figfting corruption in indonesia

8/8/2019 FIGFTING CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/figfting-corruption-in-indonesia 1/23

UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA

SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

SPA501 : PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Professor Lim Hong Hai

FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA,

IS SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO ABLE TO?

By :SARJANUDDIN (P-SM0123/09)

MUHAMAD IZZWANDI BIN MAMAT (P-SM0081/09)

INTRODUCTION

On July 8, 2009, voters on the more than 17,000 islands of Indonesia

went to the polls to elect the country's President. As suggested, Susilo Bambang

Yudhoyono, the incumbent candidate, notched up a resounding victory. Since

winning the country's first competitive election in 2004, the former general has

been a cool steward of Indonesia's young and often chaotic democracy, denting

the country's grim legacy of corruption, cracking down on radical Islamist groups

and rebuilding a nation that suffered the brunt of 2005's devastating Indian Ocean

tsunami. SBY — Yudhoyono is widely referred to by his initials — is seen as a

moderate and honest figure in a nation still emerging from decades of cronyism

under the deceased military dictator Suharto. When his triumph is certified, he

will become the first President to be re-elected in what is the world's most

populous Muslim democracy.

1



As Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono re-elected for next 5 years as the

president of Indonesia has breathed Indonesia life into new expectation in fighting

corruption. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has acted in good steps to bringing back

country’s confident in facing negative publicity about world’s corruption level

either from inside country media or international media.

Indonesia ranks in the bottom of the corruption perception index in

Asia, and it is believed that graft as the main problem in the country. President

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, owes much of his popularity to his clean image and

record of fighting corruption. But much remains to be accomplished before

Indonesia can say it has beaten corruption.

Corruption in Indonesia was a serious problem since the Dutch

colonial period as the salaries of the Dutch Company's personnel were not

adequate enough. Corruption became endemic during President Soekarno's rule

because his “disastrously inflationary budgets eroded civil service salaries to the

point where people simply could not live on them and where financial

accountability virtually collapsed because of administrative deterioration"

(Mackie 1987: 87- 88).

Corruption in Indonesia has become usual behavior in every single

civil servant activity. For example, we can find that no more than 50 metres away

from the Central Jakarta Palace of Indonesia's President, policemen are pulling

over cars seen to be violating the city's rather compromised law known as the

three in one. That traffic minimisation law holds that during peak hours, cars on

selected major roads must always be carrying three people. The trouble is that the

rule has also spawned an entire sub-industry, ridden by people called jockeys, the

2



name given to the individuals with their thumbs out at intersections, prepared to

jump into your car for a small fee. That aside, the car we see the police pulling

over down the street has only two people in it. A conversation is had through the

window and something is passed between a policeman and the driver, who we

then pull over for a chat.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has defined

corruption as "the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit

through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or

embezzlement" (United Nations Development Programme 1999: 7). Perceptions

Index (CPI) in 2003, Indonesia ranked 122nd is perceived to be the second most

corrupt after Myanmar, which is ranked 129th among the 133 countries surveyed.

In this essay, we focuses on what was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

did in his first 5 years reigning Indonesia and what will he do for next second 5

years in fighting corruption.

CAUSES OF CORRUPTION

According to Quah, 1999; Corruption is a serious problem in

Indonesia (and other countries), the extend of corruption in Indonesia depends on

two factors: (1) the nature of the causes of corruption; and (2) the degree of

effectiveness of measure initiated by political leaders to combat corruption. In

order to curb corruption in Indonesia (and other countries), the causes of

corruption must first be correctly diagnosed so that political leaders can take

appropriate action to minimize, if not eliminate, such causes.

3



The nature of mostly Indonesian made the corruption grew fast in

proportion to economic growth. Most of Indonesian had heart set on saying thank

you with money or things. In the past, it was a good habit, but later it became bad

and worst. Thank you in money or things, in the past, gave after someone got

what he/she need achieved. Over the time, it was changed slowly; the money or

things gave before the desire is achieved, and hoping that what desired come true.

