Strikes in Brazil, 1961-1964

Felipe Pereira LoureiroPhD candidate in Economic History, University of São Paulo (USP)

December, 2009

Scholars often discussed the role of strikes in capitalist economies, emphasizing whether strikes are the causes or the symptoms of social changes1. Some authors advocate that strikes are closely related to the evolution of several macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and unemployment2. Others point that strike activity, at least in the long run, should be interpreted as mainly connected with the level of labour`s organization, and not only with economic issues3. More recent research, though, employing original data settings and diverse methodological frameworks, highlight the importance of the micro-foundations of the bargaining process between workers and entrepreneurs as a way to understand how strikes are induced4.

The debates on the patterns of strike activity in Latin America, however, are much less developed than that of Europe, Oceania and North America. The reason for this relies primarily on the nature of the data available. In contrast with their counterparts in the Northern Hemisphere, who kept detailed records on strikes since the beginning of the twentieth century, Latin American countries produced trustworthy and continuous statistics on strikes only in the last decades of that century. Before that, all we have is a scattered and unreliable set of data manipulated by public organs, like in Argentina, or, worse, no permanent quantitative information at all, like in Brazil5. To offset these disadvantages, many scholars have attempted to construct annually, or even monthly, series of Latin American´s strikes, relying on newspapers, magazines and official reports6. However, as will be further developed, this historiography presents some

1 For a survey on the historiography of strikes see Roberto Franzosi, ´One hundred years of strike statistics: methodological and theoretical issues in quantitative strike researches`, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 42, No. 3, (1989), pp. 348-62. 2 Orley Ashenfelter and George Johnson, ´Bargaining theory, trade unions and industrial strike activity`, American Economic Review, Vol. 59, (1969), pp. 35-49; John Pencavel, ´An investigation into industrial strike activity in Britain`, Econometrica, Vol. 37, No. 147, (1970), pp. 239-56; Douglas Smith, ´The determinants of strike activity in Canada`, Industrial Relations, Vol. 27, No. 4, (1972), pp. 663-67. 3 Charles Tilly and Edward Shorter, Strikes in France 1830-1968, (Cambridge 1974); David Snyder, ´Institutional setting and industrial conflict: a comparative analysis of France, Italy and United States`, American Sociological Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, (1975), pp. 259-78; James Cronin, Industrial conflict in modern Britain, (Croom Helm 1979); Paul K. Edwards, Strikes in the United States, 1881-1974, (St. Martin´s 1981); Roberto Franzosi, The puzzle of strikes: class and state strategies in postwar Italy, (Cambridge 1995). 4 Alan Harrison, ´Contracts and strikes in Canada, 1952-1988`, The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d´Economique, Vol. 29, Part 1, (1996), pp. 76-83.; Peter Crampton et al., ´The effect of collective bargaining legislation on strikes and wages`, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 81, No. 3, (1999), pp. 475-87; Sandra Cockfield, ´State regulation and collective action in three workplaces, 1900 to the 1920s`, Labour History, No. 93, (Nov. 2007), pp. 35-55. 5 See, for instance, the ´Statistics of Strikes` (Estadísticas del Huelgas), published by the Labour Department of the Argentine Republic between 1907 and 1939. Besides changing methodologies for gathering data, these Statistics countered only the strikes that happened in the city of Buenos Aires. See James W. McGuire, ´Strikes in Argentina: data sources and recent trends`, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 31, No. 3, (1996), pp. 128-9. 6 Francisco Weffort, ´Sindicatos e política`, unpubli. PhD. diss., (University of São Paulo 1973); Roberto P. Korzeniewicz, ´Las vesperas del Peronismo. Los conflitos laborales entre 1930 y 1943`, Desarrollo Económico, Vol. 33, No. 131, (1993), pp. 323-54; Salvador Sandoval, Os trabalhadores param. Greves e mudança social no Brasil, 1945-1990, (Ática 1994); Guillermo O´Donnell, ´Argentine domestic violence

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methodological weaknesses, because either it employed only the quantity of strikes as the foundation of its analyses, or it made assessments that extended beyond the capabilities of its data basis. Therefore, many of the conclusions of these studies are tenuous.

This article seeks to establish a better understanding of strikes in Latin America by analysing the pattern of strike activity of the non-agricultural workforce in Brazil during Jânio Quadros` (January to August 1961) and João Goulart`s (September 1961 to March 1964) governments. The article diverges from the typical methodology that is used to examine strike activity in Latin America, offering a different method to assess the issue. In addition, many specialists recognize the period under scrutiny as one of great importance for Brazil, not only because of the economic unbalances and social unrests at that moment, but also because it immediately precedes the 1964 military coup, which introduced a dictatorship in Brazil that lasted until 19857.

Regarding labour strikes specifically during Jânio Quadros` and João Goulart`s governments, one can divide the historiographical interpretations into mainly three groups. The first of these, typified by the works of Weffort and Sandoval, holds that Brazilian labour unions were characterized, at that time, by a great dependence on the State8. This reliance, according to the authors, was perceptible because of the workers` grievances, which were dominated by political themes, especially those of interest to the President João Goulart. Weffort and Sandoval conclude, thus, that this close connection with the State was responsible for the labour unions` lack of resistance when the 1964 military coup occurred.

The second interpretation, in turn, that is typified especially by the studies of Erickson and Leite, points out that the beginning of the sixties in Brazil recorded a significantly enlargement in the number of strikes, related directly to increasing inflation and, consequently, to the impoverishment of the people9. Due to this, according to the authors, most of the strikes at that period were fomented by economic grievances, especially increased wages and not political demands. Indeed, Erickson asserts that the political-led strikes that presented satisfactory results were the ones also addressed the worsening of people`s material conditions, such as the July 1962 national strike, which enhanced political and economic grievances and was shaped by an environment of rising prices. It is important to assert, though, that theses scholars do not present sufficient data to sustain their conclusions. Erickson, for instance, does not produce a general strike inventory, but, instead, catalogues only the most striking Brazilian 1960s stoppages. Although this may give some guidelines about the pattern of strikes, it does not provide sufficient empirical evidence to support the author`s assertions on the issue.

and economic data, 1955-1972`, ICPSR 5213, Ann Arbor, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, (2000), s.p.; Marcelo Badaró Mattos (ed.), Greves e repressão policial ao sindicalismo carioca (1945-1964), (APERJ/FAPERJ 2004).7 For a survey on the historiography about Jânio Quadros´ and João Goulart´s governments, see Carlos Fico, Além do golpe: versões e controvérsias sobre 1964 e a ditadura militar, (Record 2004), pp. 15-58. 8 Weffort, ´Sindicatos e política`; Sandoval, Os trabalhadores param. 9 Kenneth Erickson, Sindicalismo no processo político do Brasil, (Brasiliense 1979); Maria de Paula Leite, ´Sindicatos e trabalhadores na crise do populismo`, Unpub. PhD. diss., (Universidade Estadual de Campinas 1983). The classical study of Rodrigues also addressed the positive relationship between inflation and strikes in Brazil. See Leôncio Martins Rodrigues, Conflito industrial e sindicalismo no Brasil, (Difel 1966).

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The third interpretation, to finish with, is specially represented by Mattos10. The author claims that Erickson and Leite were right when they advocated that the level of strike activity in Brazil increased during the beginning of the sixties. However, Mattos emphasizes two important things: first, the author points out that one cannot simply attest that economic grievances were the most important type of demands within Brazilian labour movement. Mattos argues that, although this kind of demand has shown some quantitative predominance, economic strikes had been losing grounds to political and solidarity strikes throughout the opening of the decade. And, second, Mattos claims that various strikes occurred without the influence, or the direct participation, of labour unions, but, instead, were initiated by rank-and-file workers. According to the author, this feature complicates the conclusions of Weffort and Sandoval about the dependence of the Brazilian labour movement on the State.

