e TF-34,
and a lm os t2 5 p e rcent lighterin weight. By
mounting the two engines a t c h e t height,orthrop claimed easy accessibility and a
half-hour total replacement time. 4
Interchangeable parts n ot o nIy m e t t h e
U A F n e ed f or e a se o f m a i nt e n an c e a n d
s u pp ly, it a lso meant reduced initial con
tractor c o sts , w ith o nl y o n e ingle part
h a vi n g t o be tooled up and produced for
both sides o f t he aircraft. orthrop was
able t o t a ke advantageof this by featuring
portand starboard duality not only in the
engines, but a lso in the main landing-gear
flaps, speed brake, ailerons, elevatorsand
spoilers, a m on g o t h e r p ar t .4.
T o e n su r e survivability in the face of
e xp ec te d b at tl e damage, orthrop s
designers came u p w i t h w h at t h ey t e rm e d
redundant critical structural members .
With these built in, an aircraft could sur
vive even ifvital features were damaged or
made totally inoperational; in the ground
attack systems that were th n current,
such damage would automati a lly le ad to
the 10 s of theentire aircraft. In Northrop s
design, the access doors on the A-9 would
rapidly vent themselve in t h e ve nt o f a n
internal explosion f ro m a high-explosive
shell or missile strike, t h us a v oi d in g a n y
lethal build-up of pressure that might rip
the whole aircraft apart. Cabling for con
trol was c1ualled and separated, so that it
could not be eliminated b y ju s t o n e h i t in
a v ital s p ot. A ll hydraulic system and flight
controls w e re f itte d w ith manual back-up
i n c as e of power failure. The fuel tanks
were foam-filled a n d s p li t up i n t o t h re e
separatemodule in each wing o n t h e same
p r in c ip l e, a l t ho u gh o n ly o n e o f these was
self-sealing.
Northrop YA 9
The Y A- 9 w as of conventional de ign,
with short, straight, shoulder-mounted
wings, and a s in gl e f in . I ts e ng in es w er e
faired intothe slenderand elegant fuselage
undereach w ing r o ot, c los e to thecentreof
gravity. T his positioning minimized pitch
trim c h an g es m a de necessary by power
hanges, but led to limited yaw in engine
out situations. 46 The pi lot s canopy-shaped
cockpit wa mounted well forward over the
nose, giving 360-degree i l ity w ith 2 0
degree ventral viewing ahead.
Re s po n din g to the Air Force s urgent
requirement to cut costs to the bone,
o r th r op c am e up with something of a
bolt-on philosophy, with a h ig h numberof
equipmentsutilized
off theshelf .
Themainla nd ing - ge a r s tr u ts w e re f ro m th e McDon
n ell D ou gla s A - 4; the w he els a n d b r ak es
came from theG rumman Gulfstream 2; the
nose landing gear and s tr ut c am e f ro m
orthrop s own F-5; and the Escape 2 ejec
tionseat had been developed by McDonnell
D ou gl a f or the Lockheed -3A Viking.41
The choice of powerplant was equally
dominated by cost considerations. orth
rop opted for the veo Lycoming ALF
502, given the military designation of
A-X specification s Table pages 32-3).
I n f a ct , i n many ways their designs reflect
ed the significant differences in t h e c o m
panies thatoriginatedthem. T heyhad cer
tai n aspects in c om mo n: b ot h were
single-seater, ubsonic, twin turbofan-pow
e r ed a irc r af t; both featured interchange
a b le p a rts and dual redundancy controls;
b o th h a d the pilot seated well forward, forgood all-round visibility, and encompassed
in an armoured citadel; both could deliver
16,0001b 7,270kg) of munitions precisely
to the target at lo w le ve l. H o we v er , each
contractor s interpretation w i th in t ho s e
basi s similarities wasvery different.
The Oillpetition
YA Versus YA IO
a nd Compa risons
competitive flight evaluation, compar
the YA-9 with the Y A- I O, to o k p lac e
30 May and 24 October 1972.
period the two companies also
flight-testing of their respective
The Y A- 9 c lo c k ed u p a to tal of
s o rties , amounting to 1 61 .6 f lig hts, while the YA-I made 14 sorties for
a l of I 9.6 flight hour .4\
23 August, the second YA -9 proto
w as being evaluated by the company
s ,s o a ll f o ur a ir cr a f tw e r e r e ad y in
for the fly-offs. T h e re h ad b e en hic
w ith both YA-lOs along the way: the
prototype had made a he a vy la nd
r e s ulting in both mainlanding wheels
o ut a nd t he aircraft scraping its
o n t he deck. The first prototype had
more s e rio us d if fic ulties
stalled, for the resulting turbulence
t h e i n bo a rd s e ct i on of the w in g w as
i n to t h e TF-34s, which themselves
stalled. T his problem necessitated a
of the inner-w ing profile, with
a dd it io n o f a f ix ed s lo t t o d am pe n
n t h e degree of airflow.
SAF Proposal Instructions P I),
contained e ve ry e ential require
for t h e c o n ti n u ed developing and
, w e re r e le a se d on 10 August 1972.
c o mp e ti t or s h a d t o m e et these by the
of 10 O ctober,and give their
p r op o sa ls b y 2 4 October.
fly-off betweent he A -9 and the
a u th o riz ed in Pr og r am Introduc
Document P-71-7-10,originated by the
S P O ,and by AFFTC Project Directive44 I t b e ga n at Edwards AFB, on 10
1972, and was completed on 9
The c ri t er i a f or the fly-off
the technical evaluation, opera
u ira bility , a d e ra iled co t analysis,
negotiation of rival proposals.4;
two competing machines differed
antly in t h ei r a t t e mp t t o m ee t t h e
30 31
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TH OMP TITION - YA-9 VERSUS YA-IO
Ar Force FlghtEvaluaton Systemsl of the A.9A PrototypeAircraft, Technca report No 732 byFrank Lucero Thomas R Yechout andRoy D. Brdges Jr Air ForceFlght Tes Centre Edwards AFB
forna March 1973 ppl 13
Ar Force FlghtEvaluaton Systemsl of the A. 0PrototypeAircraft, Technca report No 733 by FrankN Lucero Thomas R Yechout andRoy D. Brdges Jr Air ForceF ght Tes Centre.Edwards AFB
forna p3
660rounds
4,000 rounds/min
60 Iburst limiter instaled for testsI
n/a
n/a
Hydraulc
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.69
488 sq ft
n/a
-1 deg
7deg outboard panel)
52.5 sq ft each)
Taper rato 0.61
118.4 sq ft total area)
-7 deg
829 sq It
40deg
4879 sq ft
25 deg up, 15deg down
92.36 sq ft total areal
or -65 deg
n/a
n/a
28.42 sq It total)
30 deg up, 10 degdown
11.2 sq It each tail)
or - 25 deg
2 Internal fuselage tanks and 2 internalwing tanks
10,010
n/a
2.755
3,055
2,100
n/a
2,100
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Norsight
A IO
635rounds
4,000 rounds/min
60 Iburst limiter instaled fortests)
1,0651b
7081b
Hydraulc
22in
45 in
72in
98 sq ft
30 deg, 29 min
0000 deg
1000 deg
88sq ft
45 deg
22.7 sq ft
30 deg upand down)
102 sq ft
57 deg up, 63 degdown
98sq It
60 deg up)
42sq ft
12 degup, 8degdown
31 sq It
30 deg right or left
Internal - 5each wing
9,750
1,500
n/a
n/a
4,875
750
4,875
750
3,900
600
1,950
300
9,074
1,396
n/a
A 9A
n/a
580 sq ft
3deg, 12 min
0000 deg
0000 deg
98 sq ft
TH OMP TITION - YA-9 VERSUS YA-IO
Horizontal tail exposed area
Sweepback lat 25 pctchord)
Incidence
Dihedral
Flght controls fap total area Fowlerarea)
Fap travel
Aieron area each, aft of hinge)
Aieron travel
Speed brake split aierons) area total aft of hinge)
Speed brake travel
Lift dumper upper fap surfacel area total
Lift dumper travel
Elevator area laft ofhinge - 70 pct)
Elevator travel
Rudderarea aft of hingel
Rudder travel
Fue tank configuration
Fue volume weight lbl
Liquid measure gal
Leftmain fuselage
Rightmain fuselage
Left wingweight lbl
Liquid measure ga)
Right wing weight lbl
Liquid measure ga)
Pyons 21- total weight b)
Pyons 2)- total lquid measure ga )
Pyons - each weight Ilbl
Pyons - each lquid measure gal
Usable fuel - total weight Ib)
Usable fuel- total lquid measure ga )
Gunsight
Armament total capacity
Automatic gun 11. six-barrel. fuselage-mounted,
model M61Al, 20mm
Rate off ire
Burst shots
Overal weight - loaded
Overal weight - empty
Gun and feeddrve system
Overal gunwidth
Overal gunheight
Overal gun length
Taper ratio
Wing area total
Sweepback at 25pct chordl
Incidence
Dihedral
Vertcal tail exposed area
20,500
45,600
20,500
23.800
26.2 design - gear up)
28.0 design - geardown)
n/a
n/a
26
n/a
n/a
32
n/a
n/a
1.5 to 1 8 fwd
n/a
n/a
+or--40 deg
24 x 77-1Dn, 14-ply
36 x 11 in, 24-ply
n/a
631.0
174.4
79.0
64.0
64.0
61.0
125.0
660.0
226.0
212.24
231.92
130
56.0
29,800Idesign)
Trcyclegear - single wheel, each with
direct-acting oleoshock struts
Single-place, low-wing, twin rudder tail
Two GS YTF34/F5 turbofans
9,2751b each
n/a
A IO
41.795 II)
18,719 1)
19,219 II)
20,754 I
20,254 III
n/a
n/a
382.5
32.6
108.5
380.6
31.0
109.0
389.1
38.0106.5
382.5to 382.4
32.6 to32.5
108.5to 109.2
30 deg
18 x 6.5-8in, 12-ply ratng
32 x 8-16in, Type VII 24-ply ratng
642.0
203.0
123.5
83.0
30.0
60.0
63.0
696.0326.95
122.5
224.4
12.0
47.0
23,734 I)
23,615111
A 9A
Single-place, high wing,single conventonal tail
TwoLycoming YF 02-LD-l00 turbofans
7,5001b each
Two - each with hydraulc pump,
generator, andengine start turbine
Trcyclegear - single wheel. each with
direct-acting oleo shock struts
empty dry, no pylons, no ammuniton, gun includedl
empty gun, no ammunition, 10 pyons,unusablefuel
approx. 2,0001b flight test instrumentationl
re of gravity atdesign weight - fuselage staton
MAC
gear up) - fuselage station
MAC
aft gear down)- fuselage station
MAC
abrupt cg Shift gear up to gear down) fuselage station
MAC
nosegear steering
tyre sze
geartyre sze
nches]
h essboom)
height
stabizer height atroot
at centrelne
height ground to bottom of fuselage)
height ground to bottom of tail)
height aft centrelne)
taispan
landing gear span Ityre centrelne}
e landing gearaxle tomain landing gearaxe
landing gear off-centre lIeft of centrelne)
centrelne distance from fuselage centrelne
htl b)
I
weight max alternative)
I
load Imax)
I
empty dry, no lquids or guns)
ng gear
between theA·9A and the A·
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THE COMPETITION - YA· VERS S YA·IOTHE CO IPETITION - YA VERSUS YA IO
34
Making Choices
With rhe conclusion of Milestone II,
the termination o f t h e rrials, on 2 Dec
ber 1 9 72 , f i nal f l ig h t t im es totalle d 3
hours forall the YA-9aircrafr, and 32 .1
the YA-I Os. Analysis o f t h e resulrs took
weeks, inc luding r he holida y period, a
The de ta ile d br e a kdow n and anal
for rhe YA-lOis gi ven in r he ta ble on pa
36-7.
Simultaneous with the flight-tesr
ystems C ommand h ad b ee n conduct
its own bench-top examination and co
parisons on survivability, powerplanr,
production-run adaptability. Specialla
ratory faciliries h a d b e en e st a bl i sh e d
Wrighr-Patterson AFB, Ohio, to resr
effecrs borh of sustained jetengine wea
t he s t ru c tu r e, a nd also the r e s is ta nc e
oviet anti-aircraft weaponry o f t h e p
od, both gunnery and missile.
Systems C ommand u ed l iv e f ir e f ro
c a pture d 23m m w e a pon, w hic h fired hi
e xplos ive r ounds intoexact replicas o f
fuel r a nk s t o b e u se d in both aircraft. T
aim was to s ec i f rhe foam-filling in
ranks, a nd t he surrounding voids, wo
lerform as claimed. The t a nk s s t o o d u
the tests, faiIi n g t o e xp lo de , even wi rhigh-s leed s i mu l at e d a i rs t re am b l ow
over rhem, and being hit b y F R G-HE
projectiles at muzzle velocity. Such pro
tion was unique and achieved e onomi
ly with only two or three per c e nt o f
rota I tank volum e be ing dis pla c e d by
volume o f t h e intern;ll f oa m. I n addir
the fuel t a nk s w er e k e pr well clear o f
engine hot sections, s o t h il t , i n rhe ev
o f t h e m b ei ng p u n t ur ed , r he risk of i
tion was minimized.
For protection again r heat-seeking m
siles, the infra-red signature of rhe airc
was reduced by the upward cant of
e n gi n es , o u p le d w i t h the size and loca
ofthe empennage, which together mas
much o f t h e h e at output. The tempera
o f t h e e x ha u st plume w asal so reduced
cool bypass air mixing w ir h r he exha
gases.
S i m il a r t e st i ng was done against
a r m our pla te o f t h e G A U - gun. The
le t- pr oof w indshie ld for the aircra
canopy w as si m il ar ly t es t ed w i th 7 . 62
a r m our- pie rc ing r ounds , w hic h f ai le d
p e ne t ra r e, w h il e 2 3 m m a nd 3 7m m H
were fired hor izonta lly inr o r he p i l ot s ptective tiranium harhrub panels.i
35
Deficiencies
High rudder forces upon loss hydmulic
power; unacceptableoperation the heading
and reference system pilot discomfort caused
by the ejector seal. one these was an
insurmountable obstacle «
Deficiencies
El1gine/airframe incom/Jatibility; general cock
pit reach; unacce/Jtable o/Jeration the head
er and reference system; /Jilot discomfort
caused b) the ejection seat; unacce/nable man
ual reversion control in /Jitch.
Conclusions and
Recommendations
Attributes
Strafing and bombing acwmcy annament
control; cockpit visibility; auxiliary power
unit; maintainability.
One important innovation produced by
Northrop was the unique s ide force con
trol FC) linked to t he c om bi ne d
aileron/speed brakes o f t he o ut er wings.
Whereas both aircraft featured the s e s plit
upper and lower panels, to give fasr decel
erarion w ith lit tle or no rrim change, the
YA-9 s s pec ial f e atur e connected these
speed brakes to the rudder by m a nua lc on
trol. The s yste m a ided tracking accuracy,
leaving the pilor free to concenrrare on
r he gr ound ta r get w hile t h e S F C took c a r e
of r h e b a nk a n gl e and fuselage direcrion.
YA-9
YA-JO
Both aircraft came o u t o f t h e tests well and
were c onside re d to ha ve a dva nc e d CA S by
significant amounts. The d eci si o n w as hair
line. Th e overall evaluations wereas below.
Ami/nttes
Bombing and strafing accuracy; annament
control; visibility; pressurization; ground cock
pit cooling; maintainability
the t es t p il ot o pt ed for the YA-IO. This
w as a v i t al f act o r, because o f t h e similarity
of the de live r y a c cur a cy te st results. The
next stage of the trial was therefore vital to
the final outcome, both in the source selec
t i on p r oc e s and the follow-on develop
ment, and this was the assessment o f t h e
respective aircraft s survivability factors.
OM ING RESULTS
I. T here was no difference hetween the
YA-9 a nd t h e YA-IO, regardless o f t h e
hom bing profile selected.
2. T here were no differences between the
YA-9 and the Y A- lO i n the overall
BD -33 bom bing results; both were
e qually a f fe c te d by external factors.
3. T here was no s ignif ic ant dif f er e ncebetween the YA-9 a nd t he YA-lO in
the g r ad u al i m pr o ve d l e ar n in g t r en d .
4. T here were differences in individual
p i lo t p e rf o rm a n ce b e tw e en the YA-9
a nd t he Y A- 1O i n the B D U- 3 3 b o m b
i n g r esu l ts. As before, how eve r , the se
t e n de d t o c a nc e l e a c h other out.
4. On first-pas strafing the YA-9 per
f or me d s li gh tl y better than the
YA- l Oo n the 45-degree profile.
S. All four te s t pilots pe r for m ed s lightly
hetter with the Y A -lO in the 15-degree
profile.
6. T here w e re dif fe r enc e s he tw ee n the
YA-9 a n d t h e YA-lOin individua lpilot
performance in the 45-degree profile,
hut t h es e d i ff er e nc es t e nd e d t o c a nc e l
each other out.
One thing the trial could not evaluate by
,tatistics was the pilots gut feeling . When
asked which aircraft felt r ightto fly most of
A-10 on duskexercises swoops low over an air
liaison officerduring thecomparative trials with
the A-7A. The A-10wonthe trials. handsdown.
despitepolitical scepticism. USAF. The YA-IO performed better overall on
the I5 -degree profile.
2. The YA-9 pe r f or m e d s lightly hetter
overall o n t he 45-degree profile.
3. On first-pass strafing hoth aircraftwere
essentially the same o n t he IS-degree
profile.
STRAFI G RES LTS
Strangely e n ou g h t h e accuracy o f t he
competing systems was n ot t h e principal
factor in these trials. Instead, t h e i n te n
tion was to s t re t ch b o th designs as fa r a s
possible in o r d er t o identify and magnify
the differences between the two in a whole
raft of challenging fl ight profiles.
The S t ud y G r ou p , based a t K i rt l an d
FB, e w M ex ic o, but assigned to
DC /Dev Plans at C o m ma n d H Q , com
prised Captain Ronald L. K er ch n er , t u dy
Ma nage r , R ic ha r d H. Anderson, Captain
Robert F Couch, L i eu t en a n t C o lo n e l
William B. ewhart, Jr, a n d K e nn e t h W.
Smith, Office o f t he Assistant for tudy
Support. Their findingswere that there was
no significant d i f fer ence i n weapons deliv
ery accuracy between the two prototypes.i2
The final report on this s ta ge o f t h e pro
gramme made the following p o i n t :
Flght hours
146
1385
Fly·off comparisons
Type Sor1es
YA·9 123
YA·O 87
A s t h e GAU-8 wasstill underdevelopment,
t h e U SA F substituted the M61 cannon for
the tests a nd 20,000 rounds of ammunition
from this weapon were expended on strafing
r un s, w h il e 7 00 cOlwentional homhs were
dropped in the hombing t est s. A 1 0 includ
e d i n the c time t o t al s w er eai r cr af t p elf o r
m a nc e a nd ha ndling testing.
• SeeFrankN Lucero James Ford and Roy Bndges Jr.
AirForce F ghtEvauaton SystemsIofthe A·9APrototype
AC aft. TechnIca reporr No 73 2 AFFTC Edwards AFB CA,
March 1973 and Frank N Lucero Thomas R Yechout and
Roy Bndges AirForce F ghtEvauatonISystems)of the
A-0 PrototypeAwalt Techntca report No 73-3
March 1973 AFFTC Edwards AFB C p
w er e a ls o on hand to e xa mi ne b ot h
machines for their respective maintenance
and probable combat-ready-in-service sta
tus. The planned flight programme was
123 hours for each aircraft, but, in the
event,both m a c hines e xc e ede d this total.
The n um b er o f sortie conducted by
each o f t h e competitors prototypes during
the fly-off is s h ow n i n the lable below.
Joint Test Force J T F) c om pris e d te s t
ts dr a w n from the Systems Command
responsible for the engineering and
of all U AF aircraft, and
Tactical Air C o m m an d T A C) , who
to he the pri me users. Experts from
an d A ir Training Commands
e Fly-Off
YA-10 on18 December 1974. totingtwenty-eight Mk-82bombsover Edwards AFB. California.
angledlower tail fins. and the observationcameras- two forward.angled rearwards. one
angledforwards. one undereither wingtip angledinwards- to record tests. NatonalArchives.Washington, DC
forward operations. The main
ng ge a r itself partially retracted back
two-thirds) into streamlined pods.
course, duality in the form of inter
parts w as a s much a feature of
YA-1O as o n t he YA-9, and its landing
ailerons, rudders, elevators, control
and engines w er e al l construct
this pr inciple. The m a nua l ope r a
pr ovide d for in the e v e nt o f hydraulic
was s im ila r to t he o rt hr op design,
one s pe cia l pr ovis ion the YA-IO had
a n i n -b u i lt s el f -s t ar t in g a ux i li ar y
unit for the supply of compressedair
en g ine starts.
w as a ls o developing special
c on ce pt s a nd c on du ct in g
layouts on tooling at t h is s t ag e l
table, pages 32-3).
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7
T cOMP TITJO YA 9 VERSUS YA JOTHE COMP TITIO YA 9 VERSUS YA IO
system evaluationreportsummary
no Date 1972 Safety code Correcton category Def ciency Sera no Date 1972 Safety code Correcton category Defciency WUC 11 0001 PROPULSION SYSTEM WUC 230001
2 Nov M Poor accesst o t opof f uselage 10-2-1 2 Nov III M Possible inadvertent doubleengine shutdown10 Nov D Unacceptablenylon straps retaininglower fuselage access 10-25-18 9 Nov I D Difficulty in interpreting fan tachometer readings
doors 10-62-54 6 Dec II M Restrctedaccess for fuel control removal/installation14 Nov M Lockin integral cockpit ingress/egress provisions 10-65-55 2 Dec I M Excessve carboning of engine carburetting scrol2 Dec D Large numberof fastenings required forengine nacele
AUXILIARYPOWER UNITiWUC 24 1accessdoors
Excessve gapat air inlet duct/engine inletinterface10-50-19 24 Nov M Poor locaton of APU inlet forunpreparedsurface operatons2 Dec II M
2 Dec I D Potental damage to coin-slotted screws durng removal ENVIRONMENTALSYSTEMS WUC 41001
4 Dec I D Difficulty in handlng RT unit for removal and replacement) 10-10-5 Nov D Lack of disconnect provisions on over-temperature sensor4 Dec II M Crack in structure at F 512 {aft fuel tankbulkhead stiffener}
wiringof refrigeration package10-47-36 27 Nov M Poor access to ventilation garment blower12000}
2 Nov II M Poor locaton toofar forward) of throttles LIGHTINGSYSTEM WUC 440001
10 Nov I D Poor location and actuation of throttle friction collar 10-27-23 13 Nov M Incompatibility of interior lighting with task requirements14 Nov I D Difficult ingress to cockpit with parachute on 10-21-62 14 Dec M Lack of formaton lights on forward fuselage13 Nov I M Lack of la be l n g of release mode control
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WUC 45000}14 Nov II M Poor location of external lghts control pane
10-6-2 Nov III M Unacceptablerapid bleeding at hydraulc pressure after eng14 Nov I M Poory designed latching device o n r a m inlet doors
M Poor grouping of prm ary flight instruments shutdown15 Nov II10-17-12 14 Nov D Inadequate dumping provisions for hydraulc reservoirs14 Nov I D Poor grouping ofengine instruments10-23-22 14 Nov D Difficulty in reading hydraulc pressure gauges15 Nov I D Poor actuation of speed brakes
15 Nov I D Unsatisfactory grouping of light test buttons/switches FUEL SYSTEM WUC 46000)
16 Nov I D Uncomfortable parachute 10-4-13 14 Nov II D Inadequatefuel quantity indicating system18 Nov I M Unconventonal actuation direction of crossfeedand 10-3-35 18 Nov III M Inadequate fuel shut-off control for APU
tankgate valve controls 10-48-37 24 Nov II M Poor access to f uel cel problem s27 Nov D Poor forward visibility 10-57-40 24 Nov I M Inability tocorrect fuel imbalance27 Nov M Unacceptable locaton of anti-skid switch
OXYGEN SYSTEM WUC 47 14 Dec M Poor canopy operaton for emergencygroundegress
10-12-8 2 Nov III M Unacceptable location ofoxygen overflow vent5Dec M Engne over-temperature durng airstarts with throttles
forward of IDLE INSTRUMENTS WUC 51000)
14Dec M Poor access beyond reachl of forward cockpit control surface 10-14-10 6 Nov M Highly vulnerablelocation of pitot tubeto maintenance
activitiesGEAR SYSTEM WUC 13000110-5-19 10 Nov III M Functonalinadequacyof attitude indicatng system2 Nov III M Poor locaton of brake componentsfor forward airstrip10-46-41 30 Nov I D Lack of HARS gyro cut-off circuit durng maintenance activitieperatons
18 Nov III M Possblehardoverof nose-gear afterelectrical component INTERPHONE WUC 6400
malfunction 10-18-21 10 Nov M Poor access to intercom headset cordage4 Dec M Loss of normalbrakingsystem with both electrical systems
RADIONA VIGATION WUC 71001inoperative
10-54-48 4 Dec D Difficulty in reading TAC RT unit indicators12 Dec III M Loss of normal and emergency braking with anti-skid10-53-57 14 Decmalfunctions M Inadequatemarkingsof TAC suppresser cables on RT unit
WEAPONS OELIVERYWUC 75000}CONTROL SYSTEM WUC 14000)
10-67-5814 Dec M Inadequate access to electric connector in pylons, 3 4 8 and2 Nov I M Lack of access to speed brake actuator
10-68-59 5Dec M Lack ofaccesspanels on wing pylons and 1114 Nov II M Poor location and modeof fap control
10 Nov I D Poor material uti zed in flightcontrol surfaces ALL AVIONICS
14 Nov II M Undesired fap blowback 10-8-6 2 Nov D Poor type of electrical connectors solder-ani27 Nov II M Lack of flight controls ground lockin cockpit
2 Dec I D Poor access to aieron trimactuator
4 Dec III M Inadequate switchover t oandf rom m anua reversion
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THE COM PETITIO 1 - YA 9 VERSUS YA IOTHE COMPETITION - YA 9 VE RS S YA IO
view of an A-10 during icing tests atalti tude overEdwards AFB
1975. Thisplane haddistinctivemarkings with port-onlyleading edgesof
undercarriage pod knee tail fin andengine nacellecoloured yellow.
Archives Washington
Report and the FY 74 Congressional
h ee t o n t he A-IO in the light of
D ARC review of [ 0 Mar ch [ 97 3.
Depu ty Secre ra ry dec lared the new
mate of ].7 01 i ion'wasfor reporting
poses', and that i t would not alterthe
scribed to ta l un it flyaway design-tn-
target of 1.5 million.
The A-IO DT E / IOT E Phas
fl ight-testing began on 10 March [
wi th the two YA-lOs at Edwards AFB
ontinued throughout 1973 and 1
when the first ofthe pre-production b
a ir cr af t t oo k o ve r. l os t of these tr
ate Company Pnce Quantty Target C e mg Quantty Contractor Governm
development estmate estmat
01/3/73 Fairchid-Republ c $1593 1 $1594 Ch 1 1 $1594 1870
01/3/73 Genera Eectrc. Lynn, MA. Ch 2) $277 32 $273 305 323 $273 30503/11/72 General Eec(nc. Lynn, MA Ch 2) $145 $149 $163 $149 $163
21/6/73 GeneralE ectnc. Burmgton, VT Ch3 $238 $131'
PROCUREMENT
Fairchid-Republc 110.3 48 110.3 $1253 48 1103 1103
General Eectnc, Lynn, MA $593 128 $593 $656 124 $593 $593
GeneralE ectnc, Burmgton, VT $132 48 $132 $143 48 $732 $137
aircraft. There was an option for initia lpro
duction of forty-eight aircraft, but this was
dependent upon results of the pre-produc
tion tests and rhe ou tcome of the GAU
Gatling gun trials. General Electric was to
develop and deliver thirty-twoTF engines.
The details of the conrracts are ontained
in the table below.
There was sti muchconcern over cost
ings and orne of those involved seemed to
be having second thoughts. The Deputy
ecretary for Defense asked the ecretary
of t h eA i r Force tn modify and re-submit
rhe 3 [ December 1972 elect Acquisirion
Excellentrear under-viewof an A-10 in a dive showingthe splitflaps inoperation.
It is carryinga mixedrangeof ordnance including asingle AGM65 under theport
wing. Natonal Archives Washington
Cost Pus Incentve Fee:
Defmmzed Development)
Fixed Pnce Incentve Frm.
Defmltzed (Procurement)
Fixed Prce IncentveF rm:(Defmltzed)
Fixed Prce Incentve Firm: Defmltzed)
Fixed Pnce IncentveFirm:
(Defmltzed) Development Procurement
F33657-73-C-0500
F33657-73-C-0222
F33657-73-0073
A 10 original contract details
Contract Type
that the design-to-contract hould a im at
the 1.5-million target and conta in con
tractual incentives aimed at keeping costs
wel l below thi s f igure, i f th i s were achiev
able. They sril lbasedrhe procurement pro
gr<lmme on t h e 1.7 million figure rhat was
CAIG's besr esrimare, however''''
Proceeding to
Full-Scale Development
• Targetpnce overal
• A-fO proporton of IOta Pnces are In m i o ns of do ars.
Having demonst rated and validated, as
hest they cou ld, the systems feasibility
under the Proto type Development Pro
gram, the next srep was full-scale develop
ment , and rhe design, fabrica tion, testing
and evaluation for the system. Approval
for this was given by the DeputySecretary
of tate for Defense, William P Clements,
Jr, after further review of the -X pro
g ramme and t he D ARC recommenda
tions. He pas sed hi f ind ings to the ecre
tary of Defense on 2 F eb ru ary 19 73,
telling his superior that he expected the
Air Forc e to make a thorough review of
rhe whole design, and t o k ee p it t igh t tn
prevenr unnecessary additions [ the bud
ger. Th e Air Forcewas expe ted, he wrote,
' to e l imina te any features whi ch a re n ot
absolutely necessary for accomplishment
ofthe closeair- upport mission .
Th e authorization to proceed with the
award of both airframe and engine con
trac tswasreceived byA ir Force Command
on I March 1973. Th e twocost-plus-incen
tive-fee contracts were duly i ssued that
same clay. Fairchild-Republic was to con
t inue with p roto type aircraft testing'and
[ develop and build ten pre-production
I. There must be successful accomplish
mentof thecompleteQualification Test
(QT) as a demon tration milestone.
2. The date of exerci ing Option Il, which
committed the first substantial amount
of production funding, was not ro pre
cede the completion ofrhe QT.3 . A d el ay option c laus ewa s ro be keyed
to Option II.
p r epared to make a has ty dec is ion . On 1
January 1973, the Deput y e cr et ar y of
Defense, Kenneth M. Rush , took the next
cautious step. He author i zed rhe U AF to
make asourceselecrion announc ment,and
also ro enrer intocontractual negotiations
with Fairchild, including the design-to-cost
objectives. Th force was not, however, per
mitted at thiss tage to proceed any further
and sign a full-scale development contract.
This was placed on hold while the whole
programme continued under review of the
Office ofthe ecretary of Defense D) by
way of t he C os t Analysis Improvement
Group (CA1G), whose brief was to obtain
costings appertaining to the entire pro
gramme. Not until the CAIG report was in
could thenex t stage be r e c h e d l ~The CA[G r ev iew was pas sed to rhe
DSARC on February 1973. Given a fif
teen-year expected I ife cycle for t he 6 00
a ir cr af t t he A i r Force proposed to purchase, the group estimated that a force of
A-lOs that size would, in Fiscal Year (FY)
1973 doll ar s, c ost 3.[5 billion rather
than the 3.134 bi ion the A iI Force had
estimared. Furthermore, while Fairchild
hadestimated the total unit flyawaycosr as
1.4 million, a nd t he A ir Forc e had e st i
mated it at 1.5 million, the CAIG wasfar
more pessimistic, puttingthe figure at any
thing up to 1.7million.lo
Despite this review, the DSARC went
ahead with the recommendation t h at th e
ecretary of Defense should duly authorize
theAir Force tn go aheadwith the award
ing of rhe definitive engineering contract
for rhe A-IO . Howeve r, t he D SARC
insisted that the contract wi th General
Electr ic for t h e e ng in e mus t c on ra in t he
following three provisions:
·Cost-orientation wasalso recommended for
both airframe and engine contracts, so that
special attenrion hadro begiven tos t a ying
within the design-to-cost guidelines. Fur
thermore, both contractsshould have pro
vision for extending long lead-time obliga
tions. Indeference to the fears expressed by
the CAIG review, they also recommended
The pi l o t ' op in ions on t h e YA-10 were
also given a hearing. The Direc to r o f
Defense Research and Engineering, Dr
John . Fo tel ', J r, - t at e d that those pilot
who had flown both types had expressed
preference for the YA-IO.
Other factors that may have swing the
decision Fairchild's way were the utiliza
tion of an existingpowerplant, the superi
or in-built redundancy features, and rhe
berrer maintenance/flight hours ratio of
the YA-IO.
One final influencing factor, unofficially,
was political. There was no doub t rhat the
aeronautical future of ew York tare re lied
very much on rhe securing ofthe A-X con
t r ac t for Long I sl and plan t s. Apart from
Grumman, Fairchikl-Republic was the only
other major p laye r and , by 1972, i t was in
trouble. The cancelling of the Boeing SSTprogramme in 1971 had been a heavy blow
to itsmain sub-contractorand rheF-14pro
ject, another prop, was not going well and
seemedlikelyto go the same way. orthrop,
based in buoyant California, was not suffer
ing in the same way. 0 doubt, Congre s
Olen from the north-east made theAir Force
well aware of the situation.
Th e D ARC recommendation was
passed on to the DoD f or i ts r ev iew. Fur
ther srudies were requiredand no one was
January 1973, the DSARC h el d a
to review the findings and make
l decision.
YA-9 was adjudged to have uperi
d l ing characte ris tic s, while the
had much greater roll inertia, but
r had the edge on toughness, load
e and ease of maintenance. Both
ines had exceeded the specification,
was highly commendable, but a
still h ad t o be made.
DSARCchoice was the YA-lO, for
s listed by ecre tary of theAir Force,
C. Seamans, J r The overall consen
thatthe YA-I0 had superiorground
capacity, as the underside o f t h e
gave ea y access and the larger size of
itselfgave greaterordnance-carry
Another influence on the deci
was the fact that the YA-I 0 was closerthan theYA-9, and itstransi
f rom tes t programme to product ion
be quicker, with only minor modifi
ns to the prototypes required. The
wasalso expressed a t the time that the
of the YA -I w ou ld en 'ure
its f lyaway costings mightbe heldclos
the required 1.4 millionper unit than
of itsrival. Seamansadmitted that this
not be guaranteed, and in the event
ed to be ill founded.
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THE O ~ I P E T I T I O \ YA 9 VERSUS YA 1
Another Fly-Off?
Eastern-seaboard organization onlyad
to the partisan political ballyhoo ;
aturally, there was widespread opp
t io n t o a n y fly-off between the A-7D
the YA-tO , bo th in the Air Force a nd
Fairchild. ot be ause, a s s ome ena
would have it, t he y h ad any t hi ng t o
from such competi t ion , bu t because
two sys tems were so d is simi la r that
conclusions would be meaningless. T
would simply not be comparing l ike w
Iike. The Presidentand Ch iefExecutiv
Fairchild Industries a t t h e time, Edward
Uhl, spel t th is ou t in simple terms.' A
eva lu at io n, h e p oi nt ed o ut , h ad t o b
c ombina t io n o f flying chamcteris
basic design featur's and analysis '. A
off against an aircraft such as the A-
which was totallydifferent in concept
design, '[could] not be used to evaluat
the salient characteristics of the A-
Uhl doub ted whether any tests wo
change minds alreadymade up and did
feel the 'abilityof anyone toconvince
cial interest Congressmen of the need
specific flight-handling characteristics
performing close air-supportmissions,
vivability', or, indeed, any 'other close
support performance parameters, espec
ly when they are not directly evalua
through flying''' .
TheOSD was opposed to the fly-ofthe same reasons. Ellio tt L. Ri hards
Secretary of Defense a t t he time, h ad
appear before the Armed Services Co
mittee on 2 March 1973, and faced h
tile questioning about why the trials
not yet been c ar ri d o ut . He could o
reiterate t hat ' i t wa difficult to sec ho
f ly -o ff wou ld p rov ide mean ing fu l n
information'. Merely taking the two
craft in to the a ir wou ld leavea whole
of knowledge untapped and untested. T
The A Trials
(instantsupport in theevento f amphibious
landings to counter localized threats, as at
Inchon dur ing the Korean War, or during
interventions in Lebanon and the like) had
the heavy punch ofthe proposed A-X. This
new aircraft 's role was defined as 'concen
trating heavy firepower, matching selected
munitions to different targets, Itthreatened
sector from dispersed b<lses .
This a rgument did not completely
s i lence Congres s iona l c ri ti cs , many of
whom had their ownaxe to grind, but it suf
ficed to keep the programme al ive. By
December J972, however, the wolves were
o n t he prowl again and fresh demands for
comparative analysis of the Y -10, t he A
7D, and the AH-56 helicopter were being
voiced. The r ev is ed A-X Development
Concept Pap er was b ei ng p re pa re d for
December 1972 release, but, as early as July
1972, the Director of Defense Re-carchand
Engineering (DDR E), Dr John . Foster,
Jr was asking the ir Force to examine the
A-I0/A-7 comparison issue a nd t o provide
supporting analysis for such data to be
in orporated in those findings. 1
The RDT E Def en se Bud ge t w as
reviewed by Congress in September 1973,
and critics homed in on several aspects of
the A-LO programme, which led again to
c al ls f or a comparative t r ia l w i th t he A
7D. Citingthe high production co t of the
A-IO and its single-role capabilityagain t
the alleged vcr atility of the A-7D , they
also referred to uninformed c ri ti i sms i n
some in t he Wes te rn media, queryingwhether theA-I 0 could perform even that
single role . In particular, Democrat Sena
tor Howard W. Cannon from Nevada
made the is ue hiscrusade, using this as his
main argument. In a meeting with James
R. chlesinger, ecretary for Defense, he
'challenged the survivability of t he A -tO
in the European environment '. The fact
that the A-7D was being produced by the
LTV Corporation, based in Dallas, Texas,
while the Fairchild company was an
Politics Politics n Politics
Congressional Critics
CHAPTER FIVE
Early in I, the A-X programme came
under the balefulscrutiny of Congressmen,
who queried why three separate aviation
systems were being promoted t o d o what
seemed to them to be one job.Suspicion of
t he US Military buying anything foreign
led t o w ra th in some quarters when the
Marinesshowed In interest in the Hawker
iddeley Kestrel. Questionswere alsoasked
aboutthe suitability of the Army consider
ingsuch a -ophisticated attack helicopter
as the Cheyenne. aturally, the A-X d id
not escape condemnation, and the 000was a sked to explain why so many types
were required for the same task.
This coincided with the DOD's own fur
the r in -depth examinat ion of the role of
CAS, which began in February 1971. This
studied CA acro s the whole spectrum,
including doctr ine , tact ic and require
ments , moving away from the V ietnam
experiencesand looking more to ATO's
European defence needs. The Air Force
was undergoing a similarswitch, with the
South-East Asia scenario fading away, anda new emphasis on redressing the huge
imbalance of conventional ground forces
in Europe.
The 00 0 toldCongress thatthe increas
ingly important role o fCA in the new
'trip-wire' scenario , which tried to avoid
first use of tactical nuclearweapons, meant
that a ll typ e were requi red to mee t t he
varying th re at s posed by mass Soviet
armour. Neitherthe Cheyenne (with c1ose
in, immediate response) nor the Kestrel
The 'Warthog' was involved in many fights
and battles during the first twenty years of
i ts life , a ll of which were against political
enemies. Indeed, long before the first pro
to type took to the air, the aircraft had been
subjected to misinformed criticism that
a lmos t l ed t o i ts d em is e b ef or e i ts b ir th .
80
10
58
148
83
3
64
160
andorgani:ationalchanges in the office to
cope with theex tra workload. The setting
up of a management operations office was
IT4uested, along with the separating of
procurementand production intoseparate
directorates, pius the additionoffunction
a l d iv i sions within those directorates.'
The table belowshows how th is developed
over the course of the next year.
The euphoria ofthe supporters of theA
t O following the much-debated award of
the pre-production aircraft contract was
short-lived. Less than a month af te r the
developmentcontract for t heGA - had
been awarded, the SenateArmed Services
Committee put the whole programme
backfor many months by cuttingthe num
ber of pre-production A-I0s from t en t o
six ; More thelll that, thecommittee made
a recommendation for yet another fly-off,
th is t ime be tween the A-I0 in i ts incom
p letes ta te, and the A-7D , the Air Force 'version of the avy'- Corsair-II, which
h ad b ee n i nt ro du ce d i n to t h e U AF a
long ago a s 1969 ot for the firs t time,
and not by any means for the last, politi
cians were meddling withthe A-LO and it
was once morefighting for its life.
Dec 75
AuthOrsed ASSgned
65
6
54
125
72
5
56
133
30Jun 74
AuthOrsed ASSgned
98
54
7
37
92
48
6
38
Dec 73
Authorised ASSgned
Tota /Ight hours
590.9
548.5
On 18 April 1972, the A-XSystem Pro
gramOffice was redesignated theA-I 0 ys-
tem Program Office an d o n 2 \ June, the
Acting Secretary o f t h e A ir Force, John L
McLucas, announcedthe award to General
Electric ofthe developmentcon tractfor the
GA - gunsystem beingdeveloped for the
-10. The award consisted of a fixed-price
incentive-fee contrac t o f 23,754,567 for
three pre-production systems. This com
pleted the f in al l in k i n t he c ha in o f t h e
programme.
In keeping with the change of pace and
new status signified by the renaming of the
A-X programme, the A-LO PO became
'Deputy for t he A - I ' . Brigadier General
Thoma H. McMullen,who had been pro
moted on 19 July 1973, was appointed to
the j ob , a r ol e he relished. As full-scale
development was now under way,
M Mullen requested Command Head
quarters to authorize increased personnel
8 14 4 14 14 10 10
1 1
27 43 43 48 48 50 50 35 57 57 62 62 61 fJ 61 fJ
1 1 1 1 1 2 2
4 5 5 5 5 10 8
5 6 6 6 6 12 10
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 2 2 3 3
104 158 164 203 195 236 8 222 8
6
36
2
23
Tota sortes
467
354
63
34
2
27
aSSgned as needed on parr tme baSIS
LOGISTICSCOMMAND
Offcers 1
Airmen
Civi ans 4 _
TOTAL
AIR/AIR TRAINING COMMANDS
Offcers 2
Airmen 1
Civi ans _
TOTAL 3 _
GRAND TOTAL 107
ATEDPERSONNEL
Engineers
Offcers 8
Airmen
Civi ans 28
TOTAL 36
TOTAL
OFFICE
Offcers
Airmen
Civi ans
of A-10 Program Officemanning 1973-74
30Jun 73
AuthOrsed ASSgned
flight details _
ype Retrementdate
15April1975
13June 1975
were conducted at a lower intensity
before, were designed to test out
and additions that were to be
in th ese ten machines. The
of changes were introduced on
nd prototype (7L-L370), leaving
(71-1369) for comparison. The
an was increased by 30 in (75cm)to
induced drag and, as further aids in
r ec ti on , t he c oc kp it a nd c an opy
redesigned, the engine pylons made
to reduce the profile and the land
r fairing and kneecap were made
in profile . The fixed slats intro
d ur in g t he e ar li er t ri al s w er e
d with fully automatic retractable
With these improvements, p inand
ry testing took place during 1974.
machines were not finally pen
offuntil 1975, by which t ime they
ach ieved a considerable total of
hours, as shown in the table above.
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POLITICS. POLITICS AND POLITICS - THEA-7ATRIALSPOLITICS. POLITICS AND POLITICS - THEA-7ATRIALS
The Fort Riley CAS Tests
Dates 1974
7 23 Jan
3Jan 5 Mar
20 Feb 1 0A
8Apr1974
8 11 Apr
10 13 Apr
12 13 Apr
15 Apr 15 M
15 19 May
15 Jun
Mid to late J
LateJun
A·10/A·7Dfly off schedulemilestone
Schedule miestones
Air Staffand GSO review of plan
A 70 training
YA·l0 training
Testforce in place
Aircraft deployment
Coordinaton meetings/briefings
Loca area flights
Actvetestng
Redeployment
Reports 3 provided to DOT E
OSARC III meetng
Report to Congress
Four fighter pilots who had wide C
combat experience flying such aircraf
the FA or F-IOO, but who had flown neit
The test was scheduled to take p la ce f r
McConnellAFB, Kansas, between IS Ap
and9 May 1974. The aircraft would fly s
ulated combat missions against ground t
gets and defences a t t he Army's Fort Ri
Kansas,test area. The venuehad beench
sen because its size gave enough scope
realistic operations and itsterrain wassi
lar, if not exactly identical to the expec
northern European battle area. The Ar
had adequate data-collection instrumention already in place, with Range Meas
ing System II (RMS-II), which provi
the players'positions, andthe telemetry
n al s f or important ground and airc
events, and the Cooper Harper rating
tem, plus the test pilot summaries, used
evaluate pre-flight and taxi, take-off, atta
features and landing.) The weather
recorded as'favourable' (whether 'good'
the normalsense of the word, or favoura
in that i t was bad enough to simulate
miserable European climate, was not sp
out ). A timetable for the tr ia ls was p
pared)) see below).
4. Cockpit visibility analysis.
5. F ligh t and handl ing qualities of t he
craft h roughout t he en ti re miss
envelope'. Qualitative data was t o
assembled on taxiing to take-off, he
gross weight on take-off, loitertime o
target, manoeuvring, both priorto atta
and thereafter, according to type of o
nance being delivered, evading SA
and AAA defences andlandings. 7\
I . P ilot 's target location and subsequent
attack and fur th er a tt ac ks on same
through different weather, heigh t and
visibility windows.
2 Respective aircrafts' evasion response
while conducting such attacksand how
low-level manoeuvring affected the
defensive unit.
3. How t he aircraft could be tracked by
the defensive unit while conducting its
attacks.
43
prepare an analysis of resulting data to sub
mit to the DDT E.71 The Currie scheme
was further refined on 10 December, with
Tactical Air Command (TAC) given the
lead Air Force role in overall charge, the
additional i np ut o f t h eAFSCand t he A ir
Force LogisticsCommand (AFLC) in every
phase, and the provision of additional sup
port for the Army, as necessary.
The dateofthe fly-offwas fixedfor spring
1974. The expectation was t hat t he A-1O
would be far enough along the line to have
qualified for a maximum l oa d f ac to r in a
representative configuration gross weight,
so that some of the ordnance qualification
tests would have been completed, and some
communicat ions equipment and the vital
depressed reticule sight would have been
installed and tested. Itwas inevitable, how
ever, due to the time-scale, t hat t heYA-1O
would not be fully equipped (making the
test even more farcical). The GAU-8 gun,t he HUD , t he Maverick missile system,
flare dispenser system, IR jammer equip
ment and ECM equipment wou ld al l b e
missing from the test machine. The aircraft
itself would not be qualified for maximum
load factor at all gross weights, and nei ther
wou ld i ts external fuel tanks.7 As Dr
George M. Watson, Jr, concisely summed
up, withall th ishighly relevant equipment
missingfrom the YA-l0, one might wonder
why the fly-offwas ever undertaken'74.
Why indeed) Perhapseveryone,from the
DoD and A ir Force downwards, thought
that thi s was the only way t o halt ill
informed political criticism in an open and
final manner. Ifth is is the case, the wasted
time and effort would be fully justified.
The Program Management Directive
spelt o ut t he aims o f t he fly-off as the
acquisition of evaluations by combat
experienced pilots, and assistance in the
determination of the relative capabilities
of t he A-IO /A-7 aircraft in the CAS mis
sion. They presented a Ii st of perti nen t
points on which evaluat ion data was to be
assembled and examined:
survivability in the face of hostile force, for
example, wa s a v it al f ac to r i n CAS, but
would not be part of any fly-off equation,
hereas actual test firings against A-X
wing specimens have provided real data to
use in vulnerability assessment'. How
woulda fly-offdetail the ability to operate
from badly damaged fields'? Nor was a fly
off considered cost-effective for the infor
mation it would yield'70
A similarview was expressed before the
House Subcommi tt ee of t he Commi tt ee
on Appropriations, by the Deputy Chiefof
Staff, Research and Development , Lieu
tenant General William J. Eva ns . He
stoutly maintained that extensive studies'
had shown that the A-IO was f ar mor e
l ik el y t o s ur vi ve enemy fire t ha n t he
A-7D, or, indeed, any other aircraft that
we could apply t o t he close support role'.
He added t hat t heA-7D, FAand F-IOO all
lacked what was sought for the correctconductof the CAS mission.
A l l thi s reasoning was t o n o avail, and
the politicians were dete rmined to have
their say show who was i n c ha rg e.
Accordingly, on 9 September 1973, the
Air Force Chief of Staff, General George
S. Brown, told Senator Cannon that the
fly-off would take place. The actual com
petition would involve assembling a team
of highly experienced combat pilots,
allowing them to fly both t he A -7D and
the YA-IO, and let tingthem state in detail
which aircraft they would prefer to fly in
combat in the CAS role. The Senatorhad
to b e sat is fi ed with that; meanwhile, a
concept and guidelines for a fly-offto sat
isfy Congress h ad t o be drawn up.
On 2 Octobe r , Ma lcolm R Currie,
Director of Defense Research and Engi
n ee ring, p ropo sed a p lan to complete the
fly-off. Under this scheme, the Deputy
Director of Defense Research and Engi
neering (DDT E) and the Weapons Sys
tem Eva lu at ion Group (WSEG) would
develop joint test programme parameters.
The USAF would come upwith a detailed
plan forthe
flight schedules,forapproval bythe OSD. The deadline for thi swas I Janu
ary 1974.TheAi r Force would carry out the
tests ina realisticcombatenvironment that
included a varie ty of tactical scenarios in
suitable terrain and weather conditions
matching the central European battlefield.
The US Army would help bysupplying the
'targets' o n t he ground, and having them
simulate known Soviet defences and tac
tics. The WSEG would monitor the tests
and then the Ai r Force and WSEG would
Below Included inthe tri ls conducted by the
VA lOs at Edwards AFB w r testsof thefuelling
system. Here a ground fuelling testis underway.
with theVA lO beingfed by a KC 135 Stratotanker.
USAF
Close up vi w ofthe spinchute compartment
duringtests with the A 10 at Edwards AFB.
California. USAF
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POLITICS. POLITICS AND POLITICS - THEA-7ATRIALS POLITICS. POLITICS AND POLITICS - TilE A-7A TRIALS
t A-7CorsairII another military aircraft saddled with t h e n a me o f an illustrious forebear.
of theirown suitable aircraft forground-attack missions the Army adapted the CorsairII for
theA-7Dpurely as astop-gap. Whenthe A-10 was developedto dothe jobproperly an
A 7D lobby influenced Congressto haltfunding unti la trial fly-off was heldbetween the two
on everycount. Natonal Archives. Washington
Vulcan de-brief: ajorClyde A. Hayman USAF talking with Army
Sergeant Ronald C Weems Vulcan squadron leader about the A-10/A-7D
evasive-action performance during thefly-off. ajorHayman was responsible
forvoice-recording systems andground-data collection at FortRiley Kansas
during thef1y-offsin Apri l 1974. Natonal Archives Washington
figure of 1.5 million for 6
aircraft (1970 rates), which w
the PO estimate, but M
Mullen recommended that th
should budget for 1.7 millio
whichhad been theCAIG e
mate. Using t h e same gui
lines, the PO estimate w
1.6 million a nd t h e indep
dent Air Force estimate,
million, right on target.':
The C ha irm an o f
D RC review, Arthur
Mendol ia, Assistant Secret
of Defense ( Ins tal lat ion a
Logistics), then questioned
Deputy Dir ec to r o f Defe
Research and Engineering
Test and Evaluation, Gene
Alfred D. Starbird, on the p
gramme from hisangle. Gen
al tarbird counselled cautirecommending a minim
commitment until further te
ing h ad b een f in al iz ed .
a sk ed for 39mi ll ion long -le
funding , whi le k ee pi ng
option for a minimum quan
of twenty-eight aircraft, unti
l ea st O \ 'ember 1974, thed
of the next test review.
The Chai rman o f the C
AnalYSis Improvement Gro
(CAIG), Milton A. Margo
p oi nt ed o ut t ha t t he over
weight of the A-IO h
increased by 1,0001b (454k
sin e the last DSARC h
pushed t h eAi r Force estim
up to 1 .7 million. This caused him gr
concern asdid the SPO s 15 per cent e
mated i n r ea se i n the cost ofthe firstfo
dozen aircraft, a nd t hi s was without
increased inflation costs. He thought
Air Force 's 6 . per cent escalation r
was a more re liable estimate than
ystem Acquisition Review's 4 .9
cent, and he congratulated the Air Fo
for i t analy is. 4
Mr Mendoliawasequallycomplimenta
telling the Deputy ecretary of Defense
26July 1974 that theAir Force had mett
critical te t mile tone ofdemonstrating
compatibility of the prototype GA - g
a nd t he A-I . He noted that by th is d
ove r40 hou rs of flight-testing of the pro
type aircraft had been carried out and t
Fairchild had put right all the deficienc
noted o n t he early Air Force evaluati
The DSARC was therefore recommend
T alk and Yet oreTalk
butawait more meaningful 'overall testing
results ' before mak in g a ny p ro du ct io n
commitment. CI ments asked t h at Con
gress allow such flexibility, and reque ted
192.7 million for FY 75 and 1.4million
for RDT&E.'1 However, the fight was not
y et won - not by any means_
On 9 July 1974, the D ARC lilA con
vened to assess theAir Force's plan to ini
t iate the package - the A-I 0 aircraft, the
GA - Gatling and its associated 30mm
ammunition. s <1lways hudget<1ry consid
erations were at the top of the agenda, and
the A-1 P ro gr am Man ag er , B ri ga di er
General Thomas H. McMullen, reiterated
the January 1973figur s that had been set.
The Air F or ce ha d g iv en a n a im ed for
The Texas lobbyists' biggest
'selling point , the fact that the
Corsair-II was proven and in
production, and would there
fore he cheaper, was dismissed
asmyth. Infact, the conclusion
was that the A - 10 w ou ld be
cheaper, in term-of hoth acqui
si tion cost and Iife-cyclecosts. ;
When it came to the te timo
ny of the four pilots, the conclu
sions of the instruments and ref
erees were more than backed up.
A ll p lump ed f or the YA-IO,
especially when flying CAS in
poor weather. One pilot, Cap
t ain Mike Sexton, flatly stated
thatthe YA-I0 was the onlyair
craft that can hand le the close
air-support type of mission in a
full spectrum of weather opera
tion encountered in the European scenario'. Another, M<1jor
Williard K. Mincey, confirmed
this, stating that under a visihil
ityrange of two-and-a-half miles
and with a low c loud base, the
turn rate o f t he A-1 0 provide
the only airplane that will allo\\'
you to operate and main tain
visual contact with the target
and stay in close proximity '' '' ' .
Perhaps the decidingfactor in
this one-sided contest was the
comparison ofthe loitertimes of
the two aircraft. On one mis
s ion, w ith both aircraft flying
their sorties with an ordnance
loading o f e ig ht ee n 500lb
(227kg) hombsagainst the FortRiley target
a re a 299 miles (480km) away, the YA-IO
was able to remain over the target for two
hours. nd er the same conditions, the
-7 0 could only manage eleven minute I
The 'Dough-Boys' on the g round in a Hot
War condition, with hordes of Soviet T-55
battle ranks stomping all over them, need
edmore than eleven minutesofm aningful
air support, whatever enators 6,000 cosy
miles awayin Kansas might think
The t e st f ind ings weredu l r eviewed by
the hierarchy and, in June, as sched
uled, Secretaryof State Clement recom
mended to enator John L. McClellan,
Chairmanof the Committeeon Appropri
ations, that the FY75 A-I programme
should be approved. Th is endorsement
was still l imited, however, with the rider
that t h e DoD shoul d n ot proceed o n t he
results of this rather inadequate test alone,
Gatling, and a new powerplant to ge t off
the deck w it h i t. I n the light of this, the
Texas delegation s Congressional tactics
are easily understood.
In fac t, the Cor air-II was ye-terday 's
aeroplane and there was really no conte·t.
There was almostcomplete unanimity from
both as essors and pilot alike that the Y
10 was b y f ar the bes t y stem for the job.
Under ir Force analy is the YA-IO, with
its far heavier payload, the projected anti
tank lethality of the GAU- gun, and its
better vision in murkyair conditions, such
as those that prevailed in northern Europe,
was more suitable t ha n t he A-7D. More
over, the survival rate of the Y -10 , s o d is
paraged by Senator Cannon and the media,
was projected to be far higher t ha n t ha t o f
the Corsair-II. Losses would be far fewerdue
to the YA-lO's inherent strength, toughness
and resistance toground fire, whileits sortie
and maintenance ra tio would bewayabovethat of the A-7D.
simulated: unlimited,S, 0 ft (1,5 Om),
3, OOft (900m) and 1,000ft DOOm). Two
situation responses were assessed: (a) Red
attack on friendly forces executing delay
ing tactic; and (b )Red breakthrough dis
organi:ed friendly force. No actual bombs
were dropped during the flight tests.
Th e second prototype YA-lO aircraft
(71-1370) was utilized in these tests.
The YA-IO s competitor, the A-7D, wa
a former Navy aircraft, the Corsair-II, or
, LUF' (' hort Little gly F***er ).;
Introducedinto theAir Force as a stop-gap
mea su re , i t was f ir st evaluated by the
USAF at Luke FB A ri zo na , in u gus t
1969, by t h e 4 52 4t h Fighter Weapons
Wing. Had the tests gone the way the
Texas lobby had hoped, a new variant, the
F-7DER, wou ld have kept t he Ling
Temco-Vought (LTV) production lines at
Dallas/Forth Worth going for several more
years. It would have had a stretched airframe t o a cc ommo da te t he GAU-
s i m ~ u l ~ a t : : : i o = = n ~ _ =sy ste ms q ua tn g So vi et e qu ip me nt
gun Quad 23mm AAA
tramer SA 7 IR SAM
SA 6 radar guided SAM
luation had sixteen missions, each
consisted ofone YA-IOsortie and
D sortie. The ordnance configura
MD 2bombs (heavy), six
b omb- (me di um ), and gun strafing
with simulated Maverick, Rockeyepalm a ttacks . Fou r c ei ling s were
n or t he -10, were selected.
were split into two phas
a limited, qualitative evaluation,
the respective test sites; and
a qual i tat ive and quan t ita t ive
Fort Riley. Here, t h e Army pro
following equipment to simulate
(wietequipment.
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POLITICS. POLITICS A 0 POLITICS - THEA-7ATRIALS
Pre-briefing session: Captain Mike Sexton, USAF receivinghis target
recognition briefing priorto hissimulated CAS mission overFort Riley, Kansas,
duringthe A-7D/A-10fly-oils inApri l 1974. Natonal Archives Washington
CHAPTERSIX
IBM, Fai,child continued to expand h
various companies.
When he witnessed the t r o i o u ~ con
ditions f aced by a er ial photographe
irchild
Underside view ofthe A-10 with bottom access doors down,showing how thehuge
bulkof theAvengerguns systemis accommodated inside thefront ofthe aircraft,
and how thisnecessitatesthe shifting oil-centre ofthe nosewheel andassociated
gear. Fairchid Republc
York and other eastern-seaboard cities
and then expanded to Canada. Bu iness
b oo me d a nd , e ve n a ft er inheriting a 2
mill ion fortune and a seat o n t h e board of
At this stage of proceedings, with t h e G o
button finally pressed afteryears of agoniz
ing and G overnment toing and froing on
the CA issue, doubts began to creep in
about thecompany that was torroduce the
A-IO. omewhat belatedly, the ability of
Fairchild to cope witha programme ofthis
importance and magnitude began to cause
increasing concern in Air Force circles.
The Background
The Fairchild Airplane Manufacturing Cor
poration was founded in 1926. Thegenius
b e hi n d t h e c o mp an y was herman Mills
Fairchild,born on 7Ap ri l 1 96, to awea lthy
family from O neonta, N ew York State . His
fathe r was a Repub lican ong re ssman as
well a a successful businessman and o n e o f
the f o u n d e r ~ of a small tabulating company
that was later to become IBM. A n aptitude
for all th ings mechanical was inherited by
h is son , who , in h is you th , h ad f re e run of
the factory in Endicott, New York, and
became fascinated with adding m h i n e ~and photography. III health dogged the
young man s youth and he was forced to
leave Harvard, which he had entered in
1915, inorder tospend time in the healing
climate of Arizona. An early achievement
the world s first night-timerhotograph,
taken using a ~ y n h r o n i z e d flashsystem and
timer that he hadinvented.
Health problems frustrated Fairchild s
efforts t o j o in up w he n t he U SA e nt er ed
the First World War , in 1917. Turning his
brain to t h e w ar effort, h e c am e up with
an advanced aerial camera system for the
Army, but, by t he t i me h e h ad p er fe ct ed
this in 1919, military interest had w aned.
The following year, w ith money from his
father, Fairchild established his n com
pany, the Fairchild A erial C amera Com
pany, and succeeded in persuading the
A rm y t o t ak e his product after all. ext,
h e h ir ed a n a ir cr af t to demonstrate his
cameras, t h e n p u r c h , r ed his own aircraft,
a Fokker D.VII. H e o b t ai n e d l u cr a ti v e
contracts to make aerial urveys of ew
o f t he A- IO programme. The
review, w hi c h t o ok place from
4-22 eptember 1 97 4, was
headed by L ieutenant G eneral
Robert E Hails, ViceComman
der, Tactical A ir C om m an d.
Colonel Samuel J Kishline,
Deputy Director A-I Program,
i nf orme d D RC that the
GA - g un a l ig n me n t had
been corrected by mak in g a
modification to the aircraft that
depre sed the gun by 2 deg re e .
The use of automatic elevator
pitch-down was con side red
redundant, and was abandoned.
The secondary gun gas problem
hadalso beensolved by addinga
double-baffled deflector to the
barrels and a potassium-nitrate
flame- uppre sant additive to
the propellant. This worked,and increased the projectile
v eloc ity a l it tl e. Thus, by 18
eptember, the C ritical Design
Review C DR ) o f GA - /
30mm gun was completed.
The engine qualification
tests on the TF34-G E-I 00
tot all ed 2, I I hours. They
included high-altitude trials
wi th a B-47 te t ai r craf t; an
environmental series that
included inlet distortion, cli
mat ic, water , s t eam , sand and
rocke t g as inges to r tes ts ; and
o ve r -t e mp e ra t ur e a n d over
speed demonstrations. T hey had all been
completed by 31 October 1974. Tests on
s ta ll , p os t- t al l and spin characteristics
tests had also been brought to a successful
conclusion. By II eptember, compatibili
ty l a un c he o f A G M - 65 A Maverickair-to
g ro un d t ac ti ca l m is si l w it h - 10 a ir cr af t
at Edwards AFB had also b ee n o m pl e te d.
All that remained outstanding was the
critical de i gn r ev iew CDR) of the
armour-piercing incendiary A P I) round
for t h e 3 0 mm c a n no n . On 6 ovem ber,
Colonel Jay R Brill was appointed A -IO
Sys tems P ro gr am D ir ec to r, r ep la ci ng
Brigadier G eneral T homas H. McMullen,
whose succe sfuJ tenure of office had last
ed from June 1973 t o o ve mb er 1974, and
h ad s ee n t he A -l O c om e t ri um ph an tl y
through a critical period.
The yearwas crownedon 22 November,
w he n De pu ty ecretary of Defense
Clements authorized procurementof fifty
two A- I 0 aircraft.
the firing pass was can idered the answer
to that difficulty. More serious and more
visually spectacular) was the appearance
o f t h e e c on d ar y g u n ga ignitionphenom
enon. The gases generated by the propel
lant were not being tota lly consumed
inside the gun barrel; some gaswas surviv
i ng t o be e xp el le d i nt o t he a ir , where i t
fla h-ignited. This r esul ted in a larg f ir e
b al l i n front of the aircraft, temporarily
blindingthe pilot at a critical momentand
causing enginedisturbance as the gasball
was ingested i n to t h e turbines. T here were
also hold-ups concerning the ammunition
for the gun. The ecretary of Defense had
authorized c on t in ue d d ev el op m en t o f
heavy metal munitions depleted urani
um), buthad w ithheld approval to procure
such munitions for inventory until the
developments were completed.H
Thes problems caused concern and,on
4 eptember,Air Force Vice hiefof taff,
General Richard H. Ellis , ordereda v w
Tests
- gun and armour
ammunition critical
review.
gun testing at
ssed angle.
firings, including
for gun ga concentra
with inc re ased la r r el
a n d Phase II (pro
on) ammunition with
rotating band.
o ad s a n d p er f or m an ce
s wi th ai rcr aft wing
ions.
ach to stall,stall and spin avoid-
tests.
engine qualification tests.
ss ystem sled tests .
in-flight refuelling.
stores ertification.
of 39 mil lion for
funding, as requested,
e approval of fifty-two
, but with t he o pt io n
e nt y- ei gh t o nl y b ei ng
The DSARC further
p rova l for u sing heavy
production ammunition
etary of Defense
g v the go-ahead to
I Force to proceed wi th
t ial production o f t he
g the long-lead fund
1 July 1974. Atthe same
approved procurement
-two aircraft, subject to
to twenty-eight, until
1974, when a whole
important testswere due
factorily concluded.
tests were the following:
wasgiving unexpected prob
General Electric. On 26 February,
t in-flight tests o f t he A -I O 1
pe wi th t he GA -8/A gun
been conducted. On 19 June,
/ A 3 0 mm g un wa f ir ed for the
with combat ammunition. II
good. But, during the A -10/A -7
pilots had encountered problems
by t h e g un a l ig n me n t angle. This
ina tendency to fly a dangerously
nana patternduring the low-angle
runs. Realignment to flatten out
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The pilot s titanium-assembled bathtub citadel designed to protecthim and his instruments from
groundfire. Note thatit is assembledfrom individualplatesof varyingthickness and nota single
forging. airchid· epubl c
from open-cockpit aircraft, and
o ut th at no enc losed cockp i t
existed, Fair hilddeterminedon
hi: own. I li ri ng o rm an Mac
as his chief engineer, and with the
Professor Alexander Klemin of the
m School of Aeronautics (he
a er on au ti ca l ski ll s h imse lf ) ,
soon produced the first aircraft to
name, the Fairchild CahinModel
or FC-1. In an era of biplanes, this
g monoplane, as this aided
photography, and had other r vo-
features, such as an enclosed,
h ea te d c ab in and full
ns.
FC-I went through a host of vari
modifications, firmly establishing
ng company, which went from
t o s t rength. As the aviation
mushroomed across the U A in
1920s and throughout the 1930s,Airplane Manufacturing Corpo
g rew wi th i t. Starting with shared
facilities at Farmingdale , Long
in 1925, t he company expanded
series of transport,survey, sea
and light aircraftdesigns, including
-2W2 u se d by Admiral Richard
Antarctic exploration. Eventual
c ompany s et up another factory
real in Canada in 1929, and in
r began construction work on
larger plantat Hagerstown, Mary
Fairchild Caminez Engine Cor
wasalso set up a t t he sametime.
9 , Fairchild viation Corporation,
company for the Fairchild
acquired Kreider-Reisner Air
ny and became a suhsidiaryof
i at ion Corpora t ion (Avco) . In
Kreider-Reisner became Fairchild
C or po ra ti on ( FA C) , and
created RangerEngineeringCor
to manufacture aircraft engines.
t heone original holdingcom
two when Fairchild Avi
split , with the creation
ild Engine and AirplaneCor
(FEAC) at Hagerstown with the
EngineeringCorporation at Farm
The aerial photography and sur
remained in the F C. FE C
two materials-processing compa
mold Aircraft Corporat ion in
AI-Fin Corporation in 1941, to
forming and bombing processes in
manufacture. Alsoin 1941, FEAC
the tratos Corporation to
high-altitude superchargers. The
F IR HILD
coming ofanother world warsawFair hild
a i rc raf t r iding h igh , and the building
around the same time of all-metal aircraft.
Perhaps t he most successful of t he many
design coming out o f those plants in the
econd World War was the M-62 initia l
flight tra iner, which spawned a hos t o f
variants. These were soon sub-contracted
out, so g re at b ec ame t he d emand, a nd
more thaneight thousand were eventually
produced.
After t he war a ser ie of large-capacity
troop carriers, such as t he C - 2 A P ac ke t
a nd t he C -119A Flying Box Car, carried
Fairchild on for some yea rs in so l id p ro fi t
while other companiesexperienced leaner
pickings. However, with the relative fail
ure o f t h e C-I23B Provider to gain large
orders, Farmingdale began to need sub
contract work to stayafloat. Fortune were
revived with the collaboration with the
Dutch Fokker company, which producedthe Fairchild-Hiller FH-237 from the F-27
Friendship.
In 1961, FEACbecame Fairchild Stratos
Corpora t ion (FSC), and expanded in to
space applications. In 1964, FSC acquired
Hiller Aircraft Corporation, a helicopter
builder, and b ec ame t he Fairchild-Hiller
Corporation(FHC). Other famous compa
nies were not faring so well. By mid-1964,
the Republic Aviation Company, a neigh
bouring Long Island outfit famed for pro
ducing many front-line fighter-bombers,
from the original econd World WarPA7
Thunderbol t to the Vietnam veteran F I05
Thunderchief, or Thud , had I een reduced
to sub-contractwork on the McDonnell F-
4 Phantom-I tail sections. Fairchild him
s el f wa s n ow a n o ld man , b ut h e was as
shrewdas ever, and beganpurchasing large
chunk of Republicstock. This ca h injec
t ion kept the company afloat until the
inevitable takeover finally took place on
29 eptember 1965. Wit h t he establish
ment of the Republic Aviation Division of
the Fairchild-Hiller Corporation, the A-X
first came int o t he picture . In 197J, FHC
became Fairchild Industries Incorporated
(FI), and acquired aircraft manufacturer
wearingen Aviation Corporation.
The longdelay from the fir t scoutingof
t he conc ep t t o t he actual placing of firm
orders was not to Fairchild's advantage
apart from the fact that other, less patient
companies fell ou t o f t he c ompe ti ti on
while t heGovernment and the Air Force
deliberated f or ye ar s, w it h maddening
slowne s. While they waited, their current
wor k wa s d ry in g up. By 22 ovember
1974, when the decision was finally made,
Fairchild-Republic Company was a ivi-
sion of Fairchild Industries, and i t was the
Fairchild-Republic Company that actually
hand led the A-10 project.The YA-10was
the very la t a i rc ra f t project to be under
taken by hi company prior to he rma n
Fairchild's deat h , on 2 March 1971, a
month shor t o f his seventy-fifth birthday.
ssessment and
Misplaced Optimism
Business was badfor the Fairchild-Repub
lic Company (FRC) around t hi s t im e. It
had not been running a full-time aircraft
assembly line since November 1964, nine
years before, when the F-I05 had reached
t ermina ti on. i nce that date , on ly sub
contract work h ad b een und er ta ken,
including the product ion of wing controlsurfaces for the Boeing747 Jumbo airliner,
and t ai l a ss embl ie s for t he McDonnel l
Douglas F-4 Phantom. At first, this did not
seem to be problemat ic, ei ther to the Air
Force or t o t he company itself.
Itwas standardpractice for th e SAF to
conduct pre-award surveys ofany compa
ny to whom a largeconn-act was due to be
placed to satisfy themselves of itscapabili
ties to deli ver and high li ght any faults.
Teams would go into a companyand assess
its capacity, capability and financial foot
ing. Thi practice wa app l ied t o FRC as
normal ami thecompanygot a clean bill of
health, being rated assati factory. (Even if
it h ad not passed this in itia l inspection,
FRC would not necessarily have been de
barredfrom obtaining the contract.) How
ever, the company subsequently proved
itself deficient in many areas, and this 'ini
tial erroneous assessment''''-' was t o h av e
far-reaching repercussions.
In mid-1972, Fai r ch ild Indus t ri e s at
Farmingdale had been very upbeat about
the project. At this stage, both prototypes
hadbeen completed and, after completion
and roll-out, had been disas embled (the
fuselage had engines, wings and empen
nage removed for a separate load), and
loaded aboard two McDonnell Douglas C
124 s for shi pment t o Edward' FB. the
firs t was flight-testing at Edwards AFB,
while the se ond,completedat the Repub
l ic Div i sion , was a lso at Edwards being
readied for herdebut ight.Vincent Tizio, the programme manager
a t t he time,proclaimedin an interview that
Fairchild's approach was related directly to
the goals of t he programme under t he Air
Force 's n ew pol i y of prototype fly-offs for
aircraft. He explained the difference. He
claimed that most militaryaircraftdevelop
ment had been gea red towards advanced
pelformance parameter, frequently with
a weight constraint that migh t b ea fac to r
in this . Cost became a function of what it
took to achieve these specifications. With
the A-X, Tizio saw the design goal as the
incorporating of pelformance capabilities
already achieved intoan opt imum aircraft
for the CA role and environment,with an
ease of maintenance:
Tizio admi tt ed t hat t he cost factor dic
tated much o f wha t Fairchild was doing:
We made many, many trade-off studies on
cost, maintainability and performance.' He
cited the examples of t he GEC TF34: We
worked hard with GE t o come u p w i th a
less expensive engine. And we had to take
some performance and weight penalties,
F IR HILD
but we gotit . 'Other examples he gavewere
the state-of-the-artand minimum-cost ori
entation leadingto the usc of brazed rivets,
a minimum ofhoneycomband no compo
i te , which re ulted in 'basically a state-of
the-art aluminium airplane'.
The company carried out its own com
ponent- t es t ing under t he 41.2 mi ll ion
fixed-price contract for the two YA-IOs.
Several hundred hours of wind-tunnel
work were involved, in both Government
and private facilitie , including tests that
simulated power -on cond itions. Th is
investment eliminated the possibility of
toomany problems appearing on t h e flight
tests. Nor d id i t c ause undue delays in the
p rog ramme , wh ich was , at that stage,
seven weeks ahead of schedule. The deci
sion to test-fly from Edwards rather than at
Farmingdale, taken for s afety rea sons ,
among others, cost twoweeks of that time,
accordingto Tizio.
Republ ic took the whole programme
seriously that Vice-President Donald Str
(a former P-47, F 4 and F-J05jockey hi
self) haddeliberately set out to create a f
-imile o f th e f amou s Loc kh ee d ' k u
Works' at Farmingdale. This a re a w
screened hehind high wooden fence a
labelled the 'Tiger Works '. What Ti
termed 'semi-hard ' tooling, suffic ient
the two prototypes and no more, was us
Sub-contracting was kept to a minimu
Revealingly, hes t a ted t ha t , We re prep
ing r igh t now for production, organi:
our people and deve loping product
concepts as well as doing design layout
tooling.' However, he h ad t o admi t t
th is design-oriented programme had n
included any capital investment in plan
This was t heorgani : at i on a t whi ch t
Air Force now to ok a longha rd look, a
th ey were far f rom imp re ssed with w
they saw
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F IR HILD F IR HILD
50
I. Top-level management was market
oriented. It wa no t exper ienced nor
ideally structured to manufacture the
A-IO weapon system.
Hails, was appointed to head up a team of
very experienced te hni ca l a nd profes
sional personnel, a m ix o f b o th A ir Force
and civilians. one of themhad any prior
involvement in the A-IO Program, ensur
ing complete impartial ity. The composi
tion of the r ev iew te, lm was a s shown in
the box (above).
I. Fifteen advanced numerically co
troll d ( /C) milling machines, w
three-axis, three-spindled and five-ax
three-spindled mills.
2. 45 conventional mills.
3. 2 or 3 tape-controlled drilling machin
4. 3 or 4 automatic machiningcentres
drilling, boring with au tomated to
head changers.
5. p ec ia li ze d cutting machines.
Farmingdale s workforce increased fro
1,750 to 4 ,000 very quickly, with proje
t io n t o 6 ,0 00 , whi le Hag er st own we
from 800 to 1,200 in thesame period, w
1,000 dedicated to the A-I0. This ex
employmen t b ro ug ht t h e age ave ra
down to 45, the industrial average. IIO
which regarded his experience in planni
and control a i nv al ua bl e t o t he pr
gramme. A separateA-I 0 Program Gro
under Vincent Tizio , with assistant dire
tor J. B. hedlock (described as 'one
the best contracts men we've got'), w
appointed from in-house. Away from t
A-IO programme, the McDonnell Do
glas, Boeing and Space Shuttle work w
hived offseparately.
Collis was confident that the e alte
ations would do t h e trick. 'Thesechang
in organization are aimed at strengthe
ing ourmajor functional areas such as Pr
curement a nd M anu fa ct ur in g a nd
improve our capability of de tec t ing a
correcting the root ause of possible d
ciencies in ouroperation,'he told Warr
Whetmore. )HIt wasas well that Collis f
that way for, on 20 March 1975, he w
replaced by D r Norman Grossman, w
hadbeen for thirty-two years a t the heaof FRC aircraft design, development a
construction. I
For r e- eq ui ppi ng, t he c om pa
planned f or a maximum product ion ra
of f ou rt ee n t o twenty aircraft
1977-7 ,and estimated that, to achie
that level via in-hou e machining, a
million investment in n ew s pa ce a
machine tools was r eq ui re d o ve r a
above the current 20 million, five-ye
capital budget. ome o f t he e qu ipme
would be fi nanced via the Defense Indu
trial Plan t Equipmen t Center 1PE
pool, while the rest would come o ut
company f un ds . A 90 ,000 square fo
capacity warehouse was conver ted to
new machine shop , at a cost of IO m
lion. New equipment for Farmingdale w
Iisted as follows:
51
The PO was specifically charged with
asce r ta ining whether the contractor'
re tructured proposal included all the costs
re la ted to a ovember 1973, stop work
order; re -nego t ia t ing , wi th appropr iate
consideration, a more realistic schedule;
keeping a c lo se check on FR s finance
'to ensure that adver e financial condi
tions in other divisions [did] not degrade
thecashpos it ion ofFRC to thede t r imen t
of the -10 program l);.
hanges
Th e findings and recommendations of the
Hails Report resulted in sweepingchanges
in both policy, company management and
equipmen t. Air Force organization and
attitudes also underwent equally signifi
cant changes across the whole spectrum.
Many changes t oo k p la ce at FRC
be tween November 1974 and January1975. In a n i nt er vi ew t he President,
Char le Col i is, outlinedthem. I ,Th e office
of President was e tallished, with Colli
initially holding the position with respon
sibility for overseeing the bus ine s s id e,
while Norman Grossman, former Director
of Engineering, wa promotedto Executive
Vice President, with responsibility for all
techn ica l and product ion aspects of the
A-IO. The two men had adjoining offices,
forease of communication.
Th e widely separated facilities, which
had led to such a complex organizational
set-up, were done away with. 'We cen
tralized, rather than decentralized,'
explained Collis. With 25 per cent ofthe
p la nn ed p ro du ct io n w or k o n t he A -I O
destined for Hagerstown , the various
facilities of bo th p lan ts were regrouped
into principal functions reporting direct
t o t he President. Quality assurance was
taken from the Manufacturing Division
a n d g iv en independent s tatus under a
new director, L. 1. Medlo k, brought in
from General Dynamics. Procurement
was treated in a similar fashion. Similar
changes invo lved In teg ra ted Logi tics
Support being r moved from Engineer
ing, a nd p ut u nd er D on al d J. trait as
director. Their brief was 'everything rela
t ive toopera ting the A-I 0 - s pa re s provi-
ioning, ground support equipment, man
uaIs I0;
Ralph Bonadede, former F-I05 factory
manager, wasappointed to head up Manu
facturing, with John Healey, formerly of
Rockwell International, as assistant. This
was a move that pleased t he A ir Force,
Recommendations
Despiteits findings, the Hails Report con
cluded that the ir Force should continue
its support of the A-IO programme, while
taking correctiveaction to resolve identi
fied management deficiencies. Muc h o f
the report s findings were no tmade imme
diat Iy publ ic as the Air Force did not wish
to makethings worse for the company, but
i t was recommended that a number of top
managers shou ld be rep la ced, either
through re-assignment or outside recruit
ment.
They also made a number of detailed
recommenda t ions abou t pu tt ing the Air
Force s house in orde ra t the plant.
Th e programme office was to become
more involved in the production,sub-con
tracting and manufacturing aspects of the
programme; there was t o b e insistence on
timely notification of lead time change,
with ac tion to resolve any p ro bl m that
arose; formal taskingprocedures hould be
establ ished and any PMRT and Produc
tion Readiness Review deficiencie fol
lowed up; and it hould be ensured that th
AFPRO was actively participating i n a ll
phases of the project.