This also happens in government activity, especially in project management.

Where certain parties to give thanks at the beginning of the project in hopes the

project will be his.

In Palmier’s comparative study of the control of bureaucratic

corruption in Indonesia, he has identified three factors as important causes of

corruption: opportunities (which depended on the extent of involvement of civil

servants in the administration or control of lucrative activities), salaries and

policing (the probability of detection and punishment).

- Low Salaries

Palmier has identified low salaries as an important cause of

corruption. "If the official is not to be tempted into corruption and disaffection,

clearly there is an obligation on the government to provide or at least allow such

benefits as will ensure his loyalty; one might call it an implicit contract" (Palmier

1985: 2). Thus, "adequate pay" becomes "an essential ingredient in reform"

(Palmier 1985:6).

If bureaucrats are paid a high enough wage, even a small chance of

losing their jobs would discourage them from being corrupt." Conversely, if the

real salary of civil servants decreases drastically, "even the most rigidly honest

4



bureaucrats will be tempted to go beyond the law to preserve their standard of

living" (Banerjee 1996: 110).

- Opportunities for Corruption

The expanding role of the public bureaucracy in national development

has increased the opportunities for administrative discretion and corruption as

"regulations governing access to goods and services can be exploited by civil

servants in extracting 'rents' from groups varying for access to such goods and

services" (Gould & Amaro-Reyes, 1983: 17).

In Indonesia, Warwick has introduced the interesting distinction made

by civil servants between "wet" and "dry" agencies, depending on their budgets

and access to the public. According to Warwick (1987: 43): "wet" agencies . . . are

generous with honoraria, allowances, service on committees, boards, and

development projects, and, recently, opportunities for foreign training. They are

departments that deal in money, planning, banking, or public enterprises. "Dry"

agencies are those doing traditional administrative work. Perceptions of unfairness

about benefits not only reduce staff morale, but lead to the feeling that illegal

compensation is a fair way to even out staff benefits across agencies.

Thus, "wet" agencies like the customs, immigration, internal revenue,

and police will provide more opportunities for corruption than "dry" agencies like

research and administrative departments, which do not interact directly with the

public. According to Prawiro (1998: 230-231,264), Coordinating Economics

Minister in Indonesia from 1989-1993, the tax office and the customs service

were the most lucrative of the "wet" government agencies in Indonesia. Indeed, as

5



"dry" agencies have reduced opportunities for corruption, "being posted to a dry

position is about the worst fate any official could fear" (Loveard 1999: 111).

- Low Risk of Detection and Punishment

As corruption is an illegal activity in all countries, those individuals

found guilty of corrupt offences should be punished accordingly. However, in

reality, the probability of detection and punishment of corrupt offences is low in

Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand as the public in these countries perceive

corruption to be a low risk, high reward activity.

The Indonesian Civil Service's weak disciplinary control is reflected

in the difficulty in detecting corrupt behaviour among its members and the

absence or light penalty for such behaviour. In his 1969 survey of regional

economic planners in Indonesia, Smith (1971: 30) found that apart from the lack

of incentives for correct behaviour, sanctions were also absent or rarely applied to

those officials who were under-performing as "cultural norms effectively preclude

punitive denial of the perquisites, however minor, that attend each position."

Smith (1971: 30) concluded that "the common procedure for dealing with officials

whose corrupt practices became open knowledge is to transfer them to new jobs

before their activities gain wide attention."

Similarly, when a senior Indonesian civil servant was advised to

dismiss his indolent and corrupt subordinates, he replied that he could not do so

because they "had large families to support and needed these jobs. Besides, they

didn't earn enough anyhow" (Palmier 1985: 210). Finally, Palmier (1985: 280)

found that corruption was rampant in Indonesia because it was tolerated as corrupt

officials were seldom punished.