One of the purposes of the article, thus, is to verify if, and to what extent, the main conclusions developed by scholars on the Brazilian 1960s strikes hold. It is hoped that the data presented in this article shed some light on this debate, as well as contribute to a better understanding of the development labour movements in Latin America

In addition to this introduction, this paper is divided in four sections. Section one describes the characteristics of the methodology employed to examine Brazilian urban strikes. Sections two and three present the pattern of distribution of strike activity in Brazil according to its insensitiveness, as well as to the workers´ grievances. Finally, section four frames our conclusions.

1. The methodology for analysing strikes in Brazil

As in other Latin American countries, continuous and reliable statistics accounting for Brazilian urban strikes appear only appear at the beginning of the 1980s11. Before that, the main source of information we have is the press, whether workers´ syndicate periodicals or national or local newspapers. These kinds of sources, however, bring several restrictions for researchers12. Firstly, commercial newspapers usually do not report small urban strikes, due to a lack of concern, or a lack of structure13. Secondly, newspapers do not systematically give information on the number of workers involved or the duration of strikes. Thirdly, as periodicals have political bias, an overestimate or an undervaluation of the number of strikes might occur, depending on the support that a specific newspaper gives to the ruling government. When it comes to labour´s newspapers, this ideological issue usually turns out to be problematic. A communist-biased periodical, for example, tends to neglect strikers driven by its ideological and political enemies, and vice-and-versa.

Nevertheless, there is no escape for those who wish to study strike activity in Latin America in the long run unless one employs newspapers as sources. To do that,

10 Mattos, Greves e repressão. 11 Since 1983, the Inter-union Department for Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (DIEESE, in its acronym in Portuguese), an autonomous organism that had been created by Brazilian workers´ syndicates, started to publish monthly data about urban strikes, including information on number of strikers, quantity of days lost as well as sectors involved in stoppages. See Paulo Pichetti, ´Towards an economic theory of strikes: further evidence from Brazilian data`, Unpubli. PhD, University of Illinois, 1995.12 Roberto Franzosi, ´The press as a source of socio-historical data: issues in the methodology of data collection from newspapers`, Historical Methods, Vol. 20, No. 1, (1987), pp. 5-16. 13 The coverage of Brazilian rural strikes by newspapers was almost inexistent. Even the peasant periodicals, such as “A Liga”, published by the Peasant Leagues in the beginning of the 1960s, did not present systematically data on the issue. For that reason, we choose to analyse only the Brazilian urban strikes.

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however, some precautions must be taken. First, it is required to rely upon a range of newspapers, selecting those that have, preferentially, different ideological perspectives. This tends to unbias the number and the types of strikes accounted for. In addition, one should only use the kind of data that was found in all strike observations, and not in some of them. As it keeps the homogeneity of the information drawn from the sample, this procedure allows one to make comparisons between different strike periods.

Unfortunately, though, long run studies produced on Brazilian strikes have not taken these precautions14. Some scholars, such as Weffort and Sandoval, for example, based their researches on a single commercial newspaper (Folha de São Paulo)15. Furthermore, Weffort applied only the absolute number of strikes as a parameter to analyse strike activity in Brazil. Although this variable might give a rough picture of the patterns of strike movements in a given region, it may also result in misleading conclusions. For instance, suppose that, in two consecutive years, one hundred and two hundred strikes, respectively, occurred in a particular country. At first glance, one could address that the labour conflict during the second year was more intense than in the former. However, if the strikes of the first year had involved a greater number of workers and had lasted longer than of the second year, any conclusion drawn only from the absolute number of strikes would be problematic.

Others scholars, such as Mattos and again Sandoval, base their researches on a more exhaustive range of variables – such as the duration and the size of the strikes –, and not just the number of strikes itself. Yet they did this without considering the homogeneity and the representativeness of the variables they gathered. As the newspapers inform the duration and the number of workers involved in only some and not in all strikes, any comparison on strike volume woven between different periods might lead to thorny conclusions16. Mattos, for instance, evaluated the quantity of workers involved in Brazilian strikes in the years of 1946 and 1962, but he was able to collected data on this variable in only 16,2% and 18,03% of the strikes published in newspapers for those respective years. Of course any assessment relying on this method would be difficult, as we do not know the size of more than eighty percent of the strikes that happened in 1946 and in 1962. One could argue, nevertheless, that if Mattos had employed inferential statistics that limitation would have been overcome. In fact, that difficulty would still remain, because, as the author did not obtain random the data on strike sizes, the samples would be spurious for statistical procedures. Besides all these drawbacks, Mattos does not hesitate to determine the volume of strikes in 1946 and 1962, concluding that the average of workers involved in strikes was higher in the former than in the latter year17.

This article used two methods to attempt to surpass some of the limitations embedded in the employment of periodicals to inventory strikes. First, it increases the survey of newspapers used as sources. Although the catalogue of strikes elaborated by

14 Narrower-scoped studies, which focused on specific strikes or on precise economic sectors, will not be taking into account here, as well as the studies on Brazilian strikes from the two last decades of the twentieth century, which were supplied with better data sets. 15 Weffort, ´Sindicatos e política`; Sandoval, Os trabalhadores param. 16 Scholars usually understand as volume of strikes the parallelepiped shape that is formed when one plots in a three-dimension graph its duration (number of hours or days lost due to strikes per striker), its size (number of strikers per strike) and its frequency (number of strikes per one hundred thousand workers in the appropriate segment of the labour force). On the volume of strikes, see Shorter and Tilly, Strikes, pp. 46-77; and Douglas Hibbs Jr., ´On the political economy of long-run trends of strike activity`, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 2, (1978), p. 156. 17 Mattos, Greves e repressão, pp. 46-7.

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Weffort is taken into consideration, the article relies upon three others periodicals, namely O Estado de São Paulo, Última Hora and Novos Rumos. The first two were national commercial newspapers and originated from two of the most important Brazilian economic regions: the state of São Paulo and the state of Rio de Janeiro, respectively. They had also contrasting ideological backgrounds. While O Estado de São Paulo was very conservative, Última Hora advocated a more advanced social position and supported the politicians of the Brazilian Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro [PTB]), including the President João Goulart18. Novos Rumos, in turn, was published by the Communist Brazilian Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro [PCB]) and was mainly directed to workers. This explains its well-structured coverage on strikes, especially on those that had been launched by communist leaders. One may argue, though, that our selected range of newspapers still presents limitations, especially because of its regional bias, focused mainly on southeast states. Although these periodicals owned a national-wide coverage, theoretically publishing news on strikes in other Brazilian regions, it is a fact that their coverage in states such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara (actually, the city of Rio de Janeiro), Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul war broader and better. However, these states accounted for more than 70% of the Brazilian industrial labour force in 195819. As the research process in newspapers is very time-consuming, it was assumed that it would be better to use these papers to construct an inventory of strikes that was quintessential to the universe of non-agricultural Brazilian workers than to use others that presented different kinds of regional favouritism but that lacked representativeness.

Second, in order to reconcile scholarship that either employed only the number of strikes as their indicator of the level of strike activity (Weffort) or that dealt with variables that accounted for size and duration of strikes (Mattos and Sandoval), different ordinal variables were developed to measure the pattern of strikes in Brazil during the beginning of the 1960s. Strikes, thus, were split according to three distinct parameters: location, sector broadness and labour categories20. When it comes to location, they were divided into five groups: municipal, inter-municipal, state, inter-state and national strikes. In reference to sector broadness, they were detached in four sets: unitary, sector, inter-sector and general strikes. And, finally, in relation to labour categories, they were split into three groups: manufacturing sector, essential service sector and secondary service sector strikes.

