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FHSMUN 39

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN

Authors: Heather Ahles, Lucas Ballestín & Brian D. Sutliff

Abstract: The fragility of the security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan presents the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with a serious dilemma: can NATO and its international partners, including the United Nations, neutralize the threat to Afghanistan and Pakistan’s internal coherence posed by a resurgent Taliban or is the international community’s best option to strive to create a cordon sanitaire around Afghanistan and concede at least partial control and/or autonomy to the Taliban? NATO is tasked with resolving this dilemma in a comprehensive manner that will permit Afghan civilians to live in peace while not compromising the core principles of the UN and North Atlantic charters in the process.

Introduction

The countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan lie in central and southern Asia, a region defined by rugged mountains and valleys. For centuries, the area has been a point of contention for the major powers of each age. As a result of this, the peoples of Afghanistan and Pakistan have frequently encountered difficulty exercising full sovereignty over their territory. Despite the numerous states that have risen and fallen across the land and the centuries, Afghanistan and Pakistan today still struggle for unity and sovereignty. The mere mention of the words Afghanistan and Pakistan in New York, Washington DC, Ottawa, London, Paris, Berlin, and Brussels can be quite vexing to policymakers bent upon bending the Afghan and Pakistani peoples and political scenes to their preferred outcomes. Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace recently ranked Afghanistan 9th and Pakistan 17th in their annual list of “failed states”1; the resurgent violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan has wrought havoc in the political and security machinery at the United Nations, for the Trump Administration, and in various North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and surrounding countries’ governments.

Scale of the Problem: Afghanistan

Afghanistan has not known peace for 40 years. Various regions have been relatively calm and peaceful during different periods of the seemingly endless series of wars but no region has been fully spared from the devastation and misery. In his 2012 recent report to the Security

1 Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, “2017 Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy, 2017. Found at: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/

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Council on the situation in Afghanistan, then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that the total number of “security incidents” in the early part of 2012 decreased considerably but that “the southern, south-eastern and eastern provinces accounted for over 70 per cent of incidents, of which armed clashes and improvised explosive devices were responsible for the majority.”2 Thankfully, civilian casualties also decreased during the first 4 months of 2012 but the levels of violence throughout the country remain high, presenting serious sustained challenges for the people of Afghanistan as well as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops and aid workers.3 Furthermore, as the 2014 projected exit for international forces approached, meaning that the responsibility for security would become the exclusive domain of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and related security forces, NATO member states believed it essential to examine the readiness and capabilities of those security forces, particularly given that approximately 70% of attacks on security forces are directed against Afghan army and security personnel.4 The precarious security situation combined with political instability and the ennui that typically accompanies extended foreign military and peacekeeping operations present the UN Security Council with critical stumbling blocks that must be cleared before Afghans and the international community can enjoy peace and sustainable development.

“The Great Game”

In the eighteenth century, contemporary Afghanistan and much of the surrounding region was heavily contested by the British and Russian empires who struggled to dominate the central Asian location, in addition to their desire to control a direct route into northern India. Over the course of centuries, these two world powers sought to dominate the region through commercial domination and military incursion alike. This finally culminated in a series of treaties aimed at defining Afghanistan’s boundaries. Border agreements were reached with Russia (1885 and 1895), British India (the Durand Agreement, 1893), and Persia [Iran] (1905). The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 guaranteed the independence of Afghanistan, allowing for internal sovereignty but placing the country’s foreign affairs under British control.5 This peace lasted a decade until the Russian revolutions of 1917. Following the triumph of the Communists in the Civil War, which saw American, British, French, Italian and Japanese intervention on the side of the Royalist Whites, the diplomatic relationship between the Russian (now Soviet) and British governments became much more strained, especially over the issue of spheres of influence and Afghanistan.

Under the leadership of Amānullāh Khān, which lasted from 1919 to 1929, Afghanistan regained control over its foreign affairs. Amānullāh Khān’s reign was one of progress and strong attempts at modernization. Among other projects on the agenda were a strong constitution, equality for women and increased trade relations with Europe and Asia. Khān was able to play off foreign influences to Afghanistan’s benefit until he was deposed by conservative factions in 1929. It was under Khān’s relative and eventual successor that Afghanistan joined the UN in

2 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security” A/66/855-S/2012/426 June 20, 2012 p. 5. 3 Rod Norland and Alissa J. Rubin, “Drop is Seen in Casualties for Afghans” New York Times May 30, 2012. 4 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General” A/66/855-S/2012/426 June 20, 2012 p. 6. 5http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html

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1946. From 1947 until the early 1970s, Afghanistan remained neutral in the Cold War which came to define international relations for four decades.6

The first “generation of Afghan children whose ears would know nothing but the sounds of bombs and gunfire”7

The year 1973 saw a volley of economic problems beset Afghanistan as significant droughts affected the region. As a result of King Muhammad Zahir Shah’s perceived mishandling of this crisis, a military coup took place which invited chaos into the Afghan political arena. After a couple of changes in the power structure, a pro-soviet Marxist government came to power. It was at this point that the USSR entered Afghanistan in full bellicose force.8 Citing the Brezhnev Doctrine of offering assistance to friendly Communist regimes facing external and/or internal threats, Soviet military forces invaded Afghanistan, triggering a decade long war that would claim hundreds of thousands of Afghan lives, force several million Afghans to flee their home country, litter the country with landmines for decades to come, and ultimately destroy the resilience of the Soviet economy and military. The United States, seeing an opportune moment to weaken the Soviet Union through one of the Cold War’s many proxy wars, funneled massive amounts of money and weapons, including shoulder-fired Stinger missiles, from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and ultimately to Afghan and foreign mujahedeen or Muslim holy warriors. Pakistani military and intelligence officials frequently directed aid towards their favorite Afghan commanders, primarily the most religiously zealous Pashtun Sunni Muslim commanders, thereby creating vital ties that could be strengthened further in the 1990s.