6



The three major causes of corruption in Indonesia, are the low salaries

of civil servants and political leaders, the many opportunities for corruption in

"wet" or vulnerable agencies, and the ineffective policing or low probability of the

detection of and punishment for corrupt offences.

FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA

According to the World Bank’s Combating Corruption in Indonesia, “The

political transition has led to greater competition among political parties, forcing

them to depend on the old elite for the considerable funds needed to mount

effective campaigns in such a vast country. And decentralization has opened new

avenues for corruption by the local elite, who may earlier have had difficulty

getting “their fair share of the cake” in a tightly centralized Indonesia.”

Eradication of corruption itself takes a long time because it was his own

corruption has taken hold so strongly in everyday life even in the era of the

nation's 50 existing corruption.The fight against corruption in Indonesia began

after the 1955 election as corruption was rife especially in the area of import

licenses.

In December 1967, President Suharto established the Team Pemberantasan

Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Team or CET) within the Attorney General's

Office to deal with corruption cases. However, the CET was ineffective because

its efforts were blocked by influential men in the regime.(Quah, 1982:170)

The anti-corruption efforts of the Habibie administration exposed the

problem of Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme (KKN or corruption, collusion and

nepotism) but were also ineffective because there was no serious attempt to "bring

7



offenders to justice" during Habibie's presidency as KKN was viewed as a

legislative problem to be resolved by introducing new laws and, the various

institutions created by President Habibie to eradicate KKN "failed to perform, and

no significant progress was made" (Assegaf et al 2002: 149).

President Abdurrahman Wahid's administration inherited "a substandard

legal system" and "a murky taxation system" which provided ample opportunities

for corruption (Smith 2001: 11). President Wahid also inherited the new anti-

corruption laws and the Joint Team for the Eradication of Corruption (TGPTPK)

was formed in June 2000. TGPTPK team was ineffective because of the poor

work commitment of its members, the lack of financing which resulted in the non-

payment of its members' salaries for several months, and its lack of authority to

investigate corruption cases which occurred before 1999 (Assegaf et al 2002:

169).

When Megawati Sukarnoputri became president in July 2001, she

inherited "a severely weakened presidency" and the unresolved problem of KKN

(Sen 2002: 17). she promised that her anti-corruption campaign would begin with

her family and that corruption must be eliminated to strengthen Indonesia's

democratisation. She also directed her cabinetministers and senior civil servants to

declare their assets to the state auditors. Furthermore, she indicated that her

ministers would be held responsible if they were found to have given unlawful

benefits to her relatives. She added: "If later it is found that any of the children

have benefited from any project, or anything else, it will be the minister who will

bear the blame" (BBC News 2001: 1-2). Megawati's remarks must be understood

8



in the context of the rampant and blatant corruption perpetuated by former

President Suharto and his family during the 32 years of his rule.

THE SBY’S ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGN

In September 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was elected

President of Indonesia and his vice president is Jusuf Kalla (JK). In large part

because of his promises to improve governance and fight corruption and President

Yudhoyono has been outspoken about the need to reduce corruption, and his

government has taken a number of steps in support of this goal.

Two years into the President’s term, it is an appropriate time to examine

what his government has done to fight corruption and to what effect. Recognizing

that reducing corruption is a difficult, long-term endeavor, this report offers a

stocktaking of the variety of anti- corruption initiatives begun or enhanced since

2004. A central concern of this report is whether these initiatives can produce a

significant and lasting decline in the level of corruption in Indonesia.

According to Transparency International’s 2005 Global Corruption

Barometer, 81% of Indonesians surveyed think corruption will decrease “a lot” or

“a little” over the next 3 years. Only 10% surveyed think it will get worse. This

level of optimism was the highest of all the countries surveyed.

The Yudhoyono government’s agenda for its first 100 days was as broad

as it was bold. It proclaimed: “To create an Indonesia that is just and democratic,

the main agenda is to improve the performance and to restore public faith toward

law enforcement agencies, especially the AGO and Police, also the functioning of

9



judicial system that is credible and accountable, and the implementation of civil

service reform based on good governance principle.”