It is important to assert some characteristics of these variables. First, they were based on information found in all strike observations gathered from newspapers – and not only on some observations, as some scholars have proceeded. This allows us, therefore, to make comparisons among different strike periods.

Second, the first two sets of variables (location and sector broadness) work as proxies of the size of the strikes, e.g., they are related somehow with the number of workers involved on stoppages. An ordinal ranking of the size of the strike is based on a scale where the categories municipal-unity and national-general strikes represent minimal and maximum parameters. However, these parameters have two weaknesses: they cannot measure the impact of strikes when it comes to duration and, sometimes, 18 The Brazilian Labour Party, notwithstanding its name, was launched by one of the most important Brazilian politicians of the twentieth century, Getúlio Vargas, who ruled Brazil for almost twenty years (1930-45 / 1951-54), being part of this period as a dictator (1937-45). See Lucília de Almeida Delgado, PTB: do getulismo ao reformismo, (Marco Zero 1989).19 Anuário Estatístico do Brasil (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 1961), p 90-2. 20 Specific information on the content and on the methodological boundaries of the variables presented below are in the Appendix A.

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they can be deceptive. Misleading with these parameters might occur, for instance, if we compare a strike that happened in the city of São Paulo, which has the biggest population of all Brazilian cities, with other that occurred in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, one of the smallest states within the Brazilian Federation in population terms. Although the first strike should have been greater in size than the second, the latter would be categorized, accordingly to our methodology, as a state-wide strike, while the former, only as a municipal one. This scale above would have been deceptive, since, in this case, the municipal strike was probably larger than the state-wide one. Notwithstanding this limitation, we consider that is better to utilize these parameters than simply rejecting them, because the alternative would be to apply the crude number of strikes as the unique data reference for our analyses.

A third feature of the methodology is that it can compare between distinctive strike periods only if considering data to calculate the strike frequency. For our purposes, we are dealing with a restrict number of years (1961-64). In these situations, concerns on strike frequency, albeit important, are less significant.

Finally, the third set of variables (labour categories) should be interpreted as proxies of the strikes` impact on the economy. This means that manufacturing strikes and essential service strikes, which include stoppages on railways, merchant ships, ports, energy companies, etc., will be considered more influential in the determination of to the level of national product than secondary services strikes, comprised by sectors – through significant, such as hospitals and schools – that do not have straight and immediate relationship to the production and distribution of goods in society.

Strikes were also split according to labour grievances. Ten variables were built in reference to the latter, encompassing various types of economic and political demands. Framed into this methodology, the next two sections will present some evidence extracted from the data gathered.

2. The pattern of strikes during Jânio Quadros` and João Goulart`s governments

If one accepts the quantity of strikes as a good parameter to measure the level of labour conflict within a given society, it would be undeniable that class conflict in Brazil, at least in urban areas, increased during the beginning of the sixties. Figure 1 demonstrates that there was a growth in the quantity of strikes between the years of 1961 and 1963. This expansion was particularly substantial after April 1962, and reached a peak in November 1963, when more than forty strikes happened in Brazil.

The pattern of Brazilian strike activity, however, was not linear. One can notice in Figure 1 that strikes occurred in a cyclical outline. With the exception of January, which presented a considerable quantity of strikes throughout 1961 and 1964, labour conflict was higher in the last semester of the calendar year. This pattern matches with the fact that many labour categories negotiated their wage readjustments at the end of the year. The debates over the minimal salary revision also frequently took place between September and December. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that these issues might have had a role in the shaping of the strikes outline.

It is interesting to note also in Figure 1 that the cyclical pattern shown by Brazilian strikes in the opening of the 1960s experienced a change following April 1962. From 1960 up to this period, the annual strikes cycles were more clearly defined, and had a similar average of strikes per month (Table 1). After April 1962, though, one can attest that strike activity in Brazil achieved a more linear and crescent (albeit initially erratic) pattern of evolution. By the beginning of 1963, however, the cyclical

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patter resumed, but with higher strike levels in both the low (February to August) and high phases (September to January).

It is necessary to ask at what extent this increase in the quantity of strikes post-April 1962 represented a similar enlargement in the number of workers evolved on stoppages. A possible way to approach this question is to verify if there were any changes in the relative distribution of strikes in reference to location and sector broadness. When it comes to the former of these parameters, one can attest that there were not great upheavals in relative distribution: municipal strikes largely predominated throughout the whole period with a stabile share, accounting for more than 70% of the Brazilian strikes. The minor downward changes presented by the distribution of the inter-municipal, inter-state and national strikes in 1963 were offset by the increasing of state strikes in the total number of stoppages (Table 1). Therefore, one cannot argue that the increasing quantity of strikes post-April 1962 featured a greater proportion of stoppages within narrower regional boundaries.

In relation to the sector broadness, there were perceptible changes in relative distribution. It is noticeable that the unitary and state strikes switched places; while the former showed a decrease in its participation during the period, the latter, proportionally, augmented its share on the aggregate strike distribution. The inter-sector strikes` participation grew substantially in 1963 as well. All these changes indicate that the quantity of strikes not only increased after April 1962, but also that although location parameters were maintained, strikes` impacts were broadened when sectors` dimensions are taken into account.

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Sources: Novos Rumos, O Estado de São Paulo and Última Hora, Jan. 1960 to Mar. 1964.

Table 1, Arithmetic mean of the monthly number of strikes, according to labour categories, location and sector broadness, Brazil, January 1961 to March 1964

Mean % of the total mean

1960 1961 1962 1963 1960-64† 1960 1961 1962 1963 1960-64†MS* 3,7 4,0 5,8 6,8 5,1 34,65 36,36 38,25 28,08 33,24SES 5,5 4,5 6,0 10,3 6,6 51,97 40,91 39,34 42,12 42,92SSS 1,2 2,3 2,7 5,8 3,0 11,03 20,45 17,49 23,97 19,48ISG 0,3 0,3 0,8 1,4 0,7 2,36 2,27 4,92 5,82 4,36M 7,9 8,3 11,2 18,7 11,5 74,81 75,75 73,23 76,71 75,34IM 0,6 1,2 1,3 0,8 1,0 5,51 10,61 8,20 3,42 6,27Sta 0,9 1,2 1,6 3,3 1,8 8,66 10,61 10,38 13,70 11,44ISta 0,6 0,3 0,5 0,6 0,5 5,51 2,27 3,28 2,40 3,13N 0,6 0,1 0,8 0,9 0,6 5,51 0,75 4,92 3,77 3,81U 6,1 5,2 5,8 7,7 6,2 57,48 46,97 37,70 31,51 40,33

Sec 3,9 5,3 8,7 14,8 8,2 37,01 48,48 56,83 60,96 53,54Isec 0,3 0,3 0,3 1,7 0,6 3,15 2,27 1,64 6,85 4,09G 0,2 0,3 0,6 0,3 0,3 1,58 2,27 3,82 1,03 2,04

Total 10,6 11,0 15,3 24,3 15,3 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

Sources: “Novos Rumos” (NR), “O Estado de São Paulo” (OESP), “Última Hora” (UH); Jan. 1960 to Mar. 1964.Notes: * Acronyms in this column stand for Manufacturing Sector (MS), Essential Service Sector (ESS), Secondary Service Sectors (SSS), Municipal (M), Inter-municipal (IM), State (Sta), Inter-state (ISta), National (N), Unitary (U), Sector (Sec), Inter-Sector (ISec) and General (G) strikes.† January 1960 to March 1964.

