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1. Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co.

*Facts: The Talisay- Silay Milling Co., Inc., in order to secure

its indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank, induced its

planters, among whom was Mariano Ledesma to mortgage

their land to the creditor bank. As compensation and bonus

to those planters for the risk they were running with their

property under the mortgage, the Talisay-Silay granted to

herein respondent, Mariano Lacson Ledesma, the sum of

19,911.11.The petitioner file a complaint against Talisay-Silay for the

delivery of the amount 13,850 or promissory notes or other

instruments of credit for that sum payable as bonus in favor

of Mariano Ledesma. It also prays that the Talisay-Silay be

ordered to to render an accounting of the amounts it owes

Mariano by way of bonus and to pay the petitioner a sum

sufficient to satisfy the judgment and that sale made by

Mariano be null and void.

The PNB filed a 3rd party claim alleging a preferential right

to receive any amount which Mariano might be entitled tofrom the Talisay-Silay as bonus because that would be civil

fruits of the land mortgaged to said bank by said debtor for

the benefit of the Talisay-Silay reffered to and by virtue of a

deed of assignment and praying that Talisay-Silay deliver

directly to the bank said sum on account of the latter’s

credit against the aforesaid Mariano.

Talisay-Silay answered stating that Mariano’s credit , 7,500

belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchased it.

Cesar in turn, claimed that he is a buyer in good faith.

Bachrach answered the 3rd party claim that its credit

against Mariano was prior and preferential to that of the

bank.

At the trial, all agreed to recognize and respect the sale

made in favor of Cesar and that Bahcrach had a preferred

right to receive Mariano’s bonus and ordered Talisay-Silay

to deliver the sum.

PNB appealed on the ground that bonus in question is civil

fruits of the land which the owners had mortgaged for the

benefit of the Talisay-Silay and that said bank was entitled

to it on the ground that the mortgage had become due.

*Issue: Whether or not the bonus in question is civil fruits

*Held: No. Art.355 of the Civil Code considers 3 things as

civil fruits: (1) the rents of buildings, (2) the proceeds from

the leases of land, and (3) the income from perpetual or life

annuities or other similar sources of revenue. As the bonus

in question is not the rent of a building or of land. Also it is

not income for it is not obtained from the land but from

something else. The said bonus bears no immediate, but

only remote and accidental relation to the land, having b

granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected

one’s land to a lien in favor of the bank for the benefit of

Talisay-Silay. It is not civil fruits or income from the

mortgaged property and has nothing to do with it.

2) Tacas v. Tobon (Accession) FACTS:

Aquiliana Tacas, filed an action to recover from defendan

Tobon the ownership and possession of three parcels of

land, together with the fruits collected by him during the

time he was in possession of said land since January 1912

He alleged that Tobon unlawfully took said parcels upon

death of Francisco Dumadag, predecessor in interest of t

plaintiffs; and that he remained in possession, enjoying t

fruits to the value of P700 annually.

Exhibit H of the plaintiffs, Dumagdag whose title is apossessory information record duly approved and inscrib

in the registry of deeds of Ilocos Sur, that he was in

possession of the land for so many years until his death.

In his answer, Tobon alleged that he is the owner of said

lands, having purchased them from Exequiel or Gil Tacas.

(Dumagdag’s brother-in-law)

Exhibits 1 and 2 of the defendant, instrument whereby G

Tacas sold three parcels of farm land in the place called S

to Evaristo Tobon for P300 conan

Ramon Tolentino- justice of peace, concludes that the

signature in Exhibit 1 is false.

The trial court declared the plaintiffs to be the absolute

owners of the three parcels of land in litigation, and orde

Tobon to deliver said parcels of land to them, together w

the fruits collected each year since 1912 until the comple

termination of the case, and in default thereof, to pay th

P11,040, which is the total value of the rice and tobacco

from 1912 to 1927. Tobon appealed.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in ordering Tobon to deliver to

the plaintiffs the fruits of the land from 1912 to 1927?

RULING:

Yes, the trial court erred insofar that it ordered Tobon to

deliver to the plaintiffs the fruits of the land from 1912 to

1927. Evidence being lacking to show that when he enter

upon the possession of the lands in question, he was awa

of any flaw in his title or mode of acquiring it,he is deeme



possessor in good faith (Art. 433, Civil Code), and in

accordance with Art. 451 of the Civil Code, the fruits of said

lands were his, until he was summoned upon the complaint,

or until he has filed his answer thereto. Manresa

commented that to every possessor in good faith, there

comes a time when he is considered a possessor in bad

faith. When the owner or possessor with a better right

comes along, where he becomes aware that what he had

taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learnsthe grounds in support of the adverse contention, good

faith ceases.

The possessor becomes aware that his possession is

unlawful from the time he learns of the complaint, from the

time he is summoned to the trial. It is at this time that his

possession is interrupted, according to Art. 1945, and that

he ceases to receive the fruits, according to the first

paragraph of Art. 451. Thus, Tobas is only bound to return

to the plaintiffs the fruits received

from April 1918 to 1927 with the right to deduct theexpenses of planting and harvesting (Art. 365 of the Civil

Code), which shall be determined by the trial court, after

hearing both parties.

Court upheld the trial court’s decision of declaring the

plaintiffs to be the absolute owners of the three parcels of

land in litigation and ordering Tobon to deliver the said

parcels to them but he is bound to return the received fruits

from the time he was aware that his possession is unlawful.

3) Floreza vs Evangelista

Facts: Petitioners own a residential lot upon which

respondent built a house of light material which was with

the consent of petitioners but with no agreement as to the

rental since the petitioners have a debt of P100.00 to

respondent. Petitioners subsequently borrowed more

money from respondent the value of which reached

P740.00. Respondent demolished the house and replaced it

with a house of strong materials and as before, no rentals

were paud. Petitioner then sold said lot to respondent with

a right of repurchase within 6 years. Before the expiration of

the repurchase period, the petitioners paid in full the

repurchase price. Petitioners then asked respondent to

vacate the premises who however refused to do so until he

was reimbursed the value of his house.

Issue: WON petitioner was a builder in good faith

Held: The SC upholds the decision of the CA that the

petitioner could not be upheld as a builder in good faith

under Art. 448 because such can only be applied when th

builder, planter or sower believes he has the right to buil

plant or sow because he thinks he owns the land or belie

himself to have a claim to the title. Respondent makes no

pretension of ownership.The house that respondent buil

was with the tolerance of the petitioners in consideratio

the debt they have incurred. Neither could he be consideas a vendee de retro and has therefore no right to be

reimbursed much less retain the premises reimbursed. T

Court holds that the right of the petitioner are more of a

usufructuary under Art 579 of the NCC for if the

improvements made by the usufructuary were subject to

indemnity, it would be dangerous and unjust for he could

dispose of the owner"s funds by compelling him to pay fo

the improvements which he perhaps would not have ma

4. Mercado Vs CA (4, Right of Accession)

The private respondents herein Bulaong Group, had for

many years been individual lessees of stalls in the public

market of Baliuag, Bulacan; from 1956 to 1972. The mark

was destroyed by fire on 1956; the members of the Bulao

Group constructed new stalls therein at their expense; an

they thereafter paid rentals thereon to the Municipality o

Baliuag. In 1972, the members of the group sub-leased th

individual stalls to other persons, referred to as the

(Mercado Group). After the Mercado Group had been in

possession of the market stalls for some months, as sub-

lessees of the Bulaong Group, the municipal officials of

Baliuag cancelled the long standing leases of the Bulaong

Group and declared the persons comprising the Mercado

Group as the rightful lessees of the stalls in question, in

substitution of the former.