Eradication of corruption is a big government agenda Yudhoyono-Kalla.

Of course, levels of achievement and success is very dependent on the quality of

the performance of law enforcement officers, one of the Corruption Eradication

Commission.

SBY enhance the role of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in

combating corruption in Indonesia. Performance of the executive or the

government of SBY-JK 2004-2009 in combating corruption is still not optimally.

Rather, it is found that the policy even undermine efforts to eradicate corruption.

KPK's mission is to create Indonesia becomes a country is free from

corruption. That means all the problems related to corruption, collusion and

nepotism must be completed. Commission have to drive change, so that this

nation become a nation of corruption. The presence of the Corruption Eradication

Commission (KPK) really felt the impact when successful imprisoned ex-officials

who had been untouched by the law. Many failure stories besides its success.

Some progress can be noted in the efforts to reform the compensation

system. The Minister of Finance has set up a task force to examine the entire

compensation package with the goal of creating a more transparent, systematic

and coherent framework of pay and allowances linked to a comprehensive review

of job classifications and categories.

In 2005 was a golden year in the SBY government corruption. It was

marked by the emergence of Presidential Instruction No.5 (Inpres 5) to encourage

and accelerate the eradication of corruption. The, in December 2005, the President

10



instructed National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) to prepare the

National Action Plan for the Eradication (RAN-PK). In the plan suggests that

civil service pay should be increased to curb corruption. Evidence from

elsewhere, however, suggests that the link between government wages and

corruption is tenuous at best. Low earnings prompt individuals to seek alternative

sources of income. But high earnings are not sufficient to counter corrupt

practices.

In short, pay increases can play a role in changing behavior but they must

be part of an over all policy package designed to influence civil servant behavior .

It is important to begin by acknowledging that the President is genuinely

committed to fighting corruption, and he is supported in this effort by a small but

significant constellation of reform-minded actors inside and outside the

government who have the potential to make a difference. Moreover, his

comprehensive approach, with its emphasis on both punitive and preventive

measures, has considerable promise. However, there exist real political and

bureaucratic constraints on the pace and scope of reform. Because the president’s

cabinet is essentially a coalition government, his ability to push (or punish) his

Ministers and other senior officials is limited. And because the government’s anti-

corruption agenda involves action by many parts of the government, it requires

continual and active leadership.

It doesn’t appear that the office of the president has the capacity to

continually press the anti-corruption agenda. By way of example, the

government’s “National Action Plan for the Eradication” (RAN-PK) is in danger

of becoming nothing more than the bureaucracy’s way of doing the minimum

11



required to show the president that it is complying with Inpres 5. As a result, the

President’s most significant action to improve governance has not been the

introduction of institutional reforms; but rather clamping down on standard

practices such as cronyism in appointments, political favoritism in commercial

and regulatory decisions, and political intervention in independent commissions

and oversight bodies.

The President has been less proactive in developing and implementing a

strategy of institutional reforms to reduce the incentives and opportunities to

engage in corruption.

To date, the most pronounced change has been in the area of punishing

corruption. There are a number of significant, and in some respects

unprecedented, steps being taken to uncover and punish corruption—such as the

invigoration of audits, investigations and prosecutions, and the pressure being

applied to reform the AGO, the police and the courts. These punitive measures are

important because they are sending a message that engaging in corruption is no

longer risk-free. But given the still limited capacity in Indonesia for exposing and

prosecuting corruption relative to the pervasiveness of the problem, it is unlikely

that by themselves, these measures will fundamentally change the risk-reward

calculation.

The KPK has posted some important successes with its investigations and

prosecutions, and it has helped to energize other anti-corruption efforts. However,

it has been less successful promoting preventive reforms, and its effort to collect

and investigate wealth reports of government officials appears lack luster. Even if

the KPK excels in prosecuting corruption, its overall impact will be limited if

12



there aren’t significant and sustained reforms in the Attorney General Office

(AGO), Police, judiciary, auditing and procurement.

