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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

MUNUC XXIX

Topic A: The Projection of Power in Eastern EuropeTopic B: The Militarization of Outer Space

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MUNUC XXIX

EXECUTIVE LETTER

Delegates,

It is our pleasure to welcome you to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and MUNUC XVIII. We are Mitchell Dennis and Rachel Zucker, and we will be serving as your committee chairs. We are looking forward to a wonderful weekend with all of you.

To introduce ourselves, we are both third years in the college. I (Mitchell) study Global Studies and Romance Languages and Literatures and Rachel studies Fundamentals and Economics. Rachel and I met as first years in the International Olympic Committee at MUNUC. While we are close friends, Rachel and I could not be more different. Rachel is from Los Angles and spent a year in high school abroad, while I am from Michigan and have spent most of my life in the Midwest. However, we are united by our shared experiences, our love for Interstellar, Hans Zimmer and all things brunch related. In addition to MUNUC, Rachel is involved in Money Think and Women in Law. Besides MUNUC activities, I work at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and serve in UChicago’s Amnesty International as Secretary.

The Trans-Atlantic alliance, which is represented by NATO, plays a fundamental role in post-World War II security situation. The establishment of NATO, from an American perspective, was a ground shattering event, represent America’s first foreign commitment in its history. For much of Western Europe, NATO represented the best chance for security against the Soviet Union and integration to prevent future wars.

As a member of NATO, you have a difficult and pressing task ahead of you. You must confront deep regional disparities in economics and military capability, while working to prevent the outbreak of a conflict with Russia. Through compromise, negotiation, and hard work, these divisions can be solved. If you cannot bridge this divide, then any solution to our problems will be difficult to pass and even harder to effectively implement, leaving NATO open to exploitation about foreign powers who wish to manipulate the western world into a weak strategic position.

While preparing for MUNUC, please feel free to contact myself or Rachael Zucker, your co-chair, with any questions you might have. I would love to answer any questions you have about the committee, MUNUC, or the University of Chicago.

I am very excited to meet all of you this February.

Sincerely,

Mitchell Dennis and Rachel Zucker

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HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded by the North Atlantic Treaty, signed April 4th, 1949 in Washington DC.1 NATO is headquartered in Brussels, Belgium and it is led by a Secretary General, who coordinates with an integrated military NATO staff.2 3 The current Secretary General is Jens Stoltenberg, from Norway.4 The Secretary General and the agenda for NATO are organized by permanent representatives appointed by each member state, in addition, annual Head of State meetings are held to discuss pressing issues.5 NATO also includes a military committee, which includes military representatives from each of the member countries.6

The original signatories, the United States, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal, Norway, Iceland, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, and Belgium created the alliance not only to deter the Soviet Union from

attack, but also to prevent militant nationalism from causing another major conflict in Europe and to promote integration among European powers.7 The events that precipitated NATO and motivated Western Europe and North America to unite was the communist backed coup against the democratically elected Czechoslovak government in 1948 and the decision by the Soviet Union to blockade shipments of goods to West Berlin, which was located into the Soviet zone of control in the post-World War II division of Germany.8 Throughout the Cold War, NATO expanded several times adding Turkey and Greece in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.9

Along these three axes, (Soviet deterrence, prevention of future European conflicts, and European integration) NATO has been largely successful. NATO outlasted the Soviet Union, successfully deterring direct attacks

1 “The North Atlantic Treaty.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last Updated March 21, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

2 “NATO Headquarters.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last Updated September 01, 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49284.htm.

3 “Who’s who?” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last Updated July 27, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/who_is_who.htm. 4 “Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General 2014.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last Updated March 14, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/

natohq/who_is_who_49999.htm. 5 Who’s who?” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/who_is_who.htm. 6 Ibid. 7 “A short history of NATO.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. N.d. http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html. 8 Ibid. 9 “What is NATO?” North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” N.d. http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html.

Post World War II Division of Germanyhttp://slideplayer.com/slide/3926273/

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and has promoted integration across Europe. However, NATO has struggled to prevent militant nationalism in some areas of Eastern Europe, in particular this struggle was evident during the break-up of Yugoslavia.10 With the end of the Cold War in the early-1990s, many people felt that NATO no longer had a purpose, however, NATO found 3 purposes over the following 20 years. First, NATO continued to promote European integration, welcoming in new members from across Eastern Europe. NATO welcomed Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in 1999; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria in 2004; and Croatia and Albania in 2009.11 Second, after the 2001 attacks on the United States, NATO became involved in the Global War on Terror, specifically intervening in Afghanistan.12 Finally, more recently in the wake of the annexation of Crimea, NATO has been reinvigorated to oppose Russian influence throughout Eastern Europe. On this final issue, NATO must play a fundamentally role in ensuring the territorial integrity of its member states in the face of Russian opposition.

In the present day, NATO is a strong alliance that has protected its members for nearly 70 years. While NATO still works to protect its members from outside attacks, using a variety of methods such as deterrence and diplomacy, NATO must continue to innovate if it is to remain relevant into the coming decades.

10 “Timeline: break-up of Yugoslavia.” British Broadcasting Corporation. Last Updated May 22, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4997380.stm. 11 “What is NATO?” North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html. 12 Gordon, Philip. “NATO and the War on Terrorism: A Changing Alliance.” Brookings Institution. June 01, 2002. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/

nato-and-the-war-on-terrorism-a-changing-alliance/.

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TOPIC A: THE PROJECTION OF POWER IN EASTERN EUROPE

Statement of the Problem

Introduction

One of the original goals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was to protect Western European states from the domination of the Soviet Union and attacks from its Eastern European satellite states.13 While the Soviet Union has disappeared into the depths of history, the threat from its successor state, the Russian Federation, is at an all-time high. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the democratization of Eastern Europe in the 1990s, NATO admitted new members, all in Eastern Europe, expanding the borders of the alliance closer and closer to Russia. This expansion has placed NATO and its more recently admitted member nations at greater risk of a conflict with Russia. NATO expansion, while helping to successfully integrate new members into the ‘European Family’, has diluted NATO’s projection power, weakened the cohesion of its member states and, most importantly, created new challenges NATO is ill-equipped to handle. NATO must work to ensure the safety of its eastern members, such as the Baltic States and Poland, while ensuring that it minimizes the risk of conflict with Russia and other powerful nations.

A Feeling of Vulnerability

Eastern Europe nations originally sought NATO membership to ensure that they could leave Russia’s sphere of influence and firmly embed themselves into the global economy and the European world. While many of these new NATO members have successfully left Russia’s direct influence, feelings of insecurity and vulnerability remain amongst these members. These fears were present even after Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia gained NATO membership, but in the aftermath of the Georgia-Russian War and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, these nations are more concerned than ever. Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, promised to protect all ethnic

13 Masters, Jonathan. “The North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO).” The Council on Foreign Relations. Updated February 17, 2016. Accessed May 08 2016. http://www.cfr.org/nato/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato/p28287.

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Russians, no matter where they live.14 His conflicts in Georgia and the Ukraine must be understood through this lens. Due to this, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia feel especially vulnerable given that they all share a border with Russia. The Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, are viewed as most at risk. Estonia and Latvia have large ethnically Russian populations in several of their Eastern regions, while Lithuania sits between Russia and Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea.15 The leaders of the Baltic States fear that Russia could instigate a conflict on the pretense of protecting Russian speaking minorities or uniting Kaliningrad with Russia proper. Experts from the Rand Corporation, a military think tank, estimate that if a conflict occurred between NATO and Russia in the Baltic States, Russia would easily win and inflict heavy casualties on NATO forces.16 Until recently, there were very few NATO forces stationed in Eastern European nations.17 The insecurity that the Baltic States poses a very real threat to NATO and its continued cohesion as a military alliance.

Moreover, Eastern members are particularly vulnerable to missile attacks from the Middle East and Russia. There were plans in the 2000s to develop a missile defense shield that would have already begun defending

14 Coalson, Robert. “Putin Pledges to Protect All Ethnic Russians Anywhere. So, Where Are They?” Radio Free Europe. April 10, 2014. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-ethnic-russification-baltics-kazakhstan-soviet/25328281.html.

15 Bender, Jeremy. “These Countries With Large Russian Populaitons Should Fear What Putin Might Do Next.” Business Insider. March 21, 2014. http://www.businessinsider.com/countries-with-large-russian-populations-2014-3.

16 Shlapak, David and Michael Johnson. “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank.” The Rand Corporation. 2016. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.

17 Baczynska, Gabriela and Wiktor Szary. Poland wants NATO Summit to okay more troops for Eastern Europe. Reuters. January 18, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-poland-idUSKCN0UW1T1.

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NATO members from ballistic missiles, serving to deter conflict with Russia and Middle Eastern powers.18 This shield would be entirely defensive, serving to deter new conflicts and deter missile attacks, rather than see usage on a regular basis. A missile defense shield is not fool proof, as it can easily be overwhelmed by launching a large amount of missiles at once.19 However, it would provide greater protection than the current national missile defense shields. Although the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit saw leaders agree to integrate national missile defense systems and develop missile defense capabilities, progress has been incredibly slow.20 Missile defense was originally an area of cooperation between NATO and Russia, but Russia suspended the work and ultimately sees a NATO missile defense shield as a threat, even threatening to engage in nuclear war.21,22 With a fully functional missile defense shield several years away and relations with Russia deteriorating, NATO members must assess whether the increase in power projection in Eastern Europe that this system affords outweighs its price tag, its inefficiencies and the response it provokes from Russia.