The Soviet Union did not leave Afghanistan until 1989 and in its wake left a country that was deeply divided and widely devastated. Regional factions quickly rose to power in their respective areas of control. The war enacted an incredible toll in human, economic and structural terms. In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the official Afghan government increasingly lost control of the territory, and by early 1992 the capital of Kabul had been captured, and the guerillas set up a 50-member council to rule from Kabul. Burhanuddin Rabbani was named interim president of this council. The creation of this council proved insufficient as a way of uniting the diverse guerilla factions which still retained control of the country, and new attacks began to occur between factions and against the ruling council itself. The nation-state effectively became a loose network of fiercely independent regions, each with its own customs and rulers.

“Seekers of knowledge”9 led by the one-eyed mullah

It was in 1994 that a Pashtun militia of fundamentalist students, who styled themselves the Taliban, began to rise to power, fueled by Pakistani military and intelligence assistance and residual Afghan disgust for the corruption and hypocrisy exhibited by feuding warlords. In 1996, under pressure from the increasingly powerful Taliban, a power-sharing accord was signed in an effort to stem the rise of the movement. By September of 1996, however, the Taliban had marched into Kabul and usurped what little power the central council had and declared itself the legitimate government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Immediately, the Taliban, while 6 http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html 7Khaled Hosseini, The Kite Runner Riverhead Books New York 2003 p. 36. 8 http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html 9 While the traditional English translation of “Taliban” is “students,” it also translates to “seekers of knowledge.”

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under the direction of Mullah Muhammad Omar, began to enact and enforce an extremely puritanical interpretation of Sharia law in the sections of the country which they had managed to bring under their control.10

From 1996 until 2001, the Taliban were engaged in a brutal war with the Northern Alliance, the last remaining rival to their absolute control over Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance, it should be noted, was the officially recognized legitimate government of Afghanistan by the United Nations with Burhanuddin Rabbani as president. The Taliban controlled about 90% of the country in 2000. Throughout their reign, the Taliban became notorious for their uncompromising imposition of a very harsh interpretation of shar’ ia, Islamic law; public executions were conducted during sporting events, women and girls were not allowed to leave their homes without being escorted by male relatives, and religious minorities such as the Hazara, Afghan Shias, were killed in large massacres.11 This conflict caused one million Afghan deaths, as well as three million Afghan refugees in the neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan. It was at this juncture that a devastating drought hit central Asia, with Afghanistan suffering the worst effects. As the Taliban gained the upper hand, the world began to condemn certain actions taken by the group, such as the destruction of two giant Buddhas carved into the cliffs of the Bamiyan valley in central Afghanistan. On September 9th, 2001 Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance and head of the resistance against the Taliban was assassinated by Taliban soldiers. Two days later, the World Trade Center attacks took place, which had been allegedly been coordinated with the help of Osama Bin Laden, the reputed leader of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. Immediately, demands of the Taliban to turn Bin Laden over to the US were made, and the latest of the many conflicts in Afghanistan began.12

Within six days of the attacks, the U.S. leadership pointed to Osama Bin Laden as the ‘prime suspect’ in the investigation that immediately followed the attacks. Then-President George W. Bush stated that the United States would seek justice and would pursue Bin Laden’s capture, “Dead or Alive.”13 On September 20th, 2001, Bush delivered his now famous ultimatum to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The demands included among other things the dismantling of Al-Qaeda operations in the country, the handing over of Al-Qaeda leaders to the ‘proper authorities,’ and that access be given to U.S. forces to verify that the camps had been shut down. Bush included the remark: “They will hand over the terrorists or share in their fate.”

The first Security Council resolution to be passed after the September 11, 2001 attacks directly pertaining to Afghanistan was resolution 1378 (S/RES/1378), adopted on November 14, 2001, but the United States would be able to cite the seminal resolution 1373 adopted on September 28, 2011 as well as Article V of the North Atlantic Charter as bolstering its legal rationales for initiating, or depending on the perspective responding to, military action against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

The conflict began with a large-scale air attack, which was followed on the ground by US, UK and allied troops advancing on Taliban targets. In conjunction with the Afghan ‘Northern Alliance’ the current war in Afghanistan began on October 7th, 2001. The air strikes

10 http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html 11 Patrick Cockburn, “UN finds mass graves of Hazara killed by the Taliban” The Independent August 8, 2002. 12 http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html 13http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/17/bush.powell.terrorism/

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and subsequent invasion were a direct response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Intelligence from the U.S. government had indicated that a pre-emptive attack on Afghanistan could be possible if it were deemed necessary to engage the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, which had a great part of its operations in the country. In essence, Al-Qaeda relied on the Taliban government in Afghanistan to provide a safe haven for its militant operations.14

The state of affairs in Afghanistan is in many ways a paradigm of the globalization phenomenon. The internal relations among parties in the nations are astoundingly complex, as different factions upholding different worldviews and inheriting differing historical legacies vie for influence and dominance. It would be impossible for policymakers today to resolve conflict within Afghanistan without becoming somewhat acquainted with the country’s history. Afghanistan sits squarely in the center of the Old World, a crossroads of trade routes and a strategic advantage to its possessor. As a result, Afghanistan has never quite been capable of distancing itself enough from its neighbors and gaining enough sovereignty to chart its own path. In more recent history, Afghanistan has undergone extended periods of occupation by both the USSR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacebuilding mission known previously as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and now as Resolute Support. Most national governments are at least partially acquainted with the difficulties facing the ISAF/Resolute Support troops in the country, including their efforts to destroy the Taliban networks as well as gain the support of the populace. The current NATO-led ISAF states its mission as: “…to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance.”15