The Air Force itself did not c ome out
unscathed from the report. The Systems
Program Office (SPO) and ir Force Plant
RepresentativeOffice (AFPRO/AFCMD)
were said to lack management and coordination aswell as organizational relation
ships I . The AFCMD on occasions failed
t o r ea ct t o t he n ee ds of t he AFPRO in
SPO/AFPRO relationships. In the view of
the report team, 'Thi less than co-opera
tive relationshipbetween the PO and the
AFPRO had a negative effect upon FRC s
re 'ponsivene s. 1 4
Th e machinery in the plant was criti
c ized as be ing ou tda ted and in some
cases totally obsolete. 'One assessment
was the Fairchild-Republic's capital
equipment was at l ea st 1 yea rs outdat
ed. Another officer noted that some of
the e qu i pmen t o n t h e s ho p floor was
used t o produce the Republic P-47
Thunderbolt 30 years ago.I 1
9. Th e average age of the workforce was
54, which indicated experienced men,
however, the report expressed concern
ra the r than satisfaction at th is , pI
sumably o n t he n ot io n that theycould
not stand the high-pressure, full-scale
production programme I)1.
2. The FRC-IO Program Director (who
doubled as a Company Vice President),
h ad n o d ir ec t c on tr o l o ve r e i th e r t he
Hagerstownor Farmingdale plants,and
was himself based at a third facility, at
Germantown, Maryland.
3. Th e two FaciIity Managers lacked
experience in large-scale weapon sys
tems production.
4. The companyorganization, scaled down
as i tw as t o sub-contract work, was 'too
complex and organizationally cumber
some to allowfor efficient commitment
to the A-IOproduction program'' ' '
5. Financially, FRC had overrun i ts in ter
naldevelop test and evaluation (DT&E)
budget baseline by 16.1 p er c e nt a t t he
54.1 per cent completion point, and \Va.
3 million behind schedule.
6. Major components had fallen behind
schedule, and the revised schedule for
the f ir st s ix a i rc raf t had a projected
overrun of almost 12 million.
7. Overall, the division was 'not reallyopti
mally organized to manage and control
a sophisti ated production program .
The Hails Report Review Team
LieutenantGenera R Hais
Colonel R Kleinman ISystems Managementl
Top SergeantJ.Seigler
Mrs E Cook
Colonel L R Reed ContractAdminis tration/OAI
LieutenantColonel R C Smith Management Engineerng)
Major R O Suelze Procurement/OAI
Mr M. Vezeau Procurement/OA)
Colonel E O Reinhardt Air ForcePlant Representatve)
LieutenantColonel W.A. Williams Contract Administration)
Major N. W. Kuzemka ProcurementManagement)
Colonel R E Lx IIndustrial Resources)
Major K H Kagyama Producton/QA)
Mr P A. Melanese Productonl
Colonel E Hunt Procurement Polcyl
Lieutenant Colonel J. O Zacharry Financial Management)
Major C T Keeney Financial Management/Overhead)
Major A. L Mcintyre Financial Auditingl
Major R R Pinkbiner Financial Management/Overhead)
Colonel J. O Tanner Producton/OAI
Lieutenant Colonel W. A. Wolfe IManufacturing)
MajorW. Head Procurement Managementl
Colonel W. M. Lake Program Managerl
LieutenantColonel R L Bulmer Systems Procurement)
Lieutenant Colonel E Low R D Managementl
LieutenantColonel H Blue Flght Operatons/SystemsSafety)
LieutenantColonel J.J. Stirk Judge Advocate)
FLIGHT OPER TIONS S FETY
LEGAL
M NUF CTURING
M N GEMENT
FIN NCE CONTR CTING
FACILITIES
SUBCONTR CTING
TE M CHIEF
TE M STAFF
QU LITY SSUR NCE OA
The indings
The Hails Report of the team s findings
appeared o n 3 0 e pt em be r 1974, and was
as detailed and comprehensive as i tw a far
from <complimentary about the FRC man
agement and organization. ;The criticisms
ranged from top management right do\Vn
to shop-floor tooling and the competence
a nd e xp er ie nc e o f t he emp lo ye es t hem
selves. They can be'[ be summarized as
follows:
am
ails Report
Commander, Tactical ir Com
L ie ut en an t Gen er al R ob er t E.
F orc e was s o concerned that
several inves tigat ive teams in to
-Republicwith the remit to high
deficiencies, and de te rmine the
ible way of putting them right.
therefore, the Air Force Contract
Division (AFCMD) told an
Management Review
lRT ) t o ' e v al ua te FRC s produc
bility ' at both Farmingdale and
The teamstarted work on 30
year and continued, with com
zeal, to probe and assess until
Their repor t made d istu rb ing
it finally h i t the desks in the
team concluded that, while FRC
competenceto accomplish
development, test and evalu
(RDT&E), it lacked 'theto p er fo rm in the production
phase >;. Neither FRC s technical
agerial structure was capable of
anything like t he A ir Force s
delivery scheduleduring the pro
phase. The report, PMRT-I, listed
than 131 discrepancies within the
' s management func t ions that
correction by the contractor ;.
b ruary 1974, a fte r a seven-month
space, thesecond report, PMRT
encourage theAir Force that
putting i tshousein order quickly
although some progress had been
e in-house Air Force Plant Rep
Officer at Farmingdale contin
monitor progress, but FRC s [ resi
to provide t he AFPRO wit h
n concerning the proposed
plant consolida
A-I 0 System Program Director
and the Air Force Contract Man
Division (AFCMD) were both
of thi', and i t re inforced doubts
t ome et t he A ir Force s
bells were now ring ing loudly
4 September 1974, the Air Force
e f o f caff General Richard H.
to conductan urgent review.
PMRT Reports and
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F IR HILD
Re-scheduled deliveryprogramme for pre-productionA-las
Demonstrated Current
performance I estmate
300 342 342
1,200 1,900 1,900
1,200 1,460 1,460
1.8 1.8
112 lor
10 4 4
3.5 3.2 3.2
2.2 2.0 2.0
19,260 20,850 20,850
45,640 47,400 47,400
12 12
Approved
programme
Rome A ir Development Center; 71-137
was acquired by th Air ForceOrientatio
Group AFOG), which used it for sever
years as a travellingdisplay nationwide, I
fi nal r es ti ng p la ce was, appropriate
2
10
112
12
45,640
19,260
300
Developmentestmate
10. 1,200
Land 1,200
A-l0 technical progression
Operatonal/technical charac te f/s t cs
TECHNICAL
Strafng accuracy,ICEP) mies)
OPERATIONAL
Cruise speed Ikm/hl
Weight empty IIbl
Bombing accuracy, MK 82 ICEPllft)
Sustained load factor, 6 MK8 2 a nd 7 5 0 r d s ammo:
at 275 Klg) 3.5
at 15 0 K g) 2. 2
Forward airstrip 10. andland ro l, 4 MK 82,
750rds 30mmammo 1ft)
Loit ert m e at 250nm radius, 18 MK 82,Ihr)
•Meets orexceeds contractualguarantees
I= mean vaue
Maximum gross we igh tl b )
Maintainability manhours/flt hrsl
Both went in to flyable storage and ended
up in different places: 71-1369 was disas
sembled and itsairframewas despatched to
Griff is s AFB , ew York, where i t was u ti
l iz ed i n ECM experimental work a t t he
he tO orn
Development Under Way
CHAPTER SEVE
18 December 1974, at Edwards AFB, California.
YA-lO pictured on the runway armed with
twenty-eight Mk 82 bombs. Natonal Archives,
Washington, DC
With the delivery of sixpre-production air
craft, the A-IO programme wa a bl e t o
develop properly. Visually, there were few
differences. Perhap most obvious were the
YA-IO's lower f in s, which had the front
lower section angled, whereas those on the
p ro du ct io n mod el s wer e r ou nd ed i nt o a
smooth curve. The leading-edge slats
became standardized, like the trailing-edge
fairings that hadbeen retro-fittedto the YA
1 to aid engine airflow. Ventral trakes
a dd d t o p er fo rm a s im il ar f un ct io n wer e
also carried. A further 2ft 6in (75cm) were
added by extendingthe wingtipsoutboard of
th ailerons.Flaptravel was reduc d from 40
to 30 degrees(and would be reduced further
to just20 degreesin full production models).
The first pre-production machines
arriveddisassembled at EdwardsAFB v ia a
Lockheed C-5A transport aircraft on 15
February 1975, the day after the 1,000th
YA-lO test fl i gh t h ad b ee n clocked up.
With the appearance of thes aircraft, the
YA-10's pioneeringworkwas largely done.
LocatIOn
Edwards AFB
Farmingdale
Farmingdale
Farmingdale
Farmingdale
Farmingdale
First f g ht date
15-2-75
26-4-75
10-6-75
17-7-75
9-8-75
10-9-75
t he AFPRO had b een responsible to the
SPO.lli Few agreedwith this, and G ner al
Samuel C. Phillips, AFSC Commander,
felt that the AFCMD per formed a v ita l
function in ensuring consistent application in dealing with contractors. He listed
a number of important innovative pro
grammes t hat the AF C had introduced,
and concluded that future good work of
that kind would be lost. 0 This viewpoint
carried the day.
The Air Force had nothing to complain
about wit h r eg ar d t o FRC 's p re di ct edDT E schedulefor these six aircraft. The
original delivery had been agreed as com
mencing in December1974, with the final,
sixth aircraft having a June 1975 delivery
date_ Fairchild fully in tended to comply
with this, but late vendor deliveries and
other problem were making thi difficult.
The Air Force and the company therefore
mutuallyagreed a new schedule s table
below), which wasduly followed.
There was always scepticism aboutthe A-l0
in the upper echelons of theAir Force, as well
as in Congress, and politics has always playeda
large part i n t h e A-l0 story. Keeping the to p b ra ss
fully aware of the aircraft s real capabilities in an
attempt to counter b ot h t h e m e di a a n d politically
inspired rumour factory has always been vital.
Here,Captain Allenback explains s o me o f t h e
A-la s cockpitinstruments to Secretary of the
Air Force, Verne Orr. USAF
No. S n Old de IVery date Newdelvery date 1 73-1664 December 1974 February 1975
2 73-1665 February 1975 May 1975
3 73-1666 March 1975 June 1975
4 73-1667 Apri 1975 July 1975
5 73-1668 May 1975 August 1975
6 73-1669 June 1975 September1975
figures were wrongand that o nl y I m il li on
wou ld be saved by such a move. Fur ther
deliberations took place between Brigadier
General Jay R Brill, -10Program Directorand General Sam C. Phillips, Commander,
ystems Command. The final outcome was
the announcement, made on 3\ larch
1975, by the Secretary of theAir Force, that
the i r Force \vas not averse to mov ing
some A-I workload to Hagerstown'IH.
i r Force hanges
The USAF also took action to implement
the HailsReport recommendations and set
itsown house inorder.Extramanpower was
assignedto the SPO and AFPRO. Brigadier
GeneralThomas H. McMullen hadalready
beensucceeded by Colonel laterBrigadier
General) Jay R Brill, on 6 ovember \974,
in the normal course of events.
General Hails thought that the whole
investigation migh t have been avoided if
of emphasis from Long Island to
brought anguished squeal fromState politicians, and charges of
of faith' from Democrat Congre s-
m J Downey, West Islip. He wa
ewYorkCongressionaldelega
inJanuary 1974, put presure on
togo ahead withsucha move,
Id mean the los of 1,000 jobs. 1
th , FRC had, since winning the
for the A-la, de te rmined on
90 per cent of the aircraft at Farm
and 1 per cent at Hagerstown. 2the HailsReport,Charle Collis,
hi l as t act as President, had sug
2 -41 per centof the workload
b e r ea ss ig ne d f rom ew York to
There were sound environmen
afety reasons forthis move - flight
s more acceptableover the seaoff
of Maryland thanover suburban
rk. Costs wou ld a ls o b e s av ed
as much as 8 .5 mil l ion
s - because the faci Iities the
se) already existed at Hagerstown,
would be cheaper to employ and
taxe were lower
o test f rom ewYork Congre smene A ir Force to carry out another
the benefits or otherwi e of the
i ch t oo k p la ce b etwe en 3 a nd 5
1975.They concluded that Collis's
g in
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THE IO IS BOR THE IO IS BOR
Oppositepage, bottom The very first production
A-10 is towed out complete on 20 January 1975,
Fairchild-Republic Archives, counesyCradleof Avialion
Museum, New York
characteristics at high angles of attack,
stall warning, susceptibility to depar t
from controlled flight and susceptibili
ty to spin. Additional tests evaluated
PAVE PE NY and aural stall warning
ystems. In eptember L975, AFTEC
announced that the results o f t he se
tests were 'excellent l .
2. Further verification of operational suit
ability and military utility and opera
tionaLeffectiveness.
3 . Analyticalasse smentof the A-I0 capa
bility in the face ofthe postulatedthreat.
4. Targetacquisition, attackand re-attack.
5. Further asses men t o f t he GAU- /A
10 compatibility to include strafesafe
tyaccuracy.
6. B omb w ea po n delivery accuracy
demonstration.
7. Initial evaluation of reliability, main
tainability, and supportability,
8. Demonstration of critical static loads
to ultimate loading condition.
9. omplete one lifetime of fatigue test.
It soon became clear that the full LOO per
cent flight-airload te ting would not be
completed by D AR IlIB and, on L
August, t he A ir Force, NA A, DDR E
agreed to drop the requirement prior to
DSARC IIlB, and accept the 0 per cent
flight-airload testing already completed bythe YA-I O. This was felt to give suffic ient
proof to support a p re di ct io n t h at t he
DT E aircraft could carry the extra 20 per
cent ordnance I quired, The Air Force
predicted that th 100 per cent te ting
would, in any c as e, b e completed by
June. 'l;
On 21 October L975, another milestone
was reached,when the first flight of a pro
duction A-IO ( s/n 75-025 ) was complet
ed at Farmingdale, This aircraft, along
Opposite page, top The Number One production
model A-10 comes together at Fairchild-Republic,
Fairchild-Republic Archives, counesy Cradeof Aviation
Museum, New York
1. Invest iga t ion of s tal l /post stall/spin
characteristics. To include forty sorties
to a certa in aerodynamic and engine
then were f lown to Edwards AFB under
their own power. The assignmentsfor each
aircraft were a shown in the table above.
The opportunity was taken luring the e
trials to te t co lour scheme and camou
flage patterns, in order to ascertain their
relevance t o t he A role. The A-LOs
appeared in a var iety o fh u e a nd p at te rn s
in the Californian skies, includingMASK
lOA in which, lacking FS595 equivalents,
the appearance changed , cham leon- like
w ith the sh if t ing light conditions. In the
end 'Ghos tGrey' was the scheme adopted
prior to European deployment, when a
very different camouflage requirement was
manifestly needed.
The test p ilo tsfor th is large programme
at Edwards included three from Fairchild,
four (later five) from the A ir Force Flight
Test Center (AFTEC), and four from the
A ir F or ce T es t and Evaluation Center
(AFTEC), Kirtland AFB. This establish
ment r mained static in strength although
other t es t p ilot s were rota ted through it.
This series of trials, Phase L LOT E, was
completed by 13 June 1975. The next
phase, D ARC III B was the final series of
test', uponwhich full production approval
was dependent . I t h ad been postponed from
October L975, until February 1976, and
included freedom-from-flutter tests, initial
performance measurements, fly ing qualities, GA-8/A-LO accuracy demonstration,
aerial refuelling, laser spot seeker (PAVE
PE Y integration, bombing accuracy,
combat ammunition pelformance against
tanks andAPCs,and 10T E conducted by
AFTEC. The specific te t objectives were
I i t ed a s fol low :
n
73-1664
73-1665
73-1666
73-1667
73-1668
73-1669
Programme
at t he A ir Force Museum, at
AFB, Ohio.
mechanical changes that had taken
the original design a nd t he
the A-IO are shown in the table53.
Performance tests; handlng tests, aerodynamic qualities, flutter and airloads
demonstraton, loading to 100percent limit
Gun and ordnance stores testing and certification
Systems evaluaton and weapons delvery accuracy tests
Buk of the performancetestng, performance and propulsion evaluatons.
Spare for initialoperational test and evaluation lOT EI
Prncipal initial operatonal test and evaluaton (IOT E) vehicle, although this was
alsodone with someother aircraft
Clmatc testarticle. Pans caled for cold-weather testing in Alaska, tropical condition
testng in Panama and desert testing at Edwards, Centro. Also clmatic hangar tests
at Edwards fortemperaturerangesof -65 to 165 degrees
six pre-production aircraftwas
a s pe ci al r ol e i n the t es t p ro
which had a planned I, 00 flight
DT E valua tions . ; In addition
flyable aircraft, FRC bui l t two
ames, specifically for t he c on
of ground test involving static
g ue t ri al s. A t e t laboratory was
c ted a t Farmingdale for this pur
fatigue-tested aircraft h ad , by
undergone 6 ,000 hou rs , wh i1e
c-test airframe t ri al s w er e t o b e
by September. Infact, these ran
a crack developing when, on 23
lifetimefatigue te ting was
ent through its range. This led to
ening and a con tinuat ion of the
d on 2 October 1975, testing of
cracked fuselage frame was
with the full 6, 0 - ho ur mark
a ined . Th is re in forcement was
nda to ry , commencing with a ir 14 (75-0263), and was retro-fit
Nbrs 6 and 7 (73-1664and
-IO 10T E Phase II testingbegan
1975. '10 The first pre-produc
aft waspacked full of instruments
the fourthaircraft, was not, initial
w ith th GAU- /A Gatling.
i t made its first few flight with an
jacket. The remaining five
f ir st f lew f rom Farmingda le and
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TilE A-IO IS BORN T HE A-IO IS BORN
Close-upof the refuelling slipway a to p t h e n o se o f t h e YA-l0 at Edwards AFB. Natonal Archives
ColegePark MD
canopy. Thc solution w as r o in rall a s im
ple screcn-wash s y stc m in e vita bly , c h r
tened H ogw ash ). T his proved uccessf
and was madc a standard fitmcnt fromai
crafr br 16 75-0265) onwards, a s w e ll
bcing rctro-firrcd [0 carlier a irc r af t. I t w
alsosuspecrcd that the gasemissions mig
affcct cnginc pcrformance, 0 cngin
cleaningsolvcnts wercused [0 dissolvc th
gas rcsiduc. During tcsts on 3 N o ve m bc r a t t h c a
gunncry r,mgcs at Ncll is AFB, N cvada, th
- 1 0 m o st succcssfully dcmonstratcd th
fired off. The h ei gh t o f t he firing passes
r a ng e d f ro m 10f t 3 m) up to 25, Oft
{7,5 Om),arspeedsthar variedfrom 135ro
415 knO[ ,and at g f o rc es r a ng in g f r om r o
5 during s lip s, b a nk s and h ig h a n gle s of
a rr ac k. A ll t h es e w er e conducted w ithout
mishap, e x ce p t t h e s o n ie o n 2 ovember
1975, when a G -8 gun g as e m is s ion
caused the gun to ja m. This w as a tempo
rary sedlack, however.
One s id e- ef fe ct wa s c au se d by the
re idue o f t h e gun sgas tending ro blur the
p il or s v is io n a s i t adhcrcd ro thc A-IO s
The addition of pmassium nitrate oxidizer
ro the propellanrallowedfor moresroi hio
metric comhustions o f t h e gun g as e w hi le
t he y w e re t il l i n the gun barrel. This ITleanr
t ha t t he g as w as les s p r op e lla nr - r ic h a s it
exited the mu::le. This solution had been
passed ro t he A ir For c e b y the avy,
w hi ch h ad u e d a s im il ar method in itslarge
1 6i n b ar r le sh ip ), i n h ea vy c ru is er ) and
6in light cruiser) naval guns.
In excess of sixty flights were made dur
ing GAU- cannon testing, during which
some 39,000 rounds of ammunition were
Close-up view o f t h e l a s e r tracker o f t h e A-l0 also
givinga good view ofthe undercarr iage detail .
Edwards AFB California 4November 1975. Natonal
Archives Washington
with the f o llo w in g tw o s ins 75-0259 and
75-0260), was sent ro j o in t h e d ev e lo p
ment t e am a t Edwards AFB. T h e se t h re e
A-lOs brs 7 a nd 9 ), a lo ng w it h t h e
tenth aircraft s i n 7 5- 261) were the last
be entirelycon tructed at Farmingdale.Beginning with the elevenrh aircraft sin
75-0262), the w o rk w as divided between
there ami Hager [Own, as t h e n e w facilitie
came on-srream.
There w er e s till s o me p r ob lem s w ith g a s
emissions from the GA - . A h ea vy -d ur y
nose shroud, affixed [Q the aircraft s nose
like the visor of a k ni gh t s helmet, had
proven c u mb e rs o me , s o an arrempt was
made to solve the problem of the secondary
ignition ofthe gas, and the resultanr fireball.
Above Themunitions barrel loader known as the
Oraggin l is hand-manoeuvred intoplace by three
ofthe ground teamprior to loading the GAU-8/A
30mm ammunition belts at EdwardsAFB California
February 1975. Note the only built-in access tothe
cockpit is on the portside anda ladderis needed
on thestarboard side. Engineshave their covers in
place. Natonal Archives Washington
56 57
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lethality against captured
T-62 b at tl e t an k targets. The
c o uld f ir e o f f 1 3 5 0 rounds in just
ds of continuous firing b u t t h is
n ec e s ar y. I n f ac t a two-second
u f fic ien t to d em ol i h the major
targets.
THE A IO IS BORN
The y ea r 1 97 6 b eg an w i th h ig h h op es
t h a t t h e A - t O programme was at last getting
into full swing. On 10 February DeputyS ec
retary of Defense Clements signed Develop
ment C oncept Paper 23 B authorizing the
Air Force to proceed with full production of
the A LO at fifteen aircraft per month.
Even then furthertesting was to contin
ue the follow-on programmeafter DSARC
III B including:
I. F ly in g q ua li ti es p e rf o rm a nc e a n d
propulsion testing.
2. C ompletion of airload testing.
3.
4.
5.
6.7.
8.
Stores certification.
Climate testing.
Systems evaluation.
Verification of technical data.
Reliability maintainability and sup
portability analyses.
D evelopment ofoptimum tactics.
THE A IO IS BORN
9. N o rm a l a n d e m er g en c y procedures.
LO Evaluation of cost of ownership.
lL. Identification d e f ic ien c ies to deter
mine mission area or s y te m s r e qu ir
ing further t e t i ng .
12. E va lu at io n o f a er os pa ce g ro un d
e q u i p m e n t l ~
On 30 Ma r ch 1 97 6 the A L 0 w as f o
mally accepted i nt o t he A ir Force by th
Commander Tactical AirCommand Gen
e ra l Ro be r t Dixon from C ommander
Air Fo rc e Sy ste ms ommand Gener
William Evans at Lan gley A FB. A f ter
longgestation period theA -I 0 h a d a r r iv e
H WGM N - Donald l Sorensen
The Fatigue Aircraft is set up for tests
rability and longevity. Fairchid-Republc
Cradleof Aviaton Museum. New York
an A 10 fromEdwards AFB in 1976. showing
arriageretractingforward. The aircraftis
750bbombsforfurthertesting. Natonal
Washington, DC
58
In the deveopment of any aircraft the test pilot and those that flight trialled the
teething problems on the earlyproduction models, hadthe most influence on whether
a design. brilliant or indifferent. c ame to a successfu fruition. One of the men that
ensured the A-10 was one of the formercategorywas Donald L Sorensen who was
invoved with much of the Hawg's eary deveopment.
Born in the townshipof Turock, Caforna. in 1945.the son of a local turkey farmerwell
known inthe Himar area, Donald joned theUSAFand, after qualifying as apilot spent
most of hiscareer in the Air Force SystemsCommand, in the f e d o f weapons acqus-
ton. He primarily flew flight acceptance on newaircraftat the factores. In addition to
the A-1 O. Donaldalso accepted F-16s at the Fokker Company in Amsterdam, Netherands.
and at the General Dynamics facility in Fort Worth. Texas. He was statoned twice at
Edwards AFB. Ca forna firstly from1974to 1975asan A-37 test support pilot and againf rom 1983 to1985 as a Field Mantenance SquadronCommander and F-4 pilot.
Itwas durngh s first assignmentat Edwards flying theA-37, that Don first became
invoved inthe A-1 0 program. The fly offbetween the YA-9 andthe YA-10had just been
competedwith the A-1 0 being seected as the newair to ground fghter. Don's job as
atest support pilotwas to chase the A-10 with the A-37 durngvaroustest flights. Of
ths seresof fl ighttests three in particular he reca ed to th e author as being of spe
cialnote. These were the initial icngtest. the spin recovery testing and the gun devel-
opment problems. Don tod me;
Theicng test requ iredtheuseof a specialy equpped KC-135 tanker with a tank ful of green
dyed water and a specal spray rng nozze extendedfrom theboom.
Thegoa of the test missonwas to spray water intotheintakeof oneof the A-I 0engnes at
an alttudewith temperaturesandconditons toinduce icng. Iwas in asupportA-37 with an engi
neer on board to evaluatethe icng procedures.The immediateprobem was forthe A-I 0 to be
in the proper positon toreceve theice,the piots vSon was obscuredbyIcecoverngthe wind
screen and preventedh mfrommaintainingproperposton off of the KC-135.Thereforewe decd
ed that theA-10 piot would need to fy formaton off of myA-37and I. in turn. was requred to
fy formaton off of thetanker in order tokeepthe A-lOin properpositon.Ths worked wel and
the A-I 0begantakng theice. Probes wereattached tothe naceleof the A-I 0engne so that my
engineercoud visualy measurethe amount of ice forming. After about two inches ofice accu
mulated we began a descent to see what happens when the chunks of icecame off and were
ingested in theengne.The engnewas equppedwith a varety of telemetry instrumentaton,
reayng rea tme informaton toground supportpersonne. One probem. Evenas we descended
to lower alttudes, we st couldn't fnd awarmenoughtemperatureto melttheice.We decded
to return to base and abortthemisson.Fina y as wewere descendng andon fnal approachto
land theicecame off and went intotheengne. It wasvery uneventful. The A-I 0 engnes hgh
bypass rato can withstand a lot of FOD. Futuremissons were pannedfor warmer days.
The spn testng wasaccomplshedeary in theprogram. The A l0 required a specal bal
l s tc operatedmechan sm to be attached tothe tai secton to shoot out a spn recoverychute
shoud the aircraftnot be able torecoverf rom thespn.They decded that thespn would be
initatedat an alttudeof about 30,000 feet The aircraft used for achase panewastheA-37
due to its s im i a r f gh t characterst cs. Theproblem for us was that theA-37 cockpit was
unpressursed and was lmited to 25.000 feet for physiologicalcondit ons ( .e . the bends).The
test group got specalpermissionforthe A·37to fy above25,000 feet in th is specal testenv
ronment Qute abit of extra physiologicaltraining wasgiven to a l o f thechase piots. Durng
my frst chase f g ht I found it becoming uncomfortable as wepassed about 27,000 feet At that
alttude theoxygensystembegan to pressurefeedthe piotwi th 100 oxygen.Ths made it
very diffculty tobreathand talk as pressurewas constanty bengforceddownour lungs. After
the frst misson supportng thespn test I decded I coud monitor the entresi tuatonjust as
wel fromsomewhere below 27,000feet. Thespn tests were accomplshed onthe A-I 0with
absolutely no problems.
59
Asyou know the whole A-10airframe wasdesgnedaroundthe 30mmGat nggun. The fr
ingbarre of thegunwas algnedexactydownthe centrelne of the aircraft to aVOid anyyaw
ing durng gun f rng For this reason thenose wheel had to be desgned offsetof centrelne.
Manyprobemsarosewith the gun testng. The frst probem occurred as thegunwas f\fng Gun
gases would b Ud u p in front ofthe noseof the aircraft durngthe f rng sequence and then the
heat generated by the f rng wouldoccasionaly cause a fame-outof an engne. In fact one A
10 test aircraft was lost due to thegunprobemsand fame-out of both engnes with no restart.
O coursethe beneft of thetest envronmentwas that practcaly everythingwas on f e so the
frst ejectonsequencefrom an A 0 was wel documented.To resovethe gun gasprobemthey
deveoped a gas suppressant additve to be added tothe ammuOiton powder. DUrng the frst
subsequent test everything wentwel with no gungas igniton. But therewas st oneprobem.
The suppressantres duecovered the piots front Windscreen makng it neary impOSSbe fo rhmto see toland Thenext soluton tothe gasproblem was to add a gungas diverter attached to
thebarre of thegun.Ths worked fairy wel as it divertedthegasesaroundthenose of theair
craft. Eventuay though,they found that theincrease in weight fromtheheavy diverterf xture
was eventualy crackngthe gun mounts on the aircraft. Asyoucansee fromal this. in the test
ingbusness. one fx sometmes can leadto another probemand so on, adinfn tum.
In 1975Don was assigned tothe Air Force ContractManagementD vs on (AFCMD) to
be working with the A-10 producton.
In ita ly the A-Os were gong t o b e buit and fown at theRepubc Companylocated at the
Repub c Airport in Farmingdae, Long Isand, New York So initaly. I was assgned to Farm
ingdale,but.beforethe orderswere processed.theydecded insteadto buid thefuselageand
wingsat Repubc and shpthemto the Fairchid Companyin Hagerstown, Maryland, for fnal
assemblyand f g h t operatons. When I arrvedin late 1975there were no operatons or fnal
assembly lnes yetestablshed I was basicaly given freeregn to set upthe fy ingportonof
the acceptance test mission at Hagerstown. Ths included offce space, f g h t planning faci
tes rampspace. airspace procedures, weather, lfe support, acceptanceprocedures plus oth
ers.Ths took severa months so the frst twelve A-Os were fown in the extremely congested
airspace around the New York Cty compexes. We few the frst twelve in awarning area at
theend of Long Isand. Idistncty rememberone day, at theendof amission as wewere return
ing tobase, the AirTraffc Centersay ng, 'Im showing about fortyaircraftbetween you and
Deer Park and ata l alttudes; use cauton. Not very comfortng words in the fghter testng
environment tosaythe least. We were g a d t o be in Hagerstown.
I actvely started flYlOg the A-I 0 10 October.1976. SlOce therewas not an actve training
squadronyet establshed, I attended a ground schoo at Oavis-Monthan AFB in Tucson. Ar
zona, folowed by fying training usngthetest aircraft at Edwards.The frst producton A-l 0I
few was the thirteenthaircraftthat came off the producton lne No tme to be superstt ous
Flght operatons hadquite a fewgrowingpans as with any new weapons system.There were
a total of850 testpointsaccomplshed on each f ght. Sncethe A-I 0 carredaboutfourhours
of fuel internaly, we were ableto accomplsh it al durngone verybusy f ght. Durng the ini
t a l f gh ts we would discover upto forty discrepancies as not beng within the contractual
specifcatons. Theseconsisted of suchminorthings as paint missing orscrewsloose.to major
things such as f g ht control miS-rggng or problems with in-fght engne restarts.
Eary on inthe programwe hadan aircraft aieronthat wouldbegnto futter (rapid twistng
vibraton) at amaxmum speed of 450 knots andzero gs. After severa re-rggings ofthe f gh t
controls with noapparenthep. we convncedthe System Program Offce SPO , based at
Wrght-Patterson AF8 and prmary overseers of the contract, that the aieron shoud be
removed. It subsequentywas removedandsentto Edwards AFB andpaced on a test A-I 0that
hadcamera pods mounted on the wings to f m the futter. And.sure enough, usnghgh speed
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THE A IO IS BORN
HAWGMEN Donald l Sorensen continuedCHAPTER EIGHT
he tO escribed
A leanand mean profi le is presented by thissleek A 10. 78-674. of the23rd Wing seen on therunway at
Pope AFB. North Carolina. The SLIMElights andformation str ipscan be clearly seen on the outboard wing
section inthis photograph USAF
When Iwas goingthrough the T 38 p h a ,e o f my
[raining, it cemed like the instructor,who h lll
flown the A-I 0 real ly enjoyeJ t h e t h r il l of fly
ing, a n d w h e n I [ a l ke d w i t h [ h e m, [ h e y , p o ke o
[heir daysflying [ h e A - I 0 as a r ol e [hey really
lo\ ed. T h e y J i d n r h a \ e a n y p r o hl e m w i t h [ h e
Image- [hey weren t concerneJ ahou[ thar. Rut
[hey Im ed that kll1d of flying 1:
Airframe
The original RFP from t h e D o D h ad a k
contractors to xp lo re var ious des ig
Built with lasiccostsfirmly in mind, muc
o f t he A-IO s des ign was conventiona
e v en w he n ir first appeared in the mi
1970s, but i ta lso carried some very innov
ative ideas i nt ot he skies,
qualified to fly any aircraft in t he A i r For
inventory, she chose t h e A - I 0:
Perhaps thos e e xpe r ts s hould have
examined more closely the results o f t he
Fort Riley competition tr ials more than a
decade earlier I
Like its predecessors, the Junkers Ju 7
S t uk a a n d t h e Douglas AD Skyraider, the
A-IO was built for a special job, and, like
them, i t d id t h at j o b perfectly. three
aircraft were functional and efficient, if
not beautiful. The A-IO was h a te d a n d
feared by its e ne mi e a nd loved and cher
i sh ed by i t customer, the troops o n t he
ground, but i t was derided and scorned by
its own people, both in t h e A i r Force and
outside it.
As aircraft became increasingly auto
mated, and pilots became less and less
involved in actually flying them, those air
craft that r ea ll y h ad t o b e f lown became
more appealing. The A-IO has proven
i tselfbeyond all critic ism, a nd n ow pilots
w n to fly i t. F ir st L i eut enant D i ane
Ridgely explains why, when he had
It is no cxaggcrarion 10 say that almosteveryone
lI ith f i r >t · h an J k n o ll l e J g e (eel, t ha t t he
USAF , Jecision t o r e pl a ce t h e A - 7 D lI ith the
FairchrlJ A - I O T h u n Je r h o lt II \ \ a , i l l -con
cei\·ed and prem llure.I:;
When t h e A - I 0 first j oi ned t he Air Force,
it presented a truly unique profile and out
line. T here was absolutely n o c ha nc e o f
mistaking i t for any other type of aircraft,
military or civil. The sneering began
immediately . If t he uni nformed observer
was not criticizing its appearance, t hen it
was i ts lack of speed, or c h an c es o f sur
vival. Its lack of aesthetics h id i ts multi·
functional talents from thos e a ir superior
ity fighters who were always ai mi ng t o go
hi gherand faster. No young flyer w i th T o p
Gun ambitions \Vas going to volunteer to
fly the A-IO - or so t hey t hought . I t was
t he d on e thing to knock the A-tO, and
even as lace as 19 s elf -procl aimed
experts were making remarks like this:
modeof f ght.A l ter workng with the SPD on theprobem acontractualspecif caton was writ
tento alow 80poundsmaxmum stck force at maxmuma rspeed whie inmanua reverSon
Alter thatwe carred a force gaugewith us on eachacceptance f g ht topace on the stck to
check theforce in-fght.
TheA-O wasaso the frst aircralt to recevetheACES I I ejecton seat a remarkabe eec
ton seat that is st usedonthe F-16 andF-15.
As theprogramprogressedthe qualty of the aircralt improved conSderaby In-fght dis
crepances were reducedto very few on each f g ht with only anoccasona major probem
When I left the factory on anotherass gnment the Fairchid-Republc Company wasproducng
twelve aircralt permonth It wasvery excitng and sometmes frustratng to be inon the inital
development and productonof amajorweapons system. Butto see the faci ty and operaton
gofrom absolutelynothing to ful-scaleproductonwas very rewarding.
Don finally retred fromthe USAF in February. 1988.He immediatelywent to work for
Delta Airlines andis currently 19991 a captainof MD-88s I ... a stretchedversionof
the DC-9 with glass cockpit. flight management system IFMSI and a variety of other
electronic gadge s A verygood relable aircraft.l based in New York. Donhasbeen
marred toElen for thirty-one years andtheyhave threechidren.Mark. JohnandClare
and several grandchidren. They enjoy travel ng. andDon especialy lkessnowsking
andbackpacking
it was shown that the aieron setupanosciatory frequencycausng the surface
twist. Had the aieron been left onan operatonal aircralt it most lkely would
eventualy cracked in f ght.
interestng dscoverywas excessve aircraft ro inmanua reverson. TheA- 0 had
a reverson system that coudbe actvated in-fght shoudthehydraucs be lost forsome
it pump faiure or as a resultof ground fre. Thswason y a get youhome feature
dsconnected the f g ht controls fromthe hydrau c actuators and bascaly reverted to a
ngthe trm tabonthe aieronwhich In turnmoved theentreai eron.We always sad
lketryng to fy the Queen aryas the stck forces wereextremely heavy. Ths al worked
a t l ow speeds but we dscovered that each arpanesstck force was different at hgh
requredvery lnle stck pressureto maintainleve f g ht atmaxmum speed whie
d over 100 pounds of sde stck force just to maintain leve f ght. We soon
that asmpe re-rgging ofthe aieron coud alter theamount of forcerequred in ths
Donald Sorensenin the cockpit of one of the first six pre producton A-Os
his finalflight operatons preparaton which was to include engine runand
checks. These werenorma y completed before the aircralt was painted in its
The firstsix pre producton aircraltwere each painted in adifferent paint
to be evaluated andto enable selection of afinal colour. Donald L Sorensen
60 7
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THEA IO DESCRIBED THE A IO DE CRIBED
Force Plant Representative Office Fairchild monitoredall the work atthe
n. Maryland.plant during the construction ofthe A l andacceptedthe
forthe AirForce. Here airframecomponentsare being preparedfor assembly.
for the AX which wou ld be re la
inexpensive, rugged and highly sur
Mindful of th i , Fairchild always
the A-la s ailframe configuration
the cost/performance balance 2i.
o f t he high thrust of the sel
powerp lant , a nd t he in-built fuel
economy built i n to t h e basic specification,
there was l i tt le n eed for the streamlined
external surfaces that wereconsidered to be
state o f t h e art a t t he t ime. To ensure ease
of manufacture- again , following the 1011
cost philosophy insisted upon by Congress
a nd t he A ir Force - FRC kept the A -l a s
62
l in es aus te re . In Fai rchi ld s own words,
Because o f t h e high t hrust and fuel econo
my o f t he engines, simple external lines
were possible w i t hout t he need for twisted,
tapered external sUifaces. The straight-line,
constant cross-section fuselage segments
a llowed mul t i-use par ts to be fab rica ted
from one set of too ls in large lot sizes. 2H
This type of fuselage, with as little com
pound (or double) curvature as pos ible,
alsoavoided t he t i m e-con um ingand cost
ly proce ses of manu fac tu ring t r etch
formed ections.
Some 95per cent oft he fuselage was built
from stress and corrosion-resistant light
alloys 2024 and 7075) with partsbraze-riv
eted together in traditional manner. Com
posite materials, then comi ng i nt o vogue,
were deliberately shunned because o f t he
cost. The A -l a s skinning was mainly done
with simplefla tp lates, many oft hem inter
changeable. As Ed Heinemann had done
with the Douglas AD Skyraider design, 20
great effortsweremade to reduceweight if
a cos t p enal ty ensued. Dr orman Gross
man based hiswork on an arbitraryfigure of
75 per Ib ( 165 p rkg) empty weight. Any
alteration or modification put forward had
to meet thi s r equi r emen t; i f i t wou ld cos t
more per unit saved, it was rejected. When
a change of design added weight, but saved
more t ha n t he yardstick figure of extra
weight, itwa given due consideration.
A m odul ar approach was the basis of
simplifying construction to s u ch a n e x t e n t
t h at , o n c e t h e p l a n t got into ful l w ing, a ll
the various parts could be mated within a
normal eight-hour shift. The fatigue-test
ing crack at 80 per cent of design life-span
had led to s ome strengthening of the
affected ect i onaroundt he area w here t he
two engi ne m ount fa irings were incorpo
rated. Here, the fu e lage began i ts taper
toward the rail secti on, w hi ch t erm inat ed
in a hinged, upward-tilting tail-cone.
There were t hreem ai n fu elage ections
- forward from the nose to abaft the cock
pit, c e nt r e, a n d aft - incorporating the
engine m ount i ngs and empennage fixingpoints. Wit h the tradition<ll internal
bomb-bay no longer needed, withalls tores
carried on pylons, t he avi oni cssuiteswere
located forward, and t hererem ai ned some
24.5 cubic feet of unusedspace internally.
The common belief t h at t he A -I was
b ui l t a r ou n d t h e GA - / A g un is partly
right, but t he p o i t io ni ng o f t he wings
(low), a n d e n g in e h i gh ) , a n d the need to
give the pilot t he m axi m um visibility, all
also had an impact on the airframe design.
n interior wide-angle view ofthe Maryland plant
showsin detai l the paperhoneycombsectionsof
construction. US
Below A Fairfield worker isseen preparing
various A l components for bonding ofcardboard
honeycomb. Adhesivefi lm was put
in place. honeycomb material was positioned
and thenlightly sealed down pr ior to theactual
bonding process. US
Below right A rotary mill cutsmetalhoneycomb to
the correc ts izeforbondingto the A l engine
nacelledoor covering. US
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THE IO DESCRIBED THE IO DESCRIBED
Looking forwardalong the under-fuselagefromthe portelevator. showingthe various
ventral lymountedantennae. including therearward-slopedVHF/AM bladeand theVHF FM blade as well as thefuel-dump pipeto port. Peter Smith
Location o f t h e e n gi n es aft o n t he uppe
rear fuselage was deliberate policy, leavin
the wings f re e o f e n cu m br a nc e . The
advantages o f t h e engines positions wer
listed by Vincent Tizio, as follows:
further separated from t h e o t he r by rigi
foam panels and protective firewalls. The
two widclyseparatedhydraulicsupply mod
ules, t h e e n vi r on m en t al c on t ro l u n it a n
the auxiliarypower unit A P U ) are locate
in the aftersector under the engines.
The fuselage immediately abaft the
cockpit has two rectangular-shaped flush
air inlets forward, and the tw o outboar
d u mp n o :: l es aft. These reveal the loca
tion of theavionicsequipment bays, wher
the densely packed electronics cabinet
require maximum airflow for cooling out
side the pilor s titanium armour citade
The various antcnnae arc ventrall
mounted, including the rearward-slopin
VHF/AM blade, a nd t he VHF/FM blade
Also located here are the fuel-dump pipeto
port, and a ventral strake, an addition tha
was deemed desirable after in itia l tr ia ls
The AP e xh au st \ Tn ts t hr ou gh t h
IOlVer after-fu e age_ The fuel-dump pip
access is a largcr opening. The main fue
bag tanks arc l o ca t ed a l on g t h e t o p o f thi
s e ct i on o f t h e fuselage, w it hi n t h e m ai
fuselage a n d s u rr o un de d by r et i u la te
foam for self-sealingin t h e e v e n t o f a c ti o
damage. Smaller sLimp tanks,also self-sca
ing, arc locatedat the bottom and contain
sufficient reserve fuel supplyfor 230 mile
370km).
Powerplant Positioning
I C learunderw ing and fuselage area fo
loading up t o e l ev e n pylons w it h a
unre tricted variety ofordnance.
2 lncrea ed invulnerability to F O D vi
the extremely high vacuum-cleanin
effect o f t he big turbofan ingestin
debrisfrom rough stripsl
3. Less c h a nc e o f gun-gas ingestion intthe engines.
4. Ease of maintenance in the fi ld and
access for rapid rearming and fuellin
turnaround of aircraft in forward-are
combat condition, fo r a high sorti
rate_
S Minimal ground jet blasteffect, aide
by the upward cant o f t h e n o d e s aft
6. M o un ti ng o n separate nacelles on
either side o f t he fuselage reduced
one-strike-and-you re-out AA A o
re i s ta n t a n d self-sealing, and filled with
folded foam-rubber panels. This reticulat
ed systemsub-divides the tanks,re tricting
airflow, spillage a nd c om bu tion within
them. Each tank is shielded bymore foam
protection, paddingout the space between
t he t ank a nd t he i nne r fuselage, and is
The APU exhaust can be seen here. below theengine on theright-handside.in the
lower after-fuselage.Thelarger opening isthe fuel-dump pipeaccess. The mainfuel
bag tanksare located alongthe topof thissect ion of thefuselage. within the main
fuselage andsurrounded by reticulatedfoam forself-sealing inthe eventof action
damage.Smallersumptanks.also self-sealing. arelocated atthe bottomand contain
sufficient reservefuel supply for 23 miles (370km). Peter Smith
The low rearfuselage. showingthe APU inlet (the exhaust venting isopposite. on
theport sideI The lower sideof theGeneralElectr icTF-34-GE-l00 turbofan engine
nacelle can also be seen. Peter Smith
The starboard ide o f t h e lower forward
fuselage features t h e e me r ge nc y rescue
access. T here i no boarding-ladder provi
sion o n t h i ide o f t h e aircraft.
The main fuel tanks, built I y Goodyear
Tire Rubber Company, are ated in
t he e nt ra l section. These tanks are tear-
o ut h an dl e a nd a rm a me n t access panel,
centre, with the forward hinged door. The
whole underside o f t he frontal fuselage
hinges d ow n t o starboard t o g iv e u nr i
valled and unrestricted maintenance
a c es s t o t h e whole of the General Electric
/ 49E-6 cannon ystem.
t h e b o tt o m o f t h e fuselage abaft the pylon
hinge upward and gives acce s t o t h e liq
uid oxygen. Four inset flush air inlet to
cool the avionics h el ve s a rc l oc at ed
behind and below the cockpit.
The f r on t c e nt r al p o rt fuselage section
houses the external rescue latchw ith pull-
Detail ofthe fuselage abaftthe cockpit. which carries both the national insignia.
and that of the US irForcesin Europe. The two rectangular-shapedflush air inlets
forward. andthe two outboarddump nozzles aft. reveal the location ofthe avionics
equipmentbays.where thedensely packed electronicscabinets require maximum
airflow forcooling outsidethe pilot s titanium armourcitadel. Peter Smith
t he g un a nd t he e ng in e affected
is very apparent, especially for
and cockpit visibility was certainly
o r ta n t c on s id er a ti o n. The A-IO
20-degree visibility overthe nose,
over the side and a omplete
round. The need to accom
the huge Gatling in the aircraft s
the length. The adoption of
versal aeria l refuelling receptacle
( ARRSI), a ls o i n a unique posi
p t h e nose and ahead of the pi lot
the need to accommodate the
protective titanium bathtub llictat
configuration ofthe forward section.
the port sside forward,easy access to
electronics and avionics com
is by way of drop-down panels.
hinged door s open out to the star
side o f t h e aircraft and the whole
offset to that side to accommodate
/A A vengerG atling that take
o f t h e space forward. On the lower
fuselage, there is a square panel
access t o t he electrical sy tems
and a test panel with four oblong
recesses, and, just a h ea d o f t h a t , t h e
magazine.
forward port fuselage section houses
and fully retractable board
der, with built- in steps, in a stowage
is lowered and r ai ed automatically
pilot s cockpit, and is dulylabelled
warningsign to tand C le ar . B oth
and abaft th is door are the vertical
ntallyslatted air-ventilatingout
the ductsmark the loca
the flexible ammunition feed chutes
the two drums, e a ch h o ld i ng
PGU-13 high-explosive HE) or
armour-piercing AP) incendiary
Below the fuselage is the ventrally
HF bladeaerial.
small, bottom-hinged pull-down
with recessed finger grip is located
ow the rear c an op y o n t h e tar
side o f t h e forward fuselage. This is
manual cockpit rescue release.
fairing t h a t e x te n ds downthe starboard side o f t h e fuselage at
centre is the side-mounted pylon,
A A -35 P VE PENNY laser spot
devi e T his tracker device locks
nd trackssurface target illuminat
aser, a nd t ra n m it t he d at a directly
pilot s head-up d i p lay H D), or
to t he o nb oa rd c on tr ol o f t he
Maverick anti-armour missile.
mounted V H F homing aer
th is . A small hatch at
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THE IODESCRIBED THE IO DESCRIBED
ardrearwing showing thecurved blended fillet atthe junctionof thefuselage
section, with i tstrai l ing-edge slottedflaps inboard. Also seen are
ncestation pylons, numbered r ightto left) 8 7 6 5 and 4 Peter C Smith
Above Close-up view ofthe portunderside of
the wing showingthe layout ofthe single-slott
Fowler-type interchangeable trai l ing-edgeflap
andailerons. Alsovisible isthe honeycomb
compositeconstruction ofthe tabbalance wei
Small rubber grippers on t h e e d ge o f t h e f l a p a r
a ground-handlingsafetydevice inadvertently
leftin place. Peter Smith
The starboardwheel-fair ing kneecap , and
leading edge ofthe innerhydraulical ly operate
interchangeable Fowler-type wing slats, which
have three settings,improve airflow and provid
added lift at slow speed. The flap deflection on
productionmodelsis 20 degrees, compared wit
twice as much on the prototypes. Peter Smith
Below Theunderside ofthe hydraulical ly
powered, heavily camberedstarboard wing flap
Whendeployed, these split aileron/decelerons
increasethe standard wing area. Peter Smith
Possible Loadings
5 was an afterthought, to give better air
flow. l at s o n t he leading edge o f e ac h
wing o n t h e i n i de o f t h e wheel fairing are
there to avoid stall at lowspeed and high
atrack angle.
The porr wheel fairing kneecap at the
leadingedge o f t h e outer wing has a front
section, which hinges down, and houses on
its left-hand side the single-point pressure
refuelling connection attachment, where
the fuel hose is connected. T his fairing
nose also houses, o n t h e r i gh t -h a nd side,
the self-test maintenance panel, for routine
testing o f t h e aircraft s y tems. The under
carriage fairings house the Menasco tricy
cle undercarriage. This forward-retracting
g ea r h as Typ e VII mainwheels and trap
doors. The rear parr o f t he fairing can
accommodate a A lE-40 chaff/ R decoy
dispenser.
Based on the Skyraider, t he A -I O has
eleven stores pylons - ten underw ing and
one centrally mounted under the fuselage,
numbered I to 5 u n de r p or t w in g) , 6 central) and 7 to I I under the rarboard
wing). tations I, 2, IO and II have a
pylon w e ig h t l i mi t of I, OOlb 454kg),
while stations 3 and 9 have a pylon limit
of 2,5001b I , 1 35 k g) a n d s t at i on s 5 6
and 7 were rated at 2,5001b I, 135kg) load
capacity. The centreline pylon is rated at
5, 0 Ib 2,275kg) capacity loading and is
o ne o f t hr ee o f t he t at io ns p lu mb ed for
the 50 -gallon 6 0 gallons/2,27I
lin-es) droptanks foroverseas ferry flights.
The leading edges o f t he o ut er wing
have a 7-degree dihedral and pa ne ls a r e of
honeycomb composition. The A-IO was
designed from t he o ut et as a l ow -s p ed
aircraft a nd t he wing were configured
with n il weep. The requirement for shorr
take-off and landing operations ( T O l )
from primitiveor makeshift airstrips close
to the f r ontline in a central E ur ope a n ba t
rle scenario, and for tight ba ttle f ield tur ns
at low altitudes, was met by a d e ep a n d
rounded ACA 6716 profile, which
tapers to a NAC A 6713 profile a t t he t ip
o f t h e wing. The elongatedP itot tube head
is m ou nt ed o n t he starboard outer wing
section. S tarboard navigation and strobe
lights are carried o n t h e c a m be r ed wingtip
fairing. The A- IO carries an AlE-40 chaff
dispen er i n i de t h e c u r ve o f t h e H oe r ne r ,
w hichcan also carry infra-red IR) decoy
f la re for protection against such Russian
nasties as t h e S A - 7 Grail.
The single-slotted Fowler-type inter
changeable t ra il in g-edge f laps and
ailerons, with their cables and actuating
rods, have hydraulic hinge activation. The
a i le r on t a b is of honeycomb composite
con truction, with t a b b a la n ce weights.
ingle-slotted flaps are mounted inboard
o f t h e ailerons. The inboard flaps are auto
matically openedat slowspe d byhydraulic
jacks, to improve airflow and give wing lift
at low speed. Each hydraulically operated,
interchangeable Fowler-type wing slat has
three settings. The flap deflection on pro
duction models is 20 degrees, compared
withtwice t h at o n t h e prototypes.
The very large hydraulically powered
ailerons/decelerons and slotted flaps split
and hinge upwards and downwards a t t he
l eading edge to s low the aircraft. When
deployed, the e split a ilerons/decelerons
increase the srandard wing area. The set
tingsusedare 7degreesfor the take-off pro
file and 9degree for landings.They al so a t
as airbrakes, s plitt inga bove and below the
wing, and can alsobe utilized asdive brakes.
The flaps are interchangeable and the
aircraft can still fly with one flap shot away.The control cab le (used ins tead of the
more vulnerable rigid control rod s) a re
duplicated, and led thr ough a r m our e d ducts
o n b o th sides o f t h e fuselage. They operate
the triple redundancy hydraulic flight-con
trol system. The rear wing features the
curved blended fillet a t t h e j u n ct i on o f t h e
fu elage a n d t h e i n n e rwing section, withits
trailing-edge slottedflaps inboard.
A ventral srabilizerfairing o n t he front
o f t h e fuselage-mounted ordnance station
c e n tr s e ct i on , d i he d ra l le d o u te r s ctions
and sharply drooping wingtips. These take
the form of cambered wingtip fairings, the
flat outer edges ofthe dow nturned H oern
er w in gt ip d e igned to reduce drag and
give improved aileron effe tiveness. This
design provides better lift capabilities at
low speeds and minimized t ip los e s ll l.
Giving the wingtip this droop increases
c ru is e range by 8 per cent, it is claimed.
The Fairchildlow-wing mounting,asdi
tinct from the high-w ing a ppr oa c h of
orthrop s YA-9 contend r was motivated
by the need t o m o un t t h e m a x i mu m num
ber of weapon-carrying pylons without
compromising the aircraft s sustain d, low
level, low-speed handlingand manoeuvra
bility. The straight wings have trailing-edge
splitflaps, while theordnance is mainlycar
ried o n t he t en underwing pylons, plus an
optional central s ta ti on u nd er t he main
body o f t he aircraft. The heaviest load
bearing pylons are c o nc e nt r at e d o n t h e
thicker, inner section o f t h e wing, closer to
the fuselage itself, and the aircraft s centre
of gravity. The rolling inertia o f t h e A-IO
was thus sub tantially reduced, which aids
handling in the fully laden configuration.
A Iso, a l ow w in g a ll ow s e as y a cc es s for
rearming and aids fast combat sortie rurn
around times. witching the bulk ofthe fuel
carried from the wing t o t h e central fuselage
reduces vulnerability, although integral fuel
tanks a re t il l c ar r ied o n t he wing centre
sections, port and starboard.
considerations affecting the place
t h e e n g i ne s were infra-red blank
tability
main landing gear partially retracts
faired pods, and this con
to the unique wing form and
that is necessary for the low-level
envelope for w hich the A-10
igned. It a lso enables a wide land
eartrack, offering maximum stability,
i a l in operations f rom rough for
landing grounds.
wings are of three-spar construc
w ith the fuel ranks in the centre sec
Extensive wind-tunnel testing result
t he u ni qu e profile, w i th s t ra i gh t
gs, Flaps and Fairings
damage so c o mm o n a m on g
pe l ik e th F-I05.
I tanks kept well awayfrom engine
sections, for additional security.
engine noi e in the cockpit,
pilot fatigue and enhancing
time_
a ci ng engines outside the main
ture permits a s imp le , uninter
structure.
t ure p o te n ti a l, s h ou l d a l ar ger
i n e b e co m e a requirement, and
space for fu elage-carried111
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THEA-IO DESCRIBED THEA-IO DESCRIBED
Empennage
The tail unit is a tlVin interchangeable
T hi - configuration, c om mo n d ur in g
econd World War, but less popularfo
rast three decades, allows the a i r r a
continue functional flying even if one
of the tail is shot away by ground fire.
p or t a nd starboard unit· a rc f ul ly i
c h a ng e a hle . Bo th the rudder and el e
Mk 2 L DG P a n d AIR bomhs. The rear
section of t h e m ai n wh e el semi-recessed
housi ng can house an LEA chaff dis
p e n se r /I R d e c oy d isp e ns e r, a s \Veil as the
ol eo a nd t rap for the f o rw a rd s e mi
retractable main\Vhecl housing.
T here is a commonalityof parts between
t he p or t a nd starboard sides, and l andi ng
g ea r, a iler o n rudder, elevators, control
acuators a n d e n gi n es a re a ll d up l i ca re d,
Above The hydraulically operatedrudder actuator on the lower p o rt i on o f t h e s t a rb o ar d u n i t o f t h e twin interchangeable tail f i n. A t t h e
frontof thefair ing isa smallformation-keeping l ight Peter Smith
Right Detail ofthe starboardrudderand endplate tail f i n o f t h e twin interchangeable tail unit on A-10 AF-77-259. Peter Smith
Top Detailof thestarboardempennageshowingthe inside configuration ofthe rudder and endplatetai l fin.The projection below thetail-cone
isthe receivingantenna ofthe ALR-69 radarwarning system, which comprises the ALR46 V receivercoupled with the ALR-64 CompassSail
low-band missilealert receiver,This apparatusprovides an all-roundnoticeof enemyradar locking on tothe aircraft in readinessto engage.
elowthatsection isthe ventral lymountedradarwarningantenna.The portand starboard elevatorshave trimtabs outboard, Peter Smith
a nd c an b e q ui c kl y r e mo v ed i n h ig h- r is k
c o mb a t, t h us i mp r ov i ng t h e m a no e uv r a
hility o f t h e aircraft.
A m on g t h e more exot i cordnance that
can form rart o f a n A-la s working kit are
the LA -6 even-round rocket launcher,
the MX -64 baggage pod, the Mk 7
Rockeye and t he U-64 Gator, c1u,ter
lo m b uni t s C B U ), a s w e ll a s m or e mun
dane w earons ouch as the S -3 H a n d
B et ween t hem , th e se w in g p y lo n s can
cope w ith ju s t about everytype of standard
USAF tactical confi gurat i on, i ncludi ng
el ect roni c count ermeasures E C M) pods,
electronic warfare EW) dispensers and
the A LQ -1 31 d e ep and shallow), the
ALQ-I 4 V )-IS l o ng ) , a n d t he A LQ
1 4 V) - 1 l o ng ) po ds , p lu va ri ed o rd
nance, i ncl udi ngMk 2 I o w- d mg , g e n er
a l -r u rp o se , o r L DG P ), M k 4 L DG P, Mk
2 AIR, M1 1 7 w ith MA - 1 7 f in ) ,b o m b s
and B D U-33 pract i ce bombs, The wing
s p ar s a r e s tr e ss e d f or 733 g w h ile c a r ry in g
at maximumordnance capacity, The inner
st at i ons can be f it te d w it h L A - 117 s in
gl e-roundor LA - triple-round Maver
ick launchers, while t h e o u tb o ar d wing
p y lo n s, w ith lighter rayl oad l i m i tat i on-,
can b e f itte d w ith the dual-rail adapter for
two A I M- 9 L/ M i d ew in d er missiles,
R epresentat i ve and typical A -l0 load
ing s a r e g iv e n in the table below,
Thin ventral s tl a ke s w er e a dd ed i n
order to improve the airflow a r ou n d t h e
fuselage weapons pylons at stations 5 and
7. These stationsthemselvesare detachable
Port undercarr iage fair ing ofthe Menasco tricycle
undercarriage showing the forward retracting gear
with the Type VIImainwheels and trapdoors.The
rearpart ofthe fair ingcan accommodate an ALE-40
chaff/lR decoydispenser. Alsoseen isordnance
station 4, of which t h e i n b oa r d p y lo n h as a
maximum loading weightl imit of 3,5001b 1,588kg).
TheA-10can carryexotic ordnancesuch as the
LAU-68 seven-round rocket launcher,the MXU-648
baggagepod, the Mk 7Rockeye andthe SUU-64
Gator,clusterbomb units, as well as more mundane
weapons, like the SUU-30H and Mk 82 LDGP and
AIR bombs. Peter Smith
ative pylonloading forthe A 10 -Mk82 Mk77 Mk 20 Rockeye AGM-65 Laser-guidedbombs AIM-9 2.75 I LUU-l LUU-2 30mm
500lb Incendiary Clusterbombs Maverck Sidewinder Rockets
bombs missie missieI -
-GBU-l0 BGU-12 1 000CBU-52 CBU-65 CBU-87 CBU-89 CBU-97
12 2 1 0004 2 1 000
- - _ -
6 2 2 1 000
4 2 2 1000 6 2 1000
4 2 2 1000- -
6 2 1.000- -
I 1.0006 2
2 2 1.000
4 2 I 1.000f - - - -
I4 2 1.000_
outof Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, banks overthe desert while carrying out
n g m is s io n . N o t e t h e l a s e r p y lo n i s e mp t y a nd o n ly a s i n g l e Maverick
USAF
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THEA-IO DESCRIBEDTHE A IO DESCRIBED
Breakdownof single-engined CAS Gombat loss
by types llS
By designing the wing and tailpla
c on ti nu ou one -p ie ce structures,
building their surfaces around three
of approximatelyequalsize andstreng
was hoped tha t the loss of anyone cou
absorhed by the remaining two. The
approach wa taken with the fuse
which conta ined four main longe
allowing the aircraft to survive on th r
great deal of w o rk w as later don
Fa irc h ild s c ien tists , in conjunction
the ir Fo r c e Fligh t Dynamics Labor
at Wright Patterson AFB, Oh io , o n
frame and general damage tolerance
ways to strengthen airframes against
Prior to the l at e 1 96 0 , this type of an
sis h ad n ev er b ee n done in depth,
Fairchild s work at this time has bene
other systems, both military and civi
this day.
Percentage ofdamage oss
62 per cent
8 percent
percent
7 per cenl
3 percent
Leh Detail ofthe starboard Type VII mainwheels ofthe Menasco tricycle
undercarriage, which aretotal ly interchangeable port and starboard.They f
forwards intothe large bulbousfair ing centre ,to eliminateany weakeningof
highly stressed wing The wheels ofthe main landinggearprotrude below t
fair ing sufficiently tominimize damagein anyemergencybellylanding. Peter
Above Close-up ofthe nosewheel ofthe Menasco tricycle undercarriage fr
thestarboardside, with the oleogear retractedto itsminimumlength.Theto
ofthe hydraulic activation leverholdsa landing spotlight,and the hydraulic
steering unitis seen directly abovethat. Behindthestrut i s the hingedrear
door with retention straps, and above isthe lower section ofthe rectangula
py lon,at the bottomof which the AAS-35 PAVE PENNYlaser-seekingpod is
located. Peter Smith
Above, right Starboardside view of thenoselanding gear of theMenasco
tricycle undercarriage. The Type VIInosewheel isforward retracting andha
emergency gravity extension. Peter Smith
auseof damage oss
Damage to fuel system
P ot incapacitation
Fy ng-contro damage
Loss of enginepower
Structural damage
period gave them a unique insight, and
FRC th er e f or e h a d something of a h ea d
start in designing the A-tO. They alsostud
ied Israeli lossesin the ix-Day War, which
h a d b e en unexpectedly severe. They found
that in both these widely different combat
areas, AAA h it s c au se d m or e damage or
losses than Ms. A b r ea k do w n of vulner
able areas came out as hown in the table.
emergency gravity extension. The nose
wheel and its gear is offset to the starboard
side of the aircraft s nose to accommodate
the General Electric A/A 49E-6 cannon
ystem. The cylindrical hydraulic steering
unit is mounted between the two landing
lights and thestarboardopeningdoor folds
upwards and inwards t o e nc as e t he Type
VII unit totally.
Internal Arrangements
Re pu b lic h a d conducted detailed studies
and analysi intothe cause ofcombat losses
o n t he F-I05 during the Vietnam Wa r. I ts
database grewas losses ofThunderchiefs to
ground fire and m is s ile s s te a dily in r ea s ed
during the period 1965-68, when opera
tions intensified. Their findings over a lo ng
RIGHI SYSTM
HYORAUIIC RfSfRVOIR
~ U X l l l ~ R Y POwfR UNIf
fNVIR CONIROI UN
un SYS IfM
HYORAULIC R[SrRVOIR
RUDD[R
marks this out as a production model. The
YA-IO prototypes featured an angularcon
figuration here.
The l ow r e ar f us el ag e has the A PU
inlet, with the exhaust venting opposite,
on thepor t side. The hydraulically operat
ed rudder actuators are o n t he lo we r p o r
t io n o f t h e twin interchangeable ta il f in.
Undercarriage
The main landing gear h as a simple wide
trackmain gear with anti-skidbraking and
a steerable nose gear. Both the main gear
use i ng le struts that do not t um , b ut
retract forward, so that in an emergency
they free-fa 114
The Menasco tricycleundercarriage has Type VIl mainwhee l
(dimensions 36 x II in), which are totally
in te rchangeab lepor t and ta rboard. They
fold forwards. in to rhe large bulbou fairing
to e l imina te anyweaken ing of the highly
s tre s se d w in g. The wheels o f t he main
landing gear protrude b el o w t hi s f ai ri ng
s u f fic ien tly to m in im ize damage in any
emergency belly landing.
The Ty pe V I I nosewheel m e as u r es 2 4 x
7.7-lOin, i f o r wa r d- r e tr a ctin g and has
WING
r 0 r t a n d s ta rb oa rd e l ev at o rs h v trim
tabs outboard.
The underside view of the after-fu elage
and u n de r ca r ria ge f e atu re s a c u rv e d a fte r
tail fin. The huge engine nacellehouses the
massive TF34 high-bypass turbofan and is
mounted close in to the fuselage,simplifying
the asymmetric handling problems. This
type of engine has fewer moving parts, sim
plifying installation and maintenance. The
9,000Ib.s.t. engines arc also very quiet com
pared with those of conventional jets and,
having no afterburner, p re s en t a much
s m aller lR f o otp r in t f or SAMs and hand
held missiles to lock on to The core engine
exhaust nozzle itself is canted upwards a t the
r ea r, r e du c in g th is ig na tur e even further.
The angled exhaust ducts vent betweenthe twin-boomed tail fins. The engines are
positioned uniquely above the wings and
to the rear of the aircraft, to give great
invulnerability to light groun I fire, and a
degree of immunity f ro m d e br is f o r eig n
object damage, or F D), when operating
from primitive forward airstrips, the Auto-
b hn and so on.
The rudder has a n e xt en si on s tr ip o n
the lo we r e d ge , w h ile the bulbous lower
frontal s ec ti on o f t he e ndpl at e t ai l f in
G ~ U l A GUN
tructed of a honeycomb compos
t ur e that combines lightne s with
A s m all formation-keeping light
at the front of the fairing for the
operated rudder actuator on
por ti on o f t he s ta rb o ar d u n it.
lar ge n a ce lle s h id in g the General
TF-34-GE-100 t ur bo fa n ar c s et
the wingsclose to the rear fuse
the twin-tail assembly provides
safety margin dictated by a l ow
low-altitude battlefield combat sce
his aircraft was designed for a high
ti-s o rtie r ole, and had to be
for intense SovietSAM and fight
Tank columns from Central
were expected to b u rs t a cr os s the
plain at any time, to swamp ATOsheer weight of numbers.
cting below the tail-cone is the
an tenna o f the ALR-69 radar
system, which c ompr is es t h e
receiver coup led with the
om pas s a il low-band missile
This apparatus provide an
nd notice of enemy radar locking
the aircraft in readiness to engage.
that section is t h e v en tr al l y
radar-warning antenna. The
arrangement.
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THE tO DESCRIBED Ti lE tO DESCRIBED
A-lOs began to be dep loyed to
pean zone of operat ions , even
- in strengths were found to be
i ronica lly, th is was partly
o f t h e A-I O s ,uccess. Increased
times meant more exposure at
and in turhulence, and the orig
s ign had n ot bee n required to
for this. Cracks were found in the
of fastener holes in the lowerwing
ome A -lOs were equipped with
which revealed t ha t t he
ng sk in were experiencing three
expectednumber ofhigh-g load
led to thicker lowerskins being
ted, giving a n e xt e nd ed life of
,
interior of t he A-IO naturally
thesame emphasis on survivabili
exterior de ign. The flight con
use completely redundant, dual
lically powered actuation servos,
drive dual flight control surfaces,
is also a manual back-up system,
the pilot the ability toge t his dam
safely hack to base should all
power be lost.
duality built in under the sun iv
mandate is extensive. Evena major
a projectile is not always ertain of
g the A-IO. Losing any fuselage
anymain structural rib, orone
chment , o r engine a t tachment ,
not necessarily C<1u e catastrophic
The control system involves the
independentlyactuated ailerons
to ensure survival even if
lost. imilarly , sub-systems, and
such as a l te rna tors and
were p lac ed in widely separated
The flight control systems had
l led in other aircraft, b ut t he A
wide phy icai eparation,withcon
running through troughs on sep
of the aircraft.
Originally des igned to make d iving
attacks, the a ir cr af t h as a dive velocity
stabilized a t 2 60 k no ts by the airbrakes
( de ce le ro ns ), w it h t he u pp er a nd lower
surfaces of the ailerons opening up.
The fuel system is well protected, and
combat damage is kept to a minimum via
thc independen t tanks and feed systcms.
There is no need for special fuel manage
ment for the con tro l o f the aircraft s cen
tre of gravity, as the main tanks are locat
cd r igh ta t that spot to mainta in ba lance .
The fuel system is completely automatic
and has b ee n k ep t basic, with single
point refuelling, a nd t h e slipway a top the
nose replacing the probe of the YA-IO.
Three o f t h e stores stations, 4, 6 and 8,
arc adap ted to take the P/ 7540 63-1
fuel tanks (600 US gallons/2,270 litres
capacity), a fac il i ty i nc lu de d t o allow
ferry operations from CO U bases to
Europe, Asia or any other potential dan
ger point.
Spec ial pa in ts were t ri al le d o n t he
outer surfaces to reduce the IR signature
via sun glint. The pilot s survival,should
evcryother ystem fail to keep his mount
airborne, r e t s with the zero-zero (:ero
height, :ero- peed) e ject ion seat , g iving
h im eve ry chance of be ing p icked up.
The original pre-production YA-IOs and
the firs t 101 production A-lOs featured
the McDonnel l Douglas IE-9 Escapac,
which was tandard U AF equipment
the time. However, early in the produc
tion life (commencing with number I 2,
wi th sin 77 -1077), an improved scat from
the same company, the Advanced Con
cept Ejection Sea t(ACES II), was intro
d uc ed , a nd e ar l ie r operational aircraft
were retro-fitted.
TheACE II works on a fully automat
ic inertia-reel system, with rocket catapult
ejection tr iggered in three scenarios, as
shown in the table below.
time sequenceoptions
Jettson
fres
gun f res to slow seat
fres
chute bndle severs
tme to safe altitude
release actuates
Inflation
survival kit deploys
lime sequence sees low speed
00
03
N/A
0.5
N/A
N/A
0.75
25.8
lime sequence sees hgh speed
00
03
047
127
142
N/A
152
29
64
lime sequence sees hgh alttude
00
03
047
1.27
142
variable
variable
variable
variable
72
Ease of Maintenance
Designed to opera te with the bare mini
mum o f s uppo rt in extreme conditions,
rapid ru rnaround ofcombat mis ions and
easy maintenanceof the aircraft s systems
wer e k ey f ac to rs i n the A-IO s design.
Much thought was g iven to this, a nd t he
resulting aircraft is outstanding in these
respects. The built-in system test for fault
isolation, and the quick-disconnect com
ponents ensure this. The A-I wa, alsoas
self-sufficient as possihle, with a 30 per
cent reduction in speciali:ed ground- up
port equipment being c1aimed 14
A tul1laround t ime of th irty minutes
between sorties was the aim, providing 80
per cent availability, based on an average
mission time of I. hour . In thar half-hour
on the ground, the supportingteam can fully
refuel the A-I 0 and load ix Mk 2 bombs
on sixstations,along with fullyre-ammuni
tioning the Gatling, makinga total weight
of 2,0001b (910kg) combat loading. The
design target for main tenance on theA-I 0
is 9 .2 hou rs p er f ligh t hou r, a f igure that
compa res wi th 19. hou rs for the simple F
5E, and 26 hours for the A-7. The civilian
on-condition method was initially adopted
for engine maintenance with onboard
inspection. The engine modules, including
theho t section, can be changed withoutan
engine removal, a can all the fan blades.
The engine overhaul t<lrget wa 3,500 hours.
The installation of an engine can takeplace
with the half-hour time frame,as there is no
need to move any airframe sections.
To help speedy maintenance, each mov
<lble surface and the control co lumn in the
cockpit are aligned with rigging pins. To
reducehydraulicleaks, permanent connec
tions femure all through the system, except
for the actuators. At the Edwards AFB tri
a ls , 6 .2 maintenance hours per flight hour
was achieved over a l38-f1ight period.
Cockpit
The single-place co ckp it o f t he A -I
Thunderbolt II hinges r ea rwards , h as a
padded and armoured headrest, and is
quipped with the McDonne l l Douglas
ACES II ejection s cat an d t he Kaiser
head-up display (H D). A sma ll , bottom
hinged pull-down panel with recessed fin
ger grips is fitted just below the rear canopy
for external manual cockpit rescue release.
The pi lot s wi ndscreen is bulIet-proof,
made from a IY2in 3 cm) th ick glass-and-
plasti sandwich, and the front screen was
tested with 7.62mm armour-piercing (AP)
projectiles. The wholepilot s compartment,
along with the internal ammunition canis
ters, is surrounded by a titanium citaclel that
is proof again t lightgrouncl fire.
Originally built w i thout any inertial
navigation system I S), the A-1O was
originally to have reiied torally on visual
navigation and target acquisition and iden
tification. A simple and robust fixed gun
sight reticule o n t he HUD and a control
panel for the Maverick missile were the
soleaids to targeting. The introcluction of
mobile Soviet AM units such as the
SA- Gecko, and mobile AAA weaponry,
73
An engineer makesadjustmentsto the ACES II
ejection seat first introducedin No 77-1077.
Natona Archves Colege Park MD
typified by the quadruple 23mm ZSU
tem, capable of 4,000rpm, and their ac
deployment in among the batrle tank
the front line, led to a i tch of polic
the TAC 5 review. The change from d
to low-level attack also brought about
need to retro-fit the system.
Optimum pilo t and inst rument p ro
tion is provided by the titanium batht
This citadel is built in and integral w
the forward airframe and consists of v
ously sized heavy titanium sheets bo
together. The toml wcight of the enclos
is I,2001h (545kg)and accounts for a l
part of the ovcrall lVeight of 2,88
(1,310kg) devo ted to protect ion , o r so
14 per cent o f t he A-IO s to ta l em
weight. The thickncss o f t hi box va
from in (12.5mm) to a maximum of I
3 mm) extending up t o t he c an opy a
windscreen framing. The pilot, his eje
scat, and all flying control and instrum
panels, sitwithin this shield.The insid
the bathtub is lined with ballistic nylo
n eg at e t he effects of t i tan ium pal
internally from direct hits externally. D
ing the statictesting to compare the re
tance of the t i tan ium pla tes against b
ceramics andaluminium, some430 rou
of API and HEI were fired in to the co
pit area, with 7.62mm API fired in to
armoured windscreen. The A-IO s pi
un ival from uch hits wasrated ten tim
higher t ha n t h at o f pilots ofconventio
warplanes. The Gulf War would dem
strate that such academic ratios could
fully borne out in combat conditions.
The pilot s instrument layouts as origi
ly conceived and finallyfitted arc illustra
in the diagram ancl photograph on pageThe conceptwas toavoid complex avion
to keep down cost and improve main
nance and sortie rates. Therefore, no co
puter ancl no radar is featured. Fire con
for bombing and strafing is via the sim
gunsight, on whichairspeed, diveanglea
tucle (including roll angle), and altitude
displayed, withtarget information.A tele
sion displayandhand controller is useclw
the Maverick missile, which, once aim
requires no further attention from the pi
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THEA-IO DESCRIBED THEA-IO DESCRIBED
• Air to air radio
• Air to ground radio
• Basi c HUD display
• TACAN navigation system
• PAVE PEN Y l ascr spot scckcr
• Maverick ASM provision.
For adverse weather conditions which
might blank out laser and visual weapons
sighting a beacon transpondercan becar-
ried for use with the MSQ 77 blind deliv-
erysystcm Thc full complcmcntof avion-
ics installed wasas follows:
Starboardsideof thefuselage - thepull-down
panel isfor externalmanual cockpit release. The
oblongfairing is theside-mounted pylonthat
carriesthe AAS-35 PAVE PENNY laserspot tracking
device. Thislocks on andtracks surface targets
illuminated by laserand transmitsthe data directly
tothe pilot s head-up display HUD ordirect lyto
the onboard controlsof theAGM-65Maverick anti
armour missile. Theventrally mounted VHF homing
aerial can be seenbehindthis. The small hatchat
the bottomofthe fuselage abaftthe pylon hinges
upwardsforaccess tothe liquid oxygen, while the
fourinset flush air inlets are tocool the avionics
shelves locatedbehind and below thecockpit.
Peter Smith
Below In-flightrefuelling helped to extend the
A-10s rangeconsiderably. but thiswas only a
necessityfor long-range deploymentmissionsfrom
the CDNUS area outto Europe, Asia and theMiddle
East. Herea Hawg ofthe Air Force Reserve takesa
drink while hercompanionwaits herturn.
USAF
The cockpit ofthe A-10 presentsa clean, uncluttered appearance below .
SimonWatson
40. Enginecorespeedindicator L R
41. Engineoil pressure indicator L R
42. Fan speedindicator L R
43. Fue flowindicator44. APU tachometer45. APUtemperatureindicator46. Hydraul ic pressuregauge( eftsystem
andright system)
47. Fuequanti ty indicator48. Auxiliary landinggear extension handle
49. Laser spot seekerpanel50. Rudderpedaladiustmenthandle51. Essentialcircuit breakerpanel52. GuncameraCTVS53. HARSfasterectswitch
I
thefuselage - thesingle-place
A-10 ThunderboltII. showingthe
armouredheadrestof theMcDonnell
ACESII ejectionseat. The small. bottom
panel with recessedfinger grips
the rear canopyis forexternalmanual
se.The oblong fairing at centre
topof the side-mounted pylon, which
AAS-35 PAVE PENNY laserspottracking
starboard sideof thefuselage.
mirrorsometerfal lack indexers
(HUD)
lightsl storesjettisonswitchnef repul lhandle
hand lee fre pull handleshingagent
raswitchy l ighteel steering engagedlight
edl ightcontrolindicatorrolpanel
n l ightdeindicator
azimuthindicatortechan.l freq.indicator
attackindicatorindicator
ADIindicator
r
axi lightsswitchondisplay
eand overridebuttonon indicator
rolpaneltal situation indicator(HSI)tion mode selectpanelge turbinetemperatureindicator
7 7
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THEA IO DESCRIBED
was as follows:A-10 Basic Dimensions and Areas 1974
CHAPTER NINE
Area488 s q f t (453m ); flap area80.2 s q f t 7 .4 5 m ) ; a i l e ro n a r a 4 7 .1 4sq ft
(438m ); deceleron area86.0 sq ft 7 . 9 9m ); a il er on t ab r ea 5 .0 q ft
0.46m ); leadingedge slatsarea 10.56sq ft (0.98Im )
Area 107.5 sq f t 9 .9 9 m ) ; r ud d er a r a 2 2.4 s q f t 2 .0 m )
L ngth 53ft 4in 16.25m); height14ft8in 4 .47 m ); h o ri z on t al t a il s p a n 1 f t
lOin 5.74m); wingspan55ft Oin 16.76m);wheel track17ft 2.6in 5.25m);
wheelbase 17ft8.76in 5.40m)
Area 118.4 s q f t 11m ); elevator area 29.0s q f t 2.69m ); elevator tab area
2 1 s q ft 0.19m )
turn radius altitude 5 OOOft/1 500m; tropical day conditions;
Mk 82 bombsl
target. TheHUD provides the pilotwith his
aimingcues, aswellas the pitch and roll atti
tudes, airspeed and altitude o f t h e aircraft.
The High-Bypass Turbofan
When the A-X programme w as f irs t i
ated, the problem of finding the opti
d ue t o t h e failure o fo ne o f t h e dual-p
T38 u n its , w h ich , s till c o up led u p, s u
all the power from the s ys tem . Ra pid
couplingmighthave saved the day and
l ed t o the installation of an automati
c o up ler , to s e pa r a te the section from
p r op d r ive s h ou ld a s imila r f a ilur e OCC
The turbopropcontinued to be pla
bymore problems, not onlywith the w
ing o f t he new automatic de-coupler,
also with overheating [on the skinaro
the exhaus ts, a lubrication problembearing failure ; the list went on and o
In themean time, Allison were modif
the T40 with a nine-stage compressor,
hop es o f a ch ie vi ng 5 ,5 00 hp w e re h
However, yet another incident occurr
June 1953, when a Skyshark being d
b y D ou gl as t e st pilot C G . D oc
ingston and his compatriotGeorgeJa
shed its propellers and part of the gear
Livi ngs ton go t the p lane down f or a c
landing, wasforced to eject, and ende
in a plaster cast forseveral months.