The members of the Bulaong Group sued. They filed seve

individual complaints with the CFI seeking recovery of the

stalls from the Mercado Group as well as damages. (Thei

theory was anchored on their claimed ownership of the

stalls constructed by them at their own expense, and the

resulting right, as such owners, to sub-lease the stalls, an

necessarily, to recover them from any person withholdin

possession thereof from them).

Respondent Judge rejected the claim of the Municipality

Baliuag that it had automatically acquired ownership of t

new stalls constructed after the old stalls had been razed

fire, declaring the members of the Bulaong Group to be

builders in good faith, entitled to retain possession of the



stalls respectively put up by them until and unless

indemnified for the value thereof. The decision also

declared that the Bulaong and Mercado Groups had

executed the sub-letting agreements with full awareness

that they were thereby violating Ordinance No. 14; they

were thus in pari delicto, and hence had no cause of action

one against the other and no right to recover whatever had

been given or demand performance of anything

undertaken. The judgment therefore decreed (1) theannulment of the leases between the Municipality and the

individuals comprising the Mercado Group (the defendants

who had taken over the original leases of the Bulaong

Group); and (2) the payment to the individual members of

the Bulaong Group (the plaintiffs) of the stated, adjudicated

value of the stalls, with interest IF

Issue: WON Court erred in declaring the members of the

Bulaong Group to be builders in good faith, entitled to

retain possession of the stalls respectively put up by themuntil and unless indemnified for the value thereof.

HELD: YES

It was indeed error for the Court to have so ruled in

accordance with Article 526 of the Civil Code. The members

of this group (Bulalong) were admittedly lessees of space in

the public market; they therefore could not, and in truth

never did make the claim, that they were owners of any part

of the land occupied by the market so that in respect of any

new structure put up by them thereon, they could be

deemed builders in good faith. To be deemed a builder in

good faith, it is essential that a person assert title to the

land on which he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in

concept of owner, and that he be unaware "that there exists

in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates

it. It is such a builder in good faith who is given the right to

retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he has

been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses

but also for useful expenses. On the other hand, unlike the

builder in good faith, a lessee who "makes in good faith

useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which

the lease is intended, without altering the form or

substance of the property leased," can only claim payment

of "one-half of the value of the improvements" or, "should

the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, ... remove the

improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer

damage thereby."

5. Pershing tan quarto vs ca

Facts:

- restituta tacalinar guanaco de pombuena received the

questioned lot of the cadastre survey of the municipality

centro mizamis occidental either as a purported donation

by way of purchase (50php, feb 11,1927)

- transaction took place during her mother's lifetime, her

father having predeceased the mother

- that the donation or sale was consummated while restit

was already married to juan pombuenA- jan 22,1935 Juan filed for himself and his supposed co-

owner restituta an application for a torrens title over the

land

- nov 22,1938 a decision was promulgated pronouncing j

(married to restituta) as the owner of the land

- sept 22,1949 a contract of lease was entered into bet p

and restituta (with consent of Juan) for 10 years

- dec 27 1960 restituta sued pet for unlawful detainer (th

lease contract having expired)

- an original certificate of title was issued in Juan's name("married to restituta")

- unlawful detainer case was won by spouses in the

municipal court but cfi dismissed it on appeal bec of an

understanding (barter) whereby pet became the owner o

the disputed lot and the spouses in turn became the own

of a parcel of land (with house constructed thereon)

previously owned by pet

- that the barter agreement (oct 10,1962) bet juan and p

pet constructed on disputed land a concrete building,

without any objection on the part of restituta

- restituta sued both Juan and pet for reconveyance of th

title over the lot, for the annulment of the barter, and fo

recovery of the land with damages

Issue:

1. Is the questioned lot paraphernal or conjugal?

2. In having constructed the building on the lot, should p

be regarded as a builder in good faith (hence be entitled

reimbursement) or a builder in bad faith (no right to

reimbursement)?

Held:

1. Land is conjugal. Not donation, no public instrument.

Ownership was acquired both by Juan and restituta by

tradition (delivery) as a consequence of contract of sale

(50php). Lot is conjugal, having been acquired by the

spouses thru onerous title (money used being presumab

conjugal there being no proof that restituta had paraphe

funds of her own).



2. Even assuming that despite registration of the lot as

conjugal, pet nursed the belief that the lit was actually

restituta's (making him in bad faith) stu restituta's failure to

prohibit him from building despite her knowledge that

construction was actually being done, makes her also in bad

faith. Mutual bad faith would entitle pet to the rights of a

builder in good faith thus reimbursement should be given

him if restituta decides to appropriate the building for

herself.But pet having bartered his own lot and small house with

the lot with Juan (OCT conjugal owner) may be said to be

the owner-possessor of the lot. Thus he is a builder-

possessor bec he is the owner himself.

(Builder in gold faith is one who is not aware of the defect

or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition)

- petition granted

6. Lopez Inc., vs Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., Inc.

Facts:• The Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., Inc., as lessee, was

occupying two doors with mezzanine of Lopez building in

Baguio, belonging to Lopez Inc. of which Atty. Eugenio Lopez

was then the President.

• During the bombing of the City of Baguio (Japanese

occupation), the Lopez Building including the two doors in

question were burned and seriously damaged

• After liberation, because the Lopez Inc. did not

rehabilitate the building, the PETC corporation, desiring to

resume the lease, thought of rebuilding it.

• Mr. Macario Rebodos, Vice-President of the PETC, went to

Manila to confer with Atty. Eugenio Lopez, about the

rehabilitation of the premises. He left a letter for Mr. Lopez

with an inmate of the house. Said letter was never

answered by Attorney Lopez.

• PETC proceeded to repair or rebuild the two doors

spending the amount of P14,583.45. Said improvements

were introduced with the knowledge of Mr. Joseph K. Icard,

agent for the Lopez, Inc. Later, an agreement was entered

into between the Lopez, Inc. and the PETC whereby the

latter re-occupied the premises paying a rental of P300 a

month.

• The PETC failed to pay the monthly rentals amounting to

P2,200. Although admitting its delinquency, PETC was of the

belief that inasmuch as it had the right to be reimbursed in

the sum of P14,583.45, value of the improvements

introduced by it, the amount of its delinquency (P2,200)

could well be charged against it and so it need not pay the

monthly rentals until the value of the improvements had

been exhausted.