Newer Types of Conflict

An additional challenge to projection power in Eastern Europe is the proliferation of new types of conflict. In many ways, the structure and purpose laid out in NATO’s founding documents render the organization unable or unfit to tackle and fight against these new threats.

Frozen conflicts are conflicts in which official fighting has ended between two powers, yet a state of conflict still exists as no peace treaty has been signed and sporadic skirmishes continue.23 The Russia often uses frozen conflicts by quickly defeating a neighboring power, taking a small portion of typically ethnically Russian territory, and continuing the conflict on a smaller scale by supporting these new territories. Russian frozen conflicts resulted in the creation of territories such as South Ossetia in Georgia and the Donbas region in Ukraine.24 Article 5 of the NATO Charter stipulates that an attack against one member is treated as an attack against all members.25 However, frozen conflicts rarely involve a declaration of war, as the conflict is unofficial. These frozen conflicts are a useful tool in Russia’s arsenal as they could potentially use them to cleave apart territories with large Russian speaking populations, weakening NATO members. Furthermore, given the

18 Calabresi, Massimo. “Behind Bush’s Missile Defense Push.” Time Magazine. June 05, 2007. http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1628289,00.html.

19 Blair, David and Matthew Day. “Russia cries foul as NATO activates missile defenses in Europe.” May 12, 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/12/russia-cries-foul-as-nato-activates-a-missile-defence-shield-in/.

20 “Ballistic missile defence.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Updated July 25 2016. Accessed October 08, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm#.

21 Kramer, Andrew. “Russia speaks of nuclear war as US opens missile defense system.” Boston Globe. May 13, 2016. https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/05/12/russia-speaks-nuclear-war-opens-missile-defense-system/hKlzF4Fw7FKF6B4gIaZT6J/story.html.

22 “Ballistic missile defence.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm#. 23 “What defines a frozen conflict.” The Economist. October 23, 2014. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/10/

economist-explains-19. 24 Ibid. 25 “Collective defence-Article 5.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Updated March 22, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.

htm.

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hesitancy of western NATO members to commit their militaries to Eastern Europe, there are serious doubts whether other NATO members would respond to an attempt by Russia to begin a frozen conflict.

Another unconventional threat facing Eastern European states is cyberattacks. While all countries face cyberattacks from terrorist groups as well as other nations, Eastern European nations are at a particularly high risk and have faced a deluge of attacks in recent years from Russia.26 For example, Russia hackers attacked Estonia in 2007, while Ukraine’s power grid was hit in 2015.27,28 Cyberattacks, even when the assailant is known with a high degree of certainty, are not regarded as declarations of war under international law.29 NATO’s response to the 2007 Estonian attacks was to send defense experts to help them recover.30 Lacking a formalized procedure for dealing with cyberattacks leaves all members, but particularly those near Russia, unsecure.

Economic Concerns

There are economic concerns that complicate any projection of power into Eastern Europe. Many Eastern European nations are highly reliant on Russian natural gas. For instance, 40% of Lithuania’s energy comes from Russian gas imports.31 If Russia were to cut off gas exports in the cold winter months, economic calamity would occur and many lives could be lost. Russia holds the ability to leverage its economic power against many eastern European countries, and potentially the actions of NATO. If Russia wanted to hurt NATO cohesion it could cut off gas exports at any moment, weakening member states as these member states would be left unable to supply natural gas to any of their citizens. Without any mechanism to respond to this type of economic attack, coordination between member nations would be incredibly difficult and would take too long to develop, allowing Russia to gain a strategic advantage. While NATO remains a military alliance, increased economic cooperation on fundamental sectors such as agriculture, military industries, and energy is a part of any strategy that improves NATO’s capacity to project its power.

Could a NATO Rebalance Provoke Russia?

Finally, any increase in projection power into Eastern Europe has the potential to alter the strategic balance and thus, the relationship between Russia and NATO. If NATO continues to rebase soldiers and establish a

26 Traynor, Ian. “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia.” The Guardian. May 16, 2007. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia.

27 Agence France-Presse. “Russia accused of series of international cyber-attacks.” The Guardian. May 13, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/13/russia-accused-international-cyber-attacks-apt-28-sofacy-sandworm?CMP=twt_gu.

28 Traynor, Ian. “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia.”29 When do we call a cyber attack an act of war? No one knows at the moment.” Glitch News. June 29, 2016. http://www.glitch.news/2016-06-29-

when-do-we-call-a-cyber-attack-an-act-of-war-no-one-knows-at-the-moment.html. 30 Traynor, Ian. “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia.”31 Chyong, Chi-Kong and Vessela Tcherneva. “Europe’s vulnertability on Russian gas.” European Council on Foreign Relations. March 17, 2015. http://

www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_vulnerability_on_russian_gas.

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serious military presence in Eastern European members, this could incense Russia and drive them to more confrontational behavior. Conversely, without working to secure Eastern Europe, Russia could be left with a free hand to increase its influence and weaken NATO. It is therefore integral that NATO members consider how to balance projecting their power into Eastern Europe with relations with Russia.

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History of the Problem

NATO, which was founded as a military alliance to defend against the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, has pursued an aggressive expansion of its members in the two decades after the conclusion of the Cold War in the 1990s.32 This rapid expansion has fundamentally altered the priorities of NATO. Today, it is crucial that we consider how NATO will project its power into Eastern Europe, not only for the sake of its Eastern members, but also for the stability of Europe in general. To properly consider NATO’s power projection capabilities, we must understand NATO’s expansion as a historical phenomenon, how this expansion has brought NATO into conflict with Russia, how and why Russia has responded to the expansion of NATO to its borders, and the historical lack of NATO forces stationed in Eastern Europe.

The History of NATO Expansion

NATO has sporadically expanded since its foundation in 1949.33 At its foundation, NATO was only comprised of Western European nations, (United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland) and 2 North American countries (the United States and Canada).34 NATO first expanded in 1952 when it added Greece and Turkey due to their strategic location in Europe and to ensure they did not become allies of the Soviet Union.35,36 Their admission into NATO allowed NATO countries to gain a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union, as NATO could station missiles and airplanes closer to

32 “Enlargement.” 2016. NATO. Accessed November 7. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm.33 Ibid.34 Ibid.35 Ghosh, Palash. 2012. “Why Is Turkey In NATO?” International Business Times. June 26. http://www.ibtimes.com/why-turkey-nato-704333.36 Ragoussis, Yiannis. 2012. “Greece and NATO: A Long Lasting Relationship.” NATO. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/turkey-greece/

Greece-NATO-partnership/EN/index.htm.

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the Soviet Union. This allowed NATO to pose a greater military threat to the Soviet Union.37 NATO would expand again 3 years later when West Germany was admitted.38 West Germany was admitted because, like Turkey and Greece, it offered a strategic advantage to NATO. In this case, West Germany increased the military manpower and technological capabilities of NATO.39 NATO would not expand for 17 more years.

Spain: A Case Study for Further Enlargement

NATO’s final expansion during the Cold War would come in 1982, when Spain was admitted.40 Spain was not an original NATO member because, despite having a viciously anti-communist government, Spain was not a democracy.41 However, after the death of its dictator in 1975 and the return of democracy, a debate among Western European NATO members developed over how to best protect the Spanish democratic gains. It was decided that Spain, despite its economic and military inferiority, would be integrated into European economic and defensive institutions.42 As such, it was invited to join NATO in 1981 and successfully joined in 1982.43 Spain’s admission to NATO and the reasoning for its membership diverges drastically from the motivations for admitting Turkey, Greece and West Germany. However, Spain represents the beginning of the current phase of NATO expansion. In this phase, expansion is no longer made for strategic reasons, but rather to integrate Eastern European countries into Western Europe, western ideals and European organizations that promote democracy and capitalism.

After the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, NATO welcomed Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria in 2004; and Croatia and Albania in 2009.44 With every new country welcomed into NATO, many members debated whether the admission of new members weakened NATO by overextending the organization and by welcoming militarily inferior members.45 However, each time new members were admitted as it was thought as the only way for formerly communist nations to fully integrate into Europe, guarantee their new democracies, and to avoid Russian domination.46 Many members now believe that this expansion into Eastern Europe has fundamentally weakened NATO’s military capabilities and become a large financial burden on wealthier members.

37 “Why is Turkey in NATO?”38 “Enlargement.”39 Haftendorn, Helga. 2005. “Germany’s Accession to NATO: 50 Years on.” NATO. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/history.html.40 Masters, Jonathan. 2016. “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).” Council on Foreign Relations. February 17. http://www.cfr.org/nato/

north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato/p28287.41 King, Seth S. 1982. “Spain Enters NATO as First Country to Join Since 1955.” The New York Times, May 31, sec. World. http://www.nytimes.

com/1982/05/31/world/spain-enters-nato-as-first-country-to-join-since-1955.html.42 Ibid.43 Ibid.44 “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).” Council on Foreign Relations.45 Ibid.46 Ibid.