President Yudhoyono is committed to punishing corruption, and there is a

small but The Yudhoyono government’s approach to fighting corruption has a

number of notable characteristics: First, the president has made anti-corruption

“his” issue: to date he has not delegated leadership and oversight to anyone else in

his government. (However, the president appears to have designated the KPK as

his proxy in the fight against corruption.) Second, the president’s approach is

multi-faceted: it includes prosecutions, prevention and education. To date,

however, the most noticeable thrust has been in the realm of prosecutions. Third,

the approach is incremental and “rehabilitative”: the president seems to have ruled

out the wholesale replacement of government officials and instead believes that

they can be induced to stop their corrupt behavior. Fourth, it also appears to be

very attuned to political considerations. To date, there has been only limited

action taken against those at the apex of power in Indonesia, namely politicians

and generals who currently hold high level positions in the national government,

political parties or military. Finally, it is notable for the absence of any explicit

emphasis on investigating and prosecuting corruption by former president

Soeharto and his family and close associates—despite continued calls to do so

from civil society.

The President’s anti-corruption effort also is notable less for the

introduction of

institutional reforms than for an emphasis on ending a variety of practices that

historically have bred and abetted corruption, including cronyism in

13



appointments, political favoritism in commercial and regulatory decisions, and

political intervention in independent commissions and oversight bodies. He has

been less proactive in developing and implementing a strategy of institutional

reforms to reduce the incentives and opportunities to engage in corruption.

Under President Yudhoyono, the number of anti-corruption prosecutions

has

increased, continuing a trend since 2001. This is the result of the combined efforts

of THE KPK, AGO, POLRI, BPK, PPATK and several other agencies. These

punitive measures are sending a message that corruption is not risk-free. Indeed,

many Indonesian commentators are already claiming that these measures are

changing the way bureaucrats behave, including causing them to slow down the

release of funds for government projects. But it is unlikely that by themselves,

these measures will fundamentally change the risk-reward calculation over the

long term.

To date, the impact of the national government’s anti-corruption initiatives

at the local level is also a mixed picture—which is not surprising given

decentralization. On the one hand, some 1,000 members of DPRDS (local

assemblies) across the country are under investigation for misuse of DPRD funds.

On the other hand, there continue to be numerous opportunities for corruption and

collusion at the local level.

The KPK has only a very limited reach beyond Jakarta and in most places

local auditing functions are still at a low stage of development. Moreover, the

capacity of local civil society groups and capacities to expose and prosecute

corruption are improving. An encouraging development is the national

14



- To date, it appears the KPK has not aggressively collected or

investigated the wealth reports of senior government officials.

However, the KPK has taken steps to make the submission of complete

wealth reports easier, and KPK leadership assert that they are

scrutinizing the wealth reports of a number of “high profile” officials

and ex-officials.

- To date, the KPK has done relatively little in the area of corruption

prevention.

- Although the KPK has formed partnerships with several provincial and

kabupaten governments, its reach outside of Jakarta still is very

limited.

Because the KPK is new and is still in the process of defining its role (and

has become the most prominent actor in the fight against corruption), it is

important to be cognizant of a number of potential issues. These include:

First, there is the risk that the KPK will grow too quickly and spread itself

too thinly. In particular, there is a risk that if the KPK expands its efforts in the

area of prevention too rapidly, it will diminish its focus on prosecutions. Attention

must be paid to issues such as the KPK ’s comparative advantage and absorptive

capacity. Recognizing this, the KPK isn’t planning a major expansion of its

regional presence for several years.

Second, there also is the possibility that the KPK will avoid pursuing

politically-sensitive cases. To date, the KPK has not taken action against any

officials, politicians or generals currently in powerful positions in the government,

House of Representative (DPR) or Indonesia Military Forces (TNI).