• Because of PETC’s refusal to pay the delinquency the

Lopez Inc. brought an action of ejectment in the Municip

Court of Baguio to have the PETC vacate the premises pa

the back rentals with legal interest

• Municipal Court rendered judgment in favor of the

Plaintiff

• PETC appealed to the Court of First Instance of Baguio.

ruled in favor of the Plaintiff ordering the Defendant tovacate the property. Said Defendant, however, is not

obliged to pay the said P300 monthly in cash. It has the r

to set off against the rental, part of the value of the

improvements. Regarding the P2,200, back rentals, the

court also declares that this sum is already offset by a pa

of the amount of the value of the improvements. The

Defendant is free from paying it in cash.

• Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals

Issue: WON the PETC have the right to reimburse the valof the improvements from Lopez Inc.

Held: As the Court already said, they both thought that a

lessee may be considered a possessor in good faith and t

improvements introduced by him on the leased premises

are to be regarded as made in good faith. This rule or

principle contained in the civil law refers only to party wh

occupies or possess property in the belief that he is the

owner thereof and said good faith ends only when he

discovers a flaw in his title so as to reasonably advise or

inform him that after all he may not be the legal owner o

said property. This principle of possessor in good faith

naturally cannot apply to a lessee because as such lessee

knows that he is not the owner of the leased property.

Neither can he deny the ownership or title of his lessor.

Knowing that his occupation of the premises continues o

during the life of the lease contract and that he must vac

the property upon termination of the lease or upon the

violation by him of any of its terms, he introduces

improvements on said property at his own risk in the sen

that he cannot recover their value from the lessor, much

less retain the premises until such reimbursement. His ri

to improvements introduced by him is expressly governe

by Articles 1573 and 487 of the old Civil Code which read

follows:

“Article 1573. A lessee shall have, with respect to useful a

voluntary improvements, the same rights which are gran

to usufructuaries.”

“Article 487. The usufructuary may make on the property



held in usufruct any improvements, useful, or recreative,

which he may deem proper, provided he does not change

its form or substance; but he shall have up right to be

indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such

improvements should it be possible to do so without injury

to the property.”

The rights of the PETC with respect to the improvements

made on the property by him must be governed by Article

487 in relation with Article 1573 of the Civil Code. UnderArticle 487 the PETC is entitled to remove improvements

made by himself so far as it is possible to do so without

injury to the property; and this means that he may remove

the improvements provided he leaves the property in

substantially the same condition as when he entered upon

it. Articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code, which define the

rights between the owner of land and builders of

improvements thereon in good faith, are not applicable as

between landlord and tenant, since the Code supplies

specific provisions designed to cover their rights. Besidesthe tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he

has no pretension to be owner.

PETC is not entitled to reimbursement for the value of the

improvements introduced by it; that it is ordered to pay to

Lopez Inc. the amount of P2,200, with interest at the legal

rate from the date of the filing of the complaint; and to pay

the amount of P300 per month until it actually vacates the

premises. PETC is however given the right to remove the

improvements introduced by it without injury to the

property.

7. Heirs of the late Jaime Binuya vs. CA, Romero, Carpio

and Dungao

FACTS: Petitioners' father, Jaime Binuya, was the registered

owner of a parcel of land. He leased out a portion thereof to

private respondent Dungao who constructed thereon a

residential house. The lease was to run for a period of ten

(10) years, starting 1986. A monthly rental of P20.00 was

agreed upon. In 1973, private respondent Carpio bought

one of Jaime's two (2) houses on the lot. After the said

purchase, Carpio leased that portion of the lot occupied by

the house for a period of ten (10) years commencing 1973.

Both contracts of lease were in writing.

The contract with Dungao was renewed for a period of two

(2) years after its expiration. Although no further renewal or

extension was agreed upon, Dungao was allowed to stay in

the premises on a month to month basis. There was no

extension or renewal of the contract of lease with Carpio

after its expiration, but he, nevertheless, continued to st

on the premises, paying a monthly rental.

Upon their failure to pay, an amicable settlement thru th

conciliation procedure prescribed under P.D. No. 1508 w

attempted. This having failed, Jaime Binuya filed a separa

civil case for ejectment against Bernardo Carpio and Rust

Dungao, respectively.

In their Joint-Affidavit submitted to the MTC, private

respondent Carpio claimed that Jaime agreed to reimburhim (Carpio) for the value of the improvements he would

introduce on the house and that the current value of suc

improvements is P80,000.00. On the other hand, private

respondent Dungao claimed that Jaime also agreed to

reimburse him for the value of the improvements he wou

introduce on the portion leased should Jaime decide to

repossess the land. Both private respondents further

asserted that their respective contracts of lease were

renewed for a period of ten (10) years per renewal; Carp

was on his second renewal while Dungao was on his thirdrenewal.

MTC-in favor of Jaime

RTC-Jaime died. Appeal of resp. affirmed. It ordered

respondents that resp. shall be reimbursed for the value

the houses since resp. are considered builders in good fa

ISSUE: CA erred in holding that private respondents are

builders in good faith and in applying the case.

RULING: In jurisprudence it states that “The contention t

the defendant is entitled to the benefits of the provision

Article 361 of the Civil Code can not be maintained becau

the right to indemnification secured in that article is

manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one

builds or sows or plants on land in which he believes him

to have a claim of title and not to lands wherein one's on

interest is that of tenant under a rental contract; otherw

it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve

landlord out of his property.”

Art 361 of the old civil code: “The owner of land on which

anything has been built, sown, or planted, in good faith,

shall be entitled to appropriate the thing so built, sown, o

planted, upon paying the compensation mentioned in

Articles 453 and 454, or to compel the person who has bu

or planted to pay him the value of the land, and the pers

who sowed thereon to pay the proper rent therefor.”

(Article 453 referred to necessary and useful expenditure

while Article 454 referred to expenditures purely for

ostentation or mere pleasure.)



****This principle of possessor in good faith naturally

cannot apply to a lessee because as such lessee he knows

that he is not the owner of the leased property. Neither can

he deny the ownership or title of the lessor.

It is to be noted at once that the old Civil Code allowed

neither indemnity nor retention. The new Code, however,

allows indemnity, to the extent of one-half (1/2) of the

value of the useful improvements, if the lessor chooses to

retain them. In short, it is the lessor who has the option topay for one-half (1/2) the value of the improvements.

The lessee does not have the right to demand that he be

paid therefor. For if the lessor refuses "to reimburse said

amount", the only remedy available to the lessee is to

"remove the improvements, even though the principal thing

may suffer damage thereby," provided, however, that he

should not "cause any more impairment upon the property

leased than is necessary". Also, not being a possessor in

good faith, and therefore, not entitled to the benefits of

Article 546 of the new Civil Code, the lessee does not havethe right of retention over his improvements until he is

reimbursed one-half (1/2) of the value of the useful

improvements.

8. Imperial Insurance vs. Simon

9. Spouses del Campo vs. Abesia

Facts: The case involves two friendly parties who are co-

owners of a corner lot at Flores and Cavan Streets in Cebu

City. Plaintiff owns 2/3 of the lot and Defendant owns 1/3 of

the same. The total size of the lot is 45 square meters.

Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned

property into two lots. 30 square meters went to the

plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to the defendants.