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Looking back on the end of the Cold War and rapid expansion of NATO, Vladimir Putin and much of the Russian ruling elite claim that NATO made a promise not to expand into Eastern Europe.47 The idea of this promise being made is categorically untrue. Regardless, Putin and the Russian government still promote the narrative that NATO has broken its promise because NATO’s expansion represents a serious affront to Russian interests.48 Expansion makes Russia insecure because, as Putin himself asked, “…against whom is this [NATO] expansion intended?”49 No matter what the intention is behind NATO expansion, expansion threatens Russia. Historically, Russia has sought to create buffer states (that is, states who are Russian allies and can protect Russia from an invasion before it reaches Russia’s territory) between itself and other powerful countries in Europe.50 European Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Ural Mountains, is a flat plain, with no mountains or large bodies of water protecting it from invasions. As such, Russia has been repeatedly invaded. From Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 to Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Russia (or the power ruling Russia) has sought to place other nation’s in-between itself and other strong nations.51 Thus, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union desperately kept Eastern Europe aligned with its interests.52 Consequently, as the Eastern Europe states became democracies and left Russia’s sphere of influence by joining NATO, Russia has lost its buffer states. It now confronts a reality in which it shares a border with NATO member-states and, by extension, the United States. This puts Russia in a tenuous position as it is historically prone to land invasions from Europe.

How Eastern Expansion has Fueled Russian Aggression

Since expansion into Eastern Europe, Russia has taken aggressive actions against NATO members and other Eastern Europe nations. In 2007, Estonia was hit by a crippling cyberattack that targeted its government, political parties, banks and news services.53 While nobody has ever taken credit for the attack, it is viewed by many to be Russia lashing out at a new NATO member.54 Under NATO’s Charter, cyberattacks are not defined as a military attack and therefore no NATO military response was taken – only cybersecurity advisers were sent.55 This attack was only the first example of intimidation by Russia, which attacked Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.56 In both cases, Russia justified its intervention on the pretense that governments were repressing its ethnically Russian minorities. In reality, Russia intervened in an attempt to prevent the Georgian

47 Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Joshua R. 2016. “Russia’s Got a Point: The U.S. Broke a NATO Promise.” Los Angeles Times, May 30. http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-shifrinson-russia-us-nato-deal--20160530-snap-story.html.

48 Pifer, Steven. 2014. “Did NATO Promise Not to Enlarge? Gorbachev Says ‘No.’” Brookings. November 6. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/11/06/did-nato-promise-not-to-enlarge-gorbachev-says-no/.

49 Ibid.50 Marshall, Tim. 2015. “Russia and the Curse of Geography.” The Atlantic, October 31. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/

russia-geography-ukraine-syria/413248/.51 Ibid.52 Ibid.53 Traynor, Ian. “Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia.” The Guardian. 2007. Accessed May 08, 2016.54 Ibid.55 Ibid.56 Gressel, Gustav. 2015. “In the Shadow of Ukraine: Seven Years on from Russian-Georgian War.” European Council on Foreign Relations. August 6.

http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_in_the_shadow_of_ukraine_seven_years_on_from_russian_3086.

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and Ukrainian governments from becoming friendlier with Western countries and eventually joining NATO.57 NATO expansion into Eastern Europe has created a sense of insecurity within Russia which is reminiscent of Russia’s historical insecurity. As a result, Russia has lashed out at Eastern European countries and created the necessity for NATO to project its power and defend its eastern members.

Recent Russia Incursions into NATO Members and Allies

In the past year, Russia has begun to confront NATO forces. In April 2016, Russian fighter jets buzzed, or flew very close to, an American warship and Polish helicopters in the Baltic Sea.58 Russia’s military has continued to harass the militaries of NATO members and its allies. In one instance, the Russian military drove a submarine into Sweden’s territorial waters because of Sweden’s close ties to several NATO nations.59 These incursions represent bolder actions by the Russians, and it is curious if they will continue to become bolder still, potentially risking a confrontation in Eastern Europe. Thus, it is essential that NATO increases its military readiness in Eastern Europe so that it can properly defend itself if such a confrontation occurs.

Lack of Military Presence in East Europe

Despite the integration of Eastern European members into the military alliance, few troops from older (and more militarily powerful) NATO members – namely the United States, France, and United Kingdom – are stationed in Eastern Europe. For instance, of the nearly 30 NATO bases, only 1 is stationed in Eastern Europe. That base is located in Albania, which is 4 countries away from Russia.60 Historically, 65% of American troops in Europe have been stationed in Germany.61 The cause for this lack of military presence in Eastern Europe is entirely historical in nature. Until the 1990s, West Germany was considered the most important area for defending Europe against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.62 Therefore, the large amount of American and NATO bases and troops in Western Germany made sense as it directly protected the interest of all NATO members and served to deter attacks from the Soviet Union. Basing large amounts of troops in critical areas has always been a fundamental strategy of NATO.63 This strategy, called “deterrence”, made the idea of attacking NATO so potentially costly that the Soviet Union preferred to avoid conflict. The countless armies and militaries bases in West Germany served to deter military conflict.64 This strategy was also practiced

57 Applebaum, Anne. 2008. “World Inaction.” Slate, August 8. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2008/08/world_inaction.html.

58 Lubold, Gordon, and Julian E. Barnes. “Russian Warplanes Buzz U.S. Navy Destroyer, Polish Helicopter.” Wall Street Journal. April 13, 2016. Accessed May 08, 2016.

59 Braw, Elisabeth. 2015. “Submarine Intruders on Sweden’s Coastline.” World Affairs Journal. September 29. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elisabeth-braw/submarine-intruders-sweden%E2%80%99s-coastline.

60 Dufor, Jules. 2007. “The Worldwide Network of US Military Bases.” Global Research - Centre for Research on Globalization. July 1. http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-worldwide-network-of-us-military-bases/5564.

61 Ibid.62 “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).” Council on Foreign Relations.63 Rühle, Michael. 2016. “Deterrence: What It Can (and Cannot) Do.” NATO. Accessed November 7. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/

deterrence-russia-military/EN/index.htm.64 Ibid.

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by the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact nations in order to deter NATO attacks. With the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999 and, most notably, the Baltic States in 2004, the center of NATO moved from Germany into Eastern Europe. While these new members were admitted, older NATO members were reluctant to rebase their militaries into Eastern Europe. This has led to a NATO force that is currently ill-equipped to rapidly deploy in Eastern Europe.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused a great deal of insecurity in many Eastern Europe countries. As a result, the Eastern European nations, led by Poland, have begun to vocally demand the establishment of NATO military bases and the deployment of NATO troops into their territories.65 These Eastern European members cite the success of deterrence in the Cold War and believe that by stationing more NATO troops in Eastern Europe, Russia will be less likely to attack these members. They theorize that the Russians will not want to risk a direct and potentially bloody conflict with NATO.66 Whereas the Eastern members fear that if more troops are not moved to Eastern Europe, then Russia will be more likely to invade, as the Russians believe they will be able to easily win.

NATO has a long and illustrious history that very much continues to influence its actions and beliefs today. NATO’s eastward expansion in the past two decades have brought it into direct conflict with Russia on many occasions and has challenged NATO’s ability to respond and act to crises. The ability of NATO to project its power in Eastern Europe and ensure the security of all its members is directly linked to NATO’s history of expansion and the benefits and problems associated with it. To successfully improve NATO we must look at past expansions and past actions in order to learn how to best plan for the future.

65 Baczynska, Gabriela, and Wiktor Szary. 2016. “Poland Wants NATO Summit to Okay More Troops for Eastern Europe.” Reuters, January 18. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-poland-idUSKCN0UW1T1.

66 “Deterrence: What It Can (and Cannot) Do”

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Past Actions

To improve its projection of power into Eastern Europe, NATO has taken several actions. Some of these past actions have proven successful, but many were hampered by problems that have prevented their effective implementation. It is important to consider that actions can be taken by individual NATO members or by the alliance as a whole. However it will become clear that actions taken collectively by NATO, which are often the most effective actions, can prove difficult for all member states to implement, thus reducing the effectiveness of many past actions and solutions.

Increased Defense Spending

A wholly ineffective strategy utilized by NATO to improve its ability to project power into Eastern Europe was to ask member states to increase defense spending to 2% of gross domestic product (GDP). This 2% target was initially set in 2002, but calls were renewed at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales.6768 In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and global recession, increasing defense budgets is important, but this task takes on a greater importance when we consider that Russia has increased its defense spending by 5.7%.69 While NATO has a larger collective defense budget than Russia, the United States accounts for 75% of all spending by NATO members, with a majority of American defense spending going towards domestic defense.70 Spending 2% of GDP on defense has failed for a variety of reasons. From the onset, this 2% benchmark for defense spending has been elusive for most member states as their economies were battered by the global recession, followed by the Eurozone crisis. As of 2015, only five

nations – Great Britain, Poland, Estonia, United States and Greece – spend more than 2% of their GDP on defense.71 Moreover, six nations are decreasing their defense spending, while another six are increasing such

67 Mölling, Christian. 2014. “NATO’s Two Percent Illusion.” SWP Comments, August. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C36_mlg.pdf.

68 Kay, Sean. 2016. “Scrap NATO’s 2 Percent Target and Go Bold!” Carnegie Europe. Accessed November 7. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61309.

69 “Russia’s Military Budget Ranks Fourth Worldwide.” 2016. The Moscow Times. April 5. https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-military-budget-ranks-fourth-worldwide-report-52390.

70 Bendavid, Naftali. 2015. “Just Five of 28 NATO Members Meet Defense Spending Goal, Report Says.” Wall Street Journal, June 22, sec. World. http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-calls-for-rise-in-defence-spending-by-alliance-members-1434978193.

71 Ibid.

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spending.72 NATO has no mechanism through which it can force member states to spend more money on defense; it can only recommend that more money is spent. Therefore, little progress has been made on this issue. It is clear that members in Central and Eastern Europe must continue to increase their defense spending so that they can better provide for their own defense.