In addition to a coalition of Western countries, ISAF included small but symbolic troop contributions from Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and a significant contingent from Turkey; Resolute Support does not include contingents from Jordan or the UAE but both Armenia and Azerbaijan currently contribute personnel to the mission.16 While Turkey’s total troop contribution may not be as high as that of a number of its NATO allies, Turkey’s long history of friendly relations with Afghanistan and status as the only Muslim majority member of NATO are oft cited elements of ISAF’s/Resolute Support’s prospects for a successful mission.17 ISAF at first was limited in its scope to the capital of Kabul and the surrounding areas, relying on allied war chiefs to combat Taliban forces elsewhere. Local warlords typically maintain a local focus except insofar as it may advance their own personal ambitions, namely to become president of Afghanistan or to acquire greater wealth. Whenever American or ISAF/Resolute Support militaries pursue more traditional warfare, particularly using powerful air strikes to destroy Taliban military capacities, they risk alienating local support because of widely publicized reports of large-scale civilian casualties.18 Resolute Support’s long-term stability, much like ISA’s previously, is threatened by its internal fragility; the war in Afghanistan is very unpopular in many ISAF/Resolute Support countries and governments that support the war may fall in the wake of scandals or casualties. On August 1, 2010, the Netherlands became the first ISAF 14http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20020201.htm 15http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm 16 The full list of contributing countries(as of May 2017) may be found at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/20170523_2017-05-RSM-Placemat.pdf 17 Aydemir Erman, “How Turkey can help NATO in Afghanistan” Christian Science Monitor February 9, 2010. 18 The Economist, “Collateral damage of every sort” September 10, 2009.

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country to withdraw its troop contingent from Afghanistan, but it is clear that other governments are considering following suit, particularly in countries where the war in Afghanistan is a prominent electoral issue19; Canada removed its combat forces in 2011 and subsequently removed its approximately 500 soldiers then in Afghanistan to assist in training of the Afghan police. In June 2012, then French President Francois Hollande announced that all French troops would leave Afghanistan by the end of 2012.20

Resolute Support’s stability is further threatened by command and control issues and disputes over the appropriate strategic doctrine to be pursued; in June 2010, then US President Obama relieved General Stanley McChrystal of command in Afghanistan after disparaging comments about the Obama Administration and NATO allies surfaced in a Rolling Stone interview. The corresponding political flap over McChrystal’s dismissal had barely subsided before the publication of tens of thousands of pages of leaked documents as well as disagreements within the US government and military over the appropriate pace of any planned drawdown of forces from Afghanistan.21 Paramount among the concerns for all ISAF countries in 2014 was the rising level of violence in Afghanistan, particularly when that violence takes the lives of their soldiers, civilian personnel, and humanitarian aid workers. July and August 2010 have been the deadliest months of the entire time that US military forces have operated in Afghanistan, and other ISAF countries experienced higher casualty rates then as well.22

“Where liberty dies, evil grows”23

Developing a viable Afghan state and economy will require political stability in a country where stability is a rare commodity. The hopes of the international community initially rested upon the person of Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan since December 2001. Karzai initially supported the Taliban during the mid-1990s for the same reason that many Afghans originally supported the Taliban – they seemed like the only force that might guarantee peace and that could end the fratricidal civil wars and corruption then plaguing Afghanistan. Within a few years, Karzai would break with the Taliban and spend the years before the overthrow of the Taliban in exile in western Pakistan. Karzai would reenter Afghanistan when the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001 and would almost immediately be wounded in a US missile strike. After receiving medical treatment outside of Afghanistan, Karzai would return and be named the Chairman of the Transitional Authority at the Bonn International Conference on Afghanistan in December 2001. Within a few months, Karzai would be named Interim President and he would then be elected to a full term in 2004. Karzai’s first 7 years as president would be marred by repeated Taliban attempts to assassinate him. The constant flanking of President Karzai by Western security contractors, primarily from Xe, the former Blackwater, has been a further point of contention for the Afghan people and government; allegations of human rights abuses, misappropriation of funds, and illegal weapons smuggling have plagued Xe in Afghanistan, originally leading President Karzai to announce that

19 Radio Netherlands Worldwide (RNW), “Netherlands: first NATO member to leave Afghanistan” August 1, 2010. 20 BBC News, “French troop pullout from Afghanistan to start in July” June 9, 2012. 21 Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, “US Military to Press for Slower Afghan Drawdown” New York Times August 11, 2010. 22 Rahim Faiez, “5 American Troops Killed in Latest Afghan Violence” The Washington Post August 31, 2010. 23 Hamid Karzai.

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private security contractors will no longer be welcome in Afghanistan after 201024; after receiving assurances that private security contractors would follow much stricter rules, Karzai relaxed his outright ban, initially stating that the security contractors could remain until March 2012. In the wake of greater violence in 2011, Karzai further extended this deadline for private security contractors until September 2013.25 While the relationship between Karzai and ISAF countries, especially the United States, had been volatile for years, tensions really flared during Karzai’s reelection campaign in 2009.

Then President Karzai was reelected in August 2009 in an election that was marred by serious allegations of vote fraud, intimidation, and massive corruption. The international community pressured Karzai to hold a run-off election against his opponent, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, but the run-off would never be held after Dr. Abdullah dropped out on November 2, 2009 and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) would summarily declare Karzai the winner at the beginning of November 2009.26 Immediately, Karzai would face a series of allegations of corruption, including involvement with the burgeoning heroin trade emanating from Afghanistan.27 As accusations of corruption and misdeeds mount against Karzai and his relatives, cooperation between the Afghan government and ISAF becomes increasingly precarious. Relations between Presidents Obama and Karzai are clearly strained, especially because American policy-makers are becoming increasingly frustrated with an apparent lack of progress by the Afghan government at tackling corruption28, developing an effective military29, and combating the cultivation and trafficking of heroin and Afghan anger over ISAF bombing and raids that kill Afghan civilians.30 In August and early September of 2010, mounting concerns over the perceived fragility of Afghanistan’s banking system prompted then President Karzai to issue a public guarantee of the deposits at Kabul Bank, one of the largest and most troubled banks in the country.31 With the long postponed parliamentary elections scheduled for July 201832, Afghan civil society representatives and the international community must rectify the problems plaguing the Afghan political system and minimize the corruption and voting irregularities that marred the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections. Improving relations between the current Afghan and Resolute Support governments must be an absolute priority if the security situation in Afghanistan is to improve.