Still focusing on the changing pattern presented by strikes in reference to sector broadness, it is worth noting that a great proportion of unitary stoppages – such as those in 1960 – indicates that workers relied mainly upon organizational settings structured out of the official unions to enhance their grievances; as the law in Brazil did not allow the development of syndicates within labour units21. This confirms Mattos` assertions on the importance of the workers` rank-and-file organizations played in the strengthening of the labour struggle in Brazil during the Fourth Republic (1946-64)22. However, the steady increase of the proportion of the sector-wide strikes after 1961 suggests that that picture changed over time. Among the years of 1961 and 1963, the kind of strike that was hegemonic was not the municipal-unity, but the municipal-sector one, which

21 The so-called Unionization Law, enacted under Getúlio Vargas` regime (1930-45), allowed only the existence of one labour union per workers` category in a given territory. Within the municipal jurisdiction, there may be only one syndicate per category; within the state region, one federation of syndicates per category; and, in the national scope, one confederation representing the main economic sectors of the country (industry, commerce, agriculture, banking and transport services). Various scholars emphasized that this union`s structure was responsible for the control of the labour movements by the State, shaping, in the Brazilian Fourth Republic (1946-64), what has been named as the “Populism State” – e.g., a State ruled by a charismatic leader supported by a set of controlled workers` unions and by an compromise with elites sectors. See Erickson, Sindicalismo, pp. 53-7; and Hans Füchtner, Os sindicatos brasileiros de trabalhadores, (Graal 1980), pp. 87-112. 22 Mattos, Greves e repressão, pp. 224, 250.

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coincides exactly with the jurisdiction at the bottom level of the Brazilian workers` syndicates23. This organization suggests that, possibly, the official labour unions not only may have performed a greater role in the underpinning of the workers` mobilization at the dawn of the Fourth Republic, but also may not have been so tightly controlled by the State, as Weffort`s and Sandoval`s studies imply. Due to its importance, this idea deserves deeper consideration.

Throughout 1963, when Brazil was facing considerable external unbalances and rising inflation, President João Goulart consistently pursued the stabilization of the economy. These pro-stabilization efforts were at their highest during the beginning of the year, when the Plano Trienal (Three-Years Plan, 1963-65) was launched, under the guidance of Celso Furtado, one of the most famous Brazilian economists; and in the middle-end of 1963, when Carvalho Pinto, ex-Governor of the state of São Paulo, took over the Ministry of Finance24. In both periods, the government`s members attempted to establish contacts with entrepreneurial groups and with labour unions in order to settle a provisional agreement to lower inflation rates. In theory, while the government would compromise with the reduction of the public deficit, entrepreneurs would have to cooperate by not increasing prices; and workers, in turn, would have to accept lower wage readjustments25.

It is undeniable that an increase in the strike activity during these stabilization efforts would have been disastrous for the government, since strikes tend to have a negative effect on production, diminishing the supply of goods and, consequently, bringing pressure for the raising of inflation. Of course a wage boost, another possible outcome of stoppages, would also have weakened the government´s attempts to moderate prices` swells. In that sense, the growing of strikes post-April 1962, reaching a peak in November 1963 – constituted mainly by municipal-sector strikes –, indicates that the government did not have absolute control upon the official labour`s municipal unions. If the government had had that control, the increase in the quantity of stoppages would have been curtailed. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, during the weakening of the Plano Trienal, in May 1963, President João Goulart tried to establish a new labour central union, called Workers` Union Syndicate (União Sindical dos Trabalhadores [UST]), in order to replace the existent one, named Workers` General Command (Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores [CGT])26. According to Gilberto Crockat de Sá, the official assessor of the union for the government, the CGT was promoting irresponsible strikes and riots, which contributed to the weakening of the Brazilian economic development27. In contrast, the leaders of the UST emphasized the importance of the maintenance of the “social peace” between capitalists and workers, as well as condemned the employment of strikes as an approach to settle labour issues28. In spite of all the official support received by UST, the project was abandoned in the end of 1963, because of the lack of legitimacy that the new central union had among rank-and-file` labourers.

23 I want to thank Professor Alexandre Fortes for giving me this insight. 24 For general remarks on the economic policy draw by Goulart`s administration, see Mário Magalhães Mesquita, A política econômica sob Quadros e Goulart, Unpubl. PhD. Diss., (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro), pp. 118-236. 25 See declarations of the Brazilian policy-makers on the issue in “O Estado de São Paulo” (written afterwards as OESP), 20.11.1962, p. 6; 01.12.1962:14; and in “Última Hora” (written afterwards as UH), 23.10.1962, p. 13. 26 See the UST`s manifest of foundation in OESP, 28.05.1963, p. 927 See Crockat de Sá`s declarations on the issue in OESP, 19.05.1963, p. 25; UH, 20.05.1963, p. 2.28 OESP, 28.05.1963, p. 9.

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To sum up, the rising in the quantity of strikes post-April 1962 was followed by an increase in the sector broadness of the stoppages. The municipal-sector strikes constituted the majority of strikes between the years of 1961 and 1963 – coinciding with the lower official jurisdiction of the Brazilian syndicates. Thus, as the government was interested in promoting the social peace between labour and capital, in order to guarantee the accomplishments of its stabilization economic efforts, one can attest that an important part of the Brazilian union`s structure was, to say little, out of control of the State, contributing to the strengthening of the labour movement before the entrepreneurial groups.

However, when it comes to the distribution of the labour categories caught up in strikes, taking the year of 1961 as the reference for our analyses, it is noticeable that there was a shift in relative participation. The manufactured sector lost grounds to the essential service and, mainly, to the secondary service sectors between 1962 and 1963 (Table 1). This shifting means that the 1963´s strikes might have caused lower consequences for the level of the national product than the 1962`s stoppages. This tendency may have been counterbalanced, however, by the fact that, in 1963, the number of inter-sector strikes increased considerably, although the same cannot be said about the national ones (Table 1).

Combining the variables on Brazilian strikes shed new lights on this issue. One can note, in reference to the manufactured sector stoppages, that the period between the 1962`s third trimester and 1963`s second trimester featured a broadening, as the strikes embraced a great proportion of sector and state strikes. These kinds of stoppages in the last trimester of 1963 were characterized by contraction (Table 2). The essential services strikes, in turn, passed through two important moments: during the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1962, when the proportion of its unitary stoppages lost grounds to its sector strikes, whether in municipal, whether in state or even in national scopes; and during 1963`s second and third trimesters, when the proportion of its state and national strikes reached significant numbers. Finally, when it comes to the secondary services strikes, what is remarkable is that the increase in these strikes focused in the last two trimesters of 1963, especially the last one, when the participation of this sector`s stoppages peaked.

What can be addressed by these figures? First, these combined variables demonstrate that the increase of the quantity of strikes from 1962 on was not only more substantial than it had appeared before, but also that it caused considerable impacts on the economy, since the growth in the proportion of broader stoppages – in location and, especially, in sector terms – is noted in both the manufactured and the essential services sector. Second, the data shown that the year of 1963 has two distinctive periods: the first semester, although characterized by a lower number of strikes, might have presented great shocks on the economy, as it involved wide stoppages on important economic sectors; while the second semester, especially the last trimester of the year, might have caused lower damages for the national product despite the huge number of strikes, because many of these stoppages occurred in the non-essential sectors.

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Table 2, Relative distribution of strikes according to labour category, location and sector broadness split by trimesters, Brazil, 01.1960 - 03.1964, %

Sources: See Table 1 Notes:* For the acronyms of this column see Table 1.