From the sketch plan, both parties discovered that the

house of the defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiff’s

adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm of it. The parties then requested

the trial court to adjudicate who should take possession of

the encroached 5 sqm.

The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner

of the land on which anything has been built, sown or

planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as

his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the

indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige

the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,

and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the

builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its

value is considerably more than that of the building or tr

In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner o

the land does not choose to appropriate the building or

trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upo

the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the

court shall fix the terms thereof.

Since art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot be oblig

to pay for the portion of defendant’s house that entered

into the 30 sqm lot, and Defendant cannot be obliged to for the price of the 5 sqm their house occupied. Why? Th

RTC believed the rules of co-ownership should govern, an

not that of accession.

RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered

Defendants to demolish the 5sqm part of their house

encroaching the 30sqm lot of the Plaintiffs. Defendants

where horrified at having to axe the family home, hence

they appealed.

CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules of accession applies (and

not co-ownership) on property that used to be co-owned

but was subdivided.

Ruling: The rule of accession applies because co-ownersh

was terminated upon the partitioning of the lot. Art 448

therefore governs. The house of defendant overlapped t

of Plaintiff, but this was built on good faith. Hence, the

plaintiffs have the right to choose one of two options

1)Appropriate the 5sqm portion of the house of Defenda

after indemnifying the Defendants; or 2)Obliging the

Defendants to pay a portion of the land on which their

home rested. (or they can rent it)

10. Pecson vs CA

Facts: Petitioner Pecson was the owner of a commercial

located at Quezon City on which he built a four-story

apartment building. Petitioner however failed to pay rea

taxes which caused said land to be sold at public auction

the city treasurer who in turn sold it to herein private

respondents spouses Nuguid. The respondents contend t

the building should be included in the sale but the trial co

as well as the CA and the SC upon a petition for review,

denied such.

In 1993, respondents filed with the trial court a motion fo

the delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment

building citing Art 546 of the Civil Code. The trial court

decreed that the movant (respondent) shall reimburse



plaintiff the construction cost of the apartment building

amounting to P53,000.00; that upon payment of the

reimbursement, respondent shall be entitled to the

immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the lot the

improvement on it; that petitioner should pay respondent

no less that P21,000.00 per month which is the same

amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the land;

and that the amount of P53,000.00 due from the

respondent shall offset against the amounts collected by thepetitioner as rent. A writ of possession as eventually issued

in favor of respondent.

Issue: WON petitioner is a builder in good faith

Held: The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in

good faith of the apartment building on the theory that he

constructed it at the time when he was still the owner of the

lot, and that the key issue in this case is the application of

Articles 448 and 456 of the Civil Code.The trial court and the Court of Appeals, as well as the

parties, concerned themselves with the application of

Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. These articles read as

follows:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been

built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to

appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after

payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and

548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the

price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.

However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy

the land if its value is considerably more than that of the

building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,

if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the

building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall

agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of

disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every

possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain

the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in

good faith with the same right of retention, the person who

has defeated him in the possession having the option of

refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the

increase in value which the thing may have acquired by

reason thereof.

Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the

land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses

ownership of the land by sale or donation.

Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to t

case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision

therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy conside

that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state o

forced co-ownership.

11. Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp Vs CA (11Right of Accession)

Petitioner is a corpo who is the registered owner of lot in

San Dionisio Parañaque,

Metro Manila. Said land was purchased by plaintiff from

Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970, together with all the buildin

and improvements including the wall existing thereon

Defendant (eduardo uy) is the registered owner of a parc

of land known as Lot No. 4531-B of Lot 4531 of the

Cadastral Survey of Parañaque, covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 279838, of the Registry of Deeds fthe Province of Rizal; that said land which adjoins plaintif

land was purchased by defendant from a certain Enrile

Antonio also in 1970; that in 1971, defendant purchased

another lot also adjoining plaintiff’s land.

It was discovered in a survey, that a portion the buildings

and wall bought by plaintiff together with the land from

Pariz Industries are occupying a portion of defendant’s

adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or

occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of privat

respondent’s land, the petitioner offered to buy from

defendant that particular portion of Uy’s land occupied b

portions of its buildings and wall with an area of 770 squa

meters, more or less, but the latter, however, refused th

offer

The parties entered into a private agreement before a

certain Col. Rosales in Malacañang, wherein petitioner

agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of its lan

thus giving to the private respondent possession of a

portion of his land previously enclosed by petitioner's wa

Uy later filed a complaint before the office of Municipal

Engineer of Parañaque, Metro Manila as well as before t

Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal against Technogas i

connection with the encroachment or occupation by

plaintiff's buildings and walls of a portion of its land but s

complaint did not prosper; so Uy dug or caused to be dug

canal along Technogas’ wall, a portion of which collapsed

June, 1980, and led to the filing by the petitioner of the

supplemental complaint in the above-entitled case and a

separate criminal complaint for malicious mischief agains



Uy and his wife which ultimately resulted into the conviction

in court Uy's wife for the crime of malicious mischief;

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in

holding the petitioner a builder in bad faith because it is

‘presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property.’

HELD:YEs: The two cases it relied upon do not support its main

pronouncement that a registered owner of land has

presumptive knowledge of the metes and bounds of its own

land, and is therefore in bad faith if he mistakenly builds on

an adjoining land. Aside from the fact that those cases had

factual moorings radically different from those obtaining

here, there is nothing in those cases which would suggest,

however remotely, that bad faith is imputable to a

registered owner of land when a part of his building

encroaches upon a neighbor’s land, simply because he is

supposedly presumed to know the boundaries of his land as

described in his certificate of title. No such doctrinal

statement could have been made in those cases because

such issue was not before the Supreme Court. Quite the

contrary, we have rejected such a theory in Co Tao vs.

Chico, where we held that unless one is versed in the

science of surveying, “no one can determine the precise

extent or location of his property by merely examining his

paper title.”

There is no question that when petitioner purchased the

land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other

structures were already in existence. The record is not clear

as to who actually built those structures, but it may well be

assumed that petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pariz

Industries, did so. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes

good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the

encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of

private respondent’s land was done in bad faith by the

builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be

presumed to have built them in good faith. It is presumed

that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same

character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is

proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that

the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any

defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by law,

passed on to Pariz’s successor, petitioner in this case.

Further, “(w)here one derives title to property from

another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while

holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence

against the former.” And possession acquired in good fait

does not lose this character except in case and from the

moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not

unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or

wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the moment defe

in the title are made known to the possessor, by extrane

evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the tr

owner.

Recall that the encroachment in the present case wascaused by a very slight deviation of the erected wall (as

fence) which was supposed to run in a straight line from

point 9 to point 1 of petitioner’s lot. It was an error which

in the context of the attendant facts, was consistent with

good faith.