By now, t he US Navy was running
of pa tience . Heinemann , no t conv i
that the car-o rienta ted General Mo
concern was giving its Allisondivision
support, wasalready involved in the de
of a more conventionally powered
a lt er na ti ve , w hi ch b ec ame the fam
A4D Skyhawk. The avy cancelled
duction orders and the project even t
died. The Allison T40, however, con
ued to be tweaked and changed. A B
enquiry, headed by Commander A
Jacks, found t h at t he main difficultie
with the metallurgy of t he b ul l g
which was a t t he limitsof
the technoo f t h e day. With this, ando ther impr
ments, the T40 wen t o n t o c on fo un
critics, andeventually transmuted in to
engine that powered the successful L
heed Electraairliner.
The Navy sponsored t he T 40 , w hi ch
hadtwo power sections, eachdrivinga p a ir
of 14ft diameter Aeroproducts propellers.
By 1947, the Navy specification wasfor an
attack aircraft able to take o f f f r om the
short d ec ks c i rc a 470ft) of t h e l it tl e
asablanca class escort carriers, with a
combat radius of600 miles (960km), and
the ability to conduct sustained attack on
ground or sea targets. [n substituting sus
tained attack for ax imum lo ite r t ime ,
the p a ra lle ls w ith the A-X become evenmore significant.
That summer, Douglas was sent a letter
of intent for the engineering development
o f a n imp ro ve d A D , a nd t h is w as f ol
l ow ed by a contract f or tw o p r o to ty pe s ,
under the designation XA 20_1. 4 \
Along with project engineer Ben
Collins, Heinemann came up with a
22 OOOlb (I0,000kg) a ir cr af t, w i th f ou r
20mm cannonon three main bomb stations
for strafing and e igh t ( late r in cr e as e d to
twenty) other ordnance attachment points.
I t was capable of l ifting o f f t he d ec k in
und er 3 00 ft ( 90m) and had a maximum
speed o f4 00 knots, which, i t w as h op ed ,
could b e im pr o ve d to 500 knots, or c los e to
the final figures for the A-tO. This looked
like a f o rm ida b le a irc r af t, even i n 1 94 7.
Although the design was going w e ll, b y
1948, increasingly frequent problems were
being encountered with the turboprop.
These w er e s o s er i ou s that they delayed
the whole programme and the fi rst fl ight of
the Skyshark did no t t ak e place until 26
Ma y 1 9 50 . The unreliability o f t he gear
box and the sensitivity of the prop-control
system at one point prompted considerat ion of a change to the Prat t andWhitney
turbopropT34, but this was having its own
difficulties at the time.\H
By December 1950, the A2D-l had
achieved a s pe ed of 4 7 5 k n ots ; the Navy
d e cid ed to p r o c e ed w ith a p r elim in a r y e v al
uation and ordered ten moreaircraft. Hopes
w e re d a sh e d, h o we v er , on 14 December
1950, whe n t he Sk y sh a rk c r a sh e d at
E dw ar ds AFI 3, k il li ng t es t p il ot H ug h
Wood. This w as s u bs e qu e ntly f o un d to b e
The TF Turbofan
Douglas A2D-l Skyshark
[n the summer of 1945, Ed Heinemann set
to work to f ind a s u cc e ss o r to h is f a me d
Navy a t tack bomber, the Douglas AD
Skyraider. 42 The advantages of turbojets
were already known, while theconcept o f
the turboprop, a gas turbine powerplant
g ea re d t o a p ro pe l le r, w as showing great
promise, in theory. Both theNavyand the
ArmyAir Force had sponsored studies into
their potential. The results predicted that
a turboprop-driven attack plane w o uld b e
able to to te significantly heavier ordnance
weights, overgreater distances, at a higher
and faster cruising s pe ed , w it h a shorter
take-off distance than conventional air
craft. Such advantages heldgreater appeal
for the avy, limited by thedeck leng thof
aircraft carriers, than for t he USAAF , a t
tha t time still apparent y obsessed by the
long-range strategic mission. However, an
aircraft with suchattributes would almost
exactly fulfil the requirements of the A-X
programme two decades later.
The early choice of powerplant for
Heinemann s team was the General
Motors, Allison Division T40. In t hi s,Heinemann was enthusiastically backed
by the Bureau of Aeronau t ics (BuAer)
t eam, u nd er Captain Selden Spangler,
who was convinced of this engine s poten
tial. Douglas had already been examining
alternative powerplants for the Skyraider s
successor, and among these w as a 5,000 hp
d es ig n f ea t ur i ng a p ai r of wing-mounted
gas turbines,each driving its own propeller
w it h a n associated reduction gear system
d e sig n ed b y the Joshua Hende company.
A t ur bo fa n w as recommended early on as
the ideal powerplantby theAir Forcefor the
A-X. lt had become well established among
c ivilian a irc r af t b y the I970s, but earlier
attempts t o h ar ne ss i t t o m il it ar y r eq ui re
ments had come unstuck, due to the state of
t he a rt at t he t ime . I n a d dition , p o litica l
implications had stifled cross-over technol
ogy he tween different develoflers.
250nm
2 hours
406nm
258nm
2 365nm
2.29 g
326 g
234 g
5.93 g
385knots
390knots
260 knots
3 850ft
1 130ft
2 140ft
1 085ft
A-l0Actual
55
36
25
CEP
ft)
10
750
2 1201b
44 2281b
Forwardairstrp weight30,3441b
51 1
5.2
5 5
Accuracy
Mrad)
Air Force Goa
250nm
2hours
350nm
250nm
2 300nm
g
35g
g
50g
350knots
400knots
260 knots
4 000ft
1 000ft
4 000ft
1 000ft
225
225
300
Airspeed KCAS)
The final production parameters for the
A-IO asordered under the 1974programme
are shown in the boxabove.
10
1 350
9 5401b
1810 650lb
Maximum take-offweight45,5601b
3 062
3 302
3 518
Slant range
ft
10
20
45
Angle
degrees)
STRAFING 30mm gun predictedFrng conditons
No. of Mk 82s
Numberof pyons
Ammuniton rounds
External ordnance
Operational mission weights
Internal fuel
Horizontal rail:
Vertical tail:
Wing:
A-10 performance characteristics
Parameter
Toral aircraft:
CAS radius
Loiter t m ea t CAS radius
Reconnaissance radius
Escortradius
Ferry range
Sustained load factors at 150knots
Sustained load factors at 275 knots
Instantaneous load factor at 150 knots
Instantaneous load factor at300 knots
Combat speed with s x M k 82 bombs at 5 000ft
Cean at sea level
Stabized 45-degree dive speed
Take-off distance SL 32 degrees C maximum gross weight
Forward airstrip weight
Landing distance SL 32 degrees C maximum gross weight
Forward airstrip weight
61
69
75
CEP
ft
350
275
265
Airspeed KCAS)
Accuracy
4 550
2 750
1 350
AltitudeAGL ft)
130knots 1 003ft 306m
150 knots 972ft 296m
170 knots 1 176ft 358m
200 knots 1305ft 398m
250 knots 1 864ft 568m300 knots 2 598ft 792m
delivery performance
actual results
faps
munications UHF/AM 225.00
.975 MHz); VHF/AM L 16.00
MHz); VHF/FM (30-76
; IFF/SIF (AIMS); Secure Voice;
AIC-18 Intercom
ns delivery o ~ i c a l s i gh t w it h
D; a rmamen t c on tr ol panel;
/APX-IO[ I FF X - ba n d tr an s po n
guncamera; Maverick fire control
tion AN / R - LI (V )
UHF/OF; HARS; VORl
LORAN C/O
P AV E P E N Y l a se r
tra tion : Ra da r homing and warn
as follows: AN/ALR-46(V)
to 75-0299);AN/ALR
7 5 -0 2 99 to 7 6 -0 5 54 ) ; AN/
7 7- L07 7 to 7 7 -0 2 76 ) ; 7 8 -0 5 82 ) Late r s im p[ i
t o t wo t yp es AN/ALR-46(V)-9
r af t up t o 7 8- 05 81 ); A / AL R
post78-0582).
Mariet ta AAS-35 PAVE
laser-seeking pod is an optimized
g h in g o n ly 3 21 b 1 4 .5 kg ) , and
) long. Under this system, first
servicein 1978, the seeker con
d-scans, looking for laser radi
i t p ic ks u p the coded signals
forward air controller (FAC), situ
ground, in a custom-built fixed
ationaircraftor, more common
y s , in a h e lic o pte r o v er the front
ck s i ts s po t i n the pre-selected
76 77
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Detail ofthe starboard GeneralElectr ic TF34 GE 100 turbofan engine nacelle with the U i n le t i n t h e
fuselagebelow. The angled exhaust ductsventbetweenthe twin-boomedtail finsand theyare notfi tted
with afterburners to givea measure ofinfra-red immunity.The engines positionsabovethe wings and to
therear of theaircraftgives greaterinvulnerabili ty to light groundfire anda degree of immunityfrom FDD.
Peter Smith
plant remained, although in the
years ince the kyshark fias
hnology had moved on. The Gen
ctric Company of America ; had
experimenring with VTOL designs
end ofthe 1950 , with mixed results.
u pw it h a m al l jet exhaust-driven
lift engine. This concept was
through 90 degrees, give forw::Hd
T HE T F3 4 T R BO FA N
propulsion, and became the cruise fan.
Testing of both designs resulted in data
that showed that, with massive increase in
size and power , the se fan s could work
much more efficiently at subsonic speed
than previous turbofans.
With the active interest of theA ir Force
f rom 1 96 2 o nwar ds , General Electric
moved o n t o develop a sys tem whe rebya
Ease ofmaintenance isone factorthat makes
theturbofanpowerplants ofthe A-10 so effective.
Staff SergeantJames Johnston a r w chief with
the 354th Aircraft GenerationSquadron services
aThunderbolt II engine. Natonal Archives Colege
Park MD
conventional turbine was able to drive the
f an byway of a connecting haft. The air
that passed through the f an was eight
times t he amoun r pas ing through the
core engine (compressor, combustor and
turbine), an S: I 'bypass ' ra tio . This led to
the developmenrof the G E1/6engine, and
the company s expertise was rewarded
with a n A ir Force contract to power the
hugeC-S Galaxy freighter.
The research conrinued, with theGEC
planr a t Lynn, Massachusetts, working onmailer ver ions of the same idea. There,
t he T 64 turboshaft engine was combined
with a mul t i- s tage power turbine, with
smaller versions o f t he T F3 9 fans being
added. These ideas parallelled develop
menrs taking place in the Lycoming com
pany, which hadbeen experimenting with
its TS5 rurbine with a reduction gear, and,
in 1963, had carried o ut t he first high
I ypas engine test run. By 1965, the Lynn
plant had refined its ideas into a practical
engine, the TF34.
I n 1 96 6, this powerplant won a US
Navy competition, against the rival Alli
son TF32, as the powerplant for the Navy's
new S-3A Viking anri-submarine aircraft.
This success, which surprised evenGener
al Electric themselves, brought the high
bypas to prominence at precisely the time
when th e A-X programme was wrestling
with the engine question. It was destined
to provide the solution.
Ithough it lacked the efficiency of the
turboprop sy tem considered for the A-X
programme, the powerplant offered sever
al advantages for low-altitude, low-cost
operations, asenvisaged for the CAS role,
as follows:
• i mp li ci ty of design. 0 propeller and
no reduction gear, or, at least, a much
smaller or simpler system
• Ease of maintenance, v ita l in the bat
tlefield and for optimum sortie rates
• Ease of installa tion, being modular in
design, and ease of acce s
• The high-bypass turbo was relatively
qu ie t compared with the prope lle r
orconventional jet engine. On e unex
pectedbonusdur ing theGulf War was
the ability of the A-IO to sneak up on
enemy armoured columns, whose own
noise masked the approach. This had
a s p ower fu l a psychological effec t as
did the screaming sirens of the Junkers
JuS7 rukas on ground forces. The
enemy did not always h ea r t h e A -lO
coming until it hit them, and by then
i t was too late
• Affordability: cheap to purchase, cheap
to run, cheap to replace
• Reduced IR ignature
• High thrust at low speed, enhancing
manoeuvrabi Iity.
Comparing th e General
Electric TF34 and the
Lycoming F102Both conrenders were tria l ie d by the
Air Force. The 9,2751b (4,2ISkg) GS
YTF34/F5, f i tt e d to the YA-IO, was
deemed a b et te r b et t ha n t he 7,5001b
(3,4IOkg) YFI 2-LD-IOO, even though
powering a much heavier aircraft. Faults
found on the Lycoming wer e l is te d as
follows:
I. I na de qu at e engine removal/installa
tion clearance.
2 Unnecessary oil filler cross-over rube
to oil tank.
3. Inadequate sized mesh screen i n o il
tank.
4. Inadequate c lamping of engine oil
tank supply line.
S Chafing of fuel supply l i ne against
accessorygear case.
6. D if fi cu lty in reading engine oil-pres
sure gauges.
7 Dif ficu lty in reading engine oil
temperature indicator.
Lack of shrouds on engine tail-cones.
9. I na bi li ty to adjust throttle resistance.10. Burning, buckling, and di to rt ing of
second- tage turbine nozzle vanes.
II. Inability of engine hoist to allow
longirudinal movemen t o f engine.
12. nstable engine operation para
ters at high power settings.
13. n ac ce pt ab le r eq ui rement t o s
down left engine to arm/de-arm gun
According to Dr Watson , Oneof the
ons Northrop chose a lower-thrusteng
was b ec au s i t cost less. But th is selec
had certain repercussions, since the sm
er engine required a trade-off of a num
of pelformance objeetives. 4
In the even t , choosing a lower - th
engine helped orthrop lose the contr
hut other factors, less obviou from fl ig
testing, wouldsway the final decision:
I The Lycoming F102 wou ld req
more work and expenditure to deve
into full-scale production, with
redesigned fan and a boosted T55
11 Bcore. The TF34 wasalready un
initial production.2 The TF34 \Va demonstrahly suit
for military usage, as demonstrated
the avy's Viking programme, and
Air Force' plan to utilize it on th e
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THE TF34 TURBOF N
the TF engine
CHAPTER TEN
Fuel and Refuelling
a safety factor. The APU inlet is located on
the starboard side o f t h e fuselage, with the
exhaust venting on the port side.
The m ai n t an ks a r e s u b- d ivid ed with
900lb 41Okg) self-sealing sumps. Collec
tor ta nks pr ovide theengine with an emer
g e nc y 1 0 -s e co n d f u el s u pp ly in negative g
c on fi gu ra ti on a t m ax im um pow er. A
booster pump in the port main tank is providedfor engine and APU startings should
the main boost pump fail. The system
automaticallyemptiesthe wing tanks first
via higher-pressure boost pumps.
Two independent sub-systems operate
the f ue l s u pp ly f ro m the m a in , w ing and
auxiliary tanks f irs t d e sig ne d f or the F-
I l l ) . Under thissplitsystem, the portmain
and wing tanks feed the por t e ngine a nd the
APU, while the starboard main and wing
• P er s on ne l i n f o li ag e and foxholes
• M o vi n g a n d fixed armoured vehic
including armoured trucks and med
a nd he a vy tankssuch as the Russian
76 light tank, T-54 medium tank
JS-lll heavy tank
The Competition
A r ou n d t h e s am e t i me , P h il c o- F or d
been following another line of resea
w h ic h h a d r e su lte d in the M39 based
the MG 213), and the A ir Force had fi
this t o b ot h t he F-IOO and F-5 f igh
bombers. Other contenders were un
development at the H ughes Tool Com
ny andG eneral A mericanT ransportat
By the time o f t h e A-X programme, th
fore, much work had already been do
On 5 January 1968, t he A ir For
R equirement A ction Directive RA
had given clear expression of their urg
need for a heavier-calibre aircraft gu
Earlier studies clearly demonstrated tthe b e st w ay o f c ov e ri n g t h e target sp
trum envisaged for CAS w as w i th a 30
gun. CAS targets were defined as follo
into its own, being used not only in fi
er-bombers such as the F-4 a nd t he A
but a lso in gunsh ips, such as the AC -
and AC-130. E ve n gr e ate r c om pre s s
r e su lte d in t h e G e ne r al Electric 7.62
Minigun, a G atlingthat wassmall eno
t o be carried in helicopters, the A-3
a nd t he AC-47 P u ff t h e Magic Drag
gunship adaptations for ground straf
These weapons were satisfactory w
d ep lo ye d a ga in st i nf an tr y and s
skinned vehicles, b ut wh en t he N oVietnamese regular army entered the
w ith its a r r a y ofS oviet-built and supp
battle tanks, something w i th m o re pu
was required. This l ed t o General Elec
developing a 3 0m m G at l in g w it h m
penetrating and t he re fo re m o re s
ping) pow er when used against armour
1967-68, the six-barrel T-212 demons
tion g u n w as being tested.
• I nc re as ed r at e of fire
• Less w e ar on each barrel and, therefore,
lo ng e r lif e e x pe c ta n cy o f t h e weapon
system
• E xt e rn al s ou rc i ng of power giving more
reliable jam c l ea r an c e o p ti o ns o v er
recoiI weapons
• L es s s tr es s o n t h e aircraft s environment
than reciprocating weapons, due t o t h e
rotary m o ve m e nt o f t h e G a tl ing.
The m a in dis adva nta ge s were t h e s h ee r
bulk o f t h e system - which m a de f itt ing to
conventional a ir cr a ft v e ry d iff ic ult - andthe weight, which obviously had a n eg a
tive i mp ac t o n t he carrying fighter s per
formance.
By 1949, the General Electric 20mm T
71 Gatling was test-firing at 6,000 r ounds
per minuteand, further developed, refined
and reduced in size as the M61Al, was fit
ted to the Lockheed F -l04and the Repub
lic F-105 fighteraircraft. W i t h t h e a d v e n t
of the V ietnam conflict, this weaponcame
World War b a tt l es s u ch a s Y pr es , the
S ommeand Passchendaele. 111
G ermany took theconcept further, with
t h e d e ve l op m en t during t he S ec on d
World War of the Mauser MG 213
revolver c an no n. T hi s single-barrelled
weapon could be fired at 1,400 rounds per
minute, twice the f irin g r a te of conven
tional w e ap o ns . Like s o many other Ger
man designs, th is w as f ar in advanceof the
Allies owndevelopments, and France, the
UK a nd t he USA all plundered the ideaand began to look at a v e rs io n o f t he M G
213 for their own forces.
Around 1946, t he U SA A F h ad begun
its own independentquest for the ultimate
aircraft weapon, under Pr oje c t V u lc a n.
The development workwas undertaken by
General Electric, which decided that a
modern equivalent ofthe G atlingconcept
was the only a ns we r to increasing the rate
of fire w ithout running into insurmount
a b le m a ter ial w e ar and heating problems.
The advantages of re-adopting the multi
barrel method wereas follows:
The GAU venger atling
History
l The 3 0m m G AU -8 c an no n itself,
specifically designed for destroying
armoured vehicles, m ou nt ed o n t he
centrelineof the aircraft.
2. The titanium-armoured ammunition
drum, holding 1 l74 rounds of ammu
nition.3. The various ammunitions used.
The core o f t h e A- 1O s deadlyfirepower is
the A/A 49E-6 gun system, which h as a
gross weight of 4,2001b J,910kg). The
three-part system comprises the following:
The history of the GAU-8 can be traced
back to l86l, w he n A m er i ca n Richard
Gatling revolutionized warfare by invent
ing what was, in reality, the first machine
g u n. I n Gatling sconcept, six independent
gun barrels and breeches were held togeth
er in a circular arrangement, and turned
around a common axisby means of a hand
cranked handle. A lthough h i gh r at es of
fire could be achieved by trained infantry
men with the weapons o f t he day the
British Army was the most proficient at
this), Gatling s i de a g av e t ro op s a much
higher rate of fire against massed opposi
t ion. A c c ur a c y was not so much a p r ior ity
as pure firepower, a nd t he ability t o s t op
oncoming f o ot s o ld ier s with an almost
sol id wall of lead.
Gatling s invention proved its worth
d u ri n g t h e A m er i ca n C i vi l War, and was
also invaluable to the B r it i sh A rm y,
invariably heavily outnumbered in such
campaigns as the ZuluWar, t h e S u d an a n dthe Boxer Uprising in China. lo The
British e q ui v al e nt , t h e Maxim which
u se d r ec oil e n er g y) had a ba d reputation
for jamming a t t h e most critical times, and
Gatling s weapon, a l th o ug h n o t i m m un e
to such s im ila r p r ob lem s , w as m o re popu
lar. In the end, i t w as made obsolete by the
invention of the belt-fed, water-cooled
Vickers machine gun, and its many deriv
atives, which caused such carnage in Firs t
lowpressuretur ine
tanks feed the starboard engine. There is
p i lo t -o pe ra t ed c ro ss -f ee d v al ve l in ka ge
be tw ee n the two, which allows pressurized
flow into either engine from either system
in t h e e v e n t o f damage or malfunction.
Forair-to-airrefuelling, the sideways H
type marking on top of the noseare visual
cue lines. The aerial refuellingslipway and
UARRSI receptacle for the tanker boom
a r e lo ca te d a t op t h e nose, forward o f t h e
cockpit, giving the pilot an easy view.
The slipway door hydraulically folds
down on operation of a l ev er o n t he fuelsystem control panel. O n c e t h e nozzle has
been guided d ow n t he slipway to t he
receptacle, nozzle latch rollers automati
callylock into position by means of actua
tors a n d t h e flow commences. The pilot is
able to select t he t an k sequence himself.
On c o mp l et i on , t h e nozzle disconnects
either v ia a manual disconnect/reset but
ton on the pilot s control s tick g r ip or via
a s ign al f r om the tanker itself.
highpressure
tur ine
essorydrives
om ustorompressoran
General Electric TF34-GE- 100tur
engine n a ce lle h as a le ng th of 100in
) a n d a diameter of 50in l25cm).
identical and interchangeable. To
infra-red lR) lock-oo by target
S A Ms , t h ey are not f itte d w ith
and their unique pos itioning
as they are partly screened
twintail units. To avoid trimchanges
different powersettings, the jetpipe,
after-end protrudesfrom the nacelle,
an upturned angle.
to expedite self-sufficiency ind , a n A u xiliar y Po we r U n i t A P U)
in the after-fuselage space midway
the two TF34 e n gin es . I ts d u tie s
supply air for engine starting, and it
generator for the aircraft s electri
w er . I t can a lso b e p re ss ed into ser
h y dr a ulic pump to pressurize
c r af t s h y dr a ulic s y ste m, to enable
maintenance. I t h as an automated
deviceintegral to the system, as
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THEGAU 8 AVENGER GATLING THE GAU 8 AVENGER GATLING
A 30mmAvengerArmamentsystem: theseven barrels left . the bel ts
n centre . andthe 3 shells inthe helix right . General Eectrc
Below TheAvenger growls and groundcrewwearing earprotectors wince asground test firing ofthe
GAU-8/Ais undertakenby thepilot ofthe YA-lO test aircraft atEdwards AFB. US
breech, and a bolt with integra l cock
firing mechanisms. The muzzles of the
rels protrude from a perfora ted shield
low-slung housing extension. Each ba
is 7ft 6in (2.30m) in length, and a spe
reduced-length bolt was built by Gen
Electric especially t o h el p a ch ie ve e
this figure. The barrels have spiral riflin
the apertures. Powered by dual hydra
rotary motors, each barrel rotates thro
the firing chamber with ra te-of-f ire
tings of 2 ,100 rpg (or 35 rounds per
ond) and 4,200 rpg (or 65 rounds per
ond). This compared with 6,000 r pm
the smaller M61 gun. A pe r-bar re l f i
rate of 10 rounds per second which ensu
longer barrel Iife through less wearper
rel even though the rounds themselves
heavier. Minimum life expectancy
each set of gun barrels is 21,000 roun
The gun is off se t to port but t he fi
barrel is always posi t ioned on the cenline, the direct starboard barrel, and w
the other s ix ba rr el s cyc le through
spot , i t c ool s down ready for the next
ing. Each round is rammed intothe bre
and is locked into position. As each ba
l in es up i n turn, t he c oc ki ng p in c
presses a firing spring and a tr igger re l
es. Th e actuation of the firing mechan
The A49£-6 Gun SystemDescribed
it needed to beable to identify the lead
a nd c ommand t an ks from the dross
following.
The A/A 49E-6 Gun System met, and
v exceeded, all the criteria demandedof i r. I t is an awesome weapon, which has
proven i tse lfdeadly in combat.
Theseparameters pointed to a Gatling for
h igh ra te of fire, t o smoth er t h e t ar ge t
f rom a distance; a high muzzle velOCity to
aid penetration by concentrating the
force a t t he p oi nt o f impact so that the
pene t rato r can get through the protec
tion. In the A-X equation, thistranslated
into a need definitively t o k ill a Russian
T-62 MBT t an k a t a range of 4,000ft
(1,200m) with the minimum number of
direct hits.
The 3 mm GAU8 Cannon
The 30mm General Electric GAU-8/A
Avenger Gatling cannon has seven non
repeating barrels, each with t he ir own
1 Lethality - the ability to pene t ra te the
latest Soviet tank armour.
2 Accuracy - the abil i ty to hit a target
with a re la tively small print from the
air.
3. Cost efficiency - the cost of a weapon
knocking out a tank mus t be cheaperper h it t ha n t he t an k itself.
4 . Endurabi I ity - the systemmust be capa
ble of multiple kills in order to take out
more than one target at a time i f i t was
to be battle-effective.
5. Accountability - the system must be
able to te ll fr iend from foe, but,equally
important when facing mass targets,
the toughestof tough-hide monsters. Not
only were their ta rgets seemingly invul
nerable to fire, bu t they also presented a
verysmall print, which required extraordi
nary accuracy to strike . Moreover, they
exis t ed in t he ir t en s o f thousands. Not
onlyhad the new A-X aircraft to beable to
deal with these monsters individually, but
also en masse Any successful weapon sys
tem had to combine lethality and penetra
tion with a high hit-and-hit-again capaci
ty to take out several targets in one pass.
The GAU-8 was required to have the fol
lowing attributes:
and PhiIco-Ford, but it covered all bases by
also contrac t ing a t the same time for a
back-up system with Hughes. The Hughes
entry was its licence-builtSwiss-manufac
tured Oerlikon 304RF, a lso a 30mm gun.
The Air Force intended to test and evalu
ate this weapon (which it designated the
GAU-9), against the winner of the GAU
8 competition. However, when it came to
comparisons, after the testingof theGAU
9 had been completed in A pr il 1 97 3, it
p roved so infe rior t o t he GAU-8 that it
was immediately dropped from any further
competition.'
This cleared the way for the funding of
the General Electric winner, a nd t he gun
programme was accordingly awarded 3
mi ll ion in FY 1970; 9.62 in FY71 and
6.30 in FY 1972. I19
The Task
This weaponssystem was easily the biggest
gun carried by any combat aircraft a t t he
time of its inception. It needed to be, for
its t ask was a daunting one. It was to
destroy the Russian main ba tt le tanks
(MBTs), and the So vi et s had been
renowned for many decades for producing
for identifying technical and engineering
aspects of the system and providing flexi
bility in costand performance relevant tothe A-X. II
The Air For ce RFP, i ss ue d on 16
November 1970, called for a 30mm
weapon able to fire at a rat e o f 4 ,0 00
rounds per minute, with a muzzle velOCity
of 3,500ft/sec (I ,050m/sec), parameters
that could only be met by a Gatling-type
design. General Electric, having had the
most experience in thisf ie ld, was favourite
from the outset. In theend , it camedown
to a straight 'shoot out' between GE and
Philco-Ford. In June 1971, each company
was given 12 million contracts to build
prototypes that would be evaluated against
each other. Included in the contracts were
also the deve lopmen t o f f our types of
ammunition: target practice (TP); highexplosive incendiary (HEI); semi armour
piercing high-explosive (S PHE); and
armour-piercing incendiary (API) with
steel penetrator. 116 In the interim, the YA
10would use the 20mm M61 as a stop-gap
weapon. ; In fact, the GAU-8 wasfitted to
both prototypes i n 1975.
For the competition in June 1971, the
Air Force awarded the contracts for the
GAU-8/A prototypes to General Electric
BTR-50P armoured p r s o ~ car
t-sensitive, hard-point targetssuch as
bunkers and artillery pieces.
October 1971, a Memorandum of
was signed by the Comman
Aeronautical Systems Division,
Armament Developmentand Test
designated the A-X Program
and t h eA i r Force Armament Lab
as responsible for bot h t he man
t and deve lopmen t o f the GAU
The agreement assigned overall
responsibility to the pro
office s project division and listed
as including included Pha se I
titive phase), 'except for pro
responsibility upon award of the
contract'. The other responsiincluded in te rf a ce engineering,
ing, and r epor ti n g t o higher
Armament Developmentand Test
was responsible to the A-IO Sys
Director (SPD) for techni
eering support for the GAU
The ADTC designated a GAU-8
Manager, based at t h eA i r Force
Lahoratory, to be responsible
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THE GAU AVENGER GATLI G THE GAU AVENGER G AT LJ G
The considerable size ofthe Avenger s 30mm round isclear. An A-10 pilot presentsa
dummyroundto thecommanderof theKorean Air Base he i s v i s it i ng . A s h el l w a s
presented to thecommanderof each base visited by the A 10 crews during the
demonstrationtour. USAF
Source policy, to ensure c o nt i n ui t y
delivery, were manufactured by b ot hA erojet and Honeywell concerns.
The training round hasa steel body w
a s imp le aluminium crumple head. T
HE1 round has a n a l um i ni u m cartri
case, with an ignitortubein the base, al
with either a single-base nitro-cellu l
extrudedpropellant or a double-base ni
cellulose/nitro-glycerine ball propell
The tip is a s te el fragmenting body c
taining the high-explosive/incendiary m
and with a MS05A3 im pa ct fuse a t t h e
Eac h A PI round h as a 15m m de ple
uranium penetrator built intoan alumi
um base, and this extension is surround
by a aerodynamically profiled windshi
o f t hi n aluminium, with the head o f
penetrator held in position by an alumi
um ring a t t h e c o n ed e nd. D e plete d ura
um is a by-product of t h e n uc l ea r fu
enrichment process and possesses a v
high denSity, hence its choice for the j
Although i ts use brought the expec
outrage from the S oviet U nion, w hich,
propaganda purposes, branded it an at
ic w eapon , there is negligible radioact
ty involved a nd t he rounds are perfe
safe to hand Ie. However, it was not just
Kremlin that expressed concern;the usdepleted uranium also impacted o n
USA a nd p ut the weapon into a spec
export category, which, under nuclear p
liferation concerns, stric tly limited
nations permittedto purchase it. Acco
ing to some allegations, th is voideda p
siblesale of the A-10 to Thailand, wh
had expressed interest.)
The impact o f t h e p e ne t ra t or ensure
massive concentrationof force over a v
w i th 8 0 per cent of rounds fired o v er t h e
optimum distance of 4,000ft 1,200m)
falling within a 40ft 12m) diametercircle.Each API shell is built with an alumini
um alloycase rather t h a n t h e brass or steel
used previously, making f or a 30 per cent
reduction in ammunition weight. They are
f it t ed with p la st i c driving bands, which
ensures less wear and, again, extends gun
barrel life. While the pr a ctic e r ound and
HEI round were commonplace, the APl
types were especially developed for the
GA -8 a n d, u n de r t h e A i r Force s Second
damage agents . The pilots making the
firing passes attacked at low altitude and
used correspondingly low dive ang le s inorder to simulate movement through a
h o st i le a ir d e fe n ce system. Ammunition
used in the attacks comprised 30mm
armour-piercing incendiary rounds, \
The improvement in the ballistic quali
ties ofthe ammunition compensates for the
heavier rounds and reduces projectiledrop,
so that during its time of flight over 4,000ft
1,200m ) only a [Of t Jm ) drop is experi
enced. This translates into high accuracy,
The a r c o f f l a me s p ew s o u t a nd i s t a k en u n de r
thenose ofthe aircraftduringaerialtest fir ing
ofthe GAU-8/A cannon on the Edwards AFB ranges
with observation aircraft attop left. Withthe paint
burning offthe nose aftereachfir ing andthe
obvious dangersinvolved much work was done
to alleviate thisconditionbeforea solution was
final lyfound. USAF
Below I n a n attemptto solve theburstsof
flaming nose gas whenthe GAU-8/A was first
tested at Edwards AFB a heavy-duty nose
installation was fitted on thetest VA-to aircraft.
This did notproveeffectiveand was removed
shortlyafterwards. Shownin this view arethe
fitmentsthat heldthe heavy wedgein place.
Natonal Archives Colege Park. MD
A-10 normally fires a combat mix eM )
with the ratio o f o n e 1.51b (0.68kg) PGU
13 high-explosive incendiary HE[) round
for e ve ry f ive d e pl e te d u r an i um DU)
1.651b (0.75kg) PGU-14 armour-piercing
incendiary AP[) rounds. The 30mm pro
jectiles are 1ft (JOcm) long, have a weight
ofO.941b (0.43kg) and are emitted from the
barrel at 3,240ft 980m ) per second. They
havean effectiverange against Soviet-built
armour of 21 ,600ft (6,500ft)
On 10 March 1978, test firings o f t he
GAU-8 weapon system were made against
a simulated Soviet tank company actual
ly ten A merican combat-loaded M-47
tanks). The pilots a t ta c ke d a t low alti
tudes and dive angles, simulating opera
tions in a hostile air defence environ
ment. The G U -8 achieved 253 impacts
on the targets, including forty-three per
forations o f t he armoured envelopes and
inflicted damage totalling eight immobilized tanks, four o f w hi ch were cata
strophically killed. l60
On 14 August 1979, further G A U -8 test
firings were conducted, again against ten
combat-loaded M-47 tanks simulating a
S oviet tank company A rray [7 .161 Sim
ilar trials followed at intervals. Array 21
utilized t h e 3 0 m m armour-piercing incen
diary rounds, which proved Aerojet lot
number A JD 79A181-001 to be effective
The Munitions
linkless feed system. This avoidsjams for a
total of30 secondsof continuous firi ngtime.
The large fixed outer drum is cylindri
cal andcontains an internal drum that ro
t at es . A helical cutaway in t hi s d ru m
holds the radially stored shells, tips facing
the axis, and bases held in c h a nn e l s o n
t h e o ut er d ru m. When t he r ot or turns,
the s h el l s a re c o mp r es s ed forward and
mechanically lined up, before entering
the loading chutes.
Both gun and drum feed mechanism are
driven by a pair of77hp 57.4kW) hydraulic
motorsgiving the maximum 4,200 rpgfiring
rate. Aselsewherein the -10, the system is
dualled,so that if one motor goesdown, the
reduced 2, 100 rpgrate can be maintained by
the one remaining motor.
For r e ar m in g b e tw ee n sorties, the
mobile automatic loader system ALS) is
used. This transfers the belted ammuni
tion from stacked bins to t h e i n te r na lammunition canisters by remote control.
Three principal types of rounds can be car
ried, the P G U-14 armour-piercing incendi
ary, w hich can penetrate tank armour; the
PGU-13 high-explosive incendiary, used
for taking out trucks and soft-skinned tar
gets; and the training practice round. The
mmunition rum
ws this sequence is v ia a synchro
rotor, which revolves o n t he com
inside the guncasing. Each bar
s its own individual fire system
ex ternally on th is rotor, and
fixed cam tracks internally.
rotor makes one revolution,
c ur ved c a m tracksengage and, thus,
rotor spins, the whole firing
is initiatedand repeated.
bolt then unlocks and slides back,
withit theempty cartridge case. 0
ammunition is externally ejected,
, i t is collected back in the ammu
d r um a n d recycled.
exhaust gas venting for the gun is
o n t he por t front side fuselage,
to the rear a r e a ir -c ooling slots for
on feed chutes.
g un , 7 ft 6 i n 2 . 30 m ) in length
80 calibres), reaches back i n to t h e
fuselage, and the total A/A 49E-6 gun and ammunition drum com
has a weight of 4,2001b (1,910kg).
barrels are mounted so that they
2 degrees from the aircraft s line of
and each one has its ow n br e ec h and
a firing mechanism external to
moving revolving rotor. The
horsepower MH P ) , c o mp u te d
muzzle velocity, rate of fire and
mass, comes out at 17,700,
c om par e s w ith under 100 MHP for
l Second World War weapon.
thegun produces a deep-throated
which in itself is very intimidating.
also pr oduc e s 4SkN 10,000I b) of
which slows down the aircraft by
knots. A lthough the whole ammu
supply can theoretically be fired off
half a minute, in practice, bursts
t o o n e o r t w o seconds, deliv
ore than enough firepower to take
ost Russian-built armour. There is
atic round counter, which keeps
informed of hisreserve condition.
g un was f ir st f it te d i n Feb ru ar y
Soviet T-62 battle tanks
by Israel from the Egyptian and
armies proved its worth, and actualduring Desert St01m against Soviet
armour confirmed this.
for theGatling arelocatedto
of the g un in their own massive
l hou sing . A max imum of 2,348
can be carried , in two 1,174-round
drums, fed to the barrels by a
86 87
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THEGAU AVENGER GATLINGTHEGAU AVENGER GATLING
A Korean airman examinesthe General Electric GAU-8/A Avenger
30mm seven-barrel cannon mounted o n a n A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft.
The A-10 was on demonstration at air bases in the ROK to familiarize
field commanders therewith its capabilities. USAF
89
Above Membersof the 75th Combat Munitions
Unit Munitions Flight 23rd Maintenance Squadron
feed 30mm roundsinto the GAU-8/A weapons
system onan A-10 Thunderbolt I I o f the 75th Fighter
Squadron. USAF
Right Detail of the mouths of the seven 30mm
General Electric GAU-8/A Avenger cannon
showing thespiral rifling of the apertures. Each
barrelrotatesthroughthe firing chamber and has
rate-of-fire settings of2,100rpm and 4,200rpm.
Peter Smith
Th e PGU-14 rounds were found to be
able to penetrate armour o n t he Soviet
built T 55 T 62 and T ba ttle ta nks w ith
no difficulty. A-lOs are c r ed i te d w i th
k n o ck i n g o u r n o less r h an 9 8 7 Iraqi ranks
during Operation s rt Storm.elow
Black
344
1.50
082
034
11.4
6 8
12
HEI PHU 13 B
Black
White
33
1.60
0.97
34
11.4
6 8
1.2
API PGU 14 B
Above An A-10 ofthe 355th Tactical Training
Squadron carrying AGM-65 Maverickmissiles
opens firewith itsGatlingcannon overthe Gila
Bend Tactical Range in 1988. Natonal Archives,
Coege Park, MD
small a r ea a b o ut t he di amet er of a fifty-
pe nc e pie ce ) , a nd ge ne ra te s enough ener
gy to punch i ts way through the thickest
Russian t a n k a r mo u r o f t he t im e. A s a n
a dded bonus, the de ple te d ur a nium ignites
as i t pe ne tr ate s a nd forces a jer of flame
into the tanks innards. After penetrating
the ta r get ve hic le , the A PI does not have
s u ff i ci e nt p o we r t o e x it , and so remains
inside having the maximum effect o n t he
occupants. It is a highly s a tis f ac tory
w e a pon to use a ga ins ta n aggressor in that
the ta r get is de s tr oyed, a nd the c r e w is also
voided and therefore not a va ila ble to man
reserve tanks.
Blue
White
34
1.50
0.84
34
11.4
6 8
1.2
TP PGU 15 B
88
GAU-8 ammunition characteristics
Case colour
Markings
Muzzle velocity FPS
Weight Ib complete round
Weight lib projectie
WeightIIbl cartridge case {after firingl
Length inl complete round
Length inl projectie
Diameter. projectie
e personnel loadthe 30mm cannon on an
the combinedArmy-Air Force live-fireIV at the YukonCommand
Site Alaska. Natonal Archives, Coege Park,
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
acking a unch
IO rdnance
Propulsion is boost sustain, and a s pe ed of
a bo ut 7 20 m ph l 150km/h) is attained.
The guidance system can be electro
optical television, imaging infra-red, laser
or infra-red homing. When the electro
optical TV system is used on the Maverick
A variant, as s o on a s the protective dome
cover is remotely detached from the nose
o f t h e m iss ile , its v ide o c irc u itr y b e c om e s
a c ti v at e d, a n d t h e view generated by the
TV camera is transmined t o t he pi lot s
PACKING A PUNCH - A-IO ORDNANCE
control bunkers, emplaced artillery a n d t h e
l ik e. I t combined a much larger warhead
with a penetrator with either ground or air
borne laser designators. The missile seeker
p r ob e s a s e c to r 7 m ile s I 1km)wide and 10
miles I6km) ahead forits target. A s a n in
built safety factor, should the missile lose
the laser spot, it goes ballistic and the war
head is neutralized. The M a ve ri c k F is a
avy variant w ith IRR a n d t h e larger war
head f or s imila r d u ty m a in ly f or u se a g ain s t
sweep. To enable highsurvivability aga
strongly defended targets, the Maverick
equipped with launch and leave LL ca
bility. This enables the pilot to take ano
er target under fire directly one A G M-6
launched, or to take violent avoid
action without affecting the accuracy
the missilestrike. The Ma v er ic k h a s a w
height and speed launch envelope, andc
be fired at targets as distant a s 1 3 nauti
miles or as c lo se as a few thousand ya
u gh t he GAU-8/A s ev e n- ba r re l
is the A-IO s mostfamous weapon,
P un ch , t h e aircraft is no
when it comes to delivering a w ide
range ofother heavy ordnance.
the features that made the old A
a id er s u ch an outstanding success
was the sheer amount and
of rockets and b om bs i t c ou l d toteb at t le zone, sufficient to counter
d every threat s e ve r al tim es o ve r .
hilosophy behind the A -1 O w as
the s a me line s and the aircraft was
p r o vid e d f or in that respect by
no less t h an e i gh t u nd er w in g a n d
under-fuselage pylon stations. The
of stores c a pa b le o f b e ing c a rr ie d
was therefore large from the
o n ti n ue s to grow w iththe new
gy of the last twenty years.
p y lo ns a r e not ju s t f or c a r ry ing
ns. Provision is a lso m a de f or in fr a
flares, electronic
rmeasure chaff d isp e ns e rs , r a da r
pods a n d i l lu m in a ti o n flares,
stores.
Weapons
Tank executioner parexcellence An AGM-65Maverick air-to-surfacemissile on the
underwingpylon of an A 10 parked on theflight line ready for operations.
National Archives. Co egePark, MD
An A 10 ofthe 81st Tactical Fighter Wing in 1983 attheheightofthe Cold War banking away to theright to
displayits ordnance to thecamera- fourAGM-65 MaverickSceneMagnification missiles, and an AUAlQ
119 electronic countermeasures pod. USAF
- 1O us es a w id e r an ge of air-to
guided missiles AGM) and guided
units GBU) t o a c co m pl i sh its
e d t ac t ic a l r ol es of tank-smasher
S . G ui d an ce o f such systems can
J R, r ad ar or laser, b u t t h e effects on
a r mo u r a r e e q ua lly d e v as ta tin g .
Maverick
e fe rr ed A -1 O w e ap on , u se d w it h
effect duringOperation Desert
is the AGM-65 Maverick. The A
the Maverickgo together likepork
andS addam Hussein s depleted
es learned onlytoo well the dead
f the combination.
The AGM-65 is a tactical,air-to-surface
guided missile ASM) designed specifical
ly for C A S , i n te r di c ti o n a n d t h e defence
suppression mission. It provides stand-off
capability and a h igh p r ob a bility of strike
a ga in st a w id e r an ge of ta c tic a l ta r ge ts,
including a rm ou r, a ir d ef en ce s, s hi ps ,transportationequipmentand fuel storage
facilities. When used by the U S A F during
Operation Desert S wn n, t he M av er ic k
s c or e d 8 5 p e r cent hits on itstargets. By far
the majority o f A G M- 6 5s thus utilized
were fired by A-lOs.
Developed and produced by Hughes Air
craft C ompanyand theR aytheon Corpora
tion, the Maverick hasa number of variants
d ep e nd i ng o n A i r Force, N av y o r M a ri n e
90
usage. The launch weight o f t h e A i r Force
Maverick is 462lb 21 Okg), it has an overall
length of 8 f t2 in 249m), a diameter o f H t
30cm) and a w in gs pa n of 2ft 4i n
71.12cm). The Maverick hasa range of 17
miles plus 27km or 12 nautical miles). War
heads, which o n t h e Maverick make up the
centre section o f t he missile, are cone
s h ap e d, a n d v ar y a ls o, depending on type
and service usage. One is fired by an FMU
135/B contact fuse in the nose. The other is
a delayed-fuse penetrator for hard targets,
with a heavier warhead designed to intrude
deep intothe target by kineticenergy before
firing. In all, however, the propulsion unit,
situated behind the warhead, is the Thiokol
T X- 48 1 s ol i d- pr op el l an t r oc ke t m ot or .
cockpit screen. Once the ta r ge t h a s been
selected, t h e p il o t c e nt r es t h e o n- s cr e en
cross-hairs, locks them o n , t h e n launches.
On the Maverick B, the system is the
same, e xc ep t t h at t he s y ste m h a s s c re e n
magnification,so that smaller, or moredis
tant targets can be more readily identified.Both thesesystems are restricted to normal
vision, but for night-time operations, or
poor-weather visibility over target scenar
ios, the Ma v er ic k D u se s I RR to exploit its
h e at - se ek i ng p ot e nt i al , a n d t o give the
p ilot a c lea r s c r ee n im ag e n o m a tt e r w h a t
the conditions. All three u se s h ap e d
c ha r ge w ar he ad s. M a ve ri c k E is a US
Marine Corps adaptation f or u se a ga in st
strongly fortified positions, such as HQ or
w a rs h ip ta rg e ts , w h ile the Ma v er ic k G is
s i mi l ar t o the D, with the heavyweight
penetrator warhead for larger targets.
The Maverick is fined with the propor
tional navigation autopilot, and stabiliza
tion is via long-chord delta wings/flippers,
with tail control surfaces mounted c los e tothe trailingedge of the wing o f t h e aircraft
employing it.
The AGM-65 is cylindrical and has
either a r o un d ed g la ss n os e , when electro
optical imaging is employed for targeting,
or alternatively a z in c sulphide n os e f or
IRR. The A-IO c a n c a rr y u p to six AGM
65s o n o n e mission, usually in three-round,
pylon-mounted clusters, enabling it t o h it
s e ve r al d if fe r en t ta rg e ts during a s in gl e
97
away. The e x plo siv es c a rr ied in the w
h e ad s a r e either 8 6 lb 3 9 kg ) Comp B
80lb 36kg) PBX AF)-108.
The Air Fo rc e b e ga n to be equipp
with t h e A G M -6 5 A from August 19
a n d, t o d a t e , s o m e 2 5 ,7 5 0 o f t h e A and
variants have been delivered. Compatib
ity launches of the AGM-65A Maver
with A-lO aircraft, carried out by the
Force at Edwards AFB, were completed
11 September 1974. S i nc e t h en , t h e A
a nd t he M av er ic k h av e b ec om e t he
T ea m i n tank-busting. During the G
War, the A -lOs fired 4,801 Maverick m
s ile s, w h ich w as in e x ce s s o f 9 0 per cen
t h e e n ti r e Ma v er ic k to ta l f ire d by all
Forceaircraft. 1M The Maverick D b e ga n
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P CKING A PUNCH IOORDN NCE P CKING A PUNCH IO ORDN NCE
462 462 485 670 630 670
207.9 207.9 218.25 301.5 286 301.5
125 125 125 125 300 300
56.25 56.25 56.25 56.25 135 135
17 7 12223 152491 12223
2 ROCKEYE
The Rockeye is a free-fall, anti-tank a
armoured vehicle unguidedclusterweap
The system made its debut i n 1968, and
made up of a clamshell dispenser, fit
with a mechanica l Mk 339 t imer fuse a
filled with a load of 247 dual-purp
armour-piercing (AP) and shaped-cha
(SC) bomblets, Each weighs 21m (600
and h as a 6Yzoz (180g) shaped-charge w
head containing high explosives (H
These s haped cha rg es p ro du ce up
250,000 p,s.i. at thepo int o f impact, wh
gives armour penetration capability up
7in (17.5cm). Its maximum impact
against large formations in open coun
and it is designed t o s top mass tank bre
throughs ( as in a orth German plain s
nario, or i n dese r twar fa re , a s i n the Gurather than precision target ing, wh
remains the province of the guided weap
More recently, the Mk 20 dispenser
b een adapt ed t o d el iv er the more let
Gator air-delivered mine (ADM) syste
CBV 5
Th e most eff icient anti-personnel CB
theCBU-52, uses (alongwith theCBU-
and CBU-71) SUU-30 dispensers to ca
220 ant i-mater ia l bomblet s , w i th a to
weight of785lb (355kg). TheSUU-30
s imple metal cylinder, 93in in length, a
16in in diameter (232 x 35cm), which
divided along its l ength top and bo tt
with the upper and lower halves loc
together. The top half consists of a re
forced carrying section strong enough
withstand sway-bracing for l oad ing a
forced powerejection.
The fuse arming and delay mechani
is fitted a t t he fore e nd o f t h e dispens
tr iggered by wires or lanyards on rele
from the parent aircraft. Forflight spin s
bility the after endof thecombined cyl
der is fitted with four cast-aluminium fi
whi ch a re attached at a 9-degree ang
being canted 1.25 degrees. At the tim
moment duringdescent, the fuse booste
ignited a nd t he forward end of the SU
30 is unlocked. Simple ram air action
the dispenser does the rest, opening
two halves and releasing the bomble
w hi ch s pi n- arm t hems el ve s either
mechanica l Mk 339 timed or FMU-
FMU -2 6, FMU -5 6 o r M 90 7 p ro xi m
fuses. They self-disperse over a wide a r
dependingon thehe ight o f release.
armies some means partially to restore
imbalance on t h e ground.
Mk84
3,100.00
2,039
129
18
1,945
Trtonal H-6
Nose/tail
BSU-50 AIR
Mk 84 Conca Fin
Mk83
1,014
11994
14.06
1,000
3851b Trtonal Minai I
Nose/tail
Systems using submunitions contained in
cylindrical dispensers are w id el y u se d i n
theUSAF inventory and particularlyeffec
tive in open walfare s ituations, such as
those encountered in Desen Storm. The A
10 can carry most types of th is weapon very
well. Similar weapons were developed by
the Germans during the Second World
War to mitigate the overwhelmingnumer
ical superiority of the Russian infantry
forces. The CBU-52 is a refinement of this,
designed to give number-s tarved Western
NAPALM
The s tandard napalm dispenser carried by
the A-lOis the Mk 77 napalm canis ter
munition. Currently the only incendiarymunition in theUSAF active inventory, it
has replaced the M-47 napalm-filled bombs
in the incendiary cluster bombs of yester
year. apalm is an incendiarymixturecom
posed of benzene, gasoline and polystyrene.
It can be delivered at very low level and is
particularly effective against entrenched
and dug-in infantry forces and bunkers.
Cluster Bomb Weapons
issued for bombs w i th less aerodynamic
drag. The shape of all the bombs in the
series is cy lindr i ca l w i th conical fins or
retarders for external high-speed carriage.
Th e whole range can be accommodated
by t he A -l O a nd is shown in the table
below,
The Snakeye system to slow bomb
descent first appeared in 1 96 4 and has
been extensively utilized since. It has a
retarder tail, with Mk 14 or Mk 15 f ins for
the Mk 81 250lb ( l15kg) o r Mk8 2 5001b
( 230kg ) bomb, w hi ch a ll ow s f or a l ow
level, high-precision attack profile, while
a t t h e same time avoiding bomb-fragmen
tation damage to the delivery aircraft and
retaining theop t ionof a low-dragdel ivery.
NedCrane
268.50
Contractor
Unit cost
Free-Fall Weapons
Mark Mk8
Weight (Ib) 500
Length ( n) 66.15
Diameter ( n) 10.75
Warhead (Ibl 50
Explosive 9 b Trtonal Minai I H-6
Fusng Nose/tail MAU-93/B
Stabisers BSU49/B AIR Mk 15 Snakeye
Mk 80 family of free-falling bombs
Dumb Bombs
8 SERIES GENERAL PURPOSE G P BOMBS
These ballistic non-guided weapons ar e
not equipped with autopilot or their own
propulsion, but either an FMU-I13 radar
proximity airburs t fuse, or both nose
(M904) and tail (M905) mechanical fuses.
They can therefore be tailored for various
missions and usedas blast weapons,crater
ing dibb les or t o prov ide f r agmenta tion
effect. Target r anges are cathol ic: punch
ing holes in enemy airfields, taking out
parked ai rcr af t o r mass troop formations ,
soft-skinned vehicles and orher military
ground t r anspor t, dug- in ar ti l le ry posi
t ions , identif ied deep bunkers and com
mand posts, early-warning radar and AAA
sites, static SAM sites or mobile Scud-Bs
when located , s upply dumps and rail or
br idge cuts. The design dates back to the
late 1950s, when a new specification was
Although the Western news med ia a re
seemingly obsessed with the precision of
laser- and radar-guided weapons, there is
s ti ll a place for the conventional free
falling bomb in the modernbattle scenario,
The A-lO is capable of carrying the com
plete range, although the 5001b (230kg)
bomb is its normal inventory for this type
of payload . I n addit ion to conventional
bombs , a whole range ofother free-falling
weaponry plays an important r ol e i n mod
ern-day warfare, including napalm, cluster
bomb unit s (CBU), and o the r dispensers.
cent greater than tha t o f the Paveway In
orderto reduce weight and costs, the Pave
way II detectoropticsand housi ng are con
structed of injection-moulded plastic
instead of metal.
G
Front air to airview of an A-10 Thunderbolt II of the
25th Tactical Training Squadron, equipped with an
AN/AlQ 199electronic countermeasures podand
an AGM-65 Maverick missile taking part in
Exercise Team Spirit 86 . USAF
Below]High angle front view of an A-10
Thunderbolt II aircraft of the 81st Tactical Fighter
Wing.This A-10 is equippedwith multiple ejection
racks and is carrying an AGM-65 Maverick missile.
USAF
tation warhead is II in (27.5cm), the airfoil
group, 18in(45cm). The explosive is 1921b
(87kg) of Tritonal, PBXN-l09, with a
FMU-81 tail fuse. The GBU-12 hasa range
of 8 nautical miles and a circularerror prob
ability of 10ft (9m), Some 29,654 were produced for theAir Force at a productioncost
of 563,426 million, and a un it c os t of
19,000. Although 4,493 were used during
t he Gu lf War, again, the A-IO was not
among the carriers.
The Paveway II also features much
improvedde tector sensitivity,reduced ther
mal battery delay af ter release, increased
maximum canard deflection, laser coding
and an instantaneous field of view 30 per
B
AGM·65 Maverick missile variants
Demn
Electro-optical/television gu idanee
Electro-optical/television gu idanee
with screen magnification
Imaging infra-red guidance
Infra-red homing
Laser guidance
Launch weight Ilbl
Launch weight Ikgl
Warhead (Ib)
Warhead {kgl
Unitproducton cost { ,000 1
15-18 in (37 .5 -45cm) , the airfoil group,
28in (70cm).
The explOSive utilized is either 5351b
( 245kg) Tr itonal (BLU- I 09 ) o r 9451b
( 430kg) Tr itonal (Mk 84), w i th FMU-18
nose/tail fusing. Th e effective range is 8nautical miles and circular error probabil
ity is just 9m. The production unit cost of
theAir Force variant is 23,700 and some
10,145 have been deliver ed. During the
Gulf War, 2,637 were expended, but none
by the A-lOs.
With the smaller GBU-12, also built by
Texas Instruments, the weight is 8001b
(365kg), with a length of 129in(322.5cm).
The diameter of the Mk8 2 blast/fragmen-
and CBUl2 Paveway
ed bomb unit 10,in i ts latest form,
001b (910kg) Mk 84 bomb linked
laser guidance ( man-in
package. With either a general
(GP) or penetrating warhead, the
tesand locks on the tar
t h his laser designator a nd t he ord
is precisely homed t o a spot of laser
reflected back from the target. Not
associated with the A-lO as the
this laser-guided bomb (LGB) is
less, Thunderbolt II capable and
ordnance.
are two types of GBU-IO LGB
the original Paveway I intro
i n 1976, had f ixed wings. Control
the MAU-157 Series.
deployment in February 1986, after
f or t r ia l s and testing in
1983. The development costs of
Force s D/GMavericks is 16 8 mil
costs 2,895.5 mill ion for
ioncost of 3,063.5 mill ion.
six main types ofAGM-65 Maver
si le are given in the table (right).
lO Paveway
to the Pavel.vayI, but with MAU
i e s control, these systems have
a 2,0001b (910kg) GP (GBU-IO)
b (230kg) GP (GBU-12) war
or use against enemy armour, butBU-I 1 syst em has the Paveway
system marr i ed to a BLU
penetrator or Mk 84 blast/frag
bomb for really deep concrete
bunker C31 (command,
communica tions, in te l ligence)
The autopilot is Bang-Bang Mode.
II G BU-I 0 has a weight of
(J,165kg), and a length of l72in
The diameter of the warhead is
92 93
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PACKING A P UN CH - A fO ORDNANCE PACKING A PU CH - A IO ORDNANCE
ughthe Avengerand the Maverick arethe A-l0 spreferredweapons
st armoured targets.free-fal l ing iron bombs canalso still be effective
t certain types oftarget andthe A l hasto be mission-capable in
which it was.in fact originally designed.Here a bombdropped
a shallow diveexplodes on impact during a tactical capabilities exercise
the desert. Natonal Archives Colege Park MD
Rockeye andother retardedbombsare also partof theA-IO s servicing
equipmentfor hostilesin a hurry. Here a parachute-retarded bomb drops on
to a light vehicle target inthe Californian desert during a tactical capabilities
exercise. Natonal Archives ColegePark MD
which had only a s m all chance ofh i t t in
their targets IM
Th e SFW is becoming the main USA
weapons in halt or hold (HoH) scenario
a t the beginning of a major regional con
tingency (MRC), givingessential time f
the ground forces to b e m o bilize d an
cohere to engage such an a t tack. Th e al
up weight is 927lb(420kg),and the syste
has an overall length of92in and a diame
ter of 16in (232 x 35cm). The unit bas
line cost o f the system is 360,000and th
h a s a f fe c te d t he n umbe rs t o be ordere
wit h t he original USAF requ iremen t
17,000 being cut b ac k t o a mere 5,00
The A- I0 will be able to to te tensuch sy
te m s p e r s o rtie .
TheSFW is described as an unpowere
t op a tt a ck , w id e- ar ea c lu st er munitio
specifically designed to give a multiple k
ratefor each aircraft passingover an enem
armour phalanxand supporting vehicles.h as a p r ov e n a ll- w ea the r , 24-hour oper
tional capability. With the proliferation
SAM and hand-he ld anti-aircraft missil
s ys te ms , it w as not envisaged that survi
ability over s u ch f o rm a tio ns w o uld b e p r
longed, hence the n ee d t o m ak e everyon
o f t h e A-10 s attack runs count, inflicti
maximum damage on the oncoming ta
masses. The SFW wasdesigned forthe A-
(and its successors) to make such attacks
a heightenvelope embracing an altitude
200ft (60m) aboveground level (AGL)
20,000ft 6,000m) mean s ea le ve l MSL).
can d e liv er th is w e ap o nr y either in le
flight (the most effective method), or in
shallow-angle dive attitude, when terra
demands it, and at speeds between 250 a
650 knots. Althoughthe system can be us
outside this scenario, its effectiveness a
value show a marked decreasein proporti
to any increase in releaseheight, dive ang
or speed, due to the adverse effects of wi
conditions, weaponsdispersal area and fa
offin aiming accuracy.Thisiscommonto
TMD ordnance deliveries, and ha s l ed
the introduction of the wind-correct
munitions dispenser (WCMD) tailkit. Th
will enable improved SFW delivery frhigheraltitudes and will open the door
strategic aircraft, as well as tactical aircra
to e m plo y the SFW. The SFW ordnan
with WCMD improvement is designated
the CBU-105.
TheWCM 0 project is a top priority 00
programme under development at Eg
AFB, Florida. On 3 A ug us t 1 99 8, i t w
given the go-aheadas an Air Force lead a
streamlined acquisition programme cost
CBU97 CBU10S SENSOR FUSED WI: APON
SFW
Further 1,0001b 454kg) CBU systems, the
CBU-97/CBU-105 SFWs and SUU-66/B
TMDs, with the F lU-39 fuse, contain ten
BL - 1 08 /B s en s or - fu se d submunitions
along with forty hockey puck-shaped skeet
lR-sensing projectiles. These weredesigned
for the Cold . Wa r s et t in g, a s a means of
blocking the Felda Gap choke pointsouth
west of Eisenach, a nd s ou th o f Hersfeld
along the Felda river, and preventingWar
s aw P ac t tank hordes punching through
West Germany to the Rhine. The hope was
thatthe A-1Ocouldslow theadvanceof the
Soviet tank hordes by culling the leaders,
and a g oo d number of others along the
invasion corridors. They used to joke that
wewere a speed bump, recalled Lieutenant
ColonelSteve Ruehl, who flew the A-1O atthat t im e a s a y o un g lieutenant.
16\
The SFW s aw its fi rst operational
deployment with tw o B-1 B bombers dis
patched to Bahrain e ar ly i n 1 99 8. The
SFW is the latest wide-area cluster mun i-
tion,but distinct from the others in that it
is the first onesmartenough to f in d its ta r
get after i t h a s been released. In fact, the
SFW is considered ten times more effec
tive than Vietnam-era cluster munitions,
The most serious l imi tat ion of the sys
tem is that missions have to be requested
seventy-two hours in advance th rough
n om in at io n a t t he Division Targeting
Board, although they m ay be allocated
down to battalion le ve l. A ls o, the mine
field remains unmarked.
Th e a v er a ge a r e a covered by a ty pic a l
drop is a rectangle measuring 200 x 650m.
This w o uld b e la id by six drops, placing a
total o f 4 32 AT a n d 132 AP mines w i th
the following AT density (dependingupon
the laying direction): a re a - 0 .0 03 M/
M , L i ne ar - AA 1 - 0.66 M/L - M (200m
side) or AA2 2. L6 M/K - M (650m side),
and there is a 275m safety zone built in
around this box.
Laid minefields, once established, not
only inhib it the enemy, but a lso r e str ict
the free movement of f r ie n d Iy f or ce s. I n a
fast-flowing battle situation, minefields
can be self-defeating. In order to overcomethis problem, both the Gator mines are fit
t ed w it h pre-programmable self-destruct
mechanisms, which can be set prior to the
A-IO s take-off by means of a selector on
the dispenser itself. This gives the battle
field commander three pre-set SO t ime s :4
hours, 48 hours or 15 days.
With an all-up weight of 710lb (325kg),
an overall length, including n o se f u sin g
and tail fins, of92in (232cm), and a cylin
drical diameter of 16in (35cm), the CBU
89/B is built around the BLU-91/B AT
mine, w it h t he BLU-92/B AP mine
(DODIC K29 K292 and K293) being
used to de te r mine c lea rance . The BLU
91/B weighs 4.31b ( l .95kg) and the BLU
92/B weighs 371b (Ukg). Both h av e
dimensions of 57 5 x Sin 5.38 X 12.5cm)
and ar e 2 .6in (6.5cm) h igh . E ac h ha s a
unitcost of 39,963.
Once the d is pe ns er h as b ee n f or ce d
open , the m ine s im me d ia te ly a r m a c co r d
ing to pre-programmed instructions. Once
laid, the AT mine, which h as a two-minute
arming time, is equipped with microelec
tronic magnetic sensors. These have the
capability not only of identifying and
s e lec ting a r mo u re d v e hic le s f ro m other
contacts, but also of choosing theoptimummoment of detonation in order to in flict
the maximum pene t ra t ion of the target s
ventral protection, t o d is ab le i t M -K il l )
and/or eliminate i ts c re w K -K il l) . E ac h
mine contains a 1 .7 kg w a rh e ad w ith a Mis
znay-Schardin explosive charge of 585 g
RDX, which can defeat the belly armourof
most known Ru ss ian - bu ilt ta nk s . The
spalling metal from the v e hic le k ills a ll its
occupants instantly, even though the tank
might continueto move. Shouldthe enemy
tank beequipped withautoloaders, the det
onat ion of r ou nd s i n the belly-mounted
ammunition carousel is usually achieved.
The AP Scatmines, also with two
minute arming times, contains540 g Comp
B4 high-velocity e x plo siv e f ra gm nts
which, when activated by trip-wiring, dis
perse horizontally over a w ide r e gio n.
The area of each Gator minefield is deter
mined by the height at whicl. the dispenser
is set to open, the mines being self-dispens
ing aerodynamically. This height is con
trolled by the electromechanical fuse fitted
to the nose ofthe dispenser, or by an option
al proximitysensor.The pre-selecteddisper
sal point results ina ground-pattern of mines
proportionate to the drop height. Such sensitive weapons have to be dispensed within
set limitations, but the range for the Gator
mine is enormous, with height o f release
var yi n g f rom 2 00 ft u p t o 4 0, 00 0f t (60
1Z,OOOm) and speed of release rangingfrom
200 to 700knots airspeed. Targets of oppor
tunity can b e ta ke n under attack with the
system, the determining f a cto r b e in g the
unit b as ic lo ad U BL) ofthe FASCAM for
the ta rg e tto b e ta k e n o u t.
CBU 89 B GATOR MINE
The impressive CBU-89, from Aerojet
O rdn a nc e C ompany (AOe), is also
known as the Gator mine. This multi
weapon system is designed to scat ter a
range of mines of different capability over
a w id e a r ea i n rectangular blocks. The aim
is to denywhole areas of the battlefield, or
projected invasion pa th , to theoncoming
e ne my , o r, alternatively, to immobilize
mobile enemy concentrations already on
the move by su rrounding them with
instant and reinforceable minefields.
Mineficlds have traditionally been static
and complex; the laying of them was a
drawn-out affair, and theycould always be
bypassed once thei r whereabouts became
knownto the enemy. With theadoptionof
the Ga tor mine, US forces now h av e t he
opportunity tocreate minefields anywhere
and of any size, within a relatively) short
period once the movementsand direction
of the enemy th rus t are known. Th is sys
tem a lso g ive s a lo ng e r r a ng e -la y in g capa
bility than any other FASCAM method.
The A- lOis o ne o f t he USA F s preferred
delivery systems for the CBU-89.Bas ica lly , a L,OOOlb (454kg) cluster
munition built a round theSUU-64TMD,
and with optional FlU-39 proximity sen
sors, the CBU-89 dispenses simultaneous
ly seventy-two BLU-91/B anti-tank mines
(AT), and twenty-twoBLU-92/B anti-per
sonne l (AP) mines. There a re two com
panion systems, for Navy and ir Fo rc e
use, but t he CBU-89/B wit h the SUU
64/B TMD r e la tes to the A-IO.
was considered v ita l to thecontainment of
the overwhelmingpreponderanceof Sovi-
et f o rc es in Central Europe, and proved
equally effective in the Gulf.
CBU 87 B
A deve lopmen t o f the s tandard CBU, the
CBU-87/B is a L,OOOlb (454kg) air-deliv
ered cluster weapons system. This com
bined-effects munition (CEM), an inte
gral p ar t o f t he dispenser, is specifically
designed to take out soft targetareas with
detonating bomblets. t comprises the
SW-65 tactical munitions dispenser
(TMD), which can b e f it t ed with the
FlU-39/B proximity s en so r. I t contains
ZOZ combined-effects bombs (CEB), each
ofwhich is constructed of scored steel and
is designed to t ime-burst in to 300 frag
ments f or u se against a w id e r an ge of tar
gets. These include tanks, armoured per
sonnel carriers, trucks, ground personnel
en masse and a r ms d u mp s . Tw elv e timed
selections give ten height-of-burst (HoB)
options.
This all-embracing killing power is con
tained withinone small package and morethan ZOO ofthe bom bs dispensed from each
d is pe n se r m a ke s f or a lethal swathe of fire.
Each CBU-87/B has an all-up weight of
950lb (430kg), with a length of 92in
(Z 32cm), and a diameterof 15.6in (39cm)
They a re f it te d w it h a six-variation spin
control mechanism for controlled, but not
guided airborne delivery. Manufactured by
Aerojet General/Honeywell, each CBU
87/B h as a unit cost of 13,941
similar to t he C BU -5 2, t he
has an all-up weight of 800lb
an overall length of 93in and a
terof 1 6 in Z3Z x 35cm). Maximum
is 6Z5 KIAS, and fusing is similar.
submunitions load is 650 BLU-63A/B
ti -personnel bomblets,
of which contains 5g titanium pellets
incendiary. They are most efficiently
against f lammable targets such a s o il
, bowsers and dumps, vehicles and
areas. The unitcostof theCBU-58
2,893.
Each of the BLU-61A/B submunitions
a spherical bomb let 312in (8.75cm) in
ter and weighing 271b (1.25kg), of
0.651b 0.3kg) is an HE warhead.
effect on densely packed infantryfor
o r c ol umned motor t ra ns po rt
in d e files , is devastating. The
h as a unitcost of 1 ,542.
v ar ia ti on o n t he CBU-58, o f approxi
the same specification, the CBUcarries 650 bomblets, which combine
two separate kill mechanisms - f ra g
ion and incendiary - in one pack
Both incorporate a time-delay fuse,
causes random detonations after
The effect of th is delayed action is
neutralize large portions o f t h e battle
ld for long periods, and black out whole
delaying the progress of invading
Slowing up advancing spearheads
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6 4 p e r cent less t h an t h e original cost
It also arrived five months ahead
e d ule , in A p r il 1 99 9. A d ir ec t c o ns e
of s rt Sto rm , w h er e a dv e rs e
and dust, andthe dense
e from the b u rn ing o ilf ire s s e t by the
tingIraqis,severely limited pilotiden
ionand location of targets. The tailkit
e s t o SFW, CEM an d GATOR
and steers t h e m u ni t i on f ro m a
release point to exact target coordi
all the time giving in-flight correc
to compensate for launch transients,
and weather inter
The systemwill also beretro-fitted.
b ig p lu s f or t he A ir Force is the fact
t h e system will enable non-specialist
such as the B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15E,
and F 117 to deploy tacticalweapons
a greatheight,thusenablingthe force
backaloft once again. WCMD gives
A ir Force, never enthusiastic aboutCAS missions, a further opportu
to avoid thatcombat scenario as much
. A ccordingto theP rojectH ead,
enantC olonel S tevenWelch:
i n te n t o f WCMD is to allow aircraft and
to fly above the anti-aircraft artillery
surface-to-airmissilethreats and keep them
harm s way. Itwill allow the warfighter to
theC B U-87, -89 and -97fromaltitudesup
5,000 feet.16i
an achieved accuracy e r ro r o f less
30ft, WCMD t ur ns C BU s i nt o
T h e W C M D system is most cer
A-IO c ap ab l e, b ut , i n v ie w of such
rks, it is doubtful w hether the aircraft
b e a ll ow ed t o d ep lo y the system on
n g o t he r t h a n a small-scale profile,
t h t h e Paveway II.
SFW is something r a dic al in the
of a ir- d elive r ed w e ap o nr y . D a vid
ek,defenceanalystw ith theR and
in Washington, g o es s o f ar a s
that the s y ste m h a s a potentially
capability . Major JeffLatas,
R equirements Officer a t t h e P en ta
is equally enthusiastic:
ne pass, I can dropa whole array of weapons
n optimum fashion, so I can go out and kill
targets w t one airplanc. l68
all TMD delivery systems, the sub
are released after the container
at a pre-determined height. In the
o f t he SFW, t he t en BLU-108/B
s are parachute-stabilized to slow
P CKING A P UN CH - IO ORDN NCE
descent. Their in - bu ilt r a da r a ltim e ter s
a ut om at i ca l ly f ir e a d ua l- no zz le r o ck et
motor, which spins the submunition and
f ir es it b a c k v er tic ally. Ea ch submunition
sub-divides into four armour-penetrating
projectiles, a nd e ac h o f these four is fitted
with its own individual IR sensor, enabling
them to detect armoured targets. As t he
submunition r eg ai ns a l ti t ud e, t h es e f ou r
projectilesare released and loft over the tar
get area, where their I R lo ck on to the sig
natures of a n y a r mo u re d v e hic le s , w h er e
u p on a penetrator is explosivelyfired a t t h e
heat source. Should the sensor fail to detect
such a s ign a tu r e a f te r a p r e- s et p e rio d, the
projectilesautomatically fire to inflict hurt
on any other enemy personnel or vehicles
in the targetzone.169
Each CBU-97/ B r el ea se is designed
t o c o ve r a rectangular f ir e z o ne o f a b ou t
500 x 1,200ft 150 x 360m) in a r ea .
C olonel William Wise, Air Fo rc e Pr o gram Director, Area Attack Munitions at
E gl in , d es cr ib ed a t yp ic al low-altitude
deployment thus:
The engagement would begin with the bomber
m a ki n g a d r op a t a n altitude ranging from 200
feetto3,000feetaboveground level withatyp
ical mission altitude of 1 ,5 00 f ee t. F or a ny
attackcommencing below an altitude of 1,500
feet, the d i sp e ns e r w ou ld u se a p r e- s et t i me d
release. Although the time is variable,it would
be a b o ut o n e s e co n d a f t e r a d r op at 300 feet,
meaning the dispenser would release 10 BLU
108/B submunitions at about 280feet. Each of
the 10 submunitions then would h a ng o n a
parachute for about eightseconds,during which
time the p r oj e ct il e s a r e s p un u p and finally
ejected a t a b o ut 100 feet above ground level.
Each o f t he hockey puck-shaped projec
tiles then uses an infra-red sensor to rapid
ly l o ca t e a hot target, such as a tank or
armoured vehicle. The projectile locks on
to i ts ta r ge t and fires a self-forging; high
velocity slug, which strikes and immobilis
es the target. iO
Further im p ro v em e nts a r e in tr a in under a
pre-planned improvement P 3I) pro
gramme. These include the incorporation
of a dual-mode active/passive) IR to help
with target detectionand identification, as
well as modifications to the warhead itself
to deal better w ith soft-target options, so
that e a ch S F W f ir es a s m alle r centre slug
with an outer ring of shards. Because the
centre slug is fired at a higher velOCity it
remains as lethal as the larger slug on the
96
regular SFW. In addition, the system foot
print is to be enlarged for better targetcov
erage. This involves dispensing actual pro
jectiles at a higher altitude, thus increasing
the le tha lity z on e to a r e c ta n gle 600 x1,800ft 180 x 540m). With theadoptionof
joint stand-off weapons JSOW) suitable
for deployment by bothA ir Force andN avy
aircraft, Octal will be replaced by an insen
sitive explosive fill to allow Navy usage.
The likely A-IO SFW/WCMD load is
ten systems per sortie, which gives quite a
respectable profile in the delivery of this
new form of weapon.
AIM 9 Sidewinder
Defensive armament was not a great con
sideration for t h e A - 1 0 as it wasoriginally
conceived. Low-level flight, while expos
ing the aircraft to maximum ground retal
iation, gave in i ts elf a m e as u re of invulnerability against enemy fighter aircraft.
A lthough theS ovietU nion s expansion of
its lookdow n-shootdow n systems was to
p os e a s er io us t h re a t, t h e A - 10 m a in
chanceof survival in such encounters was
via evasion, rather than combat.
N on e t he less, provision was made for
the carrying of air-to-air defence missiles.
The standard lo ad ing in such a configura
tion wasfour AIM-9L/M Sidewinders car
r ied in p a ir s on LAU-1 05/LAU-14launch
er rails, o n A N G dual-rail adapters DRA),
o n e it he r t he p or t outboard p y lo n 1 ) , or
the starboard outboard pylon 11), w ithan
ECM pod on the opposite outboard pylon.
In t h e e v en t , a l th o ug h th e y w e re c a rr ied
intocombatduring s rt Storm, none was
ever fired air-to-air. The o n ly k ill of this
nature was achieved by the Gatling.
Three Sidewinders were actually fired
off during the Gulf War - t wo by the 23rd
TASS and one by t he 7 4t h T F S - but all
these were accidental, while the 23rd
T AS S N ai l F AC aircraft scorned their
use even for their missions, only carrying
Sidewinders on a solitary mission.
ECM
The ECM pod is u u ally m o un t ed o n t h e
outer wing station opposite the AIM. The
A-10 is configured to carry the following
Westinghouse-built noise/deception jam
mer d e ep , s h allo w and all-band) pods:
• AN/ALQ-119 V)-10, - 1 2, - 15 and -16
• A N /A LQ -131 V )-1 to -13 and -15
Head-on view ofthe 23rd Tactical FighterWing
A-10, withfamiliar shark s mouthmarkings, and
long-rangefuel tanks on the innerordnance pylo
forferry operations.It isseen here in 1991 in
Kuwai t, pr ior to i ts returntothe USAat theendo
theGulfWar. USAF
Below Chocksaway During Operation Desert
Storm theA-10really came intoher own.Here
a heavily ladenSharknose is aboutto departfor
the battle-zone with a full complement ofiron
bombsand a single Sparrowhawkfor defensive
purposes. USAF
Bottom Nosewheel inthe air, main undercarr iag
on thedeck, thisA-10, 80 224 ofthe 23rd Tactical
FighterWing is seen atEngland AFB Louisiana.
USAF
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Dusk overthe California foothills and two A-lOs
make a nice study asthey wing home after
exercises. Eachaircraft carr ies asingle
averickunderthestarboard wing anda single
Sparrowhawk outboardunderthe portwing USAF
Below Checkingovermapco-ordinates,the pilot
of this 57th wing Hog sitsunderhis opencanopy,
helmetlessin theshimmeringheat on theready
areaof a desertairstr ip.Stil lwearing the European
Theatre of Operationspaint scheme,at the express
orderofWashington,the A-lOsstoodout amile,but
fortunately, encountered little or no air resistance.
USAF
Bottom Averymixedbatchof ordnance including
MavericksandSparrowhawkmissilesistotedby this
mean-looking pairof A-lOsfromthe 57th Tactical
FighterWing working from Nell is AFB Nevada.The
combined chaffandflaredispensersabafttheunder
carriagefairings can be clearlyseen here.Theyfea
turethe new two-tone greypaint scheme. USAF
Above Head-on view oftheA-10revealsthe
considerableexhaustemissionsfrom the twin turbo
fanengines. Suchemissionshelp maskthe infra-red
fingerprintoftheaircraft a sa n unplannedbonustotheuniquemountingofthe powerplant. Also clear
isthe dihedralofthe outerwing sections. USAF
Right The 511th Tactical FighterSquadron deploys.
Thisbraceof A-lOs inthe EuropeanTheatre ofOper
ationspaint schemefly low overthe English country
side.Thetai l-bandand lettering of 79 224 show a
markeddifferencefrom the moreflamboyantstyling
sported by theVultures aircraft, 79 995. USAF
Below This quartetof A-lOsfromthe91stTactical
FighterWing, re-deployedto the Gulf from RAF
Bentwaters/Woodbridge in England,areseen in en
echelonformation andpresenta formidable show
offorce overtherugged landscapebelow. USAF
Above Bosnia bound Apair ofA-lOsfromthe 52nd CompositeFighterWin
deployedfrom Spangdahlemin Germany, l i ftoff inclose formation fromtheir
airbasetoconductanotherpatrol in theturbulentYugoslavskies. USAF
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airborne shotof testpilot Donald Sorensenflying the number 4pre-production aircraft. Donald Sorensen
An air-to-airright front view of an 78th Tactical FighterSquadron A l0 ThunderboltII aircraftduring a
g mission overthe North Sea March 1988. USAF Master Sgt Patrck Nugent
11 369 makes a splendid sight haulingfour Maverickmissiles on underwingracks. USAF
The VA-lOBdual-seatnight-attackprototype is
preservedat Edwards AFB. Ar Force Flght Test Centre
Museum Edwards AFB
Above A l0 ThunderboltII ofthe 190th Fighter
Squadron part of the 124th Wing Idaho Air
National Guard at Gowen Field Boise Idaho.The
first A l0 arrived therein 1995. Missionconversion
has occupied mostoftheirt ime sincethenand
IdahoNational Guard pilotshavenotyetf lowntheir
aircraftoutside the USA. Boththe A l0 andthe OA-
10 are operated by the 190th Squadron. Master Sgt
Tom Gloeckle 1245th Wing Visual Informaton SectonIdaho AirNatona Guard
Gulf War action. Tliisshark-nose Hawgis being
re-armed between sorties. The Draggin i s
manoeuvred into place; notethe empties coming
out on topofthe stack.The burntpaintaroundthe
noseshowsthat theAvengerhas alreadybeenput
to good use. She alsocarriesa pairof Sparrowhawk
defensivemissiles outboard on herstarboardpylon.
USAF
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Below n 195 showsthe austere colourscheme
used on 81stTFWA-10s on deploymentfrom RAF
Woodbridgefor missionsover Germany during the
ColdWar. Simon Watson
Air-to-airrefuell ing, fromthetanker sviewpoint.