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I.60 II.60 III.60 IV.60 I.61 II.61 III.61 IV.61 I.62 II.62 III.62 IV.62 I.63 II.63 III.63 IV.63 I.64 I.60 - I.64MS . M . U* 4,8 35,5 12,0 30,0 24,3 20,0 21,2 19,1 20,0 18,9 18,8 19,0 18,0 14,0 16,9 12,6 7,4 17,7MS . M . Sec 4,8 3,2 12,0 10,0 8,1 0,0 15,2 12,8 0,0 8,1 14,6 20,6 6,6 17,5 5,6 9,7 10,3 10,2MS . IM . Sec 4,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,7 0,0 2,1 2,9 0,0 0,0 1,6 3,3 5,3 1,4 0,0 1,5 1,5MS . Sta . Sec 0,0 0,0 4,0 0,0 2,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,1 3,2 1,6 1,8 2,8 0,0 1,5 1,2ESS . M . U 23,8 25,8 16,0 22,0 13,5 20,0 9,1 4,3 2,9 5,4 8,3 11,1 11,5 3,5 7,0 2,9 2,9 9,2ESS. Sta . U 14,3 3,2 4,0 2,0 10,8 6,7 0,0 2,1 2,9 2,7 0,0 3,2 0,0 7,0 4,2 3,9 0,0 3,4ESS . M. Sec 9,5 12,9 4,0 14,0 13,5 20,0 15,2 17,0 22,9 18,9 22,9 7,9 27,9 24,6 18,3 18,4 23,5 18,1

ESS . IM . Sec 9,5 0,0 0,0 2,0 0,0 6,7 6,1 2,1 5,7 8,1 0,0 3,2 1,6 0,0 0,0 1,0 1,5 2,1ESS . Sta . Sec 0,0 0,0 8,0 0,0 2,7 0,0 3,0 4,3 5,7 0,0 4,2 1,6 1,6 5,3 7,0 1,0 2,9 2,9ESS . N . Sec 9,5 0,0 0,0 6,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,1 8,6 2,7 2,1 1,6 1,6 3,5 4,2 0,0 2,9 2,5SSS . M . U 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,0 5,4 13,3 6,1 6,4 0,0 0,0 8,3 3,2 1,6 5,3 1,4 8,7 10,3 4,7

SSS . M . Sec 4,8 9,7 24,0 0,0 5,4 6,7 6,1 14,9 11,4 10,8 8,3 9,5 8,2 5,3 15,5 22,3 11,8 11,2SSS . Sta . Sec 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,0 2,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,9 0,0 2,1 4,8 3,3 1,8 2,8 4,9 1,5 2,2

Isec . M 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,2 4,9 0,0 4,2 3,9 0,0 1,5G . M 0,0 0,0 4,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,0 0,0 0,0 5,4 4,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 0,0 2,9 1,1

% total strikes 85,8 90,3 88,0 92,0 89,1 100,0 85,0 87,2 85,9 81,0 95,9 93,7 91,7 94,9 92,7 89,3 80,9 89,5

This increase in the Brazilian strike activity between 1962 and 1963 may also be identified in other sources, such as in entrepreneurs` reports. In a meeting with the Ministry of Planning in the beginning of 1963, for instance, the Vice-President of the National Confederation of the Industry (Confederação Nacional da Indústria [CNI]), Fábio Araújo Mota, stated that it would be impossible for industrialists to keep the production in pace with governments` expectations because of the great number of strikes. Araújo Mota said yet that some union leaders would transform Brazil in a “grevelândia” (e.g., a land of strikes) if the government did not do anything29. Similarly, in a telegraph message dated May 1963, the Industrial Federation of the State of São Paulo (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo [FIESP]) demanded actions from President João Goulart against strikes. Accordingly to FIESP, it would be impracticable to execute an economic stabilization plan to reduce inflation, as Goulart´s government was trying to do at that time through Plano Trienal, with the “subversion” of the social order fomented by labour movements through strikes30.

It seems reasonable to argue that strike activity in Brazil reached considerable levels after April 1962, especially during 1963. This timing is crucial because we are dealing with a period characterized by governments` simultaneous efforts to reduce inflation and to maintain the rhythm of growth. Many historians pointed out that the governments` failure to reach these goals constitute one of the factors leading to the social and political unrest that prevailed in Brazil in the lead-up to the 1964 Military Coup31. It is logical to suppose that the increase in strike activity might have impeded the application of the economic stabilization plans. This happened not only because of the intrinsic consequences that strikes normally induce (outputs` curtailment, supplies` shortages, etc), but also because of the nature of the workers` grievances (wage readjustments, for instance). Given the importance of labour demands, we will focus on that matter in the next section.

3. Strikes` grievances during Jânio Quadros` and João Goulart`s governments

The first noticeable feature of the strikers` grievances in Brazil during the beginning of the sixties was the prominence of economic issues, especially with respect to wages. From 1960 until March 1964, one can observe that more than 80% of complains were constituted by demands related to salaries and or to improvements of the conditions within the workplace. Non-economic grievances, such as those associated with protests against labour dismissals, solidarity with other strikes and political agendas, accounted for less 15% of all stoppages during the period (Table 3).

At first glance one might attest that Erickson and Leite were right when they advocated that strikes during Jânio Quadros` and João Goulart`s governments were motivated mainly by economic themes. In general sense this position is correct. However, it is noteworthy that economic complains had been losing grounds to non-economic grievances during the years of 1960 through 1964. In 1963, for instance, more than 22% strikes came about because of the latter issues. Solidarity and political strikes, thus, were no longer quantitatively irrelevant within Brazilian labour movement, as they had been in 1960. Another interesting point is that even the composition of the

29 O Estado de São Paulo, (19.01.1963, p. 13). 30 O Estado de São Paulo (01.06.1963, p. 10). For similar grievances, see also the speech of Daniel Campos, one of the directors of the São Paulo`s Commercial Association (Associação Comercial do Estado de São Paulo [ACSP], in a meeting of the commercial entrepreneurs in Ata da 55o Reunião de Diretoria da ACSP, (15.05.1963, p. 13). 31 See Carlos Fico, Além do golpe, pp. 15-58

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economic themes was transformed during the period. Strikes motivated only by wage readjustments decreased in importance, while stoppages whose concerns were the enforcement of a labour right – e.g., the payment of the 13º Salary –, or the improvement of labour conditions (attached these were attached to wage grievances), presented greater significance (Table 3)32.

Table 3, Relative distribution of the labour grievances of strikes, Brazil, January 1960 to March 1964, %*

1960 1961 1962 1963 01-03.1964 01.1960-03.1964

1† 56,46 52,39 51,05 40,36 32,69 49,042 14,77 10,72 10,03 8,12 7,21 10,693 1,98 0,90 1,98 9,01 6,06 3,624 6,11 7,68 0,83 1,13 0,00 3,715 9,44 11,61 18,26 16,99 29,96 15,016 1,88 6,55 5,48 8,30 1,75 5,337 1,04 0,52 1,42 6,45 5,85 2,568 1,52 7,27 9,04 7,51 5,26 6,279 2,43 1,67 1,52 0,38 9,06 1,9410 4,37 0,69 0,40 1,76 2,15 1,83

Sources: Novos Rumos, O Estado de São Paulo, Última Hora; Jan. 1960 to Mar. 1964.Notes:* It was computed only the primer grievance of the strikers. The cases whose primer grievance was not indentified were matched whether into the fifth, whether into the ninth parameters. † The numbers within this first half of the column stand for: (1) wage readjustments; (2) wage delays; (3) 13° salary; (4) labour conditions; (5) wages and labour conditions; (6) protest against penalties for, or dismiss of workers; (7) solidarity; (8) political strikes; (9) economic and political grievances; and (10) unknown.