Past Actions to Counter Russian Influence

In the aftermath of the 2008 cyberattacks on Estonia, NATO’s response was incredibly underwhelming. One would expect that after one of the largest cyberattacks at the time, NATO would rush to the aid of a member nation. Instead, NATO merely sent a small contingent of cybersecurity experts.73 These experts, while helpful, demonstrate the paralysis of NATO on cybersecurity, as cyberattacks do not invoke the collective defensive provisions of Article V.74 More recently, NATO has begun to hold cybersecurity drills, with one such drill taking place in Estonia in 2015.75 Neither the United Nations nor NATO have taken any steps to definitively decide whether cyberattacks constitute military attacks.

To try and reassure members in Eastern Europe, NATO has rebased some troops, increased the number of military exercises, and established some small military bases. In 2015, NATO moved to establish seven new military centers in Poland, Romania, the Baltic States, and Bulgaria.76 These military centers will allow for increased military cooperation and preparedness, but members in Eastern Europe view these actions as too weak to make a difference.77 The United States has made a large monetary commitment to NATO troops in Eastern Europe, increasing its budget for weapons and supplies from $789 million to $3.4 billion.78 This money will go to fortifying Eastern Europe, with the supplies and forces being deployed in the Baltic States, Hungary and Romania.79 This money may also be used to help other countries in Eastern Europe such as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia defend against Russian incursions.80 Finally, NATO held large-scale war games in Poland in June of 2016.81 While this is a united effort by NATO to project its power into Eastern Europe, it is little more than posturing and does not represent a serious commitment on the part of NATO to secure Eastern Europe or confront Russia. Member countries such as Poland want NATO’s western members to make a substantial

72 Ibid.73 Traynor, Ian. 2007. “Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia.” The Guardian, May 16, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.

com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia.74 Ibid.75 “NATO to Hold Major Cyber Defense Drill in Estonia.” 2016. Ynetnews. Accessed November 8. http://www.ynetnews.com/

articles/0,7340,L-4649604,00.html.76 “NATO Plants Seven New Flags in Eastern Europe.” 2015. EurActiv. May 2. http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/

nato-plants-seven-new-flags-in-eastern-europe/.77 Ibid.78 Landler, Mark, and Helene Cooper. 2016. “U.S. Fortifying Europe’s East to Deter Putin.” The New York Times, February 1. http://www.nytimes.

com/2016/02/02/world/europe/us-fortifying-europes-east-to-deter-putin.html.79 Ibid.80 Ibid.81 Szary, Wiktor. 2016. “NATO Allies Launch Large-Scale Military Exercise in Poland before Key Summit.” Reuters, June 6. http://www.reuters.com/

article/us-nato-poland-anakonda-idUSKCN0YS1E8.

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commitment with troops to Eastern Europe’s defense, saying that these actions do not go far enough to deter Russia.82 In reality, while member nations such as the United States have taken bold action, NATO as a single body has taken few such actions. Ultimately, this leaves many eastern members unhappy and insecure.

Missile Defense Shield

During the early 2000s, a missile defense shield was being constructed in Eastern Europe.83 This missile defense shield would have helped shoot down ballistic missiles coming from Russia or Iran. This plan was scrapped by the Obama administration in 2009, which instead decided to make the missile defense shield smaller and used against Iranian ballistic missiles.84 This smaller system would use satellites and radars in Turkey rather than developing advanced radars in the Czech Republic, giving limited protection to NATO members against ballistic missiles launched from Russia.85 However at the 2010 NATO Lisbon summit, members decided to integrate existing national missile defense shields as well as develop this smaller shield.86 This plan resulted in the activation of an advanced radar facility in Romania in 2016, which was quickly denounced by the Russians.87 NATO has taken an inconsistent path with regards to a missile defense shield, but the shield is moving towards completion with construction on the next necessary facilities already begun in Poland.

82 “Poland wants NATO summit to okay more troops for eastern Europe”83 Rhodes, Abi. n.d. “Defence against Whose Missiles?” http://www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/117Rhodes.pdf.84 Baker, Peter. 2009. “White House Scraps Bush’s Approach to Missile Shield.” The New York Times, September 17. http://www.nytimes.

com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18shield.html.85 Ibid.86 Hildreth, Steven A., and Carl Ek. 2010. “Missile Defense and NATO’S Lisbon Summit.” Congressional Research Service. http://fpc.state.gov/

documents/organization/154176.pdf.87 Barnes, Julian E., Gordon Lubold, and Thomas Grove. 2016. “U.S. and NATO Officials Inaugurate Missile Defense Shield in Romania.” Wall Street

Journal, May 12, sec. World. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-and-nato-officials-inaugurate-missile-defense-shield-in-romania-1463056944.

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However, this action specifically differs from most past NATO actions as it involved all NATO members coming together and pursuing a common policy, rather than pursuing individualized policies.

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Possible Solutions

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a variety of potential solutions to enhance its power projection capabilities in Eastern Europe. These solutions offer a variety of possible responses from global powers, but are built around three central themes: increasing deterrence to potential threats, slowing or ending a further expansion of NATO, and strengthening current members and the alliance before further actions are taken. It is important that delegates evaluate all of the possible solutions for both their negative and positive geopolitical ramifications. Ultimately, it will be impossible to please all NATO members with the solutions that are rendered, but it is important that the best possible solution is reached. Similarly, improving projection power into Eastern Europe runs the serious risk of provoking Russia and appearing threatening to other global powers. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the effects possible solutions will have on the world security situation and whether solutions can be balanced to actually improve power projection into Eastern Europe, satisfy all NATO member states, and keep escalating global insecurity to a minimum. Appeasing all of these different objectives while affecting real change in NATO’s Eastern European power projecting capabilities will prove a difficult task, but to truly create a substantial and lasting impact, all considerations must be measured and compromised.

Increase Deterrence

An important component of power projection into Eastern Europe is simply to increase the military presence of NATO in the region. However, doing so will increase tensions with Russia and might render the whole region less stable and, therefore, force NATO to commit more soldiers, money and time to this region. This could effectively start a new arms race between NATO and Russia. However, the current deployment of troops and arrangement of NATO bases renders a wholly unstable and under-protected eastern flank of NATO.88 Instead of redeploying the body of alliance forces to Eastern Europe, NATO members should rebalance their troops to provide for greater equality of protection among its members. This strategy will act as a deterrent to conflict with threatening powers. As a final measure of increasing deterrence, NATO should finalize and fully integrate its missile defense shield.

The alliance could first go about establish more bases in Eastern Europe, with most alliance member bases in Western Europe. The first centers were only established in 2015, but these were quite small and will make little appreciable difference in improving power projection and increasing deterrence against an attack.89 Consequently, NATO members must firmly commit to establishing more bases for army units and military airfields for the air force. Only by establishing a firm and clear presence in Eastern Europe can NATO

88 Coffey, Luke. “NATO: Back to basics in Eastern Europe.” Al Jazeera Opinion. December 06, 2014. Accessed October 10, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/nato-back-basics-eastern-europe-201412310031210648.html.

89 “NATO Plants Seven New Flags in Eastern Europe.” EurActivcom NATO Plants Seven New Flags in Eastern Europe Comments. February 05, 2015. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/nato-plants-seven-new-flags-in-eastern-europe/.

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effectively protect its members and project real defensive power against a potential attack. However, NATO cannot merely establish a few more large bases and be successful. NATO must compliment these larger bases by establishing more of these smaller command centers, like they have done in the past.90 A true network of military infrastructure must be constructed to bind these members in Eastern Europe to the other member nations, ensuring the security of all NATO members.

While establishing new bases is a long term solution as bases take time to be constructed, NATO must move more troops into Eastern Europe, both in the short term and as a long term commitment. Under President Obama, the United States has already committed more American troops to the region in February of 2016.91 This move was explicitly made with the intention to provide further deterrence against a Russian attack on a neighboring nation.92 In particular, it is important that special considerations are given to the Baltic States as these countries have Russian minority populations that the Russian government could be keen to use as a pretext for intervention. When coupled with the construction of military bases, increased troop deployments would send the clearest message to Eastern European nations as to the importance of their membership. However, it would also look like a threatening move to Russia and many global and emerging powers. Accordingly, tensions could become more strained with Russia. Given how tense relations are with Russia today, NATO members should be concerned to their potential reactions to an increased military presence or whether NATO needs to ensure its own military security first and foremost before looking to compromise with Russia. Finally, increasing the number of troops in Eastern Europe would be expensive for all members of the alliance. Given that many members are stubborn with regards to paying “their fair-share” of the NATO budget, it could be difficult to fund a large expansion of NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe. Instead, some would argue for the redeployment of current military assets from Western and Central European states to Eastern Europe. While this would be costly, it would be cheaper than starting completely from scratch.

90 Bendavid, Naftali. “NATO to Set Up Command Centers on Eastern Flank.” Wall Street Journal. January 30, 2015. Accessed October 10, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-to-set-up-command-centers-on-eastern-flank-1422618612.

91 Landler, Mark, and Helene Cooper. “U.S. Fortifying Europe’s East to Deter Putin.” The New York Times. February 01, 2016. Accessed May 08, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/02/world/europe/us-fortifying-europes-east-to-deter-putin.html?_r=0.