UN System Activities in Afghanistan

The UN System has maintained a critical presence in Afghanistan since the removal of the Taliban from power in late 2001, with the Security Council, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) maintaining leading roles in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. The Security 24 Joshua Partlow, “Karzai wants private security firms out of Afghanistan” The Washington Post August 17, 2010. 25 Daniel Magnowski, “Afghanistan’s Karzai extends private security closure” Reuters December 11, 2011. 26 The Economist, “Karzai’s tattered victory” November 5, 2009. 27 The Economist, “Taming the mafia state” November 19, 2009. 28 Dexter Filkins and Mark Mazetti, “Key Karzai Aide in Corruption Inquiry is Linked to CIA” The New York Times August 25, 2010. 29 The Economist, “Fixing the Unfixable” August 19, 2010. 30 The Economist, “When Barack met Hamid” March 31, 2010. 31 Dexter Filkins, “Depositors Panic Over Bank Crisis in Afghanistan” The New York Times September 2, 2010. 32

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Council established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) through resolution 1401 on March 28, 2002. During the past 10 years, UNAMA’s mandate has expanded to include emphases on combating corruption, strengthening Afghanistan’s nascent human rights machinery, encouraging political reconciliation and inclusion, election monitoring and assistance, working with ISAF to improve the capacities of the Afghan army and police force, and to implement the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).33 Furthermore, through its Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction program, UNAMA has prioritized the following areas for Afghan reconstruction: “agriculture, energy, private sector development, capacity building, and higher education and vocational training.”34 UNAMA’s mandate is primarily political whereas ISAF’s mandate is more directly focused on addressing the immediate, medium and long-term security concerns for Afghanistan.

Repatriating Afghan refugees has been an enormous task for nearly 9 years now and the UNHCR continues to repatriate returning Afghans from Iran and Pakistan on a daily basis. On August 27, 2010, UNHCR announced that over 100,000 Afghans had been voluntarily repatriated in 2010, with approximately 95,000 of these refugees returning from Pakistan.35 Since the beginning of 2002, a record 5.7 million Afghan refugees have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR36, clearly an enormous undertaking in any situation and even more daunting and laudatory given the geographic and political obstacles involved in Afghan repatriation. With the recent devastating floods in Pakistan, most of the remaining 1.7 million Afghan refugees still inside Pakistan face increased risks of homelessness and further destitution. As of August 20, 2010, UNHCR officials estimated that almost 70,000 Afghan refugees had been made homeless by the floods in “Khyber Pakhtunkwa province alone.”37 UNHCR’s urgent appeals for increased voluntary contributions to assist displaced Pakistanis are also designed to address the needs of these Afghan refugees; any comprehensive solution will need to examine the situation facing Afghan refugees.

According to the 2015 UNHCR country operations profile for Pakistan, Pakistan is currently hosting over 1.5 million Afghani refugees. UNHCR is making every efforts to address the needs of the Afghan refugees and the Pakistan government through the regional Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), the tripartite agreement on voluntary repatriation, and the government of Pakistan's Policy on Afghan refugees. To complement UNHCR's efforts, the Pakistan government has extended Afghan refugees' Proof of Registration (PoR) cards until the end of 2015, issued birth certificates to more than 800,000 Afghani refugee children, provided land for several refugee villages, and given refugees access to public schools and health clinics.

In July of 2014, according to the United Nations News Center, the ongoing turmoil between the Pakistani military and the militants in the North Waziristan tribal region has forced more than 75,000 people to flee their homes to seek shelter in Afghanistan. As of August 2014, 714,548 Afghans have registered as internally displaced people (IDPs) in need of humanitarian 33 UNAMA’s mandate is currently set to expire on March 23, 2011. Delegates will want to examine Security Council resolution 1917 for UNAMA’s full mandate. S/RES/1917 March 22, 2010. 34 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction” 2010. http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1754 35 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Number of voluntary returns to Afghanistan tops 100,000” August 27, 2010. 36 UNHCR, “Afghan Solutions Strategy” 2012. Found at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4f9016576.html 37 UNHCR, “Pakistan Field Update: Afghan refugees face new problems” August 20, 2010.

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assistance; however, the environment in Pakistan remains volatile with fragile security, social, and economic situations that make it difficult for humanitarian actors. UNHCR has been working closely with local partners and government counterparts in order to improve outreach to populations of concern and to build local capacities.38 With the influx of cross-border movement, all agencies have been requesting approximately $20 million for six months in order to deliver the essential items for the more than 470.000 people who have been displaced in the between the two countries in the past year.

UNDP’s multiple roles in Afghanistan are vital for long-term sustainable development in Afghanistan but UNDP and its international and civil society partners will be ultimately unsuccessful if the security situation does not improve rapidly. The UNDP Office in Afghanistan is currently tasked with “stabilization, state building, governance and development, so far disbursing approximately $1.5 billion” since 2002.39 UNDP continues to assist Afghanistan’s government further with the vital work of gender mainstreaming and developing gender responsive budgets. As Afghanistan still depends heavily upon foreign donors for nearly 90% of the entire government budget and 100% of its development budget, cooperation between the government and UNDP is an absolute prerequisite for sustainable development.

Recent discoveries of immense mineral wealth in Afghanistan provide crucial glimmers of hope for the future but Afghanistan’ current formal and/or legal economic output remains anemic. By far the most profitable economic activities in Afghanistan are the cultivation of poppy and the production of heroin and opium. According to statistics from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan accounts for nearly 90% of all “global illicit opium production in recent years.”40 Combating the production, trafficking and distribution of opiates is essential to reducing the influence of local warlords as well as preventing the pernicious effects of both drug addiction and drug-fueled crime but any drug eradication scheme will only succeed if viable economic alternatives are implemented for local farmers and their surrounding communities. UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa has consistently argued that there is “no quick fix” to the problems created by illicit drug cultivation and production in Afghanistan, particularly as heroin production soars in the south of the country. At the Third International GLOBSEC Conference in Bratislava, Slovakia in January 2008, Costa asserted that it may take a full generation to comprehensively combat the effects of drug cultivation in Afghanistan and that “therefore, the first element of any comprehensive plan for Afghanistan must be to demonstrate to farmers that there are viable alternatives to growing poppy, and serious risks if they do not switch to licit livelihoods.” 41 The most lucrative alternative crop for Afghan crops is cotton; unfortunately, for the US Agency for International Development (USAID), subsidizing Afghan cotton production, particularly if the Afghan government controls significant amounts of production or ginning, has generated considerable opposition because it

38 26 October 2014 "2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Pakistan" UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. 39 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Country Programme Action Plan 2010-2013 Between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United Nations Development Programme” December 2009 p. 3. The full report may be found at: http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/2010-2013CPD/UNDPAFG_CPAP_2010-2013.pdf 40 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “World Drug Report 2010” p. 37. 41 Antonio Maria Costa, “Drugs and Insecurity in Afghanistan: No Quick Fix” Bratislava, Slovakia January 18, 2008.