16



Third, the KPK faces a difficult challenge balancing its independence from

the AGO and the Police with the need to work with the law enforcement agencies.

Its effective will be reduced if it is too independent or becomes too close.

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the KPK’s success with

prosecutions is dependent upon the integrity and competency of the Special Court

for Corruption.

It appears there are high public expectations regarding the government and

KPK’s anticorruption efforts. The 2005 Transparency International Global

Corruption Barometer indicates that Indonesians believe there has been a decline

in corruption over the last three years and are optimistic that it will decline even

more over the next three years. It is important that the government and KPK

manage expectations, deliver on their promises, and communicate their priorities

and progress to the public.

There is a risk that the government and KPK’s anti-corruption initiatives

will provoke a political backlash and/or public disappointment. Potential problems

include:

- The credibility of anti-corruption efforts could be undermined by the

appearance of partisanship and/or selectivity.

- Efforts to impose reforms on the judiciary could be seen as undermining

the independence of the judiciary.

- The failure of anti-corruption efforts to punish “big fish” or to improve the

availability or quality of public services could fuel public frustration and

cynicism.

17



Fourth, the government must take meaningful steps to increase

transparency and disclosure in budgeting, procurement and project

implementation. In effect, this involves reducing opportunities and incentive

structure within the bureaucracy, and especially for the Yudhoyono government

and other anti-corruption agencies to produce a jobs with some measure of

confidence that they’ll be rewarded rather than punished.

Fifth, governments at the national and sub-national levels must increase

the scope, quality and integrity of internal and external auditing.

Sixth, with regard to combating corruption at the local level, one of the

most important things the national government can do is hasten and broaden the

reform of law enforcement, including the police, AGO and judiciary.

Seventh, civil society can play a larger and more important role than is

currently the case. The sectors of civil society where it appears there is the most

upside potential include universities, students, the media and professional

associations.

Finally, given Indonesia’s status as a new democracy, serious attention

needs to be paid to addressing the corrupting and corrosive influence of “money

politics” on political parties, elections and legislatures.

CONCLUSION

Performance of the executive or the government of SBY-JK 2004-2009

and KPK in combating corruption is still not optimally. Rather, it is found that the

policy even undermine efforts to eradicate corruption. There are many efforts

which have been programmed by SBY to fight corruption in Indonesia, one of

19



which is to enhance the role of the Commission in eradicating corruption cases.

The President has been less proactive in developing and implementing a strategy

of institutional reforms to reduce the incentives and opportunities to engage in

corruption.

As of mid-2006, the anti-corruption track record of the Yudhoyono

government and the KPK is positive and encouraging in some respects, but

disappointing and worrisome in other respects. The mixed record is, to a

considerable extent, a reflection of the severity and complexity of the problem of

corruption in Indonesia. But it also is a consequence of shortcomings inherent in

some of the Yudhoyono administration’s approaches to addressing corruption.

Corruption in Indonesia can be attributed to the low salaries of the civil

servants and political leaders, the ample opportunities for corruption in many

public agencies, and the low probability of detection and punishment of corrupt

offenders. The consequences of corruption are negative for the country, but they

are less serious for Indonesia because of the National Counter Corruption

Commission’s efforts in curbing corruption. The anti-corruption strategies in

Indonesia would be more effective if their political leaders demonstrated their

commitment to curbing corruption like Singapore and Hong Kong, several years

ago was a very fertile country with the practice of bribery. Even the Hong Kong

ten years ago was a country known for dirty bureaucracy. But now these countries

have recognized the country that has a clean bureaucracy. Thus, following this

case, an effective anti-corruption strategy should reduce or remove the

opportunities for corruption, raise the salaries of civil servants and political

leaders, and ensure a high degree of policing.