92 Landler, Mark, and Helene Cooper. “U.S. Fortifying Europe’s East to Deter Putin.” The New York Times.

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The final piece of the deterrence puzzle is finalizing the establishment and deployment of a NATO missile defense shield. Ballistic missile that could be used against NATO countries are a direct threat to power projection in Eastern Europe. To deter the use of ballistic missiles and thereby enhance NATO’s defensive capabilities in Eastern Europe, the completion of a missile defense shield is a possible solution. However, some have called into question whether a missile defense shield would be a long term deterrence method, as other countries could simply overwhelm the shield by developing better ballistic missiles or launching as many missiles as possible.93 Furthermore, the shield is quite costly. Although it is nearing completion, some NATO member states have continued to question its technical feasibility.94 Yet another solution to reduce the threat of ballistic missiles to power projection in Eastern Europe is to pursue an arms reduction with states that wield ballistic missiles. This strategy would require diplomatic efforts; it is unlikely that an arms reduction treaty could be reached with Iran or Russia if a missile defense shield is constructed as this shield would alienate and anger these countries, preventing negotiations.

93 Hildreth, Steven A., and Carl Ek. 2009. “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe.” Congressional Research Service. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/154176.pdf.

94 Ibid.

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Slow or End Expansion

Another possible solution to improving power projection in Eastern Europe is to slow the eastward expansion of NATO and to think more critically about the criterion of NATO membership and the geopolitical ramifications of admitting new members. In past expansions, NATO has increased its membership without a true debate and conversation about the potential geopolitical entanglements that these new members bring with them. Moreover, with many members feeling that the alliance’s priorities are many while its resources are few, it is important that NATO’s current military strength and infrastructure are taken into account as well. A further expansion eastward has the potential to dilute NATO’s current power and entangle it in new conflicts. Both of these results will hamper NATO’s ability to project power into Eastern Europe. This is not to say that new members cannot be added to NATO, but the criterion for admission must be reviewed and debated so as to allow for new members to strengthen and enhance the alliance.

Strengthen Current Members through Cooperation

Moreover, power projection can be increased in Eastern Europe through increased cooperation among NATO members. Currently, NATO serves a military alliance, with little to no formal cooperation on the economic side of international relations. However, enhancing economic cooperation among NATO members would improve NATO’s ability to project its power, as NATO members could become economically stronger and thus be able to spend more on defense, but also decrease the reliance of NATO members in Eastern Europe on potential adversaries. The reliance of Eastern Europe on Russia as an economic trading partner and for economic necessities, such as natural gas in the winter, is an untenable situation.95

95 “Conscious Uncoupling.” The Economist. April 05, 2014. Accessed October 07, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21600111-reducing-europes-dependence-russian-gas-possiblebut-it-will-take-time-money-and-sustained.

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In this regard, these NATO countries forfeit their ability to effectively negotiate and project their power as Russia could easily destroy or severely weaken their economies. Western governments have successfully forced the end to the South Stream Pipeline project, arguing it would have increased the dependence of many NATO members on Russian natural gas.96 This is a good first step to wean NATO members off of Russian resources, but economic interdependence and cooperation must be increased among members to ensure stable and reliable economic growth and the continued decrease in dependence on Russia. By eliminating these bargaining chips from Russia’s side, NATO will increase its ability to project its power.

Furthermore, cooperation on cybersecurity has been fairly limited among members. NATO would be keen to establish formal cooperation on cybersecurity of nations at risk to hackers and exploitation. If hackers can cripple military and economic infrastructures, then it is important that there is a forum and command structure for NATO to defend, resolve and investigate such actions. The disjointed nature of current cybersecurity initiatives among NATO members opens any programs to improve power projection in danger of attack or being seriously weakened.

Finally, if formal economic cooperation can be reached, all members must strive to increase defense spending so as to allow the alliance to pay for its projection of power into Eastern Europe. There have been a variety of spending benchmarks suggested, and some major politicians have even suggested revoking membership if nations do not pay “their fair share”.97 While that is certainly a potential solution, pursuing this solution could ultimately weaken the alliance as members begin to bicker, and fissures could form between members. In a worst-case scenario, these disagreements could be exploited. At the end of the day, cooperation must be reached between members and a united front must be presented in the face of adversity. If members are too busy fighting each other, NATO will never be able to effectively project power into Eastern Europe.

The projection of power into Eastern Europe is of great importance to NATO, and there are many different ways to successfully enhance NATO’s projection power. These solutions range from diplomatic to military in nature. Solutions must be evaluated for their advantages and disadvantages; weighing the effects the solutions will have on member as well as non-member nations. In the end, solutions must be found to shore up the eastern flank of NATO before its weakness there is exploited for the gain of other nations.

96 Boersma, Tim. 2014. “The Cancellation of South Stream Is a Pyrrhic Victory, At Best | Brookings Institution.” Brookings. December 18. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/12/18/the-cancellation-of-south-stream-is-a-pyrrhic-victory-at-best/.

97 Kottasova, Ivana, and Sonam Vashi. 2016. “Reality Check: Donald Trump on NATO Countries Paying Their Fair Share.” CNN Politics. July 27. http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/27/politics/donald-trump-nato-allies/.

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Bloc Positions

Canada, Great Britain, and the United States of America

As the farthest geographically removed from Russia in NATO, these highly developed nations have different insecurities about Russia’s growing sphere of influence; particularly due to its rising economic confidence. But, Russia’s rather sizeable nuclear arsenal still poses a great threat to these nations. Similarly, the growing rate of cyber attacks makes all nations vulnerable to attacks.

Traditional espionage claims continue into the modern age. During the Cold War era, the KGB, the MI6 (currently the SIS), and the CIA were famous for its espionage efforts. Claims of continued espionage are still common today, and there are allegations that cover-up for Cold War era activities are continuing. Today, with the global movement for hacking and other computer applications, one simply needs a computer to have the world at their fingertips which makes locating and identifying the source of an attack nearly impossible. These nations, are primarily concerned with relations to Russia as they relate to security.

However, the new president elect for the United States might threaten these current power relations. On January 20, Mr. Donald Trump will be sworn in as president and the fate of the US will be under his leadership as the Commander in Chief. The day following his historic victory, Vladimir Putin released a congratulatory statement which may move current US-Russia relations in a new direction.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland

These Baltic nations were once part of the USSR but achieved full, recognized sovereignty upon the dissolution of the USSR. With their high geopolitical importance to both Europe and Russia, their admittance into NATO weakened Russia’s influence in Europe and in general. These were previously seen as Russia’s buffer states, so their current status is a constant reminder of Russia’s fragile borders. These nations are wary of increasing Russian power, and are always on the lookout for activities that could increase Russia’s sphere of influence. Similarly, these nations are still transitioning away from communist governmental strucutres into more Western governments, or are being integrated into the Western World. These Baltic states are heavily reliant on Russia as an economic partner and, in recent years, have to begun to find that full reliance is disadvantageous.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are the nations that are closest to Russia. Russia continues to refuse to acknowledge that the inclusion of the Baltic States in the USSR was nothing more than an annexation and that there was no legal basis for it. The argument is based on the individual states’ non-aggression pacts prior to World War II. Similarly, many of these nations are products of frozen conflict, meaning that the conflict

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was never officially resolved and could be resumed at any time. In efforts to again mount aggression against these nations, Russia could claim that Estonia and Latvia are mistreating their Russian-speaking populations.

Vladimir Putin has repeatedly claimed that his interest lies in protecting ethnic Russians no matter where they are located. Using these tactics, the Baltic nations, with immense levels of ethnic Russians are dangerously close to being attacked. Similarly, with no strong military presence in this region, other than the threat of a united and localized NATO attack, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland are all virtually exposed to Russia.

France, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Spain, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Portugal

These Western European nations were, with the exception of Spain and Germany, the founding members of NATO along with the US, Canada, and UK bloc. Today, NATO is housed in Brussels, Belgium. As many of the Alliance members become increasingly nervous over Russia’s incursions into neighboring territories, Germany has offered another opinion; the constant request for dialogue and negotiations. Germany is currently considering removing some of the sanctions on Russia. This has created a large internal discussion over the growing political threat that Russia poses. For instance, Russia had convinced Armenia and the Ukraine to halt talks with the EU and instead begin negotiations with Russia. These countries are interested in protecting the EU and democracy from the Russian federation.

Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungry, Albania, and Croatia

Previously a part of the Soviet Union, these states were added to NATO after the end of the Cold War. NATO served as a mechanism to integrate previously communist nations into Western idealism and capitalism. Although not the wealthiest countries, their position in NATO serves to protect democracy and to avoid a Russian conquest.

Currently, only Albania hosts one of NATO’s bases—the only base in Eastern Europe— although, geographically Albania sits far away from Russia. These nations’ interests are based in the continued progress of democratization and emergence into the Western world.

Greece and Turkey

Both added in 1952 as the first additions to the expanded NATO, Greece and Turkey were admitted due to their strategic location in Europe and to ensure their anti-Soviet position. During this time, while the Soviets still held most of Eastern Europe, these two nations were geographically closest to the USSR, and a ready military could be stationed there. This action increased global tensions and showed Russia that NATO

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was willing to go to war. In 1955, NATO admitted West Germany, where a greater threat to the USSR was created. This action increased the manpower and technological capabilities of NATO.

Today, however, Greece and Turkey are struggling to maintain democracy and stable economic growth. These factors are making the continued integration of Europe less and less stable. The further Russia grows, the smaller NATO’s influence in the region will hold. These nations would be some of the first to leave the alliance.

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TOPIC B: THE MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE

Statement of the Problem

Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents members with varying degrees of development in their space programs. For many member states, the European Space Agency (ESA) is the uniting organization that serves to lift European nations into space. Important and well-accomplished, this cooperative organization is involved in a peaceful engagement in space; mainly focusing on exploration, scientific research, and the maintenance of the International Space Station. As NATO is the military alliance that unites much of Europe toward a common goal, the importance of this organization in space for many European NATO members cannot be diminished. Yet, within this military alliance, there is little official policy or conversation regarding the involvement of NATO in space, yet many members, such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom, retain significant resources in space that aid their militaries, and by extension, NATO militaries, on Earth. For such an important tactical aspect to NATO’s military strategy, space should be debated more often. Moreover, space is formally a demilitarized area, but powers around the world, including China, Iran, Russia and NATO members are developing technologies that will turn space into an active battlefield. Therefore, the demilitarization of space is incredibly important.