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might hurt US exporters as well as for a strong preference for privatization.42 Drug eradication efforts in northern Afghanistan have been far more successful than in the south, especially in Kandahar Province, the stronghold of the Taliban.

A Dangerous Neighborhood

Afghanistan’s critical, or cursed, geostrategic position combined with its chronic ethnic, political, and religious divisions create tempting opportunities for Afghanistan’s neighbors, none of whom may be remotely considered to be disinterested, to seek to increase their regional influence. Pakistan’s policies are aimed at blunting the influence of India and to a lesser extent, China and Iran; these aims are mostly readily achieved by maintaining strong ties to the Pashtun communities in eastern and southern Afghanistan. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has lessened his criticisms of Pakistani for “tolerating sanctuaries within its borders for Taliban insurgents,”43 and Afghan-Pakistani relations have seemed to improve of late, potentially at India’s expense. Any improvement in Afghan-Pakistani relations may also create diplomatic, political, and security concerns for Iran. Tehran’s policies are designed primarily to limit the influence of Russia and Pakistan as well as potentially hostile Arab and/or Sunni states throughout the Middle East and Central and South Asia. Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors also present a panoply of security quandaries, creating an undercurrent of further violence, lawlessness, and repression; furthermore, the ethnic Tajik and Uzbek communities in northern Afghanistan often feel excluded from critical political, security and economic decisions made in Kabul.

The complex and often tense relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan extend to the Resolute Support countries involved in the region. Strong criticisms and accusations of corruption, incompetence, and duplicity have frequently strained relations between the US and Pakistan. When US Navy Seals assassinated Osama bin Laden in early May 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan, many Pakistanis were upset by the US-led mission occurring on their territory; furthermore, many Americans and Pakistanis wondered aloud how much Pakistani and American government officials knew about bin Laden’s whereabouts and for how long.44 In November 2011, an American airstrike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and Pakistan sealed off a crucial border crossing into Afghanistan that NATO relied upon for shipping supplies into the field. After months of diplomatic wrangling, the US government issued a formal apology to Pakistan for the unintentional killing of its soldiers and agreed to a larger transit tax of $1500-$1800 USD per NATO truck, a lucrative tax that may net Pakistan approximately $1 million USD per day45; the reopening of the transit route also persuaded the US Congress to release hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid that had been delayed at least in part because of the closed transit route. While NATO’s leadership appears relieved to have at least temporarily resolved the transit route impasse, there are still questions as to how effectively Pakistani security forces will monitor the border and prevent “insurgents” from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from crossing into Afghanistan.46 As NATO and affiliated governments with troops and logistical components, 42 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “AID and the Afghan Cotton Saga” The Globalist August 6, 2012. Found at: http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?StoryId=9708 43 The Economist, “Ganging up on India” July 1, 2010. 44 Carlotta Gall & Eric Schmitt, “Amid Skepticism, Pakistan Calculates its Response” The New York Times May 2, 2011. 45 The Economist, “Keep on truckin’” May 16, 2012. 46 Dan Murphy, “Why the Taliban are Happy that the US and Pakistan Patched Things Up” The Christian Science Monitor July 31, 2012.

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including interoperability of weaponry and communications technologies,47 contemplate their approaching deadlines for withdrawal, they must maintain and/or enhance their relationships with Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. “All four border Afghanistan and have provided NATO with essential supply routes and bases in return for generous financial and political compensation.”48

Many NATO countries as well as all the Permanent Members of the Security Council have considerable economic, political, and security interests at stake in Afghanistan. Referring to Russia’s recent overtures to improve relations with Afghanistan, Andrew Kramer notes that Russia is seeking contracts to renovate or refurbish Soviet-era infrastructure and “the Kremlin is also looking to blunt Islamic extremism in Central Asia, which poses a threat to Russia’s security, particularly in the Caucasus, and to exploit opportunities in the promising Afghan mining and energy industries.”49 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently hosted the leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan to address the problems stemming from “fighting terrorism and drugs spreading from Afghanistan.”50 China maintains extensive interests throughout the region, in part as a check on the growing power of India as well as to minimize its difficulties with its Uighur community in western China; reports have surfaced at various points of Uighur fighters training and fighting alongside the Taliban.51 The US, in addition to its immediate political and security interests, recently identified enormous deposits of valuable metals and industrial resources with a current estimated value of nearly $1 trillion USD.52 While mining companies from around the region and around the world are already competing for access to these vital mineral deposits, “the problem is companies remain hesitant about investing in the country whilst the current security issues remain unresolved.”53 Ensuring that these minerals are extracted in a sustainable manner that fosters rising living standards and real human development in Afghanistan, while preventing a contemporary version of “the Great Game”, is a new and keystone challenge for NATO and the international community.