12. Eden ballatan vs ca

Facts:

-dispute arose from a dispute over 42 sqm of residentialland owned by pet

- parties are owners of adjacent lots located at block no.3

poinsettia street araneta university village malabon metr

Manila

- lot 24, 414 sqm, registered in the name of pet

- lots 25 and 26 (415&313sqm) registered in the name of

resp, Gonzalo go sr

- on lot 25, resp Winston go (son) constructed Gus house

- adjacent to lot no. 26 is lot no.27,417 sqm, registered in

the name of resp li Ching Yao

-1985 pet constructed her house on lot 24. She notice th

the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining ho

of Winston encroached on her property. Her building

contractor told her that her area was actually less than th

described in the title. Pet informed resp of this discrepan

and his encroachment on her property. Resp claimed tha

his house and fence were built within the parameters of

father's lot and that the lot was surveyed by engr Jose

quedding the authorized surveyor of the araneta institute

agriculture (aia) the owner-developer of the subd project

- in a report (feb1985), engr quedding found that the lot

area of the pet was less by few meters and that the lot o

resp li Ching (3 lots away) increased by 2 meters. He

declared that in 1983, he made verification survey of lots

25&26 of resp go and found that the boundaries are in

proper position. He could not explain the reduction in pe

area since he was not present at the time resp constructe

their boundary walls

-June 1985, engr made a third relocation survey upon



request of parties. He found that lot 24 lost 25sqm on its

eastern boundary, that lot 25 did not lose nor gain any area

and lot 26 lost some 3 sqm which was gained by lot 27 on its

western boundary. Lots 25-27 moved westward to the

eastern boundary if lot 24

- pet made written demand on resp to remove their

improvements on lot 24. Resp refused

- pet instituted against resp a civil case for recovery of

possession Rtc malabon- Tc in favor of pet

- ca affirmed but modified- instead of ordering resp to

demolish their improvements, orders them to pay pet a

reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which they

encroached

Issue:

Was there encroachment? *not sure

Held:- the 42sqm portion is on the entire eastern side of lot 24

owned by pet, that this said portion is found the concrete

fence and pathway that extends from resp go's house in

adjacent lot 25; that inclusive of the portion, go did not gain

not lose ang portion of lots 25-26, instead L27 on which li

chug built his house encroached on the land of go gaining in

the process 37 sqm of go's land

- ca found that it was the erroneous survey by engr

quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this

survey that resp go relied upon in the constructing his house

on his father's land. He built his house in the belief that it

was entirely within the parameters of his father's lot. Resp

go had no knowledge that they encroached pet's lot.

Deemed builders in good faith until the time pet informed

them of their encroachment on her property

- Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the

other parties did. Li constructed house 1982 go 1983 pet

1985. There is no evidence that li Ching was aware that

when he built his house he knew that a portion would

encroach on go's land. Good faith is always presumed and

upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor

rests the burden of proof

- all parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their

rights must be determined in accordance with the

appropriate provisions of the civil code on property

- the owner of the land on which anything has been built

sown or planted in good faith shall have the right to

appropriate as his own the building, Planting or sowing,

after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the

necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case,

expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner of

the land may also oblige the builder planter or sower to

purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner choo

to sell his land, the builder planter sower must purchase

land otherwise the owner may remove the improvement

thereon. The builder planter sower however is not oblige

to purchase the land if its value considerably odd than th

building planting or sowing. In such case, the builder planor sower must pay rent to the owner of the land. If the

parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the

lease, the court must fix the terms. The right to choose

between appropriating the improvement of selling the la

on which the improvement stands to the builder planter

sower is given to the owner of the land.

- pet may choose to purchase the improvement made by

in their land or sell to go the portion. If go is unable or

unwilling to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land a

until they vacate, tegu must pay rent to pet. Pet cannotcompel go to buy the land if its value is considerably mor

than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If th

value of the land is much more than go's improvement, g

must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the ter

of lease, Then they may go to court to fix the same.

13. Filipinas Colleges vs Timbang

Facts:

• The CA held that Filipinas Colleges, Inc. are declared ha

acquired the rights of the spouses Timbang in and to lot

2-a mentioned above and in consideration thereof, Filipin

Colleges, Inc., was ordered to pay the spouses Timbang t

amount of P15,807.90 plus such other amounts which sa

spouses might have paid or had to pay.

• On the other hand, Maria Gervacio Blas was declared to

be a builder in good faith of the school building construct

on the lot in question and entitled to be paid the amount

P19,000.00 for the same.

• Also, in case Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed to deposit the

value of the land, which after liquidation was fixed at

P32,859.34, within 90 days set by court, Filipinas College

would lose all its rights to land and spouses Timbang wou

become the owners thereof

• If that is the case, the Timbangs ordered to make know

to the court their option under Art. 448 of the Civil Code

whether they would appropriate the building in question

which even they would have to pay Filipinas Colleges, Inc

the sum of P19,000, or would compel the latter to acquir



the land and pay the price thereof.

• Filipinas Colleges, Inc. having failed to pay or deposit the

sum of P32,859.34 and the spouses Timbang made known

to the court their decision that they had chosen not of

appropriate the building but to compel Filipinas Colleges,

Inc., for the payment of the sum of P32,859,34. The motion

was granted and a writ of execution was issued.

• Meanwhile, Blas filed a motion for execution of her

judgment representing the unpaid portion of the price ofthe house sold to Filipinas Colleges, Inc which was granted.

• Levy was made on the house in virtue of the writs of

execution

• Then, the Sheriff of Manila sold the building in public

auction in favor of the spouses Timbang, as the highest

bidders

• Several motions were subsequently filed before the lower

court wherein the court held that: 1) The sheriff’s certificate

of sale covering a school building sold at public auction was

null and void unless within 15 days from notice of said orderspouses Timbang shall pay to Blas the sum of P5,750.00 that

the spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriff’s

sale; 2) that Filipinas is owner of 245.00/32,859.34

undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a on which the building sold

in the auction sale is situated; and 3) that the undivided

interest of the Filipinas in the lot should be sold to satisfy

unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of Blas and against

Filipinas in the amount of P8,200.00 minus the sum of

P5,750.00.

• The spouses Timbang contended that because the builder

in good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after the

owners thereof exercised their option under Art. 448 of the

Civil Code, the builder lost his right of retention provided in

Art. 546 and that by operation of Art. 445, the spouses

Timbang as owners of the land became the owner ipso facto

of the school building

Issue: WON the spouses Timbang automatically become the

owners of the building upon failure of Filipinas to pay the

value of the land

Held: No.

Based on Art 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, the owner

of the land has the right to choose between appropriating

the building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof

or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land.

Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of

the land is considerably more than that of the building. In

addition to the right of the builder to be paid the value of

his improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary righ

retention of the property until he is indemnified by the

owner of the land. There is nothing in the language of the

two article, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclus

of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay t

value of the land, when such is demanded by the land-

owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of th

improvement under Article 445. Although it is true it was

declared therein that in the event of the failure of thebuilder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chose

this alternative, the builder's right of retention provided

Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was nothing said th

as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all

rights over his own building.

The Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee

Blas is entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of t

purchase price of the school building. Blas is actually a lie

on the school building are concerned. The order of the

lower court directing the Timbang spouses, as successfulbidders, to pay in cash the amount of their bid in the sum

P5,750.00 is therefore correct.