A closer look to the contents of one of the types of the so-called non-economic strikes – the solidarity ones, which presented the largest relative increase between 1962 and 1963 – may clarify why economic issues have contributed to the deepening of the collective sense of Brazilian workers. Many of the solidarity stoppages that happened in the beginning of the sixties came about to support strikers whose complains were constituted mainly by economic issues. This was seen, for instance, in the general solidarity strike that occurred in the city of Porto Alegre in October 1963, which endorsed the local banking employees fighting for a wage increase33. Another example took place in Recife, on December 1963, when shipping workers and dockworkers stopped their jobs to sponsor the municipal employees on banking and telegraphic sectors, whose demands were also for a salary increase. Of course that there were solidarity strikes motivated by issues that cannot be claimed as being strictly economic, such as the one organized in May 1963 by the railway workers at Guanabara, in

32 The 13º Salary Law was enacted by the National Congress in June 1962. It guaranteed an extra salary at the end of the year for all workers. Before that, some companies had given an optional Christmas Bonus for its employees as a mean to incentive them to be more productive and cooperative. See OESP, 28.06.1962, p. 05. 33 OESP, 04.10.1963, p. 7; UH, 04.10.1963, p. 2

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solidarity with the airplane workers` stoppage, which had been launched because of the dismissal of a union leader34.

What has to be stressed here is that, although economic issues accounted for the majority of the Brazilian strikes` grievances in the beginning of the sixties, the manifestation for those issues lost some importance throughout the years. The relative growth of the solidarity strikes is just an example of this phenomenon: a worker`s stoppage for a wage increase is for him or herself, while a stoppage for solidarity is clearly for a larger group. Although the latter was indirectly linked to an economic issue, the workers who participated in it were not acting in a pure selfish way. This demonstrates a higher level of class consciousness. The same must be assessed for the case of strikes whose workers were struggling for the fulfilment of their rights, such as when are demanded the inviolability of union leaders` jobs or the payment of dismissal fees for those who were fired. Again, if it is a fact that these strikers do not present an economic grievance that would instantly bring direct benefits for them, it is also undeniable that this kind of movement leads to middle and long-term economic implications for those workers as a category. Labour categories that are supported by weak syndicates – because its leaders, fearing to be dismissed, do not have the necessary insurance to struggle for the class –, will probably amass economic losses in the future.

In general terms, thus, it is reasonable to suppose that this increasing of the non-immediate economic strikes in Brazil during the beginning of the sixties tended to strengthen labour against capital in bargains and struggles. This may have occurred because solidarity stoppages are likely to increase the pressure on entrepreneurs to cede to workers` demands, while strikes for the fulfilment of labour rights have the propensity to enlarge the unity of workers and the power of unions. To test this hypothesis, one may look at evidence on the strike results. If one finds that the share of the victorious stoppages augments over time, a considerable support will have been achieved for the premise about the strengthening of the labour movement in Brazil, due to the expansion of non-economic strikes. However, the available data on the issue are greatly limited, hindering their appliance. The reason for this is that newspapers did not inform systematically how stoppages were settled. Throughout the period 1960-1964, more than 50% of the strikes` results, on average, were unknown, which obstructs any possibility of comparisons among the years.

There are, nevertheless, other ways to assess the subject. The first one is to look for evidence on labour wages. As Brazil was facing, in the opening of the sixties, a steady reduction in growth rates, it is reasonable to suggest that a real increase in workers` salaries would have to be related to a strengthening labour movement, since the demand for labour in Brazil was not raising at that time – which would have made pressures for salary increases –, and as the majority of strikes claimed, directly or indirectly, for wage increases. The problem is it is difficult to apply time series analysis on the evidence on Brazilian wages during this period because the methodology for the presentation of these data passed through major changes after 1962. Before this year, salaries in the manufactured sector were determined only by manual workers` wages; in 1963, though, engineers and technicians were also included in the variable35. This, of course, impedes comparisons on wages between the periods of 1960-62 and 1963-64.

In a recent paper, though, Renato Colistete overcomes this methodological limitation, using the 1962-relative participation of manual workers` wages in total wages to predict labour salaries for the following years. Colistete develops distinct 34 OESP, 01.06.1963, p. 1035 For wages` data on the Brazilian manufactured sector, see Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, (1960 - 1967).

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possible scenarios for the evolution of wages in the period, applying three different price indexes and even a more pessimistic picture for the sharing of total wages between manual and intellectual workers. In all cases, the result was the same: the salaries of workers on the Brazilian manufacturing sector presented a real increase in 1963, ranging from 6,7% to 18,3%, depending on the perspective that is taken, whether the most pessimistic, whether the most optimistic. For the period 1960-62, though, the outcomes are much less impressive for workers: salaries present either a minimal increase, or a small decline, depending on the price index used. The same results from 1960-62 were assessed for 1964, when the Military Coup took place36. It seems to be that the economic gains were greater for workers in 1963, which is exactly the same year when, according to the strike`s data earlier presented, the Brazilian labour movement strengthened.

The second possible way to verify if, and to what extent, Brazilian workers were getting better economic results from their strikes is to look at entrepreneurial sources. One will find that not only capitalists were worried about the strikes` consequences on production`s levels – especially after 1962, as was quoted in the previous section –, but also that they were calling for the government to act against stoppages because of the impact on wage increases and, consequently, in the capacity of the enterprises to invest in the economy. In June 1963, for instance, the National Confederation of Industry (Confederação Nacional da Indústria [CNI]) published, in its monthly journal, an editorial maintaining that the “rising of strikes” and the intensification of wage grievances from workers would “compromise the dynamism of the Brazilian economy”, due to a lack of domestic saving in the short-run37. The same interpretation is found in a telegraph sent by FIESP to the Ministry of Labour dated October 1963. In the document, the President of the São Paulo`s Industrial Federation, Raphael Noschese, claimed that Brazilian inflation was being caused mainly by “salaries pressures” that “do not correspond to the rising of the living costs”. Because of that, Noschese demanded tough action from the government against the São Paulo`s labour unions that were planning to launch a wage-readjustment strike at that moment38. The most clear assessment, though, on the strengthening of the Brazilian labour syndicates and its consequences on the increase of wages was pronounced by one of the most important directors of the São Paulo`s Commercial Association, Ulpiano Almeida Prado, who, during one of its meetings, in February 1964, pointed out:

“Everyone knew about the consequences that would come up from this (a type of development relied upon inflation, draining resources from wage workers as a way to boost domestic savings), because, one day, wage workers would have to realize that they had been exploited and, then, they would organize themselves and react (via strikes), achieving greater wage increases in comparison to prices and, then, the rope would be pressed against everyone`s neck, including those who had prepared the knot”39.

One may contend that caution is necessary in weighting capitalists` complaints against wage increases during high-inflation contexts (as was Brazil´s case at that time), because they tend to protest even when they are getting greater proportions of the

36 Renato Perim Colistete, “Salários, produtividade e lucros na indústria brasileira, 1945-1978”, Revista de Economia Política, Vol. 29, No. 4, (2009), pp. 6-8; 15-8. 37 Desenvolvimento e Conjuntura, 07.1963, p. 5. 38 OESP, 22.10.1963, p. 18. 39 90º Act of the ACSP`s Directory Meeting, 04.02.1964, p. 8.

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domestic surplus. However, the wide-range and the intensification of the entrepreneurial disapproval against post-1962 strikes` results, relative to the preceding years, are reasonable indicators of the strengthening of the local labour movements before capitalists. Moreover, one has to interpret these evidences in conjunction with the aforementioned results, such as the expansion of strikes` sector broadness, the enlargement of non-immediate economic stoppages and the real increases of labour wages – all events that took place after 1962, which reinforces the premise that Brazilian workers` power was expanding.

However, even if one assumes that labour strengthened before capital in Brazil in the beginning of the 1960s, one must ask what factors were responsible for that reinforcement. There are at least two aspects that need to be emphasised here. The first one is related to the boost of inflation. Figure 2 shows that the Brazilian Customer Price Index (Índice de Preço ao Consumidor, IPC) accelerated after 1962, presenting considerable growth rates during the year of 1963. In a situation just like this, featuring exponential inflation, economic agents who get relatively fixed revenues, such as manufacturing workers, tend to diminish their relative share in the aggregate national income, unless they show some ability to achieve successive wage readjustments: whether pacifically, via indexation of salaries or a permanent and efficient labour-capital bargaining set-up; whether by force, struggling by means of strikes and other types of manifestation against capitalists.