Recent diplomatic initiatives have yielded some positive results and may provide impetus for further peaceful interactions between Afghanistan and its neighbors. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that “diplomatic engagement between Afghanistan and countries increased significantly [during the first 6 months of 2010], with high-level political dialogue with India and China on bilateral and regional cooperation and an increased frequency of exchange visits with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan.”54 Unfortunately, for every tentative step forward, violent attacks seem to force a half-step back. In early December 2012, then Afghan President Hamid Karzai claimed that the suicide bomber who attempted to kill Asadullah Khalid, head of the National Directorate of Security, was Pakistani and “attack was organized with the help of a

47 Elizabeth Braw, “Next Steps for NATO,” Foreign Affairs, November 27, 2016. 48 Judy Dempsey, “No Easy Exit for NATO in Afghanistan” New York Times December 10, 2012. 49 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Pushes to Increase Afghanistan Business Ties” The New York Times August 18, 2010. 50 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Medvedev talks with Afghan, Pakistani leaders” The Washington Post August 18, 2010. 51 Thomas Joscelyn, “Evaluating the Uighur Threat” The Long War Journal October 9, 2008. 52 James Risen, “US Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan” June 13, 2010. 33James Melik, “Afghan wealth stifled by security fears” BBC News June 25, 2010. 54 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security” S/2010/127 March 10, 2010 p. 5.

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sophisticated foreign intelligence service.”55 Improving and strengthening Afghanistan’s relationships with its neighbors as well as the wider international community is an essential component of any comprehensive solution to the political and security problems currently plaguing Afghanistan.

The Other Side of the COIN

While success in Afghanistan ultimately hinges on resolution of thorny political and economic problems, NATO’s tactics will be a critical component in determining the amount of time that NATO has to achieve its goals of stabilizing Afghanistan and destroying terrorist safe havens or sanctuaries. Within NATO, and most visibly within the US military and political leadership, there have long been disagreements over the most effective way to prosecute the war in Afghanistan. In the first eight years of the war (2001-2009), the predominant American approach was to use high-altitude bombing along with light footprint operations designed to kill as many Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives as possible. The high-altitude bombing campaigns undoubtedly killed large numbers of Taliban and, to a lesser degree Al-Qaeda, operatives but many shifted their operations to sanctuaries in Pakistan, thus presenting a more problematic series of targets. Most critically, from the Afghan perspective, this high-altitude bombing, combined with incomplete or flawed intelligence, led to hundreds of civilian deaths.56

After a palpable shift in the war in Iraq, based in part on a significant shift in US tactics to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, many high-level US military leaders, including generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, advocated introducing COIN into the Afghan theater. While this advocacy of COIN was nowhere near universal within the US political and military leadership, US tactics in Afghanistan largely shifted towards COIN in the first year of Obama’s presidency, including the introduction of tens of thousands of “surge” troops. At the heart of COIN is the concept that military operations must be centered on the protection of civilians in order to deprive the Taliban and Al-Qaeda of local support or acquiescence. When McChrystal introduced COIN into Afghanistan, he issued strict orders limiting the use of bombing because he “wanted a rapprochement with Karzai, and he had come to believe the COIN axiom that killing one civilian creates ten new insurgents.”57 While COIN may be linked to fewer civilian casualties in Afghanistan, there remained significant concerns that with the prospective withdrawal of all ISAF combat forces by the end of 2014, there may not have be sufficient time left for COIN to be successful.

Negotiating with Terrorists?

Electoral rhetoric aside, the question of whether to negotiate with those considered, by at least one if not multiple, party[ies] to be terrorists is complex and troubling. Will the presumed terrorists be further emboldened to carry out atrocities against civilians? Even if a negotiated settlement is reached, will civilians and members of the security forces accept and implement the settlement without reprisal attacks? Will those suspected of planning and carrying out terrorist attacks be prosecuted, and if so, in what legal fora? What limits will be placed on the 55 Graham Bowley & Sangar Rahimi, “Karzai Implicates Pakistan in Suicide Bombing That Hurt Afghan Spy Chief” New York Times December 8, 2012. 56 BBC News, “Strike ‘killed 60 young Afghans’” August 26, 2008. 57 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan 2012. Kindle Edition – Loc. 563.

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interrogation and treatment of suspected terrorists? All these questions are directly pertinent to the situation in Afghanistan as the Afghan government, Resolute Support, UNAMA, and the Taliban must confront the consequences of engaging in, or boycotting, negotiations.

All negotiators prefer to initiate talks from a position of strength but the various actors in the Afghan saga may not enjoy such luxury. President Karzai was “already not viewed as a credible broker”58 by many of his erstwhile allies as well as his declared enemies and he was constitutionally barred from seeking a third term as president. The stated deadline for NATO’s withdrawal of all combat forces by the end of 2014 is intended to satisfy domestic political constituencies as well as to ostensibly spur the Afghan National Security Forces (ANFS) to assume greater operational capability and responsibility for security in Afghanistan, but this deadline has also been criticized as providing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda with a greater incentive to delay any negotiated settlement until the withdrawal of foreign combat troops. The Taliban cannot be complacent, however, as the continuation of violence against Afghan civilians may further erode their support in various parts of the country, ultimately depriving the Taliban of domestic Pashtun support and making them essentially a pawn of Pakistani Pashtuns who may find a weak and unstable Afghanistan to their own benefit. Furthermore, if the Taliban miscalculate and ratchet the violence up to levels that Resolute Support countries find too threatening, they may invite a very vigorous military response that degrades their operational capabilities rapidly and dramatically. The Taliban is also not an entirely cohesive organization and maintaining its potentially fragile cohesion may become less feasible the longer that the conflict rages.

The January 2010 London Conference is still considered the roadmap for Afghan reconstruction and development and it is essential that NATO delegates accurately appraise the progress to date as well as the obstacles that remain to successfully implementing the “two-tiered” approach59 developed at the conference.60 While steady progress towards the projected 2014 withdrawal of ISAF combat forces provided hope that the mission might be wound down soon, many aspects of the political transitions and reconciliation and reintegration of former Taliban fighters into Afghan society and the economy may need to be accelerated. Speaking in October 2017, three years after his election to succeed former President Karzai, current Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, after proclaiming that he has “the worst job on Earth,” asserted that all foreign troops could withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2021.61

The International Crisis Group (ICG) notes that “eleven years into the international engagement in Afghanistan, it is clear that political settlement without political incentives is a non-starter.”62 Thus far, however, a climate of mistrust has dominated the sporadic negotiations. Inclusive talks must bring together the diverse elements of Afghan society, including ethnic 58 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan,” March 26, 2012, p. 25. 59 Julian Borger, “Afghanistan conference sets out plan for two-tier peace process,” The Guardian, January 28, 2010. 60 Delegates may view the official communiqué issued at the end of the conference here: http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/Documents_Communique%20of%20London%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf 61 Justin Rowlatt, “Ashraf Ghani: Afghan president has ‘worst job on Earth,’” BBC News, October 5, 2017. 62 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan” March 26, 2012 p. 38.