Atankerplaneof theUtah irNationalGuard refuels
A-10 232 airborne with a varietyof ordnance during
a joint CONUS exercise inthe 1980s. The stubby
wings flythe refuell ingnozze,which automatically
locksinto theA-10s slipway s i tu a te d i n f r o nt o f t h e
cockpit. Authors collection via Mark Savage
Above This TAC aircraft, sIn 79-0220 belongs
t o t h e 509th TFS whichwas relocatedat RAF
Alconbury, Cambridgeshire when RAF Woodbridge
became toocrowded.The standardEuropean
Theatreof Operations paintscheme was carried,
with a light grey str ipe, edged in white and adorned
with askull. Simon Watson
Below A-10 78-0681 on display atthe USAF
Museum,Wright-Patterson AFB Ohio.Although
here carryingthe name ofCaptain Jeff Scott on
thenose,this was alsothe mountof CaptainPaul
Johnson,who, on 21 January 1991 performed an
eight-hourrescuesupportmission during Operation
Desert Storm for which he was awarded the ir
ForceCross, the irForces highestawardfor valour.
The aircraftwas deliveredto themuseum on 24
January 1992. Rick Patterson via the USAF Museum
Wright-Patterson AFB
Bottom The 81stTFW, Woodbridge, was onc6Jthe
home forA-10sIn 233 shownhere indelivery Mask
10Apaintschemewith yellow panels on thelead
i n g e d g es o f t h e w i n g s. Simon Watson
tthe Las Vegas irShow, Nevada,Apri l 1998 a
head-onstudyof an A-10INbr. 00274 New Orleans
Baby , a DesertStorm veteranassigned tothe 55th
Fighting Fifty-Fifth ) FighterSquadron,20th Fighter
Wing. Immaculatein its new GhostGreypaint
scheme, it i s b a se d a t S h a w AFB South Carolina.
KengoYamamoto
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Vought. The object of thisweapon wa
defeatall known defences by sheer spe
Mach 4.5 or 3,000 knots (5,500km/h50per cent faster thanthe bulletsfromGAU-8 Avenger gun The spin-stabilmissiledid not have to carry anyexplowarhead; the impact of the bundepleted uranium rods was thought t
sufficient to annihilate any k narmour-plate protection ofthe day.
The HVM was to have been guidethe target by a CO
2laserguidancelink
beam scansa raster pattern and senseposition therein. Coursecorrection wbecarried out by controlsquibs carriedaft of the processor in the nose-cone.main body o f t he missile contained
boost/ ustain motor vent ing via af la r a ft , wbich a lso contained the
ward-looking laser receiver. The sspeed ofthe missile would render inetua l any avoidance movement s by
t ank, so such cor re ct ions would beVought was thinking at that t ime o
8,OOO-dollar HVM w it h a wei ghunder 80lb (35kg) and a range of 3 m(5km),which wouldhave given the Afar greater reach. The plan called forusc of the LANTIR system and acontrol installation incorporating the
get acquisition and tracking FURguidancelink built into the leadingedthe wing. 0 less than twenty-eigbtsmissi les would be mounted - nine
under each wing in two underwing pAlthough successful test f ir ings
conducted as early as 1983 and a two-programme was proposed, which whaveculminatedin aseries of live in-ftest firings by the A-IO, funding wasforthcoming.
Vought HypervelocityMissile HVM
Among the proposed armaments for tbe
A-10 in tbe mid-1980s was the hypervelocity missile then underdevelopment by
PACKING A P UN CH - A·IO ORDNANCE
97
In i ts newrole as FAC aircraft, theOA-IO
carries LUU-2 flares for illuminating targets by night or in bad weather . They areof two-mill ion candlepower and have aburn l ife of fi ve minute s i f i gnit ed at
2,400ft nOm . They arereleased in levelf l ight with a time-delay free-fall before aparachute opensand the flare ignites, giving the marker aircraft t ime to get clear .Targetmarking can be carried outeither
via the conventional white phosphorus WP or 'WillyPete ') rocket, or by the useof target markerflares. These arecarried inthe pylon-mounted SUU-25 f lare dispenser,which hasfour tubes, each capableof carrying two f l ar e . The e timer flaresa re 3ft ( 0.9m) in l ength, Sin l2.5cm indiameterand weigh 29lb (13kg). They areof I,OOO-candiepowerand havea burn life
of approximately threeminutes. There arethreetypesofLUU: I/B (red);5/B (green);and 6/B (maroon).
OA-IO Flares and
Target Marker Flares
sequence oHour- AI, A2, B1 and B2), andat the rear of both main landing-gear fair
ings (block grouping release sequence offour-AI, A2,BI and B2).These areloadedwith M-206 flare cartr idges and RR-170A/AL single and double chaff cartridges.
• Al - forward-antel);Qa module• A2 - l ow -bandmodu le• A3- mid-/high-band module
• A4 - after-antennamodule.
For defence against incoming missiles, the
OAfA-I0 car ri es combined ALE-40(V)chaff countermeasures and M-207 flareswithdispensersin four locations: under thecurve of each wingtip (l inear row release
• AN/ALQ-184 Vn
• QRC 80-901(V)-3.
Chaff and FlareCountermeasure Dispensers
Various electrical countermeasuresmountings
were utilized on the A l downthe years. USAF
The basic purpose of these systems is to
emit noise which simulates chaff) or spec ia l coded s igna ls to trigger repeaterdeception jamming (RD]) of the hostileradar picture . A single processor has twoindependent fore and aft jamming sets.Operations a re ava il able according totype, overfive wavebands.
The AN/ALQ-131 (V)shallowconfiguration(low-drag)ECM podcoversbands4and 5. I t ha sa l ength of II in (27.5cm),aheight of 20in (50cm). The -9 and -10weigh 600lb (275kg) ; the -13 540 lb(245kg); and the -15 580lb (265kg). The
deep configuration covers bands3, 4, and
5, has a l en gt h of Illin (277.5cm), aheight of 24.5in (61.25cm). The -4, -5,and -6 weigh 675lb (305kg); the -12640lb(290kg); and the -14 680lb (310kg).
The AN/ALQ-184(V)-1 is 13ft (3.9m)inlength,20in high(50Cln) andhasa widtho f lO in ( 25cm), w it h a wei gh t o f 625 lb(285kg). The (V)-15all-band pod, withtwoin-buil t heat exchangers, has an overalllength of 12ft II in(3.8m), a width of12in(JOcm)and a heightof21in (JOin with suspension lugs) (52.5/75cm) , and weighs580lb(265kg). It is a modularsystem, witheach part connected by means of a digibusand cooled by a power-free self-containedfreon/ram air system. Basic configuration is
as follows:
Left Armed with smallpractice bombs.these
two A-lOsof the18thTacticalFighterSquadrons.
343rd CompositeWing. are on atraining mission
fromEielson AFB. Alaskain 1983. USAF Offcial
Rear view of two A-lOs on the mainrunwayat
Davis-Monthan note on tail) AFB. Tucson.
Arizona.in February1998. While the engines of
theclosest aircraft 235 arecovered. the core
engineexhaustducts on the right-hand aircraftareclearly visible insidethe massive twin engine
pods. On eitherside ofthe rearnavigation light
arethe two rearbuttonantennafor the l band
radarwarning receiver. KengoYamamoto
Operation Southern Watch saw the
s periodicallydeployed to Kuwaitiairfields
rcethe southern no-fly zone overIraq.to
Sad dam Husseinfrom inflicting further
on hisown subjects with hislargely intact
e.Mavericksandrocketpods.now back in
thisaircraft s weaponsstations
anothermission. The main war
on this dutyhasbeen Iock-ons by Iraqi
systems. which usuallyprovoke an immedi
armedresponse. USAF
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INITIAL DEPLOYMENT. PRODUCTION AND TACTICS
CHAPTER TWELVE
Initial eploy lent
Production n Tactics
The first Stateside trials under Euro
pean conditions were made during Opera
tion ReforgeT h e ld in the former West Ger
many. The A-IO was a ls o a bl e t o p ro ve
its elf to ta lly compatible with the third
g e ne r at i on p r ot e ct i ve shelters, which
NATO was e r ec t in g a t t h e time t o g iv e
nuclear-blast protection f or its a irc r af t. I n
view of northern Eu ro p e s m ise r ab le
weather, testing forsuitabilityfor low-ceil
ing/poor-visibility operations was the
ifornia, along w ith a ir cr a ft f ro m t h e o t h e r
services, u n de r O p er a ti o n Red lag
Using the ellis AFB r an ge , f ul ly
e q ui p pe d w i th simulated Soviet ZSU-23
and ZSU-27 AA A and S -6 SAM sys
tems, the A-IO w as g iv en a g ru el li ng
going-over in t h e h e at and the sand. The
scenario r e pl i ca t ed a Soviet armoured
thrust with accompanying fighter support,
a n d t h e aircraftperformed well. Some 112
s o rties w er e f low n, with fast turnarounds
t h e G at l in g . The a ir cr a ft w o uld
switch roles a n d c o n t in u e t h e h u nt .
One serious teething problem wa
g u n f irin g causing the aircraft engin
stall, and this culminated w ith a d
engine stall on aircraft number six
Edwards AFB in June 1978. This ne
to be rectified before the programme
m ov e o n. Meanwhile, operational
prepared to expand as production ste
increased.
Wreathed inthe smoke from its30nm GAU-8/A Gatling, an A-10fires a burstduring
the Long Rf e III semi-annual aerialgunnery competition.The A l frequently hones
its skills insuch air-to-ground gunnerycompetitions, which testthe abil i ties of
tacticalair crews to plan and execute long-range missions, execute attacks on first
look targetsand accuratelydeliverordnanceafterlong fl ighttimes to thetarget
zone. Such scenariosare realistic with regard to modernCONUS-based operations.
National Archives,Co egePark, MD
An A-10 ofthe 510th Tactical FighterSquadron TFSI The Buzzards carryingthe tail coding WR indicating
theirbase location,Woodbridge-Bentwaters. A ful l loadof ordnance includesthe AGM-65Maverick
missile on the innerstations and an ALQ-119 V)-15 electronic countermeasurespod on theport outer
station. USAF
Delivery and Nomenclatur
Original plans had c a lle d f or a d e
schedule of fourteen aircraft per m
from F RC , w it h e ac h year s con
be ingbudge ted for on a year-by-year
In fact, as the programme rolledFairchild exceeded this target and pr
tion peaked at sixteen aircraft per m
A s p ec ial ceremony was held on 3
1978 to mark the delivery of the one
dredth a ir cr af t s /n 7 6- 0 55 3) . I n a
dance were representatives o f t he
being achieved between e a ch , a n d t h e test
resulted in an estimated loss of five A-lOs,
three fighters, one flak and one to
SAM.
The findings of these early tests, alongwith the p r ob a bl e n e w areas of deploy
ment, led s om e dr a stic re-thinking of
the A-IO s tactics. The future attack pat
tern o f t he A-IO - a ir cr a ft operating in
mutually supportive p air s - w as f irs te s ta b
lished at t hi s t im e. Under this arrange
m e n t e a c h flight co-ordinated the attack,
with one aircraft tackling ground defences
at lo ng r a ng e w ith Maverick missiles, and
its partner going in and killing tanks with
nor m . Fur ther evaluation was carried out
in t he U S A in N ovember and D ecember
1976 at the Fo rt Lew is rroving grounds,
Washington State, where the r a iny c li
mate was notoriously similar.Europe was n ot t he only possible place
f or Ea s t/Wes t c o nf lic t, h o we v er , a nd t he
A-IO had to b e f itf o r duty i n a n y climate.
A c co r din gly , in J a nu ar y a n d February
1 977 , r ct ic climatizing tr ia ls w e re con
ducted by t w o A - lO s , at Eiels on A FB,
Alaska, underOperation acl rost At the
other extreme, four A-tOs based a t t h e U S
Army D ry La ke a ir str ip took part in anti
armour thrust exercises at Fort Irwin, Cal-
profile cowlings. This was done f lyin g a
standard production aircraft, w hi c h F R C
had leased backfrom t h e A i r Forcefor just
that purpose in September 1976. The idea
was that such a v e rs io n could be powered
by theG eneral Electric low-bypass engine,
the J 101, which developed more than
10,0001b 4,540kg) of thrust. Alternative
ly this variant w o uld b e capable of takingthe European Turbo-Union RB 199
engine. T his w o uld , in th eo r y, have given
a n e x tr a 30 to 50 knots 55-95km/h) top
speed to the A-tO, but i t a ls o f ai le d t o
attract interest in Europe.
n e er t o keep it going w h ile its own devel
opment programme was under way Ulti
mately, this was to result in the P A NA V IA
Tornado. In common w it h m os t of its
European counterparts, to t h e R AF speed
wasstill e v er y th i ng a n d t h e A -I 0 w as not
iv n muchchanceof survival at a ll in this
respect.
In an attempt to produce a variant ofthe A-IO that might have m or e a ppe al to
the Allies, which did n o t h a ve a n y s u ch
a ir cr a ft in their inventory - and had not
e v en p l an n ed o n e - F a ir ch i ld sent over a
m o de l f e atu r in g e l on ga t ed a n d reduced
next milestone in the A-IO story was
a n no u nc em e nt t h at t he first opera
u ni t t o deploy t he n ew aircraft
u ld b e t h e 3 5 4t h A i r C o m ba t Wing,
at Myrtle Beach AFB, South Caroli
The first production a ir cr a f t w as d u ly
over t o t h e A ir Force Tactical Airm a n d t h e r e o n 20 March 1976, some
m o nt h s a h ea d of s c he d ule . I n the
time, the final operational test and
programme was being under
by the 355th Tactical Fighter Train
W i ng T F T W) based at Davis-Mon
AFB, Arizona. They were s oon be ing
n exhaustively, a nd t he first A-IO to
c k u p 1 ,0 00 hours flight time reached
target that December.
The V ietnamWar that hadspawned the
was by now ju st a bitterand haunting
but the aircraft s tank-crunching
ilitywould now be turned to ATO s
need in E ur op e t o b ol s te r i ts f ra il
- w ire p olic y. I t w as hoped that any
invasion could b e l i mi t ed t o con
warfare long enough to b uy time
outhaving to resort to full-scale tacti
nuclear exchanges. Mutually assured
MAD) was t h e n e x t step after
s o it w as a p olicy worth pursuing. The
heavily againstsuccess, with the
w Block ground forces outnumbering
west by more t h an t hr ee to one in
and seven t o o ne in m a np o we r .
the les s, ith a d to b e tr ie d , and if any
ft was capable of nipping off the tipsSoviet armoured columns, then sure
that aircraft was the A-IOI
Accordingly, theA -tO was previewed in
future deployment area, attending the
Farnborough Air Show in Sep
1976, and making a promotional
of U S A FE bases and installations in
Europe. The R A F tr a ditional
disliked CAS, and i n a ny c as e had the
ya l a vy s Hawker Siddeley S.2 Bu cc a -
98 99
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INITI L DEPLOYMENT PRODUCTION NDT CTICS INITI L DEPLOYMENT PRODUCTION ND T CTICS
ngtip-to-wingtip,the A-lOs swoop in low again. US
Alow-level pass by three A-10 Thunderbolt lis of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, which was
ding a firepower demonstration for US President Jimmy Carter. US
Such a delivery profile meant accep
high level of vulnerability. Again, Ge
McMullen s views encapsulated the t
ing o f t he Ai r F or ce i n the mid-1
Accepting the fact that the diving, slo
ing A-tO presented a super radar targe
emphasized the fact that radar-di
SAMs were relatively ineffectual becathe ground clutter effect. At h igh e
tu de s, m is siles c o uld b e d od g ed , w h il
borneflares provideda reasonabledef
a ga in st I R m is si le s, a s l on g as th e y
tuned to the p r op e r w a ve le ng th a n d
r e ctly f ilte re d s o that the missile di
detect the fact thar they weredecoys.
allin all, McMullen would rather have
tem that c o uld ta ke a n d survive fire,
than depend on complete non-expos
In the 1980s whenthe Hawgs first deployed to
central Germany, their potentialfighting grou
the possibilities of their forward bases being
eliminated by sneakSovietair attacks was a
too clear.Fortunatelythe A-10 wasable to
demonstratethat in such an event,the Autob
weresuitablesubstitutes for them to carryon
fightwithout toomuch inconvenience. US
Early Tactics
The most realistic CAS m iss ion e n vis
aged a t t he t im e c a lle d forslow speed and
shallow dive delivery_ Exhaustive studies
had s ho wn t h at t he o pt im um dive angle
for dive-bombing was 45 degrees, while for
s tra f ing it w as between 10 degrees and IZ
degrees. A cc or di ng t o t he e ar ly p ro
nouncementsof G eneral McMullen, T he
prototypes d e mo n st r at e d t h a t t h ey were
perfectly docile to handle in a dive and
could be very accurately aligned with the
target. The g o od r o ll r a re , inherent in the
d es ig n, m ak es i t p os si bl e to make last
minute corrections. 172
The A-tO w as a lso d e sc r ibe d a s being
insensitive to drag o f t he s tor e s . A ls o,down o n t he ground in t h e b a tt l e zone,
where evasion was t h e m a in defence, and
rapid response wasessential, the ability of
the A-I 0 to pull Z.Z ga t 150 knots, was,for
General - Mullen, a most important
attribute, especially in bad-weather opera
tions. The A -t O s b ig p lu s - the a b ility to
spend maximumtime over the ta r ge t- w as
what the A rmy w anted most of all, and
therethe aircraft delivered.
n
71-1369 and 71-1370
73-1664 to 73-1673
75-0258 to 75-0279
75-0280 to 75-0309
76-0512 to 76-0554
77-0177 to 77-0276
78-0582 to 78-0725
79-0082 to 79-0225
80-0140 to 80-0283
81-0939 to 81-0998
82 -0646 to 82-0665
A-10 production
Prototypes 2
Pre-Production 6
Production 22
Production 30
Production 43
Production 100
Production 144
Production 144
Production 144
Production 60
Production 20 - -- - -- =- - :- =- - : : : c_
yp No.
•Four aJrcraf sin73-k1670to 73-1673mcluslve, werecanceled
h a d b e e n n i c kn a m ed t h e S u pe r ho g , a n d
t h e F - I0 5 j u st h a d to be the U ltrahog .
Major posed the question: Wh a t do you
suppose t he A -I O w il l b e called - the
Warthog) The n a m e s t u ck , a n d v r the
y ea rs , u su al l y abbreviated to plain
Hawg , has become somethingof a term
of endearment.
There was initial h o pe t h a t t h e original
order might be extended,either by t h e A i r
Forceitself, or by foreign purchases, but in
the end, th is was not to be the case.
for fi v e y ea rs , d er i ve d i n part f ro m i ts
ungainlyappearance, and in part from an
article by Major Michael G . Ma jo r , in the
summer 1973 issue of Tactical A ir War
fare C entre s in-house magazine TAWC
l eview I n d is cu s sin g p o ss ible names for
the new aircraft, Major recalled that the
Republic F-84 had received the less than
complimentarysobriquetof G roundhog
d ue t o its lamentable unstickingqualities
on take-off. Following this , the F-84F
more than twenty-four German aircraft
kills between them - but it lacked flair. Of
c o ur s e, it had happened before. The -II
h a d b e en t a ck e d on to t h e P h an t om ; a n d
English Electric s PI A h ad been christened
Lightning in October 1958 to much dis
g us t i n the U K , w h er e t he n am e w as f or
ever associated with the U S AA F s S econd
World War Lockheed P-38).
The official title wassuperfluous, how
ever The A-10 ha d a lr ea dy had a name
gement and w o rk f or c e a s w ell a s top
ry brass. The Air Force took the
perform an official naming
a nd t he r at he r unimaginative
ofT hunderbolt II was duly conferred
the A-IO. 0 doubt this tribute to
u b lic s P- 47 Thunderbolt was w el l
t,and was appreciated by the twovet
PA7 pilots in attendance - r et ir ed
General Francis S. Gabreski and
C olonel R obert S. Johnson, with
707
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INITIAL DEPLOYMENT PRODUCTION A D TACTICS INITIAL D EPLOYMENT. PR ODU C TION AN D TAC TIC S
Further Evaluationand Deployment
a bl e f or operational units that a s
programmed d e po t m a i nt e na n ce P
b as e was e s ta b lish e d at McClellan
California, to retro-fit earlier a
fl own in from a c ti v e u n it s acros
Atlantic. The 81st Tactical Fighter
TFW) pilots who ferried t h es e
back to Sacramento Logistics C enter
A L C) t h en pickedup factory-fresh m
from Hagerstown o n t h ei r way back
UK.The other major addition was the
duction of PAVE PEN Y, in 1 97 8,
Meanwhile, the assimilation proces
speeding up and lessonswere beingle
all the t im e. A t ri o of A-lOs toure
Pacific Air Forces PACAF) bases in
andJuly 1977,w hileon lJulythatye
3 5 6t h T F S became the first opera
s q ua d ro n a t M yr t le B ea ch . I n Nove
1977, another la rg e-s ca le te st was h e
t he J oi nt A tt ac k We apon s Sy
JAWS) t e am a t Fort Hunter Ligget,
fornia, Here, the A-IO was tried ou
combat evaluation as a partner to
Army s AH-1 Cobra helicopter. Nom
ly rivals, these two a ct e d a s a team f
purposes of these te sts , with the C
taking o ut t he hostile air-defence sy
but improvementscame about slowly and
surely, The upgrading o f t h e stability aug
mentation s y ste m was e a sie s t t o a ch ieve,
relieving the pilot of some o f t he work
load, although its main function remains a
mandatory warning system to allow com
pensation for e x ce s s control usage. The
HUD was also upgraded, and featured an
improved symbology generator because of
the installation o f t h e A IASN-141 INS,
The first production aircraft to have this
featurefactory-fitted was the39] st aircraft
s n 79-0127). It was considered so desir-
Typicalof theterrainthe A-lOs were guarding, and thetwo-planeformation they
adopted, two A-lOs of USAFE move purposeful lyoverthe WestGermanforestsduring
ExerciseThunderhog II,held in 1980 USAF
Howard Sam Nelson piloting the A l 0 on i tsmaidenfl ight, 10 May 1972 Long
established as Fairchild-Republic s ChiefTestPilot,Nelsonsaw theaircraftthrough
itsearly teething problemsto asuccessful launch, He w a s p r o mo t ed t o t h e b o a rd o f
thecompany, butsadly was to l o se h i s l i f e a t t h e P a ri s Air Showat Le Bourget,in the
onlyserious airdisplayaccident involvingthe A-lO. Natonal Archives Colege Park MD
Early Upgrading
The e a rly te sts with training and opera
tional units, a nd t he switch to the Euro
pean battlefield, brought about some re
evaluations. In particular, the lack of all
b u t t h e basic avionics to a id the - 10pilot
in h is ta sk s, a n d t h e lack of relaxedstability , were soon fo un d to need rectification.
At the beginning there was no inertial
navigation system I NS ), n o weapons
delivery computer, no in-built drag chute,
Prolonged manual flying, invigorating a s i t
might be in an age of computer-aided
everything, w ith he dge- and tree-dodging
at v er y l ow l ev el s i n combat conditions,
put a s ignif ic ant s tr ain o n t he pilot and
causeda drop in effectiveness, The terrain
masking ability remainedat the core of the
A-IO s combat scenario, but ta c tic a l a ir
navigation TACAN) required more than
the pilot sskill to make it battle-efficient.
The A-IO h a d n o t b e en o p er a ti n g long
in Eu ro pe b e fo re n e ce s sa ry modifications
began to be made. The process was staged,
T here was much a d ve rs e p u blic ity
w he n, o n 3 June 1977 a t t he Paris Air
Show, test p i lo t H o wa r d Sam Nelson,
Director of Flight Operations at Fairchild,
was k ille d, His mount was seen t o g e t i n to
trouble o n t he s ec on d loop of a double
loop manoeuvre, rapidly developing a h igh
sink rate that proved uncontrollable. The
aircraft struck the ground without recov
ery, bounced o n ce , h i t a s e co nd t i me a n d
disintegrated, elson had n o c ha nc e o f
survival.
gestation period, and remains one of the
safest militaryaircraftto fly, despite the haz
ardous nature of its calling, This record
madebad incidentsall the morenoticeable,
....-ru . : = ~ O f
fue reserve20minloiler I
atS L I dropbombs fre ammo
/ ~150nm I 256nm
278km) 474km)
406nm 752km)radius
............_ . . ~ ~ ~ ; : l r X5
OOOf
dropbombs
- . = ~ j b m ~ ; : U X5
OOOf O ~ : : : : : : : 0 -- : t t c t : ~ M ~ m J
ArmedReconnaissance Mission
Ordnance:8 x Mk 82 bombs, 750 rounds ammunition,
• F u f ue - 8 x b o mb s : 3 3 4n m 61 9k m)• P arta fue 6,213Ib/2,828kg)- 18 x bombs:144nm 267km)
LowAlti tude Mission
Ordnance: 18/8 Mk 82 bombs, 750 roundsammunition,
150nm 278km)radius
Close Air SupportFireMission2
Ordnance: 6x Mk 82 bombs, 750 rounds 30mm ammunition,
aircraftescort mission and the armedrecon
naissance mission s diagrams ,
Even though itwas breakingnew ground,
theA -lO had a comparatively accident-free
185nm 293km)
258nm 478km)radius
350nm 648km)radius
100nm 185km)
250nm 463km)radius
. = ~ j b m , ; : l r X5
OOOf
dropbombs
_. :fut ;: _l r \ 5 O O O f t
dropbombs
rtMission
nance: 8x Mk 82 bombs, 1 350 rounds ammunition,
SupportFireMission3
ance: 6x Mk 82 bombs, 750 roundsammunition,
SupportFireMission1e:6 x Mk 82 bombs, 750 rounds 30mm ammunition,
d e r t h e o rig ina l A-X p rop os a ls , s ix
combat scenarios wereenvisaged for
A-lO: three variants of close-supporting
missions, the low-altitude mission, the
102 103
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I ITIAL DEPLOnIENT PRODUCTION AND TACTICS INITIAL DEPLOYMENT. PRODUCTION AND TACTICS
e of AGM-65 Maverick missiles on a mobile transporterawait loading on the
ingstationsof an A l0 a t a B r it i sh b as e i n t he 1980s. USAF
The -10 f or ce i n E ur op e w as s
tured w it h t wo m ai n operational
(MOB) forming the core of the opera
The e w er e both w ell b a ck f ro m the
l in e, i n E ng l an d, a t t he Suffolk bas
RAF Bentwaters a nd RAF Woodbr
Although the central front in Ge
dominated NATO thinking and stra
the -I had in theory to b e a b le to
support against a oviet la n d a s sa u
matter where that might occur. Pote
ly, t he A -I m ig ht see action anywhe
Europe, from t he o rt h Ca pe a t the t
Norway, close to the gigantic Murm
complex, down to Gibraltar, the B
base on the southernmost tip of S
I n r ea lity , h ow e ve r , any confront
was expected t o t ak e p la ce on the n
Gcrman plain. While the MOBs gav
TFS f ul l b ac k- up , s up po rt , s up pl y
administrative facilities, plus hard sh
and intelligence networks, instant-rn es s u n its continually rotated throu
destroy enemy forces and equipment.
The squadron was deployed to Barbcrs
Poi nt aval Air tation, H a wa ii, f or
Operation O/JIxmune Journey and then
at FortRucker Army Ailfield, Alabama,
for Operation Quick F i r e I ~3 . Tr a in ing : 354th Tactica lFighterTrain
ing Wing, based at M rde Beach,
outh Carolina, began to convert from
A-7Ds to A-las in autumn 1976.
The Warthog Versus the Bear
At this time, thc largest concentration of
A-las was gathering i n E ur op e, with a
continued build-up of units based at RAF
Bcntwatcrs. This bcgan w i th t he 9 2nd
TFS in January 1979 a nd cont i nu ed
apace throughout 1979 and 19 0 , until a
peak was reached , w i th 10 A-las on
strength forming some si x squadrons ofthe 1st TFW.
I. Tactical evaluation and trials: 57th Tac
tica l Figh ter Training Wing (TFTW)
based at e is FB, evada (the ir
Force Wea pons a nd Tactics Center
(WTC)), h e ga n f ly ing A-las on I
OClOher 1976, with the66 th FW
2. Ta c tic al f ig hte r tr a in ing : 355th Tacti
c al F i gh te r Tra ining Wing (TFTW)
hased a t Davis -Monthan A FB , A ri
zona, hegan conversion from A-7Ds to
A-las in March 1 97 6, w ith detach
ment touring PACAF the year after.
This unit was assigncd an important
missionbctween January and J un 1 98 6,
w hi ch w as to maintain capability to
dcployworld-wide and p ro vi de C JIld
anti-armour o pc ra t io ns i n a ny threat
environment, cmploying GA - ,Mav
erick and a v ar ie ty of conventionalmunitions on missions dC igncd to
with justfifty-five A-las operational, three
units predominated, as follows:
Artwork I Tiger II on theinside ofCaptain G. Camp s access ladderdoor afavourite placefor art on the
otherwise unadorned A-lOs.A maintenance electr ician conductsa pre-flightcockpit checkduring
Exercise Gunsmoke 89 theTacticalAir Commands biennial air-to-groundfighter gunnery competition
in 1991. The A-lOs win thiscompetition yearalteryear. USAF
four - la s no tch ing u p 117 s or ti es i n a
single day.
By A ug us t 197 , t r ai ni n g hy the 333rd
Tactical FighterTraining Squadron (TFT
washeing conducted in readiness to turn out
pi lo ts f or the 1s t T F W , w h ic h w as under
notice to switch over to the -I hy Janu
ary o f t he following year. At around the
sametime, the92nd TF was due tohand in
i ts o ld F A Ds f or the -la, under Program
Ready Thunder. I n A u gu s t of that year, the
354th TFW saw the hack of itslast A-7Ds at
My rtle Be ac h, a n d, a f te r a thirteen-month
tr a ns itio n p e rio d, b e ca m e the f ir,t f ully
openltion,ll -lOWing in the ir Force.
The A-IO cont inued to make itself
known world-wide with ten aircraft from
the 354th taking part in another Red Flag
e xe rc i se i n t he a ut umn, t he J oi nt Air
Attack Team III at Fo rt K n ox and in l-
lant Eagle held at Ty nd a l A FR, Flor ida . 1n
the same year, an e igh t-p lane un it tookpart in Ex er c is e ColJe Elite over Hawaii.
As the A-las slowly came off the pro
duction l n initial allocations werein the
continental nited tates (CO .
aturally, these wereprincipallyin experi
mental and training units,in order to make
sure tha t the aircraft was fully pannedout
and up to ,peed. By the middle of 1977,
Smokewreathesthis A l0 ofthe 355th Tactical TrainingSquadron as her 30mm
Gatling Avengerchurnsaway attank targets on theGila Bend Range during
exercisesin 1988. USAF
whole Wing, some eighty-nine fit A-I s,
made 533 sortie, in fourteen hours. The
76th Tac ti ca l F ig ht er q ua dron out of
England AFB matched thi, with twenty-
the A-la, targeted the armour. 0
ammunition was used, hut otherwise
were made as reali,tic a, po i
Evaluated hoth separately and in the
comhination,hoth system,werefound
ave improved kill ratios when work
together.
an operation-readiness inspection,
at Tr av is Field, t he A ir N at io na l
r d ( A C ) hase nearSavannah, Geor
in January 1978, a complete squadron
wo d oz en A -las of the 356th TFS was
The trials encomp,lssed hoth
rates and endurance, with ordnance
,1ssessment taking place o n t he
Stewart ranges. Over a four-day peri
the ,quadron conducted 3 19 in di\ id
missions, an ;1\ erage of three sorties per
for each aircraft, dropped 42 k 2 2
homh, and f ir ed o f f ,O llle 2 5, 00
of30mm in realistic attacks.
Between 17 and 24 April 197 , a
o f e ig ht ee n A -I , f ly in g f rom
AFB, ~ ~ u t Carolina, f le w 3 24 s or
in three days, thusdouhling the Mlrtie
to ,ix per day. Atthe endof th i , in ten
p e rio d, a ll a ir cr a ft remained coml at
This record did not lastfor long, and at
_outh K o re a in March 1979, dur
Operation Coronet Fil1c , t he A -IO
worked upfrom fi\C to seven sor
per day. Similar high s o rtie r a te s w e re
at RAF Bentwaters, Suffolk,
during Operation Porker 500, the
704 705
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the A l0 ofthe 442nd Tactical Fighter Wing on the ground duringExercise
et Card.The 30mm Avenger GAU 8/A cannon is prominent i n t he foreground
T S O Pef od T F
91st Ahlhorn 1July 1979 to 1989 2nd
509th Ahlhorn Post 1989 2nd
78th Norvenich 1October 1979 to 1989 2nd
510th Norvenich Post 1989 to19 March 1992 2nd
5091h Jever Planned only to 1989 2nd
511th Jever Planned only post 1989 2nd
510th Sembach 1September 1978 to 1989 4th
78th Sembach 1989 to 3 May 1991 4th
92nd Leipheim 1Apri 1979to 1989 4th
91st Leipheim 1989 to 25 September 1992 4th
511th Wiesbaden Planned only to 1989 4th
92nd Wiesbaden Plannedonly post 1989 4th
6
can load the 1,200-lxld rounds in twenty minu
including the time taken to haul the equipm
[ the aircraft a n d d o all theconnections.
h a f f a n d flares and t he E e M p o d a r c
loaded up. This c o n t ai n s c o s mi c sruff wh
expertscan explain, but, a s a pilot, a ll 1know
that if I go i n to a n area that radar thre
thiS is designed to r e ac t t o that a n d j am s
rad.u signals, or indicates that I am ina s l tg
different place to where Ireally am, so that
enemy GH11 l0 [ InCItemy
aircraftIt
g i v ~ L
little herrer chance to out manOCU\TC a mis
or r Rlar gun Y lcm we arc hcing engaged
Other self-protection measures include
raJarwarning receiver,a small scope lip on th
t o p w h i ch wou ld t el l u s i f there is a r a da r o
there, and, ifit h a d b e e n programmed to the fr
quency and specifics of the s igna l, i twil l te l l
what kind o threat it is, w h e th e r a n SA-2,
A - 4 , S A - 6 , w h i ch is sending out the signa
Our PAVE PENNY laser sporrerdoes not em
wouldsayif the Russians were doingsom ething
overthere. At some pointthe decision wouldbe
made for us todeploy toour forwm dlocm ions in
G e rm a ny . W e would get the aircraft ready for
com bm - that would i n c lu d e b r i ng i n g o u t live
Maverick missiles, putting in wartime amll1uni
tion loads, loading up the real M avericks and
some other m unitions, and we d be on our way
to Germany. We d usc either triple or sll1gle
M a v en c k r a i b, w h i ch wou ld b e l o ad ed f rom
theirshipping caskets. The ammunition loader,
called the A-IO Draggin,li would h o ok u p to
the aircraft s A ru.
7
The loading operation was: pull the Dragginup
to the aircraft;as the loaded heltsarefed i n t o t h e
helix, t h e e m pt y cases are aUlOmaliGllly wken
out; thearm am ent bins come Out on largetrailers,
five or six at a time, and to t a ke t h e s p e n t bullets
out they always have an extra casing that the
em ptyam m unitioncan go into. I t s a pretty slick
operation and a well-trained and practisedcrew
In case theirforwardoperating location bases were destroyed or overrun by the Red
Army the European basedA lOs frequently practisedrefuelling and rearming and
working from improvised runways Here an A l0 comes in under a bridge on anewly
completed stretch of emptyGerman Autobahn t om ake a perfectlanding Natonal
Archives Coege Park MD
Our Intelligence sources c o n s ta n t l y m o ni
tored the \ (farsaw Pactground forces nnd they
The AFE A-I 0 teams continually prac
tised tactics and patrolled over the pre
dicted kill-boxes at known choke
points , such as the Fulda G ap, through
whi h oviet armour would be funnelled
on i t t r ip wes tward to the coast. These
boxes varied but were rectangles about80
nautical miles long by 20 nau tic al m iles
wide, based on predicted scenarios. The
same routine was adopted by the remain
ing two TF , the 509th and 511 th, when
theyjoinedthe 81stduring 1980.
In the e v en t o f a Soviet invasion, it was
expected that a fast deployment from the
Kwouldestablisha force of eighteen
lOs at each FOL. C ombat deployment
wou ld be in conjunction with the FA ,
either airborne in OV-I OA Broncos, o r o n
the ground, and the A-I O s ability to linger
in the vicinity of a fast-changing scene
combat p er si st en ce ) wou ld p ro ve
invaluable. The ideal situation would see
three tw o-plane groups from e a ch u n it in
contact with the enemyspearhead, with
another three groups en route or close to
th battle zone awaiting target assign
ments. The remaining two g roup wou ld
be o n t he ground, refuelling or rearming.
Major Kennedy described the probable
preliminary mov s asfollows:
W i t h t h e bulk of theA -IO fighting units in
Europe c o nc e nt r at e d o n c o nf r on t in g t h e
mountingmenaceof theS ovietthreat,the
U A F E p i lo t and gr ound te a ms eemed
d e t i ne d to be in the forefront o f a ny
shooting war in the 1970s and 80s. T heir
training, a n d t h e tactics developed by the
A-I to cope with combat in the deadliest
fire zonein the world, are therefore central
to t he A -l O story. By combining an eye
witne ss a count l7S with t he d at a subse
quently re leased, it is possible to gain agood in ight i n to t h e scenario.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Preliminary Moves
lyingt ission
Sentinel. Throughout 1979, squadrons
arrived from the A - the 51 th, the
91 st a nd t h e 7 8 t h- untiIfourwerein place
by the end o f t h e year. Two o f t he FOLs
Ah lh o rn a nd e mb ac h) were also fully
activated, so that practice forward deploy
ment could begin immediately. The 509th
1 October 1979) a nd t h e 51] th l janu
ary 19 0) followed. The FOLs themselves
were divided b e tw ee n t h e 2 n d A T Farea
no r t h) a n d t h e 4 t h ATAF south).
The detachments were in e igh t-p lane
unitsassigned to other squadrons FOLsfor
one week in three,so each piloteventually
covered the whole area as well <: h i own .
Thus, a t ot al of th irty-two A-lOs were
always forward-deployed in Germanyat any
one time, while the rest were held ready in
the UK. Each -10 p ilot u sual ly spent four
weeks at the MOB, followed by two weeks
of intensive flying, with twosortiesper day
on occasions, from the FOL. T his churn
policy enabled the -I p il ot s t o b ec ome
thoroughlyfamiliar with the terrain and also
the people over which theywere expecting
to have to fight. ot onlydid the contours
o f t h e land become etched in their memo
ries, but the di positionoffriendlyforces was
al so u nd er st oo d; t hi s was e ss en ti al for
smoothco-ordination in time of crisis.
During t h e h e ig h t o f t h e C o ld War, the
A-IO units in the SAFE were disposed as
hown in the table below.
These dispositions were continued for
eight years, only changing when, in
autumn 19 , due to crowded conditions
a t t he uffolk bases, the 509th and 51 I th
TFSs were transferred intothe I th TFW,
based at RAF Alconbury, near Hunting
don in Cambridge hire . From that point,
the 1st maintained a forward element of
two dozen A-lOs, w iththe I th maintain
ing eight more.
USAFE A l0 deployment 1980 88
FA, bringing with them wide knowledgc
of the European c o mb a t t h ea t rc ; o t he r s
transferred from existing combat units,
bringing their expertise. Complementing
them, as always, were green pilot, main
ly new intakes from the T-38 training
schoolsback in CO US, along witha few
oftheir instructors from under the wing of
the 355th T F f W.
The 92nd TF was the first A-IO
squadron to complete tra in ing. It arrived
with i t eighteen aircraft at Bentwaters on
26 january 1979, fully combat-ready.
Almost immediately, it deployed to em
ba ch t o t ak e part in O peration C enain
of six forward operating locations
in WestGermany. These FOLs,
c a m e unde r the Allied Tactical Air
rce ( T A F) c o nt r ol , were Ahlhon1,
, Leipheim, orvenich, embach and
Of these, jever and Wiesbaden
never actually used, but would have
in hot-warconditions.
Each squad ron was a lloc ated i ts own
, wherelimited refuelling, rearmingand
or repair and maintenance facilities
ted close to the f ront . hou ld any a ir
t r equi re more major rep ai r i t wou ld
ve to withd raw to o ne o f the MOBs. In
event (which was quitc probable) that
-emptive Warsaw Pact airstrikes might
thc FOLs, the -10 would
ed to lift offinconfinedspacessuch
utob hns (indeed, itfrequently practised
newstretches of motorway prior to pub
or similar suitable cmergency
At the s ame t imc, i t wou ld have to
on its in-built independence to keep
sorties while it could, with revet
ts incamouflage wooded area, or even
n car parks, ifnecessary.
Following the arrival of the first eigh
of the 1st at RAF Bentwaters
February 1978, the build-up o f t h e so
uperwing of s ix such uni t s fol
d quickly. The pilot mix was quite
ed; some transferred straight from the
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FLYI G T HE MI SSIO N F LYI NG T HE MI SSI ON
Battle formation. A pair of Warthogs in paired-uphunting mode cross the Rhine.
USAF
One-stopground refuelling kept the A-10 mobile and versatile. Here. an A-10
is refuelled by Staff Setgeant Dana Martin of the 81stTactical FighterWing on a
German Autobahnduring exercises. Note the pilot's ladder isfully deployed in the
background. NationalArchives,College Park, MO
The he l icopter / -10teamworb \ 'erywell,W
the he los rakingout thede fence \'i 'pop-
fo llowed by t h e A - IO striking the targer,
while he goes around rhe helo pops up ag
Hnd on.
Our job i, togo in and kill t nks, to elunin
the ta rge t with I1m,i1es or hul leh ,md theA
doc, a good Jobm thIS. Very dliclent. DUTln
practice ~ c : - . ~ i o n oul III thc C.difornlan dC
they tookone A-10, fully loadedwith amillu
t ionand let her loose on fifteen tanks theyh
parked out there. They found Ih t seven
heende'troyed cara'trophically,the other ei
were all hurned out , incapable of ac t ion a
immohile.
Flymg t he A -I O i , \'ery ,,,nple. If you h
f lown a Cessn 150,you c n fly an A- IO. T
first f l igh t in ,m -10 is solo. There is no lW
scare r t r a in ing Iane, thcre\ no instruc tor
thc hack scat or next to yOlI t o g e t you out
lrnuhle. It's an ea ,y aircnlft lO fly, \Cry simp
the haSlc, of it. The h i ~ g e s t prohlemwiththe
10 come, with the ac tua l employment . \Vh
you ge tout to the target area - a nd t h e FAC
the ground ~ l a n ~ gIving you information, a
you're sitting in Ihe cockpi tof an a irpl ne t
h i l ~ no autopilol, a very marginal trim ~ Y ~th t YOli don't dare let go of for more th n aho
three seconds Your HUD i, TIght on the im
your cockpit, you look at the la rge t followi
the H Dd i sp la y, y ou l oo k a t t h e m ap t hm k i
out plan of a t t ckand try III rememher wh
the friendly forces r e, a n dwhe re t h e h d gu
re, II th thut the ctu,,1 hard pmtoftheA-I
mi ion is the CAS part.
In lerdict inn, which we do g e t t ,, ,k ed
occa onally, I e , ,,y .Relatively. Because youc
down hcf'lt'eh.md a ndp l n it II out .Kno
ju..,r where your ta rge t is, ir\ normally not vc
mobile. If it 's on rhemap, a bridge just does
on
and hopefully the FAC,he'llgive us an
o f how th e b at t le 's going. Whe re t h e 'lI'm
where the enemy' , a t , wha tkind ofequipm
the ~ n e l l l Y has in the way of i r defence , ob
vations,launches, ,mything like tha t .He ' ll
I> the s ta rt POInt ca lled the ini tia l point (
di, tance frolll the II the target.Also coo
n te, and nything ebe that will be of use to
The A-lOs can co-ordinate their at
with Cobra helicopters:
Th e A-IO can also co-operate with
Allied ground-support aircraft in the
a l though the la t ter (o ther than a few
Harriers) will mainly he conducting
bash-out' missions, while t he A -I 0 s
around.
level pproach nd acquire the larget precisely
before the final att ck r u n. I t abo facilitates the
divedeliveryof free-f,tll,as distinct from guided,
or ' launch and leave' ordn<:lI1cc, which b fi red
from heyond-visual-range (BVR) for greater
accuracy. The aircraft's no se i , r.,ised between 15
nd20 degrees, andthe ir cra ft i, rolled in to the
attackeither for bomhdeliveryor strafing.
The Army's fire-support requirements clr( '
t r ansl red and tr nsmit ted by t he a ir liaison
officers (ALOs ), t h ro ugh t h e FAC s \'ia the
'nine-line hTlef' , ys tem , which condemes the
e ential demibof each mi ion for rapid a',im
ilation. The 'nlnc;\inc-hncf' inform(ltio l com·
prises the following:
I. Initial point (11) of,mack.
2. Magneticheading IP to target.
3. Dist,mce II [ target.
Elevation or targer- area.
5. Identification of target.
6. M p coordina te, of target.
7. Position offriendly forces.
8. Optimum direction.
9 Any other relevantinformation.
Once we get to the forwlTd rea we'llcall up on
the a ir ,to , groundand go, 'Hey - w h ; J t ' ~ going
The mission continues as follows:
Adopting the c1a ic A-I 0 wedge formation,
the wingm n would drop h c k from the flight
leader at anangle of between 45 and 70degrees,
while maintaining a ~ i m i l a r di 'tancc clpart. This
g i n ~ ~ the pilot in the fear r O ~ l t i o n a hCUCf c y c ~hall on hIS le der. He i, hetter able to match ny
lllilllOCLI\TC.., thelt ~ l I c c ~ ~ l I l t r r a i n ~ l l l , l ~ k i n gmight requITe,as wellas heing lIowed to switch
to ~ t a y s l l n ; ~ i d e while maintaining the ~ ; l t n c pro
file. The downside is rhat ir m kes the rear man
morevulnerahleto hostilefighter attack.
On ppnl<lch to the t rget area t h e FAC is
contacted for the late't updme on the'ltuatlon
on t h e ground,which wtll almo't cert inly have
ch nged s i n c ~ t h ~ fi t t sking of the mission.
The protec t ion of the soldier on t h e g r ound is
paramount to the A-I 0 pilm; it is his primeduty
andonly task. After the updare, the t ' get area
attack form I ion is a dop te d , u ,i n g e i th e r t h e
wedge formation, or, iffree-I II bomhsarc heing
u, ed and t im ing be tween runs i, vit.ll, the trail
(ormation. In t h l ~ forma tion, the wingman
moves into line stern, with a \Vide g po f I to
3 mi les (2 . 5-5km) be tween the aircraft. This
allows for the ,,,fedispersal of the flight bIder's
homh f r a g m c n l ~ l hefore t h ewingman cro. lc:- , the
: lame ;llf: lpaCC to make hi;; f Ul l .
Toohraincorrect \'islItll ~ i g h [ J l l g of a ~ m a l l lar
get, t h eA - I 0 pilot use, the standard 'pop-up'
procedure, to widen hi, hori:on from the 1011 -
\Ve fly p I f or purpme. Olw;ou,ly, all the
A-lOs,except for ahout X in the AIT Force, re
single-seat ircr ft. A l ot of jets h v e a g u y i n the
h ck who occasion lly can look o ut t he back
winduw c11d ~ l : C i clllyone is coming lip astern.
Or, i fyouarc in f s t a i rc raft l ike the F - II I you
don't figure t hat anyonc\ going to he ahle lO
come up hehind youanyway. The A-I ,which,
it aid, het bird ~ r r i k c ~ on the r C i l f ~ \ i c \ \ ITHrrOf,
h , a problem. So we fly 'IS apair,flight le der 'lI1d
wingman. The j o b o f t h e flight le d i, to n,\\'t
gate, figure out whmk ind of tactic:, and \ \ ' C < l r o n ~to deploy ove r the t rget area, keep up with the
ch nge, in the s i tu tion, ge t to the II and co
ordinatethe at t acb .The Wingy\ joh the ,.lIne
IS the b ck-seater's joh, h i , j o h i , p r im r i ly t o
check 6 o'clock [ make ~ L 1 r c no o n c ' ~ coming in
to hoot the flight, nd to make su re to keep the
flight whole du ri n g t h e d es c en t i n to t h e target
area. So I shared responsihility. We have
three T<lliio ,ets th t we arcahle to t l k to e c h
other Oil and it c an g et real h l l ~ Y . . , o m c t l m c ~In Ime form tion, the two , rcraft fly any
thing from 6, 00 to 9,000ft (I, 00-2,700111)
part in l ine bre ' h t (+ or -10 degrees). Each
pih)[ l max imum al l ; round VICW, cs:,cntial
for ear ly v i su a l ~ i g h t i n g on i n coming ho s ti l e
interceptors. The two pilots split responsihili
tics, wilh the s e ni o r p il o t, t h e flight leader,
being r C l r ( ) n ~ i b l c (or cor rec tnaviga t ion to the
target zone and air#to;ground contact with
friendly forces en roule. The wing man would
warchIheir backs.
basic two-plane attack configuration: line,
wedge and trail.
According t o Ma jor Kennedy,
Flight Patterns
and Formations
The standard A-lO combat flight patterns
are long established, with the two-plane
unit as the primary hunting formation.
Three- and four-plane formations have been
tried, and areoccasionally used, but the one
and-one formation gives unique flexibility
and confidence. Three formations form the
not have t ime to 'lock on', but increases
likely damage f rom l igh t weapons and
hand-held TOW missiles. It also demands
total concentration from the 'A-I driver',
if he is to avoid natural and man-made
obstacles- trees, electricity pylons, chim
neys, and so on. Attaining ingress to the
chosen target, however, til l often involves
such missions, especially in typically Euro
pean conditionsof lowcloud layers.
Despite the retro-fitments of INS to the
H Dd is pl ay , to help alleviate the dangers
inherent in a 'down-among-the-branches'
approach, t h e A -IO pilot still needs the
basic skill ofan exper t nav ig ator . l ap s to
I:250,000 scale o n t he ingress route and
the actual ta rget vic inity are standard
equipment on all A-IO missions. Being
able to plot his position o n t he e detailed
maps is as much a part o f t he a rt o f A-l 0
flying as actual flying skills. 0 navigator
is sitting behind the pilot to keep t r ackwhile he concentrates on flying and firing
theordnance; the pi lor flying the -10 has
tot: I responsibility.
p a ~ ~ i \ ' c system that receives laser energy
on the ta rget andthrows it up ro our I-IUD.
After II the prel im ina rie s haveheen done,
i r cra ft a rc ready to go, a nd t h e y s e nd t h e
The pilotgoe, overand looks ove t the
He> got a checkli, t of the minimum thing,
h , to check to m kesure thea ir c ra f t i , a c tu
to go into comhat. Once we start thi,
it is l Z ~ h o u r r r o c c : , ~ and j- c a ngo Oil
into the night.Sometimes we simulate fly
offat night.
So, off we go - we 'l l depar tEnglandand goon
to ourFOL in (Jerman1 of which thete arc
four. We'l l go ove r the re n d we'll ,it
h rd she lte r the re, the , quad ron operatiom
It> h r d lI1d it's biologic l- and chemi
nt defended, nd we'll o pe r te o ut o f
r nd hardened '\lrcraft ,helters.
h c r ~ \\( 11 gel ICl'lking- if ~ o l l 1 c t h i n g i going
we ,,,,,,,III deploy hope ful ly before w r
out. If nor, we'll deploy , 'oon as po ,
fterw rd, nd once we ge tove r the re we'll
s t r i gh t i n to t h e b a l ti c .We will 'ser
e ' the target, olherwiseknown as destroying
k i l lin g and maim ing Clnd anylhing wec a n do
m ke the enemy lImervice ble. If not, we'll
in \ a r i ) l I ~ ~ t a g c ~ of (lIen, depending Oil the
and then, once we g e t o u r [cbk IIlg,
l l lUnchOl l t f rom the FOLthrough speci,,1
th t a rc s e t u p a nd changed periodic lly,
to the forw rd rca.
on which type of mission the
to carry out - C A , ai r
suppression of enemy air
n ce s ( EAD) , combat search and res
(the successor of the famous SA OY
of the Vietnam War era), or spe
ope rat ion s suppo rt sor ti es - h e had a
of task specifications to follow, which
been finely tuned over more than two
of experience against constantly
g threats. Althoughthe introduction
Russians of increasinglysophisticat
systems made the A-IO's
tougher, itsabilityto punishany aggres
undiminished, even if the tac
altered.
vu Inerability o f t h e A -I 0 in the low
attack posture was the sub je t of
ess debate. This configuration can be
ed a operations conducted below
ft (450m) aboveground level (AGL).
down lower, to below 500 ft
m), d ec re ases enemy action danger,
the AAA and SAM systems do
108 109
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ng exercises followed thegroundtr ials;here.the A-10 takes up
t i on bel ow and behi nda KC 135 Stratotankerover Edwards AFB California.
Classicaerial view ofthe undersideof an A-10of the81stTactical FighterWing.
based at RAF Bentwaters. Suffolk, UK patroll ingover theGerman countryside.This
would have been itsmain battleground hadthe Cold Warturnedhot She carries two
AGM-65 Maverick missiles on station9 andone on station 10. to balance the M
pods andotherweaponry. Natonal Archives Colege Park MD
There i, alway, the f l,t jeh \. , , Iuw je t, arg
ment. A l ot of peoplestill rgue that \pced
life , and that you can only,urvive 1\ er the b
tlef ield ifyoua rc going fasr. The newjc ts, p
marily thc F-16,md thc Torn ldo, have improv
and goodcapahilities. They h<ne vcrI good n l
igat ion systems, they have v y good weapo
and point ing systems. The F-16 and Torna
can both make higher homh r um a t vcry f
,pceds, knowing that whenmakinghomh dro
on ranksrhey have a fairly g,xKI chance ofh
ring c l o ~ e enough to caLisc ~ o m e damagc, an
while iron homh, fe relatively cheap, and \
have lors and 10h of them lying a round, o
Maverickscan c o ~ t , accordingIOlypc, 'lIl)'whe
he twe en 40 ,000a nd 100,000 Ihc IVa, talkin
in 19891 and that s rather,ignificant expend
ture to kill tank. Especially ifyou ,h ,dd h l
I en t o m i, s t he t an k a nd destruc t a tact ic
h u ~ h incrroL.. i t h < 1 ~ happened There arc l lprohlems IVith using the Maverick, which is wh
we p leti,e usingit I raerically evcryday to t
andgethetter at recogni:ingthe p r o h I c 1 1 l ~ .
usually try to run into highcr irspeed ,md
throttle to max. Of course, theysay thar the
10 hasjust two throttle setting,. Its cither O
m i t s Off . orqUlte l
When we egress the ta rge ta rea wego h
home to our hardened she her and s tay in
cockpit while the guys on t he ground go h
through i t a ll ga in: new Mavcr icks, load
gun again, ~ l m more g a ~ . Intel l igence w
come out and tell us what\ going on h ICk at t
hattie i f there s bc en a ny c ha nge s , a nd a
changes to our ta , king.We might he going h
to thesame targetag(l in, or we might he go
somewhere diffcrent.
The uropean ttlefield
There was much scepticism about
rationale behind the A-lO, especiall
Europe, where ground defences wer
their strongest. Prejudice against all f
of CA had been deeply ingrain edAllied air forces, and particularly in
RA F, for fifty year or more. one o f
Allies subscribed to the -10, ei
because of a lack of money, or becaus
such prejudice. The A-IO p ilot s w
aware of the controversy, but r ema
unswayed by the doubters, both in Eu
and in somesections oftheir own serv
MajorKennedy put it a follows:
Vulnerability to oviet interceptors
not con sid ered a major threat by A
Vulnerability to Soviet nterceptors
The idea is to stayprotected wirh the gun we
firc and manoeuvre h lCk outof there. With the
M l\ erick you c n sometimes stay o ut o f the
enemy,threat e n n ~ l o p e in which c a ~ e we will uSC
all the giliry and capahilityhuilt in tothe A-IO
to makca quick I/lO-degree turnand get out of
the rhreararea. Thc hattlefieldgChrealcrowded
i:lIld \\ C normally arc turningII1lo ,>omeone d . . , e ~threatenvelope again wc normally tum again
and con,tantly evade nd he clear of them hefme
theyhave tunc to achicve a lock on us.
We usc a ll our powcr to try and keep the
enemy g u n n e r ~ guessing where the jets arc
going. If we get no r e s p o n ~ c at Ih is point we
Evasion and Survival
vasive Tactics
the gla S. Thi, new y tem will I , impro\ c our
ahility to drop iron bOlnh i t Wi ll automatlcilly
gi\ e u, a calculationwhich we call thc Dearh
Dot . I fyuu fly the aircraft t u t h e f<irget, pur rhe
Dea th Dot on t h e target, ,md d rop t h e homh it
will 1Im ,r cenainlyhit c1 ,e enough to causc
terminal damage.
\Y.e are al o getting c r u i ~ e y tem w it h a
radar h imeter . They ha\ C e limated th,lt
hel\\ l en 6 and 70 per cent of A-I 0 flying acci
dcnh ,Ire due t o rhe aircrafr hilling rheground
andthey Ihrnk rhcpi lot , were j lN not aware of
how low they where, or, whenthcy recognl:ed
the danger, didn t ha\ C e nuugh a l ti t ud e t o
recoverthe <Iircraft.
What he was talking about turned out to
he LASTE.
It ll go find the target and, hasically, not make
for agood day
Thi, i , pre t tyco,mic .We ha \ e e1e\ Cn ordn ..nce
,tatiuns and this gi:mo tells us whicharc luaded
andwith what e CCln fire our W C C l p o n ~ off in
salvoes m singles and itkeeps trackof allrhc fir
ings and tells u, what is stillavailahle.It spret
II nicc.
We havesome modifications to rhe Hawg that
we re getting right now, including an improved
HUDt h a t generates a l i tt l e g r ee n c ro ss up on
Although the A-IO primarily bases its hit
ting power on either t he GAU- venger
gun or the Maverick missile, it can carry a
wide range of ordnance. The pilot s selec
tion is made according to target suitability,
via the armament control panel (A P) on
the lower left-hand side of his instrument
panel.
The ACP provide switches for the selec
tion of all the weapons tations, control of
the Ga rl inggun s f ir ing rate, a rming of
selected weapons, mechanical bomb fu ing,
AIM-9 modeselection, jettison and release
modes, ripple quantities and release inter
vals. The eleven ordnance station pylons
are each represented by the i r own selec t
push-buttoncontrol, withalarm readylights
for each, and a master switch Arm indica
tor. The thumb wheels located over each
button correspond to the type of weapon
loaded on the pylon. E/O indicate a Mav
erick missile; LDGP shows that the load is
a low-draggeneral-purpose bomb; HDGP
relates to a high-dragGP bomb.
The station required is selected by push
ing in the appropriate button. Ifa string of
weapons is to be released, the buttons are
pushed in sequence. The release mode is
rotated forSGL (single), PRS (pairs) or RIP
(ripple) release of ordnance. If the bombs
selected require fusing, there are nose/tail
activator sw it ch e . When the Master
switch is moved t o t he Arm po ition, the
ready light come on over the selections.
Once eve ryth ing i set upv ia the the
pilot chooses the methodof release by way
of a but ton on hiscontrol stick.
Depending on the target, and type of
ordnance delivered, the A-1O team theneith rgoes around againfor another run, or
stations i tself in the outfield to await fur
ther targetdirection. Egress from the battle
zone is done a t low level,with the two air
craft alternating the lead so that each can
check theother forbatrle damage.
follower a ndpu t the pipper on the target area
andrhen tr bfer downimide rhecockpit to rhe
TV ,creen . We h . \ C two type, of laverick.
One gi\ C, l a TV pICture- it\ actually a TV
\ 1I e o G11l1Crcl rhelt\ mounted in the n ) ~ l of the
Mavcrick ilnd }.nn. u a v id eo p ic tu re ;.I y ll
look at i t in hlack andwhite (actllall), l a kind
of greeny-hlack).A t lIlk u,uallyh,,, camouflage
hut , , ,ually ,hull up dark again t a pluughed
uut field fm example, which will appear to he a
light background. The Maverick will luckon to
the difference, in the cuntra,r. It check> out
fuursides o f t h e rarget lthe paramete,,1 and it
will luck on to the contra st he tween the dark
and the light <1rea, and then when you launch,
it will continue ro ,ray locked on to tha rand it
wil lguide i t elf and impac t the targer.
We also h<1ve the infra-red Ma\ erick now
thar h<1s hetter capabilities.Obviously, the TV
guided M<1verick ha, prohlem withthesmoke ,
haze and dust, lowvisibilities, <1nd ifyou C<1nnot
sec the target it s not able to lock on. The IRMaverick gives us greater c<1p<1bilities as a rank
t e nd s t og e t re<11 hot with theenginerunning
and the treads get hot as i ts ta r tsmoving. The
IRscans the infra-red spectrum to help give us
a greaterlock-on range. Again, it presents the
video for you to see o n t h e T V sc reen as <1n
infra-red picture. Hot th ings show upa s b ei ng
light a ndc o l d t h ing s s how as being dark. So
<1gain the laverick works on t h at contrast in
the light to lock on the target once launched.
Maverick control is real neat stuff and
with its own TV screen. The method is
the HUD to get a rough placement on
targetalong the Maverick s intemled line of
when we launch our. The lookout will
the position o n t he TV screen against
one on the HUD and then ha ve t o adjusr.
we l l g o into pop-up, unm<1sk nur te rra in
tanks close in the gun act ion of
has three type of kills listed:
and llHl\ C half a mileaway. Unfonunate
tank> do andthey mm e fairlyqlllckly and it\
flUId cl1\'ironmct1ryou <lfe atf,lCkl11g Into,
a g r l ~ . H dcal of concclltmtion d l l good
on the pan of the pilot and a l ot of hell
h > wingm lll
kills - hits that strip tracks
fuse turrets, making the tank useless
action.
kills - enough direct hits to
any oviet-bui l t tank into scrap
trophic kills - ammunit ion or fuel
-ups for total destruct.
favoured weapon is the Maverick:
ction of Ordnance
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onducted with minimum hindrSEAO is therefore crucial to both
and BAI missions and usually pre
them. It is equally important for the
conducting of pa sive air operation
electronic warfare (EW) missions to
or disrupt enemy radar systems at c
times during a battle ,
In order to be effective, the actual
tion, de te ct ion and pinpoin t ing of
enemy AAA and AM y tems, fixe
especially mobile, is paramount.
increasing mobility of such systems m
them difficult to fix ina wide-rangingb
and the ability ofthe A-I 0 to wipe the
depends on theEW support mea ures,
with other target-acquisition sources.
The extraordinary difficulty in the
War in dealing with the mobile S
missile launchers is a classic case in
The inevitable time-lag between loc
and strike a lway g iv e such systems
to hide themselves, hence the role o
OA-10 to combine both missions sim
neously. Airspace co-ordination are
phase l in e a re used to he lp o-ord
and optimize the EAD offensives.
In this scenario, the host i le a ir
themselves are the targets , or, ra the
hostile fighter and strike aircraft on
bases. Depending on the location of
bases, with their concentration of p
and therefore vulne rab le aircraft, t
ometimes a role for the A-IO, and s
times for something with long rang
punch, like the B-52.
Offensive Counterair OCA
Waiting andwatching. An A-10 instandard European paintscheme heads outover
theWest German plain during ExerciseReforger 83 USAF
during s rt Storm by one -10 usingmissiles to down enemy helicopters.
This entails the destruction, damage, neu
tralization or degrading of all enemy air
defence systems, inc luding radar sta tions,
EW sites andcontrol HQ bunkers,acro a
specifically defined area of the battlefield,
in order tha t o ther air operations can be
Suppression of Enemy Ai r Defence
SE D)
F LYI NG T HE MI SSIO N
defending friendly ground force s. BAI
therefore requires pre-planned cO-OId ina
t ion hetween the friendly land force and
t he A ir Force clement charged with the
destruction of mutually agreed BAI tar
gets . As such, BAI has an almost immedi
ate effect on ground operations in the
assigned sector.
Close Ai r Support CAS
This is now defined as air ac tion against
hostile ground targets that are in c lo se
proximi ty to friendly land forces, These
require the greatest degree of highly
detailed integration between both friendly
air and land forces for each mission or sor
tie conducted; the fire-and-movement co
ordination of both must be precise. The
term close proximity means that friendly
ground force and/or non-combatant are
near enough to the assigned enemy targetsto b e h az ar de d by anything less than
absolute accuracy of ordnance delivery
from theA-I O.
The role of air control as accomplished
by attack aircraft includes the suppression
of enemy a ir d ef en ce ( SE 0 which
means the b lanking of fixed and mobile
AAA andSAM sites along the front line,
and also offensive counterair (OC) mis
siems. In theA-I0 case, these are flexible
and were, in fac t, translated into action
A b u s y s c en e i n t he s h el t er o f a f o r w a rd l a nd i ng b as e i n W es t G e r ma ny i n t h e
1980sas munitionsmaintenancepersonnel usethe Draggin ammunition loader
to replenish theAvenger on aThunderboltII during Exercise Checkered Flag 83.
USAF
Battlefield Air Interdiction B A )
Current Tactics
, ighr, ir enr<1i1, a wholc lor of m<1rhem<ltic>, hur
if end, up wirh rhe had guys seeing grear
chunk> of hIS ,lIfcrafr hcing hlo\\ n <lway \\e
rh lnk he l l gcr rhe picturc
The AIM-9, which ,hould he cuming <llong
, cry ,horrly, will givc us e en grearcr self-pro
leclion cal <lhiliry. If 11chody decidc, ro comc
down rhcre wlrh l and power , r ruggle , we ll
h<lve grearcr ahiliry a nd r h c f,lcr rh<lr \\T can
C<1rry rhe AIM-9,which b a very cap<lhlc AIM
mi i le , , houldhe lp us kecp rhemof four hacb.
This is seen as a p rimary Air For ce t a k
with in the ou tl ine parameters o f t he AI
scenario. Although the enemy aggressor
ground forcesmay not have closed to with
in close proximity of defending land units,
t ho se h o t il e f orces pos e a potentially
imminent threat to the movements, dis
posi t ions or planned operation of the
This embraces all aeria l activity carried
out in order to delay, neutralize or, ideally,
totally destroy an enemy army s full poten
t ia l as a m il it ar y threat before it can be
effectively deployed against the defending
land force, The bulk of operations and
strikesare carried out beyond the immedi
ate vicinity of friendly ground force and
r hu s on ly very limited co-ordination is
required, Targets deemed to be within the
remit of the A-lOin the Al role would be
C3 communications nodes, ammunition
dump amisupplybases,rail linksand mar
shalling y ar d i n the immediate rear of the
enemy forces dispositions, vital road
bridges, and so on.
While Major Kennedy was discus ing the
1987 European battle tactics, currentt hi nk in g on t he usage of attack aircraft
had no t changed tha t much. At the very
end of the twen t ie th century, there are a
number of scenario in which the A /OA
10 f inds employment: a ir interdiction
(AI), bat t l f ie ld a ir interdiction (B I),
suppression of enemy air defence ( EAO)
and offensive counterair (OCA).
owadays, the -I is able to use the
AIM-9 idewinder in conjunction with
the lead-computing EEG -II a i r- to-ai r
gunsight.
Ai r Interdiction
nor ro dog-f igh rhu r to rak e ourordnancc to rhe
fronr <lnd make rhcArmyComlmlnde rhappy),
srill,if someoncdccide, ro srick aroundand play
wirh lIS (which \\ C <lll rhink rhey will cvcnrual
II be forccd to do i fwc causeenough prohlems
to them), we Gll1 je t t ison our ordn,lIlcc to
improveour manocuvrahiliry.
And fin<1lly, we can go in fo ra k i ll . So, if guy
i n ~ i ~ t s on ;o,t<lying around wc arc going to t<lkc
him on <I our level <1nd wc lI go im idc a nd usc
the gun on him. Thar , cyc-shooting by rhc way,
h < l ~ i c a l l y we d o n or h av e a ny a ir c om pu ti ng
FLYING TilE MISSION
life inreresring hec<luse lor o f r h e n ewe r <lir
cr<lfr h<lvegor ,m e real nicesy lems to he lprhe
pilor figure our \\ here he sgOing. Thank> to rhe
ROY l Ordn<lnce Survey \\e have 1:25 ,000
rnaps for our primary navigation means. Creal
maps, rhey reallyare.
Srep rwo - h eGlU,e of rhe m<lnoeu\T<lhiIIlYof
rhe A- IO \\ e C<ln h lc<llly our-rum <lny orher
<lircr<lfr. In Europe Ihl i> hecomingmore diffi
culr for some of rhem C<ln u ,I<l1nvcrI highGs
in makingmore difficulr rums, hur srill we make
f or a ve ry difficulr rarger indecd for cven
,killed f ighrer p i lor u sc d r o opcrming <I high
altltuJc .... 0 to hide, to turn on 1[.
If rhc guy hecome, per;isrenr, \ \ e \ \ i II i f \ \ c
are absolurely forced to ( an d ou rm a i n lask is
ngly vulnerahlc ro enemy fighrcrs. Of cour>e
heSovier intercept rypes, rhcF lankerand rhe
ulcrum, are very good, verycap<lhle aircrafr. So
heA- I ,to dcfend it,e1f, h. I\\ ay, had a basi
four-,repsurvlnil philosophy.
The firsr ,rcp to hidc - if rhey can r find
ou, rhen rhey can r ,hoor you Th<lr is whywc
cnd to fly ourprcsent t<lcrics. Iwill fly our romy
i,siom ar low alrirude, in Gcrmany, helow 500
Thc arrack phasc will find mc hclow 100
popplllg LIp toacquir e the target, service it,
hen depan again hack hclow I 0 f cc r. Makcs
jers are mOSI efficienr m high altirudesand
lirrle loirer rime.
The A-I 0 i, in for numherof IInpnnTmenrs
h<lVC heen funded. Oneo f rhemi, rhar \\e
gc t ting rhe AI t\ I -9 . Pre,enrly, \ \ i rh a l l
<lircmfr, rhere is prohlem wirh rhe
gn to \ \ h ich rhey h<lvc heen huil l , \\ hich
lowerflight, more I r m o u r ~ r l a r i n g r r o ~and, n c c c , , ~ a r y hecClu te of rhe CI1\irOll
we a rc working in performance in
, which made LIS, it is said, i n c r c a s ~
low level. interceptorscannot touch the A 10. butinfra-red andhand-held SAMs
Highmanoeuvrability with atight turning circle. andchaff and lightdispensers.
A-10a good chance ofevadingthe SAMand Triple-Aof anyenemybefore
lock on. Here. an A 10 isseen pull ing high g s a s it banks over close tothe
range demonstrations in 1984. USAF
although uninformed critics in the
be preoccupied by it. Major
described ome countermeasures
improved defences:
772 713
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FLYING THEMISSION
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
2 2n d T ac ti ca l A ir S up po rt T ra i
S quadron T A S T S), e x O V -IO Bron
2 1s t T ac ti ca l Air S u pp or t S q ua TASS), Shaw AFB, South Carolina, pa
507thTAlRACW, ex OV-IO Broncos,
verted to OA-lOsOctober 1991, but in
v ate d 1 o v em b er 1 99 1, b e in g rep lac e
3 63 rd F W f ro m G eo rg e A FB , C al if o
Tran s fe rre d to 3 6 3rd FW on 1 A p ril 1
inactivated December 1993.
Dictatorsin the Middle East andFarEasthave no scruplesaboutthe useof chemical
and biological weapons and A l0 ground crews have to be ready. Here a suitably
protected airman makes an adjustmentto a bomb rackmounted o n a n A l0 during
combat readiness competition SabreSpirit 88. Teamsfrom eleven Pacific area
commandscompeted forhonoursin tencategories related to operation
preparedness. Natonal Archives Colege Park MD
5th Fighter Weapons Wing, N e llis A FB,
Las Vegas, Nevada.
O US
20th F i gh t er W i ng , e x F - I I I E and EF-
I l I A, m o ve d fro m R A F U pper Heyford,
UK, to Shaw A FB , 3 1 December 1993,
ta ki ng over 363r d F W A- IO aircrafr
including the 21st FS OA-lOs, redesignat
ed as t h e 5 5 t h FS on I J a nu a ry 1 99 4.
luctuating ortunes
nd ew oncepts
The VA lOB the OA lO LASTE
W hi l e A -l O firep o we r w as p rinc ipa lly
concentrated in Eu ro p e, re ad y for the big
one , C ONUS units expanded, conduct
ingspecializedtasking.To fulfil othercom
mitments,and to gain experience in a w ide
range of climates and conditions, incase of
the unexpected, detachments were s e nt t o
likely flashpoints, mainly in the PACFAC
area. Frequent exchanges were made
between CO US-based A -1 O u n its and
the front-line squadrons in the U K ,s o that
a rotation of p ilots g a in e d experience of
b o t h t h e area and of ferrying. In any full
scale combat, the loss rates of a ll ty pe s of
aircraftwere expectedto b e h ig h and,w ith
the attrition rate of A -lOs likely to be sig
nificant, rehearsal of cross-Atlantic rein
forcement was deemed essential. These
pilot exchanges became known a boar
swaps . There w er e a ls o a n u mb e r o f t e st
and evaluation units,such as the AX Joint
Te st Forc e J TF), set up to monitor devel
opment, formulate A-IO tactics and sug
gest improvements.
In Europe, the rapid run-dow nafter the
c ol l ap s e o f t h e S o vi e t U nion was finally
halted w ith the reactivation on 4 January
1993 o f t h e SlOth FS as part o f t h e 5 2n d
Fighter Wing. Based a t S p an g da h le m A B
in t h e r e un i te d G e rm a ny , it had fifteen
A -l Os a nd n i ne O A- I Os from t he 9 2n d
TFS. Detachments t o A v i a no A B in Italy,
to coverthe various Balkans crisis points,
drew A-lOs from th is, the final EuropeanThunderbolt II outfit. The rest withdrew
to C ONUS , wi th d et ac hm en ts t o
PACAF.
Dispositions
T hrough the 1980s a n d i n t o t h e 1990s, the
main Air Fo rc e A -1 O d isp o sition s w e re a s
listed below.
A pa i r o f 9 2 T F S A lOs inthe last chance arming
area at Bentwaters.August 1986. Peter Davies
Such strikes reached their peak during
the Luftwaffe s pre-emptive strikes on
Soviet airfields at t h e s t a r t o f t h e G e r m a n
Eastern Offensive inJune 1941. More than
2,000 Soviet aircraft were caught on the
ground and destroyed for the loss of less
than fifty German attackers. Such success
is harder to achieve nowadays, with the
development of sophisticated early-warn
ingradar networks, but strikes likethis can
still have a lo n g-te rm e ffe c t. Ifa irc ra fta re
not actually found and destroyed o n t he
ground, the enemy is at least forced to dis
perse them, so that t he y n o lo ng e r p os e
any threat to friendly forces. For example,
in t h e G u l f War, the Iraqis had to seeksafe
refuge for their a irc raft in Iran , their for
m er e ne my . ) S im il ar ly , i t is possible to
knock out enemy facilities, maintenance
hangars, fuel supplies, ammunition dumps
andcontrol bunkers.
In order to co-ordinate the application
o f t h e a b ov e m iss ion s it is crucial for the
Joint Force Commander to have a g oo d
grasp of what is the mostessential objectivein any givensituation. The decision about
t h e e m pl o ym e nt o f t h e air component is
th e re fore a lw ay s n e go tiate d b e twe e n la nd
and air commanders and,once i t h a s b ee n
taken, it is implemented by the issue of an
a gr ee d a ir t as ki ng o rd er ATO). Time
scales can vary, butthe average time to exe
cute is about seventy-two h ou rs, w h iIe the
durationof a typical ATO is often less than
twenty-four hours.
A l0 pullsout ofthe arming pit at Bentwatersfor themain runway while the
thesection still undergopre fl ightpin pull ing. August 1986.
Davies
m a p a n d Maverick safely aboard a 511 TFS pilot advancesthrottlesfor
Peter E Davies
174 775
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FLUCTUATING F OR TU NESA D NEW CONCEPTS THE YA IOB THE OA IO LASTE FLUCTUATING F OR TU NE S A D NEW CONCEPTS THEYA I OB THE OA I O LASTE
ALASKA
II th TASS, ac tivated a t
son FB A l as ka , I J ul y
raking over A-lOs f ro m
51sr Composite Wing T
c a l) , b a e d at Osan A B R O
February 19 I, with 25th
detached at uwon AS reing -lOs from January
R ed es ig na te d as 5 I t TF
January 19 4 , a mi moved
to O san I October 1 99 0
1 9 th T
2 5t h T FS , p ar t of the
Composire Wing Tactic
Suwon AB, ROK , s t
receiving A-lOs January
By 9 ovember 19 9, g av
all A-lOs prior toconverri
F-16, butinactivaredon 31
1 99 0. R ea cr i va re d w it h
10son I Ocrober 1993.
there on I Ocrober 1990 as
of 5 1 st Figh r er Group
Inactivated I Ocrober
Left A four plane trail formationfrom the25thTacticalFighter
Squadronseenover Korea during
Exercise Team Spirit 8 Natonal
Archives Colege Park MO
19rh T S, at Suwon, ROK,
ex OV-19 Broncos, converted
to OA-IOs I A ug us r 19 9, to
replace the 25th TFS. Assigned
to 5th Tact ical ir Control
Group at Osan and moved
REPUBLIC KOREA
5th Tactical AirControl Group
TA G , at uwon, ROK,with the 25rh FS and the 19rh
TA , between I January 19 4
and I Ocrober 199 .
PACAF
Engineering FlightTest EFf ,
a ramento Air Logistics Cen
ter ALC , McCle llan AFB.
This un it f le w s in 81-0989 to
t es t s of tw ar e a nd h ar dw ar e
modifications.
EveryA-IO hasat sometime
or other passed through Sacra
men to A ir Logistics Center
SM-ALC , which is the A-IO s
main maintenance depot.)
Above Thisrear view shows how
the highpositioning ofthe engines
reducesthe riskof damagefrom
ground debris On a wet paved
runwayat Suwon Air Base inthe
Republic of Korea two A lOsstand
ready inthe earlymorning light inthat
potentially deadly f1ashpoint USAF
4443rd Test and Evaluation Group, part of
the Tacrical Air Warfare Center TAWC
at Eglin FB Florida.
422nd Te t a nd E va lu at io n q ua dr on
TE ), at ellis AFB, Las Vegas, Nevada,
redesignated 30 December 19 I.
3246rh Test Wing TESTW , a t Arma
ment Developmentand Test Center, Eglin
A FB, Flor ida . Re c eiv e d f ir t A-lOs early in
19 ,and f ou r a ir cr a f t s /ns 7 3 -1 6 65 , 7 3
166, 79- 166 and 2-064 served
be tween then andend of 1992.
6 5 I O th/4 12 th Te s tWin g , Air Force FI ight
Test Center FFfC , EdwardsAFB, Cal
ifornia. Part of the original A-XJoint Test
Fo rc e J TF) f o r m ed in 1 97 2, becomingthe
A-IOJTFon 18January 1973. Redesignat
e d as 412nd Test Wing TW 2 October
1992.
44 5th Test Squadron, flew aircraft of the
4443rd T WC at Eglin AFB, Florida. The
three A-lOs utilized between 2 Septem
b e r 1 98 1 and I June 1 98 9 w er e s in s 7 8
0715,78-0599,79-0166.
602nd Tactical AirControl Wing TAIR
CW , converted from OV-IOs to OA-IOs
IOctober
19 7 w iththe
2 3r d T a ct i a l Airupport Training quadron TASTS , fol
lowed by t he 2 2nd TA T 5 June 19
Redesignated as the 6 2nd A ir C on tr ol
Wing ACW on I October 1991 with the
22ndand 23rd TA T .
507th Tactical Air Control Wing
AIRACW , at h a w A FB, South Caroli
n a ,e x OV-I 0 Broncos, redesignatedas Air
Con tr ol W ing CW on I Ocrober
1991, operated OA-I Os from Shaw A FB
South Carolina, f ro m 1991 u nt il I A pr il
1992, when transferred to the 363rd FW.
363rd FW at h a w A FB, outh Carolina,
rook over OA-I 0 from 7t h ACW at
haw FB ou th Caro l ina , on I April
1 99 2. I n ac r iva r e d 13 December 1993,
when replaced by 2 th FW from RAF
Upper Heyford, UK.
22nd TAST inactivated I ovember
1991 and replaced by the 334rd TF ,and
23rd T T inac t ivated same da te and
r ep la ce d by t he 35 4t h TF Both
squadrons returned to the355 th Wing on
I M ay 1 99 2 and 602nd ACW inactivated
June 1992.
76th TF , converted ro A-I s winter
19 I Inactivated 2 9 Ma y 1 9 92 .
355t l \ TFS, o p er a tio m ll w ith the A-IO
F eb ru ar y 197 . I na tivated 21 March
1992, due ro the closure of Myrtle Beach,
AFB. Reactivated as part of354rh Wingat
Eielson AFB to r ep la ce r h e I I t h TA on
2 August 1993.
354th F , activated 5 January 1 99 3, a r
McChord AFB, Washington, as separare
part of355th Wing for Army co-operation
work at Fort Lewis and the Yakima Firing
R an ge . M ov ed t o Davis-Monthan AFB,
Arizona a nd t he n replaced 333rd F at
Davis-Monthan A FB , r iz on a.