There was not any mechanism of indexation of salaries in Brazil in the beginning of the sixties. In addition, the various entrepreneurs` complaints about excessive wage increases – interpreted as responsible for the inflation as well as for the impediments enterprises faced to invest – express that capitalists were not apt to give frequent salaries readjustments to workers under a conciliatory bargaining set-up. Thus, as strikes were being motivated mainly by economic issues and as wages presented a real growth during 1963, it seems to be that the boost in the Brazilian strike activity after April 1962 might have been determined, in part, by the growth of inflation rates. In fact, the correlation between the evolution of the Customer Price Index and of the number of

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Sources: Estatísticas Históricas do Brasil, IBGE, 1990, pp. 184-6, 245-7.

strikes in Brazil is quite high (r = 0,694)40. Although this statistic does not measure determination, it would be difficult to reject it entirely, since there is other evidence indicating the reasonableness of the assumption that strikes expanded partly due to the raise of inflation41.

In December 1963, the President João Goulart submitted a legislative proposal to the Federal Congress on the establishment of the so-called “moving salary” for all waged workers, including those employed in the public sector42. If enacted, this project would impose an automatic readjustment of wages when prices increased more than 5% during a three months-span. The authorities have justified the need for the indexation of salaries by means of “social peace”. According to the words of the Ministry of Finance, Carvalho Pinto, the project would be able to undermine strikes, responsible for transforming Brazil into “an aggressive and disruptive environment”43. The assumption beneath the government proposal was clear: as the rising prices accounted for the expansion of strikes, withdrawing that cause via the indexation of wages would make stoppages lose their principal reason to grow.

The reaction of several Brazilian workers` syndicates after the announcement of the presidential proposal somewhat confirms Carvalho Pinto`s belief on the determinacy of price increases in strike activity. Guanabara`s union leaders, for instance, criticized the “moving salary” project not only because it would “freeze labour wages compared to profits”, but also since it would “create a stranglehold setting for the workers` movement”, undercutting its strength to pursue greater salaries44. Similarly, some leaders of the Workers` General Command (CGT), the most important Brazilian labour organization, which supported the application of the “moving salary” (albeit with some criticism), feared that the indexation of wages “would bring negative effects on the mobilization of workers”45. In fact, CGT´s apprehension was real. It was just after the boost of Brazilian inflation that strikes became larger and more politicized: unitary stoppages offsetting sector ones, solidarity strikes expanding relative to those whose grievances were more self-motivated, etc. It is reasonable to suppose, thus, that the coefficient of correlation presented above expresses a significant degree of determinacy: since the rise of prices has a general effect on the level of workers` wages, it might also have encouraged the labour unity as a way for workers to defend their salaries` values.

The second issue that must be emphasized, as a key to clarify the rinsing in Brazilian strike activity, is the government strategy to deal with labour complaints. As was noted in the previous section, the type of stoppage that predominated after 1962 was the municipal-sector one, which coincides to the lower hierarchy of the official

40 Although there are several distinctions among the various Brazilian index prices, when it comes to the products taken as reference, to the location broadness of the gatherings and even to its methodological procedures, there were not great discrepancies on the calculation of the correlation coefficient when different index prices were employed. 41 The best option here would be to construct an econometric model that bring together some relevant variables, such as index prices and wages, as independent ones, in order to explain the evolution of the number of strikes. Unfortunately, there were not monthly data on labour salaries in Brazil during the beginning of the sixties. Other variables that might be used as proxies for workers` wages, such as labour consumption expenditure, were also not available in monthly terms. As to plot a regression of the quantity of strikes relied only upon index prices would give spurious results, the inference-statistics approach of the data was discarded. 42 OESP, 04.12.1963, p. 243 OESP, 07.12.1963, p. 18. Similar addresses were given by a high-grade director of the Ministry of Labour. See UH, 04.11.1963, p. 11. 44 UH, 10.12.1963, p. 10. 45 UH, 18.02.1964, p. 6.

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syndicates in Brazil. If one takes this evidence as an sign of the presence of the official unions in the organization of that strikes` boost – whether spearheading the majority of stoppages since its beginning, whether being obligated to carry on due to the rank-and-file`s pressures and initiatives –, one will have to take into account the fact that those unions were institutionally connected to the State. This means that the unions` actions depend somehow on the allowance of those who are within the State apparatus. In other words, there will not be a rinsing in strike activity relied upon the structure of the official syndicates, unless government actors were inclined to accept the idea that would be better to face labour struggles without the employment of repression. This was, in fact, the perspective advocated and, most of the time, applied by João Goulart during his tenure as President of Brazil.

The constant entrepreneurs` complaints about the close connection between João Goulart and subversive union`s leaders were associated mainly with two aspects of the President`s approach towards labour issues: first, Goulart respected, at least superficially, the democratic dynamics of the syndicates and the workers` right to strike46. Various were the situations when capitalists demanded for government to play a more prominent role within labour relations, whether suppressing “illegal stoppages”, whether removing “subversive leaders” from unions` directories47. The President, however, in most of the cases, has not acted in such a way48. Second, Goulart believed that it would be better to set up alliances with left-wing union`s leaders instead of taking the risk of losing strategic syndicate`s positions for them. This is not to say that Goulart proceeded always like that, but that he was inclined to follow a consented rather than a sectary position when it comes to the labour movement49.

Some scholars addressed that Goulart acted in such a way due to the political returns guaranteed by workers` unions; others claimed that the President considered the social peace an essential element for the development of capitalism as well as for the economic growth. There are those who saw in Goulart`s actions a trial to have power over the left-wing groups, which would be better controlled not by the employment of pure repression, but, instead, by the exercise of an approximation`s approach50. For his narrower supports, however, such as Clodsmith Riani, President of the National Confederation of the Manufacturing Workers (CNTI) from 1961 to 1964, João Goualrt was has a “democratic bias”, which compelled him to respect all the ideological tendencies within the unions` movement51.

46 Goulart was frequently accused of employing several types of bribery to allocate the unions` leaders whom he trusts within the official syndicates. See, for example, the charges relied upon him on the 1961`s elections for the directory of the National Confederation of the Manufacturing Workers (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Indústria, 1961), in OESP, 12.12.1961, p. 2. 47 See, for instance, the entrepreneur`s calling for government to repress the “illegal (national-wide) strike” organized by the Workers` General Command (CGT) in September 1962 in OESP, 13.09.1962, p. 7. See also the entrepreneurs` claims that workers` unions in Recife were driven by “subversive purposes” in OESP, 12.09.1963, p. 6. 48 In December 1961, Goulart supported the repression of a general strike in São Paulo done by the regional`s military forces. See OESP, 15.12.1961, p. 2 49 The sponsorship given by Goulart to the launching of the Union Syndicate of Workers (UST), in June 1963, as a trial to weaken the communist-biased Workers` General Command (CGT), was a deviance to that position. 50 For the various interpretations on Goulart`s actions, see Marieta de Moraes Ferreira (ed.), João Goulart: entre a memória e a história, (FGV, 2006), pp. 7-30. 51 Interview with Clodsmith Riani, 18.08.2009. The communist union`s leaders, such as Raphael Martinelli and Hércules Correia dos Reis, addressed similar aspects of the President João Goulart. Interview with Raphael Martinelli, 30.06.2009; and interview with Hércules Correia dos Reis, Jornal do Brasil, 29.07.1979, s/p.