14. Bernardo vs. Bataclan

FACTS: Plaintifee Bernardo acquired a parcel of land from

Pastor Samonthe thru a contracts of sale. To secure

possession of the land from the vendors the said plaintiff

instituted a civil case. The trial court found for the plainti

in a decision which was affirmed by this Supreme Court o

appeal (G.R. No. 33017). When plaintiff entered upon the

premises, however, he found the defendant herein, Cata

Bataclan, who appears to have been authorized by forme

owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make

improvements thereon. As Bataclan was not a party in th

civil case, plaintiff, on June 11, 1931, instituted against hi

civil case. In this case, plaintiff was declared owner but th

defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith, entit

for reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for work

done and improvements made.

The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith

and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled ha

not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he says, he has a rig

to retain the land in accordance with the provisions of

article 453 of the Civil Code. In obedience to the decision

this court in G.R. No. 37319, the plaintiff expressed his

desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of th

land. The said defendant could have become owner of bo

land and improvements and continued in possession



thereof. But he said he could not pay and the land was sold

at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. When he failed to pay

for the land, the defendant herein lost his right of retention.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is good faith.

RULING: The court finds that defendant has lost his right of

retention. In obedience to the decision of this court in G.R.

No. 37319, the plaintiff expressed his desire to require thedefendant to pay for the value of the land. The said

defendant could have become owner of both land and

improvements and continued in possession thereof. But he

said he could not pay and the land was sold at public

auction to Toribio Teodoro. The law, as we have already

said, requires no more than that the owner of the land

should choose between indemnifying the owner of the

improvements or requiring the latter to pay for the land.

When he failed to pay for the land, the defendant herein

lost his right of retention.The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff

himself and the purchase price of P8,000 received by him

from Toribio Teodoro, we find no reason to justify a rapture

of the situation thus created between them, the defendant-

appellant not being entitled, after all, to recover from the

plaintiff the sum of P2,212.

15. Miranda v. Fadullon

*Facts: One Lucio Tio was the owner of a parcel of land in

Cebu. A power of Attorney in favor of one Esteban Fadullon

executed by Lucio Tio was registered in the land records of

Cebu City. On the same date, the deed of mortgage in favor

of the Cebu Mutual Building and Loan Association was also

annotated. Fadullon sold the property to the spouses

Dionisio Segarra and Clemencia N. de Segarra with right to

repurchase within a period of 30 days. Fadullon failed to

make the repurchase and 10 days after the expiration of the

period, the spouses file a sworn petition for the

consolidation of their ownership and registered said petition

ion the office of the Register of Deeds. Lucio Tio filed a

complaint in the CFI of Cebu to annul the sale. The Trial

Court annulled the sale and the CA affirmed and further

required the spouses to pay Lucio Tio rentals on the

property until the property shall have been returned. It

appeared that during the possession of the spouses of the

property , they had introduced improvements consisting of

a building with 3 rooms and a storage room and artesian

with tower and water tank and a cement flooring which cost

5,300. They claimed that they were possessor in good fai

and asked the court to asked Lucio Tio to pay for the said

improvements or to allow them to buy the land should Lu

Tio decide not to pay. Lucio Tio on the other hand, claime

that the spouses were possessors in bad faith and not

entitled to reimbursement.

*Issue: Whether or not the spouses Segarra were

possessors in bad faith or good faith.

*Held: 2 circumstances which seem to stubbornly belie th

professed good faith of the part of Segarras in buying the

property: (1) The circumstance of the power-of-attorney

appearing on the back of the title as of 5 or 6 years previ

and the other circumstance of the comparatively limited

period of one month granted vendor Fadullon to redeem

the property and (2) the further circumstance that the sa

property had already been mortgaged.

Neither the trial court and CA did expressly say in so manwords that the spouses were possessor in bad faith. But

from the reading of their decisions, one can logically infe

that it was the conclusion of the 2 courts that the spouse

were not possessors in good faith. Moreover, the very fa

that The CA sentence them to pay rentals is an indication

that the spouses were considered possessors and builder

bad faith. A builder in good faith may not be required to

rentals. He has a right to retain the land on which he has

built in good faith until he is reimbursed. Possibly he mig

be required to pay rental only when the owner of the lan

chooses not to appropriate the improvement and require

the builder in good faith to pay for the land, but that the

builder is unwilling or unable to buy the land, and then th

decide to leave things as they are and assume the relatio

of lessor and lessee

16) Heirs of Navarro V. IAC (Accession)

FACTS:

Sinforoso Pascual desires to register land on the northern

section of his existing property. His current registered

property is bounded on the east by Talisay River, on the

West by Bulacan River and on the North by the Manila ba

Both rivers flow towards the Manila Bay. Because of

constantly flowing water, extra land of about 17 hectares

formed in the northern most section of the property. It is

this property he sought to register.

The RTC - denied the registration, claiming this to be

foreshore land and part of public domain (remember,



accretion formed by the sea is public dominion). His Motion

for Reconsideration likewise denied. In 1960, he attempted

registry again, claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan rivers

deposited more silt resulting on accretion. He claimed this

land as riprarian owner. The Director of Lands, Director of

Forestry and the Fiscal opposed.

Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro opposed

the same application, stating the he leased part of the

property sought to be registered. He sought to protect hisfishpond that rested on the same property. Sinforoso was

not amused and filed ejectment against Mr. Navarro,

claiming that Navarro used stealth force and strategy to

occupy a portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against

Navarro so he appealed. During the appeal, his original land

registration case was consolidated and tried jointly. (alas

Pascual died) The heirs of Pascual took over the case.

On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore

land and therefore part of public domain. The RTC dismissed

the complaint of Pascual for ejectment against Navarro andalso denied his land registration request. Pascual’s heirs

appealed and the RTC was reversed by the IAC.

The Apellate court - granted petition for registration. The

reason? The accretion was caused by the two rivers, not

manila bay. Hence it wasn’t foreshore land. (BUT the

confusion lies in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent

to Manila Bay… which is sea!) Aggrieved, the Director of

Forestry moved for reconsideration (Government insists it is

foreshore and hence, public domain). The Apellate court

denied all motions of the Director and the Government.

The matter went to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accretion taking place on property

adjacent to the sea can be registered under the Torrens

system.

HELD:

It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain.

Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the Civil

Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an

accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and

Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring

property and requires the concurrence of the following

requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be

gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the

action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where

the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership base

on Art 457 is misplaced. If there’s any land to be claimed

should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulaca

The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the river

bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion

land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.

Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea ban

foreshore land and the applicable law is not Art 457 but A

4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while oholds that accretion along sea shore cannot be registered

it remains public domain unless abandoned by governme

for public use and declared as private property capable o

alienation.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866

provides as follows: Lands added to the shores by accreti

and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form

part of the public domain. When they are no longer wash

by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purpo

of public utility, or for the establishment of specialindustries, or for the coast-guard service, the Governmen

shall declare them to be the property of the owners of th

estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and s

aside. Registration cannot be allowed.

Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is public

domain, even if the accretion results from rivers emptyin

into the sea. It cannot be registered.