353rd TFS, received A-lOs i n A ug us r
197 . Inacrivated 15 December 1992.
354rh Ta c ric al Figh r er W in g a t Myrtle
Beach FBouth Carolina,
ex A-7Dse a rly 1 97 7. Be ca m e f ir toperarional A-IO
Wing O cto be r 1 97 . R e de si g na t ed as
354rh Fighrer Wing FW on I October
1991. Inactivared in s tag e s during 1992,
355th F March, 356th F in June and
353rd FS in December.
357th TF f , ex A-7Ds converted ro A
lOs A pr il 1 97 9, and became rhe 357th
TF on I ovember 1 99 1 , a one o f t h e
A/OA-I Formal Tr ai ni ng n it FfU .
355th Tacrical Training Wing, Davis
Monthan AFB, Arizona.
358th TF f , ex A-7Ds January 197 ,
becoming the 35 t h F ig ht er Squadron
FS) on 1 October 1991, as an A/OA-I 0
Ff U
354rh TFS, summer 1994, took over334rh
TFS A -lOs a t McCho rd AFB, Washing
ton, and moved to Davis-Monthan AFB,
A r izo n a, I October 1994.
333rd TF , ex A-7D March 1 9 76 u n til
inacrivarion 15 February 1991, TAl RCW,
Davis-Monthan AF B, r iz ona , I ovem
b e r 1 99 1, 355th Wing, same p la ce I M ay
1992, handed over A-I s t o 3 54 rh TFS
ummer 1994 and became F-15E aircrew
training quadron at eymour Johnson
AFB, North Carolina.
356th TF , the first operarional A-1O
squadron, October 1977. Inactivated 3
June 1992.
FighterWeapons Wing FWW ,a t the
apon and Tactics Center WTC , el
FB Las Vega, evada.Redesignated as
Fighter Wing FW I October 1991.
F ,redesignated from the 2 1s t F at
w A FB on I J a nu a r y 1 99 4, e q u ip p e d
OA-I s until convertedto F-16 /D
1996, their OA-I Os b e in g tr a n-
to the 74 th F at Pope AFBand the
AFRE at aval Air tation
ew Orleans.
F ,as par to f the347 th FW, based at
y AFB, Georgia, converteJ to A - lOs
e ummer of 1995.
FW as part o f the 507th A irContro l
W at Shaw FB ou th Car
converted from A-lOs to F-J6C/Ds
1996.
TF , converted to A - lO s m id- 1 98 1 .
c ar e d to Po pe FB NorthCarolina 1
1992, as parr of23rdComposite Wing
Fighter Wing TFW , ex A
converted 23 September 1989, Eng
FB lexandria, Louisiana. ccept
very last A-IO s/n 82-0665 . On I
1 99 2, w ith c los u re of En g la n d A FB,
d t o P op e FB orth Carolina as
Air-Land Composite Wing.
TA T , e x O A- 37 Bs , c on ve rt ed t o
- IO October 19 7 a t D a vis - Mon th an
Arizona, as part of 602nd TAIRCW.
ivated I ovember 1991, replaced by
TF .
Ta cr ica l Fig hte r quadron, firsr of
TFW s q ua d r on s to convert to -10.
15 February 1992, converted
1 6- / D, b ur re-converted b ac k t o Ain summer 1 99 4 a r Po pe , A FB, orth
F ,as part of new23rd Wing,convert
- I in s u m me r 1 99 6, r a k in g so m e
r af t f r om 5 5r h F a r h aw A FB .
Fighter Weapons Squadron FW
is FB Las Vegas, evada as part of
57th TTW and then FW. Became the
Division of the Fighter Weapons
ol FWS o n 3 0 December 1981.
to 0 -lOs on 15 June 19 as
of 602nd TARCW. Inac t ivated I
1 99 1; r e pla ce d b y 333rd F .
776 777
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FLUCTUATING FORTUNES AND NEW C O C EP TS - THE YA IOB THE OA IO LASTE FLUCTUATING FORTUNES AND NEW CONCEPTS - THE YA IOB THE OA IO LASTE
target recognition, c ou pl ed w it
improved HUD and was expected
ready by 1985. [ t was thought tha
could be re tro-fit ted to t he A- I0 fwould provide them withall then ig
bae l-weather ab il i ty they would r
obviating any need for a specialized N
and allowing the project to die.
[n theevent , the system underwe
era l design changes and was not re
time to be fit ted on the productio
The Ai r Force delayed introduct
1981, a nd t he system finally h ad
retro-fi tted to theA- tO fleer.
The trials at Edwards were all cond
successfully. They continued unti l
but no further conversions took place
Air Forcewas convinced that the new
angled navigation and targeting inf
system (LANT[RN), then being
oped, would be the r ea l a nswe r to
prayers. LANT[RN also featured auto
LLLTVwould have been buri di n lhi ng edges of the a ir craft 's wings,
promised delivery of this version o
/AW as ea rl y as 1983. Unfortun
much more attractive to theAir For
the possibility of equipping the singl
original so that itcould handle allasp
the /AW mission. This variam, the s
scat nightattack (SSNA) aircraft, co
produced much more cheaply, and the
an even more'austere', or cut-price ve
Costing had much to do with the differ
ence in the schools of thought. The cost of
upgrading an A-tOinto a two-seater to take
the new equipment was estimated at 1,500,000 apiece. Fairchi1d came up wi th
improvements that they hoped to incorpo
rate into the production aircraft, includinga
new one-p ie ce w indshield and single
clamshell canopy for better vision. They
also planned to give the WSO some much
needed protection by means of composite
alloy/titanium/nylon sidepanels. The FUR
and radarwere to be built into the knees of
the l anding pods, whi l e the Laser ::md
Nose u p a nd bombed up looking leanand mean 73 1668 thefifth pre-production
aircraft headsout of Edwards AFB overthe Californiafoothi l ls on testand evaluation
trials. The ruddersand the tail finsare painted bright orange to aidtest observations
during thesummerof 1977. AFFTC/HO Edwards AFB
of airworthiness checkson bo th front and
rear seat control and handling. The low
a l ti tude warn ing s ensor s were t r ia l le d
extensively against a wi de v ar ie ty of
ground profiles and both natural and arti
ficial obstacles. Th is was followed by low
altitude flights, target and threatdetection
and gun firing. While the p i lo t remained
responsible for the Ca t ling gun attacks,
the missile deployment was made by the
WSO, one mansearching for thenex t tar
get while theo the rconduc ted thecur ren t
strike. The Air Force was especially eager
to assessif all the complex new equipment
could be handled equallywellby one pilot,
for , if i t could, theenhancements could all
be retro-fitted to bring the basic A-I 0 up
to date. [ n t hi s they were not backed by
Fairchild, which envisaged /AW work as
strictly a two-man profile.
built in tandem overthe main ammunition
drum, with a considerableelongationand a
built-up fairing, which were used to accom
modate di sp lac ed avionic s package s. To
accommodate two men, the cockpi t was
made side-opening (to starboard). The
WSO lacked thetitanium'bathtub' protec
tion o f t he pilot and was n ot HUD
equipped, but i n m os t other respects the
two cockpits were duplica ted, with after
fl i ght c ont rol v ia a second yawstick.
Improvements include advanced avion
ics in the form of a short-range, multi-mode
navigation and attack r adar , c ar ri ed in an
underwingpod. Based on the Westinghouse
WV-50 standard-weather radar, the new
terrain-followingradar (TFR) providestar
get indication,simple ground mapping,ter
rain tracker/avoidance and trlrget detection
modes, the latter ofwhichcan pickup small
moving targets. This enables the early
detection of hosti Ie threats from the radaremissions o f S AM and radar-controlled
'TripleA's ites . A Texas Instruments AAR
2 s te er ab le f orwa rd -l ooki ng i nf ra -r ed
(FUR) se t is carried on the centreline sta
tion, coupled with a low-light-level TV
(LLLTV) sys tem shipped in plac e o f t he
PAVE PE NY outfit . This wor ks w it h a
Litton L -3 9 i ne rt ia l navigation system.
The package makes an image presentation
superimposed upon the modified Kaiser A
10 HUD, with limiteddepth cueing,as well
as apair of cathode-ray tube (CRT) displays
in the aftercockpit. Thisdata can be input
to give target-ranging data to the Catling
gun. There is provis ion also for asecondary
terrain-avoidance monitor, as mentioned
by Major Kennedy, as well as the upgrading
of the existingINS.
A l l in a ll ,w i th thes e improvemems, the
/AW a ir cr ew was provided w ith a com
plete ' re al wor ld ' d is play , electronically
generated FUR system, with radar-gener
ated terrain contour profiles and terrain
avoidance s teering information, with a
laser-slant range-measuring system. This
resulted ina 2,0001b 91 Okg) weight penal
ty bu t theN/AW wasstillcapable of carry
ing the same offensive ordnance into battleas the A-IO. The additional weight did,
however, callfor additional stability and to
achieve this the fin and rudders weremuch
enlarged vertically, by 20in (50cm) to give
better lateral stabili ty and contro .
The N/AW variant was pushed ahead,
the first aircraft being delivered to Edwards
FB f or f ligh t t es ts , which commenced
with a debut flight on 4 May 1979. The
300-hour flight-test programme consisted
been no stated requirement forsuch an air
c ra ft , b ut , i n t ru th , t he A ir Force had
expressed growing concern at rhe fact that
the Soviets were devoting almost 40 per
cen t o f thei r training to night operations.
Whi l e t he basic A 1 could operate at
night, i tcould only do sovia the use of illu
mination flares. This relatively primitive
method could belargelynullified by adverse
weather conditions. Furthermore, experi-
e nc e o f A-1O European operations had
made i t c lear how much all-weather capa
bility was needed in that theatre.
As a preliminary step, the first ofthe preproductionDT E A-lOs (s/n73-1664) was
sent back to Farmingdale to become the
test-bed and evaluator for the new design.
Workcommenced at Farmingdale in April
1978, and continued for just over a year.
With considerable foresight Fairchild had
buil t in such an enlargement so t ha t t he
physical changes were not as great as might
have been expected. The second cabin for
the weapons systems officer (WSO) was
developments in the basic A-10 design,
and a number o f modif ica tions had been
made to it.
The poim made by Major Kennedy
rhar there was no dual-seat A-lO - had
exercised rhe minds ofborh theAir Force
a nd FRC for some rime. Indeed, a s long
agoas rhe 1972 Specification, ir had been
spelt out that ' rhe vehic le design shall
a llow for e as e of growth to a two-place
version for training (withcombat capabil
ity) and n igh t /adverse weather (N/AW)
attack'. The c ompany h ad s ou gh t to
improve on t he basicdesign andhad seenthe need for a two-seat N/AW version.
In autumn 1977, FRC made a proposal
along t hes e l ines to t he A i r Force and, in
1978, the 000 gave the company permis
sion, and 5 million dollars o f t he 7 mil
lion dollars of development f unding , to
design and builda prototype.The rest came
from FRC itself and from interested avion
ics suppliers. The 00 0 contribution
seemed generous, since there had originally
Inacrivated 1 October 1993, having
replaced by the354 thFW and355rh
on 20 August.
TFS, as part o f the 343rd Composite
received two dozen A-lOs on 1
1981, and moved to Eielson AFB,
on I January 1982. Converted to
and relinquished A-lOs from March
ng thetai l-codefor Alaska this 343rd Tactical FighterWing A l0 prepares to drop Mk 82 Iron bombs
ng combinedArmy-AirForce live-fire ExerciseCalfex IV atthe Yukon Command Trainingrange. USAF
the 1980s and i nto t he 90s,
had be en several wide-ranging
Composite Wing, w it h 18t h TFS,
son AFB, A la ska . Redesignated as
Tactical Fighter Wing on 8 June
and as a Wing in March 1991.
FW reactivated at Eielson on 20
1993, replacing 343rd Wing and
its personnel and aircraft.
118 779
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FLUCTUATING FORTUNES A N D N E W CONCEPTS- T H E Y A I O B . T H E O A I O. L A S TE FI_UCTUATING FORTUNES A N D N E W CONCEPTS- T H E Y A I O B. T H E O A I O . L A S T E
Whenthe blow from Congress came in
summer of 1982, Fairchild officials ad
ted that t hey had to place a f or eign m
tary sale within six to nine months if
were t o k ee p the A-IO production
open past April 1984. t the tim
seemed t ha t t he ir best opportunitie
such a f or eign sa le l ay in negotiations
were under way with Peru, Moro
iRAt the time of the sales drive for theA
Iran presented a picture similar to Mo
co. The Shah was an autocratic ruler,pro-West and a good bu lwark against
pene t ra t ion ofCommunisl l ' in to the
rich Middle East under the guise of A
nationalism. Had the planned sale o
A-IO gone through, however, the surp
ove rt hr ow o f t he S ha h, a nd his rep
ment by a vitriolic avidly anti-Wes
clerical government, would have led
some r ed f aces i n the White House.
Iranians might have found the A-IO u
in theirown prolonged andbitter war
Saddam Hussein, but t ha t was not t
either.
THAILAND
In the Far East, after the calamities o
1970s, when the whole area collapsed
Communist darkness, one na tion see
to hold out against the Red tide. Thai
remained a free country, butthreatene
its northern and eastern borders. Th e
o f t h e A- I0 was thought very likely h
The Thais h;ld seen the power o f t he A
a nd k ne w well enough that what
needed was rel iable hitting power, ra
than showy acrobatics. Yet again, how
er, the depleted uranium 'problem' s
stifling o f i nt er es t a nd n o sales resu
was what they really n eeded, b u t
could not have bo th that and sleek m
million dollar air superiority fighters.
A-IO was not designed to slug it ou ta t
tudes, while any fighter could drop bo
and fi re o ff m issiIes that looked effec
even if they did not actually hit anyth
There were no sales to Morocco.
A F ai rc hi ld r ep confided a t t he t
Essentially, our competitors arc f igh
which could cost twice as much as a n
10. I f there were any armies i n the w
that had t he ir o wn t act i ca l av ia t
they'd love the A-IO.' But, there were
and here was the rub: 'A Mach 2 plan
sexier, and some pilots may think hit
ground targets is a grunt's job.Ii>
In 1983, the Fairchild sales team was fairly
confident of selling between s eventy and
eighty A-lOs to foreign countries over the
following twoyears. In theevent, not asin
glesalewas evermade outside the USA. At
the ParisA ir Showthat year the talkwas of
three very interested parties, two in the
NeClr East and one in the Far East . What
happened t o t he se po te nt ia l customers?
Congress Ends A JOFunding
In 1 98 2, Congress delivered t he d ea th
blow to the A-JOwhen it voted to discontinue all funding o f t h e aircraft with the
Fiscal 1983 Defense Authorization Bi I I
The House and Sena te conferees o n t he
bi II made the recommendation and Con
gress approved. There was to be no
reprieve, although 29 million was provid
ed for ' l inetermination cost s . Even as l a t e
a s 1 98 3, F ai rc hi ld was h op ef ul that its
lobby in Congress might reverse thisdeci
sion. The Reagan adtTlinistration hCld
sought 357 .3 million for twenty A- lOs
and the House, pr ior to the House-Senate
conference, had recommended 329.3
million for 30 A-lOs, p lus 28 million for
Cldvance procurement of twenty more in
Fiscal Year 1984. I t was not t o be.
ost Sales
End of th e Line
MOROCCO
The target of extensive Fairchild presenta
tions, with a moderate ruler, and LibyCl and
Alger ia as uneasy ne ighbours , the A-IO
seemed an ideal buyfor Morocco s defence
needseast ofthe Atlasmountains. Howev
er,as elsewhere, the strictlyone-role profile
of the A-IO worked against i t. I t maywell
haveheen th; lt this excellentCAS ;lircraft
The main difference in t he OA-IO is
internal. Externally, there are hard ly any
differencesat all, withthe role beingmain
ly reflected in the pylon loading. White
phosphorus marker rockets r eplace the
Mavericks and bombs, bu t the 30mm guns
ar e s ti ll carried, c l ass if ied as a defensive
weapon, although with a change of muni
tions its tank-smashing potential remains
undiminished
Initially, two groups of A-lOs were con
verted in to OA-IOsand these were based
a t Davis -Monthan AFB, neClr Tucson,
Arizona.
Towards t he end of the 1980s, having
designed, bui lt a nd operClted the best
CA aircraft in the world, the Air Force
wasst i l l kicking hardagainst it, threaten
ing at every turn to withdraw i t f rom ser
vice and replace it wit h t he F-16. As so
often b ef or e i n t hi s d eb at e, t he threat
brought first anger, then despair from the
Army; one suggested solution was to
transfer to en t ire A-IO force to Army
control. Yet again, t h eA i r Force wanted
the best of both worlds: they migh t not
wan t t he A- I0, bu t the re was no way the
Army was going to be allowed to fly jets.
The trouble was that t he n um be rs
impinged on the pure a i r superiority jets,
the glamour planes, that the USAF was
al lowed to f ield un.der the various disar
mament treaties with the Soviets.
Tothwart the Army and reduce the num
bers problem, an alternative proposal for
entire A-I 0 usage found f avour. For a long
time the Bronco and similaraerial FAC aircraft hadbeenobsole te andther e wasclear
ly a need for a much-upgraded successor.
The A-IO filled the bill and helped solve
t he o th er problems. By converting the
A-IO in to an observation and reconnais
sance aircraft, numbers could be kept on
s trength, but would not be counted in the
pure f ighter totals. The alterations neces
sary were not very great and modifications
would ther e fo r e he cheap to implement.
A-lOB Trainer
OA-lO
Like the lAW a training vers i on a l so
called f or a two-seat design, and this, the
proposed A-lOB, wasalso studied. It called
for no advanced electronics, just dual con
trols and the like. Fairchild culled data for
this design from the trials with the l W
an d t he A ir Force p la ced an order for
twenty A-lOBs, to be added to the e nd o f
the norma l A -IO production run. The
plan was for these to b e f l own b y AFRES
and ANG units. No othe rs would have
been b ui lt ; i f the need arose, existing
A-lOs would be converted for the job.
However, the easewith which the A-IO
could be f lown negated the need for the
TrClining Twenty' i n the eyes of Congress,
and all funding WClS deleted in J983. Thus
it WClS that the FClirchild designers fell vic
tim to their own success, and the A-lOB
never became more than a g le am in thedesigner s eye.
Above Rear view ofthe VA-lOBovertheCalifornia desert showing thetai l which had
been raised by 20in 50cml. andthe extrapods
forthe night/all weather role. AirForceFlght Test
CenterMuseum Edwards AFB
Top Aerial view ofthe VA-lOBoverthe California
desert during trials from Edwards AFB showing
thesize ofthe second cockpit and associated
fairing which necessitatedthe heightened
verticaltai l on thisaircraft. Air Force Flght Test
CenterMuseum Edwards AFB
Excellent view ofthe one-off dual-seatervariant
during test-flyingfromEdward AFB California.
Notethe highrearseatingfor thesecond crew
memberand theextendedcanopyfair ing which
housedsome ofthe extra electronics forthe
night/all weather role. USAF
f 9
720 2
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FLUCTUATING FORTUNESAND NEW CONCEPTS - THE YA IOB THE OA IO LASTE FLUCTUATING FORTUNES AND NEW CONCEPTS - THE YA IOB THE OA IO LASTE
Pilotaccess to the A l0 cockpit is by way ofa telescopic boarding ladder,loweredfrom a door on the port
sideof thefuselage below thecockpit.This isseen here onan A l0 ofthe 509th Tactical FighterSquadron
TFS . pictured at RAF Alconbury,Cambridge, UK, in 1989. The rearward-raised cockpitcanopy
isalso shown to good effect, with theKaiserhead-updisplayalso clearly visible. USAF
Egypt and Thai land ,bu t no tone
came to anything. <0
failure to sell the A-IO abroad,
e in tensive e f fo r ts , le ft Fa irc h ild ,
with the finish ofUSAF production,
and dry.
roduction Run nds
the final production aircraft, 0713
rolling off the delivery line
ng delivered to theAir Force on 20
1984, an eleven-year production run
t o an end. ' This A-IO was to be the
aft built at Hagerstown and, with
of the A-IO programme,
hild was forced t o c as t a ro und for a
Since 1977, the Air Force had
hop in g t o replace the Cessna T-37
which had s er ve d i n i ts inventory
1958. Fairchild, with a history of suc
trainer aircraft, naturally was interand, even before the issue of the RFP
1, had begun preliminarydesign stud
w as hoped that such a programme
k ick in a t t he end o f t h e A-lO run,
there prove to be no reprieve, and
keep t he p la nt g oi ng . I ni ti al ly , i t
that th is w ou ld b e the case, for, on
1982, the company was named prime
for the next generation trainer
fleet, and w as a wa rd ed a 1 04 m il
to deliver the two prototypes,
an option for fifty-four more. Foreign
werealso expected to follow.
a s, i n a r e- r un of the early A-IO pro
the company had promised more
i t w as a bl e to deliver. Although its
the T-46A, was a winner, the pro
wasbeset throughout by delays and
Fairchild had promised todeliver
st aircraft in April 1985, and, indeed,
ntation to unveil the first machine
on II Februaryofthat year, but it
out t o b e a f ak e and a sham. The
displayed was not much more than
o w s he ll , a mock-up la ck ing m or e
1,200items. Whenthe Air Force Sec
V e rn e Orr found out h ow h e h ad
he was furious and the compato undergo another searching'con
r e vie w , in a r ar e c a s e of deja v
although flight-testing, which
d on IS October 1985, revealed
or nothing w r on g w ith the aircraft
t he company w as i n deep financial
Itresorted to allkinds of expedients
the inevitable showdown and
The company cash reserves were
to cover d::lily costs until, in the
same year that t he T-46A took so success
fully to the sky, the decision had beenmade
to s ell o ff the whole aircraft division, and
fruitless talks hadbeen h a d w ith Grumman
and Boeing. Costs continued to escalate and
the Air Forceslashed the T -4 6 p ro gr am me
by cancelling most o f t h e 1986 and all of
1987 budgets. Th is was the l as t s tr aw
Fairchildcould not afford to continue devel
opment without this funding. On 5 March
1987, the cancellation ofthe T-46Atrainer
programme was announced. Only the two
prototypes and the first production aircraft
survived, and nineother production aircraft
were scrapped on the line.
Hopes that renovation and moderniza
tion w or k f or the Thunderbolt II might
keep the faCility working at a reduced level
were dashed, when even the rights t o t he
A-IO programme were t r ansf err ed to
Grumman, along w i th 116 of Fairchild s
best project engineers. l The Hagerstownplant was totally shutdown in 1 98 7 . After
sixty turbulent years, Fairchild had ceased
to exist. <l
With the break-up of the Fairchild Cor
poration i t w as thought a nadir h ad b een
reached , bu t there were revelations still
t ocome.
The Certifier Scandal
One of the low points of the story was the
revelation, via the qui tam provisions of
the False Claim Act, filed on 1 3 J u ly 1 9 8 2
by eil Aliksanian, a f or me r F a ir ch il d
employee, that the company had allegedly
mischarged the Government on several
contracts and had failed to provide theAir
Force with informat ion on equipment
malfunctions u nd er a n ot he r c on tr ac t.
Under the provision o f t h e a ct a private
cit izen could f il e a suit on b eh al f o f t he
Government ami, if the Government then
took over the case, and the prosecution
were successful, the filer would receive a
part of the c ivil c laim s. The Federal
Authorities duly intervened in the case on
30 June 1989, and the Depar tment o f Just ice proceeded to probe.
Th e Officer of Inspector General for the
National Aeronautics and Space Admin
istration (NASA) launched a lengthy and
involved investigation, the result of which
was revealed by Assistant AttorneyGen
eral Frank W. Hungerof the Civil Division
on 20 December 1990.
The Department of Justice said that
Fairchild Controls, while s till a division of
Fairchild Industries, inflated the amounts
charged to ASA con tracts f ro m 1 98 2
through 1988. NASA's investigators said
that Fairchild Control mischarged engi
neeringand manufacturing labour as over
head and research and development; treat
ed capital investments as expenses;
included accrued expenses in the current
year that were not subsequently paid; and
charged unallowable expenses into over
head expense accounts.
Whil e t he c as e w as s ti ll in its earlier
stages, Fairchild Industries s o ld Fa irc h ild
Contro ls to AERO Acquisition Corpora
tion, on 25 ugus t 1989. Fairchild Con
trols, at Manhattan Beach, California, was
renamed Fairchild Space Defense Cor
poration in 1 9 92 .
Fairchild Industr ies had to pay the Gov
ernment 5 mi ll i on on behalfof itsformer
division, Fairchild Control Systems Com
pany, and had al so repaid a further2,890,000 through contract adjustments.
Aliksanian was due, under the settlement
figures, t o r ece ive 600,000 for revealing
these discrepancies_
Specifically with regard t o t he A -10
contract, Fairchild Space paid theUni ted
States 298,640 to sett le allegations con
cerning a malfunctioning certif ier device
which tested the capacity of the fuel tank
o n t he A-IO aircraft prior to take-off. The
Government said that Fairchild Space,
after discovering thepa r t was not working
properly, corrected the problem, but did
not tell theAir Force about it, then billed
the Government for the replacement. As
part of the se tt lemen t, Fairchild Space
gave t he A i r Force replacement parts and
warran ties. S;
LASTE
When Major Kennedy was describing his
low-altitude approach, a s u s e d in 1 98 9, he
gave a tongue-in-cheekaccountof how he
estimated his altitude.
We Ay out all1und 250-500 feet, estimatingour
height hy a device ca l led the peE (pilm's cal
culated eyehall). As we leave I p ic k up on a
lOwer that I know is ahoUl 500 feel h i gh a nd
adjust lO that, if I Ay past it half-way down I m
at 250 feet,IH;
His account was not far from the truth and,
even 0l)erating from the f la t Eas t A lig lian
countryside, the 509th, like other units,
had r e gu lar los se s f ro m la ck - of - altitu d e
problems.lh6 The low-altitude safety and tar
get enhancement (LASTE) s y ste m w as
th er e fo r e m o st w e lc o me , although i t w as
much delayed and did not arriveuntil 1991,
making it a post-GulfWar modification. Its
a rr i va l f in al ly d id a wa y w it h t he TLAR
('That Looks About Right ' ) bombing solu
tion, brought on by the need to fly at
12,000ft (J,600m) (instead of using the
European down-on-the-deck method) dur
ing theGulf War. Before LASTE, as Major
DaveFeehsrecalled, 'If weflewabove 1,000
f e et w e expected to get a nosebleed. HiThe s ys te m w as g ra du al l y a dde d to
active A-lOs at the Sacramento ALC,
although some unit s d id it vi a 'in-house'
speed lines. LASTE is built around a r a da r
altimeter, which is linked to a v o ic e w a rn
ing system that gives the pilot 's i tuational
awareness should he fly too low. The acti
vation waspre-set, with both a minimum
altitude datum and a f ix ed descent angle;in either case, the pilot would receive audi
ble warning in time to takeaction. Toease
some of the strain of flying (including calls
of nature) as the A-lOs shuttled across the
Atlantic,an autopilot was incorporated for
the first time, proving especially beneficial
to the OA-lO pilots.
This was coupled with the updated HUD
system, which w as s imila r to that used
o n t he F-16 fighter to improve bombing
accuracy. The HUD displays a continually
computed impactpoint (CClP), the'Death
Dot', to ensure h its . I ta ls o h a d the capabil
ity to predict the Gatling's munitions tra
jectories, improving strafing accuracy. This
improvement enabled the Air ational
Guard A-lOs of the 17th TFG to comeout
on top at t he biannual 1991 Gunsmoke
Competition for Attack Aircraft.
According to the Deputy Commandant
ofthe Fighter WeaponsSchool, NellisAFB,
prior lO LASTE i t t o ok a thousand-hour pilO
whohad been down thechute 300 ll 400 ti mes
lO begood enough r o g e t g o o d h o mh s , and new
pilorswere lucky lO h i t t h e Earlh. Now we can
put a new guyin the airplane,and because of the
LASTE system h e c a n g e l very, very accurate
deliveries. I f w e w e r egoingafter t; lnks in revet
ments likewe did i n I ra q, w e w o u ld not m iss. A
miss is v e ry r a re - and I m talkingdumh homhs
ro m 14,000 feet.''
The s ame accuracy a lso a pp lies to the
Gatling; Major John Marks s t at es that :
We routine ly shom targets <If 15,000 feet slant
range and tha t' sonly hecause tha t' show fm the
LASTE system computes. The bullets are still
effective beyond rh(lt ri::lngc, and w c r c n ow
looking t upgrades that w il l a l lo w us t o f ir e
fnl 11 greater d i s t < l n c c s l ~ 9
A f in al segment o fLASTE was giv
t he A-lO some night-fighting capabili
which was all butabandoned after the ca
celling o f t he NI W project. Improv
cockpit lighting was installed, which w
designed to work wi th t he newly int
duced night vision goggles VG).
The first experimentation with t
VG was initiated in theaftermathof t
Gulf War. As with most systems, these
now standard equipment. The princi
behind the NVG is the amplification
ambient light (moonlight, city lights, a
so on),but if this illumination is too brig
it becomes dazzling th rough the goggl
Even the lights of an aerial-refuelli
tanker aircraft can wash ou t' the goggl
so t he se h av e t o be removed a m il e f ro
the rendezvous. To prevent fai lure, the go
gles have to be stored in the cockpit forfi
minutes during both take-off and landin
On moonles s n igh t s, flares candropped overthe targetto create the sa
effect and new types ar e being develop
t ha t e mi t t he ir light in the non-visu
spectrum, which can be picked u p b y t
NVG. The downsides of the system are
awkwardness when i n p la ce ; i ts restric
(40-degree) view field; and vertigo w
prolonged use. The definite upside is
increase in the 'Nighthog's ' lethality by
factor of one hundred.
122 123
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FLUCTU TING FORTUI S A D NEW CONCEPTS- THE Y I OB. THE O I O. L STE
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
ir eserve nd National
uard Operations
917th Wing, Barksdale AFB, Louisia
June 19 0, front-line combat airc
delivered for the first time direct from
production line to a reserve u ni t, w
LouisiClnCl. As part o f t h e 9 2 6t h T F G,
received A-lOs in December 1981,
completed conversion by the follow
June. In 1992, converted to F-16s a nd
lOs w en t i n to storage at AMARC. D
sionreversed 22May 1996, and tw oA -
(78-0655 and 0-0237) taken in from
20th Fighter W i ng o n 17 June 1996;
more 79-0106 and 79-0106) contribuby t he 4 7t h F , whil e three others (
0093,79-0121 and 0 -01 )we re recei
from t h e 4 42 n d FW AFRES. An offi
welcoming ceremonyon I October 1
marked the completion o f t h e 9 2 6t h F
re-equippingwith the Hawg.
706th Fighter qua dron, pa r t o f t h e 9 2 6t h
Fighter Wi ng a t A e w O r le an s ,
303rd Fighter Squadron, part o f t h e 4 4 2n d
Wing based at Richards-Gebaur AFB,
Kansas City, Missouri, received its first A
lOs in October 1982. Squadron moved to
Whiteman AFB, Missouri, June 1994,
having been redesignated as an FS on 1
February 1992.
442nd FighterWi ng, originally442nd TFG,converted f rom a tac ti ca l a ir li ft uni t . I ts
303rd TF exchanged i ts C-130Es for the
A - IO u n it at Richard -GebClur AFB, near
KmlsCls City , Missouri, October 19 2.
BecClme 442 TW FclmlClry 19 4, Clnd then
an FW on I FebruClry 1992. Wing moved to
WhitemClnAFB, Mis ouri, I1/12June 1994,
when RicharJs-GehClur was closed down.Air Force Reserve (AFRES)
47th Tactical Fighter Training quad ron
TI T ), part of9l7 Wing, tookdelivery ofthe first factory-fresh T hunderbolt IIsJune
19 O. Redesignated 47th FS I June 1992.
Deployed four years running on two-week
basis to A viano airbase in Italy,tClking part
in the ATO peace-keeping flight· over
Bosnia-Herzegovina. I Octoher 1996,
t as ke d w it h F RE and A G A-IO pilot
training, to a u gm e nt t h e 3 5 5t h W i ng in
Arizona. Warthog face is carried o n t he
noses of their aircraft. The automatic loaderis positionedcarefully for re-aimingthe AvengerGatling. US F
In Clddition to its regular Air Force units,
the USA has two reserve forces - the A iI
Force Reserve(formed in 1946) and theA ir
a t io n al G u ar d . B o th arc highly trained
a n d m o ti v at ed , a n d c o ns t an t ly on call to
provide the regulars withan up-to-date air
striking force whenever danger threatens_
Both were found ready and highlyefficient
when the call came from the Gulf, andbothhave seen active service deployment t o t h e
trouble spots o f t h e world s ince the n.
The fell units detailed here are repre
sentatives of the whole.
45th Fighter S q ua d ro n , p a rt of 434th
TFW, c on ve rt ed t o A -I O J un e 19 1.
W h en 9 30 th T FG was activated in July
1987, the 45th with its A-lOs passed under
theircontrol, becomingan F on 1Febru
a ry 1992. Squadron finally deactivated
w he n t h e 9 3 0 t h was ordered to shed ClII its
A -lOs on 30S eptember 1994, prior todis
bandment on I October 1994.
46th Tactical Fighte r T r a ining Squadron
TITS), part of 9 1 7 W i ng , first activated
as an A-IO outfit on I October 19 3, and
redesignated as t he 4 6t h T FS o n I June
1992, before the A-I s were phased o u l o n
I October 1993 and the quadron closed
down.
t o t he aircraft s upper surfaces to further
reduce its IRsignature. The flying control
are actuated by 40mm diameter titanium
rods, which arc proof a ga ins t 12.7mm hits,
a n d t h e p i tc h c o nt r ol rods are duplicated.
Like th e A - IO , t h e u -2 5 i pecifical
Iy d es i gn e d t o operate from primitive
airstrips and ukhoi built in underwing
pods t o h au l fuel pu mp a n1 spares, and
even thought of transporting groundcrew
the same way The Su-25 nicknamed
Grarch or rook , because of its ability to
g e t t o h a r d- t o- r e ac h s p o t , which that
bird is a bl e t o d o) has b e en p r ov e n in
combat in A fghanistan, w here i t f ir st
f lew in the early 1980s. Some forty Su
25s were deployed, and f lew a t ot al o f
61,000 combat hours. It is reported that
i t h as outstanding performance in the
field, and is a bl e t o tClxi where 6 x 6
trucks stick in the mud. The Frogfoot has
higher speed than the A -I O, t o avoiddetection, whereas t h e A - IO relies on its
smaller IR p r i nt s h ie l di n g t o a c hi e ve t h e
same purpose.
The u-25, with it two T- s close
together, has proven more vulnerable to
single engine- tr ike da m a ge t ha n t he A
10, a nd n o less than f ou r u -2 5 wer e l os t
t o S t in g er missi le s in a two-day period,
w i th t w o o f t he pilots being killed. The
analysis was t h a t t h e missile shredded the
rear fuel t a nk , w hi c h was located above
the main jet exhmlsts, and the resulting
fire eventually knocked out both engines.
Extra steel p l at i ng u n de r t h e fuel tank,
a n d 1 0 -1 5 mm t h ic k steel segments, were
hastily installed between the engine bays.
Th is appeared to d o t h e trick and no fur
t h e r S t in g er losses were taken. The fuel
tanks were foam-filled.
[n nine years o f c o mb a t operations in
Afghanistan, twenty-three Frogfoors were
lost, o r o n e u-25 per 2,800hour s combat
flight time_
The -10 a lso has the edge o n o t he r
means of survivability when i t w as hit,
although the pilot enjoysa rear-armoured
scat in addition to a 24mm welded titani
um cockpit armour tub. One Frogfoot,I i10ted by Colonel A lexander V Rutskoj,
reputedly survived being hit by A , and
by two AIM-9L Sidewinders from Pakistani
F-16s. It returned to base and, after refur
bishment, was displayed a t t he Paris Air
Show i n 19 9 It is now on display at the
Khodynka Museum.
First gainingoperational status in 1984,
the Frogfooc continued in production
until 1991.
a t 9 , 92 l lb o f t hr us t giving the Su-25 a
maximum speed at sea level o f 6 0 6 m ph
5 26 k no t o r 9 75 km /h ), a nd a n a tr ac k
speed of 42 m ph 6 9 k m/ h) , while i th a s
a combat radius o f 4 00 n au ti ca l miles
7 50 k m) w it h two d rop t ank s a nd a n
o v er a ll r an g e of 777 mile s l,250km).
Ceiling is 22,965ft. The non-afterburning
engineshave the unique ability tooperate
with d ie e l and regular petrol for short
period, giving them flexibility in primi
tive areas.
Like t h e A - I 0, the aircraft is equipped
with a 3 0 mm c a n no n , b u t t h is is a double
barrelled AO-17 A w ea po n w it h 250
rounds, capable of only five one-second
bursts . I t h a s o n ly eight w e a pons pylons
for mixed stores, wi th a 9, 700lb 4,400kg)
GlpClCity. Ordnance cmried includes
UB32A pods w ith thirty-two 57mm rock
ets; B M I pods w ith tw enty Omm rock
ets; S 4 240mm guided rockets; S5 330mmguided r oc ke ts ; the A 7 Kerry A 10
Karen a nd A S 17 Kedge Clir-to-surfacemis
siles A M-); 350 , 4 9 0 a n d 6 7 0k g l a e r
guided, rocket-propelled b o mb s ; 5 0 0k g
ir on bom bs, with incendiary, anti-person
nel a nd c he mi ca l o pt io ns ; PP 22
2 3 mm g u n pods. For defensive firepower,
the Frogfoot carries AA 2D Atolls or AA
A/Jhid air-to-air missiles, which, like the
A-I s Sidewinders arc c ar ri ed o n t he i r
own small pylon, one on each wing.
T here is a l as er d e si g na t or a n d t a rg e t
indicator in the nose o f t h e aircraft, and
256 flares or chClff p a k et s arc carried in
containers positioned in t h e t a il - co n e o f
the ClircrClft Clnd Clbove t he e ng in e
exhausts.
The Su-39 wa s a mod if ie d v er si on
speci fi ca lly des igned to k il l t anks . The
two-seater trainer was converted by mak
ing the rear cockpit into a fuel and avion
ics space for t he T V tr acke r wi th t he
Kopyo-25 multi-mode radar in a fuselage
mounted pod . Powered by two 44 13 k
Tumansky/ oyuz R-195 engines, it has
extrachaff and flares in wingtip launcher
pods, a n d a n IR jammer extrusion beneath
the rudder. The 30mmcannon was moved
to a new position below the nose, but car
ries only 200 rounds. nderwing weapons
arc a pair of racks carrying eightA T 9 anti
tank missiles each; the A 17 Krypton and
II Kilrer M the ICltter for anti-radar
strikes. Laser guidance for the KAB500
LGB, the S5 r o ck e t a n d the Karen and
Kedge alsofeature. Fordefence, it can carry
the R-27, R-27ER, R-60, R-73 and R-77
A Ms. Cooling intakes have be e n a dded
A-IO?
allies were scorning t h e A - IO
concept, w hat did the other major
t he o vi et U ni on , t h in k? o t slow
i m it a te a n y military innovation, the
soon came up with a similar concept.
was not the much-touted ukhoi Su
codenamed Frogfoot by ATO, but a
more fla ttering mimic, the Ilyushin 11-
It WClS based o n a n earlier design, the
ground-attack aircrClft, and its
l ~ l performance were very
lr to t h e A - IO. The design never got
the experimental tage, however,
so the Frogfoot has come to represent
Russian Clnswer to t h e A - I 0 ; Cllthough
on is similClr, it is very different
the Frogfooc more closely
lles the failed orthrop YA-9, with
R-13 pur e tur boje ts tuc ke d
t h e wing roots o f t he high, strClight
gs. It has been described as the AlfaJeta ck version o f t he BAe Hawk, a
m a de m o re valid by the u
B, a dc-militarized two-seater combat
The dimensions arc a wingspCln of
47ft 2 in ), a n overall l e ng t h o f
3m ( 5 ft 2 i n) a n d h e ig h t o f 4. m
9 i n) , m a ki n g for a smaller profile
t he A-IO. Its empty weight is
9,500kg), max OOlb
The Tumansky R-13 is rated
was never any official confirmation
rumours that, as the threat from the
t U n io n diminished, and doubts
u t t h e survivability of t h e A -I O in i ts
ned mission continued to b e v oi c d,
A-IO was on i ts way out in 1990.
o f n e w pilots was being heavily
back, w ith ins tr uc tor s at ellis R,
da , t he A- IO Fighter Weapons
being informed t ha t n ew assign
would be coming their way beforeI , But, aspast events had shown, the
was a tough H ogto slaughter
an added safety measure, to aid sta
on night-flight formation
ian, t he A -I wa f it te d with LVF
l igh t ing ( Ll ME at the wingtips,
r edges o f t h e ta il f ins and abaft the
extra rearnodules.Floodlights
e also added to the innerslllface o f t h e
pylonsto aid night in-flight refu
These mall additions arc the only
r d indica tions of a LA TE upgrade.
724 125
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AIR RESERVE A N D N A T IO A I. G ARD OPERATIONS
This s q ua d ro n f le w the very first
LA TE- e q uip pe d A - IO , and b e ca m e
FW March 1992. The 175thfirstequipp
w it h A -l O s i n eptember 1979 and, twe
ty years on, stillproudlyflies them in pea
and war. Overseas deployments includ
by March 1989, t he u ni t h ad s he d i ts la st
A-IO.
1 7 5th Wing , lo ca te d at Wa rf ield A GB,
M ar yl an d. I t 1 04 th TF tr ad e d in A-37
for A-lOs, commencing in October 1979.
A p a i r o f Black Hogs from the103rd FighterSquadron,theflying armof the l l1th
FighterWing ofthe Pennsylvania ANG. based at Willow Grove Air Reserve Station,
north west ofPhiladelphia.Seen here over-flyingthe distinctivelandmarks of Kuwait
Cityduring their deploymentto the Gulfto enforce thesouthern no-fly zone.
Grumman Corporaton
Above lined up inthe snow on a typical Massachusetts winter d a y - 9 D e c em be r
1995 - at BarnesANGB. Westfield.arethe A-lOs ofthe 104thFighterWing. Air
National Guard. I04th FighterWng/MA ANG
1 74 t h T a ct i ca l F i gh te r Wing, based at
Hancock Field, New York. The unit s
13 t h T FS began conversion from A-37
t o A -I , eptember 1979. On comple
tion, October 1979, redesignated a s TFW.
By ovember 198 ,firstF-16arrived,and
1 28 t h F i gh te r Wing, based at Truax
ANGB, Wis co n sin . Fo rm e rly a n OA-37
outfit, the 128th TASW h ad i ts 176th
T A S S changed overto A- l Oo n I October
19 I, becoming the 12 th TFW. Be ca m e
a n FW 16 March 1992 a nd t ar te d c on
vertingto F-16. By the end of 1992, all A
lOs had been replaced.
20March 1996, withaircraft contributed by
the Massachusetts A G. Local area train
ing commenced A u gu t 1 99 6.
13 th Tactical Fighter Squadron, with the
174th TFW located a t H a nc o ck Field,
New York. A a TF , the 13 th exchanged
its A-37s for A-lOs in eptember 1979,
and flew A-I s for a decade before dis
carding them for the F-16, March 1989.
l72nd Fighter Squadron,part of 110thF W
based at W. K. Kellogg Airport, Battle
Creek, Michigan. O ri g in al l y t h e l 7 2n d
TA ,this unit exchanged its OA-37s fort he A -I 0, commencing I October 1991.
In March 1 9 92 , it becamean FS as part of
the I I O th FG , and then FW.
131 s t F i gh te r q ua d ro n, part of t h e 1 04 t h
FW at Barnes A GB, Massachusetts. As a
TF i n J ul y 1 97 9 i t f ir st r ec ei ve d A - lO s,
J u ly 1 97 9. Be ca m e an FS in March 1992,
and now rumoured to be o n t he brink of
convertingto F-16 as p a rt o f t h e Fast-As
CAS dawn.
124th Wing, Gowen Fie ld , Boise A ir Ter
minal, Idaho, with the 190th FS began con
version from F-4GWild Weasel to A-1O on
I 1I th Ta ctica l A ir S upport G roup, based
a t Willo w G rove A ir Force Reserve Base,
Pennsylvania. Its 103rd T A c om me nce d
conversion to OA-I Obs-Hogs in 19 ,
and has operatedthem since. On 16 March
1992, Wing redesignated the III th Fighter G r ou p a n d in 1 996 as an FW. 11 th
Fighter S quadron, part of 1 03 rd F W at
Bradley N G B , C onnecticut. I18th TFS
was the f ir st -e ve r A G unitto receive tac
tical combat aircraft straight from the pro
duction line, the f ir st A -1 O a r r iv ing in the
s u mm e r o f 1979. nit redesignated as a
Fighter Squadron 1996.
1 10 th F i gh te r W i ng , W K. Kellogg Air
port, Michigan. As the 172ndTactical Air
S upport G roup, this u ni t h ad its II0th
TA discard its 0 -37s and begin to re
equip with the A-IO on I October 1991.
Became :111 FS M ar h 1992 a nd t he n a n
FW in 1 99 6.
J04th Fighter Wing, located at Barnes
ANGB, Ma ss a ch u se tts. I ts I3lst TFS
began toconvert to the A-1O inJuly 1979,
and w a r e de s ign a te d a t t he 1 04 th F G i n
March 1992, a n d t h e n as the 104th FW in
1996. C o nv e rs i on t o t h e F- 16 , lo ng p re
dicted, has not happened.
14t h Fighter q ua d ro n , b e lo ng i ng t o
175th Wing, based at W ar fi el d A GB,
Maryland. As a T F S, thi unit began to re
equip from A-37s t o t h e A -I O in October
1979 and received the first A G LASTE
equipped a irc r af t. Be ca m e an F March
1992.
Air National Guard ANG)
1 03 r d Ta ctic al Air S up po rt q ua dr on
belonged t o t h e II I th Fig hte r Wing basedat Willow G roveA F R E Base, Pennsylva
nia. Converted from OA-37s between
1988and March 1989, becomingan F S 1 6
March 1992.
1 03 rd F i gh te r W i ng , b as ed at Bradley
A N GB , n e ar W i nd s or Locks, Connecti
cut, had i ts 1 18 th FS begin converting
from F-IOOs to the A-IO, summer 1979.
Redesignated as an FW 16 March 1992.
group OG), retaining the 4345th. A-lOs
p ut o ut t o grass 30 S eptember 1994, and
unit deactivated 1 October 1994.
The very f irst A G A-I wasdeliveredto
the 1 7 4th Ta c tic a l Fig hte r W in g, t he n
based a t M a rt i n A FB, Ba ltim or e , Ma ry
la nd , in September 1 97 9. F ou r m or e A G
groups similarly equipped d ur i ng t h e fol
lowingfive years.
ordnanceadornsthe underwing pylonsof two 104th Fighter Wing A-lOs s/n 78 0612 and 78-
ofthe Massachusetts ANG atBarnesANGB. Westfield. o n 1 8 October 1997. I04th Fighter Wing/MA ANG
O perationsG roup,at GrissomAFB,
a . C o mm e n ci n g J u ne 19 I, the
TFW h a d its the 45th TF convert
rom the A-7D to the A- J Wingcon
to an aerial-refuelling outfit inJuly
a nd t he 4 5t h became p ar t o f t he
activated 9 3 0t h T F G. U n it redesig
I F eb ru ar y 1 99 2 as an operations
F ig ht er W in g, a va l A ir S t at i on
e w O rl e an s, L ou is ia na . A s the
h T FG , its 706th TF b eg an t o re
w ith the A-lOin December 19 I;
on completed by Junethe following
The g ro up w as p ar t o f t he 4 34 5t h
a t G r is s om A FB, b ef or e tr an s fe r rin g
to the 442nd TFW at Richards-Gebaur
on 1February 19 4, and subsequently
e 911£h TF\V based at Barksdale a
later. The 926th was o ne o f t he
rveunitsactivated for GulfWar combat2 9 D ec em be r 1 99 0, and contributed
A-lOs to that mission. The group
ed activeduties on 15 June 1991.
of A-lOs to t h e 9 1 7t h , t h en part
TFW,G r is s om A FB, I n dia na . A ll
to the 47th TFS. Redesignatedas the
TFW in 198 , and back t o a n F W I
1992. After a p e rio d with B-52s, on I
19 96 , a n ew pilot-training pro
began, with the goal offorty-three
a nd A G p il ot s p e r y e ar q ua li fy
o n t h e A-IO.
726 727
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IR RESERVE N N TION LGU R OPER TIONS
Tail Codes, Nicknamesand Paint
wing fighter. The squadron flourished
f le w a w ide v a rie ty of types over the ye
including the F-94Starfire, the F-89 S
pion, the F-86L Sabre and the F-I 0 2 D
D ag ge r. I n 1 97 5, a change of role and m
s io n w as e nv is ag ed w he n the squad
became the 190thTacticalReconnaissa
S quadron and part o f t he 124th Tact
Reconnaissance Group. I t r e -e q uip
a g ain , th is tim e w ith the RF-4C varian
the McD onnell F-4 Phantom II, and th
s e rv e d f or tw o d e c a de s at G ow en Fielcl
1991 the aircraft were finally replaced
FAG Wild We as e l f igh te r s, and fo
themselves flying combat over south
Iraq, enforcing the no-fly zone, twicefi
anti-radiation missiles when illegally ch
lenged by Saddam s air-defence radar
tems. This wasfollowed by participatio
Operation Provide omfort enforcing
northern no-fly zone.
Further reorganizationfollowed in 1when the 1 24 th F G became the 12
Wing, with eighteen u ni t s, t w o f ly
squadrons, fifteen support units at G ow
Ficld a n d a n e l ec t ro n ic c o mb a t t r ai n
r,mge control squadron assigned to Mo
tain Home AFB. The FAGs wererepla
by A-lOs a nd t he C -1 30 Hercules tra
port in the two flying units,
The Idaho AN G n ow h as a comp
ment of 1,200 volunteers f r om a ll o
t h e s ta te , i nc lu di ng teachers, farm
plumbers, s t ud e nt s , d o ct o rs a n d sa
m e n, w ho give up t h ei r t i m e t o serve
nation. The I da ho v o lu nt e er a i rm
have not yet t a k en t h e A-I 0 into ac
c o m ba t b u t s t an d ready, should the
c om e. B ot h t h e A -l Os a nd t he O A -
a r e f lo w n w ithessential spares now be
provided by the N o rt h ro p G r um m
Corporation,
All A/OA lOs w he th er A ir Fo
AFRES or ANG, have carried distinc
u n it m ar ki ng s D UM ) , m or e g en erc al l ed t a il c o de s o r TA C codes . F
introduced at Davis-Monthan A FB t
h a ve b e co m e s u bj e ct t o A iI Force st
dardization, and are now 1 2 in h ig h
Bin w ide 30 x 2 0c m) , w it h e ac h l e
placed 2i n S cm) ap ar t a nd p ai n
black, They are located outboard jus
front o f t he each rudder. The aircra
r a d io c a ll number is usually below th
in smaller characters,
se
Eg n AFB Florda
Eeson AFB Alaska
RAF Alconbury UK
W K Kelogg Airport Michigan
Barksdale AFB Louisiana
BradleyANGB Connectcut
Davis Monthan AFB Arzona
Edwards AFB Calfornia
Engand AFB Louisiana
Eg n AFB Florda
Pope AFB NorthCarolna
GowenF ed Bose Idaho
Grssom AFB Indiana
Whiteman AFB Missouri
Barnes ANGB Massachusetts
Myrtle Beach South Carolna
Warfield ANGB Maryland
Moody AFB Georga
Davis Monthan AFB Arzona
NAS New Oreans Louisana
HancockFied New York
Osan AB ROK
Nel s AFB Nevada
Eg n AFB Florda
Willow Grove AR8 Pennsylvania
Shaw AFB South Carolna
McClelan AFB Calfornia
Spangdahlem AB Germany
Suwon AB ROK
Shaw AFB South Carolna
McChord AFB Washington
Nel s AFB Nevada
Truax ANGB Wisconsin
RAFs Bentwaters/Woodbr dge UK
m o nc y a n d n o airfield - but the squadron
gradually became established, I ts f ir st
mount was the North American P-51D
Mustang, l a te r t o be redesignated as the
F-51 Di n 1947 with the arrival o f a n i n de
pendent Air Force, T h a t same year the
squadron started flying operations from
Gowen F i el d, a f or m er A rm y A i r C or ps
training base, south of Bo is e s a ir termi
n al . I ts worth was quickly demonstrated
in the 1 95 0 K or e an C r is i s, i n w h ic h t h e
190th was placed under full-scale mobi
l i za t io n i n o rd er t o replace Air Force
units sent to the war. The squadron
s e r ve d in G eorgia and C alifornia, return
ing t o I d ah o in 1 9 53 .
Thcfirst je ts a r r ive d in 1 95 3, w ith the re
equipping of the s qu ad ro n w i th the
F- 86 A Sa br e , the first American swept-
IR RESERVE N N T ION L GU R OPER TIONS
Unit
3246th Test Wing
343rd Wing and 354thFighterWing
10thTactcal Fighter Wing
110th Fighter Group ANG
917th Tactcal Fighter Group et seq ARES
103rd Fighter Group ANG
355thTactcal Fighter Winget seq
412th and 6510th Test Wings
23rdTactcal Fighter Wing
2346th Test Wing
23rd Wing
190th Fighter·Squadron 124 Wing ANG
424thTactcal Fighter Wing and 930th Tactcal Fighter Group AFRES
442nd Tactcal Fighter Group et seq AFRES
104thFighterGroup ANG
354thTactcal Fighter Wing et seq
175th Fighter Group ANG
347th Wing
602nd Air Contro Wing
706th Tactcal Fighter Squadron 926thTactcal Fighter Group AFRES
174th Tactcal Fighter Wing ANG
51stTactcal Fighter Wing
57th Test Group
4443rd Test and Evaluaton Group
111 th Fighter Group ANG
507th AirControl Wing
337th and2874th Test Squadrons
52ndFighterComposite Fighter Wing
51 st Tactcal Fighter Wing
20thand 363rd Fighter Wings
354th Fighter Squadron
57thWing
128th Tactcal Fighter Winget seq ANG
81 st Tactcal Fighter Wing
UM
AD
AK
AR
BC
BD
CT
OM
ED
EL
ET
FT
10
IN
KC
MA
MB
MD
MY
NF
NO
NY
OS
OT
OT
PA
SF
SM
SP
SU
SW
TC
WA
WI
WR
IdahoState s first A ir N ational Guard, the
1 9 0th Fig hte r S quadron, came into being
on 13 October 1 94 6, I t w as f or me d f ro m
Second World W ar v et er an s, t we nt y
three officers and forty-four enlisted men,
who met for o n e n i gh t a w ee k i n a s ma ll
building on Fort Street in downtown
Boise, Their first commanding officer was
none other than L i eu t e na n t C o lo n el
T h om a s G , Lanphier, the P-38 Lightning
p il ot c re di te d w it h s ho ot in g d ow n the
Betty Bomber carrying the Imperial
Japanese Navy s Commander-in-Chicf,
Y a ma m oto , in a c las s ic interception mis
sion over the Solomons.
The unit started out w ith absolutely
nothing - no aircraft, no buildings, no
A- 0tail codes
Operations of an ANG Unit
The above is onlyan outline of the A/OA-
10 s place o v er t h e last decade in AFRES
and ANG service The v al u ab le - and
v ar i ab le - w or k p er fo r me d b y these units
a n d t h ei r aircraft particularly during the
Gulf War, see pages 131-46) should not be
underestimated, One outfit, appropriately
enough the first, the Idaho A ir N ational
Guard, is w ell p lac e d to stand as an exam
ple of all the units.
176th Fighter S quadron, partof the 128th
Fighter Wingat Truax ANGB, Wisconsin,
O ri gi na ll y a TASS flying OA-37s,
squadron officially changed over t o A - tO
by I October 1981, and was redesignated
t he l 76 t h TFS, Ta ctic al p a rt o f t h e titles
w as g ive n u p on 16 March 1992, and con
v e rs ion tothe
F-16followed, withthe
lastA-IO b e ing r e pla ce d b y t he e nd o f 1992,
190th Fighter S quadron, partof the 124th
Wing based at Gowen Field, Bois e Air
Terminal, Idaho, exchanged itsF-4s for A
lOs commencing 20 March 1996,
U ATO operations in Yugoslavia, fol
lowed, again operating f ro m A v ian o , D ur
in g 1 9 98 , the A-lOs o f t he 1 75 th hosted
t he A -I O W ea po ns Load Competition,
Lodeo , with three other A-1O units, Eight
aircraft and 130support personnel partici
p at ed i n alx hunder 9 8 f ro m E ie ls on
AFB, Alaska, and alsotook part in the Ford
Drum, New Y or k, Mu ltip le A- I 0 live
munitions d r op e x er c is e as well as con
tributing five aircraft to the combat search
and rescue training exercise at Patrick
AFB, Florida,
A-10 Thunderbolt IIof the190th FighterSquadron
coded 627 partof the124th Wing Idaho ir
National Guard at Gowen Field Boise Idaho.
Theport-wheelhousing isseen hinged downto
reveal theone-pointfuell ing connectionand the
onboardelectronicstest panel. In 1995 the 124th
FighterGroup becamethe 124thWing with
eighteen units two flying squadrons andfifteen
support units atGowen Field and an electroniccombattraining range control squadronassigned
to Mountain Home ir Force Base TheWing traded
i n i t s Wild Weasels the lastPhantom jetsin the
US ir Force to take on two newaircraft and
missions - one ofwhich was the A-10 ThunderboltII.
The first A-10 arrivedthere in 1995 andIdaho
National Guardpilots have used themto find
survivors ofa helicoptercrash Boththe A-10 and
the OA 10 are operated by the 190th Squadron.
Master Sgt Marion Lee 124th Wing Visual Informaton
Secton Idaho AirNatonal Guard
A pai r of its A- I 0 p ilots lo ca te d and
destroyed a Serbian mobile anti-tank gun
in retaliation f or th o se f or ce s f lee ing w ith
UN-confiscated equipment, in violation
of agreements, Unit honoured with the
Outstanding Unit A w ar d b y t h e A i r Force
i n 1 99 5, t h ei r t h ir d s uc h a wa rd i n f ou r
years, an unmatched r e co r d in recent his
tor y, I n Ma y 1 99 5, the A -lOs took part in
Exercise Air Warrior at N el li s A F B, e va
da, t h e e l ev e n deployed aircraft clocking
up 600 h ou rs i n an eighteen-day period,
Operation ecisive Edge in s u pp o rt o f
s aretaken away as t h e p i l ot o f an 175th Wing Maryland ANG A-10gets readyWarfield ANG Base nearBaltimore Maryland Air Natonal Guard 175th Wing
i n 1 98 1, 1 98 5, 1 98 8, 1 99 0 and
Canada in 1 98 2 and 1993; Hawaii in
Panama in 1 98 5 and 1989; Czecho
v a kia in 1 9 92 ; and I ta ly i n 1 99 3 and
175th was the first ANG A-IO unit
receive the L A S TE system and became
Best o f t h e Best by w inning the G un
91 World-Wide Gunnery Competi
Unit took part in Operation eny
November 1 99 3 t o F eb ru ar y 1 99 4,
Julyto September 1994, working o u t o f
ano A B to p a tr o l over Bosnia-Herze
as part of the UN/NATO task force,
128 129
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AIR RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD OPERATIONS
air squadrons of most nat ions have
r own nickname, adopted years ago,
g rad u ally m o dified a s time goes by
t a re t r a l i t io na l f ro m Second World
days, and a lla re great fun. omehave
threatened by political correcrne -,
order to appea e the s h rill fe min ist
as ha traditional n o se a rt, which
i ts fin al flo urish ing in t he Gulf War.
A/OA-IO squadrons have a rich
in this f ie ld - see ta h le b elo w.
A-IO pain t and camouflage schemes
covered almo t the whole spectrum
n the years since the aircraft s intro
The variety o f p ai nt schemes
out is only exceeded by the number
( experimental pat terns de
to hide, ma k or con ce al t he
in v ery d iffe re nt p a rts of t he world.
subject is complex and covered well
specialist books, ol but t he t abl e right
s a general outline.
S a dd a m s f or ce s w er e t ho ug ht t o
been sufficiently reduced.
The A-I 0 w as destined to playa ke
in both p h as e s, b u t, in itially, itw a s l
not makingthe war at a ll. I ts e e m s in
i bl e n o w, i n v ie w of the preponderan
Iraqi tanks and armoured forc es in
vicinity of Kuwait, but o ffic ia ls h ig h
the U AF were reluctant at first evconsidersending A-lOs t ohe l pdo th
The fact t hat t he A-I h:lLl heen bu
exactly that purpose, the o ld p reju
came to t he fore again, and c e pt i ci m
expressed in the Pentagon. Lieute
GeneralCharle A. Horner, Central
mand Ai r Forces, was one who took
attitude. It to o k the personal interve
of t he Commander- i n-Chi ef, an A
Nose artIrom th e Gu lfWa r: Fightin Irish . Smon Watson
irreversible . This wa s f ol lo we d up t wo
d ay s la ter by the statement that Kuwait
w as n o w annexed and that i t h ad become
Iraq s nineteenth province.
The Gulf War developed through two
p ha s es ; in the first, the a im w as to rush
enough forces into Saudi Arabia to deter
Saddam from invading that country. This
holding p ha se was codenamed s nShield. Once a forc e la rg e enough to eject
Ira qi troo p s fro m K u wa it h a d been as em
bled, the offensive phase followed. There
was a l on g p er io d of strategic bombing
against the masses of dug-inarmour, which
lo ok e d im pre ss ive and p ro vid e d d a ily
headlines, but actually accomplished lit
tle. The land war, under t he codename
s n Stann, was due t o b e initiated once
s rt hiel and s rt torm
Developments in th e Gulf
ustification and indication
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein, who had
long coveted oil-rich neighbouring states,
r e bu il t h is a r my a ft er h is d is as tr ou s w ar
with Ir m He began to move a la rg e a rmy
across the d e se rt, w h ile h is fo re ig n m inis
t er , T ar iq A zi z, b eg an to fabricate and
broadcast a string of lies and excuses for anattack. On 8July, Iraq reiterated its claim
t opar t o f Kuwaiti territory, andon 23 July,
audi Arabia p la ce d its armed forces on
alert. py satellitesrevealed the mRS ing of
Iraqi armouron the Kuwait border, but this
wa dismissed as a how of force and no
Western nat ion w as w illin g to act unilat
erally and issue a w a r n i n g ~I ra q t o ok i l en ce f or acquiescence and,
o n t he morning of 2 August 199 ,moved
intothe tiny independent Stateof Kuwait,
seized it and proclaimed it liberated . This
totally unprovoked Rssault on a pe<lceful
country finally roused the , although
words rather than deeds initially resulted.
Iraq h a d p o we rfu l frie nd s in the Russians
and theChinese, and thegovernments of
other Arab states, although fearing and
hating Iraq, dared not a ct t oo h a stily in
case theirown nationalists s tirre d u p tro u
ble. Only the West wa s i n a p os it io n t o
respond to Iraq s aggression, and, led by
the U A, the UK and Fra nc e , w ith the
worried backing of Saudi Arabia clearly
t he n ex t c ount ry on Saddam s menu), a
powerful coalition forc e w as g ra du Rlly
assembled. The mi sion of t hi s f or ce ,
under the overall c om man d o f G en er
al H. orman chwarzkopf tormin
Norman t o t he p re s ), w as t o e je ct t he
Iraq i a rmy fro m K u wa it. That was it N
brief, and chwarzkopf was kepton a tight
rein, and closely scrutinized by both b y h is
media-conscious superiors and a hesit<lnt
President George Bush. Meanwhile, the
I ra qi s d ug i n, c al l ed upon A ra bs every
where to back them, andon 6 August Sad
dam announced that the occupat ion was
OA-l0s at Osan, ROK temporary
75-0258.75-0259.75-0269 75-0262
146A-l0s
76-0530.77-0205.77-0227,77-0268 77-0272
75-0266 75-0269
76-0552
Al product on aircraft
One Alconbury expermentA-l0
75-0262
75-0263 - 75-0277
75-0261 75-0261
75-0261
73-1668 and 73-1669
75-0258, 75·0259 75-0260
73-1667
73-1665
73-1666
Second YA-O Prototype 73-1664
pplcaton
Both YA-O Prototypes
TAC Pattern FS3492Dark Green/FS34102 MediumGreen/
FS36231 Dark Gul Grey Charcoal Lizard
European 1- FS34092Dark Green, FS34102 Medium Green
orFS36081 DarkGrey
SuperDesothanF MASK-lOA dark/light
FS36118 Gunshp Grey overal
Gul WarPeanut - sand brown
Gulf WarFlpper - grey
JAWS Scheme variatons - FS36231 Grey/FS34092 Dark Green/
FS30118 Brown/FS34102 Olve Green/FS30227 Tan
Fase Canopy Scheme - with FS36118 Gunshp Grey canopy
shape undersideof cockpit
MonochromatC Grey
Ghost GreyFS36320 upper sdes); MASK- OA Iowerl
MASK·10A upper sdes Ghost GreyFS36320 Iowerl
Light GhostGreyFS36375
Ghost Grey/MASK-lOA
Mottled White loverBlack base)
4 0 p e r cent Ref ect ngM ASK-lOA
Post Gulf - FS36375 LightGhost Grey 7
FS36320Dark Ghost Grey t wo : o : n e: .:..:N.::ew:.:....::St:::a: ::nd::a::..:rd= _
DarkGhost Grey 36320
Mottled Grey White overBlack base)
Gunshp Grey FS36118
A-l0 paint schemes
Scheme
Aircraft Grey 16473 Standardl
An impressive line-up in th e ra in A-tOThunderbolt lisolthe 1901h FighterSquadron,
led by134, part the 124th Wing, Idaho Air NationalGuard, on the runway a t Go wen
Fie ld , Bo ise, Id ah o . Master Sgt Maron Lee, 124th Wing Vsua Informaton Secton, Idaho Air
Natonal Guard
Unit
25thTactcal Fighter Squadron
103rd Fighter Squadron
18thTactcal Fighter Squadron
91 st TactcalFighter Squadron
138thTactcal Fighter Squadron
354th Fighter Squadron
78thTactcal Fighter Squadron510thTactcal Fighter Squadron
706thFighterSquadron
131stFighter Squadron
357thFighterSquadron
355thTactcal Fighter Squadron
355thTactcal Fighter Squadron
55thFighterSquadron
74thTactcal Fighter Squadron
118thFighterSquadron
356th Tactcal Fighter Squadron
45thFighter Squadron
303rd Fighter Squadron
333rd Fighter Squadron
358th Fighter Squadron
353rd Tactcal Fighter Squadron
509th TactcalFighter Squadron
21st Tactca Air Support
Squadron
75thTactcal Fighter Squadron
92nd Tactcal Fighter Squadron
76thTactcal Fighter Squadron
5111h Tactcal Fighter Squadron
70thFighterSquadronKnights
unit names
Dragons
Hogs
Foxes
Streaks
s from Syracuse
Vipers
Fifty-Fifth
Tg e rs
Yankees
Demons
Hogs
Hawgs
730 737
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JUSTIFICATION ND VINDI TION S RTSHI L A D S RTSTORM J STIFI TION ND VINDI TION S RT SI·II L ND S RTSTORM
A-10 of the 355th TFS, Myrtle Beach, the commander spersonal mount, at a forward
operating base in Saudi Arabia during OperationDesert Storm. She carriesa single
AIM-9 Sidewinder for defence on the port outboard pylon. Simon Watson
A new development occurred when
began firing surface-to-surface missile
Israel and audi Arabia, in the hop
provoking the former and ga in ing A
wppor t. A l though Israel was restra
from retaliating, the cud-B a t ta
launched from mobile conta iners
were extr mely difficult to locate, wemost successful propaganda point for S
dam and caused much alarm. Th e att
caused only a smal l number of casual
but theyseemedunstoppable and untr
able. It wasalso clear that Saddam w
have absolute ly no qu,lIms about arm
the missiles with bacteriological or ne
gas warheads, and using them against c
ian targets.
The pilots accessladderdoorway is a prime
location for rich artwork on the A-lOs - here,
Yosemite Sam declares I m Torqued Easily, So
Watch Out . The aircraft belongs to the 355th T
theFalcons, and isseen here ata forward base
close to the Iraqi border during OperationDese
Storm. Simon Watson
Scud-B Hunting
period, theA-I 0 were achieving a tot
three sor ties a day - impressive, given
trying conditions. I twas very hot, and
and sand were keeping the ground te
on their toes, ensuring low downtim
between missions and high serviceabi
The A-lOsachieved an enviable 9 .67
cent weapon system rel iabi li ty du
esert Storm, a percentage f ar i n exce
other land-basedair units.
I. E as t and West Tac : heavy concentra
tions o fAPCs and trucks o f t he Iraqi
55th Infantry Brigade close to the town
of ukhayb. Named after two Nel l i
AFB bombing ranges.
2. Hicksville : an enormous ammunition
dump,spread overmany acres (first dis
covered by Captain AI Gator Hicks),
located between the town of Ramadi
and the yrian border.
3. Home Depot : another vast munition
storage bunker a nd w ar ehou se c om
plex, located nor th o f the main road
from Baghdadto Amman, Jordan.
4. Th e Villas : large ammunition dump
and storage facility, located to the
north of Home Depot .
Gradually, the tempo of opera tions huilt
up, and, over a twelve-hour operational
During the OC A phase, the A-lOs flew
175 combat sorties, mainly concentrating
on destroying Iraqi electronic warfare and
ground-control intercept sites_ ; Gradual
ly, as the A- lOs worked over the enemy
territory, they found and identified con
centration of the enemy force and sup
port facilities, which provided them with
a n a lm o t endless targeting menu. The
most rewarding sites included:
esert Shield
Th e A-IO, along with the AV- and F/A
I , was considered the primary weapon
system for halting any Iraqi army invasion
of Saudi Arabia during the initial phase of
the war. Th e Army was i n no doubt
abou t the ability of the A-IO: We would
be in se ri ous trouble if [the A-IO] hadn t
come, one officer was quoted as saying.
They arc the major weapons between us
a nd t h e Iraqis.
Th e A-IO was a ls o extensively used
ea rl y i n the war for taking out the enemy
early-warning radar screen along the bor
der with Iraq, thus denying Saddam s mil
itary commanders as much information on
the Allied build-up as pOSSible.
Th e very f irst A-IO sortie of the Gulf
War was carried out by the two-plane team
of Capta in Tony Ma ttox ( f lying sin 80
01 9) as leader, with Lieutenant BryanCurrier (flying sin 79-0210) a s h is w in g
man, from the 74th TF who lifted off in
the pre-dawndarkness of 17 January 1991,
and headed north. This was just the first of
322 A-IO sorties that day, 313 of which
were successful ly completed. In return,
small-arms fire slightly damaged just two
A-IO . This set the pattern for the remain
der of the initia l stage.
The deployment o f the A /OA- 0 was by
individual squadron, ra ther than by whole
Wing, and hoth regular and ANG units
were involved. Th u , the 353rdand 355th
TF swere sent from the 354th TFW as the
354th TFW (Deployed), i n e ff ec t a newunit, Similarly, t he 7 4t h a nd 76th TFS
were sent by the 23rd TFW as the 23rd
TFW (Deployed), bu t under their original
tate -ide commanding officers. By the end
of Augus t, t he se uni ts h ad m oved i nt o
their new base, set up a t t he King Fahd
In te rna t ional A irport ( KF IA ), n ca r
Damman, audi Arabia. An FOL was soon
established at the King Kahlid Military
City (KKMC) airfield, and a second
(christened Cajun West ) was added at AI
Jouf , close to the small neutral zone hard
by the 1r aq i bo rde r. A ten-strong A-IO
force was rota ted through thi base from
the F ah d q ua d for f ive-day periods. I twas
decided locally that i twas more logical to
merge t he se two dep loye d wings and,
accordingly, they officially became known
as the 23/354 TFW(D). Th is impre sive
array was given the unofficial title of The
F ah d q ua d by their pilots 1 The A-lOs
were joined by s ix OA-lOs of the 23rd
TASS in October.
By December 1990, al l the inth Air
Force s TFWs were organi:ed under the
umbrella of the 14th Air Division (Provi
s iona l) , a nd rec eived Provi siona l S tatus,
w i th the combined unit being redesignat
e d a s 23/354 TFW(P).
It became increasingly apparent that
much mor e f ir ep ower wou ld b e needed
once the l and war commenced, and rein
forcement- were deployed during Decem
b er 1 99 0 and January 1991, in readiness.
Accordingly, three extra A-lO squadrons
moved in to KFIA, the 23rd, 511 th an d
706th TF s, a nd e ve nt ua ll y s om e 155
A/OA-IOs were on sta tion s tahle left).
A GA IO Gulf War
Deployment
manwho knew the t rueva lue of the A-IO,
to g et t he aircraft included as a p ri or it y.
Eventually, reason prevailed, and Horner
was overruled by D ef en se Secretary
Richard B. Cheney, Th e -lOs began to
assemble.
Nose art from the Gulf War: PantherPrincess .
Simon Watson
deployment during the GulfWar
T SS 74th T S 76th T S 353rd T S 355th T S 511th T S 706rh T S
79-133 79-176 78-587 78-591 79-218 76-531
79-137 79-181 78-593 78-592 79-220 76-540
79-166 79-182 78-594 78-599 79-224 76-544
79-177 79-186 78-595 78-603 80-144 77-205
79-178 79-188 78-606 78-622 80-157 77-227
79-187 79-193 78-660 78-654 80-170 77-240
79-189 79-197 78-667 78-662 80-172 77-255
79-190 79-198 78-668 78-664 80-194 77-256
79-195 79-203 78-675 78-665 80-208 77-260
79-196 79-206 78-677 78-678 80-219 77-266
79-201 79-223 78-680 78-686 80-229 77-268
79-204 80-151 78-681 78-710 80-277 77-269
79-207 ~ 1 5 2 78-699 78-713 81-939 77-271
79-209 80-163 78-715 78-714 81-947 77-272
79-210 80-164 78-722 78-724 81-948 77-273
79-213 80-165 78-725 79-097 81-953 77-274
80-173 80-166 79-096 79-099 81-964 77-275
80-176 80-177 79-124 79-100 81-967 78-582
80-210 80-178 79-126 79-112 81-987
80-212 80-181 79-127 79-115 81-65780-224 80-186 79-128 79-158
80-246 80-188 79-130 79-160
82-663 80-189 80-250 79-163
80-190 82-661 79-168
80-197 82-662 79-173
80-223 82-664
80-248
82-653
This tabeIncudes r reserve arrcraft or a theAlGA· lOs present wereacrua y used In combar There was aI,mrted cross-over
rndvdua alfcraftbetween Units)
32 33
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JUSTIF I T IO ND VINDI TJO I - S RTSHI L ND S RT STORM JUSTIFI TION ND VINDI TION - S RT SHI L A D S RT STORM
wi th L U-I, -3 and -6 target mar
Some 5,4 of these were scwn from
25 d ispenser s (modi f ied LA -10 r
pods with hemispherica l nose caps)
ried on p yl on s 2 and 10. The '
Hawgs' destroyed hundreds of enem
gets, and not o ne A-I 0 engaged in
operations received as much as a s
ground-fire hit in return
The Iraqi armymade only one aggre
move during all th istime, launching a
pronged probing atrack across the bo
under cover of darkness,crossing into S
Arabia hefore dawn on the morning
January 1991. One of these columns,
matedas having s o m f i ~ t ~ battlet
as tts core, evaded cOllriter-attacks, thr.far south as the dusty township of Khaf
south-western Kuwait,and dugitselfinU Marine CO' ll was sent to eject
a nd t he A-I 0 wereca ll ed up to lend
support. In the classic manner, which
been practisedso often,they andthe A
Cobra helicopters struck the enemy.
technique used, first demonstrated in
Middle East by the RAF a t t he Wadi
defile on the Nablus-Beisan road in P
tine on 21 September 191 , was
to smash the front and rear o f t h e e
Nose artfromthe GulfWar: SecritWeapin on 591 with the Falcons artwork on the
inside ofthe ladderaccess door. Simon Watson
Both Wings desigmlted one squadron to
voluntcer for the specialized work of
n igh t a t tack, and the N igh t Hawgs' were
born. The 355th TF became most profi
cient, and led the way in tacticaldevelop
ment in thisarea during the war. After ny
ing normal daylight a t tacks on days one
and two of operations, the 35 5th reverted
totally to night-n ~ , i o l ' work and was
joined in this after ,I lllther fortnight by
t he 7 4t h TFS. This concentration was
brought on by t he a dv en t o f t he Scud-B
mobile m issi Ie attacks.
A typica l loading was two Maverick
missiles and six Mk 2 iron bombs', the
latter being fitted with the FM -113radar
fuse, which gave an airburst 0-25ft above
the g round . A s a safety measu re , these
bombs were fitted with a brass ring fuse puller to prevent them accidentally arm
ing themselves on th e ground. This device
IVa attached to the aircraft, andwhen the
bomb was relea sed, i t pul l ed the wire,
which ran through a Mk 904 (nose) or Mk
9 5 ( ra il ) f use , allowing the homb to a rm
itselfas it dropped.
Widespread use was made of the Mk 22
or LUU-2 nares and the modified LUU-2,
known as the MJ -3 IRCM flare, along
Night Hawgs
wain's mount wasduly christened Chop
per Popper and currently re ides at Eglin
AFB, Florida.
The second enemyhelo to fall was a Mi-
, which was brought down by Captain
Todd Shanghai heehy ofthe 511 t hTF
(nyings/n 1-0964) on 15 February 1991.
Further opportunities to hack down Iraqi
rotaries with the Avenger were denied to
the A-lOs by a n o rde r o f 16 February,
which forbade itsuse until the land fight
ing commenced. This was due to casualties
being caused by MA PADS, which that
day had hit three A-lOs, two f a t a l l y . ~ '
I twa, the thitd mi ion of the dayand we were
working the kill-hoxten mile, we,t of Ali Am
alem airportwc r of Ku lir :lty t \\ a . ahout
1545Land the visihillty \\'a, three to (,, 'e n le,
due to the ha:e, oilfire' and hlOlving ,and. Spot
t ed a f lt gh t o( two helicopter> and chme to
engage the lead aircraft. U,ed 30mm Carling
gun a f te r l o l I n l I c c e s ~ ( l I l locks on t f i r ~ tpas,. Iput approximately 75 hullet thmugh hi,
rot (\ [ h lades hu t d id not d e, rr oy h im , I r e
attacked and ,hot appmxinl;llely 300 hullet on
him which ,ent him cmtwheeling into the
de,err flo \[ Not muchleftto i ,, ly In theair
c ra ft h ut i t i , I e,, ned to have heen a H-105
ol en'mion mf<lCkhel icopter.
Th is fi rst happenedon 6 February 1991,
when Captain Robert R. wain,Jr, of the
706th, nying s in 7 7- 2 05 , encountered a
BO 105. Captain wain report reads as
follows:
A significant development in the A-IO's
deploymentcame with the realization that
night fighting was increasingly giving the
US rmy an edge. With thi s in mind, the
implication for the A-IO were clear to
Colonel Irwin andy harpe, one o f t h e
A-IO commanders on the spot. He held
consultations with Gener al C ha rl es
Horner, a nd t he upshot was that Lieu
tenant-Colonel R ic k McDow , a f orme rVietnam POW and a highly respected com
hat leader, overcame his deep misgivings
and volunteered to trial the new mission. '
The method wa to utili:e the ix-inch
cockpit monitors lii.ked to the infra-red
seekers in the Mavericks a improvised
imaging sys tem. Once the pilots had fired
all their Mavericks, they continued their
attacks by illuminating their targets with
the old-style parachute narcs.
Air-to-Air
The A-IO was not really expected to 'mixit' with the Iraqi MiGsand did not tangle
with t hem too much; most were quickly
evacuated, to sit out t he war o n t he air
fields of Iraq's former enemy Iran. Howev
er, i n the early stages, there were some
brushes wi th lone enemy fighters. Due to
the aggres ive srance of the A-I s and the
timidity o f t h eMiG jockeys, no A-I was
lost to Iraqi aircraft. By contrast,when the
opportunity brieny presented itself, theA
lOs lost no t ime in hacking down Iraqi
helicopters, using the awesome power of
theGAU- .
The A-I was credited with the
destruction of fifty-one Scud-B launchers
d ur in g t he G ul f War, although careful
checking since seems to indicate that this
figure was rather optimistic.