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Versions` on Goulart`s motivations aside, the thing is that the President did not intervened in an authoritarian way against syndicates and labour strikes, differently of what had happened, for instance, during the Dutra`s administration in Brazil (1946-51)52. If Goulart had put a severe control under unions` actions, workers would probably have developed other forms of protest and struggle in order to obtain their grievances, even if those forms were less efficient when it comes to the mobilization of a great number of people. However, since Goulart did not proceed like that, workers were able to use the official unions` structure as a way to better mobilize themselves and, consequently, to launch broader and more impacting strikes – especially after 1962, when inflation jumped rapidly in Brazil. It seems, thus, that the strengthening of labour movement, the specific approach performed by Goulart`s government when dealing with workers` syndicates and strikes, and the entrepreneurial reluctance to yield under labour`s grievances and, essentially, to accept government`s position on that issue might have had a significant role in the destabilization of the Brazilian democratic regime and, therefore, in the 1964 Military Coup.

4. Conclusions

The strike`s evidences outlined in this article suggest that the Brazilian labour movement strengthened in the beginning of the sixties, especially during the tenure of the President João Goulart (September 1961 to March 1964). Not only has the number of stoppages increased considerably, but also the quantity of workers involved has growth, as could be seen in the boost of the sector broadness of strikes. Other interesting evidence was the relative change in the distribution of stoppages` grievances: although mainly driven by economic issues, especially wage readjustments, strikes have become, in general, less immediate and self-centred, revealing a higher class-consciousness of the workers. The metaphor of this was the enlargement in the number of solidarity stoppages, when employees cease to work in order to strength the struggle of others, and not directly theirs.

It was also noticed that, after 1962, the municipal-sector strikes became the most representative kind of stoppage in Brazil. As its features coincided with the lower jurisdiction of the Brazilian official syndicates, it was suggested that this institutionalized unions` structure might have been employed to support the boost of stoppages in Brazil after 1962. These evidences, therefore, places some doubts on Mattos` remarks about the crescent role presented by workers` rank-and-file`s in the organization of labour struggles throughout the Brazilian Forth Republic (1946-64). This is not to say, of course, that the shop floor did not have any function in the mobilization of the workers during that context, but, instead, to recognize that the rank-and-file`s demands have been probably channelled by official unions.

The role played by the legal syndicates in the mobilization of the Brazilian workers between 1961 and 1964 might explain why Weffort and Sandoval have concluded that the labour movement in Brazil at that period was dependent of the State. The connection between workers and State, however, existed in relation to one of the tools employed by the formers to express their complaints for the society – e.g., via official unions –, but it was not true in reference to the way by means of which that tool was used. Two examples will be given to clarify what was said. During the fist-half of 1963, when the number of strikes took off – compounded, mostly, by municipal-sector stoppages –, the government was fighting firmly to achieve an economic stabilization of 52 Timoth Harding, The political history of the organized labor in Brazil, Unpub. PhD. diss., (Stanford, 1973), pp. 173-232.

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the Brazilian economy. If the State had had a locked control over the workers and of their syndicates, as Weffort and Sandoval addressed, this wave of stoppages would not have happened, since it would comprise the government`s effort to knock down the inflation. The same conclusion can be inferred when one takes the labour`s grievances into consideration. If the unions were strictly controlled by the State, the syndicates` demands tended to be mainly driven by political contents. However, the contrary has occurred, since the economic grievances, especially wage readjustments, have predominated all over the period. Needless to say that definitely this is not something that a government that was pursuing the decrease of inflation would push for.

It appears, therefore, that the institutional syndicate`s framework was auctioned by a growing and relatively autonomous labour movement. This was only viable because of two aspects: first, independently of the reasons, the President who was in charge allowed that; and, second, an social-encompassing phenomenon was taking place at that time, being partly responsible for the steadily mobilization of the workers. This phenomenon, in fact, was constituted by a triple basis: a booming inflation framed by lower growth rates of the domestic product, the inexistence of any automatic mechanism of wage readjustment, and the recalcitrant opposition of entrepreneurs to give in towards economic workers` grievances. In this situation, it became rational for workers to mobilize themselves even for the sake of others, since inflation was shrinking everyone`s salary. While the railway workers stop their job in order to support the wages` complaints of the dockworkers; in the future, it will follow the opposite: the latter bearing the former`s grievances. This tends to yield larger, stronger and more victorious strikes of both categories.

As the end, thus, it seems that Erickson and Leite were right: the strike boost that took place in Brazil during the opening of the sixties might have been largely motivated by the enhancing inflation and, consequently, by the impoverishment of workers. In fact, this interpretation is broadly correct. However, it presents an important limitation. Erickson and Leite have not recognized, for instance, how those economic incentives for employees to strike opened the way to a deeper consciousness of their interests as a social class. Even if one claims that this greater class-consciousness was still of little significance, because many of the solidarity strikes that came about through that period were backing economic-motivated and self-centred stoppages, it must be addressed, besides the fact that it constitutes a doubtful claim, that what is fundamental here is the outcome brought by a greater number of non-immediate economic strikes. And its major product is that this shift in the pattern of stoppages tends to alter the society`s equilibrium of power, favouring labour instead of capital when it comes to distribution of income. The rising shown by the real manufacturing wages in 1963, as well as the swelling of entrepreneurs` claims to the government on what was featured as a “subversive” labour mobilization, were just expressions of that relative change of power.

The strengthening of the Brazilian labour movement in the 1960s, framed by the decrease of the domestic economic growth, unleashed an open distributive conflict between labour and capital. As the João Goulart`s government has not taken decisively the side of the latter, the social unrest provoked by strikes was followed by a great political instability. A perfect indicative of the seriousness of the situation was given by a director of the São Paulo`s Commercial Association, in one of its locked meetings, in February 1964:

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“When the time comes, everyone desires to knock out inflation, but in the other`s side, not in his own. The time of the combat will arrive and we will be listed to struggle (…) Let´s army ourselves and march on!”53

In fact, the “time” came in 31 March 1964, when the President João Goulart was brought down by a Military Coup. After this, strikes were forbidden; official unions, intervened; syndicate`s leaders, jailed. At the end of that year, the military government announced an economic plan whose main intention was to throw the inflation down. Years behind, the prices` levels were reduced, as well as the participation of workers` wages in the aggregate income of the society. This shows that the entrepreneur quoted above was right: just one “side” would bear the process of “knocking out” the Brazilian inflation.

53 90º Act of the ACSP`s Directory Meeting, 04.02.1964, p. 8.

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Appendix – Methodological remarks on strikes` variables

When it comes to location, it was collected as a municipal strike the one that occurred within a given municipality; as an inter-municipal strike, the one that happened in more than two cities (belonging or not to the same state); as a state strike, the one that took place in a given Brazilian state; as an inter-state strike, the one that came about in more than two states; and, finally, as a national strike, the one that occurred, at least, in five Brazilian states, including the most important economic ones, such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul.

In reference to the sector broadness, on the other hand, it was assembled as a unity strike the one that happened only in a given unity of a particular economic sector (for instance, a stoppage that occurred within a textile factory); as a sector strike, the one that took place in the majority or in all unities of a given economic sector (say, a stoppage involving all textile factories of a given municipality); as a inter-sector strike, the one that arose in two or more economic sectors of a certain location (for example, a stoppage embracing textile and metallurgic factories); and, at last, the general strike, the one that hung together the majority of sectors of a particular region.

Finally, in relation to the labour categories, it was pulled together as a manufacturing strike the one that happened in manufacturing sectors; as an essential service strike, the one that occurred within service sectors that are essential for the day-to-day and regular development of the economic activities, such as transports (railways, urban means of transportation, ports), electricity, commerce and banking services; and, to finish with, as a secondary service strike, the one that came about in sectors that, albeit important, are not essential for the standard progress of the economic activities, such as hospital, education and bureaucratic public services.

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