Defining the Militarization of Space

One would expect defining the militarization of outer space to be quite simple; but, while there are international guidelines for the weaponization of space, its militarization is a much different topic. Historically, there are isolated incidents of astronauts bringing firearms into outer space as a form of protection, the first acts that weaponized space. The Soviet Union even developed a small capsule with an automatic gun strapped to its hull as a defensive measure. While bringing these firearms into space clearly constitutes acts of militarization and weaponization, does technology that helps military combat on the ground constitute militarization? For example, Global Position System (GPS) is operated by a network of satellites developed as a military technology to help the military in combat. Should this technology constitute a militarization? Under current international law, codified in the Outer Space Treaty, such satellites do not constitute militarization nor do they violate the treaty that is the fundamental basis of international law as it pertains to space.98

However, with many countries around the world developing satellites capable of destroying missiles, it is time for the global powers to take a second look at defining the militarization of outer space. By 2007, China had

98 “The Outer Space Treaty.” 2016. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. Accessed November 8. http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html.

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gained the ability to destroy satellites in low Earth orbits (LEO), a region of space that mostly contains military and communication satellites99 and it is also probable that they have the ability to destroy satellites in High-Earth Orbits.100 Under the Outer Space Treaty, of which China is a member, the placement of weapons of mass destruction is banned in outer space.101 While ballistic missiles, which are used to destroy satellites, are not weapons of mass destruction, it would clearly be an act of war to destroy the satellites of another country. These satellite-destroying missiles are a clear technological development that has not only weaponized space, but in many ways confirms that space is already a militarized zone, even though it is legally considered to be demilitarized. These missiles represent a threat to the entire NATO military establishment as satellites play a key role in all military command structures.102

Lack of a NATO Forum for Space Topics

Due to technological limitations, a serious militarization of space was always considered to be science fiction, and not reality. However, with rapid technological innovation and countries continuing to work towards improving their space programs, a very real and very serious militarization of outer space is potentially on the horizon. Currently, space matters are operated and organized by NATO’s Single Command for Alliance Air and Space Matters.103 However, this organization historically confined itself to commanding NATO’s air power and in reality it pays little attention to issues of space and particularly militaries in space.104 Consequently, there are currently no forums within NATO to discuss issues that relate to space. Moreover, NATO lacks an alliance-wide policy and is in dire need of a permanent and concrete forum for the alliance’s policies concerning outer space105. NATO cannot effectively utilize its resources and increase the security of all members if countries are pursuing inherently different policies.

Moreover, because satellites in space are so integral to the effective deployment and operation of a military in the present day, NATO must develop a system to share the information gained from these satellites. The information these satellites gain could prove the difference between a successful and unsuccessful mission. A change of this nature to NATO might prove difficult as nations with existing satellite networks tooled for military use, such as the United States and France, could be unwilling to share their systems with other NATO member states. However, in the face of new military threats such as the allegedly hack-proof new Chinese spy

99 Kyl, Jon. 2007. “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons and American National Security.” The Heritage Foundation. January 29. http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/chinas-anti-satellite-weapons-and-american-national-security.

100 Ibid.101 “The Outer Space Treaty.”102 “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons and American National Security.”103 “NATO’s Single Command for Alliance Air and Space Matters.” 2016. NATO Allied Air Command. Accessed November 8. https://www.airn.nato.int/

page921327.104 Ibid.105 Remuss, Nina-Louisa. 2010. “NATO and Space: Why Is Space Relevant for NATO?” ESPI Perspectives 40 (October). https://www.files.ethz.ch/

isn/124749/ESPI_Perspectives_40.pdf.

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satellite106, NATO satellites can also be used to gain valuable intelligence and it is important that a mechanism for sharing this intelligence is developed; especially given the new Chinese spy satellite that is considered hack-proof. If the NATO countries continue to maintain separate space policies and fail to develop a dialogue themselves, they risk falling technologically behind potential adversaries, risking the security of their nations.

Defining NATO’s Role

Finally, NATO must define its role in outer space and establish its views on the militarization of space. If we are to concede that spy and military satellites militarize space, and that space has always been militarized throughout its existence, then NATO must clearly recognize that space as a militarized area is a reality, and not merely something out of science fiction. Whether NATO chooses to acknowledge this reality or not, NATO must acknowledge that it is incredibly vital for the safety and security of all NATO countries. For the sake of their economies and militaries spread across the world, NATO must work to maintain a peaceful coexistence in space and work to ensure that disarmament agreements can be crafted with other world powers. By placing explicit limits on what type of technology can be used in space, NATO can ensure its own continued security, but a successful agreement with rival powers can only be reached through dialogue and cooperation.

Perhaps the final component of the problem is the lack of cooperation between NATO, and Russia and China. In general security areas, NATO and Russia maintains a dialogue through several channels, it formalized this dialogue through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).107 While the NRC was shut down in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea and continued conflict with Ukraine, it is important that formal dialogue is established in the areas of outer space not only with Russia, but with China as well. The lack of formal dialogue leaves all parties involved vulnerable to accidents between space agencies that could threaten to ignite a larger conflict between the powers here on earth. If there is no dialogue or cooperation, how can NATO possibly work to maintain space as a demilitarized area and prevent an arms race centered on space technology for military capabilities? Even in times of conflict and competition, it is vitally important that communication continues to exist.

As the nations of the world work towards furthering themselves in the final frontier the competition between nations is bound to prove fierce. In the past decade alone, space technology has developed at a rapid pace, with a specific emphasis placed on its military purposes. It is important that NATO defines a singular, united policy as it concerns outer space. Moreover, NATO must work to prevent the further militarization of space, demilitarize it if possible, and search to create a singular definition for militarization.

106 BBC News. 2016. “China Launches Quantum-Enabled Satellite Micius,” August 16, sec. China. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-37091833.

107 “NATO-Russia Council.” 2016. NATO. April 15. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm.

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History of the Problem

The proclivity of humanity to explore the world around them is an innate component of human nature. Since our earliest days, humans have continually pushed the boundaries of our known world: by the 1900s, the majority of the world was “discovered.” With the later development of flight, bodies of water were no longer major impediments to global travel; technological advancements had enabled an interconnected globe. Flight also allowed humans to begin seriously considering exploration beyond the planet. This desire for exploration when coupled with our curiosity about the stars continued to fuel our will to explore and discover long after we had “discovered” all of earth. From early Greek astronomers looking towards the stars to our first forays into outer space, the stars have always attracted humanity’s attention and technological advancements made in the twentieth century have finally allowed us to focus on this final frontier.

The Second World War saw the development and investment into rocket technologies, culminating in the V-2 rockets of Nazi Germany.108 After the war, the United States and the Soviet Union fought for supremacy

108 “Space Race.” 2016. Royal Air Force Museum. Accessed November 8. http://www.nationalcoldwarexhibition.org/schools-colleges/national-curriculum/space-race/.

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in all facets of society, seeking to demonstrate who had the superior social system. The Soviet Union scored the first point in this competition when they began our exploration of space with the launch of Sputnik, the first satellite launched into space, in 1957.109 This event, and the ensuing launch of a dog, Laika, into orbit a month later ignited the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The space race was an intense period of rapid technological advancement and investment in space technologies.110 Both powers sought to eclipse each other in a demonstration of strength and intelligence. The space race culminated in the United States landing the first people, Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin, on the moon in 1969.111 While this focus and investment in space technologies fizzled out after the 1970s, serious advancements continued to be made, such as the International Space Station (ISS), the space shuttle program and the continued exploration of space through satellites.112 These developments have all continued to make outer space an accessible area of importance to scientific pursuits and national security concerns.

Besides the scientific benefits of maintaining a costly space program and the political necessity to surpass rival countries, space programs also have military benefits. For example, Sputnik was launched in a hollowed out Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).113 These ICBMs would go on to be a key feature in the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, but their early development as rockets for satellites proved key in establishing the technology as viable. In many ways, it is ironic that, while space is often imagined as a purely neutral area for scientific advancement, the motivation for going to space in the first place comes often springs from the military considerations. Indeed, space programs are an easy way for a country to help develop and improve its technology for weapons such as ballistic missiles.114 In many ways, it is ironic that, while space is oft imagined be a purely neutral area for scientific advancement, the motivation for going to space in the first place often springs from military considerations. A country’s investment in a space program will simultaneously improve its ballistic missile program. For example, Iran has greatly invested in their space program as a way to covertly improve their missile capabilities, despite international sanctions to prevent such improvements.115

Moreover, all national militaries increasingly rely on satellites to help direct their military forces. Member countries of NATO in particular have grown increasingly dependent on military satellites for communication since the start of the NATO mission in Afghanistan.116 The satellites maintained by the NATO member

109 “Space Exploration.” 2016. National Archives. August 21. https://www.archives.gov/research/alic/reference/space-timeline.html.110 “Space Race.” Royal Air Force Museum.111 “Space Exploration.”112 Ibid.113 “Space Race.” 2016. National Air and Space Museum. Accessed November 8. https://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/space-race.114 Milhollin, Gary. 2000. “The Link Between Space Launch and Missile Technology.” presented at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,

Honolulu, Hawaii, March 16. http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/speeches/2000/GM%20Hawaii%20speech.htm.115 Gross, Judah Ari. 2016. “Iran May Have Secretly Tested Ballistic Missile Tech with ‘space Launch.’” The Times of Israel. April 26. http://www.

timesofisrael.com/iran-may-have-secretly-tested-ballistic-missile-tech-with-space-launch/.116 “NATO and Space: Why Is Space Relevant for NATO?”