Aborted cud-B hun ts m ig ht have
meant returning to base fully laden, but
there were ample targets o n t he way back
on which to expend the mi s il e , and thi
was encouraged by Colonel Bob Efferson at
Cajun We t ' .Later, th isorder wasreversed
and free-falling ordnance was placed on
targets of opportunitywhile en route to the
Scud-B hunting zones, leaving the A-lOs
free of all e nc umbr an ce s o th er t h an
their offensive Mavericks and defensive
Sidewinders (when they werecarried).
Nose artfromthe GulfWar: SharperThanAny Two-Edged Sword . Simon Watson
werein theopen under the illusory cover of
darkness. This involved great ri k t o t he
British soldiers, both from detection and
from accidents,but it was the only sure way
of raking out these elu ive pests. A typical
cud-B hunt would involvesome ten hours
in the air for the A-IO pilots.
ideal aircraft for hunting the elusive
d-B mobile launchers proved to be the
,with i ts longloiter time and built-in
potential, coupled with range.
while the A-I0 was mainly u sed in i ts
role ofCA /attack aircraft, it was
used to hunt down the Scud-Bs and
other 'Iook-and-see' missions. I
nitially, the method used wasfor teams
Os and A-lOs to bedeployed from
forward-operating location base of A I
Th ' y wou ld p at ro l over poten ti a l
launcher areas. Once a missile was
surveillanceaircraftwould mon
i ts night track, and pass the informa
back to the airborne A-lOs, which
thenattempt to follow its night path
to the firing point. They would then
on visual skills to find the launcher,
hy then would have packed up and
on to thenex t bolt-hole. nless by
the launching was conducted
a short di tance of patrollingA-I s
s was very much a hit-and-miss opera
that Kelied on luck as much as skill.
it achieved l imited success, it
by no means satisfactory. A more e(fi
was developed later on, with
ofthe Bri ti sh A operatinghehind
enemy lines, visually tracking down
launchers a nd t he n calling in the
i gh tH awgs ' to take themout while they
DesertStorm - munitionsspecial istsfrom the 23rd Tactical FighterWing
300101 roundsof ammunition intoCaptain R Patrick s A-10Thunderbolt II
ft replenishing the hungryAvengerGatl ing between high-intensity
againstIraqi armour. USAF
734 735
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Two A-las Down
The worst day for the A-I 0 was 5 Feb
ary 1991, when two aircraft were lost, a
another was damaged. The tw o- m an te
o yph Phillis and w in gm an R ob w
was attacking units o f t he Republi
Guard some 6 mi les 95km ) nor th- w
Force Fight er WeaponsSchoo at N el s AFB, Nevada In August. while the squadro
deployed to Saud Arabia in support of Operaton DesertShield he traveled to N el
Air AFB He graduated fromFighter Weapons Schoo in December 1990 as a Distn
guished Graduate,being named OutstandingGraduate ofhis A 1 0 class, and thentrav
e l e d t o Saud Arabia to rejoin the 353rd Fighter Squadron to participate in Operaton
DesertShield and Desert Storm After theending of hostilities, hs squadron returne
to Myrtle Beach AFB, on 20 March1991.
Johnsonwas thenassigned asan instructor atthe Air Force FighterWeapons Scho
at N el s AFB, Nevada. Hs military decoratons Included the Air Force Cross and th
Dist nguished Fyng Cr oss He a n d his wife, the formerPatrcia Gibbons, from Oho
have three chidren, Chrstopher, Er ca n d Jessica.
Captains RandyGoff left) andPau Johnson rght), two p io ts whoservedin the Gulf
with the 354th Tactcal FighterWing. Theirmostfamous mission was flying escort to a
Sandy rescue. Both weredecoratedfor their dedicaton durng this extremelylong, b
highly successfulmission,Johnson receiving the Air Force Cross,and Goffthe
Distnguished Flyng Cross. Johnsons aircraft is now preserved and on display at the
USAF Museum, at Wr ght-Patterson AFB, Oho. Becky Coan va Peter B Mersky
whi Ie the ygotdow n a nd picked him up. An
Iraqi army truck, w hi ch h ad h om ed o n t he
radio transmissions and was trying to beat
them to it,was taken apart by 30mm GA
ciA fire, at 100ft 30m) A G L ,200ft 60m)
slam r ange f rom jone-, w ho w at ch ed
awe:truck. Following this, t h e A -l O s were
ahle to escort Lt jones back to safely.
HAWG N- Captain Paul 1. Johnson USAF USAF Museum Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio)
JUSTIFICATIO: \ Al\O VI:-JDICATIO:-J - DESERTSIII :U Ai\ O DESERTSTORM
Captain Pau Johnson was born in Gadsden,Alabama, o n 2 6 Apri 1958, and gradu
at ed f rom hgh schoo in Dresden, Tennessee, in1976. He attended Freed-Hardeman
University and graduated from Murray State University in 1980 with a Bachelorof Sc
ence degree in Agriculture.
Johnson received his commission in the USAF f rom t he Officer Training School at
Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, in May 1985. He then entered undergraduate pilot
training at Laughln Air Force Base in D e R o , Texas and received his wings inJune
1986.
Johnson s first operatonal assignmentwas tothe 353rd FighterSquadronat Myrtle
BeachAFB, SouthCarolna, in February1987, wherehis dutes included instructorpiot.
safety officer and search and rescue pilot. In 1990, he wasselect edt o at tendt he Air
Captan Pau T Johnson, USAF USAF u s e ~ m Wr ght-Patterson AFB, Ohio
was c on si de ra bl e a nd t he A -l Os h ad to
s p en d m u ch t i me o v er the area before the
pilot was safely pickcd up. Both the -lOs
had be refuellcd no les, than four times
during a mission that totalled eight hours
flying time.
Th e lead A-IO was the first to IOGlte
jones. It h o m cd t h e c o pt e r in, and circled
eager to have a prisoner hum iliate a nd
display on tele\ ision the watching
world, s e nt o u t s n a t c h teams to find him;
the race was on. A two-plane detail of A
lOs from t h e 3 5 4t h T F S was immediately
despatched cover the pilotuntil the 1st
SO W MH - 53j he lic opte r c ould r e ac h him
and then pr ovide c ove r for the outward
flight. The two pilots were Captain Paul
johnson a nd y 5 7) a nd Captain Randy
G of f w h o had already had a husy day ).
The distance from base the c r as h i t e
Nose art f ro m t he G u lf W a r : Leslie - The Seminole Warrior. Smon Watson
Nose art f ro m t he G u lf W a r : Dobber s Sting. Smon Watson
gun on rescue helicopters sent to recover
Jow ned A merican pilots b e hi n d e n em y
l i n e s . ~ During the Gulf War, t he A -I
was able to uphold that proud traditionon
several occasions.
On 2 january 1991, a N av y A -1 4
Bu 0 161430) from VF-103, based
aboard the carrier Saratoga CV-6 ), and
piloted by Lieutenant D e vo n j o n es , wa
hit by a ground-guided, optically-tracked
A - 2,a nd came down in southern Iraq, far
from land-based assistance. The Iraqis,
JL:STIFICATIO Al\O VI: \OICATIO: \ DI S :RT SHIHD \: \0 DI:SI:Rf STORM
made famous by t h e A - I Skyraider
was the search and rescue mis
, A DYs), w he r ehySpa ds r ode s hot-
art f ro m t he G u lf W a r : Play Time . Smon Watson
bringing it a standstill. Then it
methodically destroyed. One ight
Captain jack W Thomas of the
TF , personally nailed three T-55s
g two Mavericks and si xMk 2 homh s.
Missions
art from the Gu lfWa r: Bird of Prey . Smon Watson
136 137
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JUSTIFICATION ND VINDI TION ESERTSHIEL ND ESERT STORM JUSTIFI TION ND VINDI TION ESERTSHIEL ND ESERT STORM
tations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A l0
AIM·9 2, 1OR Notcarred AGM-65 11 MK 82 21 Notcarred Not used Notcarred MK 82 2 AGM-65 11 Not car red ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR Mk 82 bomb AGM-65 11 MK82 11 MK 82 Not used MK 82 MK 82 1 A GM- 65 11 M k82 bomb ECM Pod
AIM·9 2, 1OR Not c a rr e d A GM -65 11 MK 82 31 Notcarred Not used Notcarred MK 82 31 AGM-65 11 Not car red ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR Not used AGM-65 21 MK82 11 MK82 Not used MK 82 MK 82 1 AGM-65 21 Not used ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR Mk 82 bomb AGM-65 31 MK82 11 MK 82 Not used MK 82 MK 82 1 AGM-65 31 Mk 82 bomb ECM Pod
AIM-9 2. 1OR SUU-25 AGM 65{ll MK 82 31 Not used Not used Not used MK 82 31 AGM-65 1 SUU-25 ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR SUU-25 AGM-65 21 MK 82 31 Not used Not used Not used MK 82 31 AGM-65 21 SUU-25 ECM Pod
AIM-9 2. 1OR Not used AGM 65{ll MK84 Not used Not used Not used MK 84 AGM 65{ll Not used ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR LAU-68 LAU-68 MK 82 31 Not used Not used Not used MK 82 {31 LAU-68 LAU-68 ECM Pod
AIM-912, 1OR Not used AGM-65 {21 Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used AGM-65 {21 Not used ECM Pod
AIM-912, 1OR Notcarred AGM 65{ll SUU-30 21 N ot c arr ed N ot used Notcarred SUU-30 21 AGM-65 11 Notcarred ECM Pod
AIM-912, 1OR 0 Not used SUU-30 SUU-30 SUU-30 Not used SUU-30 SUU-30 SUU-30 Not used ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR Not used AGM 65{ll SUU-30 {31 Not used Not used Not used SUU-30 3 AGM 65{ll Not used ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 SUU-30 AGM-65 11 SUU-30 SUU-30 Not used SUU-30 SUU-30 AGM-65 11 SUU-30 ECM Pod
AIM-9 2. 1OR 0 SUU-25 AGM-65 1 SUU-30 31 Not used Not used Not used SUU-30 2 AGM 65{ll SUU-25 ECM Pod
AIM-9 2. 1OR 0 SUU-25 AGM-65 21 SUU-30 SUU-30 Not used SUU-30 SUU-30 AGM-65 21 SUU-25 ECM Pod
AIM-9 2. 1OR 0 Not used AGM-6511 SUU-64SUU·64
Not used SUU-64 SUU-64AGM-65 11 Not used ECM Pod
AIM-9 2. 1OR 0 Not used AGM-6511 SUU-65 SUU-65 Not used SUU-65 SUU-65 AGM-65 1 Not used ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 Notcar red AGM-6511 Not c a rr e d Not c a rr e d Not used Not c a rr e d Not c a rr e d AGM-65 1 Notcarred ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 Notcarred AGM-6511 Not carred Not carred Not used Notcarred Not carred AGM-65 1 Notcarred ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 Not used MK20 MK 20 MK 20 Not used MK 20 MK 20 MK 20 Not used ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 MK20 AGM-6511 MK20 MK20 Not used MK 20 MK 20 A GM- 65 11 MK 20 ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 SUU-65 AGM-65111 Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used AGM-65 11 SUU-65 ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 SUU-25 AGM-65 2 Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used AGM-65 21 SUU-25 ECM Pod OA l
- - -AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 LAU-68 LAU-68 Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used LAU-68 LAU-68 ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR LAU-68 Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used Not used LAU-68 ECM Pod
AIM-9 2, 1OR 0 LAU-68 LAU-68 MK 82 MK 82 Not used MK 82 MK 82 LAU-68 LAU-68 ECM Pod
City, when Sweet's aircraft (s/n
0) took a hit from an IR SAM and
down. Th e A-LO tradition is to stick
wingman, and 'Syph', flying s/n 78
circled the area, despite the obvious
to himself in orderto establish a rescap
providesupport. He was downed inhis
by a SAM,and paidfor hisloyalty and
with his life. Sweet was made a
and was not finally released until
1991.
combined attack by A- IOs and AH
Apache helicopters was made on L9
< gainst a Large concentration of
and APCs estimated 300 strong that
just north of the Saudi border.
attacks, twenty-eight ranks,
vehicles a nd t hr ee mobile
ry pieces were claimed destroyed.
in Battlelandbattle was initiated on 24 February
much delay < nd politicalm<1chination.
opening shots werefired by the A-lOs,
the outlet valves controlling
flow of the oil pipelines that the lraqi
planning to use to feed defensive
trenches < S part of itselaborate defence
The A-lOs on this occasion put
the Gatling a nd t he Maverick, in
of 'conventional' dive-bombing uti
the 2,0001b (910kg) Mk 8 4 LDGP
The 353rdTFS fired some 138Mk66
round fin aircraft rockets (WAFAR)
M156 warheads at trenches that were
in an unsuccessful attempt
gnite t hem and render them ha rm
to the ground assault.
two A-IO squadrons deployed to
A OR t ha t operated exclusively by
used the IR Video of the AGM-65D
missiles as a 'poor man's FUR'.
IR seeker became a search too l for
not only for the Maverick itselfbut
for other weapons. ' Dug-in enemy
still proved detectable to IR, as
and sandcooled unevenly after sun
A-lOs operated under what was
the 'push-flow' method, which
n t tha t teams were despatched on a
lar basis to ensure a continual b<1ttle
presence in case CAS missions were
uired. Ifa team arrived at a t ime when
FAC had no immedi<1te use for them,
s assigned other targets.
normal A-LO employment, with
mth er t ha n four-pl::tne formations,
was used throughout. However, the low
level, contour-hugging flying foreseen in
the much- rehea r sed European sc ena rio
hardly applied in the relatively flat, fea
tureless desert. The two -s hi p t eams
ingressed at altitudes between 15,000 and
20,000ft (4,500-6,000m) in line-abreast,
wedge or trail formations. Some aircraft
released their ordnance first, thus giving
them much greater manoeuvrabili ty from
the onset, and then turned theGat l ingon
the enemy, thre a ts pe rm i tt ing . As usual,
most two-ship fonTI< tions flew with one
flight member in the high cover slot, while
the o ther carried ou t the attack, then the
roles were reversed. 4
There was no l< ck of customersawaiting
A-IO servicing. Saddam had deployed
4,000 Soviet-built and Soviet-supplied T
72, T-62 and T-55 tanks. According to the
offici< report:
The Imqi army provided a trememll1l target
alTaI. Pilots acquired targets easily, hut ta rge t
identification - discriminating a tank ll self
pmpelledartillery piecefroma truck - pnwed a
const ,m t cha llenge . When e ng ag in g a n
armoured or mcchani:cd position, some nights
made medium-al t i tude gun and/or reconnais
sance passes, dropping from 15,000 feet to
5,000-8,000 feet to attempt to distinguish
reverted trucks from reverted armour. PhotllS,
when provided, helped the pi lot ident i fy the
positionof his intended target. Some pilots used
hinoculars to assist in targetidentification;
ers remarked that the magnification 'as too lit
tle or that r h e p l an e v i hm t ed excessively. '
In general, A-IO pilots ::tlways tried visual
ly to acquire the desired priority target,
so that,when it c ame to thecrunch, Major
Kennedy's peE system came into its own.
To draw ou t the location ofenemy mobile
sorties were conducted at 12,000ft
(3,600m); the aircraft were t oo h ig h for
the Iraqi multi-barrelled weapons, bu t the
undis cip lined gunne rs would open fire
anyway. They t hus exposed themselves
and could then be methodically worked
over by t he A -I0 teams.Ordnance was principally the GAU-8
(withmore than one million 30mm rounds
being fired off during the war), and the
Maverick, eitherthe -DEOwith scene mag
for daytime use, o r t he fIR-D, fitted with
125lb (57kg) shaped-charge warheads, or
the G with larger blastwarhead. All were
carried on e it h er t he single-rail LAU-I L7
launcher, or via the triple-rail LAU-88,
each carrying sl::tnt-Ioaded pair of mis-
138
siIes. The Mk 20 Rockeye clusterbomb was
effective when used against soft-skinned
vehicles, but i t was found that singledrops
from medium level did not produce the
desired results. Instead, reverting to its
ancestry, the A-I 0 turneddive-bomber for
these missions and delivered the Rockeye
in sticks at angles of 70 degrees.
A-LOs ou to f the FOLs a t KKMCand AI
Jouf, working over enemy tank and troop
concentrations, used 1,033 CBU-8 CEMs,
which were delivered from the SUU-65
dispenser.
Protection from hand-held IR missiles
was essential and some355,381 chaff bun
dles were expended during esert Storm
along with 108,654 self-defence flares. In
s t ric t contras t , a l though the use of two
AIM-9L/M Sidewinders on a dual-rail
adapter wasofficially regarded as standard
for de fence , many unit s , e spe cial ly the
OA-LOs, carried only on eon a single-raillauncher. Others did not carry them at all,
and, o f those that did, none were required
to use them; theon ly th ree that werefired
were discharged accidentally. When car
ried , usually on pylon I, the rails were
mounted on each side of a L4 x 54in (35
x 3 Scm) spac er p lat e , s uspended from
the L4in (35cm) pylon lugs, with the rear
of the plate extending 14in out from the
pylon's trailing edge. This left the fronttip
ofthe Sidewinderextending 28in (70cm)
forward o f t h e leading edge o f t he plate.
Colour Schemes
Amazingly, the A/ OA- 0 operated
th roughout the Gulf War in i ts European
drab-green paint scheme, and stood out
l ike a sore thumb, whether on the ground
or a ir bo rn e, I nd iv id ua l u ni ts , both
CONUS- and UK-based, tried out desert
b lend ing pa in t jobs off their o wn b at
immediately before deployment. However,
this was inexplicably stamped on by Air
Force High Command, which insisted that
those few aircraft that had been so painted
should be hastily re-painted in the European scheme before they flew out toSaudi.
OA IO
Some 656 Forward AirControl (FAC) sor
t ie s were f lown by the OA-IOs, marking
targets not only for the A-LO t o t ak e ou t ,
but also for Air Force, Navy and Marine
Corps strike pl::tnes, like the A-6, A-7D ,
Actual Gulf War A/OA l0combat loadings
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On 6 February 1991, Captain Paul
son s A - I O took a shoulder-launched
hit in the u n de r sid e le ad ing e d ge
s tar b oa r d w in g. I t to ok out a twen
s ec t io n , d a ma g in g the h y dr a ulic
there, and tearing away the landin
housing, a nd t he resultant debris
damage to the starboard engine. Jo
jettisoned his ordnanceand nursed t
craft home safely and got it down
piece. The wing and housing were rep
theengine was replaced and i t w a s b
action again before t h e e n d of the
The A - IO s to ug h ne s s w as demonagain when 77-0186, t he m ou nt
commanding officer ofthe 23rdTFW
heavy damage t o its empennage,
heavy strike that chewed u p its e le
and caused severe perforation of bot
ders and tailplanes. The p i lo t w as a
bring the aircraft down u sin g ju
engine a n d a i le r on controls. In a
e x am p le , M a jo r J i m Rose o f t he
TFW, flying s n 76-540, was hit by a
747
The A-I 0 w as d es ig ne d f or s ur vi va l i n
the m os t da nger ous e n v ir o n me n t o f all,
and in the Gulf War i tp r o v e d it c ould ta ke
punishment a s w e ll a s d is h it out. Forgetful
or ignorant)of the fact t h a t t h e A-IO was
built to survive h its , c r itic s w o uld shake
their heads and s ay I t ol d y ou s o . They
were conveniently missing t h e p o in t t h at
the majority of A-lOs returned safe to base,
with pilots unharmed and w i th a n y d a m
age reparable within a v er y short t i me . I n
The abil i ty ofthe A l totake punishmentand survive. Here. s n 80 0186. ofthe 23rd
TFW hastakenheavydamage from a hitin thetai l . Despitethe devastation to the
empennage theaircraftgot safely back to base wasrepaired and carried on fighting.
On other jet-fighters a hitof thisseverity usuallymeanta combatloss. USAF
c o nt r as t , t h e c o nv e nt i on a l fast fighters,
supported by those who claimed that
speed is life , pr oved c onc lus ively thatthey could not take it. The lessons o f t h e
V i et n am W a r had to b e a b so r be d once
again, and aircraft such as the F-16 Fight
i ng F al c on f iv e l os t) , the F-15E Strike
Eagle two lost), a n d t h e P a na v ia G R. Mk
I Tornado six lost) took a higher propor
tion of los se s f or m iss ion s . The AV-8B
Harrier f iv e lo st) proved very vulnerable
t o S A M damage - if one was hit, i t w o uld
certainly crash.
The A - I O e njoye d unprecedented success
on 25 February, w h en a n e n ti r e c o l u mn o f
Iraqi ta nks s ur r ende r ed to a f lig h t of the
511 th TFS, as they circled them in p r ep a
ration for a n a tt ac k. T hi s move o n t he
e n em y s p a rt m ig ht h av e b ee n h el pe d
along by the work o f t h e 23rd TFS s two
man team of Captain Eric Salomonson
and Lieutenant John Marks who, between
them, r ac ke d u p an impressive twenty
three tanks totallydestroyed, plus ten oth
ers damaged, in just onethree-m iss ion day.
The panic-stricken Iraqi occupation
army, now f ac in g a v er y r ea l threat, fledthe city en masse, commandeering any
t h in g t h at had wheels. Baghdad dignified
this unseemly rout with the description of
a strategic withdrawal . I tg a v e Allied air
craft an unprecedented target array; they
took full advantage, a n d t h e six-lane road
the media s H ighwayof D eath ) between
Kuwait City and Basrah was turned into a
charnel house, w i th A - lO s j o in i ng other
predators against the fleeing enemy.
Dishing It Out an d Taking It
JUSTIFICATION AND VINDICATION - DESEIIT S IIELD AND DESERTSTORM
A - I O, F- 16 and F- 18 , to attack. T h e O A
l s o f t he 6 02 nd Tactical A i r C o nt r ol
Wing, part o f t he 353rd TrW , provided
tw o s e par a te groups, totalling f ifte en a ir
c ra ft , f or the target-marking in t he se
instances. Areas with potential high target
p ro fi le w er e m ar ke d o ff into g r id b ox e s,
which t h e O A- I Os diligently quartered,
;m d, w o rk ing with AFAC a nd A LO s, l it
up actual targets and passing the informa
tion on to thenext wave of incoming strike
a ir cr a ft f ro m la nd b as es and carriers, wh i e
t he A -1 0 w ou ld l et r ip w it h i ts Avenger
cannon w henever the opportunity to con
tribute safely offered itself.
The orthodox 2 .7 5i n 6 .8 cm ) w hi te
phosphorous WP or W illy Pe te ) rockets
were used by the 23 rd TASS, which fi red
off2,748 of them in the course of itsduties.
In addition to the W P s a n d the Gatling,
s o me , b u t by no means all, t h e O A -1 0 s
carried defensive AIM 9L M Sidewinders
and M k 8 2 Iron Bombs into action.
Two types of ECM pod werecarried: the
ALQ-IIO long by C ONUS units and the
ALQ-131 shallow byUK-basedsquadrons.
With a h ug e a rr ay of enemy forces dug
in, there was no shortage of targets, but
distinguishing b e tw ee n d um m y targets,
d u g- i n t a nk s and trucks, and evaluating
their destruction v a lu e a c co r din gly , w as
proving a r ea l problem.
Nose artfromthe Gulf War: NightPenetration . SimonWatson
740
JUSTIFICATION AND VINDICATION - DESERTSII ELD AND DESERTSTORM
in the desert heata 23rd TacticalWing A l stands on the runway readyfor anotherstr ike.
indesertwarfare thePentagon permitted no changes to theolive drab paintscheme. To theIraqi
these dark aircraft with theirdistinctiveshape and crucifix silhouette lack ofengine noise
s of ill omen. In the foreground armourers are working on a trailer of
Rockeye II cluster bombs and a Mk 7clusterbomb unit fi l ledwith 247 Mk 118 anti-tank bomblets
the A l used to supplementits Gatlingand Maverick kill power. Yves Debay/US Department of Defense
artfromthe Gulf War: Kissof Death. Simon Watson
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JUSTIFICATION AND VINDICATION - DESEIIT SIIIEU AND DESE iT STOIIM
enter their \ e h i c l c ~ c 1 o ~ e h a tc h es a nd
away from thc gun cmplaccments.
8 Platoon h,td h cc n s wt io nm y a nd o
thcir \'Chicles for ahout fiftccn minutcs h
thisorder wasgivcn. Asthcy sta rtcd to co
onc Warrio r , ca l l-s ign 22 , cxplodcd. An
Warrior,call-sign 23, immcdiately m'lI1oc
in front of call-sign22, andsomc crc\\ mcm
had JUSt hcgun to movcthc c; ualtics to thc
a id I ' o s t IVhcn call-sign 23 also cxploded.
aircraft were seen in the fuca t
the t ime oexplosion, hut at first mines were slisp
E;rrlicrduringthc day, twosucccssivc ~ i gUnitcd S ta tc s Air Forcc aircraft \\ crc rask
Ile' lllquartcrs 1st (British) Armourcd Div
toattack Iraqi armourat grid rde rcnccPT
Suhsequently, a funhcr flighr of tlVO USAF
aircraftrcporrcd for [asking t o t h c Rritish
tant Di\'isional Air Liaison Officcr (DA
I l is in tcntion lVas that t h cs c a i rcm ft s
attack the same target as the ll prc,'iolls f
143
two \Varr io r \'Chiclcs hclonging ro thc 3rd Ra t
ta ion Thc Royal Rcgimcnr of Fusilicrs Bartle
(Jroul'(3RRF) hasnoll ' rcportcd. It has nothccn
the practice uf : l I c c c : : . s i \ t . ~ Covcrnmcnrs to p l l h ~lish rcporrs of rhis kind, hur 1wish to gi\ 'cas full
an account as pos:-,ihle o f t h e RnaILls findings.
On 26Fch ruary 1991 , 3RRFhad fought thcir
way through numher of enemy position:' in
southcrn Iraq. Aftcr a hricf hut in tcnsc sand
storm dur ing thc carll' p a no f t h c a l k a nc c , t h c
\\'C'ather had impftw(L { givC c1car
kic
<lndgood \'isihility hI ahout 1500 hou rs lo ca l t imc,
IVhcn C Company 3RRF,\\ i th somc 37 Warrior
;-lIld Engineer vchicles \\ ;1:-. rcurgani:ing. The
tcrrain in thc arca was tlat 'md fcaturcless ' tparr
from 'some Iraqi dc(cl1si\T positions and ahan
doncd I'chiclcsandcquipmcnr. During thc rcor
g:-lIli:atiol1, Royal Engineers prepared to destroy
ncarhy Iraqi artillery picccs. Whcn t h c dCllwli
tion charges were ahout to he hlown, C
I'any Commander instructed rncn
Tragedy
Thc Ro;trd of Enqui ry in ro thc inc idcnt whcn
ninc soldicrs wcrc killcd and c lc l' cn i n jurcd in
A view ofthe highway from Kuwait Cityto Basrah afterthe A-lOs had worked it over.Burnt-outIraqitanks
ammunition trucks andother military vehicles including an oil bowser strew theroad. BaghdadRadio
claimed a greatvictory Natonal Archives ColegePark MD
JUSTIFICATIONAND VINDICATION - DESEIIT SIIIEU AND DESERTSTOIIM
One episode marred the otherwise bri iant
record of the A-IO in the Gulf. The inci
dent, on 26 February J991,was as confusing
as i twas tragic, and became the focus of the
Western news medi a f ar more than the A
la 's innumerable successes. This case of
'friendlyfire' wasa single incident, in which
two British Army vehiclesweredestroyed by
tWO A-las firing MclVerick missiles, withheavy loss of life. The best and fairest way to
describe this regrettable aberration is to use
the dry,formal worcls ofthe Bri tish Min ister
for the Armecl Forces, Christopher Soames,
MP, who outl ined the conclusions o f t he
Official Board of Enquiry i n to the incident
t o t he House of Commons in July 1991 :2<
on 31 January 1991. hydraul ic control
was los t but Rose got the aircraft safely
home using the back-up sys tems. I t sur
vived to fight another day and was later dis
played a t t h e McClellan Air Museum.
Success in Desert Swrm failed to end the
old controversy between the devotees of
the F-16 and t hos e who loved the A-IO,
bu t the opera tion certa inly proved that
the new kid on th e blockwas no match for
the A-10 i n a ll a re as , except speed and
night-operation capability.The F-16 came
out a poor s e cond to the A-IO in terms of
vulnerability to ground fire, survivability
in case of damage, and accuracy (the
30mm gun pod fi t ted to the F-16 proved
unstable i n use and inaccurate in del ivery
c om pa re d t o the internally mounted
GAU-8). The bulk of Mavericks fired were
carried by A-lOs and proved to be magnif
icenttank killers.
All this cut little ice with the Pentagon,
which immedia tely s e t to work to replace
the expended Mavericks, a t t h e sametime
se eking to phase ou t the aircraft that was
utilizing them to optimum effect.
An overturned Iraqitank lies amid hordes of
commandeeredvehiclesand army trucks on themain highway o u t o f Kuwait City dubbed the Highway
ofDeath by themedia.Thefleeing Iraqis hadbeen
serviced by the A-10 and suddenlyeveryone felt sorry
forthe aggressorsl Natona Archives Colege Park MD
142
one aircraft thatreally stopped
s massivetank force was. Here a decapitated Iraqitank
the power ofthe
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JUSTIFICATION AND VI DICATION - IJESERT SIII UJ AND IJESERT STOI M JUSTIFICATION AND VINDICATION - IJESERT SIIIEL AND S RT STOI M
British armoured personnel carrierspass a blaz ing I raqi anti-tank vehicle during
theiradvance east intoKuwait from southern Iraq. It was in such conditionsthat a
tragic 'friendly fire' incident took place, and Maverick missiles from two A-lOs
destroyedtwo of the British Warrior vehicles, withheavyloss of life. National
Archives, College Park, MD
i, a conflict of e\ idence er I\'hether
grid reference for the ta rge t W<1 pa:l:lcd from
A i,tant DALO to the A-IO,. The target
\Va 0\ ( 1 20km to the ea r of C C O I l 1 ~ny 1RRF\ po,ition at 1500 houc>.
The A-IO pilot, identified what the\
I\'a, the t ar ge t a re a f rom a phy,ical
gl\ en rhem hy a departingUSAF F
rhe pre\ iou, flight, and ,hmt lyafterl\'ard,
what t h ey thought wcre ahnur 50 I raqi
[;mb and ,UPPort \Thicle, heading
pilor, had heen midthat rhere I\'ere
friendlyforce, I\' ithin ren kilomeftT of rheir
and the,e vehicles were clmer rhan that
rhe point rhey hadident i fied as their rarget.
lead aircraft made rwo pa e a r 15,000
HOOO f ee r, to oh,etTe rhe vehicle, I\'ith
hut sal\' n friendly , ,-king,. Hoth
then fired ne infra-red Ma\ erick mi,
f rom a heighr of ahour 9,000 feer, each
ofthe \ ( h i c l c ~ , hefore fcpuning
eng,lgemenr r the A i anr DALOand
rhe area.
The pi lor, report f fifry Iraqi \Thicle, dif
dramarica Ill from earlierde,cription, f
target tha r rhe A>si ant DALO a,kc'd rhem
confirm the I carion. The f l lghr leade r
d rhar rhe arrack had raken placear grid
rT -II 51 The A i,ranr DALO
edia rely real i :ed rhar rhis p h ion \\'a,
rhan twentykilomerre, from rhe intenJed
and corre,ponded wi rh rhe locat ion of
rhen ca lledupa reconnai ance flighr
rhe area, which rep rred that flume,cenr
on panel: coulJ he : 1111 from 6.000
and rhe type of \ ehiclecould he idenrified
m 14,000 feet.
The H ard f Inquiry f undrha t H rl:1I <,,,n, C
y ,RRF I\'ere n peration, asordered.
H ardalso f und that the air planning pro
all wing a distance f more th, , ,fi(teen
hetween the ta rge t for any arrack
friendly forces had heen f ' lo l\ ' ed and
ld have heen suff icient to ensure the ,uc
l a nd Ife conduct of operations. The
rd further concluded that air control at
and Divis iona l I e\TI I \ 'h ich provided
informationto the A, O:-. was in aCCOf
I\' ith estahlished procedures.
The Hoard found that ' rlamon s vehiclescorrect in\ crrcJ V recognition
and flumescent panels. The Bo,,,d noted
some o f t h e panels could have heen pa r
y ohscured by open hatches m equipment,
thar whilea reconnaissance flightobserved
panels at 6,00 feet, this wasbelow the oper
heightofthe A-lOs. The Board could nm
k e ,my f in d in g as to whether the pilots
have seen the identification panels at
operating height. The Board concluded
that no hlame m responsibility fm the incident
could be arrrihuted m lRRF
The Hoard noted that there 1\ a Clmflict of
e idence h ct l l l l the ra rCIl1Cllh o f t he wit,
ne es f rom I leadqua rrec> ht (British)
Armoured Di \ i, ion and thme of the A-I0
pilor,. The A btant DALO t a red thar he
p a ed t he target grid reference hut the A-IO
r i l o t ~ deny rccei,·ing thb. There \ \ a ~ no e\ i
dence to :-.ugge:-.r t h at t h e two pre\ ious missions
had ,ltt,lCked anything hut the correct rargets.
Once the ev idence was presenred, the Board
found t hatno blame or re,ponsihility should be
attached to the A istant DALO.
The pilots stated that, notwithstanding the
ab,enceofa grid rderence, they attackedon the
basis of information pa ed to them by the pre
viousflight andof thei r positive identification
of the targets b enemy vehicles. The board
notedthat a USAF reconnaissance flight ,hort
II after the Warriors were attacked I \as able ro
identify the types of vehicles fmm 14,000feet.
On the basisofthe e\ idence hefore it, the Board
was unable to e,tahli,h why the attacked War
rior vehicle, I\'ere mi,idenrified hI the A-IO
pilots a s enemy T54/55 tanb, parricubrly in
,·iew of their rrl IOU l identification rUIl:-t at
l,OOO feet ami 15,000feet. In f(lt\varding the
Board\ finding t he Jo in t Commander has
drawn attention to the way i n which bpect,
weather and light condition, can critically
a f fec ta pi lot ' sahi l i ty to identify the details of
objeers on t h e ground.
The Board did not estahlish I\'hether the
USAF personnel invoked were at faulL. I t wa,
clearly established t hat theUSAF A-lOsdeli\'
ered the missiles, hut the Hoard could nm estab
lish preciselywhy they attacked rhewrongtarget.
The Hoard remarked rhat i twas clear that all
UK and USAF personnel il1\'olved I\'erestri\'
ing to 'lChieve their individual tasks to the hesr
of thei r abi li t ies in a fa st-moving ba t tle . The
Hoard thought it inc'vitable t hat ,at somestage
difficulties mayarise when individualsarc under
pressure.On 26February1991,difficultiesarose
in relation t o t h e location and identificationof
the target, an d t h e Board concluded thar only
the clearest of,tandard operational procedures
and sophi icatec l ident i f ic a t ion sy>rems will
help to prevent such tTagedie, in future.The Board recommends thar astudybe ini ti
a tedto identify a suitable air recognition system
for future ust', confirm ing the importance of
standard operating procedure for thecontrol of
aircraft in offensiveair support operatiolls and
recommended tba r they must a lways include
instrucrions that a grid re fe rence or a latitude
and longitude is specifically included in mission
briefs and thar this is always acknowledged by
the pilots.
144
The ( J e rnm en r ( and t he Un it ed SLues
Adminbtration) wi,h to expre their deepe,t
'ymp'1Ihy and condolences to relati\T oftho,e
whudied In the tragic incidenT.
tany important detai remained unclarrfied
hy thi, ,tatement: the information ,upplied to
the A-la , hI the rerurning F-16; t he d pute
between what t heDALO, rold t heA-IO pilot
including Ihe r a l ~ i n g of the grid reference; and
the pilot- denial ofthe receipt of such inforrna
tion. Both rhe,e matte r s should have been
in lt;lndy resoked, a:-. the \ erhal me:-.:-.age of
comhat aircraft can he recorded on t a pe a nd
played back. Either this procedure wa,notdone
on t h es e twooc ca si o ns , o r r he tapes wcre not
produced Cs e \ idence. Ei ther way, something
was not right. Tbe fact that Warrior APCs
could viswtlly he confirmed as T54/55 tanks is
also peculiar, notwilhst;-lnding the Joint
mandcr\ extenuation, (ur, in the pilot\ own
worlls, I-he idenrifiGltion was ·positin:: .
Despite the amhiguities,a witch-hunt should
not he Gl rri ed OUI. Tcrrihle ;1 it i- m i : . r d k e n ~identity deari ha\ e always heen commonplace
in I \a rs , , tlthough the USAF s r ecord in f ~ S ~ r lSronn was worse than any in earlier contlict:-..:l
Thl i, pmhably due to the ,peed of the Iraqi
co ll ap,e and the r e ,u lr ing t ime complexity of
the situation imposed o n t he military by the
Allied polltic ,n,.
Gener al o rman chwarzkopf, the Allied
C-in-C, made the following statement:
The very chaotic nature ofthe battlefield,where
quick deci, ionsmake the difference between life
and death, h b resultedin numerousincidents of
troops heingkilled by their own sidein e\'erywar
thar 11<1S ever beenfought. This docs nor makeit
acceptahle. N t even one suchavoidable dearh
should ever beconsideredacceptable.2t
Certainly, since the Gulf War, great effort
has been put into introducing a be tte r lD
system for the A-I0 force.21
Of course, the a l l-pervad ing media
presence highlighte I this incident among
many others. The instant-reaction ap
proach by journal ismfor TV, whereobjec
tivity may come a poorsecond to the needto be first w ith t h e news, a nd whe re n o
time for reflection is allowed, ca t a long
hadowovercombat situations in modem
wars. The media pre ence was held
responsible , in part, for the SA's loss in
the Vietnam War. One-sided images were
shown,and the North Vietnamese firmly
censured anything harmful t o t h ei r own
cause, on ly permitt ing broadcast ing of
favourable film footage showing them as
the victims where they were, in truth,
the aggressors. The a dv ent o f satellite
transmission has only served to increase
the pace o f s uc h d is semb la nc e, a nd
instant news' is now coupled with
instant verdicts' by journalists who may
have virtually no military knowledge nor
underswnding.211
While the British press was at its self
righteous worst in relating the A- I0 inci
dent, i t made hardly any mention of the
fact t ha t o n 27 Feb ruary 1991, Bri ti sh
Challenger ranks from the 14/20 Hussars
pulverized two British corpion armoured
car of the 7thArmoured Brigade,injuring
two soldiers of 10 Air Defence Battery,Royal Artillery.
Prior to the tragedy on 26 February
1991, on 31 January, five US Marines in
an armoured personne l ca rr ier had been
k il le d i n a n ight a t tack by a Maverick
launched by an A-lOw Despitethese ter
rible losses, the question has to be asked:
how many A ll ie d soldiers would have
died if the A-lOs had not destroyed 987
Iraqi tanks?
A/OA-IO Gulf War Statistics
By any standard, the record of the A-lOin
theGulfWar was an outstanding one.
l. The A-IO flew only 16.5 per cent of all
coalition air strikes.21l
2. The A-I 0 fl ew a t ot al of 8,755 sorties,
totalling 1 9, 54 5 h ou rs f lyi ng t im e,
striking 6,834 targets , including 1,041
CAS missions, and delivering ord
nance on 7,445 occa ions. 214 This was
16.5 per cen to f all tr ike sortiesflown.
3. The A-I fired 5,013 AGM-65D Mav
erick missiles, which was more than 9
per c e nt o f t h e Mavericks fired by AirForce aircraft. 2t ;
4. The 132 A-lOs were credited with the
destruction of9 7 tanks (25 per cent of
the to tal destroyed by ALL arms),
I ,106 trucks, 926 artillery pieces (25
per cen to f the total destroyed by ALL
arms), 501 APCs (30 per cent o f t he
total destroyed by ALL arms), 249 CPs,
51 Scud-B launchers (although this
total is thought t o be too h igh) , II
145
FROG missile launchers, 112 mi
structures, 96 radar installation
bunkers,2 CPs, 10 enemy aircra
the ground, 2 helicopters, 9 AM
and fuel tanks.
5. The A-IO ave raged 2 .37 hou r
flight and achieved a mi sion-ca
rate of 7.7 per cent.
6. The A -I r ec or de d one o f t h e l
rate of losses per 1,000 combat s
flown, at 0.5 per cent against a c
tion average of 13 losses per 1,00
ties.
7. Despite endless predictions of vul
bility, theonly three A-lOs werel
MA PADS andone to AAA.
A-10 target attack breakdownduringGulfWar
Targets struck Sor
Ground order of battle IGOBI 3.3
Offensivecounter-air lOCAl 1
Scud-B missile launchers 1Command. control. communications IC3) 1
SAM sites
Petroleum. 011. lubricants IPOLI
Industrial
Lines of communications (LOCI
Nu clear. c hem ica l. b to lo gi cal lN CB)
Nationalcommandcentres (NCC)
Other 2.9
TOT 6 8
Forward air control (FACI missions by OA- Os 6
Further breakdown of these figures s
that,ofthe 0 A strikes, the effort wa
mariIy focused on destroying elect
warfare and ground control intercep
during the first few days o f t he air
paign. The forty-nine strikes during
sions to suppress enemy air defences s
t imes saw t he A -lOs t eamed with
FAGs to attack fixed SA-2/3/6 site
the bulk of the 3,367day and night s
againstIraqiartillery andarmour unit
weapons ofchoice were AGM-65 M
icks and the internal 3 mm cannon
135 Scud-B total included both Sc
CAP t<lrget a nd a nt i- c ud -B areconnaissance mission .21 The OA
flew their 656 missions as dedicated
assets providing airborne control of
aircraft. 217 A/OA-IOs also contri
fully t o t h e search and rescue (SAR)
sions and were on cont inuous a ler t
the beginning o f t h e war. In one cas
lOs escorted a Special Operations
(SOF) c omba t s ea rc h a nd rescue
copter to re trieve a downed F-14 pilo
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JUSTIFICATION NDVINDIC TION - ESERTSII ELI ND IJESt RTSTORM
Opinions
The ~ i n g l e mn...,t n:cngni:ahle and feared,lircra(t
at 10\1' 1c\C1 \Va, t h eA · I 0 Thunderholt II. Th h
dark·coloured jet \l'a, d ead ly accu ra te , ra rely
mb: ling targct. It conduc ted homhing raid;.,
three or (our time;., a day and \\a:- fI seemingly
uhiquitous t h re at . A l th ough t h e actual hOl11h
run WCIS terrifying, the ;lircrafr\ Inircring around
I. Ca rry ing ou[ aerial moni[oring
enforc ing compliance wi[h the U
arionsSecurity Resolu[ion (UNS
16, which banned f li gh [s by fwing aircraf[ in [he Bosnia-Her:e
ina airspace, hy patrolling a no-fly
FZ .
2. Giving 'upporI' U [roops on
ground, a[ their reques[, shou J
feel [hrea[ened by superior for e w
carryingou[ [heir du[ies.
3. Car ry in g ou[ a pp rove d air sr
agains[ Jesigna[ed rargets, again in
ordinarion wi[h the UN.
the powder keg of Europe. Sarajevo
been[he place where the tinder-box o
FirsI Wor ld War h ad b ee n i gn it ed ,
[he resul[ing slaugh[er of million
Europe's young men. Th e [ribal feu
he[lveen CroaI's, Bosnians, Albanians
Serhs, [he machina[ions o f the B
H'lIld, the Communis[s versus Ce[
and mher hiner dispu[es, had all see
ancien[ hisrory, relega[ed the di
past , a s long as [he menac e o f t he
War hung over every[hing. In [he
'oviet era, however, all [he old har
which haJ hecn fes[ering below
,urface , re-emerged, hringing with t
genocide on ,1 scale thought impossib
[hemode rn world.
Far from heeding [he lessons of the
on [he difficul[y of interceJing be[w
these permanently warring fac[ions
Yugoslav panisans had h el d down fi
German divi s ions during the e
World War), ATO wok i[ upon i[s
assume responsibility for [he implcm
tion of [he mili[ary aspects o f t h e P
Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina.
of iI S s el f -a ppointe d duti e s incluJed
pa[rols, which would main tain an a
presence in [he skies ove r [h is unh
country.
Set up on 12 April 1993, eny ligh
given three missions:
Operation Deny Flight
Wi[h [he break-up of the former
Yugoslavia, following [hedeath of Marshal
Tiw, who h'lll held wgether [he widely Jif
fcring factions anJ rradi[ ional enemies
since 1945, [he area of [he Balkans had
once more resumed iIS tradi[ional r ol e as
Post-Gulf Operations
A·10 of the Massachusetts Air National Guard s 104th Fighter Group moving down
the runway at Aviano, Italy, in readiness to participate in NATO air strikes against the
Bosnian Serbs. USAF
Seen at Spangdhelm Air Ba se in Ge rma n y thisA-l0, 81-0962 of the 81st FS illustrates
the fulldownlock of theundercarriage configurationalongwith theBlack Panther
logo on herengine fairing atop hertwo-tone paint scheme. Smon Watson
CHAPTER EVE TEE
teadying resen e
Since [heA- I a f inal ly proveJ iI S power in
Deser tStorm, i t ha sbe en a c[ ive over vari
ous flashpoinrs a round [he world. In each
case, the arrival of[ha t distinc[ive silhou
cue has gi v en [ he agg resso r pause f or
[houghI', and a feeling of securi[y [0 [he
men on [he ground surrounded by hostile
clements.
Upgrades Announced
A i r ~ r o ~ g r o l l n d ;.lCtlonagan:-.r I raqitargcb in tht'
Per>i n Gul( \l 'atm y have saved the Thunder·
holt I.. ,(ml11 imminent retirement. Although
,en' ice offici I h d predicted hefl)re the \\' r thar
II USAF A·I 0, \l'ould either he releg;ltwllOrhe
honey rdnr turnedm'Cr t h eUS Army, current
th inkingh , turned toupgrades th t \li11 gi\'C the
clircr;.lft improved m i ~ : - . i o n c a p a h i l i t i e s . ~ 2
etais
Shotdown by Optcal AAA. 2 0 nm SW of Kuwait Cit y
Piot KIA
Shot down by IR SAM. 60nm NWof Kuwait City
Piot KIA
Shotdown by IR SAM. 60nm NW of Kuwait City
Piot POW
OA·10shot down by IR SAM. 62nm NWof Kuwait Cty.
Piot POW
Hit by IR SAM.crashed at base. Piot unharmed
OA· O hit by IR SAM. crashed on landingat KKMC.
Piot KIA
the t a rg et a reap r io r to target aCLJui:lition GHI:-.ed
much, i fno tmo re , anxiety ~ i n c e the Iraqi : o l ~d i e r ~ were unsure o f t h e h o ~ n target.
This new programmewasin addition ro the
LA TE improvemen[s [hal' had a l re a Jy
been announced for abou[ nine[y of the
s even- to fifteen-year-olcl A-las. Colonel
Chrisropher Russo, [he A-I a programme
manager a[ the acramenro Air Logis[ics
Cente r, McCle ll a nd AFB, California,
announced inJuly 199I [hal ' [ he I 50 -m il
l ion LA TE programme was scheJuled for
completion by l at e 1 992 , wi[h GeneralDynamic' as the prime conrraeror. Beyond
[hal' he predic [ed the ins[allarion of a
F UR , o r nigh[-vision goggle-comparihlc
cockpit l ight ing, ro improve the A-I 's
nigh[-figh[ing capabil i ties. In adJi[ion, 'A
global posi[ioning system is an op[ion
under sruJy, and the first improved dara
moJem sys[ems (lDM ) - similar ro auto
matic mrge[ hand-off sy st ems - wil l sran
being ins[al led in Ime 1996. ' ''
No doub[ [hey became very sure immeJi
atelyafter l
In summer 1991, following an evalua[ion
of [he A-la's 's[erling performance':::, [he
upgrading of [he Thunderbo [ II's capabil
i t ies were announced:
Cp tRch Biey
1st Lt Patrck Olson
Lt Robert JamesSweet
Cpt Steven Richard P hi s
Lt·Col Jeffrey 0 Fox
Piot
Cpt Richard DaleStorr
79·130
76-537
79·181
77-197
78-222
22Febr
27Feb
A·10 Gulf War losses
ate lfcraft
2 Feb 80-248
15 Feb
15 Feb
19 Feb
o martel ' howmuch they m ight have Jis
liked the iJea, by its JeeJs the A-IO
proved its critics wrong. Among others,
L ieu tenant-Gene ra l Char l es A . Horner
was gracious enough to aJmit, 'I takeback
all the bad things I've ever said about the
A-las. I l ove them . They're s av ing our
asses.' : :; Back in Washing[on, DC, the Air
Force Ch ie f o f Staff, General Merrill A.McPea k, r e- qu es ti on eJ [ he im mi n en r
re[irement of t he A- IO from [he USAF' s
invenwry. He was qumeJ as saying in Feb
ruary 1991, 'We 're going to keep [he A-IO
in [he inventory asfaras [he eye can see.' :
Thischangeof hean was des[ineJ , howev
er, nm [0 ou[-las[ [he en J of [he war for
long.
Wha [e ve r t he A ir Force migh[ [hink,
[he enemy haJ the I s measure in full.
On e Iraqi Army BrigaJier General, taken
prisoner af[er having his commanJ raken
apart by t he A -I , JeclareJ emmionally
[har thi' aircraft, above al l else, haJ 'won[he war ' f or [he Allies. Anmher Iraqi
colonel ta[eJ [he following:
shift of the FSCL, anJ i t was shifted back
w the south again, this was only for a brief
perioJ befo re i t was again moveJ back to
the Euphrates R i v e r : ~In t he e n J, there was no final 'Hawg
cull' of aJJam's fines[ to rounJ off the A
la's outstanJing accomplishments.
[hough the A-las ' achievcmenrs
were J u ri n g [ he Gu lf War,
e sc ape of a l ar ge propon ion of [he
can GuarJ ,: wi[h more [han 700
[ he ir bes[ [anks, many o f t he m T
took [heeJge of f [he vicI'ory. Cer
, [his ' reverse Dunkirk' meanr [hat
Husscin has haJ enough mili[ary
ro b e proppeJ up since thaI' [ime,
ro cru h very harshly [wo immeJiate
Various Army commanJers have
e b ee n c en so re d a n d d e fe n Je d in
w [his los[ opportunity, but one
s t ion [ha t did arisc wa 'Where was
A iI Force1 :2
faer, noblamecan be artacheJ for [he
lican Guard's reprieve from what
J certain annihilation. As early a
even ing of 25 Feb ruar y, I raqi army
inrercep[s revealed w [he Jo inrSur
an J Targe[ Auack RaJa I ' y s[ em
AllieJ Inrelligence that 'a general
of I raqi forces was unJer way': . I f
Armycould nm CUI them off, then [he
Force coulJ have been thrown in ,It
w reJuce their numbers. It JiJ not
pen. Ce rt a in ly, the A i r Force planneJ
a n a tt ac k, b ut the C- in -C, at the
of VII Corps CommanJer General
M. Franks, moveJ the Fire u p
Co-orJination l ine (FSCL) u p a s f ar
Euphrates River. This was no Joubt
by fear of more frienJly-fire inci
In faer , the Republican GuarJ was
outsiJe the area where AllieJ aircoulJ strike an J [herefore paralyse
IyA II ieJ force able to h i t the enemy.
the rules of engagement, such tar
coulJ o nl y h av e b ee n t ak en unJer
proviJeJ there was clear direction
FA s. There were obviously none on
grounJ that far forward, and baJ
t her mean[ that, for the most pa rt ,
were n o a ir bo rn e F AC s e it he r.
ugh the A iI Force protesteJ a t th is
issed Opportunity?
t r oye J an Iraqi raJio intercept truck
for [he pi1m.:
A-IO and two OA-IOs were com
losses in theGulf War, while a funher
were JamageJ in comlat. Of
,Tfouneen, tcn wcre returneJ [() action
one Jay, anJ a ll bu [ one flew again
ng the war, proving the resilience of
A -I . A funhcr [hirty-seven aircraft
JamageJ [() varying Jegrees through
acciJen[ Jamage.:'·'
146 147
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A STEADYING PR ESEN C E- POST GULFOPERATIONS A STEADYING PRESE CE - POST GULFOPERATIONS
Domestic upset and violence have
b ee n c on f in e d t o t h e Balkans o r t h e
d le Eas t. The old American patrona
the Monroe D octrine sawnell applic
in the rene\\ al of anorher old feud.
t i me , i t w as t h e a n ci e n t e n mi t y b e t
t\\ o tiny island nations in the C aribb
t h e D o mi n ic a n Republic an d t he
party dictatorship of Haiti. Claims b
Haitian president for the Republic re
bled t h os e m a de by Saddam H u ss e
relation to Kuwait; and thos e c la im s
met by an equally fierce and active re
o n t he part o f t h e U S A.
In Se ptem be r , the s e threats led to
mounting of Operation UI hol.d. Demo
Operation Uphold
Democracy - Haiti
deployed from Westfield, Ma sachusett
6 A u gu s t, f or a two-month spell in the
r ol e. A s s u ch , t h e y w or ke d w i t h g r
f or ce i n d ir e ct i ng a nd c o- ordina tin
strikes and ground fire by A T O f
While conducting s uc h m i i on s the A
c am e u nd er sustained attack from
ground, and o n o n e sortie one a ir cr af t
0626) had no less than six AMs laun
against it,all of which it avoided. 0 A
w er e l os t i n e i th er o f these two miss
Retaliatory strikes werein order a n
lOstoted full combatordnance int
Bosnian skies. Along with the Ave
the Maverick and the A /ALQ-131
pod, chaffand anti-missile flares were
r ied in ter n ally ,a s w ell a s dumb bomb
IM-9M Sidewinder missiles.
Operation Deliberate Force
a n d o u t to safety via Croatia and the Adri
atic. This episode was thc highlight o f t h e
deployment of the tw o u nits, which both
r e tu r ne d ta te s id e on 3June.
The scope of ATO airactivity over Bosnia
increased in autumn 1995, with the estab
lishment of Operation Deliberate Force. This
led to the planned deployment ofC A S and
other aircraft to enforce the compliance of
t h e U N peace resolutions on a truculentand
devious Serb government.
Fresh Thunderbolt lis, with Air National
G ua rd u ni t 3 FS J 04 FW), were
Taxiing inthe earlymorning sunshineat theLas Vegas Air Show. Nevada.Apri l 1998.
is A l0 Nbr. 00274. New OrleansBaby . a DesertStormveteran assignedto the55th
Fighting Fifty-Fifth ) FighterSquadron. 20th FighterWing. Kengo Yamamoto
Frontalstudyof two A-lOs onthe main runway at Davis-MonthanAFB. Tucson. Arizona, in February 1998.
Thedihedralof theouter wing panels can be seen clearly onthe nearest aircraft Nbr. 80159), as canthe
raised cockpit positionsof bothaircraft. KengoYamamoto
Dynamics/Lockheed F-16C Viper. During
spring 1995, the SlO th s p lac e in the front
line wa taken by A/OA-l u n its f ro m
home, with the 303rd F i gh te r q ua d ro n
442nd Fighter Wing) deploying to Aviano
along with A-lOs from t h e 4 6 th F 917
FW), from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana.
The porency o f t he e r b d e fe n ce s w as
revealed when o ne o f their SAMs shor
down a n F -1 6C on 2 June 1 99 5. A r es cu e
force was despatched a t o n ce to f in d Cap
tain Scott O Grady, the pilot, before the
Serbs did. Marine Corps CH-53 helicopters
were despatched o n t he S AR mission, and
flying shorgun o n t h em went a p ai r of A
lOs from the 917th FS They escorted the
helos outof Bosniawith the rescued airman,
I n A p ril 1 99 4 , the squadron was dcacti
vated, but it wa reactivated again on I
J uly in the same year, still at Aviano. On 5
August 1 99 4, in the S arajevo Exclusion
Zone EZ), the Bosnian S e rb A r my B A)
s eiz ed a n u mb e r o f he a vy w e apons from
the lIidza weapons collection site. Includ
i ng i n t h i s humiliating h ijac k w as a 76mm
M-78 Tankbuster, a m o bile , tracked, anti
tank gun. Fortunately, t h e A - IO w as a b le
to rctaliate in short order. C alled on to the
scene, i t u se d i ts GAU- in earnest, and,
firing of f s om e 600 rounds, totally demol
ished the gun b ef or e i t could be us ed
against i ts f o rm e r o w ne r s. The BA then
returned the other weapons it ha d s tole n.
A nother incident took place on 22 ep
tember 1994, when the BA madean attack
on a F r en c h a r mo u re d p e rs o nn e l c ar r ie r AP ) , a g ain near arajevo, with a f or c e
that included a he a vy ta nk. U PROFOR
requested an air strike and two RAF Jaguar
a ir cr a f t r e sp o nd e d, a l on g w it h 1 single
O A -I , w hi ch shot up the Bosnian erb
tank. It h a d b e e n found w ithin the 20-km
EZ around the town.
ince the end of 1994, the SlOth has
g iv en u p the A-IO for the new, single
seat, single-engine multi-role General
support of IFOR s Operation Joint Endeav-
our. D ur ing this time, CAS and a ir s tr ike
sorties over Bosnia-Her:egovina totalled
2 7, 0 77 , a f ai r percentage o f t h e 100,420
m iss ion s f low n b y a ll a ir a r m s .
The A-IO f e atu re d la rg e in these mis
siems. The opposition would not be
impressed by talk alone, oreven by a show
of force, for the nell Russia was justas pro
tective of i ts Ba lka n s o u sin s a s it ha d be e n
under the Czars a n d t h e Soviets. However,
practical demonstration of the firepower
of the A -1 O d id eventually sink home,
e v en t o the warringparties.
The nine ATO countries that were
involvedin and contributed aircraftto these
missions were France, Germany, Italy, the
I e th er Ia nd s, o rw ay , p ai n, T ur ke y, the
n ited K ing d om and the nited tates.Twelve O A /A -l s w er e b as ed at Aviano
Airbase, Italy. These were from SlOthFight
e r q ua dr on , w hi ch h ad m ov ed i n f ro m i ts
base at pandahlem, G e rm a ny . Be tw e en
1993 and 1994, sporting the ir ne w Ghost
Grey paint scheme, this unit flewmore than
1,700 combat sorties over Bosnia-Herzegov
ina; its members were subsequently named
Bosnia Buzzards . They did not just threat
e n , b u t bit aswell.
26this isWarthog 78626 seen ato n 3 0 July 1998. Frank A. Hudson
nder the S upreme Allied Commander
op e ACEUR), th es e m iss ion s w e re
a te d t o the C ommander-in-C hief,
e d For c es Southern Europe ClNC
based at aples, Italy, who in
delegated theC om mander, II ied Air
Southern Europe COMAIR
whose HQ was a ls o i n a pl es .
tual ope r ational c ontrol of the day
missions and sorties was the respon
ofthe C ommander, 5th AlliedTac
ir Force, based at Vicenza,Italy, with
co-ordination done via HQ at
a n d S a ra j ev o v ia I iais on o f fic er s
TO a nd t he U ni te d ations
For c es NPROFOR). On 23
1993, ATO committed CA units,
hich A-I s predominated. A do:en
s ofthe 52nd Fighter Wing wereinisent from Spangdahlem in Germany,
wererelieved periodically by both Air
e Reserve a nd A ir ational Guard
s , a ll w o rk ing o ut o f Aviano, Italy.
whole operation r a n f o r a p e rio d of
d ay s, f in al ly being terminated on 2
1995, when the Implementa
Force IFOR) assumed responsibility
B os ni an a ir sp ac e. With this, Deny
transitioned into Decisive Edge in
Starboardquarter view of Battle Creek,
172 FS at Macdill AFB, 18 April 1998.
A. Hudson
148 149
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A STEADYI G PRESENCE PO ST- G UL F O PERATIONS A STEADYI:- :G PRESENCE POST GUI_F OPERATIONS
peration Southern Watch 05W
This operation began i n 1 99 2, wit
mi sion to enforce the FZ belo
32nd para l le l i n I raq. Working fro
Jaber Airhase, Kuwait , the A II ied a
fly patrols to monitor Iraqi move
and deployments. The A/OA-lO ha
a t t h e forefront of this operation fro
s t ar t , a nd ove r the years manyuni t sbeen on th ree-month rotations of
from the mainland USA, includin
Reserve and Air ational Guard
Typical of t he deployments was
made by the 1 3rd F igh t er Squadron,
l l th Fighter Wing, from Willow
Air Reserve ration (AR , near Ph
phia, Pennsyh'ania. The Wing sent t
A-lOs with 36 unit members to A
AI- Jaber, Kuwai t, hecoming the
peration orth rn
Provide omfon end 'd \I 1A.{:Cfllltt:l
to be replaced byOp fa l lon
0 W), inJanuary 1997, flldare was for a six-month I
reviewed by the Turkish pmh III I
June and D ec em be r. h ar g d \ ing the FZ north of th th I I
Iraq and monitoring I raqi o ll l l h \I
non-compliance) with • I
tions 67 , 6 7 and 6 , the op r.1l11
defined not as 'an aggre sion again,t I
a violat ion of itssovereignty, [bur] a n
sary and legit imate mea ur to l imit
aggressive air activities .211 Not surpri
Iraq s rulerdid not see i t that way and
the Western media to continue towag
paganda protestinghis country s inno
a nd t o expose the wickedness of the
Western air forces.This policy led to a
ually escalating number of incident .The American contingent is sup
by the Uc European Command with
forty-five aircraft and more t ha n
personnel hased at Incirlik Airbas
Turkey, and is currently command
Brigadier General David A. De
USAF, and Brigadier General avas
iturk, Turkish Air Force (TAF). Afte
ing part in many o f t he earlier p
A/OA- Os ceased to be employed i
operation, although in an emergenc
are in a position to be f lown in qu
The more l ikely use for the A-lO re
in the south, with Kuwait as vulnera
ever, a nd t he A/OA-l 0 continues t
gainful employment at t he c en e
greatest triumph.
them at every tu rn . I n a be la t ed eff or t to
help the Kurds of Iraq, who were being sys
tematically eliminated by the Iraqi army,
two FZs covering northern and southern
Iraq were established. This was to prove to
be an ongoing commitmenr, which conrin
ues to thisday. In order to cu rt ai l addam s
gunships and jets joining in, the United
Na tions s et up a Combined Task For ce
(CTF) to enforce these :ones, and Opera
tion Provide omfon came into being.
Four A-l0 Thunderbolt l istaxi atAhmedAI Jaber Air Base Kuwait. before takingoff
fora combat patrol mission overIraq. Morethan 230 personnel and 18 aircraft were
deployedfrom 74th FighterSquadron in supportof Operation Southern Watch. USAF
US Air Force A 10Thunderbolt II groundcrewrunfromthe aircraftafterperforming
final inspections and giving approvalto launch from AhmedAI Jaber Air Base Kuwait
o n 1 2 March 1998 fora combatpatrolmission overIraq.The Thunderboltsof the 74th
Fighter Squadron were deployedfrom the 23rd FighterGroup Pope AFB North
Carolina. The A lOshavebeenflying since 1994 in supportof Operation Southern
Watch the US andcoalition enforcementofthe no flyzoneoverSouthernIraq. 000
Return to Iraq
I t was inevirable that, having failed to fin
ish offSaddam Hussein when they had him
on the ropes, the United Nations would be
faced with a recurr ing problem. The dicta
torship reasserted i tself , took cruel revenge
on those of itscitizens who had tried to take
advantage of i ts defeat , and gradually re
e me rg ed as a potent force, hell-bent on
humiliating its enemies and frustrating
autonomy, but this wis e p ol i y had been
abandoned on his death, and the price of
this was fina lly pa id i n 199 . With an
upsurge in separatist guerrilla warfare, fol
l owed by harsh r ep ri sal a tion from the
forces of the central government, another
diresitua tion arose quickly, and, seeming
ly, ou to f nowhere.
Once ag,l in, massacre a nd a tr oc it y
arou ed people in the Western World, via
selective media coverage, and ATO was
obliged to respond to the moral outrage.
peration Cobalt Flash
On 9 October 1998, Operation uhalt
lash was put in train as the Allies began
to assemble some 430 warplane, for possi
ble usage agaimt mili tary target should
diplomacy again fail to re 'olve the prob
lem. G iv en t h at t he problem i , \ irtual ly
irresolvablegiven the Balkan ,cenario and
age-old enmity, the A-I may wel l again
see action in that part of the globe.
As pa rt ofthe 31st AEW-SA, O/A-lOs
are once more on standby for hard strikes.The Serb-dominated defences a re wel l
equipped, with former oviet weaponry,
including SA-6 radar-guided missi les,
which, although noll old, arest i l l rated as
effective. They also possess h ,m d -h el d A
7 and A-16 m is si le s as w ell a many
23mm mobi leAAA systems. Many of the
AM sy t ems have been re cently upgrad-
ed and ATO planners wil l b e giving
them some respect. 2k
peration Determined Falcon
In it i at e d on 15 June 1998, Operation
Determined alcon W,lS an exercise based on
an aer ial patrol plan s imi lm to previous
ATO multinational operations, with the
r emi t to patrol the area over the Yugosla
vian borders withAlbaniaand Macedonia.
The commitmentof ground force, wasalsoa possibility, although the solid fronr hith
erto displayed s oon h eg an t o falter, with
France refusing to act, and Rus,-ia threat
en ing the vet o ove r a ny attempt t o ga in
UN approval for inrervention. In the opin
ion of the US, such approval was not nec
essary; according to France and Germany,
i t was. The Moscow-Belgrade, Yeltsin
Mi10sevic axis was as strong a, ever and,
although a i r exer c ise du ly took p l ace in
Macedonian and Alhanian airspace, and
A-IO deployment from pangdahlem and
home bases wa, a feature of this operation,
no shooting de\ Cloped.
Kosovo
further mi iom. In theevent, on learning
tha t the American force was airborne and
on irs way, the H 1itian presidenr resigned,ami the crisiswas quickly over.
A- - oon asone region of former Yugoslavia
s ee me d t o h av e b ee n pacified, violence
flared e ls ew he re . P re si de nr T it o h ad
allowed the e thnic A lban ian majority in
the Kosovo province a l ar ge degree of
the 510th FighterSquadron lifts offfromAviano Air Base Italy to crossthe
tains andthe Adriatic to carry outOperationDeliberate Force contingency relief
in supportof Operation Joint Force. USAF
January 1993 afterthesuddenend tothe Cod War the 510th FS movedto its new
e atSpangdhalemin thereunifiedGermany. Tail bands reflectedthe change with
SP codingsand theGerman national colours on thebanding. Thisis 81 0952 of
s in GhostGreydeployed atthat base. Smon Watson
inrended to be the largest combat per
air drop since the Second World
Some 3,000 paratroopers o f t he 82irborne Division were to be dropped on
Port au Prince airport, H liti.
As par t o f t he active support for this
the 75th Fighter c quad r on was
p lo ye d t o h aw AFB, South Carolina,
where they were scheduled to launch
missions for the invasion
The plan was for the -I to fly
combat s or ti es f rom h aw , and then
and replenish at Puerto Rico readyfor
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Guard unit to 0rerate front-line
from Kuwait. Over a three-month
the I03rd flewa total of 931 orties
t he FAC role. This gave ANG pilots,
supply, communications and
s up po rt p er so nn el a n excellent
tunity to hone theirskills in a contin
environment in an actual milestone
n retu rn t o t he U A, t he
ami sionconversion,dur
h its A-las changed from theFAC
to the a t tack mission profile.
The A-I o· of the 74th Fighter
deployed from the 23rd Fighter
p,at Pope Air Force Base, orthCar
had been enforcing the no-fly zone
Ahmed AI-Jaber regularly since
th 'ir last deployment was in March
By February 1999, theA-I a force in
ait had been reduced to a s ingle a ir
ft , hut, should the th rea t escalate, the
arewell rlaced to b e in the forefrontdefensive measures.
A STEADYING PRESENCE POST GULF OPERATIONS
TwoA 10 aircraft ofthe 74thFighter Squadron Pope AFB deploy on the f1ightline
atthe Ahmed AI Jaber Air Base Kuwait as partof Operation SouthernWatch
USAF0 s rt Fox
1998, the Iraqi government failed to co
e with t he UN teams charged under
Secur ity Resolut ions with inspect ing
dam s chemical, toxic and suspected
arsenal. When the inspection teams
e expelled from the country, the U s
dy patrollinggave way, in December, to
action, with the briefairstrikes
Operation Desert Fox Among the many
d aircraftdeployedfor this, thirteenA
were based in Kuwait.
llie orce
the beginning of 1999, the insurrec
activities of the Ko'ovo Liberation
y, a emi-terrorist organi:ation deter
on attaining a degree of autonomy
Kosovo, or even ou tr igh t indepen
provoked a brutal responsefrom the
The e rb a rmy and police moved
the area, and carried out terrible
that provoked a mass exodusof the
van populace across the borders. Th
of the West was once more turned
to the Balkans. ATO commenced
operations, initially against Serb
trol, air-defence and mnmunition
s: A the scale ofthe human tragedy on
ground began to dictate more urgent
ion, the opera tions had to be hastily
to attacks on Serbian ground
es, whose anti-a ircraft capability was
still largely intact. The A-IO was called
upon to try and hunt down and des troy e r
bian armour in the mountainsand valleys.
The media r roduced the usual mish
mash of f ac t ami f ic t ion to de cribe the
A-IOand i t t ask. The follOWing is typical:
UGLY IW NAME, UGLY BY NATURE.
In Phase II of Operation Allied Force rhe A-I 0
Thunderholt grllllnd-arrack aircraft, known as
the '\Varrhog' hecall,e of its 11< x-like shape, will
be ca lled upon hI ATO. The Warrhog was
de,igned ro wirlbrand all but the n >r devasrat
ing impach and it ahle to ~ l r \ i \ c direct h i t ~from armour piercing r l n d ~ Lip [ 23ml11. The
21- ron plane ca rr ie , up ro 7.2 r omo f Garling
hullets and 4 of weaponry, including
,idewinder mis,de , and c luste r bombs. [The
mediaseems to remain unaware ofthe fact that
rhe Sidewinder is all air;dcfcncc and not an a n t i ~rank missile.1 Prmected hI layers[sic of heavy
nrmOUf and special titaniulll cockpit sc to
shield the pilm, the formidable armour allows it
roliterally fly through AA f ir ea s i tskims above
the ground Isicllooking for targets.
This aircraft is a beas[ . I t can stay in the air
forhours, is virtually indestructihleand when it
finds something to shoot a t the re isn t much left
of it after a few seconds. The \X/arthog is the
most deadly and most feared ground-arrack
152
aircraft in the world a, well,, heing oneof the
hardest ~ h o o [ Jown. t
The erbian defence included over lOa
AM ,a mixture of radar-guided A-2, A
3, A-6 (which brought down an F-16 over
Bosnia in June 1995), and optically guided
SA-?, SA-l4 and SA-16 systems. In addi
tion, they had 1,850 air-defence artillery
pi ec es , whi ch po sed a s ev er e threat
N TO aircraft. They had 240 combat air
craft, including MiG-21s and MiG-29s,
althoughmany of the e were earlytargetsfor
initial air strike, and they also fielded forty
attack helicopters.The army wa headed up
by l ,270tanks,includingT 72, T 74 , T55s
and M- 4s, plu 25 armoured fighting
vehicle . IThere was no shortage of targets
for the A-lOs, once fully unleashed.
Deployed to Italy again, the A-las of
the 81st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron,
from Spangdahlem AF, Germany, having
first arrived at Aviano Airbase, completed
their transfer to Giona del Colle in south
east Italy, on I I Apr i l. Tge81st EFS com
menced operations over Kosovo on Mon
day and Tuesday, 29 a nd 30 Mar ch 1999.
According to one spokesman, 'We're in an
xpeditionary minliser. This is the waywe
have to be to be responsive. Master
Sergeant James Low, the logistic pl;:mner
TwoA lOsfromthe 357th Fighter Squadronflying formation It was from thisunit with its dragon emblem and yellow tail
flash thatCaptain Craig Buttonwas flying when he disappeared on 2Apri l 997near Vail Colorado USAF
SgtTimothyKing ofthe 40th Air ExpeditionaryGroup with an Ital ianpoliceman atGioia delColle Italy
King an aircraft battle damage repairman was deployedfromthe 652nd Combat Logistics Support
Squadron McClellan AFB The A lOsat Gioia del Colle were deployedfromthe 81st FighterSquadron
SpangdahlemAB Germany andthe 74th FighterSquadron from Pope AFB North Carolina USAF
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An Air Force Thunderbolt II pilotgetsoutof hisaircraft afterflying amission against
targetsin the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia on 30 March 1999. The pilotwas partofthe
81stExpeditionary Fighter Squadton deployed to AvianoAir Base. Italy from
Spangdahlem Ait Base Germany to support NATO s Operation Allied Force. USAF
155
Two USAF A-l0 Thunderbolt lis fromthe 81st FighterSquadronout ofAviano. ful ly
armed.just afterrefuelling on theitway to conduct astr ike againstSerbianforces in
Kosovo during OperationAllied Force. USAF
A STEADYING PR ESEN C E - POST-GULFOPERATIO S
I{ s not safe to go in there now. We'regoing in l
I'ery he;,,'\, <lir-defence system, and we aredoing
our hest nd , ne e ry successfully degrading it
while we go in. When youdegr<lde the ability to
cue tactic<llsystems such S the SA-7s, then you
;ncre<lse your ah il i t \, t o operate in different
el1\' imnmenr, and different <llritudes. It's obl'i
ously l )f increased danger when you' r e down
tower, and we h a ve t um a ke the determination
thcH we c a n c ondu ct t h e l)perations w i th t h e
appropriate amount of risk t o t h e s i tu at i on .
The media persisted: 'The shoulder-fired
SA-7s are going be there in profusion,
so you're really never going to get to the
point, are you, where you've got t he air
defenceseroded to the point where it'ssafe
to g o i n l Rear Admiral Thomas R Wil
son, Jo in t S taf f Director of Intelligence,
responded as follows:
With respect to the A-las, you get back to the
issue of t h e r obu st n es s o f [MjJosevic'sl airdefence systems. It isn 't jus t the mohile SAMs
and the communication links hetll'een them
a nd t he radms, hut there <1re thousands of
MAN PADs, a nd o n ce you g et d own helmv
15,000 feet withthe wea the r as bad < S it's heen,
huteven in good , .Ieather, wo rse in good wc,uh,
cr, you\c going to plllCC ourpi lo tsa t a trcmcn,
dOllS amountof risk, (lnt we\ c got to \veigh that
< we proceedwith this c a m p a i g n \ ~
accomplishment \vhcn it ' sover. Logistics,wise,
it's heen a l i t tlemorecha l lengingthan going to
other locationswhere CI least l quarter to; l half
of theequipment is already in place.1'4
On a v is it to the front-line flyers on ZI
April, the BritishDefenceMinisterwasseen
climbing in and out o f an A-l O However,
noconfirmedall-out combat deployment of
these aircraft was noted, even after F-ISs,
trying to do the A-lO's job from high alti
tude, h ad mis takenly b la sted Albanian
The A-lOs found themselves working
alongside both I ta lian and British aircrew,
with a GR-7 Harr ie r squadron, under
Wing Commander Graham Wrigh t, also
deployed from that field. They wereable to
talk to each o ther on theground, shar ing
information that would aid their co-oper
ation on similarmissionsin the air. At this
stage, the A-lOs were flying CSAR mis
siems. Vice Admiral Scott A Fry Joint
Staff Director of Operations, DoD, when
asked why the A-lOs were not 'being used
for what they're designed for - rake out
tanks and armour', replied as follows:
154
Thunderbolt lis fromthe 355th FighterSquadron. Eielson AFB. Alaska flying overthe coast ofSouthKorea
atthe KunsanBomb Range. The A-lOsare on a liveordnancebombdrop. USAF
Below A t t h e e nd o f t h e i r first deploymentagainst Yugoslavaggresion OperationCobalt Flash. the
81st Squadroncontr ibuted A-lOs.At theend ofthat phase. and with the winding downof Operation
Joint Force. thisA-l0 isseen atAviano on 9 November 1998. preparingto return to Spangdalem. AFB.
Germany. USAF
A STEADYING PR ESENC E - POST-GULF OPERATIONS
You train II year l o ng t o do t h in g s like this.
what ifyou lI'ork 16 or 18 hours d,,\,' This
II 'h ,n i t 's a l l ahour. You get a r ea l sense of
the 40th Air Expeditionary Group
added this commenton the actual
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A STEADYING PR ESEN C E POST GULF OPERATIONS
Thunderbolt II ofthe Slst FighterSquadron. carrying Maverick missiles. is
on to therunway atAviano Air Base. Italy.pendinga tank hunting
Kosovo on 3 March 1999 USAF
ered by theArmyand theAir Force to
fil the same m iss ion w e re l ead ing t
possible duplication of tha t finance.
Reviews
The United S tate s General Accoun
Office (GAO) took an in-depth look at
forces various plans to upgrade their cl
support weapons capabilities. This G
review2
; probed deeply, and i ts f inddirectly affected the 1O s future.
GA O found that, in the period 19
2001, the Army planned t o spend alm
5.5 billion todevelopand field morem
ern target-acquisition systems; the Ma
Corps p lanned to s pend 3 .2 billion
remanufacture AV-8Baircraft; and the
Force planned to spend over 547 mi l
to upgrade its target acquisition and ni
operations capabilities. However, the D
h ad n ot , a t t ha t time, de te rmined
appropriate number and type of weap
cssential for joint close-support missi
The GA O review alsofound tha t the v
ous services had taken ac tion to enha
theirown close-support capabilities, 'w
out adequately considering the capabil
of other weapons systems .
To be fair, the DoD had instituted a j
war-fighting capabilities assessmentpro
a s e a r ly a s 1 99 4, but a separate assessm
of the close-support mission had no t t
been made. Itwasclear,therefore, that u
a comprehensive assessment of joi nt
sion needs was made, the DoD could
decide which was the best moderniza
programme to fund.
Th eGAO review, therefore, took aremit a study of the following areas:
1. Military procurement.
2. Air defence systems.
3. Advanced weapons systems.
4. Combat readiness defence capabilit
5. Helicopters.
6. Air warfare.
7. Tactical air forces.
8. Fighter aircraft.
been vital t o squar e up to the re-emer
gence of genocide o n t he European scene
in the former Yugoslavia, with the atroci
t ies in Bo sn ia and Kosovo. Iraq continues
to playa cat-and-mouse game against the
UnitedNations Disarmament Delegation,
and to make increasingly demonic threats
against its neighbours, Kuwait, Saudi Ara
bia and Turkey. North Korea remains
determined continue i ts b e llic os ity
against the world while its people starve.
The A-I 0 continues to stand watch.S al e t o f or ei gn b uy er s w as another
option, but, desp i te firm enquiries from
countries a s f ar apart as the Middle East,
South Amer ica and Asia, none has come
to fruition. The specialized na tu re o f the
depleted uranium ammunition has often
proved a stumbling block. Mostpromising
w as a deal w ith NATO member Turkey,
announced in June 1993, for the purchase
of fifty of the mothballed A-lOs at Davis
Monthan AFB. These aircraft were to be
brought back into s e rv ice , r e fitted and
then shipped to the Turkish Air Force over
a three-year period. They were to have
been based at Eskisehir Airbase, in north
west Anatolia, south-east of Istanbul. Suf
ficient f u nd s w e re made available for the
purchase to proceed , bu t t h en t h e whole
deal fell apart d ue t o the cost of the refit
ting and support package.
Clearly, there w as a continuing r o le f or
the CAS aircraft, but, w i th Desert torm
behind them, all the arguments about the
suitability of different types of aircraft
came to the fore again. Despite the mas
sive cutbacks, defence needs and require
ments are not static, and a steady flow of
renewal and modernization is essential ifthe limited forces that are maintained
are to be efficient. The DoD continually
a ss es s ed m iss ion n e ed s , capabilities and
modernization p r op o sa ls f or the close
support mission, but, as always, each ser
vice tended to have its own priorities.
A lt ho ug h t he US e co no my remained
buoyant enough to support first-class
defences, there was clearly a limit to fund
ing, and the varying options beingconsid-
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
ossi le utur s
Cutbacks
With the collapse of theSovietUnion, the
dissolutionof the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and
the subsequent lifting of the immediate
th rea to f the invasion of Western Europe,
thc Western powers immedia t ely took
steps to reduce their defencc commit
ments. W it h t he new independence of
many former parts of the Soviet Em pir e a
bufferzone appeared, and with Poland and
the Czech Republic joining NATO, newthinking w as o b vio us ly r e qu ire d , in c as e a
change of leadership in Russia should pro
duce renewed hostility towards the West.
Across the board, large-scale reductions in
forces took place, with the wholesale lay
ing-up of comba t aircraft and closure of
bases. With a Ru ss ian p r om ise to s c ra p a
proportion of the tens of thousands of tanks
that had posed the biggest land threat to
NATO, the role o f t h e A-IO, continually
under pressure from the powerful speed
before accuracy lobby (until the tri
umphant v ind ica t ion of Desert storm),
carne under the microscope once more.