17.Republic vs CA

Facts: Respondents are the registered owners of a parce

land in Meycuayan, Bulacan. They subsequently filed an

application for the registration of three lots adjacent to t

property. The provincial fiscal however opposed said

application and the respondents subsequently filed a par

withdrawal of their application and proceeded only upon

one lot (Lot 1) upon recommendation of the Commission

appointed by the court. The lower court then granted su

application finding the lands to be accretions top the

respondent"s land which the CA likewise approved of.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to spea

under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what

actually happened is that the private respondents simply

transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the

Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to

speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result o

the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the wat

of the river.



Issue: WON there is accretion to the property of the

respondent

Held: Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:

"To the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong

the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects

of the current of the water"

The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of threerequisites before an accretion covered by this particular

provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the

deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made

through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that

the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the

banks of rivers.

The requirement that the deposit should be due to the

effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This

excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits

caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be theexclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no

evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said

property was made gradually through the effects of the

current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree

with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is

preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land

came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan

and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private

respondents who happens to be their overseer and whose

husband was first cousin of their father noticed the four

hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in

1939. The respondents claim that at this point in time,

accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness was

incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible

increase to their land in the years before 1939. However,

the witness testified that in that year, she observed an

increase in the area of the original fishpond which is now

the land in question. If she was telling the truth, the

accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that the

alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and

not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan

and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into

being not because of the sole effect of the current of the

rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the

river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be

registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and

gradually by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining it.

It is under two meters of water. The private respondents'

own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two

meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond

and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing

river.

The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the

right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to

compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers

because of the location of his land. If estates bordering o

rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by

destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawfulprovisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and

various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or

danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should b

compensated by the right of accretion. Hence, the riparia

owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused

special works expressly intended or designed to bring ab

accretion. When the private respondents transferred the

dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for

reclamation purposes and not to protect their property

from the destructive force of the waters of the river.The curt cannot order the registration of said lots.

18. Roxas v. Tuason, et al.

*Facts: Attorneys Rosado, Sanz and Opisso applied for th

registration of the estate owned by Roxas known as the

hacienda de San Pedro Macati. The said hacienda was

acquired by the petitioner by inheritance under the will o

his late father. The property was consist of 4 parcels of la

A, B, C, and D. It does not appear that said hacienda is

mortgaged nor that any person has any right to or any

interest therein. It is almost wholly occupied at the prese

time, under lease by about 429 tenants whose names,

residences and postal addresses are also stated in the

application. Petitioner, in his writing, requested the

summoning of the persons therein name. In another

writing, the petitioner amended his former application,

giving the postal address and names of several occupant

the property. The owners adjoining properties having

summoned and notified by means of subpoenas and not

published in the daily papers, one of them, Julia Tuason,

appeared and opposed the registration and authenticatio

of the title of the petitioner as regards to parcel C for the

reason that 2 old monuments which has separated their

respective properties had been pulled down and new on

erected without her consent, and that in her opinion, the

petitioner included a considerable portion of the land

owned by her. The municipality of San Pedro Macati also

filed opposition alleging that the and occupied by the



municipal building and the public school had been in the

possession of the town from time immemorial, and that all

the land occupied by road, highways, lanes and public

landing places belonged to the palindromic and should be

excluded from the registration. The attorney for Alejandro

and Consolacion Aguirre also filed opposition alleging that 2

parcels of land owned by them had been improperly

included within the bounds of said hacienda in the parcel C.

The judge over-ruled the opposition made by Tuason, themunicipality of San Pedro Macati and by Aguirres and

ordered the registration of the hacienda in favor of the

petitioner.

*Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s application can be

validly registered.

*Held:

(1) Opposition of Tuason- respondent maintains that the

boundary between the sitio called Suavoy and the haciendais determined by straight lines drawn between some old

monuments distant a few yards from the bank of the said

creek. The record does not show that the boundary of the

land of Tuason was inclosed by monuments belonging to

her or that the creek which divides the sitio of Suavoy from

the land of the said haceinda is included within Tuason’s

land. From the fact that the land of Tuason was bounded on

2 sides by the haceinda it does not follow that the strip of a

few meters in width on the bank of the creek belonged to

her. No legal reason exist why the slow increase which has

taken place on the hacienda’s side should be considered as

belonging to Tuason, inasmuch as the latter does not own

the bed of the creek and because it may be assumed that

the slow decrease in the width thereof benefited both

propertied equally since Tuazon has not been able to show

or prove that her land has been gradually reduced. Art.366

of the Civil Code states that “the accretions which banks of

rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the currents

belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.”

Applying it to the case at bar, it is certain that the owner of

the hacienda has its possession and that Tuason has no title

to the accretion which by spontaneous increase formed the

strip of land between creek and the monuments and no

proof that the land of Tuason reached the other side of the

creek toward the hacienda.

(2) Opposition of municipality- the owner of the building

lots and portions of land to which the opposition refers is

the petitioner. The municipality has only usufruct of the plot

occupied. The municipality cannot dispose of it as a

property of its own because according to the documents

offered in evidence by the petitioner, the Spanish

Government had recognized the dominion of the

petitioner’s predecessor over the land occupied by the

municipality and the grant made by the owner was ever

understood as usufruct so long as used for public purpose

(3) Opposition of Aguirres-time prescribed, the appellant

have not filed their brief therefore considered abandone

19. Cureg vs iac

Facts:

- on nov 5,1982, resp filed a complaint for quieting of the

title and damages with preliminary injunction against pet

with the Rtc Isabela. A tro was issued by Tc on nov 12

- complaint alleges that resp are the legal and the forced

heirs of the late domingo gerardo. That since time

immemorial, the late domingo gerardo together with his

predecessors-in-interest have been in actual open peaceand continuous possession under a bona fide claim of

ownership and adverse to all other claimants of a parcel

land ("motherland") situated in isabela (2.5000heactares

- the land was subsequently verbally sold by the heirs to

resp Domingo apostol.

- sept 10,1982 verbal sale was reduced into writing by th

vendors who executed an "extra-judicial partition with

voluntary reconveyance"; that about the time of the

execution of the extra-judicial partition, their "motherlan

already showed signs of accretions of about 3 hectares o

the birth caused by the northward movement of the

Cagayan river;

- that on about last week of sept or first week oct 1982,

when resps were about to cultivate the land together wit

its accretion, they were prevented by pet. Stating that pe

(heirs of Antonio carniyan) was the owner of a piece of la

in Isabella (2790sqm more or less bounded on the north

domingo Gerardo) that Antonio revised on 1968 his tax

declaration to conform with the correct area and

boundaries of his OCT; that the area under the new tax

declaration was increased from 2790 sqm to 4584 sqm a

the boundary in the north became Cagayan river, purpos

eliminating completely the original boundary on the nort

which is Domingo Gerardo.