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Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras [Afghan Shia Muslims], the Afghan government, the Taliban, Resolute Support, the UN, and Afghanistan’s neighbors. Even though the time period 2015-2024 has been designated as a “transformation decade”63 for the long-term peace and development of Afghanistan, maintaining the necessary political will to achieve that transformation will require a long-term commitment to Afghanistan that will by definition transcend the current political and military leadership on all sides.

In June of 2013, at their new office in Doha, Qatar, the Taliban and its representatives held a press conference that gained the attention of the international community – particularly the United States and Afghanistan. While the United States did agree to begin peace talks with the group, Afghanistan refused to engage in any type of dialogue with the group as such discussions could lead to the militants’ credibility. As of May 2014, the negotiations between the United States and the Taliban allowed for a prisoner swap. The exchange was for a prisoner that had been in captivity for five years in exchange for five Taliban officials that were being held in Guantanamo Bay. Then President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan was unaware of this transaction until after the swap of the prisoners.64

How many sands remain in the international community’s hourglass?65

Delegates entrusted to deal with the delicate situation in Afghanistan must keep several things in mind throughout the course of their discussions and negotiations. Some of these important points concern the nature of the state of affairs on the ground in Afghanistan; these issues have been described in detail above. The other points to remember are the current UN resolutions and significant opinions on what is to be done to bring about a satisfying resolution to the strife in this nation.

Former UN special representative to Afghanistan and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Kai Eide addressed the Security Council in early 2010 and said the following:

“In the next five years, he said, the central goal of the Government would be preparing for the transition to full Afghan rule by strengthening sovereignty and national ownership. He called upon the international community to ensure that every action taken in the country was in support of those efforts. Following President Karzai’s outlining of commitments and formation of a new Government, the next priority would be to forge a compact between the international community and Afghanistan that clearly defined the strategies and responsibilities of each.”66

In this way, Mr. Eide was pushing for a new Afghan sovereignty, a fundamental quality of any state wishing to engage in diplomatic dialogue in the UN as well as a quality that has been quite rare in modern Afghan history. In his efforts to assist President Karzai with his own vision for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and rebirth, Mr. Eide was perceived to be sacrificing the larger strategy in order to gain the trust and favor of the country’s rulers. As a result, conflicts arose

63 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” A/66/855-S/2012/426, June 20, 2012, p. 10. 64 The Washington Journal, “The History of the Taliban” June 2, 2014 65 Paraphrase of US Lt. General David Barno’s January 26, 2004 quote about “the sands in the hourglass of all of the al-Qaeda senior leadership is [sic] running out." 66http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9834.doc.htm

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around the issue of the shifts in sovereignty such as the changing of foreign police for ISAF-trained Afghan soldiers and similar duties that began to be returned to the Afghan authorities. In general, policy makers should be cautious to balance their obligations as nation builders with their duties as countries at war.

According to an official press release by the United Nations Department of Public Information, “in his report, the Secretary-General says the controversial 2009 elections absorbed tremendous political energy. Together with the volatile security situation, the protracted electoral process contributed to a gloomy atmosphere. “If the negative trends are not corrected, there is a risk that the deteriorating overall situation will become irreversible,”67 he says. “We cannot afford this.” To reverse the trends, a better coordinated international effort, within the framework of a strategy of transition, was urgently needed.

“We are now at a critical juncture,” the Secretary-General argued in the report. “The situation cannot continue as is, if we are to succeed in Afghanistan. Unity of effort and greater attention to key priorities are now a sine qua non. There is a need for a change of mindset in the international community, as well as in the Government of Afghanistan. Without that change, the prospects of success will diminish further.”68

Recently an American military official who chose to remain anonymous openly discussed the fact that among the American military’s leadership, it is no mystery that the strategies which were devised and implemented in the years 2002 through 2006 were full of instances of “faulty assumptions [which] gave rise to misjudgments, and how misjudgments cascaded into everyday deadly encounters.”69 These are the sorts of issues that are crucial for policymakers to keep in mind. The relations with internal factions, the population at large, and the historical legacy are where the stress falls, and where diplomats must be very careful if they hope to display their strategic acumen. The erroneous attitudes and grievous missteps of the initial planning among the NATO-ISAF/Resolute Support leadership have become ever more apparent as the conflict shows little signs of resolution so many years in. “The consensus was that little could be accomplished in Afghanistan given its history, culture and composition, and there would be little payoff beyond Afghanistan even if things there went better than expected,” Richard Haass, a senior official at the State Department in the Bush administration who advocated the insertion of a far larger force, wrote recently. He added: “They had no appetite for on-the-ground nation building.”70This carelessness resulted in some shameful details, for instance, Afghan soldiers were paid less than what Taliban soldiers were paid. Additionally, after a deceptively easy victory over the Taliban within weeks of the invasion, and working under the incorrect assumption that the Taliban movement had been soundly defeated, the US and other troop-lending nations refused to commit large numbers of troops to stabilize Afghanistan in the wake of the initial bombings and land campaigns.