20



REFERENCES

Assegaf, Ibrahim S, Rival G Ahmad, Gita P Damayana & Antonius Cahyadi

2002, "A Gloomy Picture of the Attempts to Eradicate Corruption:

Reflections of the Policies, Laws and Institutions of Corruption

Management in Indonesia, (1969- 2001)," in Richard Holloway (ed),

Stealing from the People: 16 Studies on Corruption in Indonesia. Book 1,

Corruption — From Top to Bottom, Jakarta:

Banerjee, A 1996, "Can Anything Be Done About Corruption?" in M G Quilbria

& J Malcolm Dowling (eds), Current Issues in Economic Development:

An Asian Perspective, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

BBC News 2001, "Megawati Says 'No' to Kickbacks," 16 August: http://

news.bbc.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_1493000/1493709.stm

Corruption Eradication Commission (2004). Bring Indonesia Free fromCorruption: Annual Report 2004. Jakarta: Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi

(KPK)

Gould, David J & Jose A Amaro-Reyes 1983, The Effects of Corruption on

Administrative Performance: Illustrations from Developing Countries,Washington, DC: World Bank Staff Working Papers No 580.

21



INPRES 5 and RAN PK,” Notes prepared for A Survey and Assessment of TheGovernment of Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives. Jakarta. World

Bank

Loveard, K 1999, Suharto: Indonesia's Last Sultan, Singapore: Horizon Books.

Mackie, J A C 1970, "The Commission of Four Report on Corruption," Bulletin

of Indonesian Economic Studies 6(3).

Palmier, L 1985, The Control of Bureaucratic Corruption: Case Studies in Asia, New Delhi: Allied Publishers.

Prawiro, R 1998, Indonesia's Struggle for Economic Development: Pragmatism in

Action, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Quah, Jon S T 1982, "Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: AComparative Analysis of Their Anti-Corruption Strategies," Journal of

Southeast Asian Studies, 13(1).

Quah, Jon S T 1999, "Corruption in Asian Countries: can It be Minimized?,"

Public Administration Review, 59(6).

Sen, K 2002, "The Mega Factor in Indonesian Politics: A New President or a New

Kind of Presidency?" in K Robinson & S Bessell (eds), Women in Indonesia: Gender, Equity and Development, Singapore: Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies.

Smith, Anthony L2001, "Introduction: Abdurrahman Wahid's Economic Agenda:

The Views of Leading Decision-makers and Commentators," in Anthony

L Smith (ed), Gus Durand the Indonesian Economy, Singapore: Institute

of Southeast Asian Studies.

Smith, Theodore M 1970, "Corruption, Tradition and Change," Indonesia 11.

Transparency International Indonesia (2005). Indonesian Corruption Perception

Index 2004. Jakarta: Transparency International Indonesia

United Nations Development Programme 1999, Fighting Corruption to ImproveGovernance, New York: UNDP.

Warwick, Donald P 1987, "The Effectiveness of the Indonesian Civil Service,"

Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 15(2).

World Bank (2003). Combating Corruption in Indonesia: Enhancing

Accountability for Development. Jakarta: World Bank Office Jakarta

22



World Bank (2005) A Financial Sector Agenda for Indonesia. Jakarta: World

Bank Office Jakarta. Available at http://www.worldbank.or.id.

World Bank, Justice for the Poor Program (2006). Local Government Corruption

Study —WB Collaboration Capacity Building of Anti-Corruption NGO at Local Level. Idea Note. September, 2006.

World Bank, Justice for the Poor Program (2006). Temuan Awal Penelitian

“Korupsi di Tingkat Lokal.” Power Point Presentation, October 12, 2006

Background

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was re-elected on Indonesia election July 8,

2009 as the president of Republic Indonesia for next 5 years. In this second

period, Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono partnered with Boediono to lead Indonesia

which is highly expected more directed in fighting corruption than partnered with

Jusuf Kalla in fisrt his 5 years.

http://www.worldbank.or.id/

http://www.worldbank.or.id/

figfting corruption in indonesia

Documents