-pet alleged that the motherland claimed by resp is non-

existent; that the subject land is an accretion to their

registered land and the pet have been in possession and

cultivation of the accretion for many years now

- Tc held that resp thru his predecessor-in-interest had



already acquired an imperfect title to the subject land and

rendered judgment declaring resp absolute owner

- iac affirmed decision

Issue:

Won the subject land or accretion (which is bounded on the

north by the Cagayan river) belongs to the resp and not to

the pet when the pet OCT states clearly that the pet's Land

is bounded on its north by the Cagayan riverWon iac erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to

the resp who incredibly claimed that the accretion occurred

only in 1982 and is a gift from The Lord

Held:

- pet claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the

"subject land" which is an accretion to thee registers land

while resp claimed to be entitled to the 3.5 hectares

accretion attached to their "motherland"

- resp claim of ownership is anchored mainly on 4 taxdeclarations. Declaration of ownership for purposes of

assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient

evidence to prove ownership. Pet relied on their OCT issued

in the name of Antonio carniyan pursuant to free patent

clearly showing the boundary of let's land on the both is

Cagayan river and not the motherland claimed by

respondents.

- tax declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an

original certificate of title which is of a later date. Since pet's

OcT clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north

by the Cagayan river, resp's claim over their motherland

allegedly existing bet pet's land and the Cagayan river is

deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of the OCT

- rule: decree of registration bars all claims and rights which

arose or mag have existed prior to the decree of registration

- the subject land is an alluvial deposit left by the northward

movement of the Cagayan river and art 457 civil code: to

the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the

accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of

the current of the waters.

- the increase in the area of pet's Lang being an accretion

left by the change of course of the northward movement of

the Cagayan river does not automatically become registered

land because the lot which receives such accretion is

covered by a torrens title. Hence it must also be place under

the operation of the torrens system

- petition granted

20. C.N. Hodges vs Garcia

Facts:

• A lot, which was formerly a part of Lot No. 908 of the

Cadastral Survey of Jaro, Iloilo, was plaintiff C.N. Hodges

from Salustiano Mirasol and subsequently registered in h

name as evidenced by a TCT issued by the Register of De

of Iloilo. This property was bounded on the north by the

Salog River. Adjoining that river on the other side is Lot N

2290, which was purchased by Amador D. Garcia from Dr

Manuel Hechanova.• Garcia had the land he bought resurveyed. The survey

disclosed that the land, which was originally surveyed in

1912 and was then bounded on the SE and SW by the Sal

river, had increased in area by the river bank, and that th

added area, which bounds the land on the SE and SW, is

turn bounded on the SE and SW by the Salog river.

• In due time, defendant applied for the registration of th

additional area under the Land Registration Act. The

cadastral court rendered a decision holding that the land

sought to be registered is an accretion to Lot No. 2290 andecreeing that the land be registered in his name. OCT w

issued in favor of Garcia.

• CN Hodges filed an action with the CFI Iloilo for the

possession of a portion of land designated as Lot 908-Q w

an area of 5,931 sq. m., which he claims that the portion

the area added to Lot No. 2290 was separated from his L

No. 908 by the current of the river when the Salog river

changed its course, and the separation was abrupt, like in

avulsion, so that under Art. 374 of the Civil Code (Art. 463

the new) he retains ownership thereof. The court ruled i

favor of Garcia.

• Hodges appealed to the CA. The appellate court certifie

the case to SC that it was decided upon a stipulation of fa

and for that reason question of facts can no longer be rai

on appeal.

Issue: who has better right over the lot in question

Held: It clearly appearing that the land in question has

become part of Garcia's estate as a result of accretion, it

follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that t

accretion to his land used to pertain to Hodges's estate,

which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot

preclude Garcia from being the owner thereof. Registrat

does not protect the riparian owner against the diminuti

of the area of his land through gradual changes in the

course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the ban

of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the

current become the property of the owners of the banks



(Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; art. 457 of the new.) Such

accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on

running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that

respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act.

(Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, supra).

21 BAES vs CA

FACTS: The gov’t dugged a canal on a private parcel of landto streamline the Tripa de Gallina Creek. This lot was later

acquired by Baes. The lot was divided into 3 parcels. The

government gave him another equivalent parcel as

compensation since the middle part (B) of Baes’ lot was

covered by the canal. Baes had the Aand C parcel

resurveyed. He submitted a petition for the approval of his

resurvey and subdivision plans, claiming that after the said

lots were plotted by a competent surveyor, it was found

that there were errors in respect of their bearings and

distances. This was approved by the CFI.The Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot B the

petitioners had erected an apartment building, covered Lot

3611 of the Pasay Cadastre, which is a filled-up portion of

the Tripa de Gallina creek. Moreover, lot C had been

unlawfully enlarged. The RTC then ruled that lot C be

reverted back to its status before the resurvey of the said

lot.

The only remaining dispute relates to lot B, which the

petitioners, relying on Article 461 of the Civil Code, are

claiming as their own. The government rejects this claim

and avers that the petitioners had already been fully

compensated for it

ISSUE:WON Baes owned Lot 1-B.

RULING:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the

petitioners. It is so ordered.”

Art. 461, NCC

– River beds abandoned through NATURAL CHANGE ipso

facto belong to owner whose lands are occupied by the new

course in proportion to the are lost. Owners of the land

adjoining the river bed have the right to acquire by paying

its value (must not exceed value of new bed’s area)

If change is due to concessioners authorized by the

Government, the concession may be granted to

concessioners. No grant = land belongs to owners of land

covered by the waters. Must not prejudice tge superior

rights of third persons with sufficient title.

If a riparian owner is entitled to compensation for

damage/loss due to natural reasons, there is no reson no

compensate when the change was effected through

artificial means.

The loss was caused by a deliberate act of Government. T

Government is obliged to compensate Baes for the loss.

However, Baes has already been compensated through t

fair exchange of lots between him and the Government.

22. Santos v. Bernabe

*Facts: Urbano Santos deposited in Jose Bernabe’s

warehouse 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay and Pablo

Tiongson 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of same grain. Tiongso

filed with CFI of Bulacan a complaint against Bernabe, to

recover from the latter 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay

deposited in Bernabe’s warehouse. The application of

Tiongson for a writ of attachment was granted and the

attachable property of Bernabe including 924 cavans and½ kilos of palay were attached and sold at public auction

and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson. Santos

intervened in the attachment of the palay, but the sherif

proceeded with te attachment. It does not appear that th

sacks of palay of Santos and Tionsgon deposited in the

warehouse of Bernabe bore any marks that they were

separated from one another. Santos claimed that Tiongs

cannot claim that the 924 cavans and 31 ½ kilos of palay

were part of what he deposited to Bernabe’s warehouse

*Issue: Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavan

of rice as his own.

*Held: No. Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans a

palay proportionately.

The cavans belonging to Santos, having been mixed with

those belonging to Tiongson, the following rule prescribe

Article 381 of the Civil Code shall be applied: “If, by will o

one of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar

nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if

the latter case, the things cannot be separated without

injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture

proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to

value of the things mixed or comingled.”

The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determin

the Court took the proportion only of the 924 cavans of

palay which were attached and sold, therby giving Santos

who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and Tiongson, who



deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the

rate of 3Php per cavan.

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