In 2012, renewed international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan were centerpieces at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May and an international donors’ conference in Tokyo in July. At 67 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9834.doc.htm 68 Ibid 69http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/weekinreview/01sanger.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=afghanistan%20surge&st=cse 70http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/weekinreview/01sanger.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=afghanistan%20surge&st=cse

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the NATO Summit in Chicago, NATO pledged to continue funding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to the tune of $3.6 billion USD annually for the next 10 years with the Afghan government pledging an additional $500 million USD per year.71 NATO will continue to provide approximately 2,000 military trainers in the country along with a projected 20,000 US military forces that will occupy some of the 700 military bases now found in Afghanistan. Concerns about whether these trainers will be pulled into live-fire operations persist as do significant doubts about the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Tokyo donors’ conference yielded pledges of some $16 billion USD for Afghan development aid but the total amount of aid pledged will at best erase the Afghan government’s current fiscal deficit. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s economy remains extremely reliant on foreign aid, fueling fears that a reduction or elimination of this foreign aid may devastate Afghanistan’s fragile economy72 and may push more marginalized peoples to support the Taliban or to cultivate poppy to survive.

Much rests on the outcome of the power plays taking place within Afghanistan and Pakistan and it is paramount that policymakers discuss the problems plaguing the nation and decide among themselves which of those problems should be given priority, always keeping in mind that like most other situations in which an entire country is in question, all factors tend to be related to one another. Expanding and improving the performance of the Afghan security forces is/was clearly one of the highest priorities for the international community and especially Resolute Support, and previously ISAF; unfortunately, as of August 2012, Afghan and international confidence in the capacity and commitment of the Afghan security forces remained low. While then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon claimed that recruitment of Afghan military and police forces were ahead of schedule, he admitted that “along with numbers, the orientation of the different security services has been the subject of vigorous debate, in particular the need for a distinct civilian role for the police, with a further professionalization of the force, strengthened oversight mechanisms and institutional reforms at the Ministry of the Interior.”73 Attacks by Afghan troops and police officers on NATO soldiers and Afghan civilians may also poison the relationships between the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Resolute Support.74 NATO member governments and Afghan political and security leaders and civil society representatives must ensure that these Afghan military and police forces are competent, properly equipped, paid on time and not effectively infiltrated by Taliban and/or Al-Qaeda leadership.

In recent years, while the United States has been reducing their role in the Afghanistian-Pakistan situation, China has had an increasingly larger role. "There's no guarantee things will change" says an Afghanistan Analyst, "but it's certainly worth a try… the relationship between China and Pakistan is much less tense than the U.S.-Pakistani relationship."75 As of November 1, 2014, China has put forth a proposal for a peace and reconciliation forum that would gather representatives from Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and the Taliban command; however, due to

71 The Economist, “NATO’s risky Afghan endgame” May 26, 2012. 72 The Economist, “The hand that feeds” July 14, 2012. 73 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security” A/66/855-S/2012/426 June 20, 2012 p. 6. 74 Washington Post, “Gunmen in Afghan army uniforms kill US service member, Afghan defense minister steps down” August 7, 2012. 75 Afghanistan Analyst, Reuters, 1 November 2014

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some initial resistance, President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan wishes to give Pakistan and the Taliban more time to consider China's proposal.

On November 14, 2014, after visiting Beijing to discuss China’s larger role in the conflict, newly elected President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan made a monumental visit to Pakistan to meet with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, top officials of the Pakistani Foreign office and finance ministry, and General Raheel Sharif – the army chief to strengthen “security ties, including cooperation in training and border management, and promise states’ cooperation to jointly curb the menace of terrorism”76 while still noting the fragility of the situation between the two states.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan at this point in time, all issues are as interrelated to the extent that such isolation of one particular issue is indeed impossible. It is imperative that countries work together in order to develop comprehensive solutions which while prioritizing also do not fail to take into account any significant matter. Failure to take such matters into account will, without a doubt, result in the failure of the entire effort, and at such a delicate time in the long conflict which has most recently started in 2001 but goes back for decades for the Afghan people, international coordination and concerted sacrifice is crucial if solutions will begin to replace the failures that current policymakers have inherited. In the words of Immanuel Kant: “You can because you must.”

Guiding Questions

1) How does the current security situation affect your country and/or region? Has your country contributed financial, logistical, political, or security aid or forces to Afghanistan? How might your country most effectively contribute to an improved security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

2) What are the most significant successes and/or failures in the campaign in Afghanistan to date?

3) How can NATO most effectively work with its Resolute Support partners, the Afghan government and relevant international and domestic actors to ensure timely, free and fair parliamentary elections in July 2018?

4) What are the most important points facilitating international cooperation in this time of crisis? What are the most significant weaknesses confronting Resolute Support and/or the international community? With what other countries might Afghanistan, NATO and its Resolute Support partners, and the international community wish to engage and/or negotiate to achieve a feasible and lasting solution and why?

5) What timetable, if any, should be constructed to administer the national development of Afghanistan and the return of full sovereignty?

6) What are the limits of military action? What are the limits of civilian efforts?

76 The New York Times, “Afghan President Out to Ease Relations on Visit to Pakistan” November 14, 2014

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7) How might the international community most effectively prepare to meet these future challenges?

8) Is UNAMA’s mandate appropriate to meet the demands of the Afghan government, domestic Afghan civil society partners, and the international community? If UNAMA’s mandate needs to be revised, what would be the most important changes to improve UNAMA’s effectiveness? How long will ISAF-UNAMA forces and civilian personnel need to be in Afghanistan?

Resolutions:

S/RES/2189, “Afghanistan” December 12, 2014

S/RES/2145 "Afghanistan" March 17, 2013

S/RES/2096 "Afghanistan" March 19, 2013

S/RES/2083 "Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts" December 17, 2012

S/RES/2082 "Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts" December 17, 2012

S/RES/2069 "Afghanistan" October 9, 2012

S/RES/2041 “The Situation in Afghanistan” March 22, 2012

S/RES/1989 “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts” June 17, 2011

S/RES/1988 “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts” June 17, 2011

S/RES/2011 “The Situation in Afghanistan” October 12, 2011

S/RES/1974 “The Situation in Afghanistan” March 22, 2011

S/RES/1662 “The Situation in Afghanistan” March 23, 2006

S/RES/1401 “The Situation in Afghanistan” March 28, 2002

S/RES/1386 “The Situation in Afghanistan” December 20, 2001

S/RES/1378 “The Situation in Afghanistan” November 14, 2001

S/RES/1373 “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts” September 28, 2001

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