Reductions were made, both in v iab le
operating bases, and in numbers ofcombat
ready aircraft.Following the closure of such
formerly vital A-IO bases as RAF Alcon
bury, and with the recommended closure of
horne bases such a s My r tle Be a c h AFB and
England AFB, dramatic retrenchment was
the order of the d ay . Ev en a lar g e p r op o r
tion of surviving Thunderbolt-lls went
i n to mothbal l s at 'boneyard' locations,
with the 100+ cocooned a t Davis-Mon
than AFB in the dry desert air of Arizona
being the largest available reserve.
Not every A-I0 was phased out. Whilemany j oi ne d t h e various Air Na tiona l
Guard units, o th er s mai nt ai ne d t he ir
front-line status, standing watch over
strategicallysensitive locations. The world
might b e a s af er place in th eo r y, but, in
practice, the need for an accurate close
support aircraft to back up U as well as
ATO policy still exists. The removal of
the overwhelming Communist threat has
no tmean t t he e nd o f 'hot' confl icts. I t h a s
The sort i e r a tc s t ead ily buil t up during
May, but targets proved elusive, with the
Serbs making excellent use of caves, tun
nels, barns and o ther places of conceal
ment for their t an k s and h eavy weapons.
Evenso, the A-lOs, hunting byday and by
night, began to report a s teady culling of
the Serb armour, a l thoughno t on the spec
tacular scale of Desert torm as there were
no massed targets. With t h e higher-flying
aircraft committing blunders against both
refugee co lumns and wrong targets,2 M
once again, theA-I 0 getting'up close and
personal' t o t he enemy, was shown to be
the better bet.
In fact the political decision by the Pres
i de nt t o restrict all US flights above
3,000ft and limit the A -IO t o the 'seek'
role rather than 'destroy' mode, for fear of
losses, meant tha t a mere 13 Serbian tanks
were destroyed,despite incredible ATO
claims at the t im e. I n t r ut h, t h e A-lOs
w er e w as te d over Kosovo. This 'high
flight policy meant t ha t it took 2,615
sorties to kill each tank
By 4 June, the Serbshad decided to face
facts and agreed an accord, which w as , in
effect, worse than the one they could have
had six months earlier, with no casualties.
In the light of previous reneging b y Bel
grade on treaties, the A-lOs were not stood
down, but kept on wait and watch unti l
the tr oo p s, p a ra m iI iw r ie s and police,
which had so devastated K os o vo , d id
indeed withdraw.2 \
refugees - on two occasions. Apache heli
copter gunships also moved in b ut , for a
while, the A - lO s r e ma ine d chained. Not
u nt i l M ay d id the 40 th Air Expeditionary
Group become seriously engaged in hunting
down Serbian ranks and troop columns.
An A l pilotprepares foranotherpatrol
ionover theFederal Republicof Yugoslavia
Gioia delColle.Italy.in connection with
ion Allied Force. USAF
antQuentinAdkins giving the thumbsup
A l p i lo t a t t he e nd o f a r u nw a y i n s pe c ti o n
to a patrol overKosovo.flown fromGioiadel
Apri l 1999 USAF
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IDjvlwill allow CAS pilots to receive moreacc
r;lte ;md t imely targe t ing infonnation fro
some F-16s) for the night-targeting syst
for thei rcont inuedCAS role. They c
ment ed t hat , a l though the Ai rForce
longer-range CAS aircraft by retiring
A-7s in the early I990s, 'it now emp
A/OA-Ws and multi-role F- I6s for C
The A/OA-IO, specifically designed
CAS, is able tocarrya large amountof
nance, can loiterin the battle area for u
l. 7 hours, and wasdesigned to survive l
airdefences at lowaltitudes.'They claim
that the F-16 had greater speed and
able to engage targets from higher altitu
than the A/OA-lO, but did nor comm
on itsdegree of accuracy
Among the various services ' p lans
modernizing close-support capabilities
fiscal years 1996-200 I, the projected c
for the Thunderholt-II programme (
A/OA-IO CAS upgrades) were as foll
(figures in millions o fUS dollars): R
52.1; procurement - 225 .1 ; total- 27The Air Force's stated policy was
improve its fixed-wing CAS capabilit
by providing, among other things, n
capability and a digital data-burst com
nications system, known as improved d
modem (IDM), to its A/OA-IO airc
POSSI L FUTUR S
generalization surely applied to those air
craft that had not beendesigned for the job,
bu t t h e A-lO was not excluded, except in
thesta tement that,of all the services aircraft
pelforming CAS (Air Force A/OA-I Os and
F-16s, avy F/A-18s and A-6Es, and
Marine Corps F/A-18s and AV-Bs), 'only
the A/OA-IO was designed specifically for
CAS functions'.
Between June 1993 and October 1995,
the commit tees reviewed the DOD's and
the s er vi ce s r eq u irements-generations
process and thei r previous reports o n t he
acquisition process. They obtained infor
mation from t heJo i n t Staff o n t h e devel
opmentof t heJWCA process and assessed
the capabilities and characteristics of
existing close-support systems, reviewed
technical manuals, doctrinal puhlications,
and service documents, and held discus
sions withusers in operational units. They
discussed capabilities, force structure, andoperational i ssue s acros s the whole
defence spectrum and carried out observa
tions of training and exercises. Included in
thei r in-depth study was t he A ir Force
CAS and A rmy fire-support t rai n ing a t
the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort
Irwin, California.
Th e most notable improvements includ
ed the upgrading of t he A/OA-IOs (and
In 199 I , P ie rr e Sprey wrote the following
about esert Storm
The low-tech A - I 0 - much despised hI' USAi r
Force hr<lss - W l the real he ro o f t h e <lir war.
Even th<lligh it represented only one-twelfthof
the fighter force, it flew o n c ~ t h i r d ofthe sorries
and <lccounted I r two-thirds o f t h e t ,mk k i ll s
c l aime d du ri n g t h e ;- r c ampa i gn a nd he tt e r
th ,mnine - tenths of the artillery kills. Ir domi
na ted the inte rdic t ion cunpa igns againsr rhe
ro'ili. The aircraft pro ed tough enough t o su r
vive the a n t i ~ a i r c r < l f t exposure and fire anti
rankMaverick missiles, while the F-16s, F-I I I,
and F-ISs were ju s t too vulne rahle to gmund
guns to heuseahle in this rolc. 241
The proposed p la n t o replace the A-lOs
w it h F -1 6s wa s, as Mr Sprey sta ted on
another occasion, ' one of t he most monu
mentally fraudulent ideas t ha t t he Ai r
Forcehas everp e r p e t r a t e d : ; ~
In the overall scheme of thing s i t was
acknowledged t ha t t he fixed-wing aircraft
f il le d a n iche , b eing capab le of carrying
heavier weapons against hardened rargets,
and having greater speed and range than
attack helicopters.They also stated, howev
er, that 'they have moredifficulty in identi
fying and acquiring targets and providing
accurate strikesfrom higheraltitudes'. This
Immaculatein thenew two-tonegreypaintscheme apair ofA-lOs from the 343rd Tactical Fighter Wing
headout into thenorthernskies. Each carries the emblem GunsmokeChampions atopher red-tipped
tailplane. USAF
forward uni t deep in such terra in, relying
on artillery that could not penetrate close
enough, or was beyond the endurance of
short-range helicopters l
In 1994, theJoint Chiefs ofStaff estab
lished the JWCA process t o p rovi de
insight into issues involving joint war
fighting requirements. A y ea r l at er , this
was renamed the Land and Li ttora l Wa r
fare JWCA, to assess joint close-support
mission needs and capabilities. TheGAO
recommended that, to assist the Secretary
for Defen se in determining whether and
which proposed enhancements to c1ose
support systems should be funded, and in
what quant i t ies a nd o rd er of priority , a
comprehensiv cross-service assessment of
overall joint close-support mission needs,
existing close-support systems cmd
planned enhancements should be set up
on a routine basis, perhaps within thecon
text of the JWCA. They would determine
which systems should be enhanced and
which should not.
The inventory ofSystems Used to Pro
vide Close Support gave the following
rundown figures for the Thunderbol t -II in
three fiscal years: FY 1990 - 639 ; FY 1994- 38 1; FY 2001 (projected) - 3 66 . Thus,
ou t of a projected total of 1,191 fixed-wing
CAS aircraft(F-16 andOA-10s), less than
halfwere to beA-lOs,despite the fact that
the F-16was not built for the job. The Air
Force continued to be reluctant to admit
t ha t t heA-I0 wasa better aircraft t han t he
F-16 for the CAS role, but this attitude
was the subject of knowledgeable criticism
from sources v n inside the Pentagon.
Il lustrating howthetricycle undercarriageall folds forward.this Battle Creek Hawg
isfromthe Air National Guards 11 th Fighter Group working outof W K Kellogg
Airport,Michigan. USAF
POSSI L FUTUR S
and can at high alti tudes to avoid air
defense systems.'
The report found that, since the mid
1980s, the services had all wo rk ed t o
increase efficiencyof existing systems: 'The
Air Force hasadded limited night capabil
ity to the A/OA-tO. ' It was alsofound that,
while some of the various services upgrades
might enhance other mission capabilities,
others , 'such as the upgrades to t he A ir
Force A/OA-l Os are designed specifically
to improve close-support capabilities'.
D ue t o the fact t ha t t he DoD had not
then determined the appropriate number
and type of weapons it neededfor the joint
close-support mission, the lack ofan overall
assessment had allowed the services to
improve their capabilities in this fie ld uni
laterally. The Air Force, for example, had
decided inMay 1994 to modifyits A/OA-I 0
aircraft ratherthan procure a new aircraft
solely for CAS. This decision was made,
however, 'without considering whether
attack helicopters and artillery could satis
fy some ormos t ofthe CAS requirements'.
The Army, in its submission to t he Com
mission on Roles and Missions of the
Armed Forces, acknowledged that theadded firepower of rockets, artillery and
attack hel ic op te rs h ad 'substantially
reduced the need for fixed-wing fire sup
port'. Improvements to artillery andat tack
helicopterspermit the Army to engage tar
gets that could formerly only be attacked
by fixed-wing aircraft, the report went on.
The report does not s eem to have consid
e reda Vietnam-type conn i ct in dense jun
gle, and how th iswould affect CAS for a
services have developed I,lrge numher of
that can he lIsed for closesupport. Some
specifically for the close-support
, while others were developedas tl1ulti
weapons that Gll1 <llso perform interdiction,
or l i r ~ . l l l p C r i ) r i t y missions.
ugh the systems itemized for study
to include t he A-IO itself 2\S i t was
that this premier CAS aircraft
constantly appear in the findings.
28 June 1996, the Congressional Com
vi w was presented by Richard
is, Director, National Security Analy
His report s ta ted that, in the six years
2001, the military services had a
s pe nd i n excess of \ 0.5 billion
aircraft and other systems t o improve
capabilities. Such ambit ionsdid not
well at a time 'of reduced defense bud
, force structure reductions and ques
about affordability of future defense
programs'2 '.
r epor t therefore discussed the
capabilities o f t he military ser
to provide close support and the
to which thosecapabilit ies contin
to be modernized and enhanced as well
the process the DoD used tocapabilitiesand mod
proposal for the close support
The report wasdescribedas being
of our broader effort to assess how
can bet ter adapt its combat air power
future needs' ; .
subject was defined thus: 'Close
weapons fire on targetscloseto US
forces and, asa result, are likely to
uence t he ou tcome of a battle.' They
t o n to describe the background as
listing the various services systems,
report defined the targets as 'enemy
s; ranks and other fighting vehicles
ery; fortifications; command, control
communicationssystems; air defences
racticallogistical support units ' .I t a lso
i t ted t hat , a s c lo se support was a
for such a broadrange of comsituations, there was ' no one simple,
answer. Therefore, close
systems of choice will vary, based
t he specific mission at hand , t h rea t
time of day, weather concli
and proximity to forces needing sup
Acknowledging the role of artillery
a t tack helicopters, it went on to say
'Fixed-wing aircraft have greater
and range than attack helicopters
158 159
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POSSIBLE FUTURES POSSIBLE FUTURES
7
An A l0 pilotmakes last minute adjustments a s h e sett les into hisseatpriorto a
mission. Perched up high and forward an A l0 driverhas an all roundview for those
timeswhen laserswill nothelp himidentifya Serbiantankfroma civilian b u s.F 1 7 s
and the like lack such abilityto eyeball theirtargets before releasing theirordnance
as events in Kosovoshowed onlytoo clearly. USAF
Extending the Life of the A-I
theAir Force's overall capability'. It w
also reduce the Amer ican comman
options: 'Having multiple means of at
is a distinct advantage for a comma
because it forces the enemy to defend i
against multiplethreats.'The withdraw
the CAS role would mean 'the loss o
ability to react and deploy quickly', w
was inherent in such aircraft as the A
'With fewer a ircraf t in t he A ir Fo
inventory that are capable ofCAS, de
may occur beforesignificantassets arriv
theatre to perform that mission.' Fin
t he y h ad to acknowledge that 'sha
reducing thenumbero fUS aircraft cap
of providing close air support would el
nate many of the aircraft that contrib
to an early victory in the Gulf War
helpedto keep downthe loss of US Iive
Perhaps, then, the A/OA-lO is ass
of a prolonged existence as a front
battle aircraft, as it surely deserves.
Air Data Recorder ADR
The collection and analysis of flight da
v ital i f the AlOA-10 fleet is t o b e k esafe, effective and viable instrumentof
for such an extended period. The struc
integrity programme is an essentialfact
the safety of flight under such condit
Although forty of the Thunderbolt-IIs
already fitted with airdata recorders, t
own mean time betweenfailure (MTB
only 245 hours and they arealready o
lete and becoming unsupportable. UProgramEl ement 0207131 F, initiated o
September 1996, the life of the new A
will be approximately ten t imes as l
2,400 hours. The Air Force is there
looking hard at the possibility of util
the mega data transfer cartridge (MD
as a nADR to do the job. Should this p
feasible it would allow every A-LO sti
service to collect the necessary da ta
would be cost-efficient, requiring no
Extending the life of a fighting air
f rom its o rigina l 8 ,000 hours (unt i l
2005) , rev is ing i t to L2,000 hours
2016), and then to an incredible 18,
24,000 hours (FY 2028), is an enorm
undertaking. ot surprisingly, a hos
mod if ic at io ns a nd imp ro vement s
deemed essential to keep the A-lOs fl
for that long. Some of the most impor
are described below.
767
There were, however,significant drawbacksto this option. Eliminating one-quarter of
the F-16s would limit the ability of theAir
Force to carry out its other multi-role mis
sions and ' r ep resen t a majo r reduc t ion in
Half a c en tu ry o n, e ve ry th in g had
changed, but nothinghad changed'
The advantages of hand ing over all
aspects ofCAS to the Army were outlined
as follows:
which included close air support as well as
BAI, and that , as numbers of A-lOs had
declined,assigned increasing numbers of F
I6s to that mission. None the less, the fact
remained that, since the F-L6 is a mul t i
role aircraft, it is 'not l ikely to be as well
sui ted to the CAS mission as the A-lO,
which wasdesigned specifically for it'.Nor,
in v iew of the F-16's other commitments
('of more importance to t he A ir Force'),
wou ld i t necessa ri ly be ava ilab le when
required, or sowell trained. The summariz
ing of these factors highlighted Army com
manders' concerns 'that Air Force aircraft
might not be available whe n t he A rmy
needed them to provide air support'm.
Discussion was then madeof the Army's
latest efforts to provide its own airborne
firepower. It might havebeen 1961 allover
again, or the Vietnam Wardebate , o r the
Korean War arguments that led t o t he
Skyraider, oreven those heated exchangesbetween Allied land and air forces com
manders in Tun isia in December 1942.2il
Indeed, sobad had things become in 1942
that the Assistant Secretary of War, John
J. McCloy, went to look a t t he CA S posi
tionfor himself. His conclusion was bleak:
That change would simplify opermions since the
Air Force would not helve [0 co,ordinatc its elir
strikesso closely with theArmy in o rder to avo id
atmcking (riendly troops. Moreover, t he A ir
Force could retire all of its A-lOs and reduce the
numher of rypes of aircraft in i t s inventory, there
by realizing some budgetarysavings ... retiring all
of theAir Force's A-lOs andabout one-qu>lrter of
irsF-16s wouldreduce the size of the AirFo rceby
about five wings. Such a reduction in (orce could
save 120 million in 1998 and 3. 2 hill ion over
the next five years in operating costs. ;)
It is my firm belief t h a t r h e A i r Fo rcesare not
interested in this type of work, think it is
unsound, and arc very tnuch concerned lest it
resul t in control of air units by grnund forces.
The ir interest,enthusiasm and energy is direct
e d t o different f i d d s . ~
Even rhough the Air Fo rce has had responsihil
ityfor prnviding close airsupport (CAS) t o t h e
Army for the past fifty years, several defence
exper ts have expressed c onc e rn s a nd douh t s
abour rhe willingness or ability o(the Air Force
to do soadequately. TheCAS mission involves
attacking hostile t<1rgets that are near friendly
forces and requiresclose co-ordination with the
Army. Although the Air Fo rce has airplane,
t h e A - I0, rha r is dedicared s ol e ly t o r h e CAS
mission, the service has perimlically attempted
to eliminme all of the A- lOsfmm itsforce struc
ture. The A ir Forcestill has 169 A-lOs, but that
is fm (ewer t ha n t h e 400 it fielded i n 1 98 8.
Moreover, more than half ofthe remaining ~ l i r ~craft a rc in the reserve components.
2S1
It was acknowledged t ha t t he A ir Force
had traditionally allotted 25 per centof its
fighter 8ircr8ft to ground-attack missions,
believes that fixed-wing CAS is s t il l requi red
a nd t h a t it the re fore inrcnJs to rC[ lin primary
CAS responsibilities and rhe means to execute
them. As a result, t he A ir Force is now com
mitted to retaining A/GA-IO aircraft a nd t o
modernizingthe A/GA-I 0 ami F-16aircraft for
the CAS role. Al though t h e A i r Force had
planned to retire all of its A/GA-IOs as early as
fiscal year2002, it now plans to mainta in316 of
these ai rcraf t in its force structurethrough fiscal
year 2 0 2 8 . ~
Therefore, barring another sudden reversal of policy, it seemed that the A-LO was
assured of an ex tension to its already long
life. Lt seemed that, against all the odds,
this highly individualistic aircraft would
playa lead ing role in combat air warfare
for the foreseeable future. 24 1
However, the problem would not go
away andArmy fears were once again res
urrected in March 1997 during the Con
gressional Budget Office's review on ways
of further cutting back on defence spend
ing.2\ Once more, the same argumentsand
counter-arguments were pa ins takingly
reviewed, as they had been so many times
previously. There was still much doub t
a bo ut t he s in ce ri ty a nd c ommi tment o f
the USAF to the CAS role:
re-evaluation compared with the attitude
held in the L960s.
Personalitieshad much todo with theAir
Force's disdain for CAS and, in December
1994, a change in the Air Force Chief of
Staffbrought about another abrupt change
of position. In December, the commission
was informed that theAir Force now
other indirect costs between fiscal years
1995-2001.
The potential loss o f t he A /OA- lO s
woulJ force the Army to rely more on its
attack helicopters for CAS than i t h ad i nthe pas t. I f t he A ir Force eliminateJ its
A/OA-I0s, i ts mul t i- role F-l6s woulJ
b ec om e t he A ir Force's primary CAS
a i r c r a f t ~ 4 IAsmigh thave been expecteJ, although
it recognized t h at th e need for fixeJ-wing
CAS had declined over time, the Army
opposed theAir Force'sproposal to down
grade Air Force CAS responsibilities. The
Army argument was that, although fixed
wing CAS h aJ Jecl ined , ' I t remains an
important capability espec ial ly in ear ly
entry operations, under circumstances
when close-support targets exceed the
range of land-based systems, <md/or when
special munitions, such as heavy anJ/or
precision-guiJed bombs , a re requireJ.:';'One Army Roles anJ Missions official
informed the committees that t he Army
was more concerned abou t the Air Force
retaining primary responsibilities for CAS
than it was about what kinJof aircraft the
Air Force woulJ use. While the Army sup
ported CAS as a primary func t ion of the
Air Force , i t considered the types and
quantities of the aircraft to be the prerog
ative o f t h e Air Force. Here was another
l. Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz. The 355th
Wing was to gain an additional four
A-LO a ir cr af t i n l at e L995 due to
increased Air Force formal training
requirements.2. The L03rJ Fighter Group (ANG) was
to lose one OA-L0 in miJ-l996.
3. The 124th Fighter Group (ANG) wasto covert from twenty-four FAGs to
seventeen A/OA-IO aircraft from the
beginning of L996.4. The 175th FighterGroup (ANG) was
to lose one OA-l 0 from mid-I996.
5. The 104th Fighter Group (A G) was
to lose one OA-LO from mid-1996.
6. The 100th Fighter Group (ANG) was
to lose one OA-I 0 from mid-l996.
7. The II I th Fighter Group (ANG) wasto lose one OA- l 0 from mid- J996.
These changes stabilizeJ all Air National
Guard A/OA-IO squadrons at seventeenaircraft each.
In 1994, the Congressional Budget
Office estimateJ that about $1.9 billion
cou ld be saveJ over five years if t he A ir
Force retired allA/OA-L0 aircraft. The Air
Force told the Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces that, if it
retired all of its OA/A-LOs, it could save
approximately$5.8 billionin procurement,RDT&E, operation anJ maintenance, and
changes in the future operational
ofA/OA-IO units from the 1995
iew was contained in a DoD's Ne ws
The Air Force , g g e 't e d t h at t h e Army C\ dd
prm·ide ii' \ 11 clo,e air >l'ppor lI'ith attack heli
cop ters ,md t h at t h e A rmy , ho l ii d he a igned
CAS as a primary mi ion. The Air Fmce al,o
propo,ed that irs CAS role he dOll'ngraded from
< primary tll < collate ;ll fUllction.. In connection
lI'ith this prop , al , the Air Fmce f'l\'ollred elimi
na t ing A/OA-IO aircraft frum it, il1\·enrory.'
bombshell indeed' It appeareJ
J a specific aircraft for
particular role, and having proved i t inba t, the Air Force was anxious to J is
both aircraft and responsibility as fast
i t cou ld . I t wanted to get back to the
e miles high' policy with which, since
USAF days, the majority had alwaysfeltcomfortable.
ground,h;.-t:-.cd and airhorne forward aircontrollers
who ,Ire r c ~ p o n s i h l l for (nnrrollingCAS strike:--.
r Force Structural
1995
most important factor was the same as
beenfo r the p,lst five or six decades:
cont inu ing deba te between t he A ir
and the Army over the role of fixed
ng a ircraf t for CAS. Th is cont inued
of argument seemed, to the commit
s, to illustrate the need for a comprehen
assessment of battlefield requirements.
y cons idereJ the JROC - the senior
boJyto the Chairman of theJoint
of Staff- tohave been toolimiteJ in
oversight of close-support acquisitionOne criticism was that it was
'narrowly focused', andeventhe JWCA
ocess assessments, set up in 1994, were
still 'too narrow''''.
The Air Force submitted to thecommit
t ha t t he n umbe r o f fixeJ-wing CAS
ties flown to support grounJ troops 'haslined significantly since the Korean
r. Moreover, t he A ir Force expects the
for fixeJ-wing CAS to fur the r
as attack helicopter capabilitiesThe Air Force was aJamant that
and scout helicopters operating in
co-orJination wit h g ro un d u ni ts
ld represent the op timum t eam foranJ that fixeJ-wing aircraft should
be used foremergencyback-up:
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POSSIBLE FUTUR S POSSI L FUTU R S
High offthe ground on its tricycle undercarriage the A,10 providesampleroomfor
loading ofunderwingmissilesand pods refuelling andreammunitioning with the
pilot sti l l in situ to givea highsortierate Natonal Archives Colege Park MD
o t he r t h an maintenance data
GPS/INS EGI
emhedded global positioning ,mdiner
navigation system (EG I) is a self-con
n e d, a l l- w ea t he r n a vi g at i on system,
c h o u tp u t s positioning, n:locity ami
data for the A-IO. The EG I
ads its radiofrequencysignalsfrom
e G P , satellite transmission, \\ ith the
l i ty to track upto fi\C satellitessimulta
Th e single laser ring unit lR U )
a ring laser gyro inertial naviga
n u n i t I U ) a n d G P S functions.
This system replaces the existing IN - 39
currently the highest fail-rate com
e n t o n t h e A / OA - IO . ECI will have a
of 2,000 hour s MTB F rate against the
l - 39s 185 1TBF. It is estimated
more than I) million will be savedoperations and support costings once
full f leet is modified . It is deemed
entia l for this system to be installed
ickly , as GP accuracy is crucial for
situation awareness data link
,md s m ar t w e ap o n i n te g ra t io n .
Congress hasalready m andat edt hat no
may be per formed on any
GP -equipped platforms after the
r 2000, time is fast running out.:
TE Computer Upgrade
current l TE system is at its
ghput and memory limits and will
future growth, so the development
installation of a new computer for th is
is essential. The new computer
l also incorporate the operational flight
OFP) software upgrading. Kit
will include I 9 k it s f or the
of spa re s. ymbology and
message com put er V MC ) changes
i m mi n en t a n d wil l a lso ne c e s itate
w a r e c ha nge s w ith lR , re ulting in
costs. : 9
Gearbox AGB Life
necessary modification, this
-cveral design changes to the
associated with unit removals d ue t o
j o in t oil analysis programme j O A P)
and bearing failures. T h e e design
ext end t he u efull ife oft he AG B
reduce the existing maintenance
associated with the high removal
rate. The change wi significantly
improve flightsafety andengi ne reliability
and will increase MTBF from 3,482 hours
to Z3,021 hours.:
Improved Airborne Video TapeRecorder fAVTR
This proposed newsystemcomprises a Mil
Standard 8mm colour \ ideo-tape recorder
and a high-resolution colour head-up di
play H D) camera to replace the current
hlack and whitesystemin use o n t h e active
duty A/OA-lOs. T h e A ir ational Guard
A G) have already anticipated this and
have insta lled a commercial off-the-shelf
COTS) 8mm colour recorder in their air
craft. This system is limited to th irty min
utes record time, whereas the average
A/OA-IO mission is in exces s of two
hours, making coverage less than 25 per
c en t o f mission time. Post-flight review(PFR) of all aspects of tra in ing sorties
rake-offprocedure, rejoin, low-level naviga
tion, weapons usage and landing procedure
- is deemed especially desirable for the sin
gle-placeversion, justas the instructorpilot
or supervisor is in other aircraft. These
aspects, in total, exceed the thirty- minute
limit of the old system, so the old system
jeopardized safety-of-flight issues, and poor
ha bit pa tte r ns a re l iable to he mis sed and
never corrected. The low resolution of the
existing system reduces the effectiveness of
mission e va lua tion a nd training, whereas
the proposed new HUD camera g iv es a
m uch hi gher resolution. In addition, be
cause of advances in design and build ,it is,
in fact, c he ap er t h an t he existing black
and w hite e quipm e nt.
The gaining units also had to purchase
their own playback u n it s a t o ta l of sixteen
c o lo u r m m v i de o -r a pe p laye rs - fou r p er
briefing room, in four briefing rooms), as
well as all the associated wiring and
witching hardware, and these were
included in the costings.:r.
Common Missile Warning System CMWS
C MWS is an advanced missile warning
system, which pa sively de tec ts inc oming
mi siles,gives audible w a r ning to the pilot
and initiates automatic countermeasures
responses. The programme integrates with
the electronics warfare management uite
E WMS)G roup Bequipment beingdevel
oped by lead service, S rmy A C l
acting Air Force programme manager. The
162
system gives the pilot increased situational
awareness and thus provides increased sur
vivability for missile e ngage m ents , w hich
arc c ur re ntly unde tec te d. Th e automatic
countermeasures employment wi ll a ls o
increase survi\ ability through reduced task
loading during criticli phases of flight.: :
Electronics Warfare ManagementSuite EWMS
The introduction of an EWM, will
c ons olidate EW c oc kpit controls, imprm C
the pilot/vehicle interface and generally
increase reliability and maintenance effi
ciency. The EWMS integrates the chaff/
flare dispenser A L E -4 0 ), m d ar w ar n in g
receiver RWR), a n d t h e ECM pods war
~ l r management system forsemi-,lutomat
ic and automaticoperation, superseding the
c u rr e nt m a nu a l lJperation based on the
pilot s system interpretation. It is a followon modification for t h e A i r Force based on
the ANG/AFRC program. E W M tics into
the CMW modification and it is hoped
the latter can be rescheduled to allow con
current installation oft he two complemen
taryprograms with resultant cost savings. :,d
EnhancedPosition Location ReportingSystem EPLRS with Multi-FunctionalDisplay MFD Situational warenessData Link SADL
On Z3 May 1997, COMACC recei\ ed a
briefing advocating SADL i n p la ce of
LlNK-16 for t he A /O A- ] . A vast
i mp ro ve me nt o n t he IFF procedures,
SADL comprises an EPLRS with a colour
MFD containing a computer processor.
The system will provide digital air-to-air
and a ir -to- ground da ta communications,
which will s ubs ta ntially im prove itua
tional awa rene ss . I t w il l a lso provide a
seamless integration, via direct link, into
the Army digitized battlefield.
The speedy identification of friendly air
and ground forcesequipped with E Pl A R
typ e rad io wil l avo id the risk of future
friendly fi re s enarios, like those that somarred the de ploym e nt of the A-lOs in the
Gulf War. Itwill become the primarymeans
of communication a nd c o- ordina tion w ith
t h e F A C in the CA role, the primary mis
sion o f t h e /OA-IO. As a spin-off, it will
much reduce pilot workload for thissingle
place aircraft. It will also provide the neces
sary flexibilityto beabsorbed into any future
digitized force structure by way of direct
in tegrat ion and gateway s, for examp le ,
VMF and LI K-I6. The new MFD will
increase MTBF rate of the current television
monitor TVM) fr om 4 4 h ou rs to 2,00
hours; MBTF ratefor TVM with EGI mod
ification is projected as 81 hours, while the
current TVM is unable to support SADL.:
Digital Terrain System DTS
Apart from the usual enemy threats
involved in low flying, there is alway the
constant danger o f t he A-IO accidentally
flying itself into the ground (controlled
flight into terrain, or C FI T) duringcomplex
manoeuvringover the battle zone. CFIT has
long been recognized as the A/OA-IO s
prime cause of Class A mishaps (accidentsleading to loss).To alleviate thisdanger, the
A-IO s ground collision avoidance system
GCA ) is also to be upgraded by the pro
vision o f D T via the use of a mega data
transfer cartridge/procesor MOTC/P).
Th e ligital terrain data is loaded on to the
MOTC and terrain elevation is continually
processed within 6 miles (IOkm) o f t h e air
craft sposition. DTS will provide predictive
GCAS, t er ra in referenced nav ig at ion
TR ) , database terrain cueing OBTC),
passive ranging P R) a nd obstacle warn
ing/cueing OWC).
In addition, DT is expected to improve
the A/OA-IO s weapons accuracy via PT
and target e va lua tion da ta due to t heT hun
derbolt-II s la k of any other means to
determine the bombing triangle slant range
to the target. I t will g ive increasedcoordi
nate accuracy by eliminating elevation
errors. The current system radar altimeter,
or RA), treats the earth a sa f la tp lane , but
t h e D T modificationprovide a new capa
bility to t h e A / O A- ] ,which will signifi
cantly improve system effectiveness.
The UK is a t t he forefront of t h is n e w
technology. However, d ifficulties are curr e ntly be ing encountered with regard to
the licensing issue of terrain profile and
m a tc h in g T E RP R OM ) f rom B ri ti sh
Aerospace. Initial costs estimates in 1994
for unlimited rights for the A /O -I were
3.5 million, ami the programme in 1999
was sti in t he developm ent stage.:
DT will undoubtedly significantly
im prove e xisting GCAS and give pilo ts a
predictive system to avoid CFIT.
163
Unit Training Device UTD
Th e UTD is a low-cost, semi-portable
ulatorwith a limitedvisualdisplaydes
for unit-level pilot-training capabili
support qualification and continu
t r ai n in g a t b o th t r ai n in g and operat
units. Again, th isprogramm was init
by the A G andt he AFR and is man
by A C/yWPD. om e thir tee n UTD
a re requi red for the surviving A/O
fleet. The s e, a long w it hA G p ur ch a
six uch sy t ems, w il l ful ly e q ui p
A/OA-tO squadron with on UTD
Currently, noneof the Thunderbolt-li
operational squadrons have any simul
capability, andt he st udent in t heA / O
flies his first, and all subsequent s
solo without the benefit of simulated
in a controlled environment. Hi first
in instrument conditions is solo, whil
fir t fl ight w it h an emergency iswith an actual emergency that has n
heen either practised or simulated u
c ontrolled c onditions. This to ta l la
any tr a ining de vice prevents simul
a nd e va lua tion of emergency proced
instrument f ligh t and weapons em
ment in a realistic, but safe a nd c ontr
envi ronm ent , and is considered a cr
deficiency.
Funding is t ight, as always, and
result in a shortfa ll of five TDs . T h
Force is currently working with the
t r a c to r , y m vi o n ic , with Armstrong
to restructure the program to accoun
recent fee-for-service/contra t o r t r a
servicesguidance for incorporation i n
D MT pl anu
Onboard Oxygen Generation Syst OBOGS
The current liquid oxygen system o
A/OA-tO aircraft requires pecial han
due to its cryogenicpropertie . Th e p
handling precautions involved inc
maintenance costs and aircraft down
This combined reliability/maintaina
problem will be alleviated with the iduction of the OBOG modific
whichwill replace the present liquidox
sy t em wi th a COT capablc of gener
oxygen.: ;
O t her programmes are under re
including an improved 3-D audio sy
H a lon r e pla c em e nt; he lm et- m ounte d
ing y tem HMCS); targeting pod;
red shielding; three-position MIC sw
Link-16; GATM; a nd A I M-9X integra
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POSSIBLE FUTURES pass IBLE FUTURES
164
ative aircraft from ll the TFS units based in the UK makea low passover
lconbury Cambridgeshire justp rior to its demise a sa n operational base
the run-down ofAl l ied ai rpower inEurope in the 1990s USAF
t o t h e crash.. There wasal so no evidence th
a lcoholor drugs might have p layeda ro le in [h
crash. 6i1
Total Force Concept
The harmonizing of both AFRES
act ive unit s continues to be fine-tun
With ever-decreasing budgets, and shri
ing numbers of bo th men and machin
the need is to optimize what force is
This especially applies to the A/OA
aircraft, which started from a base of s
low numbers, and hasseen much hard
vicesince. One such exercise took plac
South-West Asia (ACCNS) dur
autumn 1 99 8. I t involved the 440
Operations Group (Provisional) a nd
74 th and 303rd F igh ter Squadrons , w
the A-lOs representing a shared active
reserve tasking of labour and equipmIn a 45-day exercise , reservists wor
alongside their active colleagues, with
two A-IO reserve units combining effo
The learning curve flowed both ways
applied t o p i lo t s a s wel l a s g roundc r
The 303 Id FS CO, LieutenantColonel
Waller, said, 'We're also sharing the l
in the mission planning cell and h
started doing some flying together
well.'wl
He added tha t the pi lots were mutu
impressed with the quality o f t h e taer
interface and successful flights toget
Deployment Proje I Officer Major J
S tout o f the 442nd FW agreed: 'There
excellent planning initiated by getting
three project officers and NCOs toge
a t Whi teman. Th is made all the plann
focus in the right direction.' '
The aircraft were generated shortly a
the 442nd's a rr iv al i n mid-Septemb
despite the fact that there hadbeenno
surveys and only a small advance team
the ground. While the 74 th Intel pers
nel were n ew t o the A-IO mission, t
had an impressive country-s tudy kno
edge. By sharing the workload, and br
ing each other, the pilots' mutual inter
pendency was obviously beneficial.
I t was only an exercise, but this is h
it is likely to be in future operations: l i
notice, not much t ime, fast deploym
and the n e ed t o ge t the A-lOsactive o
the hot-spots , wherever in the world t
might be.
Th is then is the future of the A-IO. L
mayit grace the sky.
student assigned to the355th Wing, work
ingfrom Davis-Monthan, was flyinga rou
tine training mission near the Barry Gold
water training r ange , wes t of Tucson,
Arizona, with four 500lb (230kg) bombs
up. At 1158, Button's aircraft suddenly
broke formation from his two team-mates
without any warning. Radio calls from his
two companions e li ci te d no response.
Radar t r acked t he A-IO and last logged
him some 800 miles (l,300km) off-course,
passing over south-western Colorado.
A full-scale hunt and search was initiat
ed, from Arizona to the area north o fTel
luride, and then extended to a location 15
miles (25km) south -west o f Vail, Col
orado. The area was changed, as Federal
Aviation Administration radar reports
were supplemented by eyewitness s ight
ings and publiC response to a special te le
phone hotline. Even a U-2 high-altitude
reconnaissance plane from the9 th Reconnaissance Wing at BealeAFB, California,
was broughti n to a id the search.
Eventually, on 20 Apr il , a ft er eighteen
days of intense operations, debris and wreck
age were found ina very remote mountain
ouslocation, arounu Golu Dust Peak, some
15 miles (25km) south-west of Vail. The
debris was later identified as the missing
-10. The huntcontinued for Captain But
t on a nd t he missing bombs, and Air Force
pararescuespecialistsand munitions experts
began a systematic combing of the area in
July. They warned to recover Button's
remains,as well as the munitions, flares and
ejection-seat pyrotechnics, and other mate
rial that might be useful t o t he Accident
Investigation Board studying the cause of
the crash. The Air Force also wanted to
ensure that the site was safe enough to be
restored to environmental stanuards set by
theUS ForestService.
Although Button's family anu friends
wereas baffled by the incident ashis wing
men, theAir Force investigators conclud
ed the followi ng:
165
There were no m imemll1ce prohlems withthe
rlane, no mechanical failure andno evidence of
hird strike thm might have disahled the jet.
The Air Fo rce Iso doesn't- helieve Rutton was
trying to ste,,1 the plane . In fac t, on t h emo r n
ing o f t h e c ra s h, h e i ndi ca t ed h e was excited
clhout going out on his irst live bomhing r u n i n
the A-I O Rut investigators have Iso conclud
ed th t Rutton was not disahled - hI hrain
..lIlCUfYSI1l, a l ac k of oxygen Of some other
ica] reason - hecause o f e v i d en c e t h a t h e was
s t il l in control :-1nd manoeuvringthe planepr ior
Attrition
in the modification programme and relat
ed support equipment and maintain a full
complement ofengineering data. Current
ly, the Engineering Sration Chief is Sal
Alestra, with Bill Eves as Program Man
agement Section Chief. The aircraft sys
tems section under Lead Engineer Doug
Allen, has the following divisions:
I. ASIP/ACI/SLMP.
2. A BDR/structure.
3. Bonded repair.
4. Corrosion control/NDI/paint.
5. Structures.
6. A-IO project administration.
Th e aircraftstructures section, under Lead
Structural Engineer Kevon Ward, is divid
ed in to the following divisions:
I. Aero performance.
2. Egress.
3. Engineering data, drawings, specifica-
tions.
4. Eng in es .
5. Environmental controls.
6. FI igh I controls.
7. Fuel.
8 . Hyd raul ics .
9. Landing gear.
10. Weights and balances.
I J. Logistic management.
The A-lOis constantly exercised and,
w it h n ew pilots joining the ranks all the
time, losses are the inevitable price of sus
tained vigilance and realistic training.
On ] June 1997, o ne o f t h e first s ix
female pilots flying A-lOs, Captain Lynn
Svoboua, with more than 1,400 hours of
Jet flight time, was killed on a night mis
sion from Davis-Monthan. The accident
was later determined to be the result of
pilot error.
Other A-lOs havebeen written off: one
crasheu on 17 April 1997 when working
from Moody A FB, Georgia; the pilot safely ejected. At J525 on 14 May J998,
another, assigned to the335 th Wingou t o f
Davis-Monthan, crashed 3 m il es (5km)
south-west of Kitt Peak, a mountain range
in Arizona. Again, the pilot, Captain
Christopher Hamilton, from the test pilot
school at Edwards AFB, ejected and sus
tained only minor injuries.
A more unusual A-IO loss occurred on 2
April 1997, when Captain Craig Button, a
Systems Program
Management Division
re-work, 3 bearing inspections and oil
supply tube fixes.
Based at McClellan, AFB, theA-IO/F -I l l
systems programme office has the respon
sibility o f s up po rt in g t he war-fighting
force. The SPD is Colone l Thomas D.
Brown, Jr, with Frank Garcia as Deputy.
The organization is responsible for 374
A/OA-lOs and 142 F-Ills assigned to six
commands. The SPMD provides world
wide logistics and engineering support to
meet command combat readiness and sus
tainabili ty requirements , a nd USAF for
eign milirary sales commitments. It is alsoresponsible for bo th the A 1 0 350 mil
lion) and F-li l ( 19 million) modifica
t ion programmes.
The systems/structures branch supports
both types around the world and provides
specific expertise relating to both aircraft
systems and airframes. The branch re
sponds to requests for assistance both from
in the field and from depots. Their engi
neers andequipmentspecialists participate
Low LTITUDE FONCE
Wi th t he A O l 0 a nd t he F-ll l repre
sent ing theUS F s low-level attack capa
bility a nd b ot h systems becoming rather
long in the tooth, a special low-altitude
force (LA F) hasbeen es tab li s hed to 'keep
'em flying' (in the words o f t he S ec on d
World War s lo gan) A s p ar t o f this the
-10 has its own problem parts integrated
process team (lTP), with POC Mike Ret
zlaff, A-IO Weapons System Support Offi
cer. The t eamhas asits primedirective the
review of any supply-type item tha tmigh t
affect the supportability o f t h e A-IO air
craft. The i tems maybe identified by high
M ICAP hour s or inciden t s, by customer
inquir iesor by known supply supportabili
ty problems.
Th e A-IO system support programmeoffice (SPO) has as its mission the deliv
ery of total weapons system support to all
units th:H fly the Thunderbolt-Il. It is
based at Hil l AFB , Utah , a nd its brief
includes provis ion o fA- I 0 field support,
managemen t o f A -IO p ro du ct invest
ment, provision of resources and t ool s to
accompl ish the SPO mission, identifica
t ion and prepara t ion of specific material
solutions for A-IO investments, anu sup
port of 'product line' evolution.
G£NENAL LOW COST MOD/I7CATIONS
There is also budgeting (again, at less than
900K) for any modi f ica t ions that are
deemed necessary to enhance the A/OA10's reliability or maintainabily, and/or to
improve system performance and reduce
logistic costs. Previous such modifications
have included electronic clock, cold-hole
greater precision in the attack. By pulling
on the trigger to the first detent, the PAC
is activated and dampens the S S pitch
i npu t , which g iv es a f ine-tuning aiming
window t o t he p ilot . A second pull not
only fires the Garl ing but in it i at es the
SAS's automatic override of pilot control
stick input. Under this system, the old
method of firing, lining up the target with
the shots, then holding the target while the
GAU-8/A recoil and barrel rotation bumps
the sightingaround, is r ev er sed. ow, extra
time is t a ken t o g e t on to the target. Once
thePAC kicks in, the A-tO's nose is 'frozen'
on t h e target and the bulletimpact remains
concentrated on it, no mat te r how the
pilotand aircraft arc distracted.
seat reuunuancy;
coliision avoidance system
enhancement; and
augmentation system (SAS)
the precison attitude controlwith the stability augmentation sys
(S S), which synchronizes the pitch
yaw i np ut s a nd smoot he s ou t t he
flightpath, the pilot is able t o gain
money is also being allocated
modifications, as listed
COST SAFETY MODIFICATIONS
provide for low-cost modifications
than 900K) to improve safety. This
goes to support engineering stud
TCTOs to the field in response to
investigations and safety-related
deficiency reports. These stud ies arc
sent p lanned for three main areas:
Modifications
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T HE S AG A O F T HE FIRE-FIGHTING A-I
CHAPTER NINETEEN
The Saga the Fire Fighting lOs
n artist s impression ofthe A-l0 ThunderboltII conversion into an airtanker. The conversion would
involve de-Mil itar izing theaircraft.equipping themwith an infra-red lR) sensorpackageIshown hereas
the white ballunderthe aircraft s nose).fi tting a large bellytank andpipe to housethe fireretardant and
discharge system, and with a p r o be s h ow n h e r e on the lefthand sideof theaircraft s nose)for aerial
retardant reloading. eroTech td
release them from 'boneyards' and
r e sting p lac e s, a s they migh t b e r e
for comba t duty in the f u tu r e. I t
requirements were undergoing a p e
re-evaluation and changing prioritie
the release of w ar m at er i al , i n thi
combat aircraft, is strictly cont
Defense Department regulations ar
cerned, ironically, with public safet
make i t d iff icu lt f or civilian u sa ge
readily accepted. Another po in t o f
that the fire-fighting missions of fagencies are legislated by Congres
the way to get A-lOs released for fire
ing conversions w ou ld be v ia a n a
ment in the House, with federal fire
ers given missions over u rb an a r
extremely dangerous cases.
Apart from those a ir cr a ft in m u
some 174 A-lOs w er e i n s to re at
Monthan AGB, n ea r Tu cs o n, A r
on Iy 274 of t he 4 00 A-lOs left on
l in es w er e l is te d on the USAF
proved capable of doing the job as w ell a s
could be expected. However, most had not
seen the A-10 inaction, and cou Id not
makefair comparison. Indeed, cost became
a b ig f ac to r i n the arguments and counter
arguments that developed, but no t the only
factor. The AWA conversion, i t w as e st i
mated, w o uld c o st only ha lf as much as
converting the turbine S - 2, f or example.
The federal tanker f o rc e c o mp r ise s
f o rty -s e ve n o ld a irc r af t o f n in e different
types, the newes t o f which was built as anairliner in the 1960s. They are ill equipped
and, with noaiming aids, haveto use 'Ken
tucky windage , or crop-dusting methods,
to estimateconditionsand to release their
retardant loads. They cannot opera te a t
n igh t o r when there is heavy smoke haze,
which is normal with wildfires.
The USA i r Force seemed to adopt an
ambiguous attitude; o n t he o ne h an d, it
seemed eager to rid itselfof the A-I 0 , b u t,
on t he o t he r h an d, it seemed reluctant to
a contract for commercialoperation of the
Government-owned S-2s. The heavy,
multi-engined airtankers, converted trans
ports, airliners a nd t he like, with useful
payloads of 2 ,0 00 to 3,000 gallons, are pri
vately owned and contracted to agencies
such as the Forest Service, the Bureau of
Land Manag emen t a nd t he C DF . E ac h
state contracts for their use against its own
budget. They a r e r e str icte d to operating
from larger airfields, and lack the ability to
get into tight situations.Converse ly, the he licop ter a i rtankers
are able to get into canyons and draws to
tacklesuch blazes, but lack thecapacityto
deal effectively with the larger blazes, and
to ach ieve the necessary speed of
response. They are also ineffective in high
winds, the very condition that make wild
fires so deadly.
Many fire-fighting districts, alarmed at
the cost, rejected the project out o f hand,
stating that their e x istin g a irc r af t had
to remain just airborne while at i ts r e tar
dant drop s pe ed t y pi ca l ly 1. 3 t i me s i ts
stall speed), is likely to crash, should it roll
into a 30-degree bank in a tight area such
as a canyon.
The California Department of Forestry
and Fire Protection (CDF), the Bureau of
Land Management and other federal agen
cies became involved in arguments over
areas of r e sp o ns ibility . Fire s to r ms , like
those that devastated Malibu Canyon,
La gu n a Be ac h , Harmony Grove Carls
bad), Oakland Hills (which claimed twen
ty-four lives), Lake Arrowheadand north
east Sacramentothreaten built-upa r ea s in
the urban/wilderness interface, beyondthe
jurisdictionof the CDF. The fire damageto
each affected area is estimated to havecost
1.5+ billion dollars.
The CDF, the state s forestry and fire
fighting agency, was controlled by a p o lit
ically appointed d ire c tor , in charge of the
Forestry/Wildlife and State Fire Marshal s
office. The threat f r om w ild f ir e s w as v e ry
serious, and urban fire departments wereill
e qu ip pe d t o c op e w it h t hem when t he y
spread in to the suburbs. California did not
own an airtanker fleet outright but leased
converted aircraft, which, in addition to
t he f ou rt ee n p is to n- en gi ne d S -2 As ,
included OV-IO Broncos, 0- 2 Skymasters
and UH-I Huey helicopters, all on perma
nent loan from the Departmentof Defense
via the General Services Administration
(GSA) a nd , ultimately, t hr ou gh t he US
Department ofAgriculture (USDA).
California's S-2s have an 'initial attack'
prerequisite, which is to reach any threat
ened area within a commendable twentyminute period from the o order being
received. Their job is to head off poten
tially damaging blazes, with up ) twelve
missions a n h ou r operating from strategi
c al ly p la ce d airtanker bases. Their
response time is more crucial than thei r
(restricted) payload.
In the unincorporated state lands out
side the 'state responsibility area , there is
n o t im e limit for responding t o u rb an i
wilderness interface fires, and theCDF has
Recently we w e re n o t if i ed t ha r t he Uni ted
States Air Force is going to excess som e A-IO
aircraft which theya re willing to transfer to the
Forest Service. BeGlUSe our analysisshows thar
aircraft might hecome a v e ry c o st - e ff e ct i v e
m i t l m ~ s i z airtanker would liketo lequire
two for 111 R D projecr.2il
Agriculture, written on 2 Fe br u ar y 1 99 2,
reads as follows:
This R D project never came to fruition,
and was term inated when the Forest Ser
vice later became embroiled in unrelated
airtanker fraud problems, but the ideawas
taken up by other groups. There was some
interest on the West Coast, most signifi
cantly in Southern California, where reg
u lar f o re s t f ir es are an increasingly com
mon occurrence, threatening millions of
lives and frequently engulfing populated
suburbs of major cities such a s Los Ange
les. The profile of the a i rborne water
bomber was extremely high in t hi s a re a
and, although local fire-fighting services
were equipped wi th such aircraft, such as
convertedC-130 transports,many of them
w er e e lde r ly . Others were considered
unsuitable to deal with th is ty pe of subur
ban fi r e sto rm , w h ic h c a lis f o r some degree
of accuracy a s w e ll a s v o lu m e.
The Cal ifornia Department of Forestry s
main air defence rests with the converted
Grumman S-2 Tracker aircraft, designed
in the l at e I 9 40 s, and discarded by the
Navy two decades later. They were con
verted at great cost t o r ep la ce the old
wartime F-7F conversions , wh ich had
worn themselvesout, andhave served eversince. These were due t o b e r ep la ce d i ni
tially by eight S-2E/Gs, which are to be
converted to Turboprop a ir cr a f t a s S- 2Ts ,
with the option of a further fifteen. Some
sixteen S-2s h ad b ee n lost in c r as h es
delivering fire r et ar da nt a t t he required
low a l ti tude and speed, ju st above stall
speed, and especially when bank ing in
tight a re as , w as a dangerous manoeuvre.
As stall speed increases, with an increase
in bank angle, an aircraft that w ill b e a b le
h the apparen t eclipse o f t he S ov ie t
US military cutbacks resulted, and
a irc r af t w er e p r em a tu r ely r e tir ed to
a nd t he like. The future for the
II looked bleaker by the day,
it was natural that thoughtsshouldturn
a p ea ce fu l b ut m ea ni ng fu l u se f or the
that were now s u rp lus to r e qu ire
One of the m os t p r om isin g and
roles was deemed to be that o f
w at er -b om be r, t o f ig ht f or es t f ir es .
en the A-IO s handling ability at low
es itseemed, on the face of i t, a p r ac
l proposition. The US ForestryService
e a p r op os a lto p u rc h as e tw o A - lOs a n d
ert them for the fire-fighting purpose
stripping out all the armamentand mili
avionics, and fitting a large tank below
fuselage capable of holding some 1,500
of fire retardant. However, the pro
has become bogged down in acrimony
costs, suitability and practicalities.
arguments have been raging for many
and seem irresolvable, given the atti
of the various parties.
The expansion of the USA s sprawling
ou t in to the fringes of wildareas,has
increasing th rea ts to expens ive
burban homes (be longing to rich and
voters) fromwildfires.The dev
in Washington State, southern
fornia and Flor ida , in 1 99 8, is typical
t hi s n ew and growing danger. Modern
fire-fighting forces, equipped with the
s t v e hic les and technology t o f ig ht
fires, have little orno exper
s e i n t ac kl i ng , or stopping such fi res
they e nt er t h e urban s e cto r. A ir
both fixed-wing and helicopters,the obvious answer, but t he effec
o f t h e drops they make over fire
is no t ce rta in . Recen t experience
that the efficiency is compro
d by the fact tha t the aircraft used are
allyold and ungainly converted piston
which lack the capacity, the speed
response, the ability to get in where it
ts, and the accuracy required.
The original letter from the Chief of
Forest Service t o t he Secretary of
766 767
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THESAGA OF THE FIRE FIGHTING A IDs THE SAGA OF THE FIRE FIGHTING A IDs
FactSheeth il e t he b al an ce were flying spares or
trainers. in addition, fifty A
LOs h ad b ee n mothballed a fte r be ing
byTurkey. It was considered that
gh spa reA- lOs could be made avail
for federal and sta te fire-fighters, pro
Congress passed the required
to fly high-rerformance air
t just as NASA does.
On 22 July 1992, Brigadier General
E. Eberhart, Director of the Direc
of Programs and Evaluation, inWash
DC, replied toMr L. A Amicarella,
of Fire and Aviation Management,
Forest Service, also in Washington,
regarding his original request for two
s for initia l prototype conversion to
a nd t he House Appropriations
language which had directed
o f tw o A -I 0 aircraft t o t he Forest
ice. His lettersta ted the
following:
A ir Force comb<lt aircraft,such as theA- I 0 ,arc
normally restricted ro rransfers w it hi n t he
Department of Defense. Gene r al l y t h e on ly
exceprions to theserestrictions lrc thoseautho-
rized hI legislation, e.g. foreign miliwry i1 es. I (
the a i rcraf t a rc nor , old thmugh FMS, they arc
demilitarized.The Air Force is notce r ta inth:n
t h e A -IO :,ircra(r, once demilit:,rized, can be
operared s<l(elyin the manner inrended hI the
Forest Service. We recommend rh<lt you con
wct rhe General Sen-ices Administl <ltion:md
Federal Aviarion Agency to ascerra in whether
waivers will he provided toallow a comhat air
craft transfer <lnd FAA cerrifiG,rion to openlte
these a i rcraf t. Compl i : lI l ce wi rh rhe Congres
sional Cnmmincc directionwil lrequire theco
operation o these agcncics.2'i
He went on to add t hat t he Forest Ser
would be responsible for all cost affili
with A-IO aircraft transfer, demilita
and equipment removal and return
t he A ir Force: Upon accept<mce of
e twoA-IO aircraft, the Forest Service
tadhe re toDoD guidelines on t h e ha n
and disposal of a combat aircraft.'
In addition to the information requiredthe Congressional Committee direc
n, he requested that the Forest Service
a range of ques t ions to enable the
Force to evaluate the planned use of
e A -I O. These included the following:
How would the A-10 beused within the
Forest Service 7
How would this combat aircraft be
dem iI itarized and still meet safety of
fl ight considerations?
• If there were a ny p la ns t o transfer the
a ir c ra f t outs ide the Forest Service,
wou ld i t b e temporary or permanent?
• Would there be confirmation that the
arrangements for aircraft logistic sup
port wou ld be o th er t ha n t he USAF?
• Would the GSA and FAA provide the
required waivers to permit Forest Ser
vice use of t he A-I 0 7
Th e General summed up in this way:
While the Air Forcehas beensupporrive of your
previousrequests for excess USA F non-combat
a i rcraf t ,you rreques t for USA F combm aircraft
presents l uniqueand unprecedentedsituation.
We will workclo se lywi th your s taff in <In efforr
comply with any Congressional dircction.27
Mr Amicarella replied on 17 September,
answering most of these queries. He sentthe General a medium a i rt a nke r plan ,
which contained many of the details
requested, and he rei t er ated that fact that
the two A-lOs would beused for prototype
developmentand field evaluations. He also
confirmed in writing that all combat equip
ment would be removed and re turned to
the Air Force as soon as practicable, and
suggested a meet ing be tween the Forest
Serviceand the Air Force to decide exact
ly what equipment should be removed, a
schedule of remova I a nd a nA i r Force loca
t ion where the equipment could be deliv
ered. He s ta te d that the aircraft 'will
remain Government proper ty w ith the
modification work performed by civilian
contractors and would only be used within
the United States'2 . If in the future, any
plans arose to transfer either aircraft tem
porarily or permanently from the Forest
Servic e, such plans wou ld be negotiated
with prior approval from t he A ir Force.
Mr Amicarella also confirmed t hat t he
Forest Se rvice had been in contact with
the Grumman factory, whi ch had con
fi rmed wi ingness to provide the neces
sary airframe logistic support, and t hat t he
Air Forcewould not therefore be required fulfil this role. He also confirmed that
the GSA and the FAA would not put up
any barriers to processing the transfer,
accomplishing the modifications and
completingthe flight evaluations. Mr Fred
Fuch would work out any details that arose
and answer any further questions. Th e let
ter concluded as follows: We will work
closely with your staff in an effort to com
ply with Congressionaldirectionand meet
yourneeds. 2;\
768
Some five years a f te r th is exchange ,
Howard Kaloogian, a California Assem
blymanwho hadhimsel f twice to be evac
uated from t he p a th of wildfires in Carls
bad area and worried about threat t o h is
constituents r e sident there abouts , took
the mat ter up with the Air Forcefrom the
State Assembly's Capitol Office in Sacra
men to 7 Th e Air Force responded on 16
July 1997:
The A- 10 maintains an integral role in t h eA i r
Force'sstructure now {lnd\vill continue todo so
i n to t h e (uture. The A- I0 aircraft in storageat
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, <lre he ing he ld
in anticip:-ltion o f A i r Force operational m i s ~sinn needs andarc unavailable for other uses. In
a ddi t io n , t h e A - IO is a USAF <lircraft which
was procured solely as 1 military comb(l[ air
crafr. The Departments of the Air Force, Army
a nd Na vymusr
(olioII' str ict procedures whendisposing of rheseaircr fr. Combat aircraft that
arc exces s t o t he U SA F :md Depar rment of
Defense needs arc demilitarized to precludeany
reconditioning fnr (ur the r mili ta ry usc then
sold fnr scrap.277
A fac t sheet was enclosedwhich theAir
Force cons ide red answered the specific
questions Mr Kaloogian had raised. Dated
7 July 1997, it deserves to be included in
full see box oppsite).
A letter from Arthur J. Negrette, Presi
dent, Flight Safety Institute , Sacramento,
to the Air F or ce r ec ei ved a simil;u
response on 26 February 1998. Th e Chief,
Mission Support Division, Colonel Joanne
M. Roedefer, stated t ha t Th e A ir Force
remains f irm in i ts position on the A-lO.
The A-I 0 maintainsan in tegral role in the
Air Force's structure now and will contin
ue to do so into the future.27H
There followed the usual information
on the standard disposal procedure, which
was identical word forword to that used in
all previous communications.
Members of California s Congressional
delegation took up the cause and received
equally short shrift for their trouble. On18 February 1998, Congressmen George
Radanovich , R icha rd Pombo and Jerry
Lewis wro te t o the Secretary o f t h e A ir
Force, Whitten Peters. They poin t ed
out that the issue was critical for the west
ern sta tes and, in particular, for Califor
nia ,where high-performanceaircraft were
required for combating wildfires. Despite
this, the Air Force had recently declined
to t r ans fe r r e ti r ed Fai r chi ld A- IO Thun
derbolt II aircraftto fire-fightingagencies
SUBJECT A-l aircraft
QUESTION: How many of the Air Forces A-lOs a re in
f.yabe storage?
ANSWER:None. Aircraft in flyable storage are gener
ally defined as aircraft awaiting disposition andmain
tained in a flyable holdstatusat theAerospaceMain
t enance and Regenerat on Center AMARC) at
Davis-MonthanAFB for a period ofup to 90daysoras
required.
QUESTION: How many of the Air Forces A-lOs are still
in theact ve inventory?
ANSWER: There are 413AIDA-IDs in the active inven
tory. The A-1O and DA-l0 basic airframes are identcal.
Dfthis number, 370are fying Ii active duty, reserveand
guard units; 26 are maintenance trainers; and 17 are
used foraircraftbattle damage repair ABDR .
QUESTION: In total. howmanyA-lOs doestheAir Forcepossess?lIf this number is different fromthe sum ofthe
first two categores, please explain.
ANSWER: The Air Force possess 588 AIDA-IDs. Besde
the413actively fyng. anadditional 175A-IDs are stored
at AMARC for long-term storage. The A-1O aircraft in
storage at Davis-Monthan AFB. I are being held in
anticipationofAir Force operatonalmission needs and,
therefore,are not avaiable forother uses. The A-I0 air
craft is a USAFcombat aircraft andwas procured solely
for amilitary combataircraft. The Departmentsof theAir
Force, ArmyandNavymust folowstrict procedureswhen
disposing of these aircraft. Combat aircraft that are
for testing as airtankers, after having been
p re pa re d t o d o so in 1992: T he A ir
Force Congressional Liaison staff reiter
ated that posi t ion re cently while also
stating that all A- lOs would be retired
within ten years.'
I t was also pointed out that:
The r ~ t r i t i o n against transferringretired COIll
hat aircnl t to civilian government ; lgcncics is
not required hI Un ir ed S t at e sC ode o r C om
bined Federal Regularion. Ir is also unprece
dented since earlier transfers of aircr<lft to fire
fighters Cre doclIlllented by other comh(lt
aircraft tr<lns(ers to NASAand t h e oper a ti o no (
transferred aircr<l(t hI pr iva teent i t ie s, such S
the CollingsFoundation - ..Over 5 per cent of
existing I ar e o n displClY in museums.
Without compromising narioncJ security, f e d r ~al and Californian fire-fighters could make usc
o( approximarely less th:m 4 per c e n t o f r h eA
lOs controlled by the Air Force. Using tha r
small numher of aircr(l(r to save lives would
ha ve no impac t on t h e future operationalneeds
excess to the USAF and Department of Defense 000
needsare demitarizedtoprecludereconditonfor further
military use and then soldfor scrap.
QUESTION: What arethe Air Forces plansfor the A-l
fleet fromnow through theirfinal retrement?
ANSWER Current plans for the A-IDs areto remainin
the inventoryuntil the end of their service life and then
be replacedby the Joint Strike Fighter JSF) near the
end of theJSF buy,
QUESTION: Are there any plans to transfer any A-lOs
fromthe Air Forceor the Department of Defenseto any
state or federal agency orother mission? IIf so, please
expan.1
ANSWER: No. The Air Force is unaware of anyagency
currenty having an interest inexcessAirForce aircraft. In
1992. the USDA ForestServce expressed an interest in
usng A-IDs as airtankers, but eventualy dropped the
idea due to the cost and regulatory requirements. TheDepartment of theAirForce, ArmyandNavymust folow
strict procedures outned in 000 4160.21-M Defense
Reuthzatonand Marketng Manual, whendisposing of
military aircraft. Aircraft which become excess to Air
Force needsare screenedwith theothermilitary servces
and 000 actvites. Those combat aircraftthat aredeter
mined tobe excess to 000 needsare demitarizedto pre
cude further reconditon for further use and then sold for
scrap. The noncombat-typeaircraft with no known 000
requirements are then offered to the General Servces
Administration GSA) GSA will then screen the aircraft
with the other Federa andStateagenciesbeforethe air
craft is offered for general sale to the general pubc.
o( a Oeetwhich i, heing re t i red ,md of which 37
Jler cent (Ire no longer n y i n g . ~
Th e Congre ssmen there fore reques ted
that the Air Force shouldconsidermaking
A-10 aircraft available to appropriate fed
eral or Californian fire-fighting agencies,
and t ha t t he California Department of
Forestry and Fire Protection should fully
evaluate the urban interface wildfire sup
pression potential of convert ed A-lOs,
regardless of availability issues.
This request was routed to the office in
charge of disposing of surplus property andtheir policy question was not answered. At
the end of June J998, therefore, the Secre
tary of the Air Force was still unaware of
the issue o r t h e fact that several Congress
men wan te d bet te r a ir ta nk er s for their
state . Hisstaff had failed to rass on the let
t er o r the request. lnstead, a letter was
received back f rom Rea r Admiral S. R.
Morgan o f t he Defense Logistics Support
Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. ' It merely
repeated, yet again, the standard blurb on
769
the policy of surplus military aircraf
referred to the GSA by t h eDoDa n
made unflyable and unrepairable
DRMS. It passed the Congressmen b
the GSA a t S an Francisco.
Assemblyman Howard Kal
re turned to the fray in March 1998,
a different tack. He w ro te t o the D
ment of Forestry and Fire Protect
Sacramento, on 5 March, asking
contract provision allowing some
tion be used to allow detailed study
A-lO s te chnica l merit.2'2 Our c
radial engine-powered S-2A aircr
becoming extremely difficult to ma
ina safe, flyable condition... finding
able replacement for our existing air
becoming more critical.'2
The reply came on 8 April, und
signature of the then Director, Rich
Wilson:
I can a lll·e you rha tCDF hasnot prema
e limina tedrhe A-IO as a coml etitor. We
howe er, through numerous direct conrac
\\'ell <S cO Tespundcnce, heen consis
informed hI r h eUn i l ed S t at e sA i r Force
the A-lOis no t, a nd will nor he availah
u n e r ~ i o n for lise ,b ; airranker. Furrher,
i f i l were availahle today, the <lirframe and
erplant r ~ n g i n e e r i n g tnl l redesign need
ClllWert theA- I 1 an airmnker, wouldra
addition:r1 three to fouryears to coml lere h
the first prototypecould hegin the rYle c
G,tion I'rocess. Only after successfully p
type ce r ti f ica t ion, could huilding o f t he
ol erational a i rcraf t h egin . Finally, the
operating;'b an airtanker, is completely u
of the purpose for which i twas designed. T
is no guar a nt e e t h at , a (t e r all that time
A-IOcould be successfullyconverred.2H
Wilson had no avia t ion or fire-fi
experience, and this response raised
wry comments from those in the
Conversion o f t he A-IO would no
anything like the period of t imequ
converting an attack aircraft so
could attack fires would be relativeple,especially when compared to co
ing anti-submarine aircraft, a irI ine
transports for the same purpose I
The Director did not completel
the door, however,adding a rider:
Clearly, should t h eA - I0 become :l\ ailahle
the proponents could prove the aircraf
competitive ret(lrd; lnt delivery platform,
most pleased ro include i t for considerati
CDF s Oeet. .. Iandl to work with I- o
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HighBypassTurbne
57ft 6in
53ft 4n
14ft Bn
46,BOOb
43,BOOb
5 BOOlb
3,950ft
3,400ft
4,090ft
2,725ft
2,500fpm
Positve Displacement
1,550 Galons
310- KIAS = 350m ph
Yes (restricted)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Mid 1970s
Crca 1,500,000
Kaloogian and hissraffro ensure rhar CDF has
rimely acquisirion o( the mostappropri, lte fire
fighring tools, 'ailahIe2
, the impasse continued.
In 1998, a small company of like-mind
individuals was set up at Anaheim, Cal
AeroTech , consi s ti ng main ly of
rilots, instructors and aero-engi
rhe majoriry of whom were ex-ser
whohad flown close-supporrmis
for the Army and Marines. Their
was encarsulared thus:
We're speciali:ed inflying support (or good guys
in c lose comhat just l ike you o n t h e fire line.
on the fooled: dropping anything, retardant,
homhs or srrafe, is 90pe r cent aviarionand 10
percent specific torhe thing heing droPl1ed. We
alsoall have families living hetween Los Ange
les andSan Diego. '
could jusrifiably claim to have the
ssary skill and the motivation. The
rhar the A-IOcould deliver ordnance
hin 80ft (25 metres), o r ' ab ou r five
from friendly forces, and could
be entrusted safely ro deliver fire
in suburban areas, was a powerful
They claimed t ha r t h e end of
mean t r har two hundred A
Os had been mothba l led rhirty years
the military had planned to retire
from service. They set to work to
ence rhe local and federal politicians,
t h m ix ed fortunes. Opposirion was
from many quarrers, and their fight
unresolved.
The group's principal argument is based
rhe fact t he CDF proposes ro spend
on rebuilding parr of the exisr
S-2 fleet ( 3,000,000 peraircraft).The
of rhe A-IO would give new
wirh 1,500-gallon capacity againsr
S-2's 800 gallons; acruisingspeedof 340
(545km/h) , compared w ith 180 mph
for the S-2, and therefore a
ter reacrion time; and up-to-dare rech
including computer aiming, abilirynight dropping, infra-red to see through
oke and in-flighr reloading capability.
cost, rhe claim was also made that rhe
Scooper ' would cost 24,000,000+
Canadair. The cost of converring each
was put at just 2 million apiece, so
of rhem could be purchased for rhe
of one of rhe large airrankers:
Converted A-lOs will he there <H 3amwhen you
ICDFIfinally get an advantageover a Santa Ana
THE SAGA OF THE FIRE-FIGHTING A-II
driven wildfire. They'll be there for youinside the
smoke c loud tha r grounds all other aircrafr.2s;
O n i8 Seprember 1997, a flight demon
stration waslaid on ar EI Toro Marine Air
Corps Air Starion, Orange County, ar the
time o f t he Warershed Fire Council of
Southern California. This enabled the
assembledCalifornian fire-fighters ro ev l-
uate for the first rime the A-I O s capabi Ii-
ries. (The Warershed Fire Council had
been established almost fifty years before
bysupervisorsfrom then ine most souther
ly Californiancounties to work together in
many areas, i ncluding rhe co-ordination
and improvement of fire services for the
region, as well as rhe CDF and the Forest
Service of rhe Deparrmentof Agriculture.
This experienced group of fire-fighrers
represents two-th irds of the population of
California, most ofwhom are at consider
able risk from forest fires.)
During rhe demonstrarion, rhe two A
lOs raxied out in front o f t he US Marine
Museum at EI Toro in front o f t h e assem
bled fire-fighters, and med ia represenra
rives They came in low and s low in rhe
firsr of three demonsrration runs, showing
boththeir silence in approach (a particular
asset when t ack l ing urban blazes), and
rheir versatility and manoeuvrability. Both
flewa consrant-speed, controlled descend
i ng r ur n f rom 1 ,5 00 ft (450m) down ro
250ft (75m).
The firsr pass byrhe leading A-lO was a
level run, of the type rhat could be used as
a rerardant drop pattern, and the run fin
ished with a 25-degree climb, which g ve
good ins ight inro how t ighr to the ground
the A-IO can operare. The canyons and
creeks of California presenr difficult terrain
for convenrional aircraft, but not for the
A-IO I The second A-1O followed the
leader down and rhen demonstrated the
aircraft's unique abiliry to maintain its low
speed while safely r u rn ing w ith 60 degrees
of bank, utilizing rhe parrially exrended
wingtip speed brakes. The facr that rhese
brakes, which c lo se in under a second,allow the rurbine s ro run a t h ig h r ow er ,
wirhour gaining unnecessary airspeed, was
another plus; eliminating the lag between
slowflight and high power was cited as an
important safety point.
For years, A- lOs had hunted tanks in
their offset rrail duo f o rmarion, w i th rhe
wingman300ft (90m) behind and slightly
to starboard of rhe leader, and the second
descending turn, drop run and steep c1imb
out, was done in this way. Such a partern
170
would seem to demonstrate how easy i t
would be for an A-10 ream to spread the
retardant over a wider a re a, or to make
linking parterns of cover
The landing by the flight leader showed
rhe A-IO' s abi li ry to operare from
makeshifr airstrips in the field, using only
1,500ft (450m) of runway. The rwo a ir
crafr were rhen taxied overand placed on
static display while their pilors fielded
quesrions from rhe audience. Some have
dismissed this d isplay a s ' jus r a couple of
guys on a cross-country hopbeating up the
patten,', rarl,er than a proper meaningful
display, bur it clearly impressed the watch
ers on the ground.
There was an in-builr resistance on the
part of many fire-fighters to inflatedclaims
by compering parties rrying to s el l a ir
tankers. They felr that, although a useful
adjunct, such ai rcr af t could not solve all
their problems. The daybefore,a Canadair
CL-415 'Super Scooper' had been demon
stI-ared, and Los Angeles had leased thar
tanker. This aircraft, r he CL- 215T , h ad
been evaluared from 1994 rhrough 1997
after two such tests. One reporr concluded
the following:
T ho u gh t he C L- 21 5T aircraft offers some
,Kh antagcs for wil l n fire suppression to the
existingairresources of the Los Angeles Coun
ty Fire Depar tmenr , they havenor proven rohe
all exceptional resource to opcrClte in all terrains
of Los AngelesCounty and in any l11udcra[c to
high windconditions. ; i
I r w as s ai d t ha r t he cost of leasing rhe
Scoopers was more rhan r h ree t imes the
cost ofconvertingan A-I O None the less,
LA took the aircraft on lease, despire some
objections by the counry fire-fighters.
Basic arguments againsr the A-IO pro
posal were many and varied, despite the
fact tha t the aircraft were neverevaluated.
They included rhefact that rhe aircraft was
not available in rhe first place, its develop
menr wou ld rake roo long, and replace
menr S-2s would bea quicker solurion; rhefacr rhat it had never flown as an airranker;
and that ir was t echnological ly too
advanced for fire-fighting aircrew ro han
dle. AlthoughCDF leaders were quoted on
cameraand in writing as welcoming an A
10 airtanker test, they tu rneddown Con
gressional offers ro deliver A-lOs for such
tes ting and, when a California Assembly
man requesred the CDF Director ro evalu
a te t he A-lOon merit, he was refused.
CDF' s upper management conta ined no
pilors, and the pilotswere norconsulted in
airranker selection.
The Scooper did not work very wel l in
rhe Southern Californian area, according
to five separate reports. Examples of slow
or'ineffective response were given as
proof rhar airtankers were not very effi
c i en t, b ut the A-IO's supporters coun
tered by rointing our rhar delays ro such
aircraft , caused by smoke-filled v lleys
obscuring their vi sion, would be over
come by the A-IO's infra-red sysrem. This
infra-red sensor package would be built in
under the nose of the A-10, along with a
retardanr-discharge system, a b el ly rank
and pipe, a nd a n aerial retardanr-reload
ing sysrem via a probe on t h e p o rt side of
the nose. Th e intention was not to use
the A -I O t o replace all orher types of
fixed-wing airtankers a nd h ea vy -l if t
he licop ters , bu t to use ir efficienrly and
Comparison between A-lOA F 5-2FT
A lOA
Engne Specification
Wing Span
Length
Height
Operatng Weight - Fu
Weight wll .5 hours fuel
EmptyWeight 30 mins fuel
Take-Off Distance - Fu
Take-Off Distance w/t.5 hours, fuel
Landing Distance - Fu
Landng Distance - Empty
Initial Rateof Clmb - Fu
RetardantDel very System
Retardant Capacity
Cruse Speed at 5,000ft
Night Capacity
Infrared Vision System
Inflight Reloading
ComputerAim ing System
Head-Up Display
Crash Warning System
Fuly Aerobatc
Orginal Manufacturing Date
Costper aircraft alter R D
THE SAGA OF THE FIRE-FIGHTINGA-IDs
relarively cheaply to f il l a niche in the
system.
The proposed S-2Ts originated from the
Grumman Tracker anti-submarine aircrafr
rerired from service in 1972. Th e A-IO had
been designed thir ty years larer, specifical
ly for low-level, tight-manoeuvring work
from makeshift airstrips. It is not sched
uled to retire unr il 2020, so i r is current
rechnology, but with numbers available,
along w it h r he aircrew skilled enough to
handle them efficienrly.
Relevant comparison figures are shown
in the table below.
AeroTech continues to champion irs
'new-generation airtanker' proposal, cit
ingits usefulness in orher roles:
Fmexample they will mhit over a majorearth
lJuakesite with rheir 'infra-red videodownlinked
to recovery llgencics. That airhornei n r r ~ r d
COF 5 FT
Turboprop
691t Bn
42ft Bn
17ft 5n
26,1001b
24,6001b
13,7001b
4,750ft
4,100ft
4,450ft
2,B50ft
420fpm
Bomb Bay-type Doors
1,200 Galons
200KIAS = 230mph
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Eary 1950s
2,000,000
171
survey w )rk is also important over wildfire
is nowbeing flown hI NASA spy planesat
IllOUS cost airtankcrs will simultane
facilitate ground communications hy ca
radio and cellularphone relaygem. I
The arguments continue and progr
been l imi t ed . Th e Forest Service
responsibility for the urban interfac
Lake Arrowhead and north -east
mento examples notwirhstanding. E
rhe fire-fighters and the various C
Departments were fully convince
DoD continues to inform interesred
cians that there are no spare A-lOs
though an es timated th ir ty- two
museums across the US, a nd 300
have been 'retired' . In the Decembe
issue of r orceMagazine ir wasre
thar thirty-six A-lOs were to be sa
from the 'boneyards', r o be ful lybished for active service.
The pros and cons continue to be
ed. Some argue rhat theA-10 is uns
for canyon work, due to its h ig h
speed, estimated to b e 200 KIAS. O
say thar the fact that ninery A- lO
been assigned to AMARC does nor
they are surplus and available, for th
marked either as 'war reserve ma
which means attrition replacemen
not just combat. An average of four
are lost to accidenral causes everyye
they are a wasting asser, or stripp
spare parrs, which can no long
obtained from Grumman Norrhro
addition,the Air Force, which woul
pily have scrapped t h eA-1 0 years
srill under the Congressional mand
provide the Army with CAS, a nd
10 is still the only aircraft in irs inv
able to do this job properly. Ir
claimed in somequarters thar the U
est Service is not allowed ro posse
a l though o the rss ta te tha t this is n
case, and that the problems are ad
n-ative rather than legal. And soit g
Wheth er t he A-iO will ever be s
fire-fighting mode, and yer anotheof life, is still doubtful, but there is
hope.
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CHAPTER TWENTY
• .1-
New England Air Museum sA-10 s/n79-0173)is seen here inboth internal andexternaldisplays. T
display isquite comprehensivewith theGatl inggun andammunitiondrums. a variety ofordnance
otherinterestingdetai ls incorporated.This aircraft hasbeen on loanto New England from theUni
States Air Force Museum since 1993, and prior tothat wasflown by the Connecticut Air National G
based nearto the Museumat Bradley International Airport. Mchea Speciale,ExecutveDirector,New
Ar Museum, Wndsor Locks, Connectcut
A c1ose,up ofA-10 76-0540. now displayedat theAviationMuseumat McClelland AFB, California.
Dooner
reserv tions nd urvivors
Oppositepage, top A-10s/n 76-535 on display at
the Cradleof Aviation Museum, long Island, New
York. This aircraftwas gained by the USAF on
December 1977 a nd i n J u n e 1978 was assigned to
the354th TacticalFighterWing TFW), Tactical Air
Command TAC at Myrtle Beach AFB, South
Carolina. February 1982, i twas reassignedfor
work wi th the SacramentoAir logisticsAreaat
McClellan AFB, California, before being sentto the
45thTactical FighterSquadron TFS inJune 1983,
as partof the US Air Force Reserve,based at
Grissom AFB, Indiana. Joshua StoH, Courtesyof Cradle
ofAviaton Museum, NY
Oppositepage, middle The A-10 s/n 73-1666) on
display atthe AerospaceMuseumat Hill AFB,
close toSalt lake Cty, July 1995. Peter Smith
Despite the fa that the A/OA-lO is s t il l a
f ighting warplane in act ive service many
have been honourably retired and are now
on public display at air museums. Others
ha ve be e n savedas staticdisplays at various
USAF bases in t h e U S A bu t t h e n u mb er s
of t he se a re in a permanent state of flux as
more and more basescloseclowna n d t h e air-
craft are moved elsewhere. Other A-lOs are
carried on no registers b ut h av e b ee n
p h ot o gr ap h ed a n d observed on display
a lthough not being recorded as such.
Oppositepage, bottom ThisA-10 with droptank,
sIn 77-0228, is on display at Grissom Air Park,
HeritageMuseum Foundation, Grissom AFB,
Indiana. Shewas recievedinto the U SA F o n 2 6
November 1978 andthe following month was
assigned tothe 355th Tactical FighterWing Tactical
Air Command), at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. In
January 1978 she went to Europe as partof the81st
Tactical FighterWing USAFE , at RAF Bentwaters,Suffolk. where sheremainedfor threeyears. In May
1981 shearrived atthe Sacramento Air material
Area AirForce logistics Command) at McClellan
AFB.California,beforebeing re-assignedto the45th
Tactical FighterSquadron Air Force Reserve)at
Grissom AFB. She remained in service with thatunit
fornine subsequentyearsbeforebeing retired.She
was assignedto theHeritage MuseumFoundation
on 1January 1990 andhas been an open-air static
displaythere eversince. still painted inher olive
draband with Air Force Reservemarkings.