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countries form an integral network in security for NATO countries and forces fighting abroad.117 Due to the increased reliance of NATO on military satellites, NATO has been left quite vulnerable to a disruption of its military campaigns by powers who can shoot down satellites. If recent history is any indicator, it is likely that NATO will grow increasingly more dependent on satellites for communication and that potential adversaries will continue to develop more sophisticated means to cripple satellites.

A discussion of the history of space brings up important conversations about whether space has always been militarized. Neither the United Nations nor NATO, or any of its member nations, have ever sought to definitively determine whether space is militarized and how, or even if, it should be demilitarized. In many ways, space has always been a militarized area, even if generally not weaponized: if space, and space programs in particular, are used to develop military technologies then, at a minimum, outer space is partly complicit in the military system and is therefore a militarized zone. Until recently, the militarization of space on a level similar to Earth and the airspace on Earth, were dreams more fitting of science fiction; however, the development of satellite killing missiles calls this into question as some countries now have the ability to attack satellites orbiting earth.

With the advent of space programs the United Nations sought to codify regulations and rules for the use and exploration of space. In 1963 the United Nations General Assembly passed the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.118 This treaty was superseded, or came to be considered invalid, when in 1966 the General Assembly reached the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, or the Outer Space Treaty.119 This treaty entered into force in 1967 and the majority of United Nations members have ratified and signed the treaty.120 The treaty definitively laid out several key principles: the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind; outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States; outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means; States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner; the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities.121 This treaty proved important in establishing outer space as an area mainly for scientific use, but the inability to enforce the treaty has made it difficult for outer space to be maintained as a totally demilitarized zone.

117 Ibid.118 “The Outer Space Treaty.”119 Ibid.120 Ibid.121 Ibid.

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Since the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty, there have been few subsequent major treaties concerning the use of outer space. For example, the most recent major treaty concerning space was the Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization finalized in 1985.122 Since then, there have been no major efforts made by the United Nations or the international community concerning space or preventing the further militarization of space. The only serious treaty efforts related to space were the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union (discussed below).

In the past, there have been successful efforts to decrease militarized areas. While airspaces around the globe remain heavily militarized, many countries have successfully pushed for disarmament and demilitarization. The most important result is the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I and II. (SALT I and SALT II). The SALT talks concerned the exponential increase in ballistic missiles in both the United States and the Soviet Union.123 These two adversaries recognized the danger a continued arms race would cause, not only to their countries and economies, but indeed the whole world.124 Therefore they agreed to limit ballistic missiles and to continue to maintain a dialogue.125 SALT was a milestone for disarmament efforts, demonstrating to the world that rival powers can agree to limit their arms for the good of all.126 If space continues to become an arena for militarization, it risks upsetting the strategic balance that exists between NATO and other major powers.127 Upsetting this balance will increase instability and lead to more conflicts among member states. Therefore we must look for a disarmament and a limitation of arms.

Over the previous decade, the United Nations continued to sound the alarm that the lack of international law pertaining to outer space allowed conditions for an arms race to develop in outer space and to complete its weaponization.128 The United Nations and its member states continually discuss concluding a treaty to definitively layout limitations on weaponization and militarization of outer space, but no treaty has been concluded; despite the United Nations approving a resolution every year for 30 years indicating the wish to accomplish such a treaty.129

122 “Outer Space.” 2016. Reaching Critical Will. Accessed November 8. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space.

123 “Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II.” 2016. Office of the Historian. Accessed November 8. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt.

124 Ibid.125 Ibid.126 Ibid.127 Strength of International Space Law to Prevent Militarization of Outer Space, Respond to Other Current Challenges Weighed in Fourth Committee. 2010.

http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/gaspd458.doc.htm.128 Ibid.129 Ibid.

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Past Actions

Introduction

In the past, efforts were taken on several fronts in an effort to ensure that outer space was maintained as an area for science. While many of these efforts were successful, in many ways, a militarization still occurred. Despite past efforts of the international community to craft international law and past negotiations to limit ballistic missiles, outer space is still militarized. Even more recently, NATO has not necessarily worked to demilitarize or limit their military capabilities in space. In this way, NATO’s actions are as much of the problem as NATO can be part of the solution. It is important that we evaluate our past actions so as to ensure our potential solutions avoid the same pitfalls that have befallen past actions.

Multilateral Actions at the United Nations

At the beginning of its collective exploration of outer space, the international community sought to lay down basic rules and principles in international law regarding the appropriate uses of outer space. The countries of the world took action through the United Nations, successfully negotiating the Outer Space Treaty in 1966 in the General Assembly.130 This treaty made great strides in clarifying and codifying international law as it pertains to outer space. However, while it was an important step in demarcating the uses of outer space, it fundamentally failed to define acts of militarization and weaponization in outer space. The treaty uses lofty rhetoric to declare that outer space is for the use of all mankind and that celestial bodies only be used for peaceful purposes; but it only specifically prevents the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space.131 At no point in the treaty does it explicitly prohibit the placement of technologies that aid in military combat on earth or clarify the degrees to which space can be militarized.132 However, the Outer Space Treaty is incredibly useful as it established outer space as a place primarily for scientific exploration. With this strong base, it is possible for NATO members to work to craft a concrete definition for the militarization of space and work to prevent future arms races from taking place in the skies above.

NATO Space Policy and Contributions to Militarization

In the past, NATO nations have contributed to the militarization of space through the deployment of military and intelligence satellites as well as the development of missiles and other weapons that can cripple satellites. Countries of NATO have been involved in space since the 1960s and many members have national missile and satellite programs. However, as an alliance, there have been few contributions to the militarization of space until the development and deployment of the NATO missile defense shield.

130 “The Outer Space Treaty.”131 Ibid.132 Ibid.

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Moreover, while 15 nations—Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States—of NATO have military and/or intelligence satellites currently in orbit, there is very little cooperation between NATO members on intelligence sharing gained from these military satellites.133 Specific members within NATO, such as the United States and the United Kingdom share a great deal of intelligence information, some of which is gleaned from these satellites, but they do not always share such information with the other NATO countries.134 For example, NATO does not have a space strategy nor a military space strategy, as NATO is reliant on the national satellite networks developed by individual nations.135 However, among these 15 different systems, communication and coordination has no formal channels. Compare this lack of alliance-wide coordination with the integrated command system for military efforts on earth.136 For example, NATO coordinates naval maneuvers and army forces across the world without any problems. This coordination has not been developed for space policy or the contributions of space technology to our militaries on earth.137

In the past, NATO has tried to establish a missile defense shield and these efforts continue today, with recent portions of the missile defense shield coming online in 2016.138 An integral aspect of the missile defense shield are satellites for early surveillance of missiles launched from hostile States as well as for communication

133 “NATO and Space: Why is Space Relevant for NATO?”134 Spillius, Alex. 2009. “Intelligence Sharing between Britain and the United States Dates back to First World War.” The Telegraph. February 5. http://

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/4514938/Intelligence-sharing-between-Britain-and-the-United-States-dates-back-to-First-World-War.html.

135 “NATO and Space: Why is Space Relevant for NATO?”136 NATO. 2016. “NATO’s Maritime Activities.” NATO. Accessed November 8. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_70759.htm.137 Ibid.138 Reuters. 2016. “U.S. Activates Romanian Missile Defense Site, Angering Russia,” May 12. http://www.reuters.com/article/

us-nato-shield-idUSKCN0Y30JX.

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between the different components of the missile defense shield which are spread among four countries.139 Not only does the missile defense shield threaten Russia, as it upsets the strategic balance of power by giving NATO an easy way to defend itself, it also exemplifies how easily outer space is militarized.140 The construction of the missile defense shield heightens tensions with Russia and causes nations to increase their missile stockpiles or develop ways to cripple the missile defense shield. One easy way is to develop means to destroy satellites. In this way, NATO’s past actions are militarizing space and increasing the potential that other nations will move to militarize space as well. However, the missile defense shield also serves to exemplify the coordination with which NATO countries can act. All NATO countries needed to coordinate to establish the missile defense shield, as such, it is possible for NATO to improve its coordination of its military and intelligence satellite networks and its space policies on militarization.

Bilateral Actions

Past agreements have been reached to disarm and significantly demilitarize. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union reached a series of groundbreaking disarmament agreement through the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START).141 142 Together, these treaties exemplify the ability for adversarial powers to reach an agreement that decreases tensions and increases safety and security. Moreover, they should serve as a guide to current powers looking to curtain, limit or prevent the militarization of space. Multilateral agreements, such as the Outer Space Treaty, are important pieces in preventing an increased militarization of space, but many of the actions taken by countries are codified through bilateral agreements, such as SALT and START.

139 Browne, Ryan. 2016. “U.S. Launches European Missile Defense Shield.” CNN. May 12. http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/11/politics/nato-missile-defense-romania-poland/index.html.

140 Ibid.141 “Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II.”142 “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, 1991 and 1993.” 2008. U.S. Department of State Archive. April 30. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/

pcw/104210.htm.