John S March
172 173
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PRESERV TIONS NI SURVIVORS
77
PRESERV TIONS NI SURVIVORS
Oppositepage, topleft New England irMuseum sA-10(s/n 79-0173 . Front view showing
gooddetail ofthe aircraft s frontwheel andundercarr iage, offset tomake room forthe Gatling
gun;the firing barrel isone ofthe seven situated direct starboard on thecentre-l ine. Also
shownare the two ALR-69 radar warning receivers on ei thers ide of thenoseandthe UARRSI
fuell ing receptacleplaced rightin frontof thepilot, with i tsguiding cues forthe refuell ing
tanker boom. Michael Speciale, Executve Director, New England Air Museum, Windsor Locks,
Connectcut
Opposite page, topright ItsGhostGrey paintscheme showing clear signsof weathererosion,
thisA-10, pictured at PopeAFB, Fayetteville,North Carolina, in May 1998, still proudly bears
theshark s mouth andeyesmarkings.Thesewere adopted by the23rdTactical FighterWing
as atr ibute to theChennault s legendaryAmerican VolunteerGroup,which painted them on
their Curtiss P-40sin Burmaand China inthe SecondWorld War. Appropriately, the first true
tank-busters, the German Junkers Ju 87 Stuka,much earl ier inthe war, were thefirst warplanesto carry this marking intobattle,in Francein thesummer of 1940. KengoYamamoto
Oppositepage, bot/om Fairchild-RepublicA-10 s/n 75-298 in July 1998,on exhibition atPima
Air Space Museum,Tucson,Arizona as partof theArizona Aerospace Foundation display.
In August 1977, she was assigned to the354th Tactical FighterWing TACL MyrtleBeach AFB,
SouthCarolina, and in Febrauary 1979, movedto the 57th TacticalTraining Wing TAC at Nellis
AFB, Las Vegas, Nevada. In April 1980 hernext assignment waswi th the 355th TacticalTraining
Wing TAC at Davis-MonthanAFB, which is r ightacrossthe street from theMuseum, so they
plan tokeepher on display on loanin thatunit s markings. From 1990 she servedwith the 358th
TFS ( Lobos ) to at leastApri l 1992, entering AMARCduring November1992. She was given
tothe Pima ir SpaceMuseum on 25 January 1994, andremains in excellent condition.
Kirsten Tedesco,Deputy Drector/Curator of Colectons, Pima Air SpaceMuseum, Tucson
77
Thispage Head-on (top) and port quarter(above) vie
the Empire StateAerosciences Museum A-10 (BuNo 75
on externaldisplayat Scotia, New York. Built in 1975,
aircraft was thetwelfth,but onlythe sixthproduction
A-10,and sawgood service,accumulatingsome5,947
hours. Acquired by the 355th Tactical Training Wing T
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona, befor
in March 1976, tothe 333rd Tactical FighterTrainingSq
TFTS the Lancers . It saw furtherservicein thesubs
years andthenarrivedat Shaw AFB from Myrtle Beac
South Carolina,afterthat base hadbeendeactivated.
assigned tothe 507th TAIRCWat Shaw,which laterch
tothe 20th FighterWing.Theaircraftwas designated
battle damagerepairprogramme aftera crackwasdiscovered inthe RT engine mount o n 1 8 March 1990,
restr icted to normal, non-tacticalfl ighttraining.
I twas acquiredfrom 20 F Wb y the Empire StateAeros
Museum and delivered on 4May 1995 to Schenectady
County Airport,at Glennville, New York on the s iteof
formerGeneral Electr icfl ight-testfaci l i ty,vacated in
A four-man museum crew tookfive days todismantle
plane atShaw,for transportto themuseum viaa New
irGuard C-5 Galaxytransport,fromStewartAir Nati
Guard Base,New York. It thentook approximately one
to reassembleit. It carriesthe nose code263. JohnPa
Empire State Aerosciences Museum, Scota, New York
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PRESERVATIONS AND SURVIVORS PRESERVflTIONS N SURVIVORS
Th e Air Force Museum official ly owns
all the A lOs in the various museums and
tacks them by their tail number . Only two
were not flyable w hen they were s tr ipped
for display one that bell ied in at George
A FBa nd is n ow o n display at Davis Mon-
than and the McClellan exhibit . Th e rest
were justsurplus to requirements.
Given this state of constant change it is
difficult to list all the AjOA IOs that have
been preserved but the followingtable
a fa ir indication of those that the
might be able to visit. There is not e
space to feature eachand everyexamp
the photographs here are represen
Hawgs Iave also been reported on display the following locato
Bradley Air Natonal GuardBase, Windsor Locks, Connectcut
Connectcut ANG,East Grandby, Connectcut
Eieson AFB, Alaska
Expermental Aircraft Associaton Air Adventure Museum,
Oshkosh, Wisconsin Wing ony)
FortCampbel, Kentucky
Fort Hood, Texas
Fort LeonardWood, Missouri
Lackand AFB, Texas
Maryland ANG, Westfield
McChord AFB, Wisconsin
Naval Air Staton, New Oreans, Louisiana
New Cumberand
osan AB, Korea
Sprangdahlem AB, Germany
Whiteman FB Missouri
Willow Grove,ARS, Pennsylvania
Wisconsin Natonal Guard Memorial Libraryand Museum,
Vok Fied, Camp William, Wisconsin
A/DA-10Preservations
Locaton
Air Force Museum Wright-Patterson FB Dayton,Oh o YA- 1
Air Force Flght Test Center Museum, Calfornia YA-l0BI
Hi AFB Museum, Utah
Engand AFB, Hertage Park, Louisiana
New Oreans Naval Air St at on Colect on, New Oreans, Louisiana
Empre State Aerosciences Museum,Scota, New York
McChord Air Museum, Washington
Pma Air SpaceMuseum, Tucson, Arzona
Defense Distribution Center East New Cumberand, Pennsyvania
PopeAFB, NorthCarolna
Massachusetts ANG, Barnes Municipal Airport, Westfield, Massachusetts
New York ANG, Syracuse ANGB, New York
Crade of Aviaton Museum, Garden Cty, New York
McClelan Aviaton Museum, NorthHighlands, Calfornia
USAF History and Traditons Museum, San Antonio, Texas
Barksdale FB Bosser, Louisiana
USAF Armament Museum, Elgn FB Florda
Grssom Air Park, Hertage Museum Foundaton, Grssom AFB, Indiana
Pennsylvania ARS, Willow Grove,Pennsy vania
Imperial War Museum, Duxford Airfield, Cambrdge
UnitedStates Air Force Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, Oho
Myrtle Beach FB Hertage Park, Myrtle Beach, South Carolna
Davis-Monthan FB Warrior Park, Arzona
Connectcut ANG, Bradley InternationalAirport, Windsor Locks, Connectcut
Davis-Monthan AFB, Warrior Park, Arzona
New Engand Air Museum, Bradley InternationalA irport, Connectcut
Aerospace Maintenance Regeneraton Center Celebrity Row , Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arzona
s
71-1370
73-1664
73-1666
73-1667
75-0255
75-0263
75-0270
75-0298
75-0303
75-0308
76-0100
76-0523
76-0535
76-0540
76-0547
75-0552
77-0205
77 228
77-0248
77-0259
78-0681
79-0097
79-0117
79-0103
79-0116
79-0173
79-0244
A-l0 76-0540, a Gulf War veteran, now displayed at the Aviation Museum at McClelland AFB, California.
It still carriersits Desert Storm nose art and AFRES squadron markings. W i a m Dooner
The preserved A-l0 at Duxford in th e new USAF hangar. The nosewheel
its gear are offset to th e starboard side o fth e aircraft s n o se to
th e Ge n e ra l Electric A/A 49E-6 cannon system. Peter C Smth
A-l0 almost inevitably ends u p a s amuseum display. This mounted
e a n d cockpit section was an outdoor display at Eglin AFB, Shalimar,
i n M a y 1998. Kengo Yamamoto
VA-lOB was the sole dual-seat A-l0 made over from th e first
tion aircraft, 73-1664, which wasbailed to Fairchild-Republic at
Farmingdale plant from April 1978 for experimental conversion into a
dverse weathervariant. No te th e insignia on t he n os e o f an owl
an umbrellarepresenting these two duties. A right-hand pod-mounted
radar, and a forward-looking infra-red FURl pod were added
th e sa me side, as well as an IN-39 INSa n d AN/APN-1 94 radar altimeter.
tail was raised by 20in 50cm). In th e e ve n t,th e Air Force decided not to
with it and this aircraft was retained at Edwards AFB, where it is
on display. I tslo n g nose boom is clearly shown. Air Force Flght Test Center
FB
176 177
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aryfunctions: CAS; AFAC
tryinto service: March 1976and ArmyMaterial Command (AMC) to find
solution.Together,they identified 200diffe
potential solutions covering the whole DTL
(doctrine, training, leader development,
organization, material and soldier support)
spectrum.
Thebattlefield combat identification sy
(BClS) is one rE?sult from thisclose study.
wastestedduring Task Force XXI Advanc
Warfighting Experiment. An active rather
passive system, like thecurrent Mark XII
usinga millimetrewave system, BCIS allo
the pilot to look through a sight, placethe
cross-hairs on the targetusinga laser and
toldwhether it isfriendor foe. Concurren
this normal action, BCIS queriesthe targe
a codedmillimetrewavesignal. If it is loc
on to a BClS-equipped vehicle, it will reply
kind. The return signalactivatesa light in
sight and also atone signal, clearly indicat
friendly contact.
The FAC can relay this information and
identityconfirmation to any CAS aircraft li
theA-l 0, which maybe in the area awaiti
ordersto strike. Thelocationof friendlyfo
c an b e passed on via the situation-awaren
datalink (SADL), an enhanced position loc
reporting system EPLARS) radio in the A
which can communicate directlywith Arm
groundunits via a situational awareness
picture. This, with modification, can displa
thepilot'sHUD thefriendly locationsnear
thetargetthe A-lOis aboutt o engage. 1J
For night missions, advances are equal
impressive. FAC missionsare now flown
the NVG linked the air commander's po
ACP), which is a finger-attachment. Thep
attaches the ACP, a n infra-red laser device
hisfinger with Velcro. The pilot has to use
protective, wraparound, laser-protectiveglasses underthe NVG to shield his eyes
anybeamreflectionoff hisown aircraft's
canopy. Oncethe FAC A-l 0, so equipped
locates atarget, thepilot merely points h
fingerat it,the beam lockson and fellow
with NVG lock in on the laserdot generat
This gives the A-l 0 covertability of targe
selection, so thatthe enemy does noteve
know he is targeteduntil he is hit. This is
butmakescorrect target identication byt
FAC even more crucial in future conflicts.
179
APPENDIX
of assurance ' i Conditions overthe battlefield,
when the warwent hot, wereverydifferent. In
theenvironmentof fast-moving tank forces,
and the general tension and confusion of
battle, incidents of 'friendly fire' began to be
reported once more. There wasmuch renewed
horror, and disbeliefthatsucha thing could
happen in the 1990s.
Twodetailed and accurate studies by
Americans on the SecondWorld War, Vietnam
and GulfWarfiguresput them into similar
brackets, rangingfrom 10 to 14 per cent,with 17
per cent forthe Gulf War. If the Scud-Bmissile
attacks on rear areas are omitted as irrelevantto
the issue,the percentage rises to 23 percent. '
In Britain, theAmericans wereagain seen as
themain villains, principally dueto thetragic
incident when two A-lOsmistakenly shot up a
British armoured scoutcolumn of the3rd
Battalion, T h e R o ya l Regimentof Fusiliers
BattleGroup, with heavylossof life see
Chapter 16). Naturally, the bereaved families,
grieving and angry, went tothe British High
Court to force the Ministryof Defenceto reveal
what reallyhappened. They werenot to be
given much satisfaction
It can be of little consolation tothose British
families, but fratricide also occurred between
American forces in the Gulf. In fac t, 35of the
146American battledeaths during Desert
Storm an incredible24 percentof thetotal,
resulted from 'friendlyfire'. Furthermore, 72 of
the480 Americanswounded - or 15per cent of
thetotal- werevictims oferrors on thepartof
theirown sides. In addition, American forces
destroyed seven M1A1 tanks and twenty
Bradleyfighting vehiclesof their own forces.1 N
The furore in themediafollowingsome of
these casesof 'friendly fire' has concentrated
theminds of themilitary, spurred on byCongress. For theA-l O s part, this hasinvolved
the retro-fitting of awhole new system
designed to eliminate, as far as humanly
possible, the chances of such errors occurring
in future conflicts
TheAir Force is workingcloselywith the
Army on this, for obvious reasons. In the
immediateaftermathof Desert Storm theArmy
Vice Chiefof Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan
(laterto be CoS), directed TRADOC Training and
Doctrine Command)at Fort Monroe, Virginia,
riendly ire
Fratricide is agrim fact of warfare, and onethat
is often swept underthe carpet. In everywar,
fratricide has played apart in the casualty
total,m and, with theadventof airpower, it is
increasingly likelyto happen. The higherthe
altitude, thegreater the riskof hittingfriendly
forces. Duringthe SecondWorld War, the
Allies'insistence on area bombing led to some
particularlyhorrendousdisasters, not leastthe
five hundred-plusFrench civilians massacred in
thebombing of Le Portal,near Boulogne on the
night of 8/9September 1943N On the
material side, the bombing of MonteCassino
was an equally futile exercise.m
Becauseof the natureof CAS, ground forces
are laid open to risk, no matter how precisely
the strikes are made. Perhaps the most
consistentlyaccurate bombing of the Second
World Warwas conducted by theVultee
Vengeance dive-bomber squadrons of the RAF
againstJapanese troops besiegingImphal and
Kohima in 1944. Attackswere made up tofour
times a day on enemypositions justyardsfrom
British trenches. Even these skilledpilots would
err o n r a re occasions, and accidentallyhit their
own troops 2 ;
These disasters were sufficientlycommon
that advocates of CAS, including the US Marine
Corps aviators in the Philippines in 1944, had
the greatestdifficulty in convincing Army
commanders to use even their SBDs in support
of ground forces So many attacks had been
misdirected by the USAAF thatthe Marine flyers
had to demonstratetheir skillsmanytimes before
theywere acceptedas part ofthe team2 ;
In Korea, thesamebitterlessonswere
imparted; again, onlythe US Marine flyers,
specialists in CAS and dedicatedto it, flying the
Douglas AD Skyraider in thejet age, were
deliveringthe goodsaccurately. Britishmemories are especially bitter. On 10
September 1950, USAF P-51 Mustangs,
operating as fighter-bombers, dropped their
bombs on the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
at Naktong, killing and maiming sixty296
Withthe beginning of theGulf War, these
tragedies seemed to be quickly forgotten by
the media, and television pictures showing the
much-heralded 'precision' guidedweapons
delivering bombs down skylights in the heartof
Baghdad,gavethe general publica false sense
$8.8 million (original)
Fairchild-Republic Company/Grumman Northrop
One
Douglas Escapac zero/zero
Twox 40.3 3-kN General ElectricTF34-GE-l00 non-afterburning turbofans
9,0651b 4,111 kg) each engine
178
Length53ft 4in 1626 m); height 17ft8in (5.38m);wingspan 57ft6in (1753m); wing area 506 sq ft 47 sq m)
Empty 24,9591b 11 ,319kg); typical combat weight 30,5341b (13,850kg); ferry TO weight 47,0941b (21,361 kg);
max. TO weight 50,0001b 22,361 kg); wing Idg at ferry TO weight93lb/sq ft (454kg/m'); max wing loading 99lb/sq ft (482kg/m');
power Idg atcombatweight 1.7Ib/lbst (l72kg/kN); power Idg atferry TO weight 26Ib/lb.st. (265kg/kN);
max. power loading 2.8Ib/lb.s.t. 271 kg/kN)
Cruise speed274 knots(507km/h)
Max. speed 518mph (834km/h)450.81 knots
Max. speed at20,000ft(6,000m)355 knots (675km/h)
Combatspeed sea level) 330 knots 611 km/h)
Initial climb rate at max.TOweight 1,970ft/min (10m/sec)
Initial climb rate atcombatweight 4,792ft/min (24.3m/sec)
Time to climb to 22,500ft(6,860m) 23 mins
Combatceiling 34,800ft 1 0,600m)
Optimum combat 1,000ft (300m) with 1 miles 24km visibility
Combatrange 288 miles (250nm/465km)carrying 9,5401b (4,325kg) stores, 750rounds of 30mm,
and 1,646 US gallons 6,231 litres)fuel. 1.7 hours loitertime
Unfuelledferry range 2,289nm (4,220km)
One30mm GAU-8/Aseven-barrel Gatling gun,3,900 rpm; 16,0001b (7,200kg) mixed ordnance on eight underwing
and three under-fuselage pylon stations including 500lb (225kg) of retarded bombs, 2,0001b 91 Okg) GP bombs incendiary
and Rockeye II CBs, CEM, AGM-65NB/D/GMaverick missiles and laser-guided/electro-optically guidedbombs; AIM-9
Sidewindermissiles; IR countermeasuresflares, ECM chaff, jammer pods, 2.75in (699cm) rockets and illuminationflares
NVIS; LASTE PAVE PENNY Laser Tracker; ECM;AN/ALE-40; AN/ALO 119
Active 72 A-l 0, 60 OA-l 0; ANG 84A- lO,24 OA- l 0; AFRES 87A -l0
354th Fighter Wing; 355th Wing; 442nd Fighter Wing; A-lO/F-ll l SPO
Specifications
APPENDIX I
tion seat:
tank capacity: Internal 1,646 US gallons 6,231 litres); external provision for three 600 US-gallon tanks
Units:
(1999)
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
NASM Collection1989-0060
CHAPTERONE
See Peter Smith, Straight Downl CrecyBooks,
Manchester, 1999
See for example, Daniel R. Mortenen, A Pattern for
Joint Operations: World War I Close Air Support
North Africa Office of Air Force History, Washing
ton, DC, 1987,for detai ls of these incidents and the
ensuing arguments
For theful l story of the 'Spad', see Peter C Smith,
Douglas AD Skyrader Crowood Press, 1999
In line with theAl liedAirForcesown prejudices,the
other Sov ie t c lose-support a ircra ft , the far more
accurate and much faster Petlyakov Pe-2 Peshka
received relatively l i tt le public ity in the Western
media, perhaps because it wasa dive-bomber and
thus disproved the long-cherished theoriesof the
R A F a n d the USAAF
Bil l Sweetman, Modern Fighting Aircraft. A-IDA
Thunderboll-II.Aviation Fact Fie, SalamanderBooks,
1984
A anti-aircraftweapons and units in Germanycame
underthe authori ty of theLuftwafferather than the
army, as inBri tainand theUSA
See Peter C. Smith, Junkers Ju87 Stuka Crowood
Press, 1998
See Hans-Ulrich Rude, SlUka P ot Euphorin, 1952,
for details of thisinterrogation
For a moredetailed examinationof al thesefacets
of CAS, see Peter C. Smith, Close Air Support
Shrewsbury and Washington, DC, Airl i fe, 1990
CHAPTERTWO
The Ar Force F ght Test Centers 'Evauaton of the YA
10s Leading-Edge Sats, 1July 1974, is contaned in
the microfilmdocumentA r Force F ght Tes tC enter,Cal Number K286.69-42 V.9; IRIS Number 01019723,
Rol 000032471,AFHRS/RSA,Maxwe AFB
Senator Russ Symington of Missouri , whose son
wasa Congressman from St Louis,opposed out
right the 58mil l ion purchaseof theAV-18AHarr
e r, a s this money would have jeopardized thepur
chase of seventeen McDonnellF-4 Phantoms,built
in thatcity. He overlookedthe factthat McDonnell
Douglas wouldbe involved inthe future manufac
turing rights. Also, al though the original l icensing
agreement was approved by Congress, it refused
tosanctionmoneyto move productionto the U S i n
1971.Russell Murray II, assistant to the Assistant
ot s
Secretaryof Defense(SystemAnalysis), DrAlain C.
Enthoven, was equal ly virulently opposed to the
V/STOLproject,and in a 1978article, describedthe
Harrier as a relativelyundistinguished aircraft in al
respectssaveone'. See RussellMurray II, 'The AV
8B- risingverticallythrough the air, invulnerable to
runawaycuts', Treatise1978
13 See US Congress; House Committee on Armed
Services, 'Close Air Support' (218 pp), Hearings
SpecialSubcommittee on Tactca AirSupport,89th
Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC, 1966
14 See US Congress, House Committee on Armed
Services, 'Close AirSupport', report(15pp), Special
Subcommitteeon Tactca Air Support, 89th Congress, 2ndSession, Washington, DC, 1966
CHAPTER THREE
15 Theauthorowes adebt tothe fol lowing two defin
itivedocuments in chroniclingthe A-X programme:
Dr Edward C. Mishler, 'The A-X Specialised Close
Support Aircraft: Origins and Concept Phase 1961-
1970', Office of History, Air Force System Com
mand, andDr George M. Watson, Jr, 'The A-lOA
Close Air Support Aircraft 1970-1976', Office of
History, AirForce SystemsCommand
16 Dr Edward C. Mishler, 'The A-X specialised close
supportaircraft: origins and concept phase 1961-
1970 opcit
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
19 See Major Michael J. Doan, 'What 's r ight and
wrong with close airsupport', Combat ForcesJour
nal Vol. 1, No. 12, 24, Washington, DC, July 1951
20 Ibid
21 See Development Concept Paper DCP) 23A. 'AX
close support aircraft', USAF, dated 6 Apr il 1970
See AFSC Fact Sheet, 'A-X special ised close ar
supportaircraft',June 1971, p. 2
23 As detailed in J. Phil ip Geddes, 'A-lOA - USAF
choicefor thecloseair supportrole', International
Defense Review January 1974
24 See General MarkW. Clark, 'Whatk i nd ofar sup
port does theArmy want?' , Air Force Magazine
Vol. 33,No. 12, pp24-25,Washington, DC, Decem
ber1950
25 DevelopmentConcept Paper23A, p. 4, opcit
26 DevelopmentConcept Paper23A, p. 2, opcit
27 See J. Phil ip Geddes, 'A-lOA - USAF choice for
c lo se a r s uppo rt r ol e , International Defense
Review January 1974, p . 7 2
28 Ibid
180
29 SystemManagement Directive (D/GDS-83), SMD
1-453-329A(3), Document 1, 5May 1971
30 SeeC M. Pattner, 'Severaldesignstudiesexpected
for AX', article in AviationWeek andSpace Technol-
ogy 3 April 1967
31 Ibid
3 Ibid
33 Draf t 23 S), Rev B, 'A-Xspecialised closea r sup
port a i rc raf t' , 9 January 1973. A lso AFSC Fact
Sheet, 'A-X special ised close ar support aircraft' ,
June 1971
34 See Chapter 7
35 DCP 23A S), opcit
36 See 'Fairchild-Hiller, Northrop to build A-X proto
types', Armed ForcesJournal. 4January1971, p. 17
37 'The A-lOA CloseAir SupportAircraft' , opcit
38 SystemsManagementDirective(C/GDS-83), SDM
1-453-329A(3I, Document 1, 5May 1971
39 See Joint design-to-costguide- l i fe cycle cost as
a design parameter', DARCOM P700-6, NAVMAT
P5242, AFLCP/AFSCP, 800-19, 15 October 1977,
pp5-6
40 SystemsManagementDirective(C/GDS-83), SMD
1-453, 329A(3), Document 1, 5May 1971
41 See Colonel James E. Hildebrandt, Director, A-X
SPO, Memorandumto Deputy Systems Manage
ment, ASD, 'AirForceSPO/contractorrelationships
during A-X competi tive prototype program', Apri l
1971. S ee a ls o Contract Management Office,
Edwards AFB, 'YA-10A Aircraft', 14 September
1984, Microfilm Cal Number K243 0708-47; IRIS
Number 01010750, AFHRAIRSA, Maxwel l AFB,
Alabama
42 Ibid
CHAPTER FOUR
See 'History of Aeronautical Systems Division,
FY 1973',quoted in 'TheA-lOAClose AirSupport
Aircraft', opcit
44 'TheA-lOA Close AirSupport Aircraft', opcit
45 'TheA-lOA Close Air Support Aircraft', opcit
46 SeeTechnical Report73-2, 'AirForce Flight Evaua
t ion (Systems) of the A-9A proto type a irc ra f t' ,
AFFTC, EdwardsAFB, CA. March 1973
47 See 'NorthropstreamlinesA-9Amanagement',arti
c le i n Aviation Week and Space Technoogy 26
June 1972,p. 109
48 Ibid
49 Ibid
50 SeeWoodsHansen,'A-lOA prototypedesignedfor
production', article in Aviation Week and Space
Technoogy ppl17 118 26June1972
51 See Frank N. Lucero, Thomas R. Yechout and Roy
Bridges, Technical Report 73-3, 'Air Force Fl ight
Evaluation (Systems) of the A-lOA prototype air
craft', AFFTC, Edwards A F B, C A , March 1973
5 See 'Analysisof A-X competitive fly-offdata, Study
GroupReport, 29 December1972
53 Technical Report73-2, p. 3, opcit
54 Technical Report 73-3, p . 9 , opcit
55 'A-lOA- USAF choice forclose air supportrole', op
cit
56 Ibid
57 See Minutes C), DSARC 'Review of A-X aircraft
program - Milestone II', Doc 4, 17 January 1973
58 See DefenseSystems Acquisition ReviewCouncil
(DSARCI, 'Recommendations on A-lOA', Memo
randum C) tothe Secretaryof Defensefrom John
S. Foster, Jr, DDR E Doc 5), 16 February 1973
59 Ibid
60 Ibid
61 CSAF to AFSC, A-lOA Program, Message timed
012216Z, March 1973, quoted in 'TheA-lOA Close
AirSupport Aircraft', opcit
62 Memo C) to Sec re tary o f S ta te of the A ir Force
from Dr Foster, A-lOA SAR, 14 May1973,quoted
in 'The A-lOA Close Air Support Aircraft ' , o p c i t
63 See 'Historyof ASD, FY74, I, p87, quoted in'The
A-lOAClose Air Support Aircraft', opcit
64 Thefour cancelledmachineswere final ly complet
edunderthe first full productioncontract
CHAPTER FIVE
65 Memorandum,JohnS. Foster, Jr, DDR E,to Assis
tant Secretaryof theAir Force (R D), A-X, 26July
1972,quoted in 'The A-lOA Close Ar SupportAir
craft', opcit
66 Memorandum, BrigadierGeneralRaymond B. Fur
long, DeputyAssistantSECDEF (LegislativeAffairs)
to Director of DefenseResearch and Engineering,
Doc 6, 17 September 1973. Also USAF News
Reease , ' SAF McLuc as s peak s t o Rot ar y in
Boston', 19 June 1974
67 Ibid
68 Let ter, EdwardG Uhl, President and Chief Execu
tive, Fairchi ld Industries, to General George S.
Brown,Chiefof Staff, USAF, 4February1974.Cited
in 'The A-lOA Close Air Support Aircraft' , o p c it
6 9 I bi d
70 Hearing before the SenateCommitteeon Armed
Servi ces, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Report
S1263, Doc 7, 28 March 1973, quoted in 'The A
lOAClose Air Support Aircraft', opcit
71 Hearingsbefore House Subcommitteeof the Com
mittee on Appropriations, 93rd Congress, 1st Ses
sion, DoDAppropriationsfor 1974,pt 7, p p 9 9 ~ 1 1cited in 'TheA-lOAC oseA r SupportAircraft', opcit
72 Memorandum,from MalcolmR. Currie, DDR E, to
Secretary of theArmy,Secretaryof the Air Force,
NOTES
Director,Weapons SystemsEvaluationGroup,'Fly
off betweenthe A-7 andA-lOAaircraft', 23 October
1973. Also Information Memorandum from Mal
colm R. Currie, DDR E to Secretary of Defense,
'F ly -O ff Between theA- lOAand A-T, 2 October
1973, ci ted in The A-IDA Close Air Support op cit
73 Letter to TAC.CC, AFSC/CC, AFLC/CCfrom Gener
al George S. Brown,Chief of Staff, USAF, 'A-10AlA
7 FlyoffPlanning, 10 December1973,w/atch: Test
Concept Paper, cited in The A-IDA Close Air Sup
portAircraft op cit
74 The A-IDACloseAir Support Aircraft. op cit
75 Program Management Directive for A-1 OAlA-7 Fly
Off, PMD R-P4022(1), 11 February 1974,p . 2 , cited
in The A-IDACloseAir Support Aircraft. op cit
76 AFSC Fact Sheet, 'A-10AlA-7 Evaluation, 4 Apri l
1974
77 Program ManagementDirective for A-1 OAlA-7 Fly
Off opcit
78 The word 'Feller' is usually substituted in printed
sources forthe real wordthe pi lotsusedl
7 9 A FS C Fact Sheet, 'A-10AlA-7 Evaluation, 4 Apri l
1974
80 Briefing by Department of the Air Force, in Hear
ings before theHouse Committeeon Armed Ser
v ices , 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 'Fl y-Of f
Between the A-7 andthe A-lOA Aircraft' , 20June
1974, pp16-23
81 Letter to Hon. John L. McClellen, Committeeon
Appropriations, from Will iam Clements, Jr,
DEPSECDEF, 20 June 1974, c ited in The A-IDA
Close AirSupportAircraft op cit
82 Minutes, DSARC I li A, Rev iew o f A -l OA Pro
gramme, 9July 1974, cited in TheA-IDA Close Air
SupportAircraft op cit
83 Ibid
84 Ibid
85 Act io n memorandum t o Deput y Sec re ta ry o f
Defense, f rom Arthur I. Mendol ia, Assistant
SECDEF (I LI, 'A-lOA Close Air Support Aircraft
Program', 26July 1974, ci ted in 'The A-lOA Close
AirSupport Aircraft', opcit
86 Memorandum, t o Deput y Sec re ta ry o f t he A ir
Force, from DEPSECDEF Clements, 'A-lOA Pro
duction Decision', 31 Jul y 1974, a lso CSAF to
AFSC, 'A-lOAProductionApproval',timed 312150Z
July1974,cited in 'TheA-lOACloseAir SupportAr
craft', op cit
87 SeeAir Force Flight TestCenter, Vol. I of X, 'A-lOA
aircraftGAU-8 gun problems', 9 September 1984,
Microfilm Cal Number K286.69-42 V 1 , I R IS Num
ber 01050866; and also USAir Force, 'Accidentsinvolving GAU-8 30mm PAU-14/B gun ammuni
tion', Microfilm Cal NumberMICFILM 40239, IRIS
Numbe r 01073545, 1 Nov embe r 1978; b ot h
AFHR/RSA. Maxwell AFB, Alabama
88 See 'Presentation' Colonel Samuel J. Kishline,
Deputy Director, Dep/A-10A. ASD, DSARC Pro-
gram Review. also DSARC Program Review, 'The
A-lOA Close Air SupportAircraft', undated, Dir/Prg
Control . Dep/A-10Afi les; also 'Historyof Air Force
Command Systems', FY75, I, pp255-257; 'History
of AeronauticalSystems Division',July-December
1974, pps136-139; al cited in 'TheA-lOA Close
AirSupport Aircraft', opcit
181
CHAPTERSIX
89 The author gratefully acknowledges his d
this section of thebookto Kent A. Mitchell,
and his defini t ive work, Fairchild Aircraft
1987, Santa Ana, California1997
90 'TheA-lOA CloseAir SupportAircraft ', opc
91 Woods Hansen, 'A-lOA Prototype Desig
Production', article Aviation Week Spac
nology 26June1972
9 Ibid
93 See Lieutenant General Robert E. Has ,Vc
mander, TAC, 'Report relative to productio
nesspostureof theA-lOA program', 30 Sep
1974 (hereafter referred to as 'The Hails R
94 'The A-lOA CloseAir SupportAircraft' , opc
95 Ibid
96 The Hails Report, opcit
97 Ibid
98 The Has Report, opcit
99Ibid
100 Warren C Wetmore, 'A-lOA Program A
Reshaped, article Aviation WeekandSpac
nology 10 February 1975
101 Ibid
102 Ibid
103 The Hails Report, opcit
104 Ibid
105 Ibid
106 'A-lOAProgram Approach Reshaped, op
107 Ibid
108 Ibid
109 'The A-lOA CloseAir Support Aircraft ' , op
110 'A-lOAProgram Approach Reshaped, op
111 See article, New York Times 27 Februa
p59
112 'The A-lOA CloseAir SupportAircraft' , op
113 Letter, Mr Charles Collis, President, F
Republic Company, to Colonel Merton W
Commander AFPRO, Fairchild-RepublicCo
3 January 1975, cited in 'TheA-lOA Close
port Aircraft', op cit
114 'The A-lOACloseAir SupportAircraft' , op
115 Memorandum fromLieutenant General R
Has to General Richard H. E s, AFPR
Organization, 26 September1974,cited inlOAClose Air Support Aircraft', opcit
116 Lettersbetween GeneralSamuel C. Philli
mander AFSC and General R. H. E s,
October 1974 and 20 December 1974,
'TheA-lOA CloseAir SupportAircraft', op
CHAPTER SEVEN
117 'A-lOAProgram Approach Reshaped, op
118 'The A-lOA CloseAir Support Aircraft ' , o
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'A-lOAProgramApproach Reshaped, opcit
0 Draft study by staffof theUS GeneralAccounting
Office IGAO), 'A-lOA Aircraft Program', Deputy
Secretaryof theAir Force,dated December 1975,
pp23-24, cited in 'The A-lOA CloseAir Support
Aircraft', opcit
Decision co-ordinating paper (DCP), 'A-lOA Spe
cial ised Close Air Support Aircraft', 7 January
1976, cited in 'The A-lOA Close AirSupport Ar
craft', opcit
Article, Aviation Weekand Space Technoogy, 2
January 1975, p. 9
Decision co-ordinating paper (DCP), op cit See
also Air Force Systems Command, Aerospace
Medical DivisionHistory, 'GAU-l0, 3 September
1993, Microfilm Cal Number K237.01 V1, IRIS
Number 01003874, AFHA/RSA, Maxwell AFB,
Alabama
Ibid
CHAPTER EIGHT
Roy Wilkinson, The World s Great AttackAircrafr,
London, 1988
6 SeeWilliam I Smallwood, 'Old'Hog, NewTricks,
article in Air Space Feb/March 1999 edition
7 'A-lOA - USAF choice for thec lose ar support
role, op t
Ibid
See Peter C Smi th , Douglas AD Skyraider,
Crowood Press, 1999
0 'A-lOA- USAF Choicefor theClose AirSupport
Role, opcit
'A-lOAPrototypeDesignedfor Production', opcit
Ibid
Ibid
'A- lOA - USAF Choicefor the CloseAir Support
Role, opcit
Seealso 'Charting the aircraft losses', article in
Journal of the Armed Forces, Vol. 105, nbr. 42, 15
June 1968,pp4-5
6 'A-lOA - USAF Choicefor the CloseAir Support
Role, opcit
See A . K uo , 'Assessment of damage tolerance
requirements and analyses' (AFWAL TR 96-3003),
Fairchild-Republic, Farmingdale 1986; Damage
ToeranceAsse ssment Handbook, Vol. II, Airframe
damage tolerance evaluation, Cambridge, MA,
Vope National Transportation Systems Center1993, NTIS Springfield, VA, DOT/FAA/CT-93/69, II;
and H. Kan, 'Effects of stiffener/rib separation
on damage g rowth and r es idua l s tr engt h' ,
Northrop Grumman Corporation, Hawthorn, CA,
and M Mahler, NASA Langley Research Center,
May 1996, DOT/FAA/AR-95/12
SeeFlightInternational, 24 January 1976;also Air
Force magazine, July1983
Ibid
0 Ibid
NOTES
CHAPTER NINE
141 See 'Justice Departmentvetoes RB. 401',a World
Newssectionarticle, Flight International, 24 Janu
ary1976
142 See Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa,
Combat Aircraft Designer. the Ed Heinemann
Story, Annapolis, 1980
143 Ibid
144 For thefull storyof thetr ialsandtr ibulationsof the
Skyshark, W. A. Schoech,Acting Chief of Bureau,
'A2D Data Requested by Senate Preparedness
Invest igating Subcommi ttee' , f rom Chief of
Bureau of Aeronauticsto Chief of Legislative liai-
son, 6 August 1957. Some other information is
contained in Gerry Markgraf, 'Skyshark, Son of
Spad, article AmericanAviationHistorical Society
Journal, Vol. 22, No 3 , Fal 1977
145 Ibid
146 Combat Aircraft Designer. the Ed Heinemann
Story, opcit
147 This company h ad n o connection with GEC, UK
148 'AirForce Flight Evaluation(Systems)of theA-lOA
Prototype Aircraft', opcit
149 'TheA-lOA Close AirSupportAircraft', opcit
CHAPTER TEN
150 See Peter C. Smith, Victorias Victories, Speld
hurst, 1987
151 On 1July1916, thefirst day ofthe Sommeoffen
sve, the BritishArmy lost20,000dead and 40,000
wounded, the bulk to German machine guns,
which had remained inviolate despite days of
bombardment by heavy artillery
152 Requirement ActIOn Directive (RAD), 'Air-to
Ground Gun Systems for CloseAir Support Air
craft', RAD-8-218-(1) 5 January 1968. See also
DCP 103 (S/SGDS-89, Development Concept
Paper, 'Close Air Support Gun, 5 June 1970,
revised 23 June 1970
153 Ibid
154 'Historyof AirForceSystemsCommand' FY 72,
P 16, cited in 'A-lOA Cose Air Support Aircraft',
opcit
155 Memorandum of Agreement. '30mm Close Air
Support Aircraft GAU-8 Gun Program', signed by
BrigadierGeneralThomas H. McMullen, Dep for
A-lOA and BrigadierGenera Gerald K Hendricks,
Commander, AFTAL, 1 September 1973
156 History ofAir Force Systems Command, FY71n2, 201, Program Management Plan, 30mm CAS
Gun SystemGAU-8A, PE 63605F, PMD 100-2, 10
June1973
157 'A-lOACloseAir Support Aircraft', opcit
158 Briefing, 'GAU-8/A, DSARC II, May1973, cited in
'A-lOACloseAir Support Aircraft', opcit
159 Ibid
160 See Navy/Naval Postgraduate School Report,
'Combat DamageAssessmentTeam, A-1 OA/GAU
8 low-angle firings versus simulated Soviet Tank
Company', 19 April 1982, Microfilm Cal Number,
182
K237.01 l IRIS Number 01003874; AFHR/RSA,
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
161 See Navy/Naval Postgraduate School Report,
'Combat DamageAssessmentTeam, A-IOA/GAU
8 low-angle firings versus simulated Soviet Tank
Company (Array 171 , 5 Apri l 1982, Microfi lm Cal
Number, K180.711-2., IRIS Number 01037113;
AFHR/RSA, Maxwell AFB, Alabama
162 See Navy/Naval Postgraduate School Report,
Combat DamageAssessment Team, A lOA/GAU
8 low-angle firings versus simulated Soviet Tank
Company', 19 April 1982, Microfilm Cal Number,
K180 711-5., IRIS Number 01038650; AFHR/RSA,
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
163 See Navy/Naval Postgraduate School Report,
Combat Damage Assessment Team, 'A- lOA Ar
craftWeaponsSystems Gun Ammunition Lethali
ty', 25 November 1981, Microfilm Cal Number,
K180.711-9, IRIS Number 01039459; AFHR/RSA,
MaxwellAFB,Alabama
CHAPTER ELEVEN
164 See 'Conduct of the Persian Gul f War ', p T-l1
165 SeeWilliam L. Smallwood, 'Old'Hog, New Tricks,
article in Air Space February/March 1999edition
166 SeeRobertWall, 'TheDevastating Impact of Sen
sor Fuzed Weapons', article Air Force Magazine,
March 1998
167 Lieutenant-Colonel Steven Welch, 'Area Attack
Systems', quoted in Jake Swinson, Air Force
Development Test Center Pub c Affai rs , Egn
AFB, Forda, 'Wind-corrected munitions dis
penser beginsproduction',AFMC News Service,
14 August1998
168 Wa, opcit
169 See FY 96 Annual Report, CBU-97/B 'Sensor
Fuzed Weapon (SFW) OSD, Washington, DC, 6
November 1998
170 Ibid
CHAPTER TWELVE
171 A-IDA - USAFChoice for the CoseAir Support
Role opcit
172 Ibid
173 Ibid
174 See Squadron; 355 Tactca Fghter, 354 Tactca
FighterWing,Myrtle Beach AFB, SC; 'After-Action
Report, Opportune Journey'(undated), MicrofilmCal Number K-SQ-FI-355-HI. IRIS Number
00888887; AFHRA/AFS, Maxwell AFB, Alabama
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
175 Thebulkof thissectionisbased on alecturedeliv
eredbyA-lOA pilotMajorBriceKennedy, USAF, of
the 509th TFS Ithe Skulls), to an invited audience
a t t he Royal Aircraft Establishment, Thurleigh,
Bedford, on Wednesday,20 September 1989, and
questionand answersessionafterwards. Tape in
author's collection
176 So ca edbecause i thad to be 'draggedin tothe air
craft, and becausethe ammunitionit loadedenabled
theA-lOAto emitflamesand fire lke adragon
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
177 See 'Congressvotes to terminate A-lOAproduc
tion',article in Aviation Weekand Space Techno
ogy, 23August 1982
178 Ibid
179 Dave Griffiths, article in Defense Week Pars Air
Showedition 1983
180 'Congressvotes to terminateA-lOA production',
opcit
181 See LindaDuffield, 'Final A-lOA fl ies off to mark
end o f e ra , AP, in The Morning Herad, Hager
stown, Maryland, 21 March 1984
182 Ths staf f , now reduced, stil l exists at Northrop
Grumman as the A-lOA Engineering, Pant 25, at
Bethpage, New York, now undersenior manager
George C. Leavy, who waswith theproject from
the beginning
183 Kent A. Mitchell, FairchildAircraft 1926-1987, op
cit
184 See USDOJ/GOV/OPA PR/PRE 96 December
94/718, 'Twomilitary contractors payUS 8.1 mil
l ion to sett le dispute', Tuesday, 20 December
1994
185 Kennedy Lecture, opcit
186 Duringthe periodtheyoperatedfrom RAF Alcon
buryatleast threeA-lOscrashed in and around the
Fens. One camedown between the v il lages of
Over andWil lingham, thepilot safelyejecting; a
second crashed nearthe town of Chatteris, killing
the pilot, Captan Roberts from New York; a third
over-shotthe runwayat Alconburyand ended up
a t Owl End, but the pilot escaped wi th minor
injuries (information froma contact in the Cam
bridgeshire Fre Service who frequently had to
attendthe crash sitesI
187 SeeWilliam L. Smallwood, 'Old'Hog, New Tricks,
opcit
188 Ibid
189 Ibid
190 Ibid
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
191 Highly recommended i s D an a Be , Colours
Markings of the A-IDA War thog, KalmbachBooks/Airlife, 1994
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
192 The US Army, under General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf and the US Marines, conducted the
joint Exercise 'Internal Look' in Forda in July
1990, whichin manyways paralleled theirsubse
quent actions inthe Gulf War, seeAFM 2-1, Tac
tical AirOperations - Counter Air, Close Air Sup
port and Interdiction', John Heidrik, 9TIS/INT
'Planning Procedures for Internal Look - 90 and
NOTES
Operation Desert Shield, undated paperprovided
for Gul f War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) and
MFRIS), USAF/INT Targeting/MC G 'Support to
Desert Shield, Colonel James R. Blackburn,
USAF/INT, 17 October 1990
193 See Jack Anderson Dale Van Atta, 'The Hero
ThatAlmost Missedthe War', article, Washington
Post 5 March 1991
194 SeeWilliam Smallwood,Warthog, New York, 1993
195 GulfWarAir PowerSurvey, Vol. IV, Weapons, Tac-
ticsand Training Washington, DC, 1993
196 'The HeroThat Almost M issed the War ', op t
197 GWAPS Statistical Compendium Table 177,
'Strikesby AIF Categories'
198 Although greatacclaimwas heaped on the Patriot
anti-missile systemfor destroying incoming Scud
Bs at the time, post-war analysis revealed that
they destroyedveryfew,if any
199 See Gulf WarAir Power Survey, Vol. IV, op c it
200 TheThunderbolt-II pilots,weary ofwatching the F
1 5 a n d F-l 5Es screamingacross the TV screens
dayafter day, whilethey,who
weredoing thereawork, were total ly ignored, wryly named these
two helicopter-killing A-lOs'Wart Eagles
2 1 SeeWilliam I Smallwood, 'Old 'Hog, New Tricks,
op Cit
2 2 See Peter C. Smith, Douglas AD Skyraider,
Crowood Press, 1999
203 See 'Conduct of the Persan Gulf War', p. T-11,
cited in GulfWar Air PowerSurvey, Vol. IV opcit
204 See Tactca Analysis Bulletin, Vol. 91-2, pp6-8
(S/NF/WN/NC)
205 See Gulf WarAir Power Survey, Vol. IV, op c it
206 See Tactcal Anayss Buetn,Vol 91-2,pp6--9, op cir
207 See Hansard, Statement on Official Board of
Inquiry,by The Rt Hon.Christopher Soames, MP,
Westminster,July 1991. For furthercomment on
'friendly fire', see Appendix II
208 See US Department of Defense, Final Report to
Congress on Operation DesertStorm, Title V, p.
589: 'Three factors helpexplain the higher propor
tion of casualties from friendly fire in Operation
.Desert Storm as opposed to previous confl icts'
209 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, quoted by
RchardTownshend Bickers in Friendly Fire USNI
London1994
210 See Chapter 18
211 For the influence of the media, especiallyinstant
news organizations, see Major General Perry
Smith, How CNNFought theWar New York 1991.Also Rear-Admiral Brent Baker, USN, 'Decision at
the Speed of Satellite',articleUnitedStatesNaval
Proceedings, August 1992, Annapolis, Maryland
212 See Commander George Cornelius, USN IRtd),
'Haiti Bang l Who GoesThere r ,article in US Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 1993, Annapolis,
Maryland
213 CENTCOM Mission Database, opcit
214 See Desert Score, p. 20, cited in Gul f War Air
Power Survey, Vol. IV, opcit
215 SeeConduct ofthe PersanGulfWar, opcit
183
216 GWAPS Statistical Compendium, Table
'Strikes by AIF Categories', cited in Gulf Wa
Power Survey, Vol. IV, 'Weapons, Tactcs,
Training, Washington, DC, 1993
217 See GWAPS Statistical Compendium Table
OA-l0: 'USAF Sorties by MissionType, cite
Guf WarAir PowerSurvey, opcit
218 See 'Conduct of the Persan Gulf War', p.
cited in GulfWarAir PowerSurvey, opcit
219 GWAPS Statistical Compendium, T ab le
DesertStorm Coalition Aircraft Attrition'
220 See GulfWarAir PowerStudy, Washington,
May 1993
221 See H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn t T
Hero New York, October1992
222 Colonel James G. Burton, USAF IRtd), 'Pu
Them Out the Back Door', article in USN
ceeding Journal, June 1993
223 See GulfAir WarSurvey, opcit, p . 5 0
224 See William S. Lnd, letter, USNI Procee
December 1993, P 23
225 See Jack Andersonand Dae Van Atta, 'TheThat AlmostMissed theWar', opcit
226 Quotesfromthe massive records ofthe Gu
collected by t he Gul f War A r Power S
(GWAPSI, whichare heldat the ArchivesBr
Ar Force Historical Research Agency IAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama. There are two ma
lections, the Individual Collections11,500,0
and the SAF/OSG CentralCollection (350,00
Personal papers are listed alphabeticall
accessed via the IRIS system. AirTaskng O
have the Cal Number CATO
227 See DesertStorm performance sparks pr
to extendactive service li fe of A-lOA 'War
article in Aviation WeekandSpace Technoo
July 1991
228 Ibid
229 Ibid
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
230 See Jim Rande, Kosovo/Air Defense, Pe
PR, 8 October1998
231 United States European Command Bulle
February1999
232 'NATO calls inthe Warthog', teletextfromt
Network, UK, 30 March 1999
233 See 'Operation All ied Force, DefenseLi
March 1999
234 See Captain Patricia Lang, USAFE News
press release, 'Spangdahlem A-OS op
fromsouth-eastItaly', 26April 1999
235 DoD news brief ing, Tuesday, 30 March
5:20pm, 'Operation AlliedForce, Washing
236A Once agan, theWesternmediahomed i n
few mistakesandalmosttotally ignored an
tionof actual success in their television an
reportingof this war
236B In October1999, thirty-four CONUSbase
were withdrawn
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
See ombata r power: assessment of jointclose
support requirementsand capabilities is needed
(Chapter Report, 06/28/96, GAO/NSAIAD-96-451.
Report to CongressionalCommittees,June 1996
The systems evaluated were: the Apache heli
copter; the AH-64 helicopter; the multiple-launch
rocketsystem (MLRS); F/A-18aircraft; AV-8B air
craft ; 155-mm howi tzer; OH-58D heli copter ;
Kiowa helicopter; AH-1 W helicopter;A-6E aircraft;
armytacticalmissile system; low-altitude naviga
tion and targeting infra-redsystemfor night pro
gramme; Harrieraircraft; Marine Corps AV-8B Har
rier remanufacture programme; Army Crusader
sys tem; Longbow Apache hel icopter; Army
advancefield artillerysystem;Air Force F-16 mod
ernization programme; and t he A rmy AH-64
Apache Longbowupgradeprogramme
CongressionalCommitteesReport, 28June 1997,
B-262230
The committees were: Committee on Armed Ser
vices, US Senate; Committee on Appropriations,
US Senate; Committee on National Security,House of Representatives, and Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives
See Pierre Sprey, EE Spectrum , September
1991
Pierre Sprey, quoted in WallStreet Journal 1991
See Major acquisitions: DoDs process does not
ensure properweaponsmixfor close support mis
sion (GAO/NSAID-92-180I, 17 April 1992
Ibid
5 See US Department of Defense, news release,
dditional forcestructural changes , Ref Nr. 441
95, 11 August1995
Ofcourseit wasnotthatsimple; as atrade-off, the
need toconsidertheimpacton the F-16s primary
role - interdiction - would haveto beassessed if
i twereto be increasingly usedfor CAS. Ths, ulti
mately, gavefurtherpause forthought
See Armyavaton: modernizationstrategyneedsto
be reassessed (GAO-NSIAD-95-9I, 21 November
1994
Ibid
The most l ikelysuccessorto theA-lOis the Lock
heed Mar tin Joint Str ike F ighter , along wi th
Northrop Grumman and British Aerospace. Ths
aircraft JSFI i s being developed as the next-gen
eration f ighter air craf t for the US Air Force,
Marines andNavy and the British Roya Navy, and
some 3,000 of al variants are planned, tailored to
the missionneeds of themilitarybranches.A CAScapability is included. The lead aircraft is under
constructionat theLockheedMartin plantat Pam
dae, California,and is expectedto enterservice in
2007just as the A-1 0 is finally phased out
0 See educingthe DeficitSpending and Revenue
Options , Congressional Budget Office, March
1997, DEF-16 Make the Army responsible for
closea r support
Ibid
Ibid
NOTES
253 For more detailed analysis of these differences,
see Peter C. Smith, Close Air Support Shrews
bury, UK, andWashington, DC, 1990
254 Memorandum,AssistantSecretary forWar John
J McCloytoGeneral Lear, 15 May1943 See Kent
Roberts Greenfield, AGF and Air Ground Battle
Team AGF Study No. 35 , Washington, DC; Hs
torical Section, Army Ground Forces 1948, p. 50
255 DEF-16 Make theArmy responsible forclose air
support , opcit
256Ibid
257 See 1067 Number andTitle: Development Plan
Date Tit le Air to Sur face Cur rent CINC IPL,
Development Plan, 30 September 1997. ACC
PEMMajorG Smith,DRPF, 4-5279,Air ForceMis
sionArea Plan (MAPI
258 See ProgramElement 0207131 MNSNumber
Title CAF 401-91, Adverse ORD Number Title:
CAF 401-91-IIIIIIII-C, Weather Precision Strike
Capability WPSC OAlA-lOA Embedded Global
Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System
EGI . Air to Surface Development P lan , 30 Sep
tember 1996, Major G Smith, DRPF, 4-5279, AirForce MAP
259 See Program Element 0207131 Air to Surface
Development Plan, 30 September 1996, opc i t
6 Ibid
261 Ibid
262 Ibid
63 Ibid
64 See CAF 315-92 -IIIIIIII-C, Real Tme Information
in Cockpit RTIC ICDL ORD. Airto SurfaceDevel
opment Plan, 30September 1996. MajorG Smith,
DRPF, 4-5279.
265 Ibid
266 See TAF SON 312-88, Follow-onCAS Aircraft; TAF
SON 302-81, NightAttack CapabilitiesJoint MNS
forCloseAir Support, CAF 311, CMNSforAlOA1
Night Vision Goggles and Compatible Aircraft
Lighting, MajorG. Smith, DRPF, 4-5279
67 See Air to Surface Development Plan, 30 Sep
tember1996, opcit
268 CNN report
269 MajorClancy Preston,442nd FW,ACC NewsSer
vice, 15 October1998
270 Ibid
CHAPTER NINETEEN
271 Mr L. A. Amicarella, Director, Fre and Aviation
Management. USDAForest Service,Washington,
DC, to Director, Directorateof Programsand Eval
uation, Departmentof theAir Force,Headquarters
UnitedStates Air Force, Washington, DC, 2 Feb
ruary 1992
272 BrigadierGeneral Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF, Direc
tor, Directorateof Programsand Evaluation,Head
quartersUnited StatesAirForce,Washington, DC,
to Mr L. A. Amicarella, Director, Fre andAviation
Management. USDAForest Service,Washington,
DC, 22 July1992
184
273 Ibid
274 Mr L. A. Amicarella, Director, Fire and Aviation
Management. USDA, Washington, DC, to
BrigadierGeneral Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF, Direc
tor, Directorate of Programs and Evaluation,
Departmentof theAir Force,HeadquartersUnited
StatesAir Force, Washington, D C, 2 7 September
1992.S700
275 Ibid
276 TheHon. Howard Kaloogian, The State Assembly,
CapitolOffice, Sacramento, California, to SAP/LL,
Pentagon, Washington. DC, n.d.
277 SAP/LL, Department of theAir Force Pentagon,
Washington, DC, 16 July 1997
278 Chief, Mission Support Division, Colonel Joanne
M. Roedefer, Department of the AirForce, Wash
ington, DC, toArthur J. Negrette, President, Flight
Safety Institute, Sacramento, 26 February 1998
279 CongressmenGeorgeRadanovch,R chard Pombo
and Jerry Lewis, Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, to Secretary of the Air Force,
Pentagon, Washington, D C, 1 8 February 1998
8 Ibid
2 81 R ea r Admiral S. R. Morgan, Acting Executive
Director, Logistics Management, Defense Logis
tics Support Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to
Hon. George Radanovich, Houseof Representa
tives, Washington, DC, n.d., DLSC/LC
282 Assemblyman Howard Kaoogan, The State
Assembly, Capitol Office, Sacramento, California
tothe Department of ForestryandFre Protection
in Sacramento, on 5 March1998
283 Colonel Joanne M. Roedefer, USAF, Chief, Mis
sion Support Division, Directorate of Programs,
Departmentof theAir Force,HeadquartersUnited
StatesAir Force,Washington, DC, to Mr ArthurJ
Negrette, President. Flight SafetyInstitute, Sacra
mento,California,dated 26 February1998
284 Rchard A. Wilson, D irec tor, Department of
Forestry andF i re Protection, Sacramento, Califor
nia, to Honourable Howard Kaoogan, California
StateAssembly,Capitol, Sacramento, California,8
April 1998
285 Ibid
286 See Next-generation airtankers for California: a
modernization proposal , AeroTech, 27 October
1998
87 Ibid
88 Ibid
289 Ibid
APPENDIX I
290 Basedprincipallyon figures quoted by Lou Ravi,
Combat magazine, November 1997
APPENDIX II
291 French Genera Alexander Percn made a close
studyof FirstWorldWarFrench lossesand cameto
theconclusionthatone millionFrenchcasualties,or
20per cent, werecausedby theirown artilleryfire.
Hedare notuse his own figures and, instead, pub
lisheda moreacceptable figure of 2.2 percent. See
Alexander Percn, Le Masaere de Notre Infanterie
Airlife, Paris 1921
292 See M. Cumming, The Starkey Sacrifice The
AlliedBombing Le Portal 1943, 1996
93 See Rudolf Bohmler, Monte Cassno USN I Lon
don,1964
294 Squadron Leader Arthur M. G , CO of No. 84
Squadronin Burma, had toremove oneof his sub
ordinatecommandersbecausehe bombedfriend
ly troops Gi in conversation with PeterSmith, 8
October1984)
NOTES
295 See Robert Sherrod, History MarineCorpsAvi-
ation in WorldWar II Washington, DC, 1952
296 See Peter C. Smith, Close Air Support Shrews
buryand Washington, DC, 1990
97 See Wil li am V Kennedy, The mil itary and the
media: whythe presscannot be trustedto cover
a war , Westport . CT 1993. See also Major
MichaelSater, USMC, Losingthe next war , arti
cle in USNI Proceedings November 1993. Such
views agan seemto have been provento be true
in the television coverage of the Kosovo crisis
298 See Major Charles Hawkins, US Army Reserve,
Friendly fire - facts, myths and misperceptions ,
article in USNIProceedings June1994, and David
185
M. Saadah, Friendlyfire:wil l we getit r igh
time] paperpresented at 31 st US Army O
tions Research Symposium, Fort Lee, Virg
November 1992
299 See Ray W. Burgess, PGM, Friendly
Louisiana Freemason, October 1973. See
GAO findings onfratricide atUmm Hau, and
Senate hearingsthat followed
3 See Colonel Thomas Page, ystems to red
fratricide to be tested inAWE , Pentagon PR
February1997
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GLOSSARY
CEP circularerror probable DLA Defense Logistics Agency FEBA forward edge of battl
CFIT controlled flight into DME defence-measuring area
terrain equipment fire and forget
CFSR Contract Funds Status Don nepartmenr of Defense FG Fighter Group
Report DoDIC Department of Defense FUR forward looking infra
loss ry :
·ClLOP conversion in lieu of identif ication code FLOT forward line of own
procurement DPE Directorate of Programs troops
ClNCSOUTH Commander-in-Chief, and Evaluations FMA Federal Managemen
Allied Forces Southern DRA dual rail adapter Agency
Europe. DRMM De fe ns e R eu ti li za ti on F MS foreign military salesanti-aircraft artillery AFSC Air Force Systems ASOC AirSupportOperat ions ClTS central integrated test and Market ing Manual FOD foreign object damagAlaskan AirCommand Command Center
Isystem DSARC Defence Systems FOL forward operating
ArmyAir Force AFTEC Air Force Test and AT anti-tank CM combat mix Acquisition Review location
advanced aerial fire Evaluation Center ATAF Allied Tactical Air CM SEP Co ntr acto r Management Council FOUO forofficial use onlysupport system AGB accessory gearbox Force
ISystem Evaluation DSMS d igi taIstores FPS feet per second
air to air missile AGL aboveground level ATC air target chart I Program management system FRC Fairchild Republ icairbase AGM air-to-ground missile ATM air target material CMWS common missile warning DTC design-to-cost Company
aircraft harrle damage AH attack he Iicopter ATMP air target materials system DT E development test and FS Fighter Squadronrepair AHRS attitude and heading programme COIN counter insurgency evaluation FSCL firesupport co-ordinaAirhaseWing reference system ATO air tasking order COMACC Commander, Air DTLOMS doctrine, training, leader lineAirCombat Command AI air interdiction ATTG
automated tactical targetCombatCommand development, FSD full scale developme
Aviation Combat AIM air intercept missile graphic COMAJRSOUTH o rg an iz at io n, m at er ia l F TR S Fighter Training ResDevelopmentAgency ALARM air-launched anti- AWACS airborne warning and Commander, Allied Air and soldier support Squadron
advanced concept radiation missile control system Forces Southern Europe DTS digital terrain system FTU Formal Training Uni
ejection seat ALC Air Logistics Center AWOP automated weaponeering COMED cen tra li n tegrated test DU depleted uranium FW Fighter Wing
analytical condition ALQ active countermeasure optimization programme system FWS Fighter Weaponsinspection equipment A X attack experimental CONUS Continental United ECM electronic Squadron
air combat manoeuvre ALR radar-warning receiver States countermeasures FWW Fighter Weapons Wiarmament control panel ALS automatic loading BAI battlefield air interdiction COTS commercial off theshelf EEl essential elementsof fiscal yearAirControl Wing system BCIS battlefield combat CP command post information
Air Division AMARC Aerospace Maintenance identification system CPP competi tive prototype EFS expeditionary fighter GAO Government
Air Defence Battery and Regeneration Center BDA battle damage 1 phase squadron Accounting Officealtitude director indicator AMC Army Material assessment CRT cathode ray tube EFT engineering flight test GATM globalair traffic
air delivered mine Command BFDW basic flight design weight CSAF Air Force Chiefof Staff EGI embedded global management
air data recorder ANG Air Nat ionalGuard BLM Bureau of Land CSAR combat search and rescue positioning and inertial GBU guided bomb unitArmament Development ANGB Air National Guard Base Management CT F combined task force navigation system GCAS ground collisionand Test Center AOC Aerojet Ordnance BPR bypass ratio CY calendar year EUNT electronics intelligence avoidance systemAir Expeditionary Group Company BTG battle target graphic CW composite wing EMD effective miss distance GCI ground control
EW/SA airborne early AOP air operations programme BVR beyond visual range CW P) composite wing EO electro-optical installations
warning/search aircraft AP armour-piercing or ant i- rovisional) EPLARS enhanced position GEC General ElectricAir Force Base personnel CAIG Cost Analysis location reporting Company USA)
Air Force Contract APC armoured personnel ImprovementGroup DALO Divisional Air Liaison system GGI S globalgeospatialManagement Division carrier CAS closeair support Officer ESM electronic support information and servAir Force FlightTest API armour-piercing CASSUM close airsupport DARIN display attack, ranging measure GOB groundorder of battl
Center incendiary summary message and inertia l navigation EVS electro-optical viewing GP general purposeAir Force Historical APPS analytical CBI China-Burma-India DBTC database terrain cueing system GPS global positioningResearch Agency photogrammetric CBU cluster bomb unit
I DCA defensive counter air EW electronic warfare systemA iI Force Logistics position system CCCI command, control DCP development concept EWMS electronic warfare GPWS guided proximity
Command APS advanced planning commun ications paper managemen t suite warningsystemAir Force Mission system intelligence DCS Deputy Chiefof Staff EZ exclusion zone GSA genera IservicesSupport System APU auxiliary power unit CCIP continuously computed DCS/S Deputy Chief ofStaff adm in istration
FOG Air Force Orientation ASC advanced switching impact point Systems FAA Federal Aviation GSFG Groupof Soviet ForcGroup communications CDFFP California Department DDR E Director of Defense Agency in GermanyAir Force Plant ASD Aeronautical Systems of Forestry and Fire
Research and FAC forward air control GWAPS GulfWara i r power
Representative Office Division Protection Engineering FAM fire and aviat ion surveyAir Force Plant ASDP air to surface CDR critical design review DEP deflection error probable management GWER GulfWar electronics
Representative development plan CDU control display unit DEPSECDEF Deputy Secre ta ry of F FP force and financial recordAir Force Rescue ASIP aircraft structural CEB combined effects bomb Defence programme
Command integrity programme CEM combined effects D1PEC Defence Industrial P la nt F AS CAM family of aerial HARM high speed anti-radiaAir Force Reserves ASM air to surface missile munitions EquipmentCenter scatterahle mines missile
186 8
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GLOSSARY GLOSSARY
Tactical Air Control
Group
Tactical AirControl
Wing
Tactical A iI Support
Squadron
Tactical Air Support
Training Squadron
Tactical Air Warfare
-enter
terrain clearance radar
tactical command
technical officer
training and doctrinal
command
target data inventory
testand evaluation
group
triple ejector rack
terrain contour
matching
terrain profile and
matching
Test Evaluation Squadr
Test Wing
Tactical Fighter Group
terrain-following radar
Tactical Fighter
quadron
Tactical Fighter Traini
Squadron
Tactical FighterTraini
Wing
Tactical Fighter Wing
Tactical Fighter
Weapons Center
Tactical Fighter Wing
(Provisional)
tra ining guided missile
target intelligence
target identification
system laser
'That looks about rig
tactical munitions
dispenser
time on target
tube-launched, optica
tracked, wire comman
missiletarget practice
tra ining and doctrine
command
target recognition and
attack multi-sensor
terrain reference
navigation
Tactical Reconnaissan
Wing
Tactical Training Win
television monitor
TOT
TOW
TFW(P)
TFW
TFWC
TFTW
TTW
TVM
TFTS
TR
TRA
TGM
TI
TISL
TE
TESTW
TFG
TFR
TFS
TRW
TERPROM
TP
TRADOC
TLAR
TMD
TER
TERCOM
TDl
TEG
TDC
TC R
TCTO
TAWC
TASTS
TASS
TAIRCW
TAIRCG
89
Tactical Air Command
tactical a irnavigation
Tactical Air Control
Group
Royal Thai A i r Force
Base
real time in cockpit
r ldar warning receiver
Strategic Air Command
upreme Allied
Commander Europe
i tuation awareness data
link
Officeof the Secretary
of t heAi r Force Gulf
WarAir Power Survey
surface-to-air missile
semi armour-piercing
high-explosive
search and
rescue/selected
acquisition report
stability augmentation
system also Bri tish
'Special Air Service')
shaped charge
suppression of enemyair
defence
South-East Asia Treaty
Organization
Secretary of t he Air
Force
Secretary of Defence
sensor fused weapons
single
service life extension
ECDEF
FW
GL
LEP
CEAD
M
APHE
AR
AF/OSG
TA C
TACAN
TACG
programme
SLIME strip lighting i dentity
marking extremities
SM- ALC Sacramento A ir
Logistics Center
M-ALC/LAFM
Sacramento Air Logistics
Center/low-alti tude
flight maintenance
MD systems management
directive
OF special operations forces
PD system programme
director
SPMD systems programme
management divisionsystem programme office
state responsibility area
short-rangeattack missile
single-scatnight attack
short take-off and
landing
SECAF
SEATO
SAS
RTIC
RWR
RTAFB
SADL
SA C
ACEUR
radar altimeter
Royal Air Force
requirement action
directive
radar intelligence
retardant capacity
research and
development
repeaterd eception
jamming
retardant delivery system
research developmen t
testami evaluationrange error prohahle
request for
procurement/prop()sal
radar homing and
warning
'ripple' release
range measuring system
rules of engagement
Republ ic of Korea
Royal Regiment of
Fusiliers
quality assurance
Queen's Royal Irish
Hussars
qualification test
Pacific Air Force
'pilot's calculating
eyeball'
programmed depot
maintenance
post-flight review
precise geopositioning
capability
precision guided
munition
precision guided weapon
proposal instructions
predicted kill
programme management
directive
procurement
management review team
point of contact
petroleum, oil
lubricants
planning, programmingand budgeting system
pre-planned product
improvement
passive ranging
production readiness
review
precise radarsignificant
location
poundsper square inch
RADINT
RC
R D
RDJ
RD
RDT E
RRAF
RAD
QT
REP
RFP
PRSL
PPPI
RIP
RMS
ROE
ROK
RRF
PMRT
PPB
QQRIH
RHAW
PR
PRR
POC
POL
p.s.i.
PGM
PGW
PI
PK
PMD
PFR
PGC
PDM
PACAF
PCE
munitions effectiveness
assessment
multiple ejection rack
multi-function display
muzzle horsepower
mission report
mobility kill
multiple launch rocket
system
main operating base
major regional
contingency
mean sea level
mean time between
failure
maximum take-offweight
precision attitude control
naval air station
ational Air andSpace
Adm in istration
North Atlant ic TreatyOrganization
new acquisition video
navigationaland
weapons-aiming system
night/adverse-weather
numericallycontrolled
nuclear chemical,
biological
ational Command
Centers
no date
net explosive weight
no-fly zone
numberofhi ts
nautical mile
night vision goggles
navigation and weapons
delivery system
offset aim point
offensive avionics system
onboard oxygen
generation system
offensive countera iI
operational flight
programme
operationsgroup
Operation Northern\ latch
Office of the Secretary
of Defence
operational service trial
Operation Southern
\ latch
operational test
outstanding unit award
obstacle warning/cueing
MEA
PAC
N/AW
N/C
NCB
NAV
NAVW.
n.d.
NEW
FZ
H
nm
NVG
JWD
ATO
MTOW
MSL
MTBF
A
NASA
MOB
MRC
MER
MFD
MHP
MISREP
M-Kill
MLRS
OCA
OFP
OT
OW C
OAP
OA S
OBOGS
OSD
OST
OSW
OG
ON W
joint war-fighting
capabilitiesassessment
mission assessment
mutually assured
destruction
infra-red SAMs
mutual assistance
programmeor mission
area plan
ma in ba tt l e t a nk
major defence
acquisition programme
mega data transfer
cartridge/processor
King Fahd International
Airport
ki II the crew of the
vehicle
King Khalid Military City
88
low-altitude bombing
system
low-aIti tude force
Los Angeles Fire
Department
Low-Altitude Force
Executive
low-altitude force
investment
low-altitude force
maintenance
Low-Altitude ForceOffice
low-altitude force
planning
low-altitude force
support
low-angled navigation
and targeting infra-red
for night
light armed
reconnaissanceaircraft
lightweight airborne
recovery system
laser inte II igence
low-altitude safety and
target enhancement
low-drag general purpose
l inear error
leading-edge extension
laser-guided bombs
launch and leave
low-Iight-Ievel
television
lines ofcommunications
laser ranger and marked
target seeker
line replacement unit
LANTIRN
LARA
LOC
LRMT
LAFE
LDGP
LE
LEX
LGB
LL
LLLTV
LAFI
LAF
LAFD
LARS
LASINT
LASTE
LAFM
MBT
MDAP
LAFP
LAFS
LAB
LR
LAFO
MANPADS
MAP
K-Kill
KFIA
MDTC/P
KKMC
MMAD
JWCAuman-computer
interface
high explosive
high explosive
incendiary
ha lt or hold
horizontal situation
indicator
helmet-mounted cueing
system
height of burst
headquarters
head-up display
head-up display and
weapon-arming system
human intelligence
hypervelocity missile
improved airborne
video-tape recorder
integrated databaseimproveddata modem
identification - f ri end or
foe
implementation force
instantaneous field of
view
imaging infra-red
installationsand
logistics
instrument landing
system
imagery intelligence
inertial navigationsystem
inertial navigation unit
initial operational
capacity
initia l operational test
and evaluation
initi<ll point
image productarchive
integrated process team
infra-red
infra-red countermeasures
integnHed tasking order
integrated process team
joint aira ttack team
joint air weapons systemjoint direct a ttack
munition
joint digital target
material
joint oil analysis
programme
Joint Requirements
Oversight Council
joint strike fighter
joint stand-off weapon
joint test force
L
I
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GLOSSARY
Test Wing UTD unit trainingdevice WAFAR wraparound fin aircraftrockets
universal air-refuelling VA vulnerable area WCMD wind-correctedreceiver slipway VCS Vice Chiefof Staff munitions dispenserinstallation VHF very high frequency WGS World Geodeticunit basic load VMC voice message computer Systemultra-high frequency VN vulnerability number WP white phosphorusUnited Kingdom VNAF Vietnamese Air Force WPSC weather precision strikeUnitedNations VTAS visual target-acquisition capabilityProtection Forces system WS Weapons SchoolUnited Nations Security V/STOL vertical/short take-off WSEG weapons systemResolution and landing evaluation groupUnited States Air Force VTOL vertical take-off and WSO weapons systemsUnitedStates Air Force, landing officerEurope VTP video-tape player WTC Weaponsand TrainingUnited States Army VVS Voenno vozdushnye sili CenterSecurity Agency Air Force Soviet)UnitedStates ZSU Zenitny Samochodna aDepartmentof WAC weapons-aiming Usternov/<a self-propelledAgriculture computer multi-barrel AA system)
9
Alestra, Sal 165
Aliksanian, Neil 122
Allen, Doug 165
Allied Force Operation 152
Amicarella,L.A. 168
Anderson, Richard H. 34Array-I 7 T es t 8 6Aziz Tariq 131
Bell 309 KingCobra 18,103Bell Iroquois Warrior 18
Bignamini, Riccardo 17
Boeing747 Jumbo 48Boeing AH-64 Apache 20, 138
Bonadede, Ralph
Brill, Brigadier General Jay R. 52
Brill, Colonel Jay R. 46Brown,Colonel Thomas D. Jr 164
Brown, General George S. 43
BSh-2 Bronirovanny Shturmovik 10,21Button, CaptainCraig 165
Byrd Admiral Richard 48
C-124Globemaster 16
C-5 Galaxy 78Canadair CL-415 Super Scooper 170-1Cannon, SenatorHoward W. 41, 44Casablanca, US escortcarrier 77
Certain Sentinel Operation 106Cessna 0 1 E Bird D og 22
CessnaT 37122
CessnaT-37A 14
Cheney, Richard B. 132Clark, General Mark W 23
Clements, William P 38 45 46 58
Cobalt Flash, Operation ISO
Collins, Ben 77
Collis, Charles 51-2
Coronet Fille , Operation 104Couch, Captain Robert 34Currie, Malcolm R. 43
Currier, Lt Bryan 133
CurtissP-40 8
Davis, Richard 158
Decisive Edge, Operation 148
Deliberate Force Operation 149Deny Flight, Operation 148
Deptula, Brigadier General David A. 151
Desert Fox, Operation 152
n ex
Desert Shield, Operation I31-2Desert Storm, Operation 90 93 96 113
131 46 147 157 8
Determined Falcon, Operation ISO
Dixon, General Robert J. 58
Dolan, Major Michael J. 22
Douglas A4D Skyhawk 16 77
Douglas AD Skyraider 8 9 14 16 20 2
31
DouglasXA2D-1 Skyshark 77
Downey, Congressman Tom J. 52
Eberhart, BrigadierGeneral Ralph E.
168
Efferson, Colonel Bob 134
Eichelberger, Lt Cdr William R. 9Ellis General Richard H. 45, 50English Electric PIA Lightning 100
Evans, General William J. 43 58
Eves Bill 165
Fairchild C-119A Flying Box Car 48FairchildC-123B Provider 48Fairchild C-82A Packet 48Fairchild FC-I 48Fairchild FC-2W2 48Fairchild M 62 48Fairchild T-46A 122
Fairchild, Sherman Mills 47 8
Fairchild-Hillier FH-237 48Fiat G.91R-3 16
Fokker D.Vll 47
Fokker F-27 Friendship 48Forrestal, US ai rcraft carrier 15
Foster J1 Dr John S. 38Franks, General Frederick M. 146
Fry Vice Admiral Scott A. ISS
Fuch, F re d 1 68
Gabreski, Brigadier General Francis S.
100Garcia, Frank 164Gatling, Richard 83
General Dynamics F-16C Viper 149
Goff, Captain Randy 136-7Grossman, Dr Norman 31, 51, 62Grumman Gulfstream 2 30Grumman S-2 Tracker 166, 171
Hails Report 50-1
9
Hamilton, Captain Christopher 165
Hawker Harrier/Sea Harrier 17 109 I
HawkerSiddeley P II27 Kestrel 17-18
41
HawkerSiddeley S.2 Buccaneer 98HawkerTyphoon 13-14
Healey,John 51
Heinemann, Ed 16,77Henschel H s 1 29 B 13
Hicks,Captain Al 133
Hildebrandt, Colonel James E. 25-6Hildreth, Lt Cdr James R. 9Hitler, Adolf 13
Horner, Lt General Charles A. 131 13146
Hunger, Frank W. 122
Hussein, Sadam 8 131-46, 149 151
Ilyushin 11-22 Shturmovik 8 9Ilyushin 11-102 124
Jack Frost, Operation 99Jacks, Commander Angus 77
Jansen George 77Johnson, Captain Paul 136-7,141Johnson,Colonel Robert S. 100Johnson, Major Al 18
Joint Endeavour, Operation 148Jones, Lt Devon 136-7Joshua HendeCompany 77
JunkersCLl 13
JunkersJ1 13
Junkers Ju 87 Stuka 8 12-13Junkers Ju 88 13
Kaloogian, Howard 168-9Kennedy, Major Brice 107-14,118-19
122
Kerchner, Captain Ronald L. 34Kishline, Colonel Samuel J. 46Klemin, Prof Alexander 48
Laird, Melvin 25
Lanphier, Lt Colonel ThomasG. 129
Laws, MajorJeff 96Lewis Jerry 168Livingstone, CG . Doc 77
Lockheed AH-56A Cheyenne 18,41Lockheed Electra 77
Lockheed F-I04 Starfighter 15
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S-3A Viking 30-1 78
Arm Project 14
MasterSgt james 152
Major Michael G. 100
Milton A. 45
Ltjohn 141
Major john 123
T on y 1 33
Sen ator john L 45
john j. 161
john 19 21
Douglas AA 30
FAD Phantom 21 48 100
129
Colonel R ic k 1 35
john L. 40
General Thomas H.
22-4 40 45 52 101
R ob er t S . 2 0
General Merrill A. 146
L 1 51
Arthur 1. 45
hmittBf 110 3
I, Programm e 35
Major Williard K 45
Admiral S .R . 1 69
egrette Arthur j. 16
elson Howard Sam 27 102-3
ewhart Colonel William B jr 34
orth A merican A -36A 9 11
orth A merican F-86A Sabre 129
orth A merican F -I00S uper S ab r e 4 3
orth A merican P-51 Mustang 14 129orth A merican T 2 8 D 9
onhern Watch Operation 15 I
orthrop A /Y A -9 26 30-40 66 124
N-156F Freedom Fi ght er 14
20 30
orthrop T3 8 Talon 15
y em an R -I O 9
Captain Scott 149
Journey Operation 104
erne 122
G R I T or n ad o 9 8 1 4 1
Whitten 16l yakov Pe-2 9
IN X
Phillips G eneral S am C 52
Phillis Colonel S yp h 1 37 -8
Pombo R i chard 168
Porker 500 Operation 104
Porter Lt C d r j o h n M 9
Pom ex E xerci se 22
Provide omfonOperation 151
Putz Vizerfeldwebel 13
Quick Fire Operation 105
Radanovich George 168
Red Flag Operation 99
Reforger Operation 99
Repp Lt Cdr 9
Republic F-84 Groundhog 100
Republic F-84F Superhog 101
Republic F-105 Superhog 101
Republic F-I05DThunderchief 21 48 71
Republic PA7D Thunderbolt 8 10-11
1 3 4 8 5 1 1 0 0
Retzlaff POC M ik e 1 64
Richardson Elliot L 41
Ridgely Lieutenant Diane 61
RockwellOV-IO Bronco 9 22 166
Roedefer Colonel joanne M. 16
Rose Major jim 141-2
Rudel H auptmann H ans-U lrich 13
Ruehl Lt C olonel S teve 95
Rush Kenneth M 38
Russo C olonel C hristopher 146
Rutskoj C olonel A lexander V 124
Saffell Lt C d r j o h n A. 9
alomonson Captain Eric 141
Sanliturk Brigadier General Savas 151
Saratoga US ai rcraft carri er 136
Schlesigner james R 41
Schwarzkopf G eneral N orman 131
144Seamans Robert C j I 25 38
Sexton Captain M ik e 4 5
Sharpe Colonel Irwi n 135Shedlock j.B. 51
Sheehy C8ptain T od d 135
Sikorsky S-66 18
Sikorsky S-67 BlackhawkSmith Kenneth W 34
Soames Christopher 143Solt Lt Col Lou 18
792
Sopwith Salamander 10 12
Sorensen Donald L 59-60
Southern Watch Operation 151-2
Spangler C aptainS eldon 77
prey Pierre 159
talin Josef 10 13 21
Starbird Alfred D 45
Stepp Hauptmann Hans-Karl 13
Stout Major john 165
trait Don81d 49 51
Sukhoi Su-2 10
ukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot 124
S ukhoi S u-39 124
Sukoshi T igerprogram me 20
Svoboda Captain L yn n 1 65
Swain C aptain R obert R 135
Swanner Exercise 22
Sweet Major Rob 13 7-8
T3 4 t an k 1 0 12
T -55 t ank 89 135T6 2 tank 85-86 89
t an k 8 9
Thomas Captain jack W 136
Tito President 150
Tizio Vincent 48-9 65
Uhl Edward G. 41
U/Jhold Democracy Operation 149
von Greim Oberleutnant Robert Ritter
13
V ought A -7 Corsair II 20-1 40 41-6
6 2
Waller Colonel J ef f 16 5
Ward Kevon 165
Watson Dr George M jr 43 79
Weiss Oberleutnant Ot t o 13
Welch Lt C o lo n el S t ev e n 9 6
Whetmore W 8r re n 5 I
Wilson Rear Admiral Thomas R 155
Wilson Richard A. 169
Wise Colonel William 96
Wood Hugh 77
Wright Wing C ommander G raham 155
Yam8llltlto Admiral 129
Zitadelle Operation 13
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