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Possible Solutions

NATO is dealing with a variety of important and intricate issues for which it must find effective and lasting solutions. Having member nations with divergent strategies on outer space, lacking a forum to discuss alliance wide outer space policies and pursuing policies that will only increase militarization of space and distrust between NATO and other major parties must be dealt with first through a variety of solutions sought through bilateral talks and communication. The key for success is for NATO to recognize its contribution to space militarization, seek to clarify the definition of outer space militarization and establish dialogues within NATO and with outside powers.

Solutions within NATO

Before NATO can begin to discuss and establish treaties with outside powers, NATO must improve its internal outer space policy. Primarily, NATO should establish a permanent forum within NATO to discuss outer space policy. After the establishment of this committee, NATO must organize an alliance wide outer space policy. Due to the high levels of integration between military satellites in space and military efforts on the ground, NATO must treat outer space as it would naval, air or ground combat. Therefore, a clear and firm policy must be set regarding ballistic missiles and missile defense shields, NATO’s definition for militarization and weaponization of space, military and spy satellite information sharing, and an improvement in the coordination of resources in outer space. Ultimately, NATO member states, particularly the United States, United Kingdom and France maintain an extensive array of military satellites in outer space, while these satellites help to protect NATO member states, the most long-lasting and effective way to maintain peace is through measures to demilitarize outer space as much as possible. This is not to say that NATO should demilitarize and allow other powers to maintain their military presence and their ability to harm NATO communication technologies in space through satellite killing missiles. On the contrary, after setting its own policy and strengthening its own organization on themes related to the militarization of outer space, NATO should seek to open dialogues about demilitarization with other states, in particular Russia and China.

Establishment of a Dialogue

NATO should not pursue one-sided demilitarization, but should instead work with Russia, China and other powers capable to militarizing outer space in order to ensure that space is effectively demilitarized and that the threat level stemming from the militarization of outer space is reduced. If NATO demilitarizes while other countries maintain their capabilities or their military presence in outer space, NATO will surely weaken its position and leave itself open to attack on its economic infrastructure and ability to conduct war. In many respects, a dialogue already exists between NATO members and Russia and China on scientific issues as they relate to outer space. For example, the space agencies of Russia, the United States, Canada and the

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European Space Agency all cooperated to build and maintain the International Space Station.143 This type of scientific cooperation represents a positive step, but a political dialogue about the militarization of space must be established so as to prevent a future arms race and ensure peace and stability for all NATO members. This dialogue must seek to firmly define the militarization of space, work to demilitarize space if it determines it is already militarized and work to limit missiles that could be used to conduct combat in space. As China already possess satellite killing missiles, it is urgent that this dialogue is opened before the next major arms race is ignited.

Moreover, an increased dialogue is necessary so as to prevent accidents in space from developing into a larger conflict on the ground. If a lack of dialogue continues to exist between NATO and Russia and China, then a collision between military satellites or the accidental damaging of the satellite of another power could ignite a serious conflict on earth. If a mechanism is firmly developed to handle such accidents, then NATO can ensure small events do not develop into larger conflagrations.

Goals of this Dialogue

From this dialogue established between NATO and Russia, and NATO and China, member states should look to accomplish several goals: a common and clear definition for the militarization of space; the establishment of a body to ensure the space is demilitarized to an acceptable level to all as determined by this clearer definition of militarization; and a limitations of missiles and arms that involve the use of outer space for warfare or can destroy technologies deployed into space (such as communication satellites).

First and foremost, any dialogue must clearly define militarization and weaponization of space, working to delineate the difference between these two and, more importantly, seeking to rectify the current usage of outer space for satellites that aid in military combat with the idea of preserving outer space as a demilitarized zone. This dialogue could define the militarization of outer space in several very different ways. On one hand, it could define militarization as the placement of any technology that aides in military combat, thus including military satellites and ballistic missiles. This dialogue could determine that military satellites do not meet the definition of militarization, but ballistic missiles do meet this definition, and should therefore be limited or banned in some way. Finally, this dialogue could establish that neither military satellites nor missiles represent the militarization of space; therefore the situation should be left as it currently stands, but future technologies (that would represent an actual militarization under this final definition) should be banned or limited. No matter which definition is reached, it is important that NATO goes in with a united policy into this dialogue (as referenced above) and that an organization is created to implement whatever definition is created.

143 Garcia, Mark. 2016. “International Cooperation.” NASA. May 31. http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/cooperation/index.html.

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A whole host of bodies could serve as a template for an organization to arbitrate disputes in outer space and ensure demilitarization, but the most important for analysis is the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE). This organization, comprised of nearly 60 members spread about North America, Europe and Asia works to ensure that security is maintained throughout Europe and a dialogue exists on a range of issues from arms control to democratization and gender equality.144 This group has proven successful in opening and maintaining a dialogue between former and current adversaries. Importantly, this organization includes NATO members and Russia.145 It would be prudent to establish a similar organization to monitor the demilitarization of space and effectively work for the maintenance of dialogue between NATO and other active powers in outer space.

Finally, regardless of the definition established internally by NATO or externally through a dialogue, it would be prudent to develop a framework through which to limit ballistic missiles and satellite killing missiles. Both types of missiles represent an affront to peace and security and create conditions in which cooperation is difficult as states are stuck in a cycle of fearing states that wield such technology. While the total elimination of such technology is impossible, NATO countries would be intelligent to work with Russia and China, as well as its member states, to limit the number of ballistic missiles and missiles that could be used to kill satellites. This way, NATO can ensure the protection of its economic assets in outer space and can provide better protection that a missile defense shield could provide to people living in Europe. The limitations of such missiles would go a long way in creating conditions for peace and lasting security. If such technologies cannot be limited then it is more than likely that an arms race will ensue and that NATO and Russia and China will adopt increasingly adversarial and combative postures towards one another. These postures will effect a whole range of issues that demand cooperation to successfully resolve, such as climate change and the threat of terrorism.

Conclusion

The pursuit of peace and stability is a noble and often unattainable goal. The only way to effectively obtain either peace or stability is through dialogue. Both internally and externally, solutions for NATO run through the creation of a dialogue to then allow for the establishment of institutions focused on the militarization of space. Within NATO, a space policy must be created, similar to its naval or air policy. This policy must clearly outline NATO’s role in outer space, the importance of outer space to its peace, security and economy, and work to establish the proper channels to share information gained from space technology between member states. Only through this coordination and the establishment of a united front will NATO be able to work with outside forces to concretely define the militarization of space, prevent its further militarization and prevent future arms races from occurring. Even this dialogue between NATO and non-member states, however, must result in the creation of institutions to monitor such decisions reached as a result of the dialogue.

144 “Participating States.” 2016. Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. Accessed November 8. http://www.osce.org/states.145 Ibid.

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Bloc Positions

Countries with access to fully operational space programs and launch capabilities146

Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, United States

The above countries have the ability to launch objects into space, whether through their own national programs or the European Space Agency – only those countries that have a greater than 5% contribution to the European Space Agency have been listed here (Belgium and the United Kingdom).147 These delegations are the major players in the militarization of space as the currently hold the greatest amount of power in terms of their abilities to both send weapons into space and conversely, use weaponry in order to destroy objects in space. Although these nations are the only ones able to have significant influence on how to implement regulations on objects in space and the militarization of such objects at the moment, their perspectives and influence will lay out an important guideline for countries looking to develop similar capabilities in the future. It is also important for these countries to consider the impact of their actions on non-NATO nations that have launch capabilities already, such as China, Japan, and Russia.148

Countries with space programs and some operational capabilities149

Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Turkey

The above nations have some sort of government space agency that regulates and manages their affairs with space, as well as some sort of operational capabilities in space. These operational capabilities may involve functioning satellites, joint research or astronaut training programs, or basic launch capabilities. This activity is often tied to ministries or departments of science, trade and economic affairs, transport, or any number of government agencies. Therefore, it is difficult to determine exactly what route these nations may decide to take with regards to future utilization of space as an economic, technological, and possibly militarized zone. Because of this uncertainty, it is important for the countries in this bloc to establish firm guidelines and frameworks for how nations will operate in space, and how to best address the inevitable militarization of space.

146 O’Callaghan, Jonathan. 2013. “How Many Countries Have Rockets Capable of Reaching Space?” Space Answers. March 21. https://www.spaceanswers.com/space-exploration/how-many-countries-have-rockets-capable-of-reaching-space/.

147 “ESA Budget 2015.” 2015. European Space Agency. http://www.esa.int/For_Media/Highlights/ESA_budget_2015.148 “How Many Countries Have Rockets Capable of Reaching Space?”149 “Global Space Programs.” 2016. Space Foundation. Accessed November 8. https://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/

public-policy-and-government-affairs/introduction-space/global-space-programs.

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Countries with minimal space program activity

Albania, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia

The countries in this bloc have shown interest in further development of space capabilities for economic or scientific reasons, and may have even taken steps to establish a space agency or program. However, their capabilities are currently very limited, and most activity is limited to partnerships with other space agencies. It is important for these nations to consider their role in the militarization of space in the long term, especially as latecomers to space and the development of space technology. Because these countries still comprise a significant portion of NATO membership, they still have a significant influence on future actions and regulations on the militarization of space for NATO.

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“Global Space Programs.” 2016. Space Foundation. Accessed November 8. https://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/public-policy-and-government-affairs/introduction-space/global-space-programs.

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O’Callaghan, Jonathan. 2013. “How Many Countries Have Rockets Capable of Reaching Space?” Space Answers. March 21. https://www.spaceanswers.com/space-exploration/how-many-countries-have-rockets-capable-of-reaching-